

**A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE
OCTOBER 1, 1965, COUP IN
INDONESIA**

Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey

(with the assistance of Frederick P. Bunnell)

INTERIM REPORTS SERIES

**Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
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Although numerous accounts have been published of the genesis and character of the attempted October 1965 coup in Indonesia, many important aspects of that affair still remain very unclear. The fact that in most accounts so much of the picture has been painted in black and white, and in language of categorical certainty, has served only to paper over the enormous gaps in established knowledge of the event.

During the last few years transcripts of many of the political trials held in the wake of the coup have been released by the Indonesian government. The quantity is so vast that as yet none of the attempts to reconstruct the coup has evidenced a careful scrutiny and assessment of this material. But although there now exists this plethora of trial data, there are other documents of central importance which have still not been made public. Thus, both because of the sheer quantity of some of the materials and the unavailability of others, the task of any scholarly reconstruction of the events of 1965 remains enormously difficult. Nor, of course, has the political climate in Indonesia during the last six years been conducive to dispassionate research utilizing interviews with anything like a cross-section of Indonesian opinion. It will probably be some time yet before a reasonably comprehensive and sound analysis can be written.

In his present introduction to the paper here published, Professor Anderson describes the circumstances surrounding its preparation and the reasons why it was not previously published. Indeed, because of the avowedly tentative and provisional character of this early effort, there would normally be no reason to publish it any more than there would have been to publish the scores of other preliminary drafts prepared over the years by scholars working in the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project. However, this draft has been given a unique prominence. For it has been singled out by a number of those who have subsequently written accounts of the attempted coup, among whom all too many have misrepresented the authors' ideas and cited words or phrases of theirs out of context. Thus there are special reasons now for publishing this draft in its entirety--in fairness both to the authors and to all those interested in the events of 1965--so that readers can make their own assessments rather than having to rely upon doctored extracts and tendentious interpretations by writers hostile to the hypotheses advanced by its authors.

I have found myself in disagreement with some of the views presented in this paper; however, I believe that despite the limited materials available to the authors over the few months that they collected and analyzed their data, this draft, which they wrote at the end of 1965, contains a number of important insights and a considerable amount of significant data which other writers have not taken into account. Thus, those interested in understanding the attempted coup of 1965, particularly if they bear in mind the caveats of Professor Anderson's present introduction, should find this paper useful.

Over the past few years Mr. Anderson and Miss McVey have been engaged in collecting and analyzing the more recently available materials bearing on the attempted coup with the object of writing a comprehensive in-depth study of that event and its background. On the basis of the high level of scholarship evidenced in their previous publications, I expect that their study when completed will be the soundest and most comprehensive yet to appear.

George McT. Kahin

Djakarta
June 2, 1971

INTRODUCTION

In the immediate aftermath of the abortive "coup" of October 1, 1965, it was plain that a major turning-point in the history of Indonesia had occurred. But, if this was clear, virtually everything else about Lieutenant Colonel Untung's September 30th Movement was obscure, both to outside observers and to the vast majority of Indonesians. Next to nothing was known about the identity and history of Untung himself, or of his closest associates, their motives and aspirations, and their relationships to the major long-standing protagonists in the Indonesian political drama. The obscurity that surrounded Untung's movement, combined with its historic importance as the catalyst for the inauguration of military hegemony in Indonesia on the ruins of Sukarno's Guided Democracy, immediately made it the object of widespread discussion and speculation. It was in order to develop some factual basis for a more informed discussion of the September 30th Movement, and also to work out some preliminary ideas about its genesis and place in Indonesian political history, that in the last three months of 1965, Ruth McVey, Frederick Bunnell and I began to go carefully through the metropolitan and provincial Indonesian press, exchanging information as we proceeded. It soon became clear that in spite of our rather different approaches, we were coming to quite similar conclusions. The ideas we developed were presented at a number of informal seminars at Cornell University, and, while they were criticized sharply in many important respects, the response was favorable enough to encourage us to circulate them to a somewhat wider group of friends and colleagues for their information, comments and criticisms. Accordingly, Ruth McVey and I wrote up the two pieces, which together form the text that follows.

Because of the provisional character of our analyses, and because of their controversial conclusions, we asked our colleagues to treat them confidentially. At that time, January 1966, large-scale massacres were taking place in Indonesia, and it seemed not impossible that in such an atmosphere, if it became known that we had presented a hypothesis about the "coup" which ran counter to the official version, friends and acquaintances of ours, who had no knowledge of our analysis, might yet be held accountable. Our expectation that our text would remain confined to a small group of friends and colleagues soon proved to be illusory.

At least one copy was reproduced in quantity without the permission or the knowledge of ourselves and our colleagues, and was subsequently circulated in Indonesia and elsewhere. It rapidly acquired some notoriety as the so-called "Cornell Paper."

Since that time, repeated, and often highly distorted, reference has been made to this "Cornell Paper" in the growing body of literature on the Untung "coup." It is, in part, in order to rectify these distortions for the historiographic record that we are publishing the "Cornell Paper" at this late date. So that the record will be absolutely clear, no attempt has been made to improve, update or otherwise change the original text, even though, as a rough draft intended for circulation among close friends and colleagues, it contains some off-the-cuff remarks couched in an informal style which would be quite out of place in a regular academic presentation.

Historiography aside, we believe that our text has intrinsic scholarly value in itself. Since it is based in considerable degree on an intensive combing of the contemporary (September-December 1965) metropolitan and provincial press, it contains significant data which has not been published elsewhere and may be of use to other students of the October 1, 1965 Affair. This data may be the more useful insofar as no full-length scholarly study of the Affair has yet appeared, though five years have elapsed since Untung's movement collapsed.

Our text also focusses on certain aspects of Indonesian politics which have been somewhat neglected in the scholarly literature. The first of these is the political volatility and complexity of the Indonesian military. That this aspect of Indonesian politics should have been largely overlooked is all the more surprising in that the history of the Army in particular has been marked by intermittent turmoil from the moment of its formation in 1945. The July 3, 1946 Affair, the 1948 Madiun Affair, the October 17, 1952 Affair, the June 27, 1955 Affair, the August 13, 1956 Affair, the abortive November 1956 coup, the military dissidence in the Outer Islands in 1957 and the PRRI-Permesta Rebellion of 1958 represent only the major crises that the Army experienced as it transformed itself from a decentralized, popular guerrilla force into a more professional centralized ruling group. While a great deal of attention has been paid to some

of the other major actors in Indonesian politics, most notably President Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Party, no comparable attention has been devoted to the politics of the group that brought about their downfall. If our text helps to stimulate serious political and sociological study of the Indonesian military, it will have served a useful function.

Secondly, our study tentatively tries to develop a perspective on Indonesian politics which does not concentrate exclusively either on the metropolitan elite in Djakarta or on isolated provincial centers, but rather on the frequently antagonistic interaction between the two. This perspective would highlight the great cultural chasm between the Westernized, polyglot and commercial world of the capital city and the traditionalist, but often radical-populist society of the impoverished Javanese hinterland. Existing studies of Indonesian political culture have tended to stress the vertical cleavages between the santri and abangan aliran, inter-ethnic competition, or the conflict between "Javanese-aristocratic" and "Islamic-entrepreneurial" orientations. What we are suggesting here is that the rapid social and political changes that have taken place since independence have generated a new type of cleavage, in part rooted in older divisions, but primarily deriving from the ambiguous position of Djakarta as the border area between the world of the great powers and the world of rural and small-town Java. Looked at another way, we are proposing that Java is just as much a daerah (region) vis-a-vis the center as are the various Outer Islands, and that it has its own style for expressing its daerah-ist dissent.

If these are the strengths of the text as they appear to us in 1971, we are no less aware of its many weaknesses. We probably concentrated too much on events in Central Java at the expense of other provinces as well as the capital city. The text clearly suffers from a serious lack of knowledge of the internal politics of the Indonesian Air Force, Navy and Police, all of which took a hand in the crisis. Because we were primarily concerned with discovering as much as we could about Untung and his friends, we neglected to offer any extended or sophisticated analysis of the dynamics of late Guided Democracy. We paid insufficient attention to the activities of Sukarno, the Army High Command, the Communist and other major political parties, in the months prior to the "coup." The result of this concentration

on Untung and his associates is that the major groups of Indonesian politics emerge in the text surrounded with a certain aura of passivity. While it may indeed be that Sukarno, the Generals, the Communist leaders and others were as bewildered on October 1, 1965 as the text suggests, this should not obscure the fact that all of them had been engaged for months and years beforehand in complex political maneuverings which in their totality generated the situation which led Untung to act.

Furthermore, the data on which our text is based, while clearly important, are partial in their scope and do not include the great mass of material contained in the transcripts of the political trials that have been held since early 1966. Furthermore, our subsequent research on developments in the last years of Guided Democracy has convinced us that parts of our analysis were unbalanced and overly schematic. We regret that pressures of other academic commitments have so far prevented us from publishing an up-to-date analysis which would take full account of the new data now available. But it is the hope of Ruth McVey and myself that we will be able, in the not too distant future, to prepare the lengthy study that the subject deserves.

Benedict R. Anderson
Cornell University

June 1971

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PART I

The Coup of October 1, 1965

The Coup of October 1, 1965

The Conspirators

1

Their Milieu

"Forbidden to them was the land of West Java, all of it..."

- Nagarakrtagama, 16, II, 3.

The Seventh Division of the Indonesian Army, generally known as the Diponegoro Division, has always been the least approachable and most difficult to understand of the major territorial units of the Indonesian military. The reason for this is that it is the Division of Central Java, and fully reflects the complexities and withdrawn character of the civilization of this region. Like the Sixth (Siliwangi) Division in West Java and the Eighth (Brawidjaja) Division in East Java, Diponegoro is an integral part of the local landscape, and its internal structure and political tendencies closely mirror the society in which it is situated.

The most important single political fact about the region of Central Java is that unlike East Java it has no universally recognized political centre. Political power is divided between Semarang, the administrative capital, Jogjakarta, the capital of the revolutionary period, and Surakarta, the old "magical-religious" centre of Central Java.¹ In spite of Semarang's 'secular' ascendancy, it is without any moral or historical significance for the heartland Javanese, being largely Chinese and pasisir in culture, and predominantly commercial in its orientation. Jogjakarta, thanks to the great services performed by its Sultan during the nationalist revolution, forms what amounts to a province within a province, (since its Head, the Sultan himself, has equal rank with the Governor of Central Java), and largely runs its own affairs without interference from Semarang. Though the Sunanate in Solo has completely collapsed as a political entity, and Solo itself now comes directly under Semarang, the Solonese feel themselves to be the legitimate elite of Central Java, in strong rivalry with Jogja, and with considerable disdain for Semarang. These loyalties are not simply ones of municipal pride and local

1

patriotism. They also reflect powerful historical and cultural differences, which are marked externally by clear differences in speech and dress, and internally by sharp contrasts in values, lifestyle and psychology. Thus unlike the relatively harmonious and politically united areas of Priangan and East Java, Central Java is divided territorially and culturally into at least three major spheres: 1) the Pasisir residencies of Pekalongan, and Pati; 2) the Jogjakarta-oriented residencies of Banjumas, Kedu and the Special District of Jogjakarta; 3) the Residency of Surakarta.

In spite of the formal suzerainty of Semarang, every Central Javanese is aware that the old ruling class of Java was and is centred in the two royal capitals, and few if any of the dominant figures in the political structure of Central Java come from outside this area, even though they may go to work in Semarang. By what appears at first sight to be a coincidence, (but which in effect reflects closely the Javanese stereotypes of the Jogjanese and Solonese,² the "Jogjanese" have made the military their bastion of strength, while the "Solonese" have moved almost entirely into civil administration and politics. Every officer who has held the position of Central Javanese Divisional Commander has come from the "Jogja-Banjumas-Kedu" area, starting with Gatot Subroto (Banjumas) 1950-2, Bachrun (Banjumas) 1952-6, Suharto (Jogja) 1956-9, Pranoto (Jogja) 1959-61, Sarbini (Kedu) 1961-4, and Surjosumpeno (Kedu) from 1964 to the present. The former Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Army, General Sudirman, also hailed from Banjumas.³

The fact then that the dominant figures in Diponegoro politics from the start have been "Jogja" types and have stemmed from the Jogja-Kedu-Banjumas area, has not only kept leadership confined to a relatively small group, but has also influenced the types of soldier who make successful military careers in Central Java. This is all the more important since Jogjakarta itself commands great loyalty as the centre of Republican resistance to the Dutch. Most of the senior officers in the Diponegoro Division began their careers as revolutionary guerrillas, and the mystique of the revolutionary army remains very strong in this group. The ideal commander of the Diponegoro Division is a man whose revolutionary career is without blemish, and whose manner of living and command conforms most closely to the "Jogja" ideal: taciturnity, decisiveness, simplicity, directness, proven personal courage, and devotion to his men. How important this is, we shall see below.

By contrast to the other ethnic Javanese Division, Brawidjaja, Diponegoro can then be described as follows: a) it is not uncentred, but is divided territorially across three distinct cultural and political entities. b) it is not nearly as integrated into the civilian political hierarchy as in East Java, where marriage alliances through the old bupati families have preserved better civil-military relations than anywhere else in

Indonesia. c) it is located in the region of Indonesia most deeply rent by social tensions, where the population-food ratio is at its least favorable, and where accordingly Communist and anti-aristocratic sentiment is especially strong. (Whereas East Java is far more prosperous and has a pronounced Islamic character.) d) Whereas the Brawidjaja division is close to the outward-looking pasisir culture of Surabaya and Malang, Diponegoro's heart lies in the Southern, inward-looking hinterland. e) Central Java has been for centuries the seat of political power in Java. It is thus Central Java, more than East Java, which feels that its position has been usurped by Djakarta.

But it is the contrast between Diponegoro and West Java that is really most significant. It is a difference that is defined partly by the sharp psychological and cultural contrast between the Sundanese and Javanese. West Java is prosperous, exuberant, and strongly Islamic, where Central Java is poor, introspective and strongly abangan. But perhaps more importantly the officer corps of the Siliwangi division, partly because of its superior education, partly because of its location near the capital, has traditionally been internationally-oriented, speaking mostly Dutch or Indonesian, and readily adapting to metropolitan life styles and value-systems. In Bandung and Djakarta one finds a majority of officers with Westernized outlooks, expensive big-city tastes, ready access to the funds and resources of the capital, and a relatively good technical military education. In Bandung it has been possible to have an outsider as Divisional Commander (General Kawilarang from Menado), in Central Java it would always have been unthinkable.

The language of Diponegoro is Javanese, not Dutch or Indonesian. Its officers tend to regard themselves as the custodians of the asli (genuine, original) Indonesian (read-Javanese) army and its still unfinished revolutionary mission. It clings to a conception of the military man in his relationship to his subordinates and to the community which has less and less appeal in Bandung and particularly Djakarta. In the "Diponegoro" view, heavily influenced by both the experience of revolutionary war, and the communal values of Javanese culture, the good officer is Bapak (father) to his men, tied to them in a symbiotic relationship of strongly emotional loyalty and trust. He is far more than simply their commanding officer, he is also father, friend, and source of both material and spiritual sustenance. He is also deeply involved in local community life, not set apart in a "barracks career" of his own. He has responsibilities to the community which can not be defined purely in military terms.

Accordingly two general types of officer can be observed within Diponegoro, which though they can be found to some extent elsewhere, are particularly notable within its ranks. a) the

true alat negara (instrument of the state) types. Usually stemming from middle or lower prijaji (traditional literate class) families, the alat negara types have an ideal of direct service to the state in the most unpolitical sense--provided of course that the state is sufficiently Javanized to command their emotional allegiance. They are as likely to be anti-PKI (left) as anti-Islam (right), not out of clear political conviction, but because of a deep intuition that both aim at the destruction of the traditional Javanese prijaji-abangan order which defines their being. In their value-system, it is the simplicity and singleness of purpose of the Javanese satria (warrior) which is so highly esteemed or against the supposed crassness and luxury of mestizo Djakarta. b) the "Nasakom" officers. Often stemming from the village rather than the town, from the abangan or even Islamic "rakjat" rather than the traditional ruling class, the Nasakom types share some of the characteristics of the alat negara officers. But they are much more politicized, more radical, more violently (Javanese) nationalist. Metaphorically one could perhaps say that for them it is less the traditional satria than the Japanese commander of the war years who symbolizes their idea of the role of the officer. The Nasakom officers are often leftward-leaning, but in an almost purely emotional sense, without any ideological perspectives, puritanical and xenophobic, hostile to whatever appears to threaten the surging onrush of the Indonesian revolution: alien cultural influences, "modern" Djakarta em-bourgeoisement, "liberal" sexual attitudes, etc., etc. Their radicalism is more extreme - nationalist and even reactionary than progressive-revolutionary in the Communist or Socialist sense. (The parallel with the Young Officers of pre-war Japan is not at all inapposite.)

For soldiers of this kind, revolution is more drama than reconstruction, violent action rather than the transformation of institutions. Soldiering itself is less a matter of techniques and skills, than the development of moral and spiritual faculties through a kind of modernized asceticism. A good soldier is identified by the kind of man he is rather than by his effectiveness on military exercises.

The hostility between officers of this type, children of PETA and the revolution, and the "intellectual", Dutch-speaking officers of the General Staff in the capital is an old one, which existed from the day of the Indonesian Army's formation, involving as it did not simply matters of personality and personal philosophy, but the whole future of the army and the kinds of officers who would make successful careers within it. The well-known "Affair" of October 17, 1952 represented a major clash between two such groups, in which it seemed as if the "Generals" had been thoroughly defeated. Yet within a few years many of the key figures of the "Affair"--mostly notably Nasution, Parman, Azis Saleh and Taswin--were back in the highest seats of power, and their erstwhile conquerors (Lubis, Bambang Supeno, etc.) were driven from their positions into obscurity or jail.⁴

Furthermore the increasing centralization of power, funds, and prestige in Djakarta from 1956 onwards steadily widened the gap between the General Staff (SUAD) and these officers. There was a growing feeling that they were being left behind, passed over for promotions, relegated forever to the provinces, snubbed by the political officers in the capital. (Again the parallel with Japan is attractive).

With the regional crisis of 1956-1961, it appeared at first as if great changes were nevertheless under way. The Diponegoro Division gained in prestige from its share in the campaign to suppress the PRRI rebellion. There was considerable turnover at Army Headquarters of officers who had or were suspected of having regionalist sympathies. Under General Yani, a brilliant young Diponegoro officer from Magelang, then serving as first Deputy to Nasution, a new SUAD was built up, heavily Javanese, (particularly from the West of Central Java). But inevitably the officers who were gathered around Yani in Army Headquarters were the highly-educated, technically adept officers who had had considerable American training, and who fitted easily into Djakarta life. The new SUAD underwent rapid Djakartanization, and was soon effectively absorbed into the Menteng elite. The most striking example was Yani himself, who rapidly developed into almost a caricature of the "corrupted" Diponegoro officer: highly intelligent, polyglot, immensely rich, with two wives, palatial homes and several cars, close to the Americans, shrewd, cynical, anti-Communist and deft at political wheeling and dealing. Many felt that it was these qualities which had allowed him to become Commander of the Army over the heads of Generals Sarbini and Suharto, less flamboyant figures, both of whom had previously been his superior officer.

While the more technically proficient Diponegoro types tended to move to Djakarta and there become absorbed, the remainder stayed in Central Java, where for years social and economic dislocation have been developing to increasingly alarming proportions. Under Division Commander General Pranoto Reksosamudro, an alat negara type without a strong personality, many of the younger Nasakom-type officers began to come to the fore within the Division. These were influenced by the increasingly radical mood of central Java, but in their case the impulse was mainly hostility to the political Generals in Djakarta. The increasingly apparent conflict between Nasution and President Soekarno undoubtedly helped to exacerbate this radicalism, since, with all his regal paraphernalia, Soekarno commands deep loyalties particularly in East and Central Java, and in any case represents intuitive "revolutionary" Javanism as against the "rationalism" of the "problem-solving" Westernized intelligentsia.

In 1961 Nasution was responsible for the removal of General Pranoto as the Commander of the Diponegoro Division, apparently before his due term in office was over. In sharp contrast to

the usual practice, whereby the Commander's Chief of Staff moved up to replace him when he retired, (Bachrun had succeeded Subroto, Suharto Bachrun and Pranoto Suharto in this way), Pranoto's Chief of Staff, Col. Sardjono was passed over and indeed subsequently moved to an obscure post as head of the Army Historical Centre in Bandung. Pranoto's successor was General Sarbini, hitherto Commanding Officer of the Brawidjaja Division. Sarbini was an old Diponegoro man, but it was almost unprecedented for any one officer twice to be made commander of a Territorial Division. Sarbini is a tough, Nasution-minded general, and was clearly moved to Central Java, in order to put a stop to what was felt to be undesirable developments within the Diponegoro command.

If one then can picture the Diponegoro officers slowly dividing up between a "Djakarta" group making its career in Djakarta or the Outer Islands, and a Central Java group confined for the duration to the perimeter of that province, there are nevertheless a number of key officers who do not fall clearly into either category. The most important of these is General Suharto. Known for his legendary personal courage (he led the famous March 1, 1949 attack on Jogjakarta), personal simplicity, directness and soldierliness, he was nevertheless brilliant enough an officer to move out of the Diponegoro Division to assume high positions in Djakarta, first as head of the Mandala operation for the liberation of West Irian, and later of KOSTRAD (the Strategic Army Command). Though he regularly deputized for Yani when that General was out of the country, he remained aloof from the SUAD, especially its "Politburo" (Generals Parman, Suprpto, Harjono, Pandjaitan and Sutojo), confining himself to strictly military tasks. With little formal education, psychologically close to the "Diponegoro world," largely speaking and thinking in Javanese, disciplined and upright, Suharto managed to disassociate himself from the "renegade" Diponegoro men whom Djakarta had absorbed. It seems to have been this which preserved him from becoming a target of the conspirators of the September 30 Movement.

11

The Conspirators

"It was all talked over at great length,
no one feeling satisfied..."

- Nagarakrtagama, 71, II, 4.

The effective core of the September 30th Movement appears to have been a small group of "young officers" at the Semarang headquarters of the Diponegoro Division. These were 1) Col. Suherman,⁵ First Assistant to the Divisional Commander, in

charge of Intelligence and Security for Central Java. 2) Col. Marjono, Third Assistant, in charge of personnel affairs. 3) Lieut-Col. Usman Sastrodibroto, Sixth Assistant, in charge of military-controlled civilian functional groups. Though they clearly had friends and sympathizers in other cities of Central Java, as we shall see, one does not have to assume that many officers were "in the know" at the beginning. In Djakarta there were Col. A. Latief, Commander of the First Infantry Brigade of the Fifth (Djaya) Territorial Command (the post involved control of a number of mobile battalions in the city of Djakarta); Lieut.Col. Utung, Commander of the First Battalion of the Tjakrabirawa Regiment (Bodyguards to the President); Brig. Gen. M. S. Supardjo, commander of the Fourth Combat Command in Mandau, West Kalimantan, and, among a number of sympathetic Air Force officers, Flight Major Sujono, Commander of the Guard at Halim Perdana Kusumah Airbase just outside Djakarta. A larger number of junior officers was also involved as it turned out, but the abovementioned seven seem to have been the most important figures.⁶

Motivation

From the previous section it will be recalled that discontent with the General Staff and the Djakarta military was ripe in Central Java. Promotions were slow and hard to come by. Nasution himself had been in continuous charge of the Army from 1950 to 1965 except for a short break between 1953-5, while at the same time moving lower-level officers out after two-year "tours of duty." Only the top staff men had been in the same jobs for years. Hostility to what was believed to be the luxury and corruption of the Generals was widespread. Concern with the constant silent war going on between Soekarno and the SUAD probable also played a role. Suspicions of the real patriotism of the Generals, perhaps founded on memories of October 17, 1952, perhaps fanned by PKI and/or PNI whisperings about CIA contacts with senior officers, appear also to have gained considerable currency. It is probably also that many officers began to realize that from 1964 onwards the Army had been dragging its feet on the sending of troops over the Kalimantan Frontier. Unaware of or perhaps indifferent to the political and military reasons for this, the "young officers" would easily interpret this as a sign of the venality of their superiors. In such an atmosphere, with growing tension between the SUAD and the President, it was easy for such officers to persuade themselves of the danger of a coup some day by a Council of Generals, probably in foreign pay. At the very least the SUAD in their eyes was controlled by corrupt and less than patriotic elements. Untung, inside the Palace, but new to the shifting currents of intrigue and rumour there prevailing, would have been an excellent and uncritical pipeline to Central Java of the suspicions and fears being expressed in circles closest to the President.

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It is also quite possible that the group hoped to initiate a "return to the spirit of Jogja," a drive to restore the pristine purity of the revolutionary impetus of 1945. It is fairly clear that they intended to form a Revolutionary Council analogous to the Indonesian National Committees (K.N.I.) of the early Revolutionary years, to supersede the Cabinet and the provincial authorities as controlling executive bodies in Indonesia. But from the proclamations subsequently issued by the group it is evident that these "idealistic motivations" were extremely vague and confused, and were far less important than resentment, ambition, puritanism and unanchored radicalism.

The Plan

"This then was the outcome of their secret council, the essence of their deliberation, showing discernment..."

- Nagarakrtagama, 72, I, 1-2.

The basic difficulty confronting the conspiratorial group was that their strength was in Central Java, several hundred miles from the capital city, with the generally "rightist" and anti-Javanese Siliwangi Division in between. The Diponegoro Division as such had no military strength in Djakarta. The second difficulty lay in finding the means to dispose of the leading generals by surprise, since if any inkling got out of what was afoot, the plan would be easily scotched. It was here that Untung proved quite providential. Untung had been an intimate confidant of Suherman when the latter was still a Battalion Commander, and Untung himself a Company Commander.⁸ Later Untung himself became Commander of Battalion 454, normally stationed in Sron dol, some four miles outside Semarang, and in this capacity took part in the Irian campaign.⁹ Later still he became chief of Military Transport in the Diponegoro Division¹⁰ before becoming, some time early in 1965, Commander of the First Battalion of the Tjakrabirawa. With this appointment the Suherman group had a man ideally placed for their purposes, close enough to the President to be able to follow all his moves and, as part of his official job, keep an eye on possible enemies of the President. He was also in command of a crack battalion. Contact with Suherman was not difficult, particularly since Suherman, as Chief of Army Intelligence for Central Java, would be in constant contact with General Parman, his immediate staff superior, and would thus presumably come to Djakarta fairly frequently.

It was also clear that the one occasion in the year when Diponegoro troops could legitimately be in Djakarta was the annual parade and demonstration put on by paratroop, cavalry, armor and other units for Armed Forces Day October 5.

Traditionally each of the three Java Divisions sent one crack paratroop battalion to Djakarta to take part. Suherman and his colleagues on the Staff of the Diponegoro Territorial Division, particularly Col. Marjono, who was in charge of personnel, seem to have arranged that the unit sent to Djakarta for the occasion was Untung's former battalion 454, whose barracks were located at Sron dol, just outside Semarang. (It appears that contact was also made with Major Bambang Supeno, Commander of Battalion 530 (Madj un), the Brawidjaja Battalion taking part in the parade.)¹¹ Untung was also put in charge of arranging a massive "historical parade" which was to be held in Djakarta as part of the Armed Forces Day celebrations. This placed Untung directly under General Pranoto, who had overall responsibility for the whole show. The Semarang group had thus a very short space of time in which to act, roughly the two weeks in the year when Diponegoro troops were legitimately in Djakarta. There was one further advantage which the celebrations offered: all the generals aimed at would certainly be in Djakarta, and thus within reach.¹²

The essence of the coup plan, given these stringent limitations, was as follows. The Generals considered to be "political" would be the targets of carefully planned raids in the middle of the night. They would be kidnapped and later either held as hostages or killed, most probably the latter. At the same time Untung would go to Soekarno and warn him that the long awaited Generals' coup was underway, that the tanks were rolling and that he must retire with Untung to a safe place outside Djakarta, where he could be evacuated if need arose. Meanwhile Battalions 454 and 530 would seize control of the key buildings and installations in the centre of town, most particularly the Radio Station. Soekarno would then be persuaded to go on the air in support of the coup group, endorsing a Revolutionary Council of patriotic elements, who had acted to thwart a CIA-sponsored coup by the Generals. The public would be too stunned by the course of events, and the Army too decimated in its top leadership to do anything but acquiesce, provided that the authority of the Great Leader of the Revolution was lent to support the conspirators' efforts. From this point the fulfilment of the conspirators' aims would be easy enough to accomplish.

For the practical accomplishment of this rather rough plan, two difficulties had first to be solved. The first was ensuring that a suitable sanctuary be provided for Soekarno, near enough to Djakarta to allow him to be brought rapidly to the Radio Station, far enough to allow the conspirators to "persuade" him undisturbed, and where communications with Central Java could be guaranteed. The obvious choice was the Halim Perdanakusumah Air Force Base at Tjililitan, some seven miles outside Djakarta, just off the road to Bogor. For this the cooperation of some

Air Force officers was essential. Contact with certain people at the air base was therefore made, quite how we do not yet know. It may have been through Untung's contacts with Air Force officers during Combined Operations against the Dutch in West Irian. It may also have been through PGT (Air Force Paratroop) units in the Tjakrabirawa, or through some other channel. It was felt that to guarantee full and effective control of Halim, it would probably be necessary to use the authority of the Air Force Commander. Accordingly it was arranged that Air Vice-Marshal Omar Dhani would be approached at the last moment with a request for cooperation. Should he refuse or hesitate, he would be taken, gently, but firmly, against his will. Little is known about the political character of the Air Force officers involved in the coup attempt, but it is reasonably safe to assume that they were of the same general outlook as the Diponegoro conspirators, and appear to have been mainly Javanese. The Air Force had a long history of enmity with the Army, personalized in the decade-old feud between Nasution and Suryadarma. Moreover, since Omar Dhani was the Supreme Commander in charge of the North Borneo Mandala Siaga Operation in which, as mentioned before, the Army leadership had been noticeably uncooperative, it is only too likely that Air Force officers would tend to feel that the SUAD was letting them down, and allowing AURI to take the full brunt of the campaign alone. One can assume that a combination of these factors explains the presence at Halim of a small group of Air Force officers who were in on the plot, and ready to cooperate fully with Untung and his group.

The second difficulty lay in the fact that even with two "favorable" battalions in Djakarta, a certain percentage of the Tjakrabirawa behind him, and an uncertain number of troops from the First Djaya Brigade, Untung would have at the outside no more than 2,500 (admittedly crack) troops, while, according to General Umar Wirahadikusumah, Territorial Commander of the Greater Djakarta Division, some 60,000 members of the Armed Forces were stationed in the capital.¹³ It was clear that some auxiliaries would be needed to help hold all the different installations, guard Halim and carry out the kidnapping raids. Now the one group in Djakarta with minimal military training who could be absolutely relied on to help out an ostensible rescue of the President against "rightwing" Generals, would be radical youths with some military experience. These were conveniently at hand in the (mainly Communist Pemuda Rakjat) volunteers being trained since July at the Halim Airbase. If these could be mobilized, not only would the coup group's military potential be considerably strengthened, but also the PKI, once incriminated, would be virtually compelled to give any political backing that the coup group might find necessary. It would also help to persuade Sukarno that, with the PKI so compromised, he had no alternative but to go ahead and back the coup, if he was to preserve the fruits of his whole post-1959

leftward course from a violent rightwing reaction. Accordingly arrangements were probably made with the Air Force (AURI) people training these youths to have them at the ready. Since they were being trained on a regular basis, no suspicion would be aroused either in Army or PKI eyes if they were to be brought to Halim sometime during the last week of September.¹⁴

The final step that remained to be taken was to gather the remaining conspirators to their places for the crucial hours. The most important of those outside Djakarta and Semarang was Brig-Gen. Supardjo, chief of the Fourth Combat Command in West Kalimantan. He was accordingly warned to come to Djakarta by an urgent telegram saying one of his children was sick. On September 28th he left by air for Djakarta, saying nothing about his departure to anyone.¹⁵ His role, as we shall see, was to control the Palace and Radio Station during the critical hours of the seizure of power.

Now all that remained to be settled was the hour to strike. For the conspirators appear to have been convinced that once Djakarta declared for them, a chain reaction would be set off especially in Central Java, and that "young officer" elements would everywhere follow Untung's example and take power into their own hands.

It remains to be explained why the night of September 30th-October 1st was chosen for striking the actual blow. It is possible that the answer is simply the banal one that it happened to be the night when Untung himself was on night-duty at the palace, and so could act with maximum freedom. It is equally possible that the explanation lies elsewhere. A possible clue lies in the curious fact that the coup in their announcements refer to themselves as the September 30th Movement, although so far as is known, no action whatever was taken on that evening. It seems clear enough that September 30 was chosen because it was the date on which the conspirators met and took the emotional and irrevocable decision to move. One suspects that it is possibly no coincidence that the night of the 30th was also a Thursday night (Malam Djumat), a time when, in universal Javanese belief, magical forces are abroad, and spiritual strength and support most readily obtained. Malam Djumat begins at sundown on September 30th and continues till the new day breaks on October 1. It is a night for melekan, the practice of staying up all night in prayer, meditation or asceticism to draw on the power of the supernatural world. We know that on the fatal night both Mrs. Yani and General Parman, (and possibly General Suharto) were engaged in melekan.¹⁶ It is unprovable, but quite likely, that some of the coup group themselves were similarly engaged, and that the crucial decisions were taken on the basis of an intuitive inspiration arrived on that night, whether by joint agreement or with the aid of a dukun of some sort. September 30th would then have its own esoteric significance, indicating the moment of ilham or inspiration, and the decision to act upon it.

The Raids

"Now that the favorable moment had arrived, the blameless company assembled, all in order..."

- Nagarakrtagama, 64, I, 1.

The base of operations for the raids against the Generals was a training-field area called Lubang Buaja (Crocodile Hole), within the wide perimeter of the Halim Perdanakusumah Air Base, but reached by another road than the main approach leading from the Bogor Highway to the more important parts of the base. Lubang Buaja itself is about seven miles from the Presidential Palace in Djakarta. The troops who had been given the assignment of carrying out the raids seem to have included most of Untung's own Tjakra subordinates, some troops from Battalion 454, and from Latief's First Infantry Brigade as well as a few Pemuda Rakjat auxiliaries, whose function was subsequently to be confined to guard duty. All were assembled at Lubang Buaja at about 2:00 a.m., and briefed on their tasks. They were told that a Council of Generals' plot was being hatched against President Soekarno, with CIA backing, and that it was therefore essential to seize them in order to save the President and nation. The men appear to have believed this story completely. The officer directing operations seems to have been Untung's direct subordinate First Lieutenant Doel Arief.¹⁷

The troops were divided into seven units, each of which was to handle one General. These units varied in size according to which General they were assigned, those charged with seizing Nasution and Yani being rather larger than the others, since these two officers had guards outside their houses, and some resistance might therefore be expected.

Preparations were complete about 3:00 a.m., and at approximately 3:15 a.m. the seven squads set off on the 45-minute drive into Menteng, the elite residential area of Djakarta, to carry out their assignments, arriving there about 4:00 a.m.¹⁸

General Yani.¹⁹ The raiding party set off from Lubang Buaja under the command of Assistant First Lieutenant Mukidjan in two trucks and two buses, apparently numbering one and a half companies. Driving down the Djakarta Bypass, and then cutting through Djl. Rawamangun to Salemba, Djl. Diponegoro and Djl. Mangunsarkoro, they came to Yani's house on Djl. Lembang. There the group divided into three parties, one guarding the rear, one the front of the house, while the third, under the leadership of Mukidjan and Sergeant (Second Class) Raswad, entered the main courtyard and approached the house. They managed to engage the guards in conversation, telling them that they had an urgent message for Yani from the President.

Seeing their Tjakrabirawa uniforms the guards suspected nothing, until the invading group was near enough to overpower and disarm them. In answer to their knocking the door was opened by a servant, who was quickly pushed aside. Once inside the Raswad group encountered Yani's seven-year old son Eddy, who was up looking for his mother. He was sent to waken his father. When Yani emerged from his bedroom in his pajamas, Raswad told him he was urgently needed by the President. Yani asked them to wait while he bathed, but was told it was not necessary. When they also refused to allow him to change his clothes, Yani became furious and knocked one of them down. He then turned back into his room and closed the glass door behind him. Raswad then told Sergeant (Second Class) Gijadi to open fire. Seven bullets through the door killed Yani immediately. Part of the group, consisting of Raswad and Gijadi, as well as Corporal (Second Class) Djamari, Chief Private Dokrin and Private (First Class) Sudijono, dragged the body out and threw it into one of the awaiting buses. The party then hurried back via Djatinegara to Lubang Buaja, where Mukidjan reported the results of his mission to Doel Arier.

General Soeprapto.²⁰ As General Soeprapto's house was without guards, it was thought necessary to bring only a relatively small raiding party, one Toyota truckload under the leadership of Sergeants (Second Class) Sulaiman and Sukiman. There were nineteen men in all, armed with Sten guns, Garrand and Chung rifles. In spite of the fact that Soeprapto's house had been personally pointed out to Sulaiman by Doel Arief the previous evening, the group nonetheless made two false stops in Djl. Besuki before they reached the right address. Small squads were placed to the right and left of the house, while the main squad entered the front courtyard. There it split into three, the first two groups guarding the side entrances and the garage, while the third entered the house, under the direct command of Sulaiman. Unable to sleep because his molars had been removed quite recently and disturbed by the barking of his dogs, Soeprapto went to the front door in his T-shirt, sarong and sandals. Corporal (Second Class) Suparman answered his queries, by giving him a military salute and reporting that the President wanted to see him immediately. Without allowing the unfortunate General either to put on his clothes or even shut his own front door, he was hustled into the waiting truck. Mrs. Soeprapto, who had watched the scene through the window, was upset and astonished, finally coming to the conclusion that her husband was being put under arrest. She tried to leave the house but was prevented by the raiders, who also destroyed her telephone. Thereupon the attackers drove off to Lubang Buaja.

General Parman.²¹ It was about 4:00 a.m. when a group of some twenty soldiers appeared outside Parman's house in Djl.

Serang. Hearing a noise outside, the general, (who with his wife was practicing melekan), went out into the garden. He apparently thought that a robbery was being carried on at the house of his next door neighbour. Observing a group of Tjakrabirawa inside his own front courtyard, he asked them what they were doing. They answered that they had been ordered by the President to pick him up. Apparently suspecting nothing, or giving no sign of it, Parman went back into the house to change, and the main part of the raiding group followed him in. In spite of his wife's anger at what she felt to be Tjakrabirawa rudeness, Parman quietly changed into his uniform, and whispered to his wife to contact Yani immediately. He clearly thought that he was being arrested at Soekarno's orders. But as they left the Tjakrabirawa soldiers picked up the telephone and took it with them. Though Parman himself seems to have suspected what was up, he put up no resistance and was driven rapidly away to Lubang Buaja. It was not until Mrs. Harjono came weeping to Mrs. Parman fifteen minutes after the attackers had left, sobbing that her husband had been shot dead, that Mrs. Parman began to realize what had really happened. For, although she was annoyed by the behaviour of the Tjakrabirawa troops, it was the President's habit to summon the Chief of Army Intelligence at unusual hours, and till that moment she had believed that as on many previous occasions he had been summoned for a secret conference at the Palace.

General Soetojo.²² The attackers were led by Sergeant-Major Surono who had received his orders from Doel Arief in person. The group opened their assault by sealing off Djl. Sumenep where their victim lived. Next the civil defence guards on the street were disarmed one by one. Then, as in the case of the other Generals, the group divided into three squads, one each at the front and back of the house, the third charged with carrying out the kidnapping itself. They persuaded Soetojo to open his bedroom door on the excuse of bringing a letter from the President, then seized and overpowered him. He was blindfolded, with his hands tied behind his back, and pushed into an awaiting truck, which then drove rapidly back to Lubang Buaja.

General Pandjaitan.²³ Unlike the other Generals, Pandjaitan lived in the residential suburb of Kebajoran Baru, Block M, in Djl. Hasanuddin. The house, in typical Kebajoran fashion, has two stories, unlike the more old-fashioned one-storied houses of Menteng. The Pandjaitan family's bedrooms were all on the second floor. Next to the house, but within the same compound there was a small pavilion where three young male relatives lodged. Two trucks full of soldiers appeared in Djl. Hasanuddin, and parked one in front of and one behind the house. After

clearing the iron fence around the property, the attacking squad made its way into the downstairs rooms, waking up an old family servant and demanding to know where the master slept. In fear of death, the servant told them that the Pandjaitans slept upstairs. Meantime the household had been woken up. Two of Pandjaitan's young relatives, apparently thinking that the invaders were robbers, seized pistols and courageously hurried out to confront them. They were immediately shot down by the kidnapping party. One of them, Albert Silalahi, later died in the hospital from his wounds. Meanwhile, upstairs, Mrs. Pandjaitan in bewilderment asked her husband whether some kind of training was going on. Pandjaitan assured her that there was nothing of the sort. Peering down, and noting Tjakrabirawa uniforms below, he seems to have thought at first that there was a message from the Palace, but the threatening demeanour of his unexpected visitors soon convinced him of the contrary. The soldiers below were apparently nervous about venturing upstairs and loudly demanded that Pandjaitan come down. This the General refused to do. Evidently suspecting what was afoot, he first tried to telephone the police and then a neighbour and friend, Col. Samosir, but with no success-- the lines from his house had apparently been cut. He then seized a Stengun to repel the attackers, but the weapon jammed. He was only persuaded to come down when violence was threatened against his family. Once in the courtyard he again tried to escape or resist, so that, as the Catholic newspaper Kompas put it, "his attackers had no other alternative but to shoot him down." The corpse was thrown into a truck and carted swiftly off to Lubang Buaja, in spite of the widow's request that at least she be allowed to bury her dead.²⁴

General Harjono.²⁵ The attack on General Harjono's house at Djl. Prambanan 8, followed much the same pattern as those already described. An eighteen-man party under Chief Sergeant Bungkus surrounded the house. Acting on Doel Arief's instructions, the group broke up into three squads. The main squad then broke in and tried to see the sleeping General on the pretext of a Presidential summons. Harjono seems to have realized quickly that something murderous was afoot, for he ordered his wife and children to the rear of the house, switched off all the lights and waited for the soldiers to come and get him. When they entered the bedroom he tried to seize a gun from one of them, but was quickly overpowered and shot dead. Again the body was thrown into the attackers' truck and taken away to Crocodile Hole.

So far the raiders had been brutally but nevertheless wholly successful. Three of the six generals had been killed, and three captured without difficulty. But the attempt on the seventh General, Minister / Coordinator of National Defence and Security, General Abdul Haris Nasution, proved a most decisive failure.

General Nasution.²⁶ The attack on General Nasution's house was carried out in the same manner but on considerably larger scale than the other raids previously described. All in all about one hundred men were involved, brought in four trucks, one power-wagon and one Gaz (a type of power-wagon). As in the case of Soetojo, the assault group moved to seal off Djl. Teuku Umar where the General lived, and disarm any armed guards on that street. It so happened that Dr. Johannes Leimena's house (no. 36) had a three-man guard, in recognition of his status as Second Deputy Prime Minister. These guards were rapidly overcome, though one of them (from the Mobile Brigade of the Police) was killed in the scuffle. No attempt was made to enter the house or to trouble Dr. Leimena further in any way. The main objective, which was to prevent the guards at Leimena's from coming to the rescue of Nasution, two doors down at no. 40, had been successfully secured.

Out of the trucks there now poured a large troop of soldiers, some from the Tjakrabirawa, others from the First Infantry Brigade and Battalion 454, and possibly a few Pemuda Rakjat in army uniforms. The four guards in the main guard-house, or at least the two of them who were still awake, were approached by four Tjakrabirawa men, who engaged them in conversation. While their attention was thus distracted the guardhouse was surrounded by thirty assailants and the guards overpowered. A fifth guard in a so-called "monkeyhouse" lookout-post at the entrance to the driveway was similarly overpowered by a group of about thirty men. A squad of thirty penetrated the house from the rear by the long path running down between it and the pavilion by the garage. Another squad, fifteen men strong, entered by the front. Others stood around the guardhouse, while about thirty watched the street.

Inside the house the Nasutions were awake. Hearing the sound of opening doors, Mrs. Nasution went out to investigate. At the door of her bedroom she found a Tjakrabirawa soldier with drawn gun standing facing her on the opposite side of the central corridor of the house. She slammed and locked the door, immediately quite certain that someone was trying to kidnap her husband. Nasution refused to believe her, opened the door again, and only just ducked in time to avoid a burst of fire. Mrs. Nasution again locked the door, and a shoving contest ensued for control of this door between those inside the bedroom and three Tjakrabirawa led by Corporal (Second Class) Hargyono. Meantime Nasution's old mother rushed into the bedroom from her adjoining room, and burst into a loud lament, thinking her son had been wounded. Mrs. Nasution warned her not to let the assailants know that Nasution was there. Then Mardiah, Nasution's younger sister, whose room lay on the "Tjakra-held" side of the central corridor tried to run across into Nasution's room carrying Nasution's youngest daughter, Ade Irma, in her arms. As she struggled to get through the door into Nasution's bedroom,

Hargyono opened fire again, mortally wounding the little girl. Mardiah herself was hit twice in the hand. While the Tjakrabirawa still struggled with the door, Mrs. Nasution quickly led her husband out to a previously arranged escape entrance, at the side of the house, adjoining the residence of the Iraqi Ambassador (no. 38). As he began climbing over the wall, he was shot at by the soldiers behind the guardhouse. However he succeeded in scrambling over at the cost of a broken ankle and thereafter lay hidden in the garden of his foreign neighbour. The soldiers who fired at him seem to have had no idea who it was they were shooting at--probably little more than a moving shadow.

Clutching her bleeding child in her arms, Mrs. Nasution hurried to the telephone to call a doctor, but soldiers now entered from the back of the house, firing several bursts before they dared enter. They insisted that she tell them where Nasution was. She told them he was out of town, but they refused to believe her and continued to search the large house. Whistles were then heard summoning them to the front of the house, and Mrs. Nasution was not prevented from driving out with her wounded daughter and a servant to the Army Hospital.

Meanwhile in the two pavilions at the south side of the house, confusion reigned. The guard at the garage, seeing what he was up against, ran back to the chauffeurs to warn them what was afoot. Nasution's eldest daughter, Janti, hearing shots, fled to the room of Nasution's Adjutant, Lieutenant Pierre Tendeau, in the front pavilion. He told her to hide under his bed, and himself went out to meet the attackers with his Garrand rifle. He was immediately overpowered. It appears that Tendeau looked enough like Nasution in the dark to be taken for him. Though doubts were expressed by some of the soldiers, time was pressing, and accordingly they bundled Tendeau into a truck and the convoy set off for Lubang Buaja. It was just 4:08 a.m.

At 4:09 a.m. a so far untouched member of the household, Hamdan, contacted the Djakarta Territorial Commander, General Umar Wirahadikusumah, on the special KOTI communications apparatus, and warned him what had happened. About 4:30 a.m. Umar himself appeared, and shortly afterwards five tanks arrived, two to guard the house, and three to pursue the raiders who had been seen setting off in the direction of Bogor or Bekasi. A little later a contingent of marines showed up to strengthen the guard. But it was only about 6:30 a.m. that Nasution felt it was safe to make himself known, even to Umar. He was then quickly taken away to a secret hiding place, since it was felt that otherwise a second attempt would soon be made on his life. It was not till 7:00 p.m. that night that he rejoined the main body of the army.

The fleeing trucks evidently managed to evade their pursuers since they all arrived safely back at Lubang Buaja at about 5:15 a.m., to find the other squads also assembling and reporting that their missions had been successfully accomplished.

The Dupes Arrive at Halim

"In the stories that one hears there may be much that is false..."

- Nagarakrtagama, 39, III, 2.

Simultaneously with the raids on the houses of the Generals, Untung's forces, particularly the paratroop battalions 454 and 530 were fanning out in the centre of the town and seizing control of the most important installations, above all the Palace and the Radio Station. Telephone lines were cut at Gambir Station and armed guards were set up at important intersections. In some places armed Pemuda Rakjat boys, issued arms by the Air Force,²⁷ helped eke out shortages in better-trained manpower. Within a very short time the centre of the city was under the control of the conspirators.

In another part of town, a rather different manoeuvre was taking place, namely the polite "couping" of Air Vice-Marshal Omar Dhani, Commander of the Indonesian Air Force. We have already seen how there was a long history of Army-Air Force rivalry and dislike, dating back at least to the inglorious role of Air-Marshal Surjadarma in the fall of Jogjakarta on December 19, 1948. It has been suggested also that these enmities were fed by the equivocal support provided for Air Force leadership of the North Borneo campaign. We should not forget also that it was Nasution and the Navy who forced the retirement of Marshal Surjadarma after the Arafura Sea affair, in January, 1962, when Air Force "negligence" had caused the death of Rear-Admiral Jos Sudarso at the hands of the Dutch.

The succession of Omar Dhani to the post of Air Force Commander had scarcely improved the situation. Though not closely identified with the Surjadarma group, he was above all a creature of the President, without strong character or powerful personal following. Since he depended completely on the President for his position, he was generally amenable to Presidential influence. At least from late 1964 onwards, it was clear that in public at least the Air Force under his leadership was making conscious advances to the "left", evincing no open hostility to the idea of Nasakomization of its officer corps, and giving public approval to the idea of a Fifth Force of Volunteers, outside the existing four Armed Services.²⁸ Moreover SERBAUD, the union of Air Force Department Workers, was an important constituent element in the SOBSI Federation of Trade Unions, and clearly under PKI influence. The contrast

with Army reactions to Presidential pushing on these questions was striking, and it was no secret that the SUAD had little use for Dhani and his group. At the same time Dhani was notorious in Djakarta for his luxurious "Solonese" style of living, "feudal" background and indecisiveness.

Thus while the top Air Force leadership could in no sense be regarded as "leftist", institutional rivalry with the Army, personal feuds, the political weakness of Omar Dhani, and the manoeuvrings of the President had created a situation where the Air Force could be counted in the Presidential camp in the struggle with the Army. And below the top levels one found a stratum of officers very much of the Untung mentality, though possibly more genuinely leftist in their orientation. In any case a combination of these factors led the Air Force to work out an arrangement with the PKI, sometime in the summer of 1965, whereby AURI would give field training to some lower-level PKI cadres.²⁹ Candidates were apparently selected by the local PKI chiefs, and the volunteers signed up for training on party instructions. Training began in early July and continued up until the eve of October 1st.³⁰ In many circles it was commented that the Air Force command was preparing to reach an accomodation with the PKI along the lines laid down by President Soekarno.

Untung's contact with AURI elements appears to have been typically with officers of equivalent rank, Flight Majors and Colonels. Little is known about them, but among the most important was Flight Major Sujono, who was in charge of units guarding Halim Air Base.³¹ It appears to have been decided that to retain control both of Halim and other key airfields in Java (particularly Adisutjipto in Jogjakarta, Panasan in Solo, and Maospati near Madiun), it would be essential to have the cooperation (or at least the formal endorsement) of the Air Force Commander. Accordingly, as part of the coup plans, a group of middle-level Air Force officers approached Dhani on the night of the raids, probably about 2:00 a.m., to try to persuade him to go along with them. From subsequent events, it can be inferred that Dhani hesitated, demurred, and/or asked to talk to the President. It is also possible that he was not consulted at all, but was simply told the same story that was told to other dupes that night--namely that the SUAD had begun to move and that he was on the list of designated victims. In any case at about 3:00 a.m., as the trucks began to leave Lubang Buaja for their kidnapping missions, Dhani was picked up by AURI personnel and taken out to Halim, to seal the conspirators' control of the bases by his "authoritative" presence.³²

In his first radio announcement, Untung was later to make the very curious statement that he had not only saved the President, but had also taken under his protection "a number of prominent people in the Indonesian community who would have been after

targets of the Council of Generals."³³ Evidence that has subsequently come to light makes it clear that these "prominent" people were at least two in number: Omar Dhani and Dipa Nusantara Aidit, Chairman of the PKI.³⁴ It seems clear that Aidit, like Dhani, was picked up to serve the purposes of the coup group. The likeliest probability is that he was fetched by Tjakrabirawa officers at about 3:00 a.m. from his home, told that a coup had started and that the President wanted him to join him at Halim immediately. Suspecting nothing, the PKI leader obeyed the summons and was hurried out to Halim. The presence of Aidit at Halim was most important for the coup group. In the first place it placed the leadership of the powerful Communist Party under their direct control, so that subsequently there would be no possibility of the PKI taking unwanted advantage of the situation, and turn the activities of the conspirators to their own profit. In the second place, Aidit's presence at the airbase would serve as a massive lever in helping Soekarno to go along with the plans of the conspirators, since a) it would serve to confirm the genuineness of the alleged "Council of Generals" coup and the "sincerity" of Untung and his friends and b) it would prove to the President that the PKI was inextricably compromised in the affair, and therefore that if he wished to preserve his "leftward course", Nasakom, and the Revolution, he had no alternative but to come out in their favour. As we shall see in the course of subsequent developments, the policy of the conspirators towards the PKI was simple and consistent: compromise the PKI vis-a-vis the President, make use of it in the critical initial hours of the coup, and never for one moment allow it to assume either the political or military initiative.

The third major dupe of the conspirators was the President himself. After his televised speech to the National Conference of Technicians at Senajan Stadium, on the evening of the 30th, the President made his way to the house of his Japanese wife, Dewi, which is situated on Djl. Gatot Subroto, about half way between Djakarta and Kebajoran.³⁵ Untung came to him there and told him that the palace had been surrounded by troops of the Council of Generals, that a coup was underway, and that it would be best if he went immediately to Halim Airbase, where he could be sure of being able to leave for a safe place should it prove necessary. One story even has it that Soekarno was driven near enough to the Palace to see for himself the "strange" troops surrounding it (actually of course Untung's men) and was sufficiently convinced to be persuaded to hurry off to Halim with Untung.³⁶

Subsequent events allow one to assume that Col. Sabur, Commander of the Tjakrabirawa Regiment, was also routed out of bed, and hurried to the airbase on the same pretext as the others, again without time to check, verify or even clarify his own ignorance.³⁷ And so it was that Soekarno, Dhani, Aidit and Sabur were assembled at the Airbase, probably at the quarters

of Air Commodore Susanto, Director of Air Force Operations,³⁸ in any case at some distance (about one mile it seems) from the place of execution of the Generals who had survived the raids.

Halim

Murders and Discussions: The Strategy of the Coup

"Crowded were the women, old and young, taking up their places, close packed, on the great open field...their hearts were excited and rejoicing, as though they were seeing such a thing for the first time. Not to be described was their conduct..."

- Nagarakrtagama, 84, VI, 4
and VII, 1-2.

It appeared now that all the cards were in the conspirators' hands: the military, the PKI and the President. It remained simply to play them. The generals had finally to be liquidated, the PKI compromised and the President persuaded.

The first two objectives were accomplished swiftly and in one stroke. The generals who were still alive were done to death, and people from PKI-affiliated associations (Gerwani and Pemuda Rakjat) were involved in the killings. Confessions extracted by the Army from those alleged to have been involved in the killings, give extremely varied descriptions of what actually occurred and when the deaths took place. Times that are given vary between shortly after 5:30 a.m. and 8:00 a.m.³⁹ Almost all of the "confesseees" were people who had been receiving military training at Lubang Buaja on a regular basis for the past two months, and who indeed had been at the base at least since September 28 carrying out their normal exercises. The routine had evidently been established that they would be picked up from their homes in trucks, lodged in tents at Lubang Buaja for the duration of the training period, and then taken home again in the same way.⁴⁰

As we have seen the coup group was seriously undermanned, most of the regular soldiers and the Tjakrabirawa being needed for the raids and for the control of the central parts of the city. Although there were apparently some FGT (Air Force Paratroopers) available, and Flight Major Sujono of the coup group had control of the Air Base Guard, it was logical and useful to use the local trainees at the base to flesh out the defence of the base, should any difficulties develop.⁴¹ Being leftist in orientation they could be relied on fully to support any moves being made against the "Generals," particularly if they

were told that they were acting to defend the President. This seems indeed to be what happened.⁴²

The trainees were woken up early on the morning of October 1st, and told to prepare to receive emergency orders. When the trucks arrived bringing the six generals and Tendean, the final disposition of the victims began. The corpses of Pandjaitan, Yani and Harjono were thrown down a thirty foot deep well. (Part at least of the damaged condition of their exhumed bodies can be attributed to this summary burial). The remaining three were spat on and humiliated by the Gerwani and Pemuda Rakjat people, who had been told that they were enemies of the President. Soeprapto was shot in the back by Private (First Class) Nurchajan as he stood by the edge of the well. Further shots were fired at the body as it lay on top of the others at the bottom of the well. This was done in ritual fashion, the example being set by Corporal (Second Class) Djauri, who was then followed by various volunteers.⁴³ Parman was shot in the back by Private (First Class) Athanasius Buang, at the orders of Sergeant (Second Class) Sulaiman, who had led the raid on Soeprapto's house. He was then finished off with three further shots, and his body dumped down the well.⁴⁴ Soetojo seems to have been shot to death in similar fashion.⁴⁵ Details on the death of Tendean are less clear and consistent, but what seems to have happened was that he was first badly beaten up, and then as he lay on the ground (possibly already dead), Gerwani girls, most of them still teenagers, were issued razors and knives, lined up, and told each to take their turn at having a slash.⁴⁶ At least one of the confesseees, a three-month pregnant mother, fifteen years old, from Patjitan, said afterwards that she was not told who the victims were, in fact was slapped in the mouth by an AURI Sergeant when she had the temerity to ask.⁴⁷ Once the generals were disposed of into the well, the hole was filled in with leaves and rubbish, and the group dispersed back to its tents, with orders to await further instructions.

It is evident that these youths and girls were brought into the act entirely without (their) previous knowledge of what was in the wind. This seems also to have been true of the Pemuda Rakjat people who were drawn into the raiding parties.⁴⁸ The alleged 'ritualistic aspects' of the murders of the Generals, including choral singing of the old Pesindo song Darah Rakjat by more than a hundred Gerwani women, indicates that the whole scenario was designed as a "bleeding" of these ignorant wretches.⁴⁹ As suggested before, the motive for drawing in the Gerwani and Pemuda Rakjat was to incriminate and compromise the PKI, while at the same time remaining in complete control of the operation any not permitting the PKI any "patriotic" public posturing. Since the training of these people was part of an established program, set up on a routine basis between AURI and the PKI, there was no reason for the participants to

suspect that what they were being told to do was not part of PKI instructions. They had no reason to suspect the motives of their trainers, nor the danger of a provocation. It was precisely the routine nature of the training periods, and the strict instructions given by party leaders to cooperate fully with the AURI people, which permitted them to be drawn blindly into the affair.

One suspects that the PKI once again made the regrettable error of believing that they were so much more intelligent than the military that it would always be they who would use the military, and not vice versa. It was a mistake which they had already made in North Sumatra in December 1956 and in West Sumatra after the PRRI rebellion, but the lessons do not seem to have been taken to heart.⁵⁰ Untung and his group were able to make every use of the PKI that they wished, without once allowing the PKI or its constituent units to comprehend what was going on. The PKI's vaunted discipline was thus successfully turned against it. The conspirators cut successfully into the line of hierarchy and effectively assumed control of these lower cadres without anyone being the wiser.

While the final solution was being applied to the unfortunate generals by the unfortunate Gerwani and Pemuda Rakjat under the supervision of AURI sergeants at Lubang Buaja, the third objective of the conspirators--the winning over of Soekarno--was being pursued less than a mile away.

It has been suggested that the overriding aim of the coup group was to gain legitimation from the highest fountain of political authority in Indonesia--the President's mouth. It was essential to put out a proclamation of some sort as soon as possible, outlining the objectives of the coup group, their grievances against the Generals, and their position vis-a-vis the President. This being the case--and it would be true for any group in Indonesia attempting a coup de force--one would have expected that when the conspirators made their first public statement, they would, regardless of the facts, have claimed that they were acting on orders from Soekarno, to preserve Soekarno, to thwart Soekarno's enemies and to develop Soekarno's revolutionary program for Indonesia. Yet, almost incredibly, when the group did finally go on the air at just after 7:00 a.m., Soekarno's name was scarcely mentioned except for the fact that he had been taken to a safe place by members of his bodyguard. Now since it is inconceivable that any coup group of whatever colouring would not try to make maximal use of Soekarno's authority to swing public support behind them, the only credible explanation for this startling omission is that it was agreed upon between Soekarno and the conspirators.⁵¹ This in itself tells one a good deal about the relationship between the President and his "benevolent" kid-nappers, and the character of the discussions that took place between them.

Soekarno must have been willing to cooperate with the plans of the conspirators or at least have expressed sufficient willingness to persuade Untung to take the kind of personal responsibility that he did in his initial broadcast.⁵² The President clearly must have held out the promise of making a subsequent broadcast announcing his reassumption of power, and endorsing the aims of the coup group. But at the same time, he would have told Untung that it would look much better if he, Soekarno, was not directly associated with the removal of the Generals. It must be made clear to the outside world that an attack on Soekarno had been the objective of a dastardly "CIA-Generals" plot, and would certainly have fallen victim, had it not been for the decisive preventative action taken on his behalf by the loyal Tjakrabirawa.

The question then arises: why did Soekarno cooperate with Untung at all? It seems obvious that he was desperately concerned to gain time. Confused and uncertain not only about the events of the previous night, but about the nature of political reactions outside the airbase, he desperately needed to re-establish contact with the outside world, and develop a clearer picture of the real situation. One must imagine a situation very close that in Rengasdengklok on August 16, 1945, when once before the President had been politely kidnapped by a group of wild-eyed history-makers, who tried to pressure him into making a crucial decision. The example may well have been prominent in the minds of Untung and his associates, and they have been made sanguine by the successful outcome of the previous abduction of the President--the Proclamation of Independence.

But it was not purely the effort to gain time which urged Soekarno to offer cooperation to the coup leaders, though it was very important. One must not forget that till considerably later in the day the coup group virtually monopolized the President's sources of information. In the absence of alternative interpretations, Soekarno had little choice but to base his calculation of political advantage on the probability that his bodyguard was telling him the truth. Moreover, much of Untung's story must have been only too credible to the President. The existence of a CIA plot would not in the least surprise a man who since 1958 had repeatedly warned of precisely this danger. (Indeed he had been the target of a CIA plot in 1958). Nor would Soekarno find anything strange in his specially trained, heavily indoctrinated and deeply loyal Tjakrabirawa taking action on their own if they learned of a threat to the President's life. That his political enemies on the General Staff had (as Untung would have told him) "resisted" arrest would only confirm a picture of their basic disloyalty. And while the killing of the Generals was perhaps regrettable personally, the President could not have been entirely displeased to learn that the main political obstacle to the full implementation of his leftward plans for Indonesia's future had been eliminated.

Instinctively he would have sensed the advantages that could be won by exploiting this unexpected windfall. The possibility of doing this successfully must have seemed all the more inviting since we can assume that the faithful Untung did not report the one disastrous mistake that had been made--the failure to catch and kill Nasution. This was a mistake Soekarno must have bewailed every day since October 1.

But it was not only the fact that Untung controlled the only sources of information which the President was receiving that helped him to persuade Soekarno to cooperate. Another important lever lay at hand in the person of D. N. Aidit. As suggested above, the coup group did not bring Aidit to Halim to mobilize PKI support for the September 30th Movement. No effort was made to publicize his presence at Halim. No PKI demonstrations were encouraged or even permitted. No contact was allowed, as we shall see, between the incarcerated PKI chief, and his confused, bewildered party subordinates just a few miles away in Djakarta. The real reason for bringing Aidit to Halim was not to buy public support, but to use against Soekarno's anticipated tergiversations. Not only would Aidit's presence at Halim confirm in Soekarno's eyes the sincerity and genuineness of the coup group in their desire to protect the state from the machinations of the Generals--since the President would see no reason to believe Aidit and Untung in a plot together--but it would also make him realize that the affair could no longer be confined within the limits of the Indonesian Army.⁵³ The ante would now be raised immensely. With the PKI unequivocally involved, the fate of Soekarno's Nasakom design for the future was at stake. Should rightwing elements in the army get a chance to rally and strike back, civil war might well result. Once convinced that the stakes were this high, Soekarno would have little choice but to act quickly and legitimize Untung's actions with the blessing of the Great Leader of the Revolution. Such was the benefit which Aidit's presence at Halim seemed to offer to the conspirators.

The psychological "cards" were thus heavily stacked against the elderly President in the early hours of October 1. Without outside sources of information (Untung would have told him it was still too dangerous to venture into the city), impressed by the "evidence" of a CIA-Generals' plot, confronted by Aidit's bewildered (and bewildering) presence, by the facts of Pemuda Rakjat participation in the security of the capital, perhaps even in the arrests of the generals, and most important of all the deaths of those generals, what was the President to do? Knowing that so much was at stake, possibly his life, certainly his life's work (as he would think of it), should revanchist elements in the Army (especially the regional commanders) gain an opportunity to rally, the impulse to try to take advantage of Untung's actions and capitalize on the temporary decapitation of the Army high command must have been very strong. The possibility of buying "moderate" army support by strategic

promotions to the top jobs in General Staff must have seemed quite promising. Undoubtedly there were dangers involved in taking this course, but the dangers involved in doing nothing or withdrawing were evidently far greater, threatening the collapse of his whole position and even civil war.

It is important to stress once again that Soekarno was really without any independent sources of information about what was happening even within the perimeter of the air base. He was still forced to rely on Untung, and though as the hours passed his concern with the reliability of Untung's story may have increased, he had nowhere else to turn: the initiative was still almost wholly in Untung's hands (as in 1945 it had been in the hands of Sukarni, Wikana and Chaerul Saleh). He also had no reason to suppose that Untung was acting against him. Indeed he had clearly acted against Soekarno's main political enemies. It must also have seemed as if, almost unbelievably, Untung had managed to pull the whole thing off.

And so a deal, highly volatile in character, was arranged. Soekarno's own natural caution and unwillingness to be directly associated with the arrests and deaths, made him insist that his name be given minimal prominence in the initial proclamation. (He also desperately needed time to think and plan, to bring events once again under his control). At the same time, though he must have been increasingly aware that a kind of pro-Soekarno coup was in progress, he also realized that to gain some ascendancy over the conspirators' and to prevent them dragging him into further actions over which he had no control, he must clearly indicate his willingness to cooperate. This would be the only way to make sure that Untung would take personal responsibility for the initial broadcasts. It seems probable that in exchange for this, he promised Untung that he would ultimately reemerge and give his blessing to the September 30th Movement. On their side, the conspirators certainly did not want to antagonize him unnecessarily, provided they could be assured of his ultimate cooperation. One must remember too that in their minds they were acting in a sense for Soekarno, and therefore had no reason to suspect him of anything more than hesitancy and timorousness. Furthermore, as in the Rengasdengklok affair, the coup group were hampered by the fact that Soekarno was essential to their plans, that he was well aware of this, and that therefore their effective purchase over him was clearly limited. Thus the compromise that found expression in the early morning broadcast of the September 30th Movement, was an excellent mirror of the power relationships between the President and the coup leaders at that time.

The Coup Proceeds: Alarms and Excursions

"To attain these ends he tried all political ways and means..."

- Nagarakrtagama, 44, I, 4.

Once the compromise had been reached, a courier was dispatched to the centre of Djakarta, with a text of the September 30th Movement's opening Proclamation.⁵⁴ With the RRI (Radio) Djakarta building in the hands of the coup group, there were no difficulties about broadcasting their message. Nonetheless they were forced to wait until 7:00 a.m., because it was only at that hour, by standard routine, that all local radio stations in Indonesia go off the air and relay central Djakarta news bulletins. This would be the first opportunity to get news of the coup spread rapidly and "officially" across the archipelago to actual and potential allies of the conspirators', particularly in Central Java. As we shall see the RRI announcements were the signal for Col. Suherman and his friends in Central Java to take control in Semarang and later in Salatiga, Solo and Jogjakarta.

The text of the First Proclamation is a superb reflection of the political thinking of the coup group: a fantastic blend of "rightist" ideological slogans, personal grudges, moralistic radicalism, and muddled obscurity. In accordance with the deal worked out with the President, Untung (actually Untung's spokesman) assumed full personal responsibility for what he called preventive action against a plot by a Generals' Council in the pay of the CIA to seize power from President Soekarno, by using the unusual concentration of military power in Djakarta for Armed Forces Day as their instrument. He mentioned that the Generals involved had been arrested, that President Soekarno had been taken to safety, as well as a number of prominent persons in the community who would have been the targets of the Generals' plot.

Untung repeatedly stressed that the September 30th Movement was purely and simply an internal Army affair (as indeed it was) and that therefore all political parties, mass organizations, newspapers and periodicals might continue their usual functions for the time being. No attempt was made to impose any form of press control, nor indeed any particular mobilization of the press.⁵⁵

Untung also announced the formation of a Revolutionary Council (whose personnel remained as yet unnamed) which would "carry out the decisions of the MPRS and the DPRGR" -- clearly then a body somewhat like KOTI, as it has emerged subsequent to October 1st! No mention was made of the Cabinet.⁵⁶

The level of political sophistication of the Djakarta plotters at least was revealed by the curious paragraph on foreign policy, which stated inter alia that Indonesia's "free and active" foreign policy would continue unchanged. ("Free and active" has been "out" as an obsolete, "liberal" attribute of Indonesia's foreign policy for some time now!)⁵⁷

The emotional heart of the proclamation however was its concluding section, when the deep hostility of the coup group to the General Staff was openly expressed. The accusations levelled against the Generals --aside from the CIA charges-- were oddly non-political: they lived in great luxury, neglected their subordinates, and humiliated women. There was nothing about workers and peasants, almost nothing about Malaysia,-- simply the resentment of the "young officers" against their "corrupted" superiors.

Meanwhile back at Halim, the task of keeping up the pressure on the President continued. A major step forward was reached when Omar Dhani was induced, at about 9:30 a.m., to sign an official AURI proclamation expressing full support for the September 30th Movement and offering AURI's help in "cleaning up" any other branch of the Armed Forces which seemed to need it.⁵⁸ We must assume that Dhani agreed to sign this announcement because he believed that the President was about to come out for the coup leaders. Once this was done, however, the President was even more "in a box" since, should the coup still not work out, it would pit Air Force and Army against one another, with all kinds of disastrous perspectives looming ahead. Though the evidence is not clear it seems that the President was able to hold back public issuance of the announcement till after he made his own promised re-emergence. In any case the AURI's public support for the coup was not broadcast over RRI till 3:30 p.m.⁵⁹ that afternoon though there was no physical obstacle to this being done. We shall see below why the AURI statement was finally broadcast when it was.

The Pranoto Appointment

"They discussed who it should be from the Army who should succeed to the position of the honoured Apatih..."

- Nagarakrtagama, 71, II, 3.

As the morning passed Soekarno increasingly realized that events were slipping out from under him, that he had lost most of the initiative, and that he was increasingly being involved in a movement over which he had minimal control. He desperately needed outside information and contact with his normal circle of advisors. (Subandrio, Chaerul Saleh, Ali Sastroamidjojo and Njoto were all out of town and inaccessible.) He was also increasingly concerned to bring some sort of order out of an apparent chaos. But there was no effective way to resume contact with the outside world except with the cooperation of Untung and his friends. Accordingly in the talks that continued at Halim, Soekarno and the coup leaders turned to discussing the next public announcements to be made, the question

of setting up a Revolutionary Council on the lines proposed by the September 30th Movement to act as an emergency executive, the problem of finding a new army leadership, and the contacting of civilian leaders of various political complexions. While some members of the coup group were assigned to the drafting of a supplementary proclamation (already promised in the 7:00 a.m. broadcast), the main point of discussion was the central one of the new army leadership.

From Untung's description of the key Generals who had been removed from the scene, it was clear to Soekarno that the choice open to him for a successor to Yani acceptable to himself, the coup group and the army in general, was extremely limited. Of the senior Army officers still alive, Generals Mursid, Gintings, and Adjie, were strongly rightwing, anti-Communist and had no connections with Diponegoro. This left four possibilities open: Generals Sarbini, Suharto, Umar Wirahadikusumah and Pranoto Reksosamudro.

General Sarbini, Minister for Veterans' Affairs, while possibly acceptable to the coup group, was not so to Soekarno, since he was a strong Moslem and close to Nasution. These would outweigh the advantages of being a former Diponegoro Commander.

General Suharto, KOSTRAD Commander, would again probably be acceptable to the coup group⁶⁰ but Soekarno would have reason to distrust his independent-mindedness and powerful personality.⁶¹

General Umar Wirahadikusumah, the Djakarta Territorial Commander, would probably be acceptable to Soekarno, but as a Sundanese from the Siliwangi Division, and without great personal authority, he would not be likely to be wholly agreeable to the coup group.

General Pranoto Reksosamudro, Third Assistant to the Minister/Commander of the Army, seems to have fitted the bill perfectly. A former Diponegoro Commander, reserved and unambitious, with a simple-soldier image, without strong enemies, amenable to both the wishes of Soekarno and the coup group, he must have seemed the ideal choice. His political ideology, such as it was, moved along strongly Javanese nationalist lines with mystical overtones.

Provisional agreement seems to have thus been reached between Soekarno and his "rescuers" about the army leadership. Soekarno made it clear that in the crucial days ahead it would be essential to antagonize the powerful Territorial Commanders in the Outer Islands as little as possible. Should any one but a well-respected senior officer take control at the centre, the consequences in Army circles in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi might be disastrous. No one would feel threatened by

a man like Pranoto. Furthermore, for the interim, the President himself would assume direct control of the Army, leaving Pranoto as a sort of care-taker head of the General Staff. This would allow further room for manoeuvre and discussion should the Territorial Commanders and other important army figures prove obstreperous. Pranoto could later be replaced if necessary (or confirmed) according to political developments, without anyone (except perhaps Pranoto) losing much face.⁶²

Having made this agreement it was obviously essential to get into contact with Pranoto, and, should he prove unavailable, with the second most acceptable figure, the Djakarta Territorial Commander, General Umar. Couriers had to be sent out to contact these men. Soekarno was able to take the opportunity to insist that contact also be made with the more important political figures in Djakarta, as well as the remaining Service Chiefs. (Once again, the parallel with 1945 is remarkable: in that crisis too, Soekarno refused to move till he had made contact with older generation political friends and advisors like Subardjo, Iwa Kusumasumantri, etc.) Short of actually arresting the President, which the coup group were clearly unwilling to do, there was little that they could say to gainsay this proposal. They still had not won the crucial proclamation from Soekarno. Moreover the coup leaders still had no real reason to doubt Soekarno's sincerity--or the solidity of their control over the city of Djakarta. Once again a compromise was arranged. On the one hand, messengers would be permitted to go out of the base, but on the other a further proclamation would be made in which the President would publicly "re-emerge."

Accordingly Presidential couriers began to move back into the bewildered city, some going to the Palace, others to the homes of Leimena, Umar, Pranoto, Martadinata (Minister/Commander of the Navy) and Sutjipto Judodihardjo (Minister/Commander of the Police). These men were all summoned to Halim for round-table consultations.⁶³ One of the couriers (from the Tjakrabirawa) also found his way to General Suharto at KOSTRAD Headquarters. As we shall see below, this courier and the exchange of messages that he delivered was to prove the turning point of the September 30th affair, precipitating the whole collapse of the coup and the apparently irrevocable disintegration of the President's hitherto unassailable personal prestige and almost magical aura.

At the same time it was arranged that a special message would be put out over Djakarta radio (RRI), stating that the President was safe and well, and continued to hold the top leadership of the state. The statement, which was broadcast at 1:15 p.m. that afternoon, was read out in the Tjakrabirawa Headquarters behind the Presidential Palace by Col. Marokeh Santoso, deputy to General Sabur, the Tjakrabirawa Regimental Commander. It was signed by Sabur himself.⁶⁴

The significance of the announcement was immense. It foreshadowed the re-emergence of Soekarno behind the coup, just as the coup leaders had hoped. Issued over the personal signature of Soekarno's trusted security chief, it carried far more weight than anything that Untung himself could say. It made it absolutely clear that Soekarno was not the victim of any sort of coup, indeed that he was presumably in agreement with what had been done.⁶⁵ From Soekarno's own personal point of view, the announcement was of great importance: a) it served to indicate to the public that the President was again assuming the political initiative, that he was not a prisoner of events b) being issued over Sabur's signature it would indicate that it was not an "Untung" announcement, thus that the President and Untung were not necessarily completely in league. c) Inasmuch as no reference was made directly to the coup or any events connected with it, it did not yet specifically commit the President to anything concrete, thus giving him further time to explore and negotiate.

Thus at 1:15 p.m., when the Sabur announcement was broadcast (one assumes that it was written and signed about 12:30 p.m.) we find the situation at Halim as follows:

1) The six Generals arrested early that morning have been killed. Soekarno has been told of their deaths, but almost certainly not the precise manner of their dying. He has probably not been told of the survival of Nasution.

2) The Air Force, under Omar Dhani, has been induced to sign a proclamation of support for the September 30th Movement.

3) A broadcast has been made over the Untung-controlled Radio announcing the arrest of CIA-suborned Generals, the rescue of the President and other prominent political figures from the clutches of the Generals, the formation of a so far rather vague Revolutionary Council as supreme executive, and the promise of further announcements.

4) A further announcement has been made over the Untung-controlled Radio assuring the population that Soekarno is safe and well and continues to hold the top leadership of the state--implying strongly that he approves of what the September 30th Movement has done, or at least that he is not its victim.

5) After consultations with the coup group, Dhani and possibly Leimena, Martadinata and Sutjipto Judodihardjo, a provisional decree has been issued by Soekarno appointing General Pranoto as temporary caretaker of the Army under Soekarno's direct supervision.

6) Members of the coup group are busy preparing a second proclamation of the September 30th Movement, naming the members of the Revolutionary Council and detailing the broad outlines of the political and military solution that they wish to have implemented.

The Counter Coup⁶⁵

"It is clear that one meets with disasters if one opposes his orders, or makes a mistake in carrying out the set task..."

- Nagarakrtagama, 92, II, 3.

The first actual anti-coup manoeuvres began at about 4:30 a.m. It was then that in response to a message delivered from Nasution's house by one of his aides, General Umar Wirahadikusumah appeared at Djl. Teuku Umar, with five tanks of the Seventh Cavalry Battalion which he had summoned to the spot. As previously described, after learning what he could of the events which had transpired at Nasution's house, he sent three of the tanks off in pursuit of the attackers, who had evidently vanished down the main Salemba-Matraman Raja road in the direction of either Bekasi or Bogor. By 5:00 a.m. this pursuit had been abandoned as useless. Shortly thereafter Umar proceeded to the palace, but finding it in strange hands, thought it the wiser course to retire either to his own house or to some other safe place.⁶⁷ Nasution himself remained hiding with his broken ankle in the garden of the Iraqi Ambassador till after seven o'clock, not even revealing himself to Umar, when that worthy general appeared on the scene. His injuries were apparently bad enough to put him completely out of the picture for that and some days following, and he took no further part in the events that followed. Of the remaining generals of strong character and influence only Suharto and Sarbini remained active and at large.

It was apparently about 5:30 a.m. that Suharto was woken up by neighbours who told him that something serious had happened, namely that seven generals, Omar Dhani and Leimena had been kidnapped by parties unknown. Shots had been heard, and the neighbours felt it their duty to report to him as he was head of the local Rukun Tetangga.⁶⁸ Shortly afterwards an unnamed General, a colleague of Suharto's, came to his house and confirmed the news. Suharto then took the crucial decision to assume personal command of the Army himself. Acting in the best professional manner, once he learned that Yani was "out of commission," and that thus he was the most senior officer in the Army still at large, he climbed into his still chauffeurless jeep and drove off to KOSTRAD headquarters near Tjidjantung, arriving there sometime between 6:30 and 7:00 a.m. Suharto found KOSTRAD headquarters still quite unaware of what had happened. The officers who had assembled there were reporting for normal duty, probably in relation to the early morning rehearsal of the military manoeuvres scheduled for Armed Forces Day to be held at Senajan Stadium.

The first step to be taken was to find out what had really happened to the vanished generals and what the situation in

Djakarta was as a whole. While discussions continued, the first Untung broadcast came over the air, partly adding to the confusion, but also giving some clue as to what was afoot. Suharto's immediate reaction was to try to discover what ramifications the affair had, where President Soekarno stood, and as he put himself "who was friend and who was foe." Suharto started to get in contact with the various armed service units in Djakarta. He first called Umar, and got from him a report on what seemed to have happened, including the important fact that Umar had been to the palace and found it occupied by army units acting at the behest (apparently) of Brig.Gen. Supardjo. In his subsequent account of events, Suharto reported that this in itself was a shock to him, since Supardjo, as Commander of the Fourth Combat Command in West Kalimantan (Mandau), was not supposed to be in Djakarta at all, and if he had found it necessary to come should certainly have reported himself to his superior officer, the Mandala Siaga Deputy Commander, General Suharto himself.

Having little idea of the real ramifications of the coup forces, but by now fairly certain that a coup was under way,⁶⁹ Suharto told Umar that he was assuming supreme command of the army, to which Umar assented, probably thankfully. He further ordered Umar to confine all troops of the Fifth (Djaya) Territorial Command to barracks; if any officers or troops had to go out of their barracks they were to do so in civilian clothes and leaving their weapons behind.

From this moment the outlines of Suharto's general strategy were clear. His first effort was to avoid hasty action and try to locate and isolate his enemy. Secondly he was concerned to limit possible bloodshed, and to settle the whole matter in the traditional manner of the Indonesian army--by a combination of bluff, threat, negotiation and cajolement.

Having secured Umar's cooperation, Suharto then contacted the Naval command in the person of Admiral Muljadi, First Deputy to the Minister/Commander of the Navy and, like Suharto, a Deputy Commander of the Mandala Siaga Command. He explained the situation to Muljadi and won assurances of help. The navy stood fully behind the army, and was willing to put what forces it had in Djakarta under Suharto's control. Muljadi also agreed to come to KOSTRAD Headquarters himself, to act as general liaison. A similar arrangement was made with the Police. The Commander of the Djakarta Police, Brig. Gen. Sawarno Tjokrodiningrat, like Umar and Muljadi, agreed to confine his men to barracks, keeping them off the streets until the affair was settled.

It was with the Air Force that Suharto immediately experienced difficulties. Just exactly what form these took is not altogether clear. In the other three cases the Services

contacted immediately agreed to send liaison officers to KOSTRAD Headquarters. The AURI people, whether at AURI headquarters or at Halim Airbase, were either in the plot, in the dark, or felt so insecure that they refused fully to cooperate with Suharto.⁷⁰ One gets the impression that Suharto got the "run-around," evasive answers, or possibly no answer at all. Accordingly he decided to send couriers to Halim airbase, probably not so much suspecting that Halim was the centre of "enemy" activities as because Halim, being about three miles away from KOSTRAD Headquarters was the nearest important Air Force installation. This mission had no success, but Suharto did eventually make some kind of personal contact with Air Commodore Leo Wattimena, another former colleague from the Irian Barat campaign; but even here there seem to have been evasions and obstructions. By this time, however, Suharto began to discern that the Air Force was a major element in the forces opposing him, and that therefore Halim must be an important centre of "enemy" strength.

Shortly afterwards Suharto got definite word that Nasution was safe, though injured, and that contrary to earlier reports Dhani had not been kidnapped but had merely been "taken under the protection" of his own men.

Meantime in Djakarta, General Sarbini, the Minister of Veterans' Affairs, heard the Untung broadcast while having his breakfast. He immediately tried to call the Palace, Army Headquarters and KOSTRAD but in each case got no reply (the Central Telephone Exchange was in the hands of the coup group and some of the main lines had been cut). Annoyed rather than anything else, he drove off to the Palace determined, as he put it, to warn Untung against "fooling around with the state!"⁷¹ He managed to avoid the armed units on guard and entered the Palace compound by Djl. Veteran. There he found a number of high officials, including Brig. Gen. Rubijono, former police chief Sukarno Djojonegoro (who had apparently come to fulfil breakfast engagements with the President⁷²) and Brig. Gen. Supardjo. Sarbini immediately asked Supardjo where the President was and where was Untung? Supardjo answered that the President was inside, adding, rather feebly, "What Untung?" Evidently alarmed by the presence (and suspicious attitude) of one of the Army's best known and most popular generals within speaking distance of the troops of the crucial Diponegoro Battalion 454, Supardjo went inside the palace in order to arrange for Sarbini's arrest. But a Military Police officer in the Tjakrabirawa unit on guard at the palace entrance came to Sarbini, identified himself as an old Diponegoro man, and told him that the President had left early that morning. He warned Sarbini that he would be arrested by Supardjo if he stayed. Sarbini, after first being enraged by what he regarded as a junior officer's impertinence, had the presence of mind finally to take the hint. He jumped into a jeep and drove off to his

Ministry. Supardjo sent two jeep-loads of Tjakrabirawa troops after him, but he managed to evade them by changing vehicles and eventually found his way to KOSTRAD Headquarters.

Meantime Suharto was methodically proceeding to isolate the units with which he had to deal. From descriptions of the insignia on the uniforms of the soldiers that Umar and others had observed at the key installations in the centre of the city, he was able to identify these units as paratroop battalions 454 (from Sron dol) and 530 (from Madiun). As noted previously, these two units had been brought into Djakarta for the Armed Forces Day celebrations, and Suharto himself as part of his normal duties as KOSTRAD Commander had personally inspected them the day before. Indeed they were supposed to be taking part in the demonstration rehearsal which, as mentioned before, was due to take place at Senajan at 7:00 a.m. Contact was thereupon made with Senajan, and Suharto demanded to know from the Brigade Commander in charge what was going on. The Brigade Commander answered that all the other participants had already presented themselves at the parade ground, including cavalry, tank, armor and other units, particularly the crack Siliwangi paratroop battalion, Kudjang 328. Only Battalions 454 and 530 were missing.

Suharto had now established that, at the outside, the forces he had still to deal with consisted of about 1500 trained commandos, plus an undetermined number of Tjakrabirawa, and what few trained soldiers AURI could muster.

Since at least the paratroop units had previously served under him during the Irian campaign and since he was also fortunate enough to have with him at KOSTRAD Headquarters both Major General Basuki Rachmat, the Commander of the Brawidjaja Division under which battalion 530 fell, and Brigadier General Sobirin Mochtar, Commander of the Central Kalimantan Territorial Division and an old Brawidjaja man, Suharto was now able to begin the complicated but "traditional" TNI process of undermining the unity of these units by opening negotiations with different levels of command within them. He was able to discover that whereas the component units of these two battalions were stationed at different key points around Merdeka Square, the commanders of the units themselves, Captain Sukirno (454) and Major Bambang Supeno (530), were inside the Palace itself, apparently either engaged in discussions with General Supardjo or waiting for telephone orders from Halim. The company commanders and the deputy battalion commanders were approached by special emissaries of Suharto, in each case higher officers who had at one time commanded these two battalions or parts of them.³ The strategy was to counteract the loyalty these troops felt to Sukirno, Bambang Supeno and Untung, and persuade them to come over to the anti-coup side. The details of these negotiations have not been made fully clear. Apparently the

main difficulty that Suharto faced at first was that he still did not know for sure where Soekarno was or what his role in the affair could have been, so that it was difficult to persuade the units round the palace that they were not in fact guarding the President from the forces of the supposed Council of Generals. He did have much more success with 530 than with 454. Battalion 454 was, as we have seen, much more closely linked to the "Semarang group," and the numbers of its officers "in the know" seems to have been considerably greater than was the case with Battalion 530. Sobirin Muchtar was sent with some other well-known Brawidjaja officers to talk to the Battalion 530 guardposts. Staying out of sight of the Palace, they moved from group to group, cajoling and cursing in typical Surabaya slang. Eventually almost all the men agreed to "come over", and on Sobirin Muchtar's instructions drifted imperceptibly away from their posts, little by little. They then assembled at an agreed spot, climbed into their trucks and drove off to present themselves to Suharto.⁷⁴ As we shall see Suharto was later successful in using them against the other coup forces, and against the armed Pemuda Rakjat.

It seems to have been at this crucial juncture that the Presidential couriers began to reach Djakarta. They evidently persuaded Leimena to make his pilgrimage out to Halim. Soekarno's emissaries also contacted Umar and Pranoto. We do not know what happened in Pranoto's case, but it is clear that the summons to Umar was politely rejected. It seems likely that Umar simply referred the couriers to Suharto, saying that he was now acting under Suharto's orders. The couriers then moved on to Suharto's headquarters and asked him to send Pranoto and Umar to Halim as the President wished to see them.

This was the crux of the whole coup affair:

- a) It told Suharto where the President was--at the Halim Air Base, the main centre of AURI strength in Djakarta.
- b) It told Suharto that the President knew about the missing generals, since he had particularly summoned two of the few top generals who had not been kidnapped. (It is doubtful if at this point Suharto knew that Sukarno was proposing to appoint one of them to the leadership of the army).
- c) It told Suharto that the President was not a prisoner in any strict sense, that he had the liberty to send messengers into the city, and therefore his relationship to Untung was ambiguous, to say the least.
- d) The possibility of the President's being deeply involved in the kidnappings was now wide open. Probably by this time Suharto already knew that at least some of his colleagues were dead. Indeed Suharto is frank enough to state that "because of my suspicions I refused to permit these generals to go to Halim, thinking that we had already lost quite enough of our generals." (The implication of course is that Pranoto was at KOSTRAD by this time, or at least was available, for Suharto to be in a position to refuse to let him go to Halim.)

It is clear from the reports of the murders of the Generals, particularly of the arrests of Harjono and Parman, that they immediately suspected that they were being arrested on Palace orders. Harjono even went so far as to cry out that he was about to be murdered. We can readily believe that with relations between the Palace and SUAD being as difficult as they were, the staff officers must frequently have informally discussed among themselves whether they might not one day find themselves arrested by the President. Suharto would certainly not have been ignorant of these conversations. Being himself convinced of the impossibility of there being a Generals' Council, Suharto was now in the possession of the crucial information he needed to take full command of the situation. He was now in a position to withdraw significant portions of Battalion 454 away from the coup group (see below), to surround and isolate Soekarno's retreat, and destroy the coup forces in Djakarta. This is exactly what he proceeded to do.

To the other side, the courier's errand was of equal moment. When the Tjakrabirawa emissary returned to Halim with Suharto's flat refusal to allow Pranoto or Umar to show up at Halim, the whole psychological atmosphere at the airbase changed. 1) It was now apparent that the erstwhile "neutral" Suharto, a formidable soldier in his own right, had not only declared against the conspirators but had effectively neutralized all other high army officers who could be used to cover up the Untung coup. Moreover the actual power relations in Djakarta were at the very least in the balance, and probably, to Soekarno's shrewd eye, already hopeless, since Untung had now lost the element of surprise which had first favoured the coup attempt. The Djakarta command was in "enemy hands." Probably other couriers soon began returning with the news that the Police and Navy were also effectively with the opposition. Moreover the anti-coup group now knew the President's whereabouts, so that it could be expected that moves would soon be made against the Airbase. On the other hand the fact that Suharto, not Nasution, was in command, must have relieved everyone at Halim, and perhaps persuaded them that a) Nasution was dead indeed b) negotiations with the opposite side might have some chance of success. 2) Soekarno now knew that he had immediately to rid himself of Untung at all costs and disassociate himself from the coup group as far as possible. The whole gamble had failed. If the Territorial Commanders were behind Suharto he was likely to prove a formidable adversary. Obviously Suharto would probably suspect him of having engineered the whole thing. He was also now acutely aware that the Army, unless it could somehow be divided and/or placated, might well use the whole affair to destroy at least the PKI's, and probably his own authority--as well as the whole political structure which he had worked since 1958 to develop. Moreover civil war, which he had always struggled to avoid--at least the horrifying civil war of aliran against aliran, rather than within the elite--was now staring him in the face. 3) The Untung people now also realized that

things had begun to turn radically against them, and that the chances of getting Soekarno to cooperate fully were by now remote. It is in the light of this sudden reversal of the situation as precipitated by the return of the couriers that we must interpret what follows, namely the extraordinary broadcasts of 2:00 p.m. and 3:30 p.m.

In their 2:00 p.m. broadcast the Untung group shifted their ground considerably.⁷⁵ For the first time it became clear that the Revolutionary Council would assume a dominant role, apparently replacing the old Cabinet and furthermore (in a sense) replacing the full functions of the President.⁷⁶ Muddle and ineptness are not only revealed in the constitutional 'conception' but also in the listed membership of the Council itself, in which the most extraordinary spectrum of unlikely characters is assembled, ranging from the very radical Pemuda Rakjat figure Sukatno to the ultra anti-PKI figure Brig. Gen. Amir Machmud, Commander of the South Kalimantan Territorial Division.⁷⁷ Not only is the composition itself extremely eccentric, but the order of the names clearly indicate extreme haste: mnemonic clusters (top armed service leaders, top youth front leaders, top journalists) are interspersed quite helter-skelter with cronies of the coup group like Latief, Sujono, Suherman, etc. Important names which could have been expected to be on the Council--men like Ali Sastrohamidjojo, Idham Chalid, Pranoto, Sungkono, etc. are omitted, while figures like Generals Solichin, Ryacudu, Umar and Basuki Rachmat are included who could not have seriously been expected to back the coup attempt.⁷⁸

Above all the new status of the Revolutionary Council, the naming of five obscure coup-group officers to its 5-man Presidium and the foolish virtual exclusion of Soekarno when it was still in the coup group's interest to make maximum use of the President's name, indicate a panicked reaction to the turn of events. The main aim seems to have been to try to compensate for the President's growing unwillingness to cooperate, by eliciting support from "outside" groups within the society.⁷⁹

The subsequent broadcasting at 3:30 p.m. of Dhani's 9:30 a.m. statement of support for the coup group, which had probably been held back earlier at Soekarno's insistence, can be explained in the same way.⁸⁰ It was now no longer in the conspirators' interests to claim that what had happened was simply an internal army matter. It was essential to broaden the whole issue into a national question, in which as many groups as possible were drawn in on their side against the Suharto forces. Soekarno was as important as ever to the Untung people, but in a different way; it was probably beginning to dawn on some of them that Soekarno, who earlier that morning had been needed mainly to add legitimacy to the coup d'etat, would now be needed to pull the chestnuts out of the fire and do what could be done to protect the coup leaders and reach a political settlement.

This new strength in Soekarno's position vis-a-vis Untung, which was largely a function of the changed power relations in Djakarta but even more of his growing comprehension of what had happened, was reflected in the "rescuing" of Soekarno's children from within the palace, where they had been "confined" all day.⁸¹ At about 4:00 p.m. they were brought out to Halim (apparently via Kebajoran), and from there flown to Bandung, out of harm's way.⁸² It is clear that Soekarno felt at this point that the Palace would not stay much longer in Untung's hands, and that the children had to be removed before the Army took over there, in which case either the children might suffer or they might be used against him.

Meanwhile Suharto had taken advantage of the new information that he possessed about the President to make a final and apparently largely successful attempt to break up the rebel front at the palace.⁸³ Contact was maintained with the company commanders of Battalion 454 (possibly parts of Battalion 530 too-- the times are not absolutely certain). In the dialogue that ensued the emissaries of Suharto urged the company commanders to go into the palace to check whether the President was really there, or whether they had been deceived and manipulated into guarding an empty building the whole day. Apparently this was a successful manoeuvre, at least when combined with appeals to army loyalty and (more concretely) with a time limit which Suharto gave to Battalion 454 to be out of the Palace grounds. For reasons which are not clear, but probably because a struggle for authority over the troops was going on between the Company Commanders and their superior officers, the deadline was passed without Battalion 454 having taken a final decision. Some were apparently about to go over to Suharto; others, however, decided that they were too deeply involved to withdraw at this point. In any case, by late afternoon, Suharto's subtle and patient negotiations had borne fruit. By 3:30 at least, Battalion 530 was finally fully in his hands, and by 6:00 p.m. some of Battalion 454. The rest had begun withdrawing towards Halim. Since 4:30 a.m. no blood had been shed, except by the well in Lubang Buaja.

As the withdrawal of these troops proceeded (apparently unhindered by Suharto, who was only too happy to have the centre of the city cleared without violence), a new armed force appeared on the scene. Armed Pemuda--mostly Pemuda Rakjat--emerged at the south end of Merdeka Square, apparently entirely ignorant of all the negotiations that had been going on. Near the site of the National Front building, which they were apparently supposed to guard, they encountered the 530 Battalion, which had by now changed sides. To their surprise the Battalion, which they warmly welcomed, abruptly disarmed and arrested them.⁸⁴ They surrendered without a fight, and clearly played no significant part in the silent struggle for Djakarta that day. Their role in the whole affair, like that of the PKI,

seems to have been that of the myopic pedestrian who thinking he sees a green light, steps off the curb and is flattened by a garbage-truck he never even sees.

Meanwhile in Djakarta as a whole, the atmosphere seems to have been almost normal, of course with a good deal of scurrying to and fro. The streets around the palace were sealed off, but otherwise people went about their regular business, though rumours about the events of the previous night circulated fast and furiously. For lack of Suharto's special sources of information, a general atmosphere of doubt, anxiety, confusion and tension persisted. Forced to rely exclusively on the radio, and largely unaware of the silent battle for control of the armed units around the palace, the public divided largely on the basis of what it felt could be expected from a group which had apparently seized power against the SUAD, and which later on announced as supreme revolutionary authority a group whose general composition seemed, in spite of glaring eccentricities, to be left-nationalist in orientation. We have no real indication what the individual reactions of important officials was, but clearly the general response in anti-SUAD circles was excitement and pleasure, mixed with varying degrees of doubt and surprise. Among those who trusted the SUAD to protect them from the Revolution, fear and dismay prevailed. Nevertheless, until Soekarno himself took to the air, it was evident that no one's doubts would be completely set at rest.

The first public reactions to the radio broadcasts were the afternoon edition of Antara and the evening papers which appeared on the streets about 4:00 p.m.⁸⁵ It is evident that these newspapers received from Antara an Untung hand-out or text of the various proclamations, since they do not vary from paper to paper. The leftist papers clearly expressed the general mood in "outsider" leftist circles--there was factual reproduction of the Untung broadcasts, and in the cases of the Baperki newspaper Warta Bhakti and the PKI-oriented Ekonomi Nasional and Kebudayaan Baru rather routine cartoons castigating the Generals' Council, as well as various other problems and blights on the Indonesian landscape.⁸⁶ But the mood was still cautious. Editorial comment was not yet forthcoming. Clearly no one on the left yet knew what was really happening. No one had yet seen Aidit. Lukman and Sakirman were in central Java. Njoto was in Medan. Probably the infectious enthusiasm of PKI-bandwagoning journalists of the PNI "left" like A. Karim DP and Satyagraha (typically clamorous "inside-dopesters") who immediately and far less cautiously than the PKI⁸⁷ decided that the coup was a clear blow for "progress," had its effect. For the leftwing journalists without these "inside" contacts with the elite, the activities of Karim and his friends and their open jubilation must have been very convincing.⁸⁸ Even the incorrigibly opportunist and timid PNI went so far as to come out with a statement which in spite of some ambiguities clearly indicated its approval.⁸⁹

In spite of this journalistic activity, however, the civilian population of Djakarta had almost no idea of what was really going on. Nor did the civilian politicians and party representatives take any important or decisive part in the entire course of the coup and its collapse. This striking characteristic was to appear again in the pattern of events in the major cities of central Java which fell under the control of the "Semarang" conspirators.

At 6:00 p.m. or shortly thereafter the Untung controlled radio went off the air for good.⁹⁰ Apparently once again there was no bloodshed. Suharto seems to have given the coup people in the RRI building a time-ultimatum, insisting that they clear out before 7:00 p.m. or they would be expelled by force. He seems to have assured them that they could either surrender personally to him, or proceed to Halim without let or hindrance. Coincident with this, General Umar issued orders assuming complete control of all news media, "to prevent confused rumours and tendentious reporting" on the activities of the coup group.⁹¹ By 7:00 p.m. all main installations in and around the centre of Djakarta had been brought under Suharto's control, and all hostile troops had been withdrawn from the city. A few shots were still to be exchanged but they seem to have been with luckless Pemuda who were still wandering about, without any idea of what was happening or what they should be doing. The RPKAD units brought in by Suharto from Tjidjantung made short work of them, and perhaps of a few stray Tjakrabirawa figures who may have felt too deeply implicated to surrender, or some who never got the chance to do so through a breakdown in communications among the various rebel units.

Soekarno Abandons Halim

"As the Prince went out, to continue on his way, those that stayed behind looked after him, longingly..."

- Nagarakrtagama, 33, III, 2.

The remains of the Untung group were now concentrated at the Halim airbase, very conscious of the fact that Suharto was closing in on them. When RRI finally went off the air, it must have been quite clear that the rebel cause was lost, at least in Djakarta. Several very important decisions now had to be taken. Untung himself could expect no mercy at the Army's hands, and, therefore, must either have been in despair or hoping that somehow Soekarno could still save the situation. It must have already been mooted that the whole group leave for Central Java, where Untung would know that Semarang, at least, and very possibly several other areas were under rebel control. One must assume that he pressed this alternative very strongly on

the President. Diponegoro was in their hands, a stand could be made in Central Java. Suharto would surely never risk civil war there, and perhaps some kind of deal or arrangement could be made. If Leimena was still at Halim we can assume that he would have been likely to argue as strongly as he was able in the other direction. One can imagine possibly that he would have urged Soekarno to do his best to prevent further violence and bloodshed, and to start negotiations with Suharto. He may have warned the President that flight to Central Java would confirm the Army's worst suspicions, that possibly the US might intervene, and that any such move would force Suharto to bring the Army out in open conflict against him. Supposing Aidit himself still to be available, we may suppose, from his subsequent actions, and the whole line of the PKI which we have sketched above, that he would have urged immediate Soekarno intervention to prevent the beginning of violent repression against the PKI. He would undoubtedly foresee the destruction of the party unless it could be immediately made absolutely clear that the PKI was not planning any kind of seizure of power, that it abided fully by the President's decisions, that it was not encouraging anti-army activities, that it continued to trust to peaceful methods, and that it would do its best to restrain its lower level people from taking any kind of provocative or violent steps. One can assume that the Air Force top brass, at least Dhani (and perhaps Wattimena if he was there), came round to this general course of action, feeling again, in typically "Djakarta" fashion that it might still be possible to talk one's way to a not too disastrous solution, and that some arrangement might still be worked out with the army. One may assume that none of the parties concerned knew the precise details of the Generals' deaths.

The picture that develops of what occurred at Halim from about 4:00 p.m. onward is one in which the Djakarta elite began to take the leadership once again and the "outsider" coup elements moved into the background. Leimena, Dhani, Aidit, probably Sabur, and certainly Soekarno himself began to regain their normal ascendancy, while the Untungs, Heru's and Sujono's were increasingly left out of the key decisions, whose scope now went far beyond what they were capable of effectively handling. However, it still seemed impossible to make a decision until there was definite news a) from Suharto and b) from Central Java. Accordingly another courier was sent to Suharto, one of the President's personal adjutants. He seems to have reached Suharto at about 8:00 p.m., at any rate well before Suharto's first address over the radio at 9:00 p.m.

Suharto himself later gave a brief description of what passed between himself and the adjutant. He said the adjutant asked him how the situation was (read: What are you going to do next? What do you know?) and what should he, the adjutant, do now (read: what steps can we take that would facilitate a deal?). Suharto related that he told the adjutant in no uncertain terms that it was essential to move Soekarno from Halim

(read: a message was sent back that if Soekarno was not out of Halim by a certain hour Suharto would come in and get him. Moreover that so long as Soekarno was in "rebel" hands no discussions of any kind were possible.) Probably, too, in the light of what subsequently occurred Suharto may have warned Soekarno not to leave for Central Java, but to go to neutral territory--his palace at Bogor. The emissary returned to the base shortly thereafter.

At roughly the same time, we must assume that messages began coming into Halim from Central Java that the Radio Stations in Jogjakarta, and Semarang were now in rebel hands, and that therefore the situation in Central Java was very critical.⁹² Djakarta was lost, but Central Java was now theirs. Central Java appeared to be in the hands of Col. Suherman, who since his seizure of power in Semarang had assumed control of the division, or as much of it as was prepared to accept his leadership.⁹³ Soekarno was now faced with the critical decision of where to go. Should he defy Suharto's orders and go to Central Java, clearly the President would be bound finally to throw in his lot with the Untung group. There he could denounce Suharto as an agent of the CIA, but he would thereby challenge not only Suharto and Umar but also large portions of the police, the navy and most of the West Javanese Army. All chance of effective contact with the Outer Islands would vanish, and Soekarno's own position would be destroyed, unless in the subsequent civil war he could be sure of victory. Moreover, once out of Djakarta he would be completely in the hands of the Suherman group, away from all his trusted confidants and the Djakarta political milieu he understood and could dominate. He would be in the middle of a world of violence whose consequences he could not predict and over which he would have little or no control. The military odds against ultimate success would also be very slim indeed, especially as foreign intervention was quite likely in such a situation. On the other hand, should he decide to go to Bogor he would be beginning the necessary process of disassociating himself with the coup forces, he would be able to act as a fully free agent, and start using his diplomacy, personal authority, skill at negotiation and intrigue to find a political rather than a military settlement to the situation. The Suharto ultimatum must have also given him further food for uneasy thought. The President has never been particularly noted for his physical as opposed to moral courage. He can not have been sure that Suharto might not just come in and "unluckily" destroy the President in the process of destroying the rebels. Suharto certainly had the physical power to do so. Nor could Soekarno be certain that if he left by air for Central Java the plane would not be shot down.

Now if he was to take the decision not to go to Central Java, but to retire for the moment to Bogor, and thus play the

cards of diplomacy and political manoeuvring rather than the cards of military violence, it would be absolutely essential that the Central Java situation be brought under control, that especially the Air Force and the PKI be prevented from taking any precipitate action which would start the civil war which Soekarno had so long attempted to prevent, and which his approaching decision to leave for Bogor was also intended to help avoid. So far as anyone knew, the Central Java situation was as Untung and Suherman had planned it, a silent bloodless coup within the army, without as yet any further political consequences. But no one could tell what the ultimate consequences of the initial Djakarta broadcasts and the subsequent ones from Radio Semarang, Radio Jogjakarta and Radio Solo might be.

Accordingly the decision was taken to accept Suharto's ultimatum. Soekarno would leave at once for Bogor, while Aidit and Dhani would fly to Central Java to hold the Air Force and PKI in line there. Leimena would probably be sent to Suharto or at least into the city to begin contacts with political groups there. It is not certain what was told to Suharto. One doubts that Soekarno thought it wise to tell him that Aidit was at Halim, since this would only stimulate suspicions of "PKI masterminding," and further complicate the situation before it had a chance to be partly remedied.

The question then remained what was to be done with Untung. Soekarno's position was now very strong, if only vis-a-vis the wretched Lieutenant-Colonel. One can imagine him saying something like the following: "Look, we have lost control of Djakarta, and Suharto is going to attack the base very shortly. I am not going to Central Java on any account. It would start a civil war which I do not want. You can kill me if you wish, but I will not go." It would be a bluff but with every chance of success. Untung had never intended any violence against the President, and presumably did not wish to begin at this point. He could not be sure that he would get the cooperation of his men to kidnap Soekarno and push him to a plane, should the President choose to resist. Moreover, violence against the President would have eliminated his last chance of saving anything from the situation. He had so clearly bungled things in Djakarta that his own confidence in his ability to handle the situation must by now have been very low. Probably to persuade him not to make difficulties the President promised to do all that he could to protect him and his group and to arrange a political settlement, but only on condition that the President be permitted to leave, and that Untung himself not attempt to precipitate any more violence. It is very likely that here Brig. Gen. Sabur was of considerable importance, effectively shifting the loyalty of the Tjakrabirawa units from Untung back to himself and Soekarno. This may have been the djasa (merit) for which the Army later rewarded him.

In his subsequent public statements, Soekarno has repeatedly emphasized his "freedom of action" throughout the day at Halim, and that he had gone there of his own free will to avoid the threat of "undesirable events" in Djakarta.⁹⁴ Not only is this in part a real reflection of events, and of his own deep suspicion of the General Staff, it also underlines his persistent attempt to prevent the Army from using him and his supposed "arrest" by first the coup group and (a bit later) "vicious PKI elements" to destroy the Communist party. The President has been concerned at all costs not to allow the Army to make it look as if the already "implicated" PKI had taken action against the President rather than against the SUAD. While he has been desperately anxious to regain control of the Army he has been equally anxious (and this is perhaps the deepest part of his dilemma) not to allow himself to be made use of by the Army more than could be helped. These two objectives have been contradictory from the beginning. One aim requires that he accommodate the army and try to regain its confidence. The other requires that he distance himself as far as possible from it, and retain maximum freedom of manoeuvre. The combination of these two has evidently proved beyond the powers of even this extraordinarily flexible individual.

General Sabur later stated that Soekarno finally left Halim of his own free will about 10:30 p.m., October 1, reaching Bogor shortly after midnight.⁹⁵ We have it from Suharto, however, that actually the President reached Bogor by 10:00 p.m., which would mean that he would have had to leave Halim (by helicopter) about 9:00 p.m. or (by car) at about 8:30 p.m. Suharto made the further point that he telephoned a trusted aide in Bogor, a certain Col. Alex, to go to the palace and check personally to see if Soekarno had really arrived.⁹⁶ Subsequently Col. Sarwo Edhie, chief of the RPKAD, was sent to Bogor to make quite certain that Soekarno was not only there but that he would be in no position to move off again anywhere else. Col. Sarwo Edhie arrived there about 10:30 p.m.⁹⁷ It seems fairly clear that the times given in Soekarno's statement were designed to disassociate his leaving Halim from Suharto's radio speech of 9:00 p.m., and thus to repudiate the idea that he was in any sense forced by Suharto to go to Bogor.

Once certain that Soekarno was at least out of Halim--one can assume that Suharto was at once informed of this by Sabur or someone else at the air base--the self-appointed Army Commander was able to go onto the air and make the crucial announcement that Soekarno was "safe and well" (read: in Army hands), that Nasution was alive and with the Army, and that Suharto himself had assumed leadership of the Army.⁹⁸ An Army information centre announcement added that Suharto had the full co-operation of the Navy and Police in restoring security.⁹⁹ Significantly, no mention was made of AURI, nor, supposing that Suharto knew about it, of the Pranoto appointment. This sequence explains why, although Suharto regained control of the RRI

about 7:00, he himself did not go on to the air until 9:00 p.m., when he was assured that Soekarno was out of Halim and safely in his, not Untung's hands.

The struggle for Djakarta was now essentially over, and the centre of the problem now shifted to Central Java. Here there were four main loci of activity--Semarang, Salatiga, Jogjakarta and Solo.

Central Java

"The whole of Java was filled with the greatest fear and terror..."

- Nagarakrtagama, 40, VI, 1.

Semarang

As the headquarters of the Untung-Suherman group was in any case the Divisional Headquarters Command in Semarang it was hardly surprising that this was the first place at which the coup group struck. Apparently the initial Untung broadcast was the signal for action to take place, and very shortly thereafter Col. Suherman, Chief of Army Intelligence for Central Java, acting in close collaboration with Col. Marjono, chief of personnel and Lieut. Col. Usman Sastrodibroto, bureau chief for civil-military political relations, seized control of Divisional Headquarters and placed the Commander of the Division, General Surjosumpeno, under arrest. Suherman then took over command of the division, at least in name. This occurred in the midmorning of October 1, about the time that Suharto was beginning to assemble his forces in KOSTRAD Headquarters. Almost immediately, however, Suherman made his gravest mistake. Surjosumpeno was able to trick impressionable younger officers into leaving him alone long enough to allow him to make his escape from Divisional Headquarters.¹⁰⁰ From there he fled southwards out of Semarang, finding the city otherwise fully in rebel hands. He made his way directly to Magelang, where the Military Academy is located, and where army manoeuvres are usually held. It is one of the few cities in Central Java where the military completely dominate the relatively small civilian population, since community life revolves largely around the army installations there. In Magelang he was able to make successful contact with local army officers, and joined forces with the Second Cavalry (Tank) Battalion stationed there under Lieut. Col. Jasin Hussain. The question then became whether an attempt should be made to retake Divisional Headquarters in Semarang or find some safer base of operations.¹⁰¹ At this point it appears that an emissary arrived from Jogjakarta, in the person of Lieut. Col. Sugijono Mangunwijoto, chief of staff of the 72nd Military Resort, the regimental

command covering Solo, Jogjakarta, and Kedu (Magelang), to say that Jogjakarta was still secure and in the hands of Col. Katamso Darmokusumo, the Commander of the 72nd Military Resort. He urged the General to move down to Jogjakarta and make it the base of his operations. But after some further discussion Surjosumpeno decided to try to retake Semarang. Meanwhile orders were given to Sugijono to return to Jogjakarta.¹⁰²

Salatiga

In Salatiga that same morning, the Commander of the 73rd Military Resort (Pati and Surakarta), Col. Sukardi, and the Commander of the Salatiga Military District, Lieut. Col. Sugiman, were arrested at the orders of Lieut. Col. Idris, Sukardi's Chief of Staff. The main force at the coup group's disposal was Battalion 448 stationed just outside the town on the road to Kopeng. There were also Civil Defence units active in auxiliary capacity. No blood was shed at all, though evidently a few kidnappings of officers thought unfriendly to the new commander of the 73rd Military Resort took place. The whole coup was a purely military affair without civilian or party participation.¹⁰³

Jogjakarta

Meantime in Jogjakarta¹⁰⁴ the situation was deteriorating. Apparently no real plans had been made for the seizure of power in the city, but subsequent to the radio announcements from Djakarta a certain Major Muljono, a well-known "trouble-maker" who had experienced delays in promotion (his younger brother was already a whole rank higher than himself) and seems to have had perennial difficulties with his superior officers, went to see Col. Katamso, to urge him to accept the Untung proclamation and bring out the Jogjakarta command behind it. Muljono himself had previously been chief of staff to the military commander in the Bojolali district, and was currently 5th assistant (for relations with civilian organizations), to the 72nd Military Resort Commander. He was also in charge of Civil Defence for Jogjakarta, which involved him in the training of civilian volunteers, probably a large proportion of whom were PKI or left-PNI youths. He was also chief of the Jogjakarta City Veterans' Legion, an organization which typically contained many deeply discontented ex-revolutionaries frustrated by their "post-military" way of life, especially in a situation where to the rest of the community the military increasingly formed a highly visible privileged group.¹⁰⁵

Muljono tried to force Katamso to come out for the Proclamation, but evidently Katamso was too cautious or too hesitant to do so, and stalled on any decision until he had received word from the Divisional Commander, Brig. Gen. Surjosumpeno. It is not clear whether Muljono was really involved in the Suherman group as such or was acting on his own.

The best guess is that he was not, but took his cue from Radio Djakarta, in the grip of what the Suherman group hoped would be a "snowballing" tide of support sweeping across Central Java. In any case he seems to have agreed that an emissary be sent to Surjosumpeno. It may have been that this emissary was Lieut. Col. Sugijono, but more probably it was not. In any case it seems to have been agreed that no further action would be taken till the emissary returned from Semarang.¹⁰⁶ What happened to the emissary is not clear, unless it was Sugijono himself. (The argument against it being Sugijono is that if he had been sent by Katamso-Muljono he would surely not have told Surjosumpeno that Jogjakarta was "safe", even compared with Semarang.) In any case, whether he went as Katamso's emissary or on his own, on Sugijono's return he reported to Katamso what had transpired in Semarang. Meanwhile Muljono, presumably impatient of delay or perhaps learning from Semarang that Suherman had seized control there, made his move. He sent a sergeant with a squad of men loyal to him to arrest both Katamso and Sugijono, who was then still at Katamso's house. This occurred about 6:00 p.m. The two men were taken to Kentongan, a spot about three miles north of Jogjakarta, and held there at the barracks of Battalion 451 (Sixth Infantry Brigade) while Muljono continued with his plan to seize power in Jogjakarta. Apparently the first step taken was to surround the palace complex of the Pakualaman, since with the Sultan of Jogjakarta out of town, the Kepala Daerah, chief civilian executive official, was H.R.H. the Pakualam. No one was permitted to enter or leave. Shortly thereafter a group of CGMI, IPPI and PR youths, (various Communist university, highschool, and other youth organizations) and very possibly their left-PNI counterparts were instructed or persuaded by Muljono to seize the Jogjakarta Radio Station. This they did without any difficulty. There is some reason to believe that some of the Jogjakarta Police were also won over, though it is not clear on what pretext.¹⁰⁷ In any case by 8:00 p.m. RRI Jogjakarta began broadcasting support for Untung's coup in Djakarta, which was itself now in the last stages of collapse, with Soekarno preparing to abandon Halim.

Surakarta

Meanwhile in Central Java's other key city, Surakarta, the Untung broadcast had been relayed at 7:00 a.m. and provided, as in Jogjakarta, the signal for a shift in the structure of military power.¹⁰⁸ Sometime in the course of the afternoon the newly appointed commander of the Solo military district Lieut. Col. Ezy Suharto, together with his chief of staff, Captain Parman, and the Commander of the Sixth Infantry Brigade, Lieut. Col. Ashari, were put under arrest by a certain Major Iskandar, presumably after they had delayed or shilly-shallied in giving immediate support to the Revolutionary Council.¹⁰⁹ At 6:00 p.m., some two hours before Jogjakarta, RRI Solo (which was in leftist

hands anyway) put out a crucial statement of support.¹¹⁰ This initial statement was issued by the Communist mayor of Solo, Utomo Ramelan, in his capacity as head of the local National Front, and was countersigned by the secretary-general, S.K. Wirjono, a prominent figure in the local Communist artists' organization, LEKRA. At the same time, apparently on the initiative of Iskandar, the formation of a Revolutionary Council for the Solo area was announced, on the model of the Central Revolutionary Council and in accordance with the instructions issued in Untung's second Proclamation that such regional councils be formed.¹¹¹ Iskandar appointed himself Chairman, and proceeded to call together the representatives of the political parties in Solo for a consultation in the National Front building. But the conference met with little success. Evidently the only parties giving unequivocal support were the PKI, Baperki and Partindo, the others either refusing to cooperate or saying that they would have to wait for instructions from their party headquarters in Djakarta. (This would be a particularly typical PNI reaction to the situation.)

Thus the situation in Central Java at the point when the coup collapsed in Djakarta was as follows. An essentially military coup d'etat had been carried out in Semarang against the Divisional Commander, who had however managed subsequently to elude his captors. There was evidently no civilian participation and the city was completely in military hands. In Salatiga, a similar purely military coup had taken place. In Jogjakarta, the military weakness of the "coup" sympathizers had meant the involvement of civilian personnel--not the PKI itself, nor its larger mass organizations such as the BTI, SOBSI, or Gerwani, but specifically radical student elements who had personal contacts with the unruly Muljono. The two top local military officers had been arrested, and Muljono and his civilian allies held rather precarious control of the city. In Solo, civilians had taken a more prominent part, with the Communist mayor making the first Central Javanese Communist statement of support for the Untung coup (Jogjakarta and Semarang incidentally had rather right-wing PNI mayors, namely Sudarisman Purwokusumo, S. H. and Woerjanto, S.H. This may be part of the explanation for the idiosyncratic character of events in Solo; yet on the other hand, the mayor of Salatiga, Bakri Wahab, was also a Communist.) Nevertheless once again the initiative was taken by army personnel (Iskandar) though he felt it necessary, unlike his counterparts elsewhere, to invite civilian cooperation and support straight away. Only in Magelang, astride the Jogjakarta-Semarang road, did the coup group still have no power.¹¹² There the Divisional Commander and units loyal to him began concentrating for a counterstroke. Thus with the important exception of Magelang, by 8:00 p.m. the key cities of Central Java were in rebel hands, however insecurely, and all had announced for Untung's Revolutionary Council. One can be sure that army and air force radio receivers in Djakarta had picked up all these broadcasts and both sides would be well aware of the critical situation in the heartland of Java.

Once Suharto was assured of control of Djakarta, therefore, he immediately turned his attention to Central Java, and began what was to prove a long series of appeals and countermandings of orders over the military telex system and over the radio. At 10:00 p.m., (October 1) Suharto categorically denounced the September 30th Movement as counter-revolutionary, and declared that the Generals listed on the Revolutionary Council had been included without their knowledge.¹¹³ In a radiogram to Central Java he explicitly disavowed Suherman's orders to all commanders within the Diponegoro command.¹¹⁴ As an old Diponegoro commander he was undoubtedly hoping to rally loyalties to himself.

At the same time that in Central Java the rebel authorities were busy attempting to consolidate their control, generally speaking by bluff and persuasion, trying to secure maximum cooperation from timid or neutral figures, at Halim preparations were being made for the final evacuation of the airbase. Though it had apparently been decided to take off for Central Java, it was by no means yet certain what kind of reception would await them at each individual airport, nor whether the army would try to shoot down any airplanes that took off, nor what success could be expected to attend Suharto's attempts to undermine internal unity and solidarity among the coup elements in Central Java.

It is possible that the remaining figures at Halim, Dhani, Aidit and Untung were divided on what precise steps should be taken to overcome the crisis. Untung may have been encouraged by the reports from Central Java to try and persuade the others to support him. Or there may have been disputes over which people would be permitted to fly out, and if so where to. The members of Battalion 454 now guarding the base were undoubtedly concerned about their own safety and unwilling to see their leaders disappear leaving them to "hold the bag." Probably radio contacts with the main airbases in Central and East Java were being made to find out where it would be best and safest to land. Since the original coup plans probably had not provided for this particular contingency, all this may well have taken some time. It may also have been delayed by reconnoitring activities carried out by RPKAD troops under Suharto's direction who were able to damage some of the planes at the base, and harrass the groundcrews, though as yet the new Army Commander was not ready to open a frontal attack on the base. As he remarked later, though he could have sent his tanks in, he was concerned that in that case AURI might retaliate by putting bombers into the air which would then cause heavy damage in Djakarta.¹¹⁵

In any case, about midnight a diversion was created by the appearance in the sky over Djakarta of the President's Jetstar plane, which had been intended to pick up Subandrio and his

party from Sumatra, but which in fact only contained the Deputy Commander of the Air Force, Air Vice-Marshal Sri Muljono Herlambang.¹¹⁶ In any case, though the airplane was shot at, it managed to land. Shortly afterwards (perhaps because Sri Muljono exerted effective pressure on Dhani) at least two Hercules transport planes took off for Central Java, one containing Aidit and Omar Dhani, the other probably at least Untung himself, and very likely as many of his cohorts as could be accommodated.¹¹⁷ These planes, too, managed to elude the anti-aircraft guns and sped off towards Central Java about midnight. It is probable that the Untung plane landed at Semarang about 1:30 a.m., but there is as yet no clear evidence of this. The Aidit-Dhani plane landed at Adisutjipto airfield (Maguwo) a couple of miles outside Jogjakarta, at about 2:00 a.m. on October 2nd.¹¹⁸ It is possible that the Battalion 454 paratroops at Halim were deceived into staying on guard by being told that Untung was going to Central Java to get reinforcements.

The pattern of events in Central Java after the arrival of Aidit and Omar Dhani is reasonably clear in its general outlines even if some of the details have not yet been cleared up. It appears that on his arrival at Adisutjipto airfield, Aidit was driven by a certain Air Force Major Sudarjo to the house of Sutrisno, one of the more important, older local PKI leaders and a member of the Jogjakarta Governmental Executive Body (BPH).¹¹⁹ Aidit seems to have warned him to call off any demonstrations, and at all costs not allow the PKI to be provoked into violent action. The PKI should play the Bung Karno card for all it was worth, indicate complete, unconditional support for any policies that the President might declare and at all costs give no further offence to the Army. The military people should be allowed to do the negotiating and discussing among themselves, with the PKI confining itself to discreet support of "moderate" elements. The local PKI branches should not go underground or do anything else that might excite suspicion that this was basically a PKI and not an army affair.

After having apparently "defused" the Jogjakarta situation, Aidit left for Semarang early on the morning of October 2nd, in a black Fiat 1300 accompanied by two Pemuda Rakjat escorts.¹²⁰ His objective was to contact both Lukman and Ir. Sakirman, who were in that city, as well as the Acting Governor of Central Java, Sujono Atmo, an attractive, young, strongly pro-PKI politician.¹²¹ It was obviously essential to talk PKI strategy and tactics over with the two top PKI leaders. As for Sujono Atmo, his position as legal civilian head of the troubled province would allow him to do a lot to keep the overall situation calm, facilitate communications with bewildered PKI cadres, especially within the Central Java bureaucracy, and generally keep the situation from getting out of hand.

Meanwhile Lukman and Sakirman were sitting quietly in Semarang.¹²² They had left Djakarta on September 28th in Lukman's official car to do a tour of Central Java. Driving through Bandung on their way East, they reached Semarang at midnight of the 28th-29th, and lodged in the house of friends at Djl. Dempo 14. The next two days were spent in Semarang or in the environs, probably in talks with local party leaders. On October 1, the whole group listened to the first Untung radio announcement as they ate breakfast, and all were pleased and excited. They apparently remained discussing the latest news till that afternoon when a visitor arrived in a Holden sedan to take them to spend the night at another house, this time on Taman Hajam Wuruk.¹²³

It was at 8:00 a.m. of October 2nd that they were aroused by the arrival of Aidit. Intense discussions then began, which were shortly thereafter joined by Sujono Atmo, who drove up in his official car. After about an hour, all four set off in the direction of Solo in Sujono Atmo's limousine, escorted by a Jeep driven by Lukman's chauffeur.¹²⁴ In Bojolali they stopped for an hour to brief the local Bupati, Suali, a prominent PKI leader. Once in Surakarta, they went straight to the house of the Communist mayor, Utomo Ramelan.¹²⁵ That evening about 9:00 p.m. Ramelan drove out to see the Commander of the Panasan airbase, Lieut. Col. Sujoto, and invited him to come to the Mayor's office to discuss the situation. The Commander agreed and rode into town in the Mayor's car. Evidently considerable discussion ensued, in the course of which Aidit requested the use of a plane to fly to Bali.¹²⁶ This apparently was refused or was not available. Aidit then gave Sujoto a letter for delivery to the President, which Sujoto seems to have promised to have flown to Djakarta, since he took the letter with him back to Panasan.¹²⁷

The next morning Sujoto reappeared at the Mayor's and returned the letter which he had promised to deliver the night before. Further extensive discussion took place, Sujoto claiming that no plane was available to take the letter to the capital. Later that morning, Sujono Atmo returned to Semarang to resume his functions as Acting Governor and to make the necessary proclamations (for which see below).¹²⁸

The movements of the PKI leaders for the next day and a half are not clear, but it appears that they travelled to Madiun and Kediri at least, possibly to other PKI centres of strength. As in Solo, their mission was evidently a success. In none of these "red" areas was there any movement or activity, though Party buildings were guarded by squads of Pemuda Rakjat in many places. A watchful and tense stillness reigned everywhere

On October 4th Djakarta Radio broadcast the news that there would be a plenary session of the Cabinet at the President's palace in Bogor, on October 6th, which all Ministers were urgently requested to attend.¹²⁹ This seems to have galvanized the PKI leaders. Early on the morning of October 5, about 2:30 a.m., Lukman set off with his chauffeur for Semarang in Ramelan's car. There he picked up his own Ministerial vehicle and headed straight back for Djakarta, stopping only in Pemalang near Brebes to talk to the local PKI cadres. He reached Djakarta about 3:30 p.m. that same day. The next morning Lukman proceeded to Bogor, where he made his last public appearance.¹³⁰

Meanwhile Aidit and Ramelan (and probably Sakirman) remained in Solo to finish making arrangements for maintaining order and discipline in Communist ranks in the face of what was probably going to be a bad few months ahead.¹³¹ It may be that Sakirman was instructed to stay in Central Java, his home area, since he does not reappear on the scene. About 3:15 p.m. of October 5th, Aidit and Ramelan made a last forlorn appearance at Panasan, and asked for a plane to take Aidit back to Djakarta, so that he could attend the Cabinet meeting scheduled for the next morning. But once again Sujoto found reasons for being uncooperative, either because he was frightened or because he was moving towards the anti-PKI groups.¹³² In any case Aidit and Ramelan left the base soon afterwards, and Aidit at least was never seen in public again. What happened to him, one can not tell. It is certain that he was unable to make his way back to Djakarta, and since it appears that Solo fell back into "loyalist" Army hands that day (see below) it is most likely that he was arrested, and held incommunicado.¹³³

In the meantime Omar Dhani had first convinced the pro-coup people at Adisutjipto airbase to remain calm and vigilant, and on no account to start anything. He then proceeded by plane to Maospati, and from there drove in to Madiun. At 10:00 a.m. October 2, he summoned Commodore Dono Indarto, the Commander of Air Region VII (Central Java), to Madiun for talks. Discussion then ensued which ensured that the AURI in Central Java would cooperate with the President's orders and avoid any kind of anti-Army action or provocation.¹³⁴ What Omar Dhani did subsequently, is not clear. Possibly he went to Semarang or to East Java. In any case, he did not appear again in public until about 4:00 p.m. that same afternoon, when he landed back at the Semplak airfield near Bogor. From there he made his way to the palace with Leo Wattimena, to attend a special KOTI (Supreme Operations Command) session and to face a distraught Soekarno and an infuriated Army (see below).¹³⁵

The Collapse of the Coup

"They wailed, amazed, seeing the disappearance of Sanctity: the cult-statue was naked."

- Nagarakrtagama 57, III, 4.

In Djakarta Suharto spent the night of October 1st-2nd issuing a series of pronouncements, discharging rebel officers, denouncing the coup as a counter-revolutionary putsch, and taking the necessary measures to clean up "wild" Pemuda elements who had been given AURI weapons. At the same time the RPKAD forces were being mobilized for an attack on Halim, timed to start just before dawn. Once again the "ultimatum technique" was successfully used. The surrender of most of the "coup" troops was engineered and the base fell to Suharto without any blood being spilt.¹³⁶ By 6:00 a.m. all rebel resistance in Djakarta had ended, except for a few bewildered Pemuda groups. All the main coup actors had fled the scene, those who did not get out on the Hercules transports the night before apparently driving off in the direction of Bekasi, where they were soon picked up by "loyal" Army units.¹³⁷

Soekarno was still not permitted by the Army to make any personal broadcasts, although Suharto repeatedly announced his own and the Army's loyalty to the President, and declared that all actions being taken were at the President's behest. On the morning of October 2nd, Soekarno did however send messengers to Suharto and the men around him, as well as to Leo Wattimena and other high-ranking officers, summoning them to a conference in Bogor.¹³⁸ Suharto later recalled that he sent word that he was too busy to come that morning, and it was only after 1:00 p.m. that he made his way out of Djakarta, probably reaching Bogor about 3:00 p.m. There he found a group consisting of the President, Eddy Martadinata, the Navy Commander; Sutjipto Judodihardjo, the Police Chief; Dr. Leimena; Sri Muljono Herlambang; Brig. Gen. A. Jusuf, the Trade Minister; Attorney General Brig. Gen. R. Sutardhio; and Brig. Gen. M. Sabur. A little later Dhani himself arrived, accompanied by Wattimena.¹³⁹ The meeting opened in an atmosphere of great tension. Soekarno, apparently reckoning that Suharto might be outwitted, if Nasution was not present, immediately propounded his view that the whole affair was essentially political not military, and that therefore he would handle it himself. He repeated his order of October 1st assuming personal charge of the Army and appointing Pranoto as its "daily caretaker." Suharto's answer was a gem of Javanese sarcasm. He said he was quite agreeable and that he would go on the radio at once to withdraw all

statements and measures that he had taken since the previous morning. The President hurriedly withdrew his proposal, and eventually with Suharto's agreement produced an amended version of the order, in which sole responsibility for restoring security and order were given to Suharto.¹⁴⁰ Since clearly this involved full control of all army units and installations, it left the wretched Pranoto, in charge of "daily administration," with nothing but a title. Soekarno's face had been partially saved, but it was clear that for the time being the Army and Suharto were more than equal for Soekarno and were not prepared to permit him to take the political initiative away from them. For his own reasons Suharto declared his readiness to try to forestall any conflict between the Air Force and the Army, though when Soekarno later went on to the radio to state that AURI had had absolutely no part in the events of October 1st, Suharto immediately made his own broadcast stating that though this might be true, it was undeniable that AURI elements had indeed been heavily involved--virtually calling the President a liar.¹⁴¹ Certainly Army feeling against the Air Force was running so high that some such rebuttal was inevitable and one can not help feeling that Soekarno made a serious tactical error in such an obvious falsification. Suharto and Soekarno also agreed on the necessity of calling in as soon as possible all the weapons which had so far been distributed by AURI officers.¹⁴²

With this consolidation of Suharto's formal position and the thin papering over of the chasm between the Army high command and Soekarno, the pattern of events for the subsequent weeks became evident. Soekarno was reluctantly forced to accept a whole series of faits accomplis, or appear to be a President totally without power.

The bodies of the dead generals were finally discovered on the evening of October 3rd, and exhumed under Suharto's personal supervision on the morning of the 4th.¹⁴³ It seems only then to have become fully apparent to the Army high command what had actually happened, and the reports of Gerwani and PR participation in the murder of the generals began to seep out. Suharto himself certainly already knew the full story by Sunday evening since the Army newspaper Berita Yuddha of Monday October 4th, fired the first shots in what was to become a massive campaign to hound the PKI to destruction.¹⁴⁴ The newspaper attacks were immediately followed on the midmorning of October 4th by the first violent party demonstrations, demanding the dissolution of the PKI and the punishment of its incriminated membership. In the days that followed it became increasingly clear that whatever its real knowledge about the coup¹⁴⁵ the Army was determined to suppress as far as possible all news stories indicating the extent of Army and Air Force

involvement. The patent design of the Army was to place all blame on the PKI.¹⁴⁶ In this endeavour they had--and still have--the full support of the religious parties, and, in certain areas and to a lesser extent, of the PNI. But the subsequent developments of the Army's anti-PKI politique fall outside the scope of our present analysis.

The collapse of the coup movements in Central Java followed shortly thereafter. Semarang was the first to fall. On the afternoon of October 1st. Surjosumpeno proceeded with his tanks as far as Bawen, the junction of the Solo-Semarang and Jogjakarta-Semarang highways. Leaving his tanks behind, he drove the eight miles into Salatiga in a jeep, accompanied only by his chauffeur. He went straight to the Headquarters of the 73rd Military Resort where Col. Sukardi was being held prisoner. The subordinates of Lieut. Col. Idris attempted to arrest him too, but he managed to trick them into believing he was involved in the coup, and so was allowed to go free. Re-joining his men at Bawen, he advanced to Gompel, on the outskirts of Semarang. In Semarang itself the coup group was unable to prevent its troops from listening to Radio Djakarta, and thus hearing of the failure of Untung's coup de force. The authority of Suherman dwindled rapidly, and after "Suharto-style" negotiations most of the "rebel" troops were won over. On the morning of October 2nd, Surjosumpeno reoccupied Semarang without a shot being fired, the action being initiated about 5:00 a.m. Suherman, Marjono, and Usman fled with the troops still loyal to them in the direction of Salatiga and Bojolali.¹⁴⁷

Surjosumpeno now began sending tank and paratroop units down to threaten Jogjakarta and Solo. The process of trying to win back the loyalty of individual units continued unabated, in a silent struggle for the psychological momentum which would push a large mass of hesitating soldiers one way or the other. Evidently by 7:30 a.m. of October 2nd, two key Battalions, Battalion C stationed near Jogjakarta and Battalion L near Solo, had been won back by the Divisional Commander.¹⁴⁸

In spite of this the coup group remained in power in Jogjakarta. Nevertheless the situation remained fluid enough for the best respected Central Java newspaper Kedaulatan Rakjat to dare to print reports about an "Untung jang tidak untung",¹⁴⁹ and to record that Katamso and Sugijono had been removed from Katamso's house the night before by persons unknown. This edition was rapidly reported to Muljono, who did his best to recall it, by seizing bundles of newspapers at the local post office and the station. Nevertheless, apparently about one third of the edition did manage to be smuggled out somehow in spite of intimidation by Muljono's bully-boys.¹⁵⁰ In the afternoon of the 2nd, a large demonstration was held in the main part of the city in which all kinds of leftist youth took part, but with CGMI, IPPI and Pemuda Rakjat assuming the most prominent

role. These predominantly teenage demonstrators were flanked by armed veterans under Muljono's command. Placards demanding support for Untung were plastered all over the town.¹⁵¹

It seems then that Aidit's mission in Jogjakarta and his talks with Sutrisno had only partial success. Evidently the major PKI mass organizations were restrained from action, but the local youth group, who had had a history of conflict and brawling with the local military were not to be restrained. At the crucial psychological moment, Muljono was able to influence them more effectively than the representatives of their own party. This was not the first time that this had happened to the PKI, and it was, as before, very damaging to the effort to maintain the PKI's complete non-involvement in the affair.¹⁵²

In the meantime, for reasons that are not at all clear, Katamso and Sugijono were removed from their temporary place of incarceration in Kentongan and taken northwards towards Pakem on the road to Kaliurang, and there done to death in a very brutal manner.¹⁵³ It is possible that the motive was revenge, since Katamso had been Army Commander in Delanggu during the 1948 Madiun Affair. Since Delanggu was one of the areas of bitterest fighting and bloody repression, it would not be hard to find many old Madiun hands who were waiting for the day when their dead comrades or family could be avenged.¹⁵⁴

By October 3rd, the tide had begun to turn in Jogjakarta, as the news of the coup failures in Djakarta and Semarang began to seep into the city. Muljono appears to have slipped out of town on the night of October 2nd, returning to his family home in Wates, about twenty minutes drive south of Jogjakarta. From this time on he dropped out of sight until October 18th when he was arrested by the RPKAD in the vicinity of Bojolali, where he had once been chief of staff to the military district commander.¹⁵⁵ The removal of Muljono helped continue the disintegration of the authority of the pro-coup group in Jogjakarta. The Pakualam was able to emerge from his enforced confinement within the walls of the Pakualaman palace compound. Placards against the Revolutionary Council began to appear on the streets. By 7:30 a.m. of October 4th, the Jogjakarta radio station was back in the hands of anti-coup group elements, and later that afternoon radio relays from Djakarta were resumed. The same day Surjosumpeno's negotiations with the local army officers bore fruit. Major Kartawi, a close associate of Muljono's (he was in charge of operations for the 72nd Military Resort), who had evidently been left behind by Muljono to hold the fort in Jogjakarta, was summoned to Magelang by Surjosumpeno, and agreed to go. At Magelang, he surrendered and undertook to collect the rebel officers together in Jogjakarta and arrange for them to accept Surjosumpeno's authority once again. This he was evidently successful in doing, and on October 5th,

Surjosumpeno entered the city, with a heavy escort, and sealed his control of the city by a ceremony at the 72nd Military Resort Headquarters.¹⁵⁶ Shortly thereafter anti-PKI mobs, encouraged by the Divisional Commander's presence, sacked Communist owned buildings, setting an unamiable precedent which was to be followed in many other Indonesian towns in the weeks that followed.¹⁵⁷

In Salatiga the situation remained tense but calm under Lieut. Col. Idris' control. The Communist Mayor, Bakri Wahab, stayed quiet, and no communist organizations moved. So the situation remained until early on the morning of October 4th, when Surjosumpeno's tanks rolled into the town. Sukardi and Sugiman were rescued from their confinement, while Idris himself, with his closest associates, fled into the hills. The pro-rebel Battalion 448, stationed just outside the town on the road to Bojolali remained a threat however for another week, until it was finally disarmed and moved out.¹⁵⁸

In Solo, the course of events was not noticeably different. On October 2nd, the pro-coup tide was still high. Placards indicating support for Untung were plastered all over the city. Groups of pro-coup Pemuda elements wandered round the city in a vaguely threatening way, or hung about in groups on the street corners. The PKI headquarters was closely guarded, but otherwise nothing happened. Almost everyone kept off the streets, and important local notables took care not to sleep in their homes. (This applied to Communists as well as everyone else). Everyone recalled the pre-Madiun weeks in Solo, when kidnappings were the order of the day, and few of those kidnapped ever were seen again. It was not until late on October 2nd that there were indications that the tide had turned. At 1:30 a.m. on the 3rd, Soekarno made his first radio broadcast to the nation, and this was relayed into Solo, apparently by anti-coup elements working at the radio station.¹⁵⁹ As the morning wore on, Islamic youth groups began to stream across the town, plastering the walls with anti-Untung placards and stickers. The local PNI typically wavered, finally coming out with an ambiguous statement insisting on its absolute loyalty to the President. By October 4th, the Solo radio station was once again in the hands of Surjosumpeno's men, and the local military commanders who had been arrested by the coup group were released unharmed. They then began the task of restoring unity and discipline in their various units.¹⁶⁰ The situation remained calm but tense, with both pro-coup and anti-coup groups unwilling to take the risks of starting anything. Aidit and Ramelan apparently still moved about freely in a city which was militarily in Surjosumpeno's hands.¹⁶¹

Thus by the morning of October 5th, overt military resistance to Surjosumpeno had ceased throughout Central Java. Aside from the murders of the two Jogjakarta army chiefs, there had

been an astonishing lack of violence. As Col. Widodo, acting Commander of the 72nd Military Resort was later to say with some pride: "the 72nd Military Resort returned to the fold, without any blood being shed."¹⁶² Cities and loyalties changed hands silently and peacefully. It was a game of bluff and counter-bluff, threat and counter-threat, appeal and counter-appeal. Troops did not fight other troops but merely pushed them out from one place to another. It is clear that all parties were anxious, at that point at least, to avoid a real military confrontation. This was reflected in the official statements published by the Central Committee of the PKI and the Central Java Regional Committee of the party, both of which pledged the PKI to complete obedience to the government, loyalty to Bung Karno and absolute non-interference in what the party still hopefully referred to as an internal army matter.¹⁶³ On October 6th, Sujono Atmo issued an order to all civil servants in Central Java insisting that they come in for work as usual, that they remain loyal to the government, and that they leave the solution of political problems to the President.¹⁶⁴ On the other side the leftist press continued to publish in Central Java at least ten days after its equivalent in Djakarta had been completely suppressed.¹⁶⁵ Whereas in the capital and in West Java the rightist Army was completely in control, Central Java was in a very delicate state of balance, everyone wondering what would happen next, and frightened of what might happen if anyone pushed things too far. The statements of the rightist Surjosumpeno and the leftist Sujono Atmo scarcely differ in general tone during this period, both making constant appeals for calm, peace and order in Central Java.¹⁶⁶

The Reckoning with the PKI

"The commandment-breakers were visited
by expeditionary forces and totally
destroyed..."

- Nagarakrtagama 16, V, 3.

The Untung affair was now at an end. The military conspiracy which had been hatched in Djakarta and Semarang had come to an ignominious end, and it remained for the new Army leadership simply to mop up the various conspirators. Col. Latief was arrested near Djakarta on October 9th, and Untung himself near Brebes on October 11th.¹⁶⁷ Supardjo disappeared from sight, and as of this writing appears still to be at large, though reported at various times to be in Central Java and in Kebajoran. Suherman and his friends fled to the nearest refuge available from Semarang, the Merbabu-Merapi Complex, and continued a miserable fugitive existence till they were finally rounded up and shot dead by RPKAD units on December 14.¹⁶⁸

It now remained for the Army leadership to decide what was to be done in the aftermath of the abortive coup. This did not take very long. The Chief of the Djakarta Raya Communist organization, Njono, was arrested on October 3, and the entire leftist press ceased to publish as of that same date.¹⁶⁹ By the morning of October 4, the Army newspaper Berita Yudha was already opening the press campaign against the Communist Party, and the same morning the first of a seemingly unending series of mass demonstrations demanding the banning of the PKI took place in the capital.¹⁷⁰ Massive raids against all leftist elements within the Djakarta perimeter followed, together with looting and burning of PKI property and the homes of PKI notables. Within a matter of days the Communist organization in the capital was virtually destroyed, without any resistance being put up. Though Njoto and Lukman were able to appear at the Plenary Cabinet session held in Bogor on October 6, they and Soekarno were unable to make any effective stand against the violence of Army and anti-Communist anger, which had been overwhelmingly aroused the day before during the massive funeral celebrations held at the Kalibata Heroes' Cemetery, and particularly the highly emotional televised speech made there by Nasution, while his little daughter was dying in the Army Hospital.¹⁷¹ Televised and printed pictures of the (allegedly) hideously tortured Generals' bodies were even more effective in working up popular hysteria against the Communists.¹⁷² On October 7 the Army discovered its master slogan, by branding the coup group the GESTAPU (Gerakan September Tiga Puluh - September 30th Movement), and a systematic campaign to uproot the Communist Party was underway.¹⁷³

In spite of these developments in the capital, the situation in the regions remained largely quiet. The two largest centres

of Communist strength, Central Java and North Sumatra, were still and tense. The local PKI committees clung to the general line of the Central Committee's October 5th statement, offering unconditional support to Soekarno, urging national unity, and doing their best to appease the Army by going about their business as normally as possible. In North Sumatra, the local PKI chief, Djalaludin Nasution offered warm congratulations to the Army on Armed Forces Day, hopefully reminding it of its revolutionary past, while at the same time he stressed his own ignorance of events in Djakarta and the great distance between Medan and the capital.¹⁷⁴ In Central Java much the same occurred, as the statements issued by the Central Java PKI leadership, and by the local PKI committees in Jogjakarta, Klaten and Solo clearly indicate.¹⁷⁵

But the end was clearly in sight. Left to itself Central Java was fairly evenly divided between left and right; but once Djakarta began to intervene this balance could not be maintained. As soon as the situation in Djakarta and West Java was secured, Suharto and Nasution ordered RPKAD and Siliwangi units into Central Java. On October 17, the RPKAD entered Semarang, and fanned out in the direction of Bojolali. The same day Surjosumpeno for the first time felt able to issue a public warrant for the arrest of Suherman and his friends--evidently all hope of bringing them in by "internal" Army negotiations had by then been abandoned.¹⁷⁶ On the 18th the RPKAD succeeded in arresting Major Muljono in the village of Karanggenang in that district.¹⁷⁷

On October 19th, the RPKAD held a victory parade and show of strength in Semarang, though actually there had still been no fighting whatsoever, and virtually no blood shed. Then later that afternoon the bodies of Col. Katamso and Lieut. Col. Sugijono were found not far from Pakem on the lower slopes of Mount Merapi.¹⁷⁸

As in Djakarta, the finding of the corpses of murdered officers was the signal for a wave of anti-Communist repressions to begin, which could be carried out all the more securely since now there was considerable outside armed strength to back it up. The following day, October 20, simultaneously with the announcement of the exhumation of the bodies, Col. Widodo, acting Commander of the 72nd Military Resort, declared a ban on the activities of the PKI and all its affiliated organizations within the area under his control.¹⁷⁹ The Communist-leaning newspaper, Waspada, which had kept on printing three weeks after all the leftist press in Djakarta had been silenced, (and two weeks after the Semarang Communist organ Gema Massa had been shut down by Surjosumpeno), was soon suppressed.¹⁸⁰ In Semarang mobs began attacking Communist and Chinese buildings and property, following almost exactly the pattern that

had developed previously in West Java.¹⁸¹ Later in the day General Surjosumpeno froze all activities of Communist organizations for the whole of Central Java.¹⁸² The reckoning had clearly come, though still, almost unbelievably, no violence had occurred, and the PKI appeared still to be trying desperately to roll with the punches.¹⁸³

Whether it was the ban on the PKI itself, or the mob actions in Semarang, or the activities of the RPKAD, is not clear, but on or about October 21, the Central Javanese Communists, or at least a considerable number of them, evidently decided that the desperate policy of accommodation urged by Aidit on his last mission was now futile and hopeless. The Army clearly intended to destroy the party root and branch, however compliant and submissive it might be. Moreover, with the arrest of many of its top leaders, and the loss of Aidit, the party's tight hierarchical control-system began to break up, allowing undisciplined and desperate elements to take their own initiatives.

On October 21st the Communist-controlled railway-workers in Semarang and Solo struck.¹⁸⁴ Needless to say it was a matter of a few hours before the RPKAD's "tough" tactics had the trains rolling again, at least in and out of Semarang. At the same time throughout the Central Javanese countryside, the knowledge of the steady influx of RPKAD and Siliwangi units spread rapidly. With the knowledge that the military balance of power was now suddenly heavily in their favour, the Moslems began to attack the local PKI cadres, wreaking long-fostered vengeance. PKI leaders, anticipating the arrival of the dreaded Siliwangi, with bitter memories of the aftermath of the Madiun affair, decided to move while they could and wreak their own vengeance while they still had a chance. And without the RPKAD or the Siliwangi themselves having to do very much, or even necessarily being fully aware of what their presence would precipitate, the news of their arrival was the catalyst for a wave of murder, torture, arson and revenge sweeping across the plain of Klaten, up towards the Gunung Kidul and along the slopes of the volcanoes Merapi and Merbabu. On the night of the 21st Communist youth elements, probably under the leadership of the Communist Bupati of Bojolali tried to take back the town from the occupying RPKAD, but were speedily driven out into the hills.¹⁸⁵ On October 22nd, the RPKAD marched into Solo and took control, arresting the Communist Mayor, Utomo Ramelan. The same day riots and mob action against the PKI took place in most of the city.¹⁸⁶ As if in answer to these moves, incidents broke out on October 23rd in the districts of Karanganyar and Prambanan, roads being barricaded by youths armed with sharpened bamboo spears and clubs. But it was only a matter of hours before AURI Commandos from Adisutjipto airfield and Surjosumpeno's local paratroop units cleared them

again, and the Communist villagers fled into the countryside.¹⁸⁷ Violence now became general in the whole Klaten-Bojolali area, no quarter being given on either side. On October 25th a curfew was declared for the Residency of Surakarta, and on October 26th, Surjosumpeno announced that he was putting the whole of Central Java under Martial Law.¹⁸⁸ In the cities the PKI was rapidly rounded up and destroyed. In the countryside the process took a little longer, but followed essentially the same course. The struggle was completely one-sided, as the local PKI had never been trained for combat, and had virtually no arms. Moreover the Army immediately began training and arming vigilante bands of Nationalist and Islamic youths to scour the villages for those suspected of Communist sympathies. Effective resistance was over very quickly, and peace--of a kind--was restored to Central Java.¹⁸⁹ In spite of the end of the "fighting", such as it was, the massacres continued, indeed spread rapidly and even more violently to East Java, and also to Atjeh, North Sumatra and Menado. President Soekarno has recently estimated that some 87,000 have been slaughtered, though unofficial estimates indicate that the figure may be nearer 200,000.¹⁹⁰

It is not the place here to go into the details of the anti-Communist campaign which developed in the wake of the Army coup of October 1. It is however vitally important to stress that the two, though intimately related, nevertheless form quite separate political phenomena; and that between the deaths of the six generals in Djakarta on the morning of October 1st, and the clashes in Bojolali on October 21st, three weeks elapsed in which no violence or trace of civil war occurred, even according to the Army itself. What fighting finally developed began when the PKI realized it had no hope of surviving a ruthless Army purge whatever it did, and when the long-dampened fires of inter-aliran hatreds in the villages of Central and East Java burst into long-threatened flame.

The dramas of October 1 and October 21 had entirely different casts of characters, settings and scenarios. The October 1st coup was essentially an internal Army affair, stemming from a small clique in the Diponegoro Division, which attempted to use both Soekarno and the PKI leadership for its own ends, and succeeded merely in irremediably damaging the moral and political authority of the one, and causing the physical destruction of the other. The brief "civil war" of late October, though precipitated by the events of October 1st, represented the logical culmination of deeply-felt hostilities and hatreds between a far wider range of groups and ideologies--right and left, Islam and Communism, landlord and landless, santri and abangan, prijaji and peasant.

The irony of October 1st is that in one night all the elaborate political manoeuvrings of the previous decade were reduced to meaninglessness, in an action of which none of the major actors had any real comprehension. For years the Army, Soekarno and the PKI had been so deeply absorbed with each other, so obsessed by their efforts to control, influence, infiltrate, undermine, intimidate and outwit each other that it seems never to have occurred to them that quite another group might take a hand. The brilliant General Parman claimed that he was never more than three hours behind the PKI at any moment, so effective was his espionage on Communist activities. Yet he was carried off an unresisting victim to his death on the orders of a confidant of his own Chief of Intelligence in Central Java. Both Parman and Aidit were caught completely unawares by the intervention of outsiders whose aspirations and frustrations they had either never studied or never understood.

The intricate sandcastle of political institutions built for Indonesia by President Soekarno and his oratory are vanishing into the wind, the toil and trouble of years undone by a few hours of senseless bloodshed.

One thinks irresistibly of a long and complicated game of chess, played by two Grandmasters, which has continued uninterrupted for days, and in which very slowly the advantage has swung to one side, but with the issue still in doubt. Suddenly a long-ignored, frustrated child rushes into the room and with one kick sends board and pieces flying. The Grandmaster with the advantage pleads for the pieces to be put back where they were, and for the game to be continued as before. His opponent however, (who is incidentally much bigger and stronger), insists that the entire game must start all over. Better still they should stop playing chess, and switch to all-in wrestling-- with no holds barred.

FOOTNOTES

- (A) Throughout the following account the authors have sought to offer a coherent explanation of the events triggered by Lt. Colonel Untung on the morning of October 1. Inevitably, in order to arrive at any explanation the authors must weigh probabilities and exercise inference, as well as simply arrange the scattered "facts" that have been available to them. At some junctures in the account assumption has not been sharply distinguished from fact for the sake of maintaining coherence. However, in these cases the points at issue are discussed in footnotes and in the Appendix.
- (1) To this day, when a Javanese says he is going to the Negari (the city), he means Surakarta or Jogjakarta.
 - (2) The usual image of the Jogjanese is that of directness, relative simplicity, courage, and discipline. (Needless to say the Solonese generally despise these virtues, and regard the Jogjanese as hopelessly kasar). The Solonese pride themselves on their wordly sophistication, subtlety, realism, and elegance (Needless to say the Jogjanese largely despise these virtues and regard the Solonese as sly and decadent.). Given these rough distinctions it is not surprising that many Solonese have gone into politics, while the Jogjanese have often preferred the military.
 - (3) The one senior military officer from the Surakarta area is Lieutenant General G. P. H. Djatikusumo, who has, since the revolution, made his career almost exclusively in Djakarta and abroad. On the political side, however, the ascendancy of Solo is quite remarkable. At least 11 members of the present Cabinet are "Solonese", compared to 3 from Jogjakarta.
 - (4) For a full discussion of the October 17, 1952 affair, see Feith, Herbert, The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953: A Turning Point in Post-Revolutionary Indonesia (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Monograph Series; Ithaca, New York, 1958), pp. 114-115.
 - (5) Suherman is also referred to variously as Suhirman and Sahrman. For convenience his name is spelled Suherman throughout this analysis.
 - (6) This judgment of the relative importance of various officers involved in the September 30th Movement is based primarily on the relative frequency and relative prominence of mention of these 7 in various official, quasi-official, and press accounts. In addition, there is some reliance on information secured by the authors on a private basis. For a list of the 13 Army officers dishonorably discharged see AB, December 11.
 - (7) See the speech by General Nasution in which he states that the situation in Central Java was 60% in favor of the September 30th Movement militarily as well as politically. Angkatan Bersendjata (AB) November 30.
 - (8) Berita Yudha (BY), October 23.

- (9) Antara (News Bulletin) October 23 and BY, October 25. -- B. For the location of Battalion 454 in Sron dol, see the Jogja daily Nasional, December 19, 1963.
- (10) It is not known just when Untung assumed this post or when he left it, but as of February 1964 the Army Information Center's weekly paper referred to him as holding it. Sapta Marga February 13, 1964.
- (11) For identification of Battalion 530 and its commander, see BY, November 6 and AB, October 21, 1965.
- (12) For description of the Pranoto and Untung roles in the Armed Forces Day celebrations, see BY, September 21, 1965.
- (13) In the course of a press conference called to announce new security measures being taken by the Djakarta Army Command in the wake of the recent theft of weapons from a military post on Djalan Surabaya, the Djakarta Raja Military Commander Major General Umar Wirahadikusumah gave this figure. The text of the press report is as follows:
 "The total number of Armed Forces personnel in the capital city has been steadily rising since 1962 due to the Trikora Command under which the capital served as the center for concentrating troops.
 "The Commander said that before 1962 there were only several thousand Armed Forces personnel in the capital, while currently the total had already reached 60,000." See Duta Masyarakat, October 1, 1965.
 The context suggests that this total does not include those Armed Forces units brought into the city for Armed Forces Day.
- (14) See the confessions of three trainees with alleged PKI and/or Pemuda Rakjat affiliation: Api, November 3; Api, November 7; Duta Revolusi, November 10; AB, November 16. For reference to the use of Lubang Buaja as a training site, see the speech of General Suharto on the night of October 4 reported in BY, October 5. The same paper carries another story stating that the training had been carried on for three months. This length of time seems consistent also with the fact that in late June the Air Force Commander Omar Dhani had made a speech supporting the controversial PKI proposal for a Fifth Armed Forces of workers and peasants. Dhani justified this position by saying that it was Air Force strategy to defend its bases with local people. See Antara, June 22, 1965.
 It is possible that the presence of the trainees was accidental and that the use made of them was partly a last minute improvisation.
- (15) Api, November 3. Also see the speech of Major General Suharto on October 15 to members of the National Front central and regional boards. (Mimeographed). This important document is henceforth cited as Suharto speech, October 15.
- (16) Pelopop, October 9, and BY, October 17.
- (17) This is the conclusion to be drawn from specific references to Arief in separate accounts of five of the seven raids. For these see below, footnotes 19-26.

- (18) Berita Yudha Minggu, December 5.
- (19) Pelopor, October 9 and Berita Yudha Minggu, December 5. Lt. General Achmad Yani was at the time of his death Minister/Commander of the Army. For additional biographical detail on Yani, see BY, October 6.
- (20) Berita Yudha Minggu, December 5 and BY, October 6. Major-General Soeprapto was at the time of his death Second Deputy to Minister/Commander of the Army Yani. For further biographical detail on Soeprapto, see BY, October 6.
- (21) BY, October 17, BY, December 12 and AB, December 12. Major-General S. Parman was at the time of his death Assistant I (Intelligence) to Minister/Commander of the Army Yani. For further biographical detail on Parman see BY, October 6.
- (22) Berita Yudha Minggu, November 21. Brig.-Gen. Soetojo Siswomihardjo was at the time of his death Auditor-General and Law Inspector of the Indonesian Army. For further biographical detail, see BY, October 6.
- (23) Kompas, October 25, BY, October 11, and December 13, as well as Berita Yudha Minggu, November 21. Brig.-Gen. Donald Isack Pandjaitan at the time of his death was Assistant IV (Logistics) to the Minister/Commander of the Army Yani. For further biographical details on Pandjaitan, see BY, October 6.
- (24) A recent statement by the Kebajoran Baru Police indicates that Mrs. Pandjaitan had sufficient time to contact a neighbor who in turn contacted the Police Inspector (Inspector Dinas). The Inspector immediately telephoned the Pandjaitan home. After determining that shooting was in process, the Inspector's contact with the Pandjaitan home was broken. He then immediately reported to the local Resort Police Commander who ordered his men to go directly to Pandjaitan's residence. Upon arrival this police force discovered that the attackers had already departed with Pandjaitan. One policeman, who had arrived independently of the main police group, was taken away by the attacking party to Lubang Buaja where he managed to escape. See BY, December 13.
- (25) Berita Yudha Minggu, November 28. Major General M. T. Harjono at the time of his death was Third Deputy to the Minister/Commander of the Army Yani. For further biographical details on Harjono, see Angkatan Bersendjata, October 11.
- (26) Berita Yudha Minggu, October 24. Also see an account of the attack on Dr. Leimena's guards in Berita Yudha Minggu, October 10 and confession in Duta Revolusi, November 10.
- (27) Suharto speech, October 15.
- (28) See speech of Dhani in support of Fifth Force in Antara, June 22, 1965.
- (29) See Dhani speech in support of Fifth Force and other sources related to the Air Force training of Pemuda Rakjat at Lubang Buaja cited above in footnote 14. An indication of the extent to which the Air Force training

operation had poisoned Air Force-Army relations is a post-coup editorial in the semi-official Army newspaper Angkatan Bersendjata. It included this statement: "Gestapu almost succeeded in creating conflict between the Army and the Air Force as reflected in the Pemuda Rakjat/Gerwani training at Halim Air Base in Lubang Buaja...." See AB, November 25.

- (30) See BY, October 5 and also see confessions cited in footnote 14 above.
- (31) Major (Air) Sujono was the first Air Force officer whose discharge and arrest was officially announced. See RRI broadcast, October 20. Shortly thereafter at least three additional officers (Overste Heru Atmodjo, Major Gatot Sukrisno and Major Sukarto Kartono) were discharged. See Api, October 24. For a report of the Air Force Investigation Command arresting a number of Air Force personnel on suspicion of involvement in the conspiracy, see RRI broadcast, October 30. A subsequent report recounts an extensive shuffling of top officers in the Air Force. See AB, December 16.
- (32) Suharto reports that he first believed Dhani had been kidnapped (ditjulik) by the Untung group. A short time later Suharto learned that Dhani had in fact been "taken to a safe place by his own men" (diselamatkan oleh anak buahnja). See Suharto speech, October 15. Also see earlier Suharto comment on October 4 in which he pointedly takes exception to the President's attempt to absolve the Air Force from any involvement. See BY, October 5.
- As for the question of the degree of Dhani's involvement in the conspiracy, it is noteworthy that he was dispatched abroad on a study mission in mid-October and then subsequently relieved of his post as Minister/Commander of the Air Force on November 24. The fact that he was, however, given another ministerial post -- though admittedly one of little prominence -- suggests that the Army does not regard Dhani or the Air Force as a whole as involved in the planning of the attempted coup. See Api, October 18 and RRI broadcast, November 27. More recently a statement by General Nasution indicates that Dhani may, however, face punishment in the future. See BY, December 4.
- (33) Antara, October 1- B. See Appendix for the text of the announcement.
- (34) Significantly most of the "prominent people in the Indonesian community" who would also have been likely "targets of the Council of Generals" were not in Djakarta on the night of September 30. The two top Communist Party leaders after Aidit were both out of town. Njoto was in Medan on an inspection tour with eleven other Ministers. (See Harian Harapan (Medan) October 1. Lukman was traveling in Central Java. (See Surabaya Post, November 5.) Other likely "targets" would have included First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio, who was also in Medan. (See Antara, September/ 28-B) Two other possibilities were Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh and Chairman of the Nationalist Party Ali Sastroamidjojo. Both of them were in Peking for the National Day celebrations. (See Antara, October 2-A).

The only remaining major "targets" in Djakarta on the night of September 30 are then Air Force Commander Dhani and Communist Party Chairman Aidit. It is known that Dhani was brought to Halim apparently by Air Force

personnel linked to Untung. (See Suharto speech, October 15 and footnote 32 above.) The question of precisely when and how Aidit came to Halim is more difficult.

Reports of Aidit's movements on the day of October 1 are scant, but suggestive. Mrs. Aidit is reported to have told Army authorities that her husband had been kidnapped by rightist elements and taken to an unknown destination. (See AFP report from Singapore, October 7). Another source claims also that Aidit was "kidnapped" (dilarikan). Significantly this is from an anti-Communist Islamic paper which would not be likely to put Aidit in a favorable light. The same report also says Aidit was taken to Halim Air Base at Tjililitan and then flown to Central Java. (See Duta Revolusi, October 9.) These latter two points are consistent with a number of later reports that show that Aidit did, indeed, leave Halim by plane about midnight of October 1 and arrived in Jogja about two hours later. See Api Pantjasila, October 14; Surabaya Post, November 8; Kedaulatan Rakyat, November 9; Kompas, November 24 and Asahi (Japanese English-language daily), November 29. These reports constitute strong circumstantial evidence that Aidit was in fact at Halim considerably prior to his departure for Central Java. Certainly it would have been unlikely he could have gone to Halim -- whether voluntarily or under duress -- after Suharto became aware that the Untung group had control of Halim. Judging from Suharto's own statement his suspicions of the Air Force -- and very likely of Halim after his attempts to establish liaison with Halim did not bear fruit -- arose quite early in the morning. Presumably from that point on units from Kostrad (which is only about 3 miles from Halim) guarded the approaches to Halim. In any case, it is clear that Suharto's forces had begun to surround Halim soon after 6:00 P.M. Although couriers from Halim seem to have been allowed to go into the city both to deliver press releases and to summon several Ministers for the President, it seems highly unlikely that the Army under Suharto would permit free passage to their prime political enemy.

Apart from this conjecture about access to the base, it is noteworthy that despite a concerted Army campaign to blame the conspiracy on the PKI there is yet to be any Army explanation for where Aidit was during the day of October 1. While the Army naturally does not wish to unnecessarily embarrass the President and flatter Aidit by suggesting that Aidit was at Halim with the President, there is no such inhibition on saying that Aidit was elsewhere -- unless enough persons know that in fact Aidit was at Halim. Furthermore, in terms of the hypothesis presented here, it is highly plausible that Aidit was brought to Halim by Untung adherents early on the morning of the first. For it is likely that the Untung group felt that Aidit's presence at Halim would help to convince Soekarno that he should quickly and publicly support the September 30th Movement.

The possibility that other "prominent leaders" may have been brought to Halim early in the morning of the 1st is not to be ruled out. It does seem, however, rather unlikely that Untung would have employed any more of his limited forces for taking under protection lesser figures than Aidit and Dhani. Presumably he would have used any additional available troops to kidnap the Djakarta Raja Commander Umar. Yet there is no charge from the Army that Untung made any attempt on Umar.

Finally, in considering who might have been brought to Halim by Untung, it must be noted that there is evidence that other leaders were at Halim on October 1st. In the absence of any indication of when or how they came

to Halim and in view of the fact that they do not appear to have had any critical role to play in the Untung strategy, the presumption is that they came at the President's beckon after midday. They came then with Untung's approval -- and possibly -- with Suharto's knowledge. These leaders include Second Deputy Prime Minister Leimena, Navy Commander Martadinata and Police Commander Sutjipto Judodihardjo. See Kedaulatan Rakjat, October 4. For further discussion of their presence at Halim, see below p. 30 and especially footnote 63.

- (35) Api, October 17.
- (36) Mertju Suar, and Api, October 17.
- (37) See discussions below on pages 44 - 55 of General Sabur's role at a later stage in the events of October 1.
- (38) In a speech on December 6 the President himself states that he was at Commander Susanto's house at Halim on October 1. See RRI broadcast, December 6. At that time Susanto was serving as Director of Operations for the Air Force. Such a post would make it likely that he would have a home at Halim which is the center of Air Force operations. See Kedaulatan Rakjat, October 1.
- (39) Among the most detailed confessions are those of Mrs. Djamilah of Pemuda Rakjat, Suparno Bin Sastrosumarto of Pemuda Rakjat, and Memed who is identified only as a PKI sympathizer. See Api, November 7; Angkatan Bersendjata, November 16; and Api, November 3. Also see confession of another Lubang Buaja trainee who is reported to have witnessed the torture of General Suprpto. See Duta Masyarakat, October 25. Compare this with a later account of Suprpto's death in Berita Yudha Minggu, December 5.
- (40) See particularly the confessions of Mrs. Djamilah and Suparno cited above.
- (41) The Djamilah confession mentions the participation of several PGT men. See Api, November 7. Some indication that the PGT's role was limited is the vigorous Air Force denial of their involvement and the fact that to date no notice has appeared of their punishment. See RRI broadcast, October 20.
For a report of the participation of 3000 members of the Sobsi-affiliated Air Force Workers Union, see Duta Revolusi, October 9. In spite of this it is noteworthy that the Air Force apparently felt it had sufficient forces to take control of the Djakarta TV station. See BY, December 13.
- (42) One of the trainees was given a different pretext. He was told that he was needed to help withstand an imminent attack from the Islamic student organization (the HMI). See Memed confession in Api, November 3.
- (43) Berita Yudha Minggu, December 5. Also see confessions cited in footnote 39.
- (44) For details see Berita Yudha Minggu, December 12.
- (45) AB, November 16.

- (46) In the initial Army accounts of the killing of the Generals great stress was placed on alleged torture and mutilation by Communist youth and women. (See statement by General Suharto on the finding of the Generals' bodies at Lubang Buaja and the pictorial spread on the front pages of the Army-sponsored newspapers Berita Yudha and Angkatan Bersendjata for October 5.) This theme found lurid elaboration in the confessions of Memed (Api, November 3); Djamin (Duta Masyarakat, October 25); and especially Djamilah (Api, November 7).

Subsequently there have been increasing signs that these initial stories suffered from severe inflation. The confession of Suparno in AB on November 16 conceded that five of the seven victims were simply shot without any hint of torture or mutilation. And the two officers -- Tendean and Suprpto -- who were tortured according to Suparno only received blows from rifle butts. Still more significant has been the President's public charge that the initial horror stories were unfounded. In speeches on December 12 and December 22, the President claimed that the doctors who inspected the bodies of the slain generals reported that there had been no ghastly mutilation of the eyes and genitals as earlier recounted in the Army press. See Suara Islam, December 13. Berita Yudha of December 23 reports the President's speech without the allegations. Also see E. Gibbon's analysis on p. 86 below.

- (47) See Djamilah confession in Api, November 7.

- (48) See Memed confession in Api, November 3.

- (49) See Suparno confession in AB, November 16.

- (50) In the case of North Sumatra in 1956, the Army central leadership in Djakarta successfully used the pro-Communist regimental commander in East Sumatra Lt. Col. Wahab Makmur and his supporters in Communist mass organizations as a lever to force Col. Djamin Gintings to move against the rebellious Medan Commander Col. Simbolon. See Feith, Herbert, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 525-531.

In the case of West Sumatra after the PRRI rebellion, the Army made use of the PKI to assist in pacifying this predominantly Moslem area. Subsequently in 1961 when administrative autonomy began to be restored to villages in the area, the PKI was eased out of most of the positions it had previously been given.

- (51) Texts of the first Untung proclamation are available in both the English and Indonesian versions of Antara for October 1 (Afternoon Edition). For a full English translation, see the Appendix.

- (52) Untung not only identified himself as the leader of the September 30th Movement which had been formed to crush the CIA-Generals' plot against the President and the Republic, but he gave highly personal motives for his action. See Antara, October 1-B and the Appendix.

- (53) It is also possible that Soekarno may have already observed that Pemuda Rakjat people were being employed as guards by the Untung group or Untung may have simply told him of the necessity of using reliable elements of

the Pemuda Rakjat because of the relatively small numbers of troops allied with Untung. In any case, it would seem that Aidit's presence at Halim would be required to convince Soekarno that the Army would regard the PKI as implicated.

- (54) The text of the first Untung proclamation is available in both the English and Indonesian versions of Antara for the afternoon of October 1. See Appendix, for the authors' hopefully more accurate translation of the Indonesian original.
- (55) A practical consideration which may well also have influenced this permissive attitude was the limited number of troops at Untung's disposal. Compare the similar situation in Jogjakarta on October 2, as recorded in Kedaulatan Rakjat, October 20.
- (56) It is important to note that in this initial reference to the formation of a Revolutionary Council that there was no indication that President Soekarno would cease to function as President and Supreme Leader of the Revolution. Nor was the possibility that he might be appointed head of the Revolutionary Council as yet excluded. (It was not until the second Untung broadcast at 2:00 p.m. that it was made plain that Untung and his friends would themselves hold the posts of Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the new Council.) This crucial fact together with the repeated emphasis on the September 30th Movement's effort to thwart the Generals' coup in order to safeguard the President made it clear to Indonesian listeners that Untung had not acted against the President.
- (57) In October 1964 in his address to the Cairo Conference of Non-aligned Nations Soekarno had unequivocally denounced the policy of non-alignment as outdated in an era when world politics had become divided into two irreconcilable forces, i.e. "the new emerging forces and the old established forces". This speech marked the culmination of a trend dating back at least to the spring of 1961 when Soekarno's foreign policy began to strike a more militant anti-imperialist posture than that of the champions of non-alignment in the third world -- i.e. India and the U.A.R. This growing disaffection with non-alignment was reflected in the supplanting of the description of Indonesian policy as "free and active" by a stress on what was called Indonesia's "confrontation" foreign policy. Contrast, for example, Soekarno's address before the United Nations in September 1960 with the above-mentioned Cairo speech in October 1964. See Soekarno, Toward Freedom and Dignity of Man (Djakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1961), pp. 121-149, and Soekarno, The Era of Confrontation (Djakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1964).
- (58) For the text of the Dhani statement, see Antara (Warta Berita), October 1-B. The fact that Dhani has never denied that he issued this statement -- in contrast to two prominent PNI leaders who have vigorously denied that they ever issued a not too dissimilar a statement -- makes it highly unlikely that this "statement" was a forgery. That he is still held accountable for it is also revealed in Nasution's remarks on Dhani reported in BY, December 4. Also see footnote 32 above.

- (59) RRI broadcast, October 1.
- (60) See discussion of the Suherman-Untung group's likely attitude toward Suharto, on p. 29 above.
- (61) Suharto displayed these attitudes during the "July 3rd Affair" in 1946 when he rejected Soekarno's order that he replace Gen. Sudarsono as Commander of the 10th (Jogja) Division. See Sedjarah T.N.I. Komando Daerah Militer VII Diponegoro (Typescript anonymous), pp. 101-103.
- (62) The text of the President's appointment of Pranoto is found in Antara (Warta Berita) October 2-A and Harian Rakjat, October 2. Also for 1:30 as the time of its announcement, see Indonesian Daily News (Surabaya), October 4.
- (63) The summoning of Umar and Pranoto is reported in Suharto's speech to National Front representatives on October 15. Leimena's presence at Halim is confirmed by his own testimony. See his speech to the National Front representatives on October 15 (Mimeographed). According to Dhani, Leimena, Commander of the Navy Martadinata, Commander of the Police Sutjipto Judodihardjo and "various other leaders" all talked to the President -- presumably at Halim -- on October 1 prior to his issuing of his order appointing Major General Pranoto as "caretaker" of the Army, see statement of Omar Dhani issued on October 2 in Central Java and printed in the Jogja daily Kedaulatan Rakjat, October 4. The fact that the forces of the loyal Diponegoro Commander Surjosumpeno did not retake Jogja until the morning of the 4th -- about the time this issue of Kedaulatan Rakjat would have appeared -- strongly suggests that Dhani's statement is authentic. Also it has yet to appear in the Army-censored Djakarta press. The Dhani statement does not, however, indicate when or how these leaders came to Halim. Leimena's statement shows, however, that he did not reach Halim before mid-morning.
- (64) For the text of the Sabur statement, see Antara (Warta Berita), October 1-B and RRI broadcast, October 1. The authenticity of Sabur's signature on this statement is indicated by the fact that he has never chosen to deny its validity. Also the significance of the announcement in the negotiations between Soekarno and Untung also points to its validity. See discussion in paragraph below and the discussion below on page 44 of Sabur's later role in the events of October 1. For report of the release of the Sabur statement by his Chief of Staff, Lt. Colonel Marokeh Santoso at Tjakrabirawa Headquarters at 12:00 p.m., see Sinar Harapan, October 1 and Kedaulatan Rakjat, October 11. It is noteworthy that in another Sabur announcement broadcast by the Army several hours after they regained control of the radio station the phrase "continues to hold the leadership of the state" again appears. But the Army-sponsored Berita Yudha replaces the word "continues" with the word "returns". Compare RRI broadcast, October 2 with BY, October 2.
- (65) For just such a reaction see the left-leaning Warta Minggu (Solo) for October 10. It notes that the Untung story was that he had rescued Bung Karno from the Generals' coup. "This point was reinforced by the announcement of Brigadier General Sabur, Commander of the Tjakrabirawa Regiment,

that the President was safe and well." (Hal ini diperkuat dengan pengumuman Brigdjen Sabur, Komandan Tjakrabirawa, bahwa President dalam keadaan sehat walafiat.)

- (66) The following account of the counter-coup efforts of the forces directed by Major General Suharto is based for the most part on Suharto's own version of the events of October 1 and 2. See Suharto speech, October 15. Significant amendments and additions to the Suharto version will be noted.
- (67) Umar could not have gone to his own Divisional Headquarters because, according to the account given by Lt. General Djatikusumo, it was heavily guarded by forces allied to Untung. See Pelopor Minggu, October 17.
- (68) Rukun Tetangga is a neighborhood association whose responsibilities include intelligence and security. This institution did not, however, always function with the same efficiency displayed by the association in Suharto's neighborhood. One instance of its breakdown in the crisis atmosphere of early October 1 appears to have occurred in the area including the home of Major General Harjono.
- (69) Suharto stated in his account that he immediately recognized that the Untung group was lying about its motives for arresting the Generals because Suharto himself was personally certain that there was no such thing as a Generals' Council as charged in the first Untung broadcast.
- (70) It is known that Commander of the Air Force Omar Dhani had by this time already been "rescued" and brought to Halim by Air Force subordinates. Air Vice-Marshal Sri Muljono Herlambang was with First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio in Sumatra. See Suharto speech, October 15 and Antara, September 28-B.
- (71) The Indonesian phrase used by Major-General Sarbini was "main2 terhadap negara". See BY, October 17. The following story is based on this account by Sarbini himself.
- (72) It is, of course, the President's custom to call a number of Ministers, Ambassadors and various other persons to his daily breakfast "audiences". It is also noteworthy that according to General Yani's wife, the General had an appointment with the President for 7:30 a.m. that morning. See Pelopor, October 9.
- (73) American diplomats are reported to have seen high officers approach and confer with officers of the 530 and 454 Battalions stationed in the Freedom Square located in front of the presidential palace. The American Embassy also overlooks this square. See dispatch of Seth King in New York Times, October 17.
- (74) Api Pantjasila, October 31. Part of the Surabaya slang employed included this coarse phrase which defies precise translation into English. "Lho lah opo kene, ajo mulih balik njang pangkalan. Dantjuk ko-en."

(75) For texts of these broadcasts, see RRI broadcasts, October 1 and Harian Rakjat, October 2. For complete texts of all the Untung statements except for the long decree, see Antara (Warta Berita), October 1-B. For a translation of these statements see the Appendix.

(76) The whole broadcast betrays signs of haste and confusion. It conveys the impression that the President had been put aside when, in fact, the Untung group was probably still hoping to persuade the President to support the September 30th Movement and announce himself what he had just allowed the Commander of his bodyguard to announce, i.e. that the President continued to hold the top leadership of the state.

In this regard, the subsequent Army contention that the Untung group overthrew Soekarno's authority by declaring the Dwikora "demissionary" is not borne out by a careful analysis of the text. In the first place, the term "demisioner" is the classical word in Indonesian parlance for a "caretaker" government which has been defeated in parliament. Yet under the Constitution of 1945 on which Guided Democracy is based, the cabinet is not responsible to parliament, but to the President. Secondly, the President's position as Prime Minister is an anomaly, since such a post has no meaning under the 1945 Constitution particularly when the President assumes it himself. Thirdly, Guided Democracy was, even formally, an odd mixture of liberal terminology and post-liberal period practice, i.e. Djuanda (and now Subandrio) have been regarded by all but the most sophisticated political public as Prime Minister though in fact he was First Minister. In any case, the crucial point is again that given the muddled character of the statement, it seems doubtful that Untung and his friends fully understood the implications that might be drawn from their own statement. It may not have occurred to them that their declaration would be construed as being aimed at the President rather than simply at the Cabinet.

(77) Since the coup Brig. Gen. Amir Machmud has been installed as Commander of Djakarta Raya Division. See BY, December 7. This is a clear indication of the confidence the anti-Communist Nasution-Suharto Army leadership has in Amir.

(78) For a full list of the 45-member Dewan Revolusi see Antara (Warta Berita), October 1-B and October 2-A. Further signs of a lack of political sophistication and haste were the failure to include more than one representative for the entire island of Sumatra and the complete lack of representation for the Catholic Party, Partindo, IPKI or the Civil Service. The membership list, with affiliations where these are known, is included in the Appendix.

(79) In spite of the muddled nature of the membership of the Revolutionary Council, its overall vaguely Nasakomish complexion may have been consistent with Untung's emphasis that the September 30th Movement sought adjustments only within the Army and not in the polity at large.

(80) RRI broadcast, October 1. Antara (Warta Berita), October 1-B.

- (81) Clearly Untung and his group had no particular interest in Soekarno's children. This is another clear example of a Soekarno initiative.
- (82) BY, October 16. Antara,
- (83) Suharto speech, October 15.
- (84) It is not clear at what time they were sent into Djakarta -- whether early in the morning to help hold the center of the town, in a situation where Untung and his group were severely short of men, or later when it seemed that "reinforcements" were needed as the Suharto tactics had their effect. If the Communist Youth (Pemuda Rakjat) were guarding the National Front building, they can scarcely have failed to observe the to-and-fro of Army couriers. Accordingly one is surprised that they would not have had their suspicions as to what was going on. On the other hand, if they were sent in as reinforcements one must assume that they had been given some idea that Battalion 530 was no longer the reliable unit that it had been earlier on. In any case they surrendered without a fight and played no significant part in the silent struggle for Djakarta that day.
- (85) The afternoon edition of the Indonesian version of Antara (Warta Berita) on October 1 gives 3:35 p.m. as the time of its publication.
- (86) The afternoon papers of October 1 remain an important matter for investigation. There is a striking contrast in the stance taken by the leading leftist papers and the leading "rightist" one. Of the former none made any editorial comment, but all carried at least the first Untung proclamation. Significantly, however, even the headlines used for the proclamation reflected some caution on the part of the editors. For example, the Warta Bhakti headline sticks close to the wording employed by Untung himself and places above the headline in dark letters the source of the story: "RRI Djakarta Announces:". For an indication of the contents of Warta Bhakti (Afternoon Edition), Kebudajaan Baru, Ekonomi Nasional and Gelora Indonesia, see the Army attack on these four PKI-leaning papers in Berita Yudha for October 4, 5, 6. Alleged photostats of portions of these four papers are given. Also consult the respective editions of these papers which, however, do not deviate from the Berita Yudha photostats for the two papers the authors have been able to check, i.e. Warta Bhakti and Kebudajaan Baru.
- The only "rightist" paper thus far available to the authors is the well-known Sinar Harapan controlled by the Indonesian Protestant Party. Unlike the leftist papers mentioned above, it does not carry any of the statements of Untung, nor the statement of support for Untung issued by Omar Dhani at 9:30 a.m. Rather it gives front page headlines to the brief statement by the Commander of the President's personal bodyguard at 12:00 p.m. that the President continued to hold the leadership of the state. See Sinar Harapan, October 1. For a full discussion of the positions taken by all the major Djakarta papers on October 1 afternoon and October 2 morning, see the Appendix.
- (87) For the text of the controversial Harian Rakjat editorial of October 2 and a discussion of its significance, see the Appendix.

- (88) Reportedly Karim helped to stimulate such jubilation among the openly pro-Communist editors of Antara -- a jubilation which was abruptly undercut by the 8:45 p.m. broadcast of General Suharto. See account of the mood in the Antara office in BY, October 27. Concerning Karim's activities, see Karya Bhakti, October 12 and Api, October 11.
- (89) For an extended discussion of the PNI position on October 1 and 2, see the section of the Appendix dealing with the Harian Rakjat.
- (90) The statement of the RPKAD (Army Paratroop Regiment) gives this as the time that RRI Djakarta went off the air. See BY, October 11. Also see Suharto speech, October 15 for an explanation as to why he elected not to seize control of RRI until the evening.
- (91) Umar's order to control all news media was issued at 6:00 p.m. on October 1, but was not broadcast over RRI that night with the other announcements of the Suharto forces. See BY, October 2. If it was implemented immediately early on the evening of the first, it appears to have been done so selectively. Only the PKI's Harian Rakjat, the PNI's Suluh Indonesia and the heavily leftist Antara news bulletin appeared on the morning of the 2nd. Other papers, except for the specially exempted Army-sponsored Angkatan Bersendjata and Berita Yudha, were spared the burden of exposing to the public view their initial reactions to the Untung affair. For further discussion of the party press reaction, see the Appendix section dealing with the Harian Rakjat editorial.
- (92) There are conflicting accounts of the time for the announcement of the Solo Revolution Council. Api Pantjasila of October 14 gives 6:00 p.m. while Minggu Pagi of November 21 gives 10:00 p.m.
- (93) Presumably they still did not know that General Suryosumpeno, Commander of the Diponegoro Division, had escaped the net. See below for a discussion of events in Central Java on October 1.
- (94) See Soekarno interview with Antara editor Nahar on October 14, published in Sinar Harapan, October 14 and BY, October 15.
- (95) BY, October 16.
- (96) See the Suharto speech, October 15.
- (97) See statement of RPKAD Commander Colonel Sarwo Edhie in BY, November 26. Sarwo Edhie had been RPKAD Commander since January 12, 1965 and was an intimate of General Yani.
- (98) See Suharto speech on RRI on the night of October 1 carried in BY, October 2.
- (99) See the Army Information Center press release carried in BY, October 2.
- (100) For two quite different descriptions of how Brig. Gen. Suryosumpeno managed to escape, see BY, October 22 and October 29.

- (101) Magelang is approximately 1½ hour drive from Semarang. For reference to Suryosumpeno meeting Lt. Col. Hussain, see Antara, October 25.
- (102) BY, October 21.
- (103) Information on developments in Salatiga was obtained from private sources.
- (104) BY, October 14 is the main source of events in Jogjakarta. Also see AB, October 24; Api Pantjasila, October 13; Antara, November 23; Kompas, October 15.
- (105) For biographical information on Muljono, see BY, October 14. The Jogjakarta daily Nasional reports that on December 9, 1963 Muljono was transferred from his post as Chief of Staff of the Bojolali Military District 0724 to his post at the time of the coup as Chief of Section V on the Staff of the 72nd Military Resort. For data on Col. Katamso, see Nasional, December 17, 1963. This article was occasioned by Katamso's installation on December 13, 1963 to the position he held at the time of the coup as Commander of the 72nd Military Resort in Jogjakarta.
- (106) One suspects, therefore, that Muljono was reacting more to news from Djakarta than from Semarang, and possibly did not yet know that Semarang was in Suherman's hands.
- (107) This is inferred from the strong denial issued by the Central Police Headquarters on October 8 in Berita Yudha despite the fact that there had been no public accusations to this effect.
- (108) The main source of information on events in Solo is the account in BY, October 12. Also see AB, October 25; Antara, October 25. For an account of Aidit's activities in the Solo area, see the discussion below.
- (109) The Diponegoro Division has three Infantry Brigades numbered 4-6. The headquarters of the 6th is located in Solo. Lieutenant Colonel Ezy Suharto was transferred from Command of the Kudus Military District 0722 to the Command of the Solo Military District 0735 in August, 1965. (See Nasional,).
 According to the Jogjakarta weekly, Minggu Pagi of November 21, Iskandar (here referred to as Colonel Iskandar) was actually stationed in Medan, and was "on leave" in Solo. It is also implied that Ashari was in on the plot to take over Solo.
 According to Panjebar Semangat (Surabaja) (Javanese language) of December 15, p. 7 the announcement that the city was in the hands of a so-called Dewan Revolusi was made by Lt. Col. Iskandar. Furthermore, a joint statement of support for the Dewan Revolusi was made by Colonel Ashari, Commander of Solo Garrison and Infantry Brigade VI, and the Mayor Utomo Ramelan in the name of the National Front.
- (110) The report in Minggu Pagi, November 21, says that the announcement was not made until 10:00 p.m. and that it was read by an unnamed Second Lieutenant from the local Army information staff. The report indicates

that the Radio Station was taken over and guarded by troops from Battalion C within the 6th Infantry Brigade.

- (111) The text of Ramelan's statement can be found in
- (112) It is also reported that an abortive coup was attempted against the Commander of the 71st Military Resort (Banjumas-Pekalongan), Colonel Tjiptono Setiabodhie, in his headquarters at Purwokerto. The coup attempt was made by a certain Major Tukaeni, the Commander of the Tegal Military District. See Duta Revolusi, November 29.
- (113) See the statement signed by General Suharto and announced by the Army Information Center over RRI at about 10:00 p.m., October 1. See BY, October 2.
- (114) See the radiogram sent by General Suharto and broadcast over RRI shortly after 10:00 p.m. on October 1. See BY, October 2.
- (115) See the Suharto speech, October 15. Also see the account by the Commander of the RPKAD given in BY of November 26.
- (116) One suspects that Sri Muljono was sent back because Subandrio and the others were still too nervous to wish to plunge into a bewildering crisis situation in Djakarta.
- (117) For reference to Aidit's being aboard and to the use of "Hercules" planes, see Duta Revolusi, October 9. This strongly Islamic paper says that Aidit had been "kidnapped" and taken to Halim where he was "flown" to Central Java. See also the confession of Lukman's chauffeur cited in Surabaya Post, November 8. "K", one of Aidit's bodyguard, tells the chauffeur that Aidit left Halim at 12:00 p.m.
- (118) This is the time given in the editorial of the authoritative Jogjakarta newspaper Kedaulatan Rakjat of November 9. Earlier accounts also have Aidit arriving at about this time and in the company of Omar Dhani. It should be recognized that Dhani's presence would have greatly expedited Aidit's mission through his ability to win quick cooperation from Air Base Commanders. See Suharto speech, October 15; Api Pantjasila, October 14; Mertju Suar, October 22; Antara, November 23-A; Asahi (Japanese Tokyo daily), November 29; and AB, October 15.
- One account gives 5:00 a.m. as the time of Aidit's arrival and fails to mention Dhani at all. The source has, however, an obvious interest in protecting the reputation of Dhani and the Air Force generally. See statement of Commodore S. Dono Indarto, Commander of the 7th Air Command (Central Java). See BY, November 30.
- The fact of Dhani's presence in Central Java on October 2 is best established by the fact that Dhani issues a statement on October 2 which is printed only in Jogjakarta. See Kedaulatan Rakjat, October 4. Later in the afternoon of October 2 Dhani apparently flies back to Djakarta in time to attend a late afternoon Koti meeting at the Presidential Palace in Bogor. For his late arrival at that meeting, see Suharto speech, October 15.

- (119) Api Pantjasila, October 14.
- (120) Much of the following account is informed by the printed confession of Lukman's chauffeur. See Surabaja Post, November 8.
- (121) The Governor of Central Java, Mochtar, was on a visit to the People's Republic of China at the time of the Untung affair. He does not re-assume the Governorship of Central Java until October 28. See RRI broadcast of November 1 for evidence of his return.
- (122) Again the confession of Lukman's chauffeur is the prime source. See Surabaja Post, November 8.
- (123) Perhaps the house referred to is that of Goeshai, a director of the Badja Karja Company, on Djalan Hajam Wuruk 118. Although the source for this information seems highly inaccurate with regard to times, details such as this are often consistent with other accounts. See Mertju Suar, October 21.
- (124) During the whole period in which Lukman and Aidit are alleged to have been in Semarang there is no hint in the confession of Lukman's driver of any link between the Communist leaders and Colonel Suherman who successfully seized military control of the city from Suryosumpeno early on the morning of the first and held it until about 5:00 a.m. of October 2. See Surabaja Post, November 8.
- (125) See Surabaja Post, November 8 and the confession of Sujono Atmo in BY, December 3. Another account pictures Aidit returning to Jogjakarta after his trip to Semarang. See Api Pantjasila, October 14.
- (126) For Lt. Col. Sujoto's "counter" to Lukman's chauffeur's story of Aidit, see Patriot, November 24.
- (127) Despite his conscious concern with minimizing his cooperation with the alleged Communist authors of the Untung conspiracy, Sujoto does acknowledge that on the night of October 2 he was willing to grant Aidit's request to try to arrange for the dispatch of Aidit's letter to the President. Then the following morning -- perhaps influenced by the first broadcast of the President over RRI at about 1:30 a.m. on the 3rd -- Sujoto appears to have decided it would be best for him not to associate further with Aidit. In any case, it is highly probable that such a consideration determined his decision to return the letter to Aidit on the morning of the 3rd rather than the lame excuse given in his statement. See Patriot, November 24.
- (128) A further indication of the delicate position in which Sujoto found himself on October 3 is the statement he issued on that day. Echoing statements of the previous day by Omar Dhani and the Central Java Air Force Commander, Sujoto joined them in standing firmly behind the President. See Kedaulatan Rakjat, October 12.
- (129) RRI broadcast, October 4. Also see BY, October 5.

- (130) The account of Lukman's return trip to Djakarta is found in his chauffeur's confession in Surabaya Post, November 8. For a report of Lukman's presence at the October 6 Cabinet Meeting in Bogor, see Washington Post, October 10.
- (131) It seems likely that the deliberations involving Aidit, Lukman, Sakirman, Ramelan and Sujono Atmo during the period October 1-October 4 produced the first official PKI Central Committee statement on the Untung affair. This statement was issued on October 5. At the same time the similar statement of the Central Committee for Central Java was undoubtedly prepared. See Appendix for the text of both statements. It is noteworthy that Rewang, a Central Java PKI leader, may also have been in on these consultations. At least there is one report that he was with Aidit. See Mertju Suar, October 21.
- (132) Patriot, November 24.
- (133) The two most prominent accounts of Aidit's probable death have appeared only in papers outside of Indonesia. The Asahi (Japanese Tokyo daily) of November 29 gives October 22 as the date of Aidit's death, while the subsequent London Observer version printed in the Washington Post of December 19 gives November 22. The case for October 22 as the date of Aidit's death seems strengthened by the marked increase in tensions in Central Java at that time. For it is just on October 22 that the RPKAD arrives in Central Java in strength. Accordingly from that moment on the "rightist" groups led by fanatic Moslem youth feel it is safe to strike out at the Communists in the area. Moreover, the Army would certainly do its best to eliminate Aidit at this juncture for fear that he might become a rallying point for the hard-pressed Communists who up to the arrival of the RPKAD had refrained from any major provocative actions. Also see below pp. 60-64.
- (134) Suharto speech to National Front representatives on October 15 states that the two planes leaving Halim sometime on the night of the first went to Jogjakarta and then on to Maospati. Api Pantjasila of October 14 confirms this sequence of stops for Dhani. Also see the October 3 statement of the Central Java Air Force Commander in BY, November 30.
- (135) Suharto speech, October 15.
- (136) Suharto speech of October 15; RPKAD statement in BY, October 11; and Dhani statement of October 2 in Kedaulatan Rakjat, October 4.
- (137) BY, October 14.
- (138) The following account is based primarily on the Suharto speech of October 15.
- (139) It is possible that Wattimena had been ordered to bring Dhani back from Central Java or at least from Halim.
- (140) The text of this order was broadcast over RRI at 1:33 a.m. on October 3 and subsequently published in Berita Yudha of October 4.

- (141) The President's statement on AURI involvement was broadcast at 11:50 p.m. October 3, while Suharto's conflicting statement was broadcast on the evening of October 4. The texts of both statements are in BY, October 5.
- (142) Suharto speech of October 15.
- (143) BY, October 5.
- (144) BY, October 4. Although the editorial refrained from mention of the PKI, this issue carried photostats of the editorial in Harian Rakjat of October 2 together with selected items from other papers of the far left. These photostats were offered as the Army's first "proof" of PKI involvement.
- (145) It is interesting that in Suharto's "off the record" October 15 speech the PKI is not mentioned. See also BY, October 25.
- (146) It was essential to do this since an honest discussion of what had happened would have exposed too much of the tension inside the Army and revealed the "unpopularity" of the senior officers.
- (147) This account is based on information obtained from private sources. It is indirectly confirmed by BY, October 24.
- (148) Commanded by a Major Utomo Battalion C was under the jurisdiction of Colonel Katamso, the Commander of Military Resort 72. Perhaps it is significant that this Battalion had just been constituted on the previous August 14. Battalion L was part of the 6th Infantry Brigade commanded by Lt. Col. Ashari. See BY, October 5 and Kedaulatan Rakjat, October 5.
- As for the time that these two battalions returned to the Divisional Command, one Jogjakarta newspaper says the announcement of their return was only made at 12:30 a.m. October 4 in Jogjakarta. If this is the case, October 2 would be too early. See Nasional, October 5.
- (149) Kompas, October 15. There is an untranslatable pun in this phrase. "Untung" means luck in Indonesian so that the phrase as a whole means "a luck that brings bad luck".
- (150) Kedaulatan Rakjat, October 20.
- (151) Reports of these demonstrations appear in BY, October 14; Kompas, October 15; and Api Pantjasila, October 13 which places the time of the demonstrations at 4:00 p.m. on the afternoon of the 2nd.
- (152) This would not be the first time that the PKI Central Committee has proved unable to restrain its militant youth organizations from resorting to violent actions in tense circumstances. The most notable example is the role of the Communist Youth Organization (Pesindo) in helping to trigger the Madiun Affair of September 1948. See Kahin, George McT., Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 256-303. More recently, in May 1963, Communist youth again defied the wishes of the Party leadership by participating in the violent anti-Chinese riots that erupted at that time in West Java.

- (153) The main account of the fate of Katamso and Sugijono appears in BY, October 14 and 22.
- (154) See Minggu Pagi, December 12, p. 20 for Katamso's earlier history.
- (155) Kedaulatan Rakjat, October 21. Also see BY, October 14 and 22.
- (156) See Mekar Sari (Jogjakarta) (Javanese language), November 1-10, 1965, p. 19. Major Kartawi is among the 13 Army officers who have been dishonorably discharged because of involvement in the coup attempts. See AB, December 11.
- (157) BY, October 14 gives October 3 for this action. Api, October 25 gives October 5 and says PKI building was burned. Kompas, October 15 says all was quiet on October 3. In any case, these are the first instances of mob action against PKI property following the events of October 1.
- (158) Again use is made of private sources.
- (159) See Minggu Pagi (Jogjakarta), November 21, p. 9.
- (160) BY, October 12 and AB, October 25.
- (161) See above for the chronology of Aidit's and Ramelan's movements.
- (162) Mekar Sari, November 1-10, p. 19.
- (163) Neither of these statements appeared in the Djakarta press. They do appear, however, in several Central Java newspapers. See Gema Massa, October 9; Kedaulatan Rakjat, October 9; Waspada (Javanese language), October 6. Kedaulatan Rakjat of October 9 also carries a similar statement issued by the central headquarters of Baperki. This statement did not appear in any Djakarta papers. Incidentally, this same issue of Kedaulatan Rakjat reports that 44 mass organizations and parties in Djakarta have demanded the dissolution of the PKI. Kedaulatan Rakjat of October 13 carries the statement of the Partindo Central Board to the same effect. It reinforces a statement of October 4 unpublished in Djakarta by rejecting slanders against the party, standing fully behind Soekarno, and asking for national unity based on Nasakom.
- (164) For the Sujono Atmo order, see Gema Massa, October 9.
- (165) Gema Massa was banned by Suryosumpeno on October 11. See Kedaulatan Rakjat, October 14.
- (166) For the Sujono Atmo order, see Gema Massa, October 9 and for the Suryosumpeno statement, see Kedaulatan Rakjat, October 5. See also the remarkable speech given by Colonel Widodo (temporary replacement for Colonel Katamso as Commander of the 72nd Military Resport in Jogjakarta). This speech not only fails to mention the PKI, but refers frequently to the importance of maintaining Nasakom. See Kedaulatan Rakjat, October 8. Other similar indications of the delicate balance of political forces in Central Java at this time are the statement of the Jogjakarta

National Front in Kedaulatan Rakjat of October 6 and the report that an all-party delegation -- including the PKI -- left for Djakarta from Jogjakarta as late as October 10. See Kedaulatan Rakjat, October 11.

- (167) BY, October 12 and October 13.
- (168) For a full account of the end of the "Semarang group", see BY, December 18. Usman was actually killed on December 8, while Suherman and Marjono eluded death till December 14.
- (169) BY, December 3.
- (170) BY, October 5.
- (171) RRI Broadcast, October 5, reported in BY, October 6.
- (172) See, for example, BY, October 5. The hysteria was heightened by a story given wide publicity in the Djakarta press -- namely that Col. Katamso's wife and seven children had all been horribly murdered by the rebels. See, e.g. BY, October 6 and 7. This story was in fact completely untrue, and exposed as such in KR, October 7, which reported not only that the seven children were safe and sound in Jogjakarta, but that Mrs. Katamso had been all along in Bandung, where she had been in touch at least as early as October 5 with the Commander of the Siliwangi Division, Maj. Gen. Adjie, who had urged her not to return to Jogjakarta for the time being. This story indicates clearly that the Army knew the real truth when it printed its horror story on October 6 and 7.
- (173) See BY, October 8.
- (174) See the editorial in Harian Harapan (Medan), October 5. The same issue contains the statement issued officially by the North Sumatra PKI and a special press interview given by Djalaludin Nasution himself.
- (175) The Statement of the Central Java PKI can be found in Gema Massa (Semarang), October 9th. The Central Java PKI had evidently already issued on October 1 an "Instruction" to all cadres, explicitly stating that the September 30th Affair was purely an internal Army matter, in which the PKI did not interfere. This "Instruction" is referred to repeatedly in the Jogjakarta PKI's statement dated October 5th and contained in Waspada (Jogjakarta, Javanese language), October 6. Incidentally this Jogjakarta PKI statement complains at some length about H.M.I. (Moslem Student) intimidation and violence on October 4 against PKI buildings and property. The Solo PKI statement, dated October 7, is included in Waspada, October 14. The same issue reports a large Gerwani delegation being received in Solo by the local authorities (including the garrison commander) on October 8. The women came to deny accusations made in the Djakarta press, and were evidently at least politely received. The Klaten PKI statement, wired to President Soekarno on October 10, is included in the same issue of Waspada.
- (176) RRI Semarang; as reported in BY, October 18, and Waspada, October 19.

- (177) For details on the arrest of Muljono, see BY, October 22.
- (178) See BY, October 22, for an account of the parade, and BY, October 20 and 22, for a description of the finding of the (allegedly) mutilated corpses.
- (179) This order was announced over RRI Djakarta on October 20th. At the same time Col. Widodo closed down the leftist Respublica University in Jogjakarta.
- (180) The ban on Gema Massa took effect on October 11, see Waspada, October 14. According to Antara, October 26, the ban on Waspada was issued on October 22, the day of the official heroes' funeral given to Katamso and Sugijono. Kompas, October 25, gives the date of the ban coming into effect as October 23.
- (181) These mob attacks are reported in BY, October 22.
- (182) See BY, October 25. The General also froze all activities of Baperki.
- (183) See, for example, the instructions issued by Acting Governor of Central Java, Sujono Atmo, to all civilian government officials, contained in Waspada of October 16; and the pathetic article in Waspada, October 18, entitled "Katahanan Panguripan Masyarakat Surakarta tetep kaja adat saben," saying that the situation in Solo is quite normal, not one drop of blood has been shed, there has been and is no rebellion of any kind, and that published reports to the contrary are lies deliberately put out to incite hostilities and divide the nation.
- (184) See BY, October 23, for the Semarang strike; Mekar Sari (Javanese language weekly), November 1-10, p. 19, for the Solo strike.
- (185) See BY, October 27.
- (186) See BY, October 26 and 27. The October 26 issue reports that Ramelan was arrested at 9:00 a.m. on the 22nd. The October 27th issue gives the date as October 23. BY, October 25, stresses that the RPKAD took Solo without a shot being fired. For a graphic, but not wholly accurate account of the arrival of the RPKAD in Solo, and the reactions it caused, see Minggu Pagi, November 28, pp. 3f. The riot actions are recorded in BY, October 26.
- (187) See e.g. Antara (English language), October 30. Also BY, October 26, 27, 28.
- (188) See BY, October 28.
- (189) Tacitus described a not too dissimilar situation in the famous phrase: "ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant."
- (190) See New York Times, January 16, 1966, citing a Presidential speech of January 15. Compare the story given in the Washington Post, January 2, citing Nicholas Carroll in the (London) Sunday Times. For a summary of various estimates, see Washington Post, January 14.

Note on Relevant Analysis by E. Gibbon
(See footnote 46 above.)

The accounts of the atrocities committed at Halim have undergone considerable elaboration, in which the strongest emphasis has been on unholy rites and sexual orgies preliminary to the slayings: thus the Gerwani were accused of giving themselves indiscriminately to Air Force officers (Antara news bulletin, English-language edition, November 30, 1965, B) and to Pemuda Rakjat in a ritual orgy presided over by Aidit, the principal feature of which was a "Dance of the Fragrant Flowers" performed by naked Gerwani girls. (Angkatan Bersendjata, December 13, 1965). The human imagination being lurid but limited, we find similar goings-on ascribed to another "society of atheists, who, by the most daring attack on the religious constitution of the empire, had merited the severest animadversion of the civil magistrate"^{a)}--whose sacrifices differed chiefly in the substitution of innocent babes for innocent generals:

Their mistaken prudence [in keeping their rituals secret] afforded an opportunity for malice to invent, and for suspicious credulity to believe, the horrid tales which described the Christians as the most wicked of human kind, who practised in their dark recesses every abomination that a depraved fancy could suggest, and who solicited the favour of their unknown God by the sacrifice of every moral virtue. There were many who pretended to confess or to relate the ceremonies of this abhorred society. It was asserted, 'that a newborn infant, entirely covered over with flour, was presented, like some mystic symbol of initiation, to the knife of the proselyte, who unknowingly inflicted many a secret and mortal wound on the innocent victim of his error; that, as soon as the cruel deed was perpetrated, the sectaries drank up the blood, greedily tore asunder the quivering members, and pledged themselves to eternal secrecy, by a mutual consciousness of guilt.' It was as confidently affirmed that this inhuman sacrifice was succeeded by a suitable entertainment, in which intemperance served as a provocative to brutal lust; till, at the appointed moment, the lights were suddenly extinguished, shame was banished, nature forgotten; and, as accident might direct, the darkness of the night was polluted by the incestuous commerce of sisters and brothers, of sons and of mothers.^{b)}

To such accusations the Church of Justin Martyr hopefully replied: "The Christians, with the intrepid security of innocence, appeal from the voice of rumor to the equity of the magistrates."^{c)} This optimism proved unfounded (it was the reign of Nero). The persecutors were moreover escalated under Diocletian, when it was asserted that their community had flourished all too well under previous tolerance and now, "constituted a distinct republic, which might yet be suppressed before it had acquired any military force; but which was already governed by its own laws and magistrates, was possessed of a public treasure, and was intimately connected in all its parts by the frequent assemblies of the bishops, to whose decrees their numerous and opulent congregations yielded an implicit obedience."^{d)} Not long after, however, began the rule of Constantine the Great.

For above quotations, see Edward Gibbon, The Triumph of Christendom in the Roman Empire, vol. II of the History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, New York, 1958 -- a) p. 81, b) p. 85, c) p. 85, d) p. 129.

PART II

Alternative Possibilities

ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES

The PKI, Acting Independently to Seize Power

"If it concerns bad people, one's attitude should be realistic...."--Nagarakrtagama(51, IV, 3)

The interpretation of the September 30th Movement currently put forward by the Indonesian army and its allies is that it was masterminded by the PKI (in some less official versions enjoying currency among the elite, Subandrio is pictured as having begun or cooperated in the effort). The aim was a coup which would bring the Communists to power, either directly or-- in some versions, apparently to account for the membership of the Revolutionary Council--via a puppet regime which would later give way to overt PKI control. Why the Communists would undertake this is not easy to explain, for the PKI had been doing very well by the peaceful road, seemed increasingly to be Sukarno's darling, and had just won a series of notable victories against its political opponents. To undertake violence would have involved pitting itself against a vastly superior military force and might have thrown the President into alliance with the army, a combination of the symbol and might of the nation which the PKI had always shown itself aware would be fatal to Communist hopes. So far we have been presented only three motivations for such an unexpected departure from what seemed increasingly to be a recipe of success. Let us consider them one by one.

The first explanation, proffered especially in the early post-coup weeks, is that the party had information that Sukarno was about to die, and that, fearing a military move against the PKI immediately following his death, it decided to seize control before the fatal hour. It is unlikely, however, that the party would move on such a consideration before it had sure knowledge the President was actually dying, for acting too soon on the belief that Sukarno was not going to last long has been fatal to many another political group in Indonesia, most dramatically that associated with the BPS the year before. Moreover, if Sukarno did not die promptly enough following the PKI's move there would be the dreaded possibility of a Sukarno-army combination against the Communists. So the Communists would not be likely to move--assuming they felt they stood to gain by initiating an escalation into violent confrontation with the army--until the President was in extremis. But as we shall see the only strategic calculations which made the coup group's activities feasible or sensible had as their central requirement the active and continuing participation of Sukarno. Moreover, the President has not died, nor are there signs he was suffering a collapse (other than political) in the immediate postcoup period; instead, he has since withstood a period of tension and turmoil that would probably have felled a lesser governmental ox. The Presidential Illness, rather like the CIA, is a catchall source

of political trouble in Indonesia, and is used by both sides: thus Untung charged the generals with having schemed regarding Sukarno's health, and after the coup the PKI was accused, among other things, of serving the CIA. Both the kidneystones and the CIA undoubtedly exist, but as motivating factors in Indonesian political crises they should be regarded with considerable caution.

A second suggested reason for PKI initiation of a coup is encouragement, pressure, or orders from the CPR. Various reports were made in the initial post-coup period of Chinese smuggling crates of guns in among the materials for the Conefo building, Chinese doctors warning the PKI that Sukarno was about to die, Chinese poisoning Premier Djuanda with a bottle of wine, and so on. (1) The motive given for CPR sponsorship of a coup--other than the devil nature of Communism and/or the Chinese--is that Peking, having no faith in the PKI's gradualist tactics and finding the Sukarno regime insufficiently palatable ideologically, wished to place the Indonesian Communists in a position where they would have to follow a course of armed struggle. Therefore it persuaded the Aidit leadership that a coup was necessary; or forced Aidit's hand by placing the party in a compromising position through gun shipments or whatever; or encouraged dissident lower rank party members to take action without Aidit's consent; or perhaps it simply ordered the party to act. We shall not consider here whether the CPR was in a position to dictate to the PKI or any part of it; let us assume for the sake of the argument that it could, and ask instead whether it would really have been in China's interest to foment a coup.

It is indeed true that the PKI, in spite of its radically anti-imperialist stand in foreign affairs, was anything but intransigent domestically. From the beginning of Aidit's tenure it had rejected the Chinese model of violent agrarian revolution as impractical in Indonesian conditions, and it had given no real signs since that it had changed its views on the subject. As the world's third largest Communist party, and the only one out of power that seemed to have a chance of winning over a major country in the visible future, the Indonesian example would bear considerable ideological weight. Was the possibility of a peaceful assumption of power so distasteful to the Chinese that they would sacrifice the PKI to prove the impossibility of the peaceful road? Or conversely, could the Chinese have been so dubious of the prospects of the PKI's strategy as to force the party to go over to violence, on the assumption that the parallel between the Indonesian situation in the 1960's and the Chinese of the 1920's was so close that a Shanghai coup would be inevitable if the PKI clung to its "bloc within" NASAKOM line? Would Chinese concern for this have been sufficient to overcome the risks involved in an attempt to take power by force and, should the initial stroke miss, the sacrifice of immediate advantage entailed by a long period of Communist reduction to guerrilla status? In weighing these possibilities, one must consider the

costs for the Chinese entailed by a failed coup and a gross reduction in the PKI's public position, both as regards international relations and the Sino-Soviet dispute.

In the first place, although the PKI showed some hope of coming to power peacefully, this was not what the party symbolized or supported in the Sino-Soviet debate. Though attempting to play a mediatory role insofar as possible, the PKI was clearly on the Chinese side in the quarrel, protesting Soviet "neo-capitalist" inclinations, moderacy in relations with the "imperialists," attempts to impose Soviet authority on the movement and so on. Relations between the Aidit leadership and the CPSU leaders were very bad, and little secret was made of this. There was little likelihood the PKI would change its militant public stand in the foreseeable future, for it needed the feeling of revolutionary momentum and sacrifice which was otherwise so lacking under the conditions of guided democracy. Except when the Malaysia dispute threatened at times to boil over into a serious conflict (on which possibility the PKI several times expressed concern) a "Chinese" stand threatened the party in no way, provided an escape valve--probably for its leaders and certainly for its following--and helped bring Indonesia farther away from the West and thus from the sources of aid for its opponents.

Given these facts, and the non-liberal nature and "Chinese" posture of the Sukarno regime, there is little reason to think the Chinese would have feared a peaceful assumption of power by the PKI as discrediting their argument against the parliamentary road. Rather, it would have strengthened their case for arguing that the center of world revolution was in the AAA countries, and would have greatly increased the stature of what was their chief ally in the international movement. It is very possible that, once in power, the PKI would have differentiated itself further from the Chinese and would have asserted its own claims as a model; moreover, it had already put itself forward as a pattern for Southeast Asian Communism, and the Chinese were probably not too happy at the idea of a Communist Indonesia asserting itself as the light for an area in which the Chinese doubtless feel their own beam should dominate. Such considerations might influence the Chinese to limit their support to the PKI. It is not likely, however, that it would encourage them to throw the baby out with the bathwater.

It is probable, given the CCP leadership's experience and ideas regarding the road to power, that they thought the PKI would not make it the Aidit way. Would they therefore have supported violent elements in the party or otherwise sought to change its course? Such a choice assumes China had little to lose internationally if the coup failed. But in fact it had much to lose, and particularly at this time, for the expansion of Chinese influence in Africa had peaked and was now in something of a decline; the Soviet Union was getting increased

support for participation at the AA conference; support for a condemnation of the US Vietnam action at the AA conference seemed increasingly problematical, and Chinese efforts in the Indo-Pakistan war seemed to have alarmed the Pakistanis more than it impressed them. Cambodia being too small to carry much weight, Indonesia was the major link with non-Communist AA circles, where it acted effectively as Peking's stalking horse. However impatient the Chinese may have become with Sukarno, he was essential in their calculations, and they would hardly have counselled a move--on the part of the PKI or any other group--that would have jeopardized his position and possibly his life at this delicate juncture.

In foreign affairs the Chinese have not been risk-takers; nor have they been inclined to sacrifice promising relations with a non-Communist power in the interest of promoting a local revolution with dubious prospects. The "hard" stand taken by China since the affair has been much exaggerated in press reports. Certainly the CPR has been more outspoken than the Soviets regarding the post-coup events, but this is less a function of Chinese promotion of revolution vs Soviet encouragement of the peaceful path than to the fact that the USSR had, essentially, bet on the horse that won--the army, which it had been equipping--and the CPR had bet on the ones that lost--Sukarno and the PKI, which it had been putting in the international limelight. However they may feel about the fate of the Indonesian Communists, the Soviets are not about to toss away a bet that has just paid off; while the Chinese are well aware of the army's dislike of the China alliance and can have little hope that under the new regime anything better than a frigidly correct relationship can be maintained. In addition there may be a tendency for the Chinese to compare the denouement of the Indonesian affair with the Shanghai coup and to assume the ultimate impossibility that the PKI will be allowed to revive legally or that the Indonesian government will return to the left. Finally, blood is thicker than ideology: the CPR may not feel itself in a position to protect the Chinese minority in Indonesia, but there is little chance its dislike of those now in power there has been greatly intensified by the unfortunate experiences of the Indonesian Chinese since the coup. The number and bitterness of the Chinese protests to Indonesia since the coup do not, therefore, necessarily reflect a Chinese encouragement of Communist violence before the coup, while the logic of Chinese interests in international affairs and the Sino-Soviet dispute would make it unlikely the CPR would have promoted a Communist revolt.

The third motivation provided for a PKI-sponsored takeover is not an analytical but a mythological one. This is the image of Communism as a monstrous and irrational conspiracy, infinitely cunning but driven by an overweening ambition and a congenital need to express itself in violence. For years, in this view, the PKI denied its innate thirst for power and blood,

cloaked its alien and unnatural shape beneath a guise of peace and patriotism, practiced a monstrous deception which very nearly succeeded, save that at the last moment the nation was preserved --praise God but at what a terrible cost!--by the inability of the Enemy to stay his appetite for death.

This argument, or rather vision, is the main one that has thus far been presented, particularly as it became generally apparent that the Presidential Kidney was in no worse state than usual. As a temporary approach, it had the advantage of avoiding the need to provide a well-ordered explanation until one could be (though it apparently has not yet been) decided on; it drew attention away from alternative Great Plot theories, such as the Generals' Council asserted by Untung. It secured popular acquiescence and participation in the physical destruction of the PKI, and placed Sukarno under great pressure to grant the all-important Presidential denunciation of the PKI. Moreover, it was emotionally satisfying to a people in a state of shock. A monstrous event requires a monstrous cause: in the wake of the Kennedy assassination it was most difficult to satisfy people that an insignificant person had done it all, in spite of the U.S. government's best efforts to implant this interpretation. And in the Indonesian case it was politically necessary not to persuade people that there had been no monstrous plot, but the reverse: For what if the army allowed the affair to be treated as an internal military matter, the interpretation favored by the President and the PKI and the one we think is essentially the truth? Even if its rivals took no advantage of this (which is most unlikely), the admission as such would have been so demoralizing to the army internally and so ruinous to its public image that the balance of power would have shifted sharply away from the military's side. If military unity was to be restored following the coup, it could best be done through creating solidarity in a greater cause and through purges conducted under cover of larger events. If public attention was to be directed away from army fissures and from the counter-devil of the Generals' Council, then responsibility must be assigned somewhere else, namely--since the President is too sacrosanct to be directly charged--on the archenemy and major source of Presidential power, the PKI. The choice for the army was between a major victory and a stunning blow to its morale and public position; it was not hard to decide.

The army therefore injected into a shocked and extremely labile public atmosphere a stream of highly inflammatory propaganda. It appealed to the feelings of a people who had lived all too long under steadily mounting economic and political pressure, increasingly expected that the denouement would be perang saudara, a war of brothers. It appealed to an elite important segments of which had been turning, though with grave misgivings, to the thought that the PKI alone had the answers for Indonesia's problems; to an Islamic community that had felt increasingly outside and against the national political current. It appealed to a society suddenly confronted with an act of

violence which upset the whole order of things, turning the President from the nail of the universe into a figleaf for military rule, and bringing the country to the edge of civil war. Reflecting and catalyzing a violent reaction to the frustrations and tensions of the past years, it helped loose pent-up emotions, hatreds, and fears in a violent catharsis. The result was a massive psychotic reaction in which all sense of proportion was lost before the vision of Ultimate Evil incarnate in the PKI, a response which encouraged and facilitated that large-scale massacre of Communist rank and file and systematic liquidation of party leaders which has been so helpful in securing a solution of the PKI problem. (2)

On a long-term basis the "monster" explanation of PKI sponsorship for the affair has the advantage of firmly replanting the image with which the Indonesian Communists had been burdened since the Madiun Affair and which they had only partly succeeded in erasing. Whatever questions may later be asked, whatever counter-arguments produced, people who absorbed the view of the PKI which is now presented will not be able to think of the Communists later except as a group stained by atrocity and treason. (3) The Aidit leadership, having believed that its chances of success lay in persuading the "middle group"--i.e., the not firmly anti-Communist part--of the Indonesian population to side with it, had placed heavy and increasing stress on shaping a public image of the PKI as not dangerous but desirable--the incarnation of patriotism, self-sacrifice, constructive energy, intellectual capability, organizational and managerial competence, and so on. The party that knew how to do things and got them done--a comforting dynamism for a people fed too long on resounding slogans, administrative stagnation, and economic despair. Fifteen years of building a public image that was essential to the Aidit strategy was set at nought in one day--the inevitable outcome for the PKI of failure in an attempt to seize power by violence. The stakes were therefore very high--the party would almost certainly be blamed, the army would be presented with an opportunity to win an enormous victory by destroying it, and the chances of coming to power by persuasion rather than by warfare--which Aidit had rejected from the outset as not feasible under Indonesian strategic, geographic, and socio-political conditions--would be reduced very nearly to zero. The military odds against the success of Untung's move in Jakarta on October 1 were about a million to one. Is it likely, short of sudden madness, that the Communists would have gambled so much on so distant a chance? But assuming they were so stricken, would they not have taken the most elementary precautions against failure? Would they neither have tried to keep PKI sponsorship of the move so secret the party could not be connected with it should it fail? Or, on the assumption that if the army could not find a PKI connection it would invent one, throw all their strength into the effort to prevent its defeat? They did neither; some members of Communist mass organizations were peripherally but very visibly involved, and Harian Rakjat

came out in favor of Untung but without a call for mass support. Moreover, the journal made public its favor on October 2nd, when the coup was over, not on the 1st, when it was on, which made no sense if the party knew of it beforehand; nor did the two PKI papers of the afternoon of the 1st call for support of the September 30th Movement, although when they went to press it was in command. No one came out on the streets of Djakarta, and there was no visible coordination of activities either in the city or throughout the nation. It is as if the party tied a rope around its neck and then waited to be hoisted from the nearest lamp post.

A Planned Move by the President Against
the Army, With or Without the PKI

"On account of (his) wisdom's paramount power, his crushing of the villainy of the evildoers may be considered pure...."
--Nagarakrtagama (92, I, 4)

Now if it is not likely the Communists would have acted as they did had they actually managed the coup effort, and if they had a part in inspiring the affair, then perhaps they played a role at one remove--by persuading the President, directly or indirectly, to attempt the removal en masse of his and their military enemies. That is, they sparked the events but did not control them; the murders and the involvement of Pemuda Rakjat and Gerwani people were unlucky accidents in what was intended as a major political maneuver which would not escalate into violence and would give no evidence of Communist involvement. To decide whether the PKI could or would have attempted such a move, we must consider first of all what it could have expected of Sukarno--whether he would have had (or could have been given) reason to act against the General Staff, and if so whether he would have been at all likely to move in the manner suggested by the events of October 1.

To support the possibility of a Presidential initiative we may hypothesize, for example, as follows: We know the generals formed a major obstruction to NASAKOM and thus a principal threat to civil peace, Sukarno's prime concern, after his death. We may reason that he had been nibbling away at their power for years, but without great success, and that as his health declined and he began to talk openly of a post-Sukarno period he came to feel that only drastic action could establish a new, more neutral army command that would keep things in line but not move to the right after his death. He could not act against one of the key members of the General Staff--Nasution and Yani--without the others coming to that person's rescue; therefore he had to remove them all. If they were quickly and quietly removed from the scene and deposited in jail in Madiun or wherever, on charges of cooperating with the CIA, people would be too stunned--and anyway too suspicious given the current atmosphere--to object,

and the army could be placated with the promotion of Pranoto and other reasonable but not leftist types. But the generals must not get wind of this; he dared not trust anyone in the elite, therefore; and he dared not publicly involve the PKI, against which the army was all too eager to act. So when Untung or someone from Untung's group came to him he saw an element that, not having Menteng connections but having numerous advantageously placed sub-elite contacts, could be conveniently and secretly used. He told them to take action, with the idea that the generals would be arrested and shipped out of the capital; but murder was done and the PKI implicated, and so Sukarno found himself hopelessly compromised and the Communists destroyed.

This interpretation assumes a radical departure from the President's previous methods of dealing with his opponents. The only people he had hitherto jailed for political reasons were ones involved in rebel movements and therefore hopelessly compromised; politically helpless figures such as Sjahrir cs; and the expendable Sukarni. He had never imprisoned anyone who was not politically finished. At the same time, the jailing of political leaders, like the banning of political parties, had come to have an irrevocable air to it: it was not for a few months or a few years, but for good. Therefore the imprisonment of the political members of the General Staff, particularly on charges of treason, would be understood as an irreversible move. Their release before Sukarno's death would constitute a great blow to his prestige and would loose a dangerous (particularly if innocent) and vengeful group to make trouble among their former military associates. Furthermore, if he died in the near future and they were released soon thereafter, they probably would quickly regain enough influence to act as a highly disruptive element about which rightist civilian and military groups could unite, thus raising again the possibility of civil war.

The hypothesis requires a change in strategy as well as style. In the past few years both Sukarno and the PKI had attempted to deal with the army by creating an image of great strength and popular support, keeping the quarrel on a level and in terms with which the army is at a disadvantage, and preventing the army from getting any excuse to place things in military terms, by resumption of the State of Emergency or the like. They eroded solidarity of the army by the careful fostering of differences within its leadership and by the appointment of pliable or corruptible commanders wherever possible to replace those who were anti-PKI or impervious to Presidential interference. At the same time efforts were made to increase formal political influence in the army: first the formation of KOTI, next the efforts to get political cadres in the military, the training of party-connected volunteers, and the Fifth Force (which last would both have added to the PKI's physical strength and set a new political tone for the military). The summer of 1965 saw a critical phase: a major offensive against military

solidarity and for a PKI military capability had begun. Nasution had not yet been removed, but the support of the air force, and apparently of the navy at least in theory, had been achieved for the Fifth Force; and training of some volunteers had actually begun by the air force.

The army knew about this training--which it later admitted had been a bone of contention between itself and the air force prior to the coup--and it is doubtful it was entirely confident that in the long run it could keep the PKI from really acquiring weapons. Nasution was still in office, but his main political tenet, that the Communists must under no circumstances have access to arms, seemed to be going by the boards. If the SUAD was to move at a point where it could face a paper tiger PKI it must move soon; by the time of Sukarno's death, unless he died shortly, the generals might face an armed PKI with on their side a military machine whose unity and will had suffered fatal erosion. Conversely, it was vital to the interests of the PKI and Sukarno in this transitional period to prevent the army from moving, to preserve the army's feeling of helplessness, to keep it hypnotized and divided. The spell must not be broken; but it would be by violence--not necessarily death, but something that would make people kaget, and the arrest of the general staff would surely do that. Therefore such a step would be taken only for the most urgent reason, and Sukarno must have good cause for confidence, for failure would be (and apparently has been) fatal. The question therefore is: was the situation so desperate from Sukarno's point of view as to warrant so drastic an act; and was there sufficient reason to believe the move would succeed?

Let us consider first whether the situation was desperate from the President's point of view. There are three possibilities here: 1) He felt he had only a very short time to live and believed that with its current leadership the army was bound to crush the Communists as soon as he departed; if this was to be prevented he must secure another military leadership while he was still capable of acting. 2) His efforts to change and weaken the political leadership of the military had been so ineffective over the last several years that he saw no hope of making significant gains by gradual means in the future, while the condition of his health and the country, and/or the impatience of the PKI made him feel it necessary that a significant shift in the relationship between the military and the Communists must take place within a fairly short time. 3) He believed the generals were going to move against him.

As regards the first, Sukarno might have been seriously worried about his health and the succession. However, as we have already remarked, he held up quite well in spite of the strains the post-coup events put on him; moreover, unless he also suffers from some disease with a time limit on it, it would seem likely the situation would only appear that desperate to him

at a time when he was too close to death to be able to act effectively politically. If he believed, by virtue of what was said by doctor or dukun, that he was about to die it still seems unlikely he would attempt a violent move, for it would obviously take some time for the dust to settle, the new military leadership to take hold, and so on. If he were to die shortly after the overthrow of the old military leaders, it would be too easy for the right to bring them back amidst cries that the PKI poisoned him, forged charges of treason against his true supporters, and so on. Given the fact that the danger to the PKI and to a NASAKOM post-Sukarno civil peace lay in interrupting the smooth flow towards the left, in erasing the illusion of inevitability regarding Indonesia's political course, the thing Sukarno would have been most interested in regarding the period surrounding his death would be to prevent the opportunity for violence and if possible the excuse for the proclamation of a State of Emergency. He would have sought to gain acceptance, as far as possible, for the PKI's right to participate in the government on equal terms with the other parties, and to reduce the number of people in positions of power who would be likely to ally with the army after he left. Any abrupt and drastic change would not serve this.

As regards the second possibility, its major assumption --the failure of Sukarno to affect the political leadership of the military in the past few years--is doubtful. However it may look now, it appeared in the mid-1963 to September 1965 period that the military's political initiative had been seriously eroded, and that it was the army that was being domesticated along with the PKI. The number of far-right generals in positions of power had been greatly reduced; Nasution's position was now less in the political center of the army than on the political right, and this provided an opening for isolating him. He still had strong protection from his associates against attempts to remove him, but he was able--either for reasons of his own psychological reaction to developments or from a lack of agreement by his associates on initiatives that he wanted to take--to make few moves on his own. Those he did sponsor (SOKSI, Manikebu, and probably indirectly BPS) were wholly unsuccessful, and he lost interest in them even before they had met their respective Waterloos.

More and more top military positions were being determined by Presidential favor; this meant that the independent power of the general staff was being seriously undercut. The effect of this would last to some degree at least beyond the President's life: for the more alat negara (non-political, "instrument of the State") minded officers there were, and the more people who had cozied up to Sukarno and thus had reason to feel Nasution's resentment, and the more people who had gotten into positions Nasution would not have given them, the more there would be who would resist initiatives by Nasution and his colleagues in the post-Sukarno period and who might (though

they need not themselves be leftists) seek support from the left against a Nasution-anti-Communist combination.

There were possibilities, not yet fully explored, of creating new bodies and positions of military or civilian-military composition, diluting the central authority of the SUAD, acquiring control over and allocating patronage, and creating positions that the General Staff would want to see rationalized out of existence and whose occupants would therefore hesitate to back the General Staff. Considerable progress seemed to have been made at exploiting inter-service rivalries. Martadinata, though considered hitherto a supporter of Nasution, made a pilgrimage to PKI headquarters, the first time a service head did so. This set a very significant precedent for not just Sukarno but the PKI itself offering support within the military establishment; and to the extent that individuals or groups within the military availed themselves of this they alienated themselves from Nasution cs. and acquired a vested interest in not turning against the PKI in a post-coup era.

Both the navy and air force lacked sufficient ground support to give them an equal voice with the army; but they saw the possibility of getting that support or at least of reducing the army's own claims on this point, and of basking in the sun of Presidential favor by declaring their approval of the Fifth Force. Indeed, the Air Force had already begun to train people; granted only a few, but it was the first breach in the dike of Nasution's anti-PKI policy. The PKI was placing great--and very public--stress on getting military potential; how long would it be until the trickle became a flood? How many generals, given the drift of the situation, would not soon begin to put out feelers to the left, and how many would not then be maneuvered into a position where they were sufficiently beholden to the left so that they depended on it to keep office? Few were or could have become leftists; hardly anyone in the military would conceivably want political cadres imposed on them; but how many had begun to think about becoming the TNI for the PKI and were contemplating making the necessary adjustments and concessions in return for the recognition of their interests?

Perhaps, however, the condition of the country or the mood of the PKI was such that Sukarno felt it necessary not to wait for the gradual completion of this process. This assumes that popular discontent was high and threatened the President's position; or (if the initiative came from the PKI) that the party felt people were turning against it--or its rank and file was becoming rebellious--because of its complaisant attitude towards economic and political morass. Logically, this might seem a reasonable popular reaction given the condition of the nation. But in fact it was not so: not Sukarno, but corrupt and evil advisers that surrounded him were blamed for the suffering of the people; he--like the Tsar in Russian tradition--was thought popularly to desire only good for his people, who

looked the more to him for succor the worse their plight became. For, in spite of the PKI's best efforts in inculcating self-confidence in the Rakjat, their overwhelming attitude was that salvation must come from above and not from below. This extended well into the party itself: middle-level and upper-middle-level cadres talked to in early 1965 evidenced an extreme psychological dependence on Sukarno as protector and as an essential element in the PKI's further progress. Moreover, the PKI had itself managed to remain remarkably free of the onus of identification with the unsavory aspects of the regime. It was popularly identified with Sukarno, not with the wicked corruptors with which, alas, the good monarch was forced to deal; and it had in fact managed to maintain a degree of honesty and initiative that was in striking contrast to the general stagnation. Furthermore, it was advancing very rapidly in the public eye during 1965, so that it does not seem likely there was great pressure from within its ranks for rebellion--indeed, the absence of Communist response to the coup, even when under threat of annihilation, shows how little inclination for a real fight there was in the party and its following.

The PKI seems to have suffered from hubris in dealing with some of the sensitive issues it had tackled--land reform, corruption, military training--to the extent that it did not always seem to realize the extent of the reaction which they could provoke or the pitfalls into which they might lead. It does not seem to have considered, for example, that by introducing itself into armed service it might find itself used as a pawn in a military power play. Rather, it seems to have sacrificed control over its volunteers in the interest of demonstrating to the military that it would not impose political censorship on strictly military matters--reckoning, apparently, that it would be alert enough to scotch any military attempt to use it. However, the strength of the Muslim reaction had been such that the Communists could not have been overly optimistic regarding the inability of its opponents to fight. Indeed, although the land reform issue was still warm, it was not being pursued with the same vigor in August-September of 1965 as it had been in that period the year before. There had instead been developing, since early in the year, an emphasis on "boyscout" activities in the countryside (advice on agricultural techniques, attempts to develop cooperatives, aid in procuring fertilizer, setting up of party-run schools, promotion of folk culture, building of sanggar to house party-oriented community activities, improvement of irrigation, and so on). These were designed to serve as an alternative focus of PKI rural action, one which would avoid the dangerous aspects of the land reform campaign and might also spread Communist influence among the middle peasants and prevent the alienation of the well-to-do in solidly PKI villages, which had so harmed the party in Central Java during its land-reform push.

In its relations with the military, the PKI seemed aware that it needed to balance pressure to secure the Fifth Force with an effort to mollify the military otherwise; thus, in an abridgement of Aidit's 1963 lecture to the SESKOAD (Army Staff and Command School), published in Harian Rakjat on October 1 for the coming Armed Forces Day, the sections stressing the patriotic, pro-Rakjat nature of the army were reproduced virtually intact, while a portion that would ruffle military feathers was abbreviated and altered. This last is very interesting, as the PKI followed the Chinese (as opposed to Soviet) habit of not falsifying its own documents; so that it was a conscious effort not to annoy the military leadership, and this on the eve of the coup. (4) A second Aidit speech, one made to the naval school in July 1965, was reprinted in the Harian Rakjat Armed Forces Day series on October 2nd, again, it was one avoiding sensitive subjects and aiming at impressing the audience with the PKI's understanding of military questions. More important, it showed Aidit possessed a lively awareness of the danger to the PKI of military support for the coalescing Muslim reaction:

For a long time now the Communists of Indonesia have proclaimed and promoted the slogan of the Dwitunggal of the Armed Forces and the People. This dwitunggal reflects the essence of the relationship between defence and politics; we can describe it, too, as the relation between fish and water. The water is the People. Clearly a fish cannot live without water; but neither can it live within it if the water has been poisoned. For the Armed Forces, a People divided against itself is as tainted water to a fish. For this reason the slogan of the Dwitunggal of the Armed Forces and the People can only be made a reality if all sides, without exception, guard the water that it may be free from every kind of poison, from hatred for the Communists, from hatred for the masses. (5)

But if it seems unlikely that either Sukarno or the PKI had an objective interest in pushing the struggle with the political generals to a violent solution, and if they gave no signs of feeling subjectively that the time for a showdown had come, there still remains a third possibility; namely, that a move from the side of the SUAD was feared, and that the events of October 1 were a reaction to a coup plotted (or thought to be plotted) by the military. If, as we have argued, the political situation had been less one of frustration for Sukarno and the PKI than for the Nasution group, and if the latter group found its power within the military threatened with serious erosion, then surely it must have been severely discontent with the terms under which it was being forced to operate. Its ac-- monopoly of the instruments of violence through the concentration of all weapons in the hands of reliable military commanders (who could be relied on to obey commands by the General Staff)-- was its sole remaining card, and one which it might soon have

to surrender. How great the danger of this was is hard to determine, but given the speed with which the PKI had advanced and the army declined--it was only two and a half years from the ending of the State of Emergency!--one feared that once the process of retreat had begun it would be very rapid. If the army was to break out of the charmed circle with which Sukarno had circumscribed its power, it could do so only by an abrupt action.

The whole atmosphere of Djakarta for more than a year before the coup had been one of increasing tension, of the oppressive calm preceding a storm that never seemed to come, but which--via anti-inflation demonstrations, land reform clashes, and Muslim reaction--demonstrated its severity by distant thunder and lightning. Little changed and yet everything was changing; perhaps this stability of instability would last forever, perhaps it would give way tomorrow in a rush. Sukarno's policy of domestication had not brought a real increase in unity but rather a polarization, with the right dependent increasingly on the army and the army increasingly feeling that its sole advantage was its monopoly of arms. It is hardly conceivable that Sukarno and the PKI did not know of the importance which Nasution attached to preventing the Communists from gaining a military potential and therefore hardly conceivable that they did not realize that their thrust in this direction, and particularly the actual training of PKI youth by other services, was challenging what the SUAD considered a vital interest. (6) Unless and until the military reconciled itself to this, or non-army military strength had reached proportions where it could not be challenged, the power struggle was in an extremely delicate transitional stage.

Sukarno and the PKI must therefore have been in a state of considerable tension regarding the possibility of a SUAD-sponsored coup. It was not a matter of the normal objective likelihood of the army being able to decide on or succeed in a coup but rather that at that particular point, when its deepest interests were challenged and its military strength was still invincible, that the SUAD would decide on a coup if it ever did. It would not attempt a large-scale move; all that need be achieved by the action was Sukarno's death. There were always coup rumors around Armed Forces Day; this year promised to be a particularly lively occasion and some sort of army show of strength was expected; and doubtless Subandrio and the PKI, and anyone else who thought he could gain anything from it, had been encouraging stories about the army and the CIA. Sukarno would therefore have been particularly receptive to reports of CIA-sponsored intrigue and to the claims of anti-SUAD elements in the army.

But if Sukarno feared a generals' plot and wished to avert it, destroying the army's political leadership by arresting the SUAD leaders and depositing them outside Djakarta, would he have been sufficiently confident of success to take the action? For it would have been a gamble, an abrupt break in the situation

that would either totally demoralize the right or rally it. It is doubtful he would have, unless he had such evidence of collusion against him that he could silence objections; and obviously this is something he did not possess, for otherwise his post-coup position would not have been so weak. The army might not have united for a move against him, but it might very well unite against a move aimed at it; for if the general staff could be arrested without a by-your-leave then no officer was safe. Already that year the killing of an army man by peasants in the Bandar Betsy affair had been virtually countenanced, army people had been named among those accused of gross corruption, and now the general staff was to be charged with treason and thrown into jail. Would the territorial commanders outside the Javanese areas take it?--they had rallied behind Nasution and insisted on Sukarno's keeping him a year before; they might well take strong measures now, insisting on a court martial that could be highly embarrassing to the President, and making him accept the return of a by now highly hostile general staff. Could he have been sure Suharto would not balk? Suharto would never coup him, but by arresting the general staff Sukarno would be so striking at the integrity of the military apparatus that even an officer who had no ties of friendship or trust with the SUAD would, if he were at all strong and honest, be forced to make the firmest objections. Even assuming that Sukarno had reached such an over-estimation of his authority (which is doubtful, considering the delicate way he was handling Muslim disorder and other issues on which he must have felt strongly but did not dare to act) there are several reasons to believe he would not have acted in the way he apparently did if he had had time to plan in advance:

First, the choice of Untung. Why would Sukarno have taken a new battalion commander, perhaps the newest of the Tjakra commanders, in preference to someone he knew better, someone more experienced and with a firmer authority over the troops under him? Because Untung came to him saying he had support among Central Java officers for an anti-SUAD move? Sukarno must have met eccentrics with some such tale every day; he might believe the tale, but that would not mean he would use that particular chap in preference to someone whose actions he could be surer of. And of what use were Untung's Central Java contacts if what was wanted was the smooth arrest and isolation of the SUAD people? There seems little reason for Sukarno to have chosen Untung as his instrument if he were given the opportunity to choose.

Second, why is the President at Halim and why are the kidnappings so crudely carried out from a political viewpoint? If Sukarno was previously convinced the generals were going to coup him, or in any case that he must take action against them, then he had no reason to confront them. He would have desired them taken out of the city as expeditiously as possible; and if he wished to be in the city himself but accessible to a means

of exit he would certainly not have chosen as his base the same place to which the kidnappees were to be taken. Moreover, arresting seven people in their beds is a risky thing, considering the consequences if a key member of the group is missed, and the fact that at their homes some have guards, probably all have weapons, and all have both civilian and military communications systems. Was there no excuse on which Sukarno could assemble them and arrest them together? Even in the midst of a larger group, why not? That would avoid the two great risks, bloodshed and missing Nasution or Yani, and if Sukarno could get away with arresting them in the dark he could get away with it in the daylight. Indeed, a daylight move would be more in keeping with his style and source of power; the arrest-in-the-middle-of-the-night is the style of one who wishes to demonstrate that naked force is the only thing that matters and that he controls it; the public arrest can be given a ceremonial character, the awful authority of the monarch striking down his faithless servants. Properly staged, it should not prevent the swift removal of the generals from the capital. Again, why were greater precautions not taken in instructing the Tjakrabirawa troops who did the kidnappings--both about the manner in which they should approach the generals and the absolute need for taking them alive? If Sukarno had had any time to think about the affair, surely this would have occurred. Moreover, he would surely have given consideration to the consequences of a slip-up and the measures he should take if one occurred. We see no evidence of such precautions: instead Sukarno placed himself compromisingly at Halim and spent all day there, floundering.

Third, why was Subandrio unaware of what was going on? For if he knew what was afoot it is hardly likely that on the day of the affair he would not have been in Djakarta--where he would have been able to keep tabs on what was going on--or out of the country--where he would have been safe in case of failure--but in North Sumatra trailing an entourage studded with generals. Perhaps Sukarno didn't trust him to keep his mouth shut concerning the plans for removing the generals? But Subandrio did not get where he was by talking loosely about something vitally concerning his political survival. Moreover, the smooth functioning of the intelligence apparatus on the eve of such a move was essential; and it was necessary to have information collected or falsified in order to justify the arrest of the generals. It was important that Subandrio be around to act as go-between, information-collector, and scapegoat in the event of negotiation or failure. But he was not there.

Fourth, why were the Communists involved, and precisely those PKI people who were receiving military training? Of all things Sukarno would want to avoid in any conflict with the military it would be a chance for them to blame it on the PKI. He must have been aware of the training at Halim; if there was any planning to the business at all he would have made sure no one from the PKI groups was being trained there then, and

certainly he would never have involved Communists in any part of the action. Why blood the PKI and yet present the whole affair to the outside world as an internal army matter? Sukarno had no need to fear the PKI would not back him in an effort against the generals unless it were compromised; and if he had planned the operation beforehand surely he would have had enough control over the events at Halim to avoid the bloody and senseless denouement of the kidnappings. It would only have made sense for the President to involve the PKI at all if he intended to make the affair into a major leftward surge, with people out in mass demonstrations denouncing the Generals' Council and cheering the renewal of the revolution. That Sukarno would contemplate such a move is, as we stated earlier, unlikely; but in any event the fact is that nothing did happen on October 1. The first Untung statement stressed that the whole affair was an internal army matter, civilians were to keep calm and wait, and newspapers might continue publishing as usual. There was a complete lack of civilian activity other than the receipt and distribution of news furnished by the Untung group via the RRI, Antara, and newspapers, and the ditherings of politicians who obviously had not the faintest idea what was going on.

The Untung Group, Acting
Independently to Seize Power

"Only the honoured Chiefs of the corps of the Palace Guard have a limit, fixed. Five is the number of these mantri's, blameless, taking care of the business of the Interior."
--Nagarakrtagama (10, II, 3-4)

If we accept, then, that it is not likely the PKI or Sukarno planned the affair of October 1, is it not possible that the group comprising the September 30th Movement did so, acting to secure power on its own? We posit here middle-grade officers strongly resentful of the army top leadership, which they hold responsible for their professional lack of success and for the country's unfortunate situation. They would be sympathetic to opinions and rumors--inspired by the Communists and others--pointing to the Western orientation of the General Staff group, to its Menteng mentality, and to its obstruction of Sukarno's endeavors. They grumble among themselves. If only Sukarno would take action to rid himself of these people; if only he didn't stare himself blind at the General Staff and its allies among the top officers and realized that just below them was a vital part of the army willing to ally with the People and carry the revolution forward. They might but need not have formed a well-defined conspiracy; in fact, the sudden and erratic course of the coup would seem to argue against real organization or thorough planning. We need assume only the most primitive form of association--that of common feeling and common acquaintance, at least having heard of Untung and knowing where

he stood. Presumably in Central Java various officers of Untung's circle had, when he was stationed there, agreed with him often in conversation that Something Had to Be Done, and perhaps had heard him repeat that he was the man to do it. Presumably among the Semarang group this had been discussed in more concrete form after Untung was posted to the Tjakrabirawa-- unless it was sheer accident that put Untung's old battalion in Djakarta for Armed Forces Day. But those outside Djakarta need have had no prior knowledge of just what would be attempted or when; they need only have known enough so that when something did occur they were not too surprised or uncertain of its meaning to act.

It would not seem unnatural that a relationship could have existed or been established between Untung and his associates and the air force personnel at Halim; both resented the army and especially the General Staff, the air force particularly because of longstanding rivalry between the services and because of the army's footdragging in the Kalimantan campaign. We see pro-rebel sympathies evidenced at the air bases in Central Java, presumably because of similar feelings. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that the Untung group could by itself have recruited the people necessary to control Halim as completely and for as long a time as it did, for its command was apparently unquestioned: the PGT guards and trainers, the technical and air force personnel, were all either participants in the affair or silent. Moreover, although we know the Air Force commander Dhani was at Halim on October 1, that he flew off to Central Java with Aidit, and that Suharto at first blamed the AURI for the affair, still Dhani was not arrested or dismissed without the consolation of a ministry. Therefore he was not in the end considered particularly culpable, as he certainly would have been had he acted independently of the President; nor was he someone who would in any event be expected to act without the President. And so we must assume that Dhani was not, while at Halim, acting without Sukarno and that the Untung group secured his participation and ensured command of the air base by somehow involving the President.

We can understand that the rebels would have wanted to control Halim, for it gave them a relatively safe base from which to operate in Djakarta, provided a link with Central Java for communications, support, or if necessary retreat. But from a military point of view their actions were otherwise very strange: not only did they command a paltry number of troops in Djakarta compared to those under regular army control, but they made no attempt to kidnap the two generals with operational command over troops in the Djakarta area: the Djakarta garrison commander Umar and the KOSTRAD commander Suharto, the latter of whom customarily took command of the army in Yani's absence. Nor, though it was just down the road from Halim, did they seize KOSTRAD headquarters, or even block road communications to it; and it was from there that the counter-coup was organized. The coup forces' strength was almost entirely concentrated at Halim and at Medan Merdeka, where the objects on which

they concentrated were the radio station and the palace. Once they had this central but highly vulnerable area the rebel troops sat about, waiting, until General Suharto persuaded most of them to go home. As a military move it was hopeless.

But what else was intended? That the military forces be joined by massive popular demonstrations which would sweep a new regime into power? The involvement of Pemuda Rakjat and Gerwani would certainly seem to point to securing a PKI commitment, as would the apparent kidnapping of Aidit; but the Communists did not come out on the streets that day. Was it because Aidit refused to declare for the rebels in spite of being at their mercy and in spite of the compromising position in which the PKI had been placed? This does not explain it, for the first Untung radio statement declared, along with its denunciation of the generals, that the affair was an internal army matter and the civilian population should keep calm and await further announcements. Mass participation was thus not only not forthcoming but was not desired; but how then could the Untung group have hoped to succeed? There would only seem to be one possible explanation for this peculiar approach; namely that the President was the essential figure in the maneuver, for if military strength was clearly insufficient and massive demonstrations not counted on, then it must have been Presidential authority that was to tip the scales.

An Unplanned Move by the President,
Generated Spontaneously or by Others

"A consequence of his supernatural power was its disappearance, verily the Non-entity's supreme manifestation."

--Nagarakrtagama (56, II, 4)

Now if it is unlikely that the President had reason or opportunity to give prior thought to the affair, and if the moves of the Untung group make sense only if the President was, in one way or another, a key figure, what are the remaining alternatives? It is possible (A) that news of a coup already in motion was presented to the President, by Untung or others, but without knowledge on anyone's part that it was false. All subsequent action thus depended on the President and was unplanned. Or (B) Untung and perhaps others came to the President with news of a coup in progress, this having been concocted by them or by people associated with them; therefore, they or the people behind them knew it was false, but wished for reasons of their own to see a confrontation between Sukarno and the generals, though they had not intended to seek power for themselves. They thus initiated the action but did not determine its further course. Or (C) the Untung group gambled on being able to trick the President into initial involvement in the affair, reckoning that later, if he was not wholly persuaded of their true scheme, he would be forced to go along with it because he and groups he needed were

compromised. The initiative and subsequent responsibility would thus lie with them.

The first choice (A), that of a more or less accidental origin of the affair, is unlikely because it would seem improbable that the Diponegoro and Brawidjaja regiments could have been brought into the affair if the whole thing was begun all of a sudden by Sukarno. However, it might not be impossible if their commanders were friends of Untung's and Sukarno ordered Untung to call on units he trusted; we know he once led the Diponegoro battalion, while the Brawidjaja battalion had been in Irian like Untung's, so that there may have been an acquaintance sufficiently strong to command swift cooperation. Another problem is that this hypothesis makes it extremely difficult to explain the involvement of the PKI and the killing of the generals; though this also is perhaps not impossible. We may imagine, for example, that having been told there were suspicious troop movements the Tjakra acted on its own initiative. There was to have been a maneuver at Senajan on the morning of October 1. This means tanks would have been going in that direction about three in the morning, as (from what we know of a similar exercise) they were to be ready to begin maneuvers at dawn; they would have gone down Djl. Iman Bondjol, turning left on Djl. Djenderal Sudirman, then out to Senajan passing within a short distance of Dewi's house where Sukarno was spending the night. It would not be unlikely that the Army might have failed to inform the Tjakrabirawa of these maneuvers, because relations between SUAD and Tjakra were extremely poor; about a year ago, for instance, Tjakra held a startling maneuver at Senajan--which sounded like a major battle in the midst of the city--without informing the army at all. So, particularly if rumors about a generals' coup were strong at the time, it is not impossible that the reports of strange troop movements and rumors that the destination was Dewi's house and not Senajan were picked up and believed by the Tjakra guard, which then moved Sukarno to Halim to be near his plane until the situation was more certain.

Sukarno, in something between a panic and a fury, called for a confrontation with the generals he would have considered to be involved in organizing something against him--the particular people who were kidnapped, the political brains of the army. The abrupt announcement that he was in danger, the night ride, the air of urgency all created an atmosphere where not too careful inquiries would have been made once the President was persuaded to move; anyway, with his chief of intelligence away, how could he investigate swiftly about a coup which he was told was already beginning? Better to run the risk of some embarrassment--after all it was not you who took alarm first but your guard--and perhaps even if it should be a false alarm the mere fact that your guard so feared a coup from your generals that it prepared you for evacuation could be turned, with a show of moral indignation, to your political advantage.

And so orders were given to summon the generals. But in great haste and excitement; and so things which might not have been thought of from the very first by the President, but which surely he would have taken into account had he had time for sober reflection, were neglected. The Tjakra was told to bring in the generals for a confrontation with Sukarno, gently if possible, roughly if not; the presumption of such instructions was that the generals would be brought in alive though perhaps not willingly; it was not stressed that they must on no account be done to death because this was not considered as a possibility. There were not enough people among the available Tjakra to handle all the arrests, given the necessity to surround houses and over-power guards; therefore the kidnapping units added supernumeraries in the form of volunteers from Lubang Buaja, on their own initiative, for even in a panic Presidential orders for this were most unlikely. Though the kidnapping units were told the generals were to be summoned to the President, they were also informed that there was an attempt by the generals to coup the President, so that their manner of approaching the generals was rough. Several of the generals immediately assumed that they were being arrested (a measure of the tension under which the top people in Djakarta must have been living on the eve of the coup); they resisted and were killed on the spot.

But this reading of the events leads us to a third and insuperable objection: why are the surviving generals killed? If Sukarno was the prime mover, even if acting in a panic and with suspicion of the generals that was probably deepened by the fact that some of them resisted being summoned to him, it is hard to see him ordering the others killed. Apart from the question whether such action would fit Sukarno's style, he would have stood only to lose by their death. He must have known, if Untung was merely carrying out his orders, that Nasution had escaped; there was therefore almost no chance he could get away without a confrontation with that general and his supporters. The only thing to do, one would think, would have been to act with an air of lofty distress, placing the blame for violence on the servants who, if overly energetic, were nonetheless faithful to their master and shocked at the thought that there was a plot against him. Played properly this could create the impression that lèse majesté had been committed in putting him in this painful situation, and that quite possibly something even more sinister was behind it. But if Sukarno ordered the generals killed, inevitably word would leak out that he gave the orders; and this would ruin him with the army.

Is it possible that the generals were killed through some misinterpretation of what Sukarno wanted? This seems most unlikely, particularly from the strong impression of control by the PGT given in the confessions of those who took part; but, in any event, if the generals were killed by mistake or by panic-born irrationality on Sukarno's part, it is still very difficult to imagine that their bodies would have been disposed

of by dumping them in a well at the very place where the volunteers were being trained by the AURI. It would have been no problem--since planes could and did take off from Halim that day, and it was some time before Suharto's forces surrounded the base--to dump stripped bodies from a considerable height over the sea, which would have precluded their being identified. The army would doubtless have been furious, but vanished generals are much harder to make public martyrs than demonstrably dead ones, particularly ones as badly mauled as these were said to have been. Without bodies it would have been much easier to cast doubt in the public mind about the fate of the generals and about the roles of Pemuda Rakjat and Gerwani, and thus would have left the President considerably more room for maneuver.

Is it possible then that Sukarno, on discovering that some of the generals had been killed, gave Untung a tongue-lashing which convinced him that if he did not wish to find himself executed for murder he had better force Sukarno to protect him? And therefore he had the remaining generals murdered, declaring to the President that if he did not cooperate he, Untung, would claim he had killed them on Sukarno's orders? That he then had the announcement made concerning the Generals' Council and spent the rest of the day bargaining with Sukarno, in a stalemate that would prove the downfall of them both? This would not explain why Sukarno was in such very bad odor with the unpolitical General Suharto following the affair; if he had been clearly forced--and surely Untung's claim would not have stood long under questioning--his moral authority would not have been so severely damaged as it was.

Moreover, General Supardjo was seen in the palace early on the morning of coup. What is a general who has deserted his command doing in the palace on the morning of the affair if there had been nothing afoot beforehand? And why, if nothing was intended by either Sukarno or Untung beyond the arrest or covering up of the murders of the generals, was it announced that a Revolutionary Council would be formed? If Sukarno intended it as a dodge so that he could later claim he had been kidnapped and was a prisoner of Untung's, it is inexplicable that he issued a statement after the affair in which he insisted he went to Halim voluntarily.

An "accidental" origin of the affair thus seems unlikely. Let us therefore consider the second alternative we have suggested, i.e., the conscious concoction of a coup tale by Untung or people behind him for the limited objective of seeing a confrontation between Sukarno and the generals, not necessarily with the idea of killing them and not with the idea of any further moves towards the reorganization of the state. This brings us first of all to the question of motivation.

On the left there were certainly those who had an interest in raising Sukarno's suspicions of Nasution and his colleagues,

and surely the PKI and Subandrio had been fanning the embers of distrust. But neither of them had an interest in seeing an abrupt confrontation of Sukarno with the general staff as a body: their technique was to take frontal action against one person at a time and not to provide the military with a cause about which it might unite. The arrest of the generals would provide such a cause unless the charges could be well substantiated, for as we pointed out earlier even the nonpolitical military elements could not afford to accept the arrest of the general staff on false charges. Moreover, the very delicate process of securing army acquiescence to PKI acquisition of a military capability demanded that the Communists be particularly careful in not arousing the army to action. If the Communists aimed at anything less than the killing of the generals they would presumably have ended up with Sukarno doing his embarrassed best to bluff his way out of an encounter with a ruffled and indignant general staff; the generals would have been made more conscious of the President's distrust of them and of Communist perfidy. The President would be furious at them for having put him in such a position; and they could hardly be sure he would not find out they were behind the maneuver. If they aimed in fact at forcing Sukarno to seize power from the generals and provide a leftist surge to the revolution, then killing the generals and implicating Sukarno made sense--if one can assume that the PKI felt itself, for reasons unknown to us, in a desperate situation. But in that case surely more generals would have been taken care of, particularly Suharto and Umar, who commanded troop movements in the Djakarta area; yet according to Suharto no attempt on them was made. No attempt was made to take KOSTRAD; Suharto drove out there in the morning alone in his jeep and met no interference. No attempt was made to coup commanding officers in non-Diponegoro territories, nor were any kidnappings, murders, or whatever done to military commanders who might have sent troops to Djakarta to put down any disturbance there. This includes General Adjie of West Java, who was known to be very hostile to the PKI and who could easily send in his Siliwangi troops.

If for some reason the PKI wished to promote a confrontation between the President and the generals--bloody or unbloody--it would presumably keep itself and its organizations completely out of the picture so that it could not be implicated and could reap the benefits of whatever turmoil the affair created; or come out in full force, with mass demonstrations and actions, in order to overwhelm the unfavorable military situation by political means, creating such a whirlwind that army people would either be too confused to act, yield to the temptation to jump onto what appeared to be a rapidly rolling bandwagon, or fear to initiate reprisals because of the awe-inspiring appearance of mass support for the movement. But, as remarked earlier, neither path was taken. And had the party had any knowledge of what had actually transpired on October 1 at Halim, Harlan Rakjat would surely have contained not pallid

praise for Untung, but either last year's rice prices or a call to arms.

But if the PKI did not spark Untung's move, and if the whole maneuver, given the immense military odds against its success, worked against rather than for the interests of the PKI and Sukarno, is it not possible that the instigation came from their enemies? We think here of types associated with the Murba grouping; not the Adam Malik-Chaerul Saleh sort, but the Sukarni people, some of them by now rather paunchy but who, never having outgrown the pemuda mentality, still dream of the day when they kidnapped the President and shared in the excitement of Revolution. This was the one group that held a simultaneous enmity for the army, the PKI, and the President. It is the civilian equivalent, in many respects, of the sort of people Untung and his military friends seem to have been; and they are given to low-level intrigue and the promotion of things to embarrass the PKI. Their efforts in this line made up in cunning what they lacked in intelligence, and were in fact a distinct worry to the Communists, who were always afraid the Sukarni types would start something for which the blame would be pinned on the PKI. Aidit had quite a complex about Sukarni for this reason, out of all proportion to Sukarni's ability or independent political strength. It was a case of the elephant being frightened of the mouse; but the mouse was dangerous because it knew how to keep out of sight and had very few compunctions about what it did--and all it had to accomplish was the compromising of the PKI, as it could count on the more powerful opponents of the PKI, such as the army, to follow up on whatever it started. Only a few weeks before the Murba Party had been banned, after nearly a year of persecution: that its adherents would want to make trouble--for everyone in general and the PKI in particular--is very imaginable.

We remember the odd confession of one of the military leaders involved in the plot, Colonel Latief. It mentions persons who "to the best of the knowledge and conviction" of Latief (the proviso is always included in the several mentionings of their names) were members of the CC PKI. (7) Though their names are presented as being genuine and not aliases, they are not listed on the official roster of CC members and candidates, nor do we have any record of them holding any post in the party. They could, however, have said they were "secret members" to explain this. They assured the military plotters that Aidit approved of the coup plan, gave the conspirators to understand that they were in constant touch with the PKI chairman and that he had approved the check list (which the Untung group, not the PKI, drew up!) of people to be murdered, from which Aidit magnanimously removed the named of Hatta, Sukarni, and Chaerul Saleh.

Presumably Murba elements could have gotten hold of, or concocted, some documents as evidence of these agents' authority

to show the Untung group. Not much would be required, given the ability of Murba types to wield a Marxist phrase or two, and the image of Communism as a vast conspiracy, which would be particularly believable to people who had predilection for conspiracy themselves. That the Untung group could be gulled by a maneuver of this sort is not unimaginable; but would they not have checked at all in the course of their plottings about the credentials of those they were dealing with? As commander of one of the guard units, Untung would have seen Aidit often enough at the Palace; would he not have tipped a wink to his "fellow conspirator"? Supposedly this contact had gone on since February 1965, a long time for light not to have dawned in even the most feeble brain. Presumably the Untung group would have relied on the "Central Committee members" to provide PKI support, for why else get involved with the PKI, real or false? Would the later, conservative (that is, few PKI and relatively many rightwing generals) composition of the Revolutionary Council represent an Untung reaction to the discovery that the PKI was not coming through with support in the way he had been led to believe? But presumably if Untung thought he was working together with the PKI and expected it to come out on the streets to back them, he would have made a rousing initial statement. Instead, he stressed that it is an internal army affair. Nor is this the sort of message Murba people would have encouraged Untung to give, as their interest would have been precisely in implicating the PKI as deeply as possible.

We may also ask in this connection whether there may not have been discontented lower-rank PKI members who, finding Aidit's gradualist approach insufficiently revolutionary despite its achievements, helped promote the incident and involve the party with the idea that it would then be forced to try a violent seizure of power. Could such people have presented themselves to the Untung group as "Central Committee members"? Much the same objections to this suggestion arise as to the Murba possibility: it is unlikely the fiction could have been maintained for long, and unlikely the Untung group would have dealt with the "PKI" without expecting and broadcasting for mass participation by the Communists on October 1. Moreover, the presumed purpose of discontented lesser party figures would be to get the PKI committed to revolution, in which case they would surely have made clear to the party heads, once the kidnappings and murders had occurred, that the PKI was compromised and must commit itself to revolution. But this was not done, else the response of Harian Rakjat and the party to the events of October 1 would not have been so fatally ambiguous.

Perhaps there was PKI collusion at an even lower level, however; that is, perhaps the Communist volunteers were at Halim by virtue of connivance between the plotters and the local PKI leaders who recruited them for training. The latter, having been informed what was to take place, brought together particularly pliable or tough recruits, who would obey any orders they

were given, and in this manner they provided the coup group with badly needed auxiliary personnel and committed the PKI to revolution. According to various confessions, the volunteers were recruited--as was normal for each training period--via the CS (Section Committee) of the PKI in their locality. (8) Now the levels of PKI organization above the group or cell were: local committee (CR), subsection committee (CSS), section committee (CS), and party committee--this last being the CDR, the Greater Djakarta Committee, which, because it represented the capital district, simultaneously had the status of first-level regional committee (CDB), the highest level below the Central Committee itself. A Section Committee was therefore high up on the local ladder, and one would assume that in Djakarta, where the party had been at particular pains to prevent indiscipline that would alarm the elite, the leaders of these committees would have been carefully chosen. However, everyone makes mistakes; let us assume that one--or rather several--were made this time.

It is still hard to believe that lesser PKI figures, if they had played an active role in organizing the attempt, would not by now have been mentioned prominently in the army press; though of course it would not be stated they acted contrary to party commands. They were not, however; only Njono, head of the Djakarta party organization, was given prominent treatment. He was too high up, too long a member of the Aidit team, to fill the bill of rebellious underling, however; presumably he was picked up at a very early point (October 3; for questioning, according to the first reports) because as head of the Djakarta party organization the army would hold him responsible for the actions of local Communists, including the involved volunteers. And again, there is the problem that PKI plotters at any level would surely have informed the higher leadership that Communist involvement was a fait accompli and the party had better commit itself in strength accordingly; but obviously this was not done.

Much the same can be said of PKI participation in the Central Java plotting of the coup; what is extraordinary is not the amount of Communist participation in the initial phase of the affair but the lack of it. There was a certain amount of bandwagon-jumping, for some letters of encouragement to the September 30th Movement were written by Communist units on October 1; but these were scattered, mostly from young people clearly acting from naiveté and opportunism rather than any comprehension of what was going on; and there were not more than half a dozen of them. There was a certain amount of score-settling by Communist elements in areas affected by the coup, but again this happened only after the affair was well under way, and we hear of no such activity undertaken concurrently with the takeovers or in the few days when the rebels were in actual control.

The only involvement of Communist groups as auxiliaries to the rebel military forces or for demonstrations of mass

support was in Jogjakarta, where students reportedly took over the radio station on October 1 evening and where on the afternoon following the coup leftist youth groups demonstrated under rebel guard in support of the September 30th Movement. This participation, however, appears to have been chiefly a function of connections between the local coup leader, Major Muljono, and civilian youth groups. The demonstration was notable for the absence of PKI, SOBSI, Gerwani, and BTI participants; whether those organizations knew about plans for a demonstration and refused to participate, only to be defied by enthusiastic young people, or whether Muljono had recruited the demonstrators entirely without reference to party and mass organization leadership is hard to say. In any event, it is apparent that their activities took place after the Jogja coup itself had occurred, and no evidence has been brought forward of individual civilian leaders, from youth groups or otherwise, participating in the plotting or carrying out of the coup.

There is only one place in Central Java where a PKI official came out in open support of a takeover, and that was in Surakarta, where mayor Utomo Ramelan made a brief statement backing the local coup. But Ramelan had been put up by the PKI for the mayoralty because, being easygoing and of good family, he was salonfähig enough to content the non-Communist groups. He was possibly the most timorous and conservative man in the PKI, and the last person to take initiative on anything, let alone a rebellion. In all likelihood, the Surakarta coup leaders demanded he make a statement of support, and he was too frightened and muddled to refuse. The Surakarta incident is interesting not as evidence of PKI responsibility for the affair but as the only place where there seems to have been any attempt by coup leaders to involve civilian authorities at all. For what is extraordinary about the coup in both Central Java and Djakarta is the extent to which civilian groups were ignored, or at best used peripherally, by those who attempted to seize power.

If, then, the PKI had no demonstrable cause to plan or join in the September 30th Movement; if the President had little reason or opportunity to plan the action beforehand; if the Untung group could not have hoped to succeed militarily and did not attempt to mobilize civilian support, there remains one possibility why the events of October 1 took place as they did. The coup group gambled on being able to persuade Sukarno to go along with them initially, reckoning that once at Halim he would have no choice but to support them. Halim was to become the new Rengasdenklok; the radio station was guarded to ensure that the President, having been persuaded to proclaim the renewal of the revolution, would be able to rally the nation behind it. The palace was held chiefly for its symbolic value, and so that the President could return to it in triumph after the proclamation. His word would be enough; it was not necessary to have great military strength or civilian participation, except as Sukarno

himself would command. It is our idea of what actually happened, but, as a certain currently unmentionable political organization was wont to say in sunnier days, we are always open to criticism from other groups.

Notes

(1) For the Conefo crate story, see Api Pantjasila, October 20, 1965. The KOTI denied the charges promptly (RRI broadcast, October 21, 1965; Sinar Harapan, October 22, 1965); it is possible the Chinese elicited this swift response by informing the army that if it did not like what was in their crates they would not send any more. For the charge that Djuanda died of drinking poisoned Chinese wine, see Suara Islam, October 22, 1965; it was denied by President Sukarno in a speech of October 23 (RRI broadcast, October 26, 1965). As regards this accusation, we can state on unimpeachable authority that the late Ir. Djuanda met his death at the hands of Ratu Aminah Hidajat, who enticed him against his better judgment to dance the twist one evening in the Nirvana Room of the Hotel Indonesia, as a result of which activity he suffered a fatal heart attack.

(2) In paranoid judgment, as the overt meaning of an object approaches zero its covert significance nears infinity: A nice example of this is the November 12, 1965, raid on the DPRGR office of M. H. Lukman, gallantly led by Arudji Kartawinata, deputy speaker of parliament and before October a mighty friend of the PKI. Incriminating evidence seized in this expedition consisted of a uniform and books, some rags, a scrap with writing on it, and a blank sheet of yellow paper (RRI, Djakarta domestic service in Indonesian, November 13, 1965, conveying an announcement of the DPRGR public relations office; see also Berita Yudha, November 15, 1965, and other Djakarta papers of that day). We are not told in the accounts of this seizure what sort of uniform it was or what the books were about; but we are told that the rags had been used for cleaning firearms and the writing was "something which looked like code". Most menacing of all is the piece of yellow paper, to which no significance can be attached and which is therefore mentioned prominently in all accounts. A universe of evil hides in a speck of dust; there is a mark on the road--one glances down and sees, suddenly and horribly, that it is Satan's hoofprint.

(3) In the short run, of course. The final fitnahan will naturally be determined by whomever wins ultimate control of the country and thus of its historical viewpoint. To use a comparison introduced earlier: the emperor Nero, having divined that the burning of Rome was masterminded by the Christian aliran, took firm and (at least temporarily) effective measures to destroy that Evil root and branch. Unfortunately, the history of the Roman Empire was in the end interpreted largely by Christians, with the result that Nero is well known as the lout

who fiddled while his capital burned, wrote a poem in honor of the conflagration, and very possibly started the fire himself.

(4) In the original version, the sensitive section was composed of a paragraph stating that the function of the Armed Forces was solely to execute the Political Manifesto and not to take initiatives of its own, then the following paragraph (quoted to give an idea of the tone of the whole), and thereafter three paragraphs emphasizing the importance of the Air Force and Navy and the need not to stress one service (i.e., the army) in Indonesia's defense (Audit, PKI dan Angkatan Darat (Djakarta, 1963), pp. 29-32):

Indeed, at present the State of Indonesia still consists of two aspects. First, the aspect which represents the interests of the People, which is anti-imperialist and anti-feudal in nature; and second the aspect which represents the interests of the enemies of the People, which is anti-popular in nature. This is possible because there are still dark forces which are desperately defending the interests of the enemies of the People. Hence the importance of President Sukarno's policy concerning the retooling of the state apparatus and the principle of "revolution from above and from below" (Djarek). Although the force representing the interests of the People is daily increasing in strength, there remain along with it forces which are trying to stem the tide of the Revolution. As an instrument of state power, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia belongs as a whole, in its capacity as a Manipulist instrument of state authority, to the aspect which represents the interests of the People, to the popular aspect. If there are elements which do not belong to the People's aspect within the Armed Forces, they are indeed a foreign substance within the body of the Armed Forces. It is the duty of all members of the Armed Forces genuinely to struggle on the side of the People and oppose every attempt at counter-revolution.

In the October 1st version, these five lengthy paragraphs were telescoped and toned down into two brief ones:

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, seen in its entirety as a Manipulist instrument of state power, belongs to the aspect which represents the interests of the People, the popular aspect. If there are elements which do not partake of this popular aspect, they are certainly foreign to the Armed Forces. It is the duty of all members of the Armed Forces to struggle genuinely on the side of the People and oppose every attempt at counter-revolution.

Another characteristic of the Indonesian Armed Forces is the unity and effective coordination of the four services, including the police, without favoring any one; that is, unity and effective coordination between the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Police. An attempt to emphasize one

branch alone would not contribute to effective state power as required by the special conditions of the Indonesian island-nation.

It would not seem that the PKI would so soften its remarks to disguise the fact it was planning a coup, or because it would not want to annoy the army unnecessarily around Armed Forces Day. The original comprised a lecture given two years previously and printed up as a pamphlet then--thus it could hardly be proven incriminating when repeated in 1965--and it had been Aidit's first lecture to a military body. He had been at some pains to make a good impression and be invited back, to judge from the introductory remarks of the original speech; and it would therefore not seem likely he would feel it necessary to speak more softly for Armed Forces Day in 1965 unless there were other considerations, such as offering the carrot of reduced pressure in return for conceding to the training of volunteers.

(5) Aidit, lecture to the SESKOAL, July 16, 1965, abridged in Harian Rakjat, October 2, 1965. The speech was apparently not published in its complete version. As it appeared in the October 2 abridgement, it seemed largely designed to show that Aidit had made a thorough study of Indonesia's military requirements and found at their heart the need for a stronger fleet--a message not likely to displease his audience. He did not mention such sensitive matters as Nasakomization or the Fifth Force, although at least on the latter subject the PKI had had reason to hope the navy would lend support.

(6) Thus General Yani, speaking at a press conference in Lombok on September 27, 1965, stated firmly his opposition to the Fifth Force, which would "render more complicated the policy of the Armed Forces". Hansip (army-controlled civil defense system) was a sufficient concession to the principle of arming the workers and peasants, he asserted. As for the Nasakomization of the armed forces, he opposed it because "there could arise a sort of dualism which could endanger our revolution" (Mertju Suar, October 24, 1965; and see also Harian Gelora (Mataram), September 30, 1965, citing remarks made by Yani at a press conference on September 26).

(7) Confession of Col. A. Latief; photocopy of typescript.

(8) Possibly they were not in fact brought in this way but via the Pemuda Rakjat and Gerwani locals, or the Front Nasional or Front Pemuda/Kowani; and the PKI contact was an army substitution in the confessions made to implicate the party more directly. An article on the Gerwani volunteers appearing in Harian Rakjat a few days before the affair stated that they were registered with the local Front Nasional and trained in cooperation with other Nasakomist women's organizations belonging to Kowani (Kartinah Kurdi, "Intensifkan latihan Sukwati sampai ke-basis2 can unit2," HR, September 27, 1965). It is thus not impossible

that there were non-PKI volunteers attending the Halim training but that this was kept quiet by the army as it did not fit its anti-PKI campaign. The first reference to the volunteers as members of Communist mass organizations was made in General Suharto's broadcast of October 3 evening, October 3 being the day the army apparently decided to use the coup attempt to crush the PKI. Moreover, some initial accounts state the irregular forces at the base were not Pemuda Rakjat people but SERBAUD (aviation employees' union) members. Others say they were pemoedas, "mostly" Pemuda Rakjat members. The volunteers might therefore have been recruited via the Front Pemuda and not the PKI, and not been solely Pemuda Rakjat members; or they might have come from other groups, PKI-oriented or not. However, pending any real evidence to the contrary we have proceeded in our analysis on the assumption that the volunteers were in fact drawn solely from Communist mass organizations and were recruited by the PKI.

UNTUNG STATEMENTS

((All translations are based on Indonesian texts found in Antara (Warta Berita), October 1 (afternoon edition) and Harian Rakjat, October 2.))

1. Initial Statement of Lieutenant Colonel Untung
(Text as broadcast over the Djakarta radio at approximately 7:15 a.m. on the morning of October 1.)

On Thursday, September 30, 1965, a military move took place within the Army in the capital city of Djakarta which was aided by troops from other branches of the Armed Forces. The September 30th Movement which is led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, Commandant of a Battalion of the Tjakrabirawa, the personal bodyguard of President Sukarno, is directed against Generals who were members of the self-styled Council of Generals. A number of Generals have been arrested and important communications media and other vital installations have been placed under the control of the September 30th Movement, while President Sukarno is safe under its protection. Also a number of other prominent leaders in society, who had become targets of the action by the Council of Generals are under the protection of the September 30th Movement.

The Council of Generals is a subversive movement sponsored by the CIA and has been very active lately, especially since President Sukarno was seriously ill in the first week of August of this year. Their hope that President Sukarno would die of his illness has not materialized.

Therefore, in order to attain its goal the Council of Generals had planned to conduct a show of force (machtvertoon) on Armed Forces Day, October 5 this year, by bringing troops from East, Central and West Java. With this large concentration of military power the Council of Generals had even planned to carry out a counter-revolutionary coup prior to October 5, 1965. It was to prevent such a counter-revolutionary coup that Lieutenant Colonel Untung launched the September 30th Movement which has proved a great success.

According to a statement obtained from Lieutenant Colonel Untung, the Commandant of the September 30th Movement, this movement is solely a movement within the Army directed against the Council of Generals which has stained the name of the Army and harbored evil designs against the Republic of Indonesia and President Sukarno. Lieutenant Colonel Untung personally considers this movement as an obligation for him as a member of the Tjakrabirawa which has the duty to protect the President and the Republic of Indonesia.

The Commandant of the September 30th Movement further explained that the action already taken against the Council of Generals in Djakarta will be followed by actions throughout Indonesia against agents and sympathizers of the Council of Generals in the regions. According to the statement of the Commandant of the September 30th Movement, as a follow-up action, an

Indonesian Revolution Council will be established in the capital, while in the regions Provincial, District, Sub-District, and Village Revolution Councils will be established. Members of the Revolution Council will be composed of civilians and military personnel who fully support the September 30th Movement.

Political parties, mass organizations, newspapers, and periodicals may continue functioning, provided that within a time period which will be specified later they declare their loyalty to the Indonesian Revolution Council.

The Indonesian Revolution Council which will be established by the September 30th Movement will consistently carry out the Pantja Azimat Revolusi^(*), the decisions of the MPRS, the decisions of the DPR-GR, and the decisions of the DPA. The Indonesian Revolution Council will not change the Indonesian foreign policy, which is free and active and anti-nekolim, for the sake of peace in Southeast Asia and in the world. Also there will be no change of policy with regard to the Second Afro-Asian Conference and Conefo as well as the confrontation against Malaysia; and KIAPMA along with other international activities which have been scheduled to take place in Indonesia will be held as planned.

As Commandant of the September 30th Movement, Lt. Colonel Untung called on the entire Indonesian people to continue to increase vigilance and fully assist the September 30th Movement in order to safeguard the Indonesian Republic from the wicked deeds of the Council of Generals and its agents so that the Message of the People's Suffering can be fulfilled in the true sense of the word.

Lt. Colonel Untung appealed to all Army officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers to be resolute and to act to eradicate completely the influence of the Council of Generals and its agents in the Army. Power-mad Generals and officers who have neglected the lot of their men and who above the accumulated sufferings of their men have lived in luxury, led a gay life, insulted our women and wasted government funds, must be kicked out of the Army and punished accordingly. The Army is not for generals, but is the possession of all the soldiers of the Army who are loyal to the ideals of the revolution of August 1945. Lt. Colonel Untung thanked all troops of the Armed Forces outside the Army for their assistance in the purging of the Army and hoped that purges also will be carried out in the other branches of the Armed Forces against agents and sympathizers of the Council of Generals. Within a short time Commandant Lt. Colonel Untung will announce the First Decree concerning the Indonesian Revolution Council; other decrees will follow.

Djakarta, September 30, 1965.

Information Section of the September 30th Movement as broadcast over the Indonesian Radio in Djakarta.

* The "Pantja Azimat Revolusi" translates imperfectly as "the five charms of the Revolution". As designated by President Sukarno in June 1965, these are the following Indonesian ideological concepts: Nasakom; Pantjasila; the Political Manifesto; Trisakti; and Berdikari. See Sukarno's Independence Day Speech on August 17, 1965 in Antara, August 17, 1965.

2. "Decree No. 1 on the Establishment of the Indonesian Revolution Council"
 (Text as read over the Djakarta radio at approximately 2:00 p.m.,
 October 1.)

(Text) In the interest of the State of the Indonesian Republic, in the interest of safeguarding the implementation of the Pantjasila and the Pantja Azimat Revolusi completely, in the interest of the safety of the Army and of the Armed Forces in general, at midnight Thursday, September 30, 1965, a purge was carried out in the Capital City of the Republic of Indonesia, Djakarta, against members of the self-styled Council of Generals which had planned a coup on the eve of Armed Forces Day, October 5, 1965.

A number of Generals have been arrested. Means of communications and other vital installations in the capital have fallen completely under the control of the September 30th Movement.

The September 30th Movement is a movement entirely confined within the body of the Army to put an end to arbitrary actions of Generals who were members of the Council of Generals and other Officers who were henchmen and sympathizers of members of the Council of Generals. This movement was assisted by Armed Units not belonging to the Army.

2. To facilitate the follow-up of the action of September 30, 1965, the leadership of the September 30th Movement will set up an Indonesian Revolution Council whose members will consist of civilian and military individuals who unreservedly support the September 30th Movement.

For the time being, pending general elections for the People's Consultative Council (Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat) in line with the Constitution of 1945, the Indonesian Revolution Council will constitute the source of all authority in the Republic of Indonesia. The Indonesian Revolution Council is a tool of the entire Indonesian people to realize the Pantjasila and the Pantja Azimat Revolusi completely.

The Indonesian Revolution Council in its daily activities will be represented by a Presidium of the Council which will consist of the Commandant and Deputy Commandants of the September 30th Movement.

3. With the falling of the entire authority of the State into the hands of the Indonesian Revolution Council, the Dwikora Cabinet automatically assumes a decommissioned status. Until the formation of a new Council of Ministers by the Indonesian Revolution Council former ministers are dutybound to carry out routine tasks, and to preserve order in their respective departments. They are prohibited from appointing new employees and from taking actions which may have broad consequences. All former ministers are obliged to give a full account to the Indonesian Revolution Council along with the new ministers to be appointed by the Indonesian Revolution Council.

4. As instruments of the Indonesian Revolution Council, there are to be established in the regions, Provincial Revolution Councils (with a maximum membership of 25), District Revolution Councils (with a maximum membership of 15), Subdistrict Revolution Councils (with a maximum membership of

10), and Village Revolution Councils (with a maximum membership of 7). They are to be composed of civilian and military personnel who unreservedly support the September 30th Movement.

These Regional Revolution Councils constitute the highest authority in the regions concerned. At the provincial and district levels they are assisted in their work by the respective Bodies for Day to Day Administration (BPH) while at the subdistrict and village levels they are assisted by the local National Front Leadership composed of individuals who unreservedly support the September 30th Movement.

5. The Presidium of the Indonesian Revolution Council consists of the Commandant and Deputy Commandants of the September 30th Movement. The Commandant and Deputy Commandants of the September 30th Movement are Chairman and Vice Chairmen of the Indonesian Revolution Council.

6. Immediately after the establishment of Regional Revolution Councils the Revolution Council Chairman concerned must report to the Revolution Council one level higher concerning the full composition of the Council membership. Provincial Revolution Councils must acquire written approval from the Presidium of the Indonesian Revolution Council. District Revolution Councils must acquire written approval from the Provincial Revolution Councils and the Subdistrict and Village Revolution Councils must acquire written approval from the District Revolution Councils.

Djakarta, October 1, 1965. Command of the September 30th Movement. Commandant: Lieutenant Colonel Untung. Deputy Commandant: Brigadier General Supardjo; Deputy Commandant: Flight Lieutenant Colonel Heru; Deputy Commandant: Sea Colonel Sunardi, Deputy Commandant: Adjunct Senior Police Commissioner Anwas. Announced by the Information Section of the September 30th Movement on October 1, 1965.

3. "Decision No. 1 Concerning the Composition of the Indonesian Revolution Council"

(Text as read over the Djakarta Radio at approximately 2:05 p.m., October 1.)

I. Fulfilling the provisions of Decree No. 1 concerning the Formation of The Indonesian Revolution Council, herewith follows the full membership of the Indonesian Revolution Council:

1. Lieutenant Colonel UNTUNG, Chairman of the Council.
2. Brigadier General SUPARDJO, Vice-Chairman of the Council.
3. Flight Lieutenant Colonel HERU, Vice-Chairman of the Council.
4. Sea Colonel SUNARDI, Vice-Chairman of the Council.
5. Adjunct Senior Police Commissioner ANWAS, Vice-Chairman of the Council.
6. OMAR DHANI, Air Vice Marshal.
7. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO, Police Inspector General.
8. E. MARTADINATA, Vice Admiral.
9. DR. SUBANDRIO.
10. DR. J. LEIMENA.
11. IR. SURACHMAN (Nationalist Group).

12. FATAH JASIN (Religious Group).
13. K. H. SIRADJUDDIN ABBAS (Religious Group).
14. TJUGITO (Communist Group).
15. ARUDJI KARTAWINATA.
16. SIAUW GIOK TJHAN.
17. SUMARNO S. H.
18. HARTONO, Major General, Navy Marine Corps.
19. SUTARTO, Police Brigadier General.
20. ZAINI MANSUR (Central Youth Front).
21. JAHJA S. H. (Central Youth Front).
22. SUKATNO (Central Youth Front).
23. BAMBANG KUSNOHADI (PPMI).
24. ABDUL RAHMAN (Deputy Secretary General of the National Front).
25. HARDOJO (University Student).
26. BASUKI RACHMAT, Major General.
27. RYACUDU, Brigadier General.
28. SOLICHIN, Brigadier General.
29. AMIR MAHMUD, Brigadier General.
30. ANDI RIVAI, Brigadier General.
31. SUJONO, Flight Major.
32. LEO WATTIMENA, Air Commodore.
33. MRS. UTAMI SURJADARMA.
34. A. LATIEF, Colonel.
35. UMAR WIRAHADIKUSUMAH, Major General.
36. MRS. SUPENI.
37. MRS. MAHMUDAH MAWARDI.
38. MRS. SUHARTI SUWARTO.
39. FATAH, Colonel.
40. SUHERMAN, Colonel.
41. SAMSU SUTJIPTO, Sea Colonel.
42. SUHARDI (Journalist).
43. DRS. SUMARTONO, Senior Police Commissioner.
44. DJUNTA SUWARDI.
45. KARIM D. P. (Indonesian Journalists Association).

II. The Chairman and the Vice-Chairmen of the Council constitute the Presidium of the Indonesian Revolution Council which between two plenary sessions of the Council acts on behalf of the Council.

III. All civilian members of the Indonesian Revolution Council are given the right to use the military insignia of Lieutenant Colonel or equivalent rank. Indonesian Revolution Council members from the Armed Forces group maintain their previous ranks with the exception that those higher than Lieutenant Colonel must use the same ranks as that of the Commandant of the September 30th Movement, namely that of Lieutenant Colonel or the equivalent.

COMMAND OF THE SEPTEMBER 30th MOVEMENT
Chairman of the Indonesian Revolution Council
Signed
(Lieutenant Colonel Untung)

DJAKARTA, October 1, 1965.

Announced by the Information Section of the September 30th Movement on October 1, 1965.

4. "Decision No. 2 concerning Demotion and Promotion in Rank"
 (Text as read over the Djakarta radio at approximately 2:10 p.m. on
 October 1.)

1. As all authority in the State of the Republic of Indonesia on September 30, 1965, was taken over by the September 30th Movement and as its Commandant is an Officer with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, all ranks and equivalent grades in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia above that of Lieutenant Colonel are herewith declared invalid.

All officers who were previously of a rank higher than Lieutenant Colonel must state their loyalty in written form to the Indonesian Revolution Council and only thereafter have they the right to use the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Lieutenant Colonel is the highest rank in the Armed Forces of the State of the Republic of Indonesia.

2. Because the September 30th Movement is basically a movement of lower-ranking Soldiers, especially of Enlisted Men and NCO's, it is herewith stated that all Enlisted Men and NCO's of all Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia who support the September 30th Movement are promoted one grade above those they occupied before September 30, 1965.

3. All Enlisted Men and NCO's who took a direct part in the purge against the members of the Council of Generals on the evening of September 30, 1965, in Djakarta are promoted to two grades above those they occupied prior to September 30, 1965.

Commandant of the September 30th Movement/Chairman of the Indonesian Revolution Council.

Signed: Lieutenant Colonel Untung. Djakarta, October 1, 1965.

Announced by the Information Section of the September 30th Movement on October 1, 1965.

AFFILIATIONS OF INDONESIAN REVOLUTION COUNCIL MEMBERS

<u>Name</u>	<u>Official Position</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Ethnic Group</u>
*1. Lieutenant-Colonel UNTUNG	Commander, 1st Battalion, Tjakrabirawa Regiment	-	Javanese
*2. Brig. Gen. SUPARDJO	Commander, Fourth Combat Command (West Kalimantan)	-	Javanese
*3. Flight Lieutenant- Colonel HERU ATMODO	?	-	Javanese
*4. Sea Colonel SUNARDI	?	-	Javanese
5. Adjunct Senior Police Commissioner ANWAS	?	-	?
6. Air Vice-Marshal OMAR DHANI	Minister/Commander of the Air Force	-	Javanese
7. Brig. Gen. SUTJIPTO JUDODIHARDJO	Minister/Commander of the Police	-	Javanese
8. Vice-Admiral R. EDDY MARTADINATA	Minister/Commander of the Navy	-	Sundanese
9. Dr. SUBANDRIO	First Deputy Prime Minis- ter/Foreign Minister	(nominally P.N.I.)	Javanese
10. Dr. J. LEIMENA	Second Deputy Prime Minister/Coordinating Minister for Distribution	Parkindo	Ambonese
11. Ir. SURACHMAN	Minister for People's Irrigation	P.N.I. (secretary- general)	Javanese
12. K. H. FATAH JASIN	Minister of State	N.U.	Javanese
13. K. H. SIRADJUDDIN ABBAS	-	PERTI (chairman)	Minangkabau
14. TJUGITO	Member of Political Bureau of KOTRAR	Communist	Javanese
15. ARUDJI KARTAWINATA	Chairman of the DPRGR	P.S.I.I. (chairman)	Sundanese
16. SIAUW GIOK TJHAN	-	BAPERKI (chairman)	Chinese

* An asterik indicates the person concerned took an active part in the October 1, 1965, coup, so far as is known.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Official Position</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Ethnic Group</u>
17. SUMARNO, S. H.	Coordinating Minister for Finance	P.N.I.	Javanese
18. Maj. Gen. (Marine Corps) HARTONO	Commander of the Marine Corps	-	Javanese
19. Police Brig. Gen. SUTARTO.	?	-	Javanese
20. ZAINI MANSUR	Central Youth Front (Presidium member)	P.N.I. (General Chairman Gerakan Pemuda Marhaenis)	Palembang
21. JAHJA, S. H.	Central Youth Front (Presidium member)	N.U. (General Secretary)	Javanese?
22. SUKATNO	Central Youth Front (Presidium member)	Communist (Secretary-General Pemuda Rakjat)	Javanese
23. BAMBANG KUSNOHADI	P.P.M.I. (Chairman)	P.N.I. (Chairman of the G.M.N.I.)	Javanese
24. ABDUL RACHMAN	National Front (Deputy Secretary General)	N.U.	?
25. HARDOJO	D.P.R.G.R. (Youth Representative)	Communist	Javanese
26. Maj. Gen. BASUKI RACHMAT	Commander, East Java (VIII) Territorial Division	-	Javanese
27. Brig. Gen. RYACUDU	Commander, West Kalimantan (XII) Territorial Division	-	Ambonese
28. Brig. Gen. SOLICHIN	Commander, South and Southeast Sulawesi (XIV) Territorial Division	-	Sundanese
29. Brig. Gen. AMIR MACHMUD	Commander, South Kalimantan (X) Territorial Division	-	Sundanese?
30. Brig. Gen. ANDI RIVAI	Governor of South and Southeast Sulawesi	-	Buginese?

<u>Name</u>	<u>Official Position</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Ethnic Group</u>
*31. Flight Major SUJONO	Commander of the Guard at Halim Airbase	-	Javanese
32. Air Commodore LEO WATTIMENA	Commander of the AURI Operations Command/Halim Airbase; Chief of Staff, Mandala Siaga Command	-	Ambonese
33. Mrs. UTAMI SURJADARMA	Rector of Respublica University (BAPERKI)	-	Javanese
*34. Colonel A. LATIEF	Commander, 1st Infantry Brigade, Djakarta Raya (V) Territorial Division	-	Sundanese?
35. Maj. Gen. UMAR WIRAHADIKUSUMAH	Commander, Djakarta Raya (V) Territorial Division	-	Sundanese
36. Mrs. SUPENI	Third Deputy Foreign Minister	P.N.I.	Javanese
37. Mrs. MAHMUDAH MAWARDI	-	N.U. (Ketua Muslimat)	Javanese
38. Mrs. SUHARTI SUWARTO	-	Communist (2nd Chairwoman GERWANI)	Javanese
39. Colonel FATAH	-	-	?
*40. Colonel SUHERMAN	First Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Central Java (VII) Territorial Division	-	Javanese
41. Sea Colonel SJAMSU SUTJIPTO	Chief of the Navy Information Centre	-	Javanese
42. SUHARDI	Head of Legal Department P.W.I. (Central)	-	Javanese?
43. Senior Police Commissioner, Drs. SUMARTONO	Chief of Police, East Kalimantan (XIV) Police District	-	Javanese
44. DJUNTA SUWARDI	-	-	Javanese?
45. A. KARIM D. P.	Chairman P.W.I.	P.N.I.	Buginese

THE HARIAN RAKJAT EDITORIAL AND PARTY

ATTITUDES DURING THE COUP

"Without reflecting, ingenuously forgetting that they were visible for all to see; all they thought about was how to get a look themselves."--Nagarakrtagama (59, III, 6)

Following is the text of the editorial appearing in the PKI newspaper Harian Rakjat on October 2, which was used as initial evidence that the Communists had masterminded the coup of October 1:

The September 30th Movement

It has happened that on the 30th of September measures were taken to safeguard President Sukarno and the Indonesian Republic from a coup by a so-called Generals' Council. According to what has been announced by the September 30th Movement, which is headed by Lt. Col. Untung of a Tjakra-birawa battalion, the action taken to preserve President Sukarno and the Indonesian Republic from the Generals' Council coup is patriotic and revolutionary.

Whatever the justification that may have been used by the Generals' Council in its attempt, the staging of a coup is a condemnable and counter-revolutionary act.

We the People can fully comprehend what Lt. Col. Untung has asserted in carrying out his patriotic movement.

But however the case may be, this is an internal Army affair. On the other hand, we the People who are conscious of the policy and duties of the revolution are convinced of the correctness of the action taken by the September 30th movement to preserve the revolution and the People.

The sympathy and support of the People is surely on the side of the September 30th Movement. We call on all the People to intensify their vigilance and be prepared to confront all eventualities.

As the reader has probably appreciated in perusing the above declaration, it is no gem of style or clarity. This is quite surprising, for Harian Rakjat prided itself on well written and cogently argued editorials; indeed, it had recently taken to publishing collections of polemics between itself and rival journals, both sides being presented without deletion or comment in the well warranted expectation that Harian Rakjat's arguments would be found more impressive than its rivals. (1) Here, however, we have a curiously disjointed piece: There are phrases of caution--"according to what has been announced by the September 30th movement", "whatever the justification that may have

been used by the Generals' Council", "what Lt. Col. Untung has asserted", "but however the case may be, this is an internal Army affair". These are mixed with unvarnished assertions of approval--"[Untung's] patriotic movement", "we ... are convinced of the correctness of the action", "the sympathy and support of the People are surely on the side of the September 30th Movement". The style is jerky and uneven. The phrases of the same sentence often do not fit well together, as if there had been much erasing and altering, and not much effort to make over the result into a stylistically coherent whole. Which is probably in fact how the editorial was composed.

The first problem in evaluating the piece is to determine when it was written. The issue in which it appeared would, if it came out on a normal schedule, have been on the streets in the early post-dawn hours of October 2nd. At 8:45 p.m. the night before General Suharto had broadcast the success of the counter-coup. Are we to think those responsible for the journal were still so in the dark about what had happened (and what was likely to) that they would go to press with such an editorial after that announcement? This is hardly probable; moreover, although the editorial seems unclear as to just what the extent of Untung's action was, it gives no inkling that its success is questioned. It would seem likely, therefore, that the issue of the 2nd was set not in the pre-dawn hours of that day or during the night before, but on the afternoon of the 1st, when Untung still controlled the official news media and when it still appeared to outsiders that he was completely in command. And indeed, both the normal publishing practices of Harian Rakjat and the peculiar circumstances of October 1 insured that this was so.

We know that the Djakarta garrison commander, Maj. Gen. Umar Wirahadikusumah, issued an order dated 6:00 p.m. on the 1st to the effect that no publications of any kind were to appear without permission of the Djakarta war authority, save for the Army newspapers Berita Yudha and Angkatan Bersendjata, whose buildings were to be guarded to ensure that they did come out. (2) Six o'clock, we will remember, was exactly the time the rebel-held RRI went off the air--thus the first point at which there was public indication that the coup had failed. Given the Army's feelings toward the Communists in general, and the specific concern created by the discovery that the AURI-armed youths on Medan Merdeka were Pemuda Rakjat, it would have been a prime concern of the counter-coup forces after taking control of the RRI to prevent the publishing and distribution, particularly to the still uncertain provinces, of material that might be inflammatory. It is therefore quite likely that the Harian Rakjat office and plant, which is located in Kota on Pintu Besar, was occupied by government troops at or not long after the time that Gen. Umar gave this order.

In spite of this probable early seizure of the press, and in spite of the fact that the Communists must have realized the compromising character of the paper at least by the time of Suharto's broadcast, the incriminating October 2nd issue still saw the light of day. The most obvious explanation, that of an Army falsification, can be safely rejected: Everything is written in the normal Harian Rakjat jargon, and the competence of the PKI's enemies at falsifying party documents has always been abysmally low. A second possibility is that the Army ran off an issue that had already been set but was being held pending clarifying developments, or that it saw to the distribution of papers that had already been printed but not yet sent out. Troops occupying the press would hardly dare do this on their own initiative; it would mean that copy was sent higher up, presumably to whomever had been put in charge of press and propaganda, and he had seen the excellent possibilities of the issue for compromising the party, particularly if Harian Rakjat was not to be allowed to speak again. (3) It would not have been dangerous to publish the issue, since the Harian Rakjat editorial for October 2nd was in itself not inflammatory: in fact the core of its message, the last sentence--"We call on all the People to intensify their vigilance and be prepared to confront all eventualities"--was standard and well-known HR-ese for "sit tight and stay out of trouble". However, it is still unlikely that, had the Army itself been responsible for the distribution of the paper, it would have made it available to the public except under controlled conditions. If we knew when, how, and to whom the issue of October 2 appeared we would probably be able to answer this, but we do not. The paper did, however, come out in Djakarta, which means it was not a matter of copies having been put on trains leaving the city (if any did) before the coup was broken and therefore being impossible for the Communists to recall. (4)

The third possibility is that the issue was completed and judged safe to publish sometime before HR was seized, that the distribution process had already started, and that no opportunity was given the Communists to recall it. We can actually calculate the paper's probable time of publication with some precision, inasmuch as it contains as a stop-press the announcement of Pranoto's appointment as caretaker of the Army. As we have already suggested in describing what we think to have been the course of the coup, the Pranoto appointment was made at Halim about 1:30 p.m. on the afternoon of the 1st. It is not, however, announced in the 2:00 Untung broadcasts, nor does it appear in the afternoon Indonesian-language Antara bulletin, which was closed off at 3:30. Quite likely the afternoon bulletin only just missed it, for HR credits Antara with the news, and it is the first item in the Indonesian-language bulletin of the morning of the 2nd. The news might have been phoned down from the Antara office, but given the chaotic state of communications it is more likely it was brought by messenger. Therefore we have the time needed after 3:30 to receive the item at

Antara, phone or bring the news from Djl. Antara to Pintu Besar (not so long on a motorbike), set the items as is into the first page (5) and insert the stop-press, which had meanwhile arrived. One would guess it was about 4:30 or 5:00 p.m. when all this was completed. Either the presses started rolling then or the issue was held up pending further clarification of the situation--it had already been delayed beyond the normal Friday press time--until the army took over around 6:00.

It is only logical to suppose that if the HR editors felt confident enough of the situation to go to press at all they would have wanted to get the paper out as soon as possible in order to make sure that the party followers knew how to respond to the emergency. Even if they did not--and there is an almost unbelievably casual air about the October 2 issue in spite of all the coup group decrees on the first page, so that one has the feeling that, however the HR editors may have seen the game that was being played that day they did not think it to be one of life and death--they still may have started the normal distributing process for Djakarta before the counter-coup group moved in. Again, the answer depends on knowing when, where, and how the issue appeared. We can well imagine that copies were held back at the press once the rebel radio went off the air, and certainly distribution must have ceased--unless the Army itself took a hand--when troops occupied HR headquarters. The Communists must have wished sorely that they could recall the distributed copies once they gained a notion of the real situation; but it is doubtful the Army would have been so cooperative as to allow them to. Quite likely the military, on prior orders or on seeing the editorial supporting Untung, hauled the HR staff off to jail or held it incommunicado, and therefore no orders could be gotten out to prevent the circulation of the incriminating issue. But whatever the means by which the October 2 Harian Rakjat came to appear before the public, it is an invaluable document in that it provides the historian with some idea--which he could otherwise hardly hope to have in any reliable form--of just what the party's attitude was during the brief span of Untung's control.

In considering why the newspaper was set then rather than closer to the time when it would normally appear on the streets--and thus after the collapse of the coup--we should bear in mind two things. First of all, the PKI journal was not intended as a newsy newspaper, up-to-the-minute and hot-off-the-press like, say, Warta Bhakti. Rather, it served primarily as a guide to party members all over the country on the central leadership's attitude toward current issues; it also provided information on PKI-allied mass organizational activities and policies, linked outlying branches and gave them a sense of importance by including news of regional and local party activities, and devoted a good deal of space--usually most or all of the third page--to feature articles and essays of ideological interest. Considering the usual flavor of the Djakarta press,

its contents were quite sober and solid; qualities which reflected both a desire to avoid provocation and a conscious effort to raise the "cultural level" of party members, extend readership to the non-Communist educated, and enhance the desired public image of respectability and responsibility. It had the largest circulation of any newspaper in Indonesia.

For PKI members and sympathizers, Harian Rakjat was a journal of policy, ideas, and record on party matters. As such it was not just for today or tomorrow--indeed, fortunately so, for what with distance and transportation problems it was often a good long time before the farther reaches received their copies. Because it set the party line, and because it was meant as a standard reference and source of authority, it followed the practice, common to the central organs of Communist parties, of putting out only one edition a day. Because of the limited capacity of the press, and because of the desire to get copies of the paper out to the provinces--especially on the train to Central and East Java--so that provincial responses to central decisions would be as well coordinated and prompt as possible, printing of the single, huge HR edition began much earlier than that of other Djakarta morning papers.

Secondly, we must note that October 1 was a Friday--a half-day normally. Thus time was short, particularly since HR usually published especially early in order that the weekend issue of the paper would reach the important outlying branches and distributors on Saturday morning--for otherwise they might not receive them until Monday. Consequently, the Saturday morning Harian Rakjat was customarily put to bed the afternoon before; news from Friday evening (unless reflecting pre-releases or leaks) would not be included in the paper till Monday. HR could, of course, have delayed printing its October 2 issue in view of the uncertainty of the situation or, far better yet in retrospect, it could have had a "breakdown" at the plant and not published at all. Here, however, the need to avoid provocation by making a mistake in what the paper said conflicted with the need to avoid provocation by a mistake in what the members did. In the capital itself discipline, word-of-mouth instruction, and the informing of local party and mass organization offices would presumably hold people in line, the more so since the rebel-held radio broadcast for people to keep order and await further announcements. But in the provinces Communists would undoubtedly be confused, and, particularly if left to their own resources until Monday, might get themselves unfortunately involved. Therefore it was important to get out the "sit tight and wait" message; and indeed, this was also stressed in "Tjekak-aos", the customary podjok (5) on the first page, which says: "You can never guard revolutionary unity and intensify vigilance too strongly"--or, in non-HR parlance, "sit just as tight as can be."

But as we have seen the editorial also expresses clear sympathy for Untung; and this is underlined in "Tjaberawit",

the other, third-page podjok: "The 30 September movement has taken steps against the Generals' Council. The support and sympathy of the People are on the side of the 30 September Movement." Not Wong Tjilik's usual clever aside, but a pedestrian imitation of the editorial, from which, we might suspect, it has simply been taken over. Why does the paper, if it does not wish to go unnecessarily far out on a limb, nonetheless express itself so unequivocally? Compare, for example, the masterful ambiguity of the PNI executive's statement given in the Antara Indonesian-language bulletin of the morning of the 2nd and you will realize how inexpertly the PKI paper handles the situation:

The session of the DPP PNI enlarged to include the leadership of the Gerakan Massa Marhaen [the association of Nationalist mass organizations]^{a)} has made the following decisions after having studied the latest developments in the capital:

1. To remain firm and loyal to the Great Leader of the Revolution/Father of Marhaenism Bung Karno and to be ready to implement every command issued by the Great Leader of the Revolution/Father of Marhaenism Bung Karno to safeguard the revolution.
2. To recognize only Bung Karno's leadership of the revolution and that of bodies recognized as faithful, loyal, and obedient to the Command of Bung Karno, the voice of the Indonesian common masses.
3. To express deep appreciation to the Soldiers^{b)} who have shown their loyalty in safeguarding the Great Leader of the Revolution/Father of Marhaenism Bung Karno.
4. In this connection^{c)} the entire membership of the PNI-FM within the structure of regional councils, districts, and branch groups, together with all members of the Gerakan Massa Marhaen, are declared in a state of preparedness to take revolutionary actions together with other progressive revolutionary forces, under the leadership of Bung Karno, to ensure the progress of the revolution.
5. To support every action^{d)} taken to purge the apparatus of the revolution of bogus^{e)} elements and those who would undermine the authority of the Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno.
6. To instruct all members of the PNI-FM to be vigilant towards^{f)} the provocations of Nekolim henchmen and counter-revolutionary elements.

We might have expected Njoto, chairman of the Harian Rakjat editorial board, to have done a better job at fence sitting; but he was in Medan with Subandrio. Aidit was at Halim; Lukman, Sakirman, Peris Pardede, and perhaps all other Politburo members except the relatively low-ranking Amir Anwar Sanusi and Njono were out of town. Partly by luck and partly through its own action the Untung group had struck at a moment when the PKI was minus most of its top leadership. The responsible Harian Rakjat editor, M. Naibaho, was an experienced and competent journalist,

but the requirements of this situation were evidently beyond him and beyond such party leaders as he managed to consult. (6)

But perhaps we should not be so hard on those who fathered the October 2nd editorial. After all, it is unfair to compare this document with the PNI statement, for the latter was issued, so the Antara item announces, on Friday evening--Djum'at malam--and thus those who composed it had time to see the capital changing hands and to realize that if they were going to declare themselves they had better so word their statement that it would appear to the final victor that they were loyal to his side. How clever of the PNI to choose its words so carefully; how wise of it to have waited before making any comment on a day when the mere timing of a remark could be so compromising. Once again, an example of the PNI's sure instinct for coming down at the right time on the winning side.

Or was it? On October 10 General Sukendro's muck raking newspaper Api published a report which claimed that before 10 a.m. on October 1, "according to a reliable source", there had been a meeting of the PNI executive which had decided to support the September 30th Movement and which had issued a statement to that effect signed by PNI secretary general Surachman. This statement, Api claimed, had been taken by Satyagraha, a party prominent and editor of the central PNI journal Suluh Indonesia, to the office of the Antara news service sometime during midday (sianq), where it was seen by a number of journalists.

The PNI executive denied Api's claim immediately: on October 11 it issued a statement signed by general chairman Ali Sastroamidjojo, vice chairman Ruslan Abdulgani, and vice secretary general John Lumingkewas saying that this was a "false and slanderous report" aimed at splitting the PNI. (7) The next day Api returned to the fray, however: it said the meeting it referred to had been a session of the DPP-PNI enlarged to include the Gerakan Massa Marhaen; that Satyagraha had taken the statement to Antara about 11:00 a.m., and that it had been read out to the journalists there, the radicals among whom (Api mentions A. Karim D.P. of the PNI and S. Tahsin of Partindo) it pleased mightily. (8) The Api article also quoted as part of the incriminating document Point 3 of the PNI statement which we have reported as appearing in Antara. The newspaper quoted again from the statement in another attack on the PNI in the issue of 14 October; but this time the version is a bit different from ours--Point 5 reads: "To support every movement or action taken to purge the apparatus of the revolution...."

Api's claims were once again hotly denied in a statement signed for the DPP PNI by John Lumingkewas and dated October 15. (9) There had been a meeting of the PNI executive and the leadership of the Gerakan Massa Marhaen on the 1st, yes; but it had not taken place until 10:30 a.m. It had been held at the auditorium of the Coordinating Department of Agriculture

(Kompertag) building at Salemba Raya 16, following a ceremony, led by Surachman in his capacity as Minister of People's Irrigation, which inaugurated the Council for the Abolition of the Algemeen Water Reglement (the colonial irrigation laws) and the Council for the Drafting of a National Irrigation Law. (10) A goodly number of the PNI leaders were there--their names are given in the statement--although the very top leaders were, like those of the PKI, mostly out of town. (11) A declaration was discussed and drawn up collectively in accordance with such facts as were at hand; the meeting closed at 11:30 a.m., and those present were told to try and collect further information. At 6:00 p.m. another meeting of the PNI and GMM leadership began, this time in Djl. Sindanglaja; it decided to reject the nomination of PNI members to the Revolutionary Council. All statements issued, the refutation continued, were put out by the PNI executive; and the Gerakan Massa Marhaen was not authorized to make any declaration on its own. At 8:00 p.m. Satyagraha took the statement(s?) to Antara; at 11:30 it was (they were?) taken by John Lumingkewas, Bachtiar Salim Haloho, and Hadji Mohammad Djambek on behalf of the DPP PNI plenum to Colonel Jogaswara of KOSTRAD.

Now that there was a ceremony at the Department of Agriculture building on the morning (pagi) of the 1st we know, for Patriot, the Medan PNI newspaper, gave an account of it in its issue of October 6. It did concern the abolition of the colonial irrigation laws, and Surachman gave a pretty little speech discussing the completion of this bit of business from the old revolution, while down the road (for Salemba is the main thoroughfare out to Halim air base) a new upheaval was in the making.

There were a number of PNI leaders at the gathering as a matter of course, for the Department of Agriculture was a PNI stronghold; (12) no doubt more Nationalist prominents were summoned or, knowing the ceremony was scheduled, came over to discuss what should be done in the face of the Untung announcement. Exactly when the ceremony took place, and whether the PNI session preceded or succeeded it--one would think the latter--is not really important. The thing is that the PNI meeting must have been held while the coup group was clearly in command. The gathering drew up a statement, as the PNI refutation declared; the question is whether it was the same as the one we have quoted and when, if ever, it was released.

The issue of Patriot which provides the account of the irrigation ceremony also contains a statement by the PNI executive. At first glance it looks like the one to be found in Antara, but on closer inspection some interesting differences are apparent, one of them being that the version of Point 5 is the same as that quoted by Api.

Let us take the principal divergencies as they occur in the text. You will note, for example, that in the first sentence there is a point we have marked a). Here, in the Patriot version, there follows "which took place in Djakarta on Friday October 1 1965." Why should this be missing from the Antara version?--after all, it was stated that the declaration was issued Friday evening, and the normal assumption would be that the meeting which decided it took place before midnight and the beginning of the 2nd. (13) But perhaps the reason was less logical than psychological: perhaps the question of time was an embarrassing one, and the PNI would rather have as little attention drawn to it as possible. Indeed, the matter of time was awkward, for according to Patriot the party issued the statement not Friday malam but sore, that is, in the latter part of the afternoon.

The difference between malam and sore is of importance in evaluating Point 3 of the PNI statement. There, b), the word peradjurit is used for those who rescued the President. This was an odd choice, for the normal reference to a military person in the political language of the day was anggota Angkatan Bersendjata or (specifically for the army) anggota Angkatan Darat. (14) Peradjurit had both a lower-rank and a heroic connotation. It is not likely the word would have been used to refer to military preservers of the status quo, but it might well have been used to mirror the common-soldier-against-the-decadent-hierarchy appeal which Untung expressed. And who else but the Untung group could it have referred to?--for the statement says the soldiers telah menjelamatkan have safeguarded (or taken into safekeeping) the President. Before malam on the 1st there was only one group to which this phrase could apply, as Api did not fail to point out in quoting this point.

In Point 4 we have noted, c), the phrase "in this connection" (dalam hubungan ini). In the Patriot version it reads "within the context of confronting all eventualities" (dalam rangka menghadapi segala kemungkinan). This is one of a number of small changes the total effect of which is to reduce the amount of militant and Untung-sounding terminology in the document.

In Point 5, d), the Patriot version reads, instead of "to support every action" (mendukung setiap tindakan), "to support every movement or action" (mendukung tiap gerakan atau tindakan); and, as also did not escape Api's eye, there was only one thing that called itself a "movement" that day. Moreover, e), the word "bogus" (gadungan) was used, before the post-coup reaction reversed all ideological terminology, solely in attacking those held insufficiently revolutionary; Marhaenis gadungan had been an epithet almost constantly on the lips of the Ali-Surachman PNI leadership during the summer of 1965 in their campaign to jettison the conservative Hardi-Hadisubeno group. It was not a term ever used by the PNI in criticizing groups to

the left of it; and given the radical posture which the coup group assumed vis-a-vis the army command, the term was not without implication. Finally, in Point 6 it might be observed, f), that the Patriot version's instruction to PNI adherents to "constantly intensify their vigilance" was changed in the Antara version to the more modest "be vigilant"--and rightly so, for it is obvious the party had not been very much on its toes to start out with.

The October 15 PNI denial of Api's charges mentioned, among other things, that the Gerakan Massa Marhaen had not been authorized to make any separate declaration. Presumably this was in response to rumors that there had been such a statement, and so there was, for the text is also given in the Patriot issue of October 6:

The Central Board of the Gerakan Massa Marhaen, consisting of the Kesatuan Buruh Marhaenis, Petani, Pemuda Marhaenis, Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia, Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, Gerakan Wanita Marhaenis, Lembaga Kebudayaan Nasional, Djamiatul Muslimin, Ikatan Sardjana Rakjat Indonesia, and Gerakan Nelajan Marhaenis, hereby instructs its entire membership in all Indonesia to execute the instruction of the DPP PNI-Front Marhaenis of October 1, 1965, with all the consequences thereof.

The Indonesian revolution under the leadership of H.E. President/Great Leader of the Revolution/Father of Marhaenism Bung Karno demands the greatest sacrifices of all the Marhaenist masses in order to safeguard the Indonesian revolution.

This is a clarion call to do nothing, of course; but given the slant of the PNI statement whose implementation it demands, it is hardly unfavorable to Untung. The statement was signed by ten leaders of PNI mass organizations; nearly all of them were listed in the October 15 PNI denial as attending the Department of Agriculture meeting on the morning of October 1. (15)

Apparently what happened was that the PNI leadership, having caucused that morning to discuss what it knew of the affair, was sufficiently convinced that developments were promising to draw up a declaration which, while cautiously worded, nonetheless indicated willingness to come in behind the September 30th Movement. Either at that meeting or just after it, the representatives of the association of mass organizations drew up their statement, designed as part of what would become a flurry of declarations of support from PNI-affiliated bodies, in the usual manner of Indonesian political campaigns of support. It was not intended to make the statement public until Sukarno had been heard from, for his continuing silence might indicate the September 30th Movement was running into some difficulty, and anyway the PNI had never moved except in Sukarno's shadow and did not intend to start now.

But some of those attending the meeting were so enthused and so anxious to display their inside knowledge that they bruited the statement about. Satyagraha took a copy over to Antara to be held until word came to make it public; he could not resist showing it to his friend Karim and other radicals whom he knew would share his delight that the PNI was coming in against the generals. In late afternoon the moment came when the PNI felt it safe to issue the statement, and this was too late for it to come into the afternoon Antara bulletin, which, as we will remember, closed off at 3:30. By about 6:00, when the RRI shut down in the face of Suharto's ultimatum, it began to dawn on the PNI leaders that a dreadful mistake had been made. A frantic scurry, and the second meeting was held. The statement, of course, would have to be redeemed from Antara; how fortunate that it had been too late for the afternoon bulletin. But alas, it could not be completely forgotten, for copies of the statement had already been sent out of town. (16) The only hope was to confuse the opposition by having Antara publish a doctored version which--most important--indicated it was issued after Untung's fall. In addition, a statement was drawn up washing the PNI's hands of participation in the Revolutionary Council, which was to be the major content of Suluh Indonesia the next morning. (17)

The late-evening visit to KOSTRAD by the party heads was probably part of this effort to secure at least a neutral public position, for we will remember that after Untung's fall military permission had to be obtained for any publication. Since the Suluh Indonesia issue which appeared on the morning of the 2nd contained the denial of Revolutionary Council involvement and thus was printed after the coup was finished, and since it is hardly likely the PNI could or would have defied an army order, we must assume that such permission was obtained. What, if anything, the military knew about the party's maneuverings during the day we do not know--probably they were as ignorant of what had been developing among the civilians in Djakarta as they had been of the military side of the coup. However, in view of the strong representation of the PNI on the Revolutionary Council and the continuing general uncertainty and confusion, the army was willing enough to see the Nationalist paper come out with a statement disassociating itself from the side of the coup. Suluh Indonesia was the only paper other than the two army journals and the fateful issue of Harian Rakjat to appear on the morning of October 2nd; it has not been allowed to publish since.

The PNI thus fell into the same pit on October 1 as did the PKI. Ever cautious and skilled in the evasion of issues as the Nationalist leaders were, they had worded their declaration more obliquely; on the other hand they went farther than the Communists by expressing themselves in formal declarations by party and mass organization leaders rather than through a newspaper editorial. Fortunately, the army was sufficiently concerned to secure the crucifixion of the PKI that it did not

choose to broaden the scope--and thus lessen the intensity--of the punishment by including the PNI among the publicly guilty.

Perhaps Surachman, Satyagraha and one or two other radicals in the group that drew up the PNI and GMM declarations might have been expected to go out on a limb from leftist enthusiasm; but how many others in that collection of seasoned opportunists could be accused of ever having taken a stand on anything unless they were very sure that was the winning side? They did, though, and at that in the latter part of the afternoon, when Untung's short-lived reign was drawing to a close. For once in their inside-track lives they had been completely excluded from knowledge of what was really taking place; and like their equally ill-informed colleagues in the PKI they read the available signs completely wrong.

Moreover, the PNI leaders obviously had no conception of the danger of the situation, hence of the fact that murder had been done. Apparently they saw the development as a new surge of the recent political tide, one that promised to break the power of the general staff and the groups with which it was identified. They wanted to make sure the generals were defeated, and they hoped to get in on the ground floor with whatever group the September 30th Movement represented; and so they drew up their declaration early in the day, waiting only for a sign of Sukarno's position to put it out. Similar attempts to clamber on the new bandwagon were made by lesser groups of young hopefuls about the country, who cast aside caution, discipline, and no doubt their lives by penning off letters to Untung on October 1 assuring him of their eager support. (18) Though the army-controlled press saw fit to publish only samples of this response from adherents of the PKI we can well imagine that it was not just among the Communist--or Nationalist--ranks that aspiring politicoes scented the sweet smell of opportunity on that day and acted with fatal rashness.

We must remember that the people who had any idea what was going on during the period of Untung's dominance were very few; they were nearly all at Halim and Kostrad, while those who were not--emissaries, palace plotters, military negotiators--were not discussing things with the general public. There was no disorder, no fighting; only a minimum of soldiers were visible, and they were convinced they were protecting the President from a coup and so, if questioned, strengthened the Untung story. The Untung group controlled communications, radio, and news outlets. The town seemed emptied of generals and service chiefs; how many had been arrested, summoned by the President, or gone elsewhere was probably, given rumor, everyone's guess. Seen from Halim, the coup group's power position might have seemed increasingly sticky; from Kostrad it might have seemed hopeless from the start; but seen from Djakarta there would have been no reason to doubt that whatever was going on was not a military success. The most that would have been noticeable were

discussions between officers and armed units in the Medan Merdeka area during the late afternoon. But these were orderly and nothing of what they concerned was indicated to the outside world. The streets were not guarded, no curfew or state of emergency was declared, there was no apparent effort at counter-attack, no preparations for military defense: the signs of absolute weakness are also those of absolute control. When then should doubts as to Untung's power arise until, with six o'clock and troops at the door, it is too late?

The initial announcement that a Generals' plot had been foiled must have struck the Communists with a blade of fear that the thing had been so close, but further with great joy that now their dreaded opponents had been removed. High party callers at the Aidit house would doubtless have been informed that palace guard emissaries had come for him in the small hours of the morning with the message that a coup was in process and the President needed him at his side. This would have seemed completely in line with the initial radio announcements by the Untung group and given confidence that the rest of its claims were true. Presumably there was puzzlement as to just what the September 30th Movement was and what had triggered the action. But this would doubtless soon be made clear; the important thing was that some or all of the SUAD clique (for there would have been little doubt that Nasution and his associates were meant) had been arrested, and one must pitch in and help make the charges stick.

We may find a reflection of such an early reaction in the Harian Rakjat of October 2, not in the textual matter but in the cartoon strip at the bottom of the first page. This strip, a regular Saturday feature of HR, contained a (usually rather stupid) series of drawings caricaturing events for each day of the week. The Thursday-Friday and Saturday cartoons are reproduced here. (19) We must bear in mind that HR's weekly cartoon strip normally depicted in its Sunday through Thursday panels events which actually took place on the day concerned; the Friday strip never did, but took instead an event of the day before. It was drawn and prepared for printing too early on Friday to include news of that day--unless, like the Untung affair, it was a development of cardinal importance that took place very early that morning. Here, then, we may find a clue as to what the PKI attitude was in the first hours after the news came through.

The most striking thing about the cartoons is the sharpness of their tone. Granted a caricature is rarely subtle, and granted the HR cartoonist was no master of his craft, they still make their point--the generals are corrupt, they are traitorous, and they fall--very bluntly. There is reference to the September 30th Movement but none to Untung, and naturally none to the Revolutionary Council, which had not been formed yet. There is very pointed stress, however, to another body--the CIA. This,

of course, was the original Untung charge against them; but we will notice it is not mentioned in the editorial. Nor, for that matter, does it appear in the headline announcing Untung's move: that, set in modest type, declares that "Lt. Col. Untung, Commander of Tjakrabirawa Battalion, Rescues President and Indonesian Republic from Generals' Council Coup" with the subhead "The 30 September Movement is an Internal Army Movement." Nor, as we have seen, is it brought up in the normally waspish *podjoks*. This is odd indeed, when we consider that Harian Rakjat had a great fondness for the CIA, devotedly cataloguing its every squirm and wriggle. The President, who had had a thing about the Agency ever since the 1958 rebellion, had become convinced it was behind the BPS affair of the year before, and since then almost everything that went wrong in the country had been labelled a tool or product of the CIA. The PKI had naturally encouraged this attention, so that finally hardly a day went by without HR discussing the subject. Indeed, on page three of the October 2 issue we find an essay on "CIA Intervention in the PRRI/Permesta Affair" as revealed in HR's standard source of authority on the subject, The Invisible Government. We would think a charge that the generals had been plotting with the CIA to overthrow Sukarno would be wonderful grist for this mill: but only the cartoonist took it up. This even though Untung discussed the charge in detail in his announcement and clearly did not mean it rhetorically, and even though Dhani's order of the day offering to help purge the army made a point of it.

To understand why this most tempting line was not pursued further by Harian Rakjat, we must try to imagine how the HR editors and those PKI heads they may have been able to consult would have reacted to the events between early morning and late afternoon on the 1st. We are guessing, of course; but sometimes if one tries to put himself in someone else's shoes and judge the situation on the basis of the information you believe available to him, things that seem illogical from the "objective outsider" viewpoint suddenly begin to fit a reasonable pattern--which hopefully is a bit closer to the truth.

For the Harian Rakjat editors, the most puzzling phenomenon of the day must have been, as it was for everyone, the fact that Sukarno did not speak. The original Untung announcement had seemed predicated on the expectation that the President would appear shortly to explain to the nation just what was going on; but he did not. The most likely reason to occur to the Communists--who doubtless feared the generals' fall was too good to be true--was probably that negotiations were going on; that Sukarno was talking with the generals and that they were trying to argue their way out of the mess they had got--or been gotten--into. If they were having any success--and apparently they were having some, else there would have been further news--then the CIA charge must be a hard one to make stick; which one might expect. Best, therefore, not to push it for the nonce,

at least till you know what the score is and who the generals involved are; for if some or all of them regain their power you can be sure they will hold you responsible for CIA rumors no matter who acted, and it would be good in that case to be able to point out that you nobly refrained from slinging such mud editorially at a time when others were. On the other hand, you don't want the generals to get away with whatever line they are feeding the President about the activity they tripped on; and so, "Whatever the justification that may have been used by the Generals' Council in its attempt...." Since the situation is so uncertain, use "Generals' Council" always, not loosely "generals" as the cartoonist did in his early optimism; for that way if the generals wriggle out they cannot blame you for attacking them--as they will undoubtedly deny the existence of a council.

As for the cartoon itself, nine chances out of ten it was forgotten in the excitement and muddle of the day. If the HR editors reconsidered it at all they probably decided to wait till just before going to press to determine whether or not it would be too risky to include. There would, after all, be certain advantages to introducing comment on the CIA charge at some point in the issue--if it later proved a bone of contention that could be gnawed further, no one can say you were so doubtful of its truth as to ignore it at the outset; if it turned out to be better buried it would be hard, in view of the firmness with which others have expressed support for the CIA charge, to make an effective fuss about two panels in a cartoon strip in an otherwise clean issue. As we shall see, there was reason at the time Harian Rakjat went to press for its editors to have felt renewed optimism about the situation, though apparently they did not feel sufficient certainty to use the cartoonist's tone of jubilant attack in any of the textual material.

To find evidence for our surmised mid-morning slump in PKI optimism concerning what was going on, we will have to leave the Harian Rakjat office on Pintu Besar and travel to Pintu Air and the headquarters of Kebudayaan Baru, an afternoon newspaper whose editorial staff consisted of prominent PKI specialists in intellectual affairs. (20) The journal, established only the preceding August, printed on the same press as did HR, and so had to finish its run before the Harian Rakjat issue for the next day was put to bed. Consequently it went to press quite early for an afternoon paper--one would guess on this day about noon.

The headline of the October 1 issue of Kebudayaan Baru is virtually the same as that which appeared in Harian Rakjat: "Lt. Col. Untung Safeguards President Sukarno and Indonesian Republic from Generals' Council Coup," with the subhead "This Incident is an Internal Army Affair." It stretches across the page but is set in very modest type. The only news of the coup is the initial RRI announcement; there is a cartoon and an

editorial, but they note only the fact that it is the CPR's anniversary. There is Ibukota, a special box for comment on events in the capital, but that chooses to consider only the inflation. There is the podjok Tjanang, but that devotes itself to quoting Aiditisms on the theme of steadfastness in the face of adversity. The only comment Kebudajaan Baru allows itself, in fact, is a small item placed immediately below the RRI announcement:

The Situation
in the Capital

The situation in the Capital today remains calm. Life continues as usual. The streets remain crowded with traffic, offices continue work as usual. So also street vendors, shops, schools, and so on.

This is less the voice of one who sees a revolutionary opportunity than of one who hopes that whatever is happening will leave him alone. If anything, its tone is less militant than that of the only non-leftist newspaper we have from the afternoon of the 1st, the Christian journal Sinar Harapan:

Keep calm, increase vigilance.
Guard union and unity.
The interests of the revolution, the nation, and the state
above everything else. (21)

The day wears on; still no message from the President, no word from Aidit. But available contacts with the elite and with inside dopesters like Karim D.P. and Satyagraha indicate worry on the part of the right and enthusiasm on that of the radical nationalists, which points in an encouraging direction. Then, too, there is the proposed declaration by the PNI, of which the Harian Rakjat heads must have been informed almost immediately after its display at Antara--where Satyagraha would have appeared, had he gone there directly after the time the PNI claimed its meeting broke up, at about noon. Inasmuch as the Nationalists were not known for betting on long shots, knowledge that they were assuming things would swing against the generals was most reassuring; moreover, the fact that they were preparing to declare for Untung was extremely comforting in that the PKI would not risk isolating itself on a dangerous political limb if it also expressed approval of Untung's action.

Around this point, too, Dhani's order of the day is received, supporting Untung's charges and offering to purge the other services. Surely things must be going in the right direction; Dhani would never move unless it seemed safe and the President ordered him to. The early afternoon announcements are heard: Sabur's assurance of the President's health and safety, then the setting up of the Revolutionary Council and the other late Untung decrees. Seen in retrospect and from the

outside, the afternoon broadcasts are the efforts of a failing movement. But as they are seen by people who had become increasingly confused and worried about the situation, and who saw no visible evidence of declining power, they appear as steps taken from strength.

From this perspective, the announcements open up a new possibility--perhaps lying uneasily in the back of the mind for some time, what with the silence from the President, the peculiar precedence of Untung's name, and the fact that Untung takes action in the name of a "movement" within the Army. A power play of some sort: a "colonels' revolt", to judge from the presidium of the Revolutionary Council and the declaration on ranks. The list of members of the Council is weird, but then so is the present Cabinet; as far as can be checked people appointed to the council know nothing about it, but then probably the membership list is the result of a deal being worked out wherever the dealing is going on. Hopefully the move will not clip Sukarno's wings, or the PKI's; the President's name is not mentioned, which is worrying, and the reference to non-alignment in foreign policy is most unpromising. But the composition of the council seems sufficiently full of Sukarnoite and "progressive" figures to be reassuring. The rightwing panglimas' names are no pleasure to see, but at least the Menteng generals seem to be definitely out. Presumably the colonels seek to take their place; hopefully they will prove more reasonable than their predecessors. In any event the Party has learned, especially in dealing with the military, to bend whenever the breeze is strong, so it will adjust if necessary to them in turn.

But if there is actually to be a shakeup in the military sector of the regime you want to start out on a good footing with these people. They doubtless will pay a great deal of attention to who sided with them at the outset--indeed, they have made this clear in their earlier remarks. Under the best of conditions the military are puzzling and worrisome creatures for a Communist to deal with, and they will probably take great offense if you are completely ambiguous in your remarks or devote the editorial to the last year's rice prices. So express appreciation to Untung--who from the continued prominence of his name may be not a spokesman or pawn but a new arbiter of military politics--and say his movement sounds patriotic. Then the conclusive news comes in--the first Presidential message, the appointment of Pranoto to run the army. The man Nasution kicked out of the Central Java command of the Central Java panglima-ship for being too Nasakom-minded, a man low down on the pecking order for top position! This means either the entire Menteng military set is by the boards or that it is so weak vis-a-vis the President and the new group that it could be skipped over. Clearly a turning point has been reached: best still to be cautious, as the whole story is not at all plain, and best to stress your agreement that it is an internal Army

affair--that is, that you intend to keep out of it. But say your heart is with the 30 September group, for clearly it has won out over Nasution and his allies--as the Nationalists also think, for now, sore, they issue their declaration. (22)

Though the editorial is by now a scrapbook of the day's hopes and hesitations, it reflects the cautious-but-positive pose that seems safest; so set it and go to press. But you have not reckoned that the generals are not outmaneuvered but dead or preparing to strike back; that the calm of the city and the assertiveness of the later announcements reflects not growing strength but mortal weakness; that with the appointment of Pranoto, Sukarno has not gained but lost control of the Army; and that the editorial, sloppy but safe, will shortly destroy you.

Notes

(1) See for example Polemik Merdeka Harian Rakjat (Djakarta: Harian Rakjat, 1964); and BPS: Aksi dan Reaksi (Djakarta: Harian Rakjat, 1965).

(2) Text of the order in Berita Yudha, October 2, 1965.

(3) One more issue of the PKI newspaper actually appeared, the number for October 3. But this was HR Minggu, the Sunday cultural issue, which was customarily made up and printed earlier in the week and held for sale on Sunday. Like other Djakarta newspapers which followed the same practice, the October 3 issue contained no news of the events of the 1st and 2nd.

(4) We should bear in mind that if the Army ran off the HR issue of October 2 there is a chance the paper--and particularly its editorial--were still viewed by the editors as open to revision. This would explain the "unfinished" look of the editorial. It would also make it impossible to assert that this reflected the attitude of the editors at the time the paper was taken over, for it might then represent a version written quite a bit earlier in the day and intended for last-minute revision when the situation seemed clear enough to go to press. The question of time is, of course, important in the search for clues as to whether and how HR's attitude changed during the day as the result of further information or second thoughts on what was happening. Our own feeling is that the fact there is a stop-press meant the editorial was considered ready for printing at that time, and that if the press had not begun to roll when the counter-coup forces arrived, it was about to.

(5) A sentence or so expressing some item of controversy or emphasis; by convention these are permitted by the authorities more license to criticize than are regular news items or editorials, and, since they are also usually expressed in peppery

language, they tend to be among the first things one looks at on getting the paper. The first page is the only one (with the exception of the podjok on page three) that refers to events of the 1st; presumably it was kept open until fairly late in the afternoon. The only elements in the paper that refer to the 1st and are not taken word for word from Antara dispatches or September 30th Movement communiques are the editorial, the cartoons, the headlines, and the podjoks. There is one further item of interest in the issue of October 2, Aidit's SESKOAL lecture, reprinted in honor of the coming Armed Forces Day, which we have described in the discussion of alternative origins of the coup.

(6) The Njono confession (see the last appendix) refers to a meeting with Naibaho at Njono's home on October 1; however, although the description of Njono's activities on October 1 is the most likely section of this remarkable document, the whole is so riddled with obvious falsehoods that it is best not to accept any of it in evidence. It is reasonable to suppose that the Harian Rakjat editors would have gotten in touch with such Politburo members as could be contacted during the day to find out how they should handle the issue. We should bear in mind, however, that unless those leaders actually stayed at the HR office, contact (given the paralyzation of communications in Djakarta and the distance of HR headquarters from the CC PKI and the Politburo members' homes) was not likely to have been well coordinated, continuing, or necessarily close to press time. This, plus the absence of the topmost party leaders, means that we must treat this issue of Harian Rakjat cautiously as an authoritative party reaction: clearly it did not represent a considered consensus of Politburo opinion in the way pronouncements on important events in other issues of the journal would, although this also does not mean the attitude of the larger group, given the same limits on information available to them, would necessarily have been different.

(7) Marhaen (Makassar PNI organ), October 13, 1965. After the banning of Suluh Indonesia following its October 2 issue, the PNI leadership (that is the Ali-Surachman group) had no voice in the capital.

(8) Tahsin (who had recently been appointed ambassador to Mali) denied, however, having been at Antara, seen Karim or Satyagraha, or read any statement on that day (PNI denial of October 15, Nasional, November 5, 1965).

(9) Text in Nasional (Jogjakarta PNI organ), November 5, 1965.

(10) According to the October 15 PNI statement Leimena was originally supposed to be in charge of the ceremony, and a deputy was sent to pick him up at his house at 8:30 a.m. as per arrangement. However, he could not contact Leimena because his house was being guarded "in connection with the September 30th

incident." Who was guarding the house--Untung or Suharto forces--and whether they were really concerned with Leimena's residence or Nasution's neighboring one is a puzzle.

(11) The PNI account states that Minister of Forestry Sudjarwo attended the ceremony; one gathers he was not present at the subsequent meeting, however. The meeting was led, according to the PNI statement, by secretary general Surachman in the absence abroad of general chairman Ali Sastroamidjojo, the 3rd and 5th chairmen (the 1st and 2nd posts having been vacant since the dumping of the Hardi group in August), and the absence from town of 4th chairman Ruslan Abdulgani. Present were John Lumingkewas (vice secretary general), Slamet Ginting (chairman of the organization department), Bachtiar Salim Haloho (chairman of the Buruh Marhaenis), Zaini Mansjur (general chairman of the Pemuda Marhaenis), Mrs. Samari (general chairman of the Wanita Marhaenis), Bambang Kusnohadi (general chairman of the presidium of the GMNI), Notosukardjo (Petani), Mohammed Djambek (general chairman of Djamiatul Muslimin), Djoni Sastrawiguna (general chairman of the GSNI), Sitor Situmorang (chairman of the LKN), Drs. Sukarno (head of ISRI), Tiranda (secgen of Pemuda Marhaenis), Karna Radjasa (first chairman of the Greater Jakarta party organization), and members of the Gerakan Massa Marhaen leadership including Satyagraha.

(12) The account of the Department of Agriculture meeting in Patriot of October 6 mentions that among others present were Forestry Minister Sudjarwo, secretary of the Coordinating Minister of Agriculture Ir. Sartojo (representing the Minister), vice secretary general of the central executive of the National Front H. Mohammad Djambek, and assistant to the Minister of Agrarian Affairs Drs. Zaini Mansjur.

(13) The stencil on which the text of the statement was typed at Antara was completed at 11:15 p.m. (it is the first of two items on the page, but the second is old news); the English-language bulletin, in which it occurs as the last item on the page, is dated 12:30 a.m. The phrase giving the time and place of the PNI meeting is missing from both Indonesian-language and English-language editions, so that it is not likely to have been an omission in typing the stencil.

(14) In the Patriot version of the PNI statement the word reads simply pradjurit, which may mean one or more soldiers. It is possible that it was originally intended in the singular--pradjurit in the heroic sense--i.e., Untung. We are led to suspect this because the Antara version uses para Pradjurit, which is definitely plural, thus indicating the authors felt uncomfortable about the original version. The English-language Antara bulletin tiptoes even farther away from the unfortunate "Soldier(s)": the word becomes "all members of the Armed Forces."

(15) The GMM statement was signed by Bachtiar Salim Haloho on behalf of the DPP KBM (labor federation), Notosukardjo for DPP Petani (peasants), Zaini Mansjur for DPP Pemuda Marhaenis (youth), Rudi P. Sihombing for the DPP GSNI (non-university students), Bambang Kusnohadi for the DPP GMNI (university students), Mrs. Samari for the DPP Wanita Marhaenis (women), Sitor Situmorang for the DPP LKN (cultural association), H. Mohammad Djambek for the Djamiatul Muslimin Indonesia (religious group), drs. Soekarno for the DPP ISRI (scholars), and S. Sawarno SH for the DPP GMM itself.

(16) Patriot credits Suluh Indonesia with its version of the PNI statement. We do not have a copy of the Suluh Indonesia issue of October 2, but it seems most unlikely that it appeared there. Berita Yudha of October 4 includes a photograph of the Suluh Indonesia masthead and of the PNI denial of knowledge about the Revolutionary Council and the use of its members' names therein; this is printed with derisive comment about the PNI's ambivalent stand. Surely if either version of the general declaration of position had been included it would have been singled out for attack by Berita Yudha or by one of the other post-coup papers. Moreover, it is not probable Sulindo would print the original version of the PNI declaration if it went to press late enough to include a denial of involvement in the Revolutionary Council.

Perhaps there were two editions of the newspaper, one printed before the collapse of the coup and containing the statement, which was successfully kept from seeing the light of day in Djakarta but copies of which had already been sent out to the provinces; and a second edition containing the denial of participation and designed to offset the bad effect of the first. This does not seem likely, though; we would surely have found references to such an issue by now. Moreover, from the way Api referred to the statement, it was clear its copy was not on the pages of a newspaper.

In addition to appearing in Patriot, the PNI voice in Medan, it also seems to have come out on October 5 in Harian Banteng, the Bandung PNI paper: at least Api claimed this (October 17, 1965). It appeared on October 9 in Ariati Waspada, the Jogja Javanese-language PKI newspaper; presumably it was copied from a previous issue of Nasional, much as the Medan PKI newspaper Harian Harapan of October 7 drew it from Patriot of the 6th.

The Ariati Waspada account is interesting in that in Point 6 it speaks of members of the PNI-Front Marhaenis "ing formasi Dewan Daerah, Dewan Tjabang tekan ranting2," thus making the same error as appears in the Indonesian-language version appearing in Patriot: There are no branch councils in the PNI, and it should read, as it does in the Antara version, dalam formasi dewan daerah, tjabang sampai ke ranting2. This eliminates

the possibility that the statement was wired or phoned out of Djakarta while the coup was still going on (assuming this was at all possible) and reduces the likelihood of the Jogja and Medan papers having acquired it from different sources. It appears probable that the newspapers were working from copies of the same text (we would guess stencilled, to judge from usual duplicating practice in Djakarta) which, through haste in typing the original document or the stencil, contained this error.

We would guess the text was duplicated at Suluh Indonesia and bore some reference to this, or to the fact that it was an item to appear in Suluh Indonesia of the 2nd, and that this was the reason why Patriot referred to Suluh Indonesia as the source. Presumably copies of the statement were put in the mails to the provincial PNI newspapers as soon as it was decided to publish the declaration, and were irretrievable by the time the coup was broken. We can only guess as to why this would have been done: possibly out of sheer enthusiasm; or possibly it was normal PNI practice to send copies of major statements to party journals and offices in addition to their inclusion in Suluh Indonesia. Or it may have been considered chancy, in view of the unsettled situation, to rely solely on the newspapers' getting through. The Makassar PNI paper Marhaen of October 4 printed the Antara version; either because it received that one first or because, unlike its fellow journals, it twigged to the implications of the original text.

(17) The PNI denial of knowledge concerning the Revolutionary Council, as it appears in the photograph of the item in the October 2 Suluh Indonesia published in Berita Yudha of October 4, is as follows:

PNI Central Board Knows Nothing

Djakarta, 2 October (sulindo)--In connection with the inclusion of the names of members of the PNI-FM in the list of members of the "Revolutionary Council" the DPP PNI in a press statement last night asserted that the DPP PNI knows nothing about and bears no responsibility for the inclusion of those names.

In addition, the members of the PNI whose names were used by the "Revolutionary Council," namely Surachman, Zaini Mansjur, Bambang Kusnohadi, Supeni, Sumarno SH, and A. Karim DP, declare that they know nothing about and bear no responsibility for the using of their names.

Thus the press statement issued by the DPP PNI last night.

Marhaen of October 4 includes a similar statement, as does Patriot of the same date with the principal difference that for the second paragraph is substituted:

All members of the PNI-Front Marhaenis are asked to continue to increase their vigilance and not to be easily deceived by evil intrigues and intimidation by the counter-revolutionaries, and heed and obey only instructions from the DPP Front Marhaenis.

Curiously enough, though the PNI claimed Satyagraha brought the denial to Antara at 8:00 p.m. the agency did not carry a version of this on the morning of October 2nd (it was suspended that afternoon and purged). It did include, however, a hand-washing by A. Karim DP and Satyagraha on behalf of the journalists' association PWI.

(18) The most important of these groups was the East Java Pemuda Rakjat leadership, which sent in a letter of encouragement to the September 30th Movement which is quoted in Angkatan Bersendjata of October 6; it seems quite genuine. There are several such examples (aside from a large number of obvious fakes); not unsurprisingly they are all from groups of younger people. The most striking is a letter to Untung by the student body of Bachtaruddin Academy, a sort of night school belonging to the PKI-sponsored UNRA educational system which was supposed to teach political science to the interested masses. In the letter, a photograph of which is provided in Angkatan Bersendjata of October 9, the students declared that they were delighted Col. Untung had saved the President and the country and that they were sure the Nasution-Yani clique was behind the plot and in American pay. They further informed Untung they had all had training as volunteers and would be delighted to help preserve the accomplishments of the September 30th Movement: "All we volunteers of the Bachtaruddin Political Science Academy are ready to be armed and take an active part in putting down and cleaning out the remaining influence of the so-called Generals' Council." And, eager to participate in Politics, they stencilled the message and sent copies to the President, the NASAKOM party leaders, the press and radio, and all the members of the Revolutionary Council. The mind boggles; we have only to remember the generals whose names were included on the Council list to know into what sort of maw the Bachtaruddin student body was thrusting its head. Laudable as the PKI's attempts at educating its followers may have been, the party seems here to have been sowing the seeds of political enlightenment upon a barren ground.

(19) It was customary for the Saturday cartoon to play on the title of a current movie; it was not customary for the Thursday and Friday cartoons to be combined.

(20) Kebudayaan Baru began publishing in August; it was, like Harian Rakjat, printed on PIR, the old Indonesia Raja press. Responsible editor was Muslimin Jasin, who had previously been first secretary of the West Nusatenggara PKI; he was a candidate member of the Central Committee, a member of the BTI (peasant front) executive, and was active in the cultural organization

LEKRA. The Other members of the editorial board--S. Anantaguna, Porkas H. Daulae, Sidartojo, Suhardjo BA, and drs. Soekarno Iskandar--were prominent educational and cultural activists. The journal was made up to look as much like Harian Rakjat as possible, with the same conservative journalistic style; the major difference was the inclusion of sketches as a regular feature and a particular emphasis on educational and cultural affairs. Its birth seems to have been due to the then ongoing PKI campaign to get control of Indonesian education and intellectual life; in addition, it was probably intended as the opening wedge in an attempt to get permission for newspapers for each of the major mass organizations, which would have given the PKI immensely increased publishing capability.

Quite another journalistic kettle of fish was Gelora Indonesia, the third PKI newspaper in the capital, which we shall refer to below. It had begun earlier in the year and, using the Harian Rakjat editorial office but a different press (Persatuan, the other Djakarta press owned by the PKI), came out later in the afternoon than Kebudajaan Baru. Its responsible editor and board of reporters were all political unknowns (it had no board of editors presumably relying for guidance on the HR editorial staff whose office it shared). The format was unlike that of Harian Rakjat, relying more on large headlines and small words, and on the inside pages it tended to carry, in place of HR's weighty essays and documents, photos of girls and discussions of sports. Presumably it had been felt, when the matter of a second paper in the capital came up, that as the party of the People the PKI ought to give the People something they wanted to read.

(21) Warta Bhakti (the newspaper of A. Karim DP), in its afternoon street edition of October 1, devoted bold headlines to declaring: "RRI announces: Lt. Col. Untung of Tjakrabirawa Rescues President Sukarno and Indonesian Republic. Only a Movement within the Army." It included the initial Untung announcement and the Dani order announcement (with a large headline: "Order of the Day by the Minister/Air Force Commander"), but that is all. It did not include the Sabur announcement of the President's health and safety, which surely it would have if this had been announced before the edition went to press. This means that although the Dani order of the day was not broadcast until mid-afternoon it was available at least to some people a few hours before that. There was no editorial in the Warta Bhakti issue, while the podjok Matadjeli devoted itself to the passionate dissection of an automobile accident that had taken place on Djl. Diponegoro the day before. Whether he was as gleeful over the September 30th Movement as Api claimed, it was apparent that Karim was still playing his cards closely so far as public commitment was concerned at the time his paper went to press. Ekonomi Nasional, which shared the same editorial offices as Warta Bhakti and appeared about the same time of day had a similar headline: one suspects the leftist papers had

probably decided together what their headlines would say that afternoon, in the face of ignorance concerning which way the political winds were blowing, since if a number of papers said the same thing it would be less likely under normal circumstances for any one of them to be punished for going too far. A notable exception to this was the Gelora Indonesia headline (see below).

Sinar Harapan, which went to press after the Sabur statement, attempted to avoid all controversy by reporting nothing of the day's events except that announcement, which it published together with a large photograph of Sukarno and the headline: "President Continues to Hold Leadership of State." Alas, it was not possible for anyone who published that day to win; the first major revision of history to be undertaken in the postcoup period was the announcement by Sabur at 1:15 a.m. on the morning of the 2nd that the President had resumed the leadership of the state; for it was of course not permissible to assert he had held it during the coup period (Berita Yudha, October 2, 1965). Sinar Harapan resumed publication on October 8 after a purge.

(22) Some evidence that the Sukarno statement was the turning point for the PKI's treatment of the coup may perhaps be found in Gelora Indonesia, which went to press after the initial afternoon flurry of Untung announcements. We have only the portion of the front page produced in Berita Yudha of October 4 to go by, but presumably anything further that could be considered incriminating would have been included or reported. We can therefore assume there was no editorial, cartoon, or podjok dealing directly with the coup.

The Gelora Indonesia headlines are mixed; they give a confused, uncertain impression. The major headline does not declare Untung had saved the President, nor does it refer to him as chairman of the Revolutionary Council, which he by then claimed to be. Instead, it declares: "Statement of Commander of Tjakrabirawa Battalion I: On the Problem Concerning the 'Generals' Council'." This heading the RRI announcement of that morning. A quite conservative approach, then; even "Generals' Council" is in quotes. On the other hand, the Dhani order of the day, prominently displayed in a box, is headed "AURI supports September 30th Movement"; while heading the early afternoon Untung announcements is: "Beginning 30 September 1965 State Power in [hands of] Revolutionary Council. Highest Rank in Armed Forces Lt. Col."

It seems clear from this treatment that the PKI journalists smelled a coup, that they were no longer sure where Sukarno stood in relation to Untung, and that they did not wish to support the Untung forces in an attempt to seize power against the President. Hence the main headline, which reduces Untung to his regular Tjakra battalion commander proportions and concentrates on the Generals' Council as a "problem" rather than

asserting Untung's heroic rescue of the President from its clutches. At the same time the paper does not dare ignore the far-reaching declarations on state power and military rank: it is obvious from the way it handles them that it believes the new group is on top and intends them somehow seriously. Finally, the journal takes comfort from Dhani's confident involvement in this worrisome business.

THE NJONO CONFESSION

"Perhaps there is something missing; perhaps there is too much."

Nagarakrtagama (39, III, 4)

Following is the text in the Antara report of the confession of Njono, as presented by officers of the Puspen (Army Information Centre) to Indonesian and foreign correspondents on 2 December 1965 (from Antara, Djakarta English edition, No. 326/B, 2 December 1965):

A top communist leader has admitted that it was the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) who was responsible for and had masterminded the bloody counter-revolutionary coup, launched by the so-called "September 30 Movement".

Njono, member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the PKI and concurrently general chairman of the communist Central Organisation of All-Indonesia Workers Unions (SOBSI)¹ during interrogations by military authorities revealed that prior to the "September 30 Affair", the Politbureau had held continuous discussions for a period of one and a half month, from the middle of July until the end of August last.

The (formerly) flamboyant trade union leader crumbled before his questioners as he revealed the contents of the discussions, which were presided directly by Indonesian Communist Party boss Dipa Nusantara Aidit and had as one of its major topics the illness of President Soekarno, which occurred around July.

Officers of the Army Information Centre at a press conference here Thursday revealed Njono's confession that the Politbureau's talk centered around plans to change the course of the state and to wrest power. The talks were held in the headquarters of the PKI's Central Committee in Jakarta.

The Politbureau comprised nine members, respectively D. N. Aidit, Lukman, Njoto, Njono, Sudisman, Ir. Sakirman, Jusuf Adjitorop, Anwar Sanusi and Rewang, but only seven participated in the discussions as Jusuf Adjitorop was in Peking and Rewang in Central Java.²

Njono further disclosed that all decisions taken by the Politbureau had to be implemented strictly by the Jakarta Committee of the PKI, as well as the party's regional committees throughout Indonesia.

During the discussions, party-boss Aidit gave information about the health of President Soekarno, and outlined plans for wresting power.³

Under the plans the supreme leadership for military operations of the so-called "September 30 Movement" was to be in the hands of

Aidit himself, while Njono was ordered to lead operations in the area of Jakarta Raya.

The Communist trade union boss said Aidit had told the Politbureau that the Army was not compact, the Air Force would give facilities while the Navy and Police could be indoctrinated.

Military operations launched by the "September 30 Movement" under the leadership of "Mahaputra" Aidit would also receive support from already trained and armed PKI units such as the Pemuda Rakjat (People's Youth), the communist Peasant Front (BTI), the SOBSI, the Gerwani women's organisation, and others.

With regard to the other political parties, Aidit was of the view that the Politbureau should not worry about the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) because of the split in PNI ranks, while he admitted that the powerful Moslem Scholars Party (NU) could pose some problems because the latter's Nasakom-mindedness could still be doubted.

In order to launch the "September 30 Movement", which became known for its viciousness and unbelievable inhumanity, the Politbureau ordered a division of tasks between its members.

Big Boss Aidit, as already reported, would be charged with leading military operations as well as determining "D" day, the day the operations would be launched. Aidit also received the task of drafting the composition of the so-called "Revolutionary Council".⁴

Njono received the task of establishing a supporting force for the Jakarta Raya, region comprising units of Pemuda Rakjat, BTI, Gerwani, SOBSI and others. Sudisman would be in charge of financial matters.

In this connection Njono revealed that he did not know where the money came from, but every time he (Njono) asked for money Sudisman gave it to him.

The final decision to launch the coup was taken by the Politbureau by the end of August last. After that extensive preparations were started, secret instructions given to the commanders of the various sectors and training at Lobang Buaja intensified.⁵

Njono said that on September 29, at 5:00 p.m., a courier, namely Sukatno, general chairman of Pemuda Rakjat, came to him from Lobang Buaja to inform him that the coup would be launched.

Since the beginning of September, Njono himself had been busy arranging the training of volunteers at Lobang Buaja and holding briefings with PKI cadres, to whom he stressed the fact that a "General's Council" would soon start a coup.

"Stand by on September 30 and listen continuously to the broadcast

of Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI)" Njono told PKI cadres and activists.⁶

Njono himself was told to stand by on September 30 because arms, rice and clothes would be dropped. Njono did not know the origin of the arms, but only knew that they would come from Lubang Buaja.

On October 1, at 8:00 a.m.,⁷ Njono in his residence received reports from the various sectors concerning the action to be launched under the name of "September 30 Movement".

The reports said that RRI and the new Telecommunications head office had already been occupied as well as the Palace compounds. Njono was also informed that several generals had been kidnapped but that General A. H. Nasution had escaped.

Also submitting reports on that day were Naibaho, then editor-in-chief of the (now banned) "Harian Rakjat" newspaper, and Anwar Sanusi.

"I also received many other reports" Njono said, "the contents of which I do not remember any more."

After the announcement by Major General Soeharto over RRI that the coup, which was launched, was counter-revolutionary, Njono left his house at Salemba and moved to the compounds of the State Printing Works, where he was captured on October 3.⁸

The squealing communist leader told his questioners that the PKI and all its affiliates had participated in implementing the decisions of the Politbureau to wrest state power and to declare the Dwikora Cabinet demissionary and thus were all equally responsible for this counter-revolutionary adventure.

Njono further disclosed that only members of the Politbureau knew that the ultimate aim of the movement was to wrest power from the legal government.

All the other PKI members were only informed about their respective tasks. And even Politbureau members, with the exception of Aidit, did not know all the plans involved in the counter-revolutionary "September 30 Movement".

Although it was thought that 2,000 people was enough to control the Jakarta Raya area, Njono promised the Politbureau to deliver 5,000 trained and armed PKI cadres and activists.⁹

The PKI Politbureau guaranteed victory as soon as the movement was launched. It turned out differently, however.

Notes

1. The SOBSI post was also used in reporting the confession of the Army press (e.g. Berita Yudha, December 3, 1965). However, Njono had not held the office of SOBSI chairman since September 1964, when he was transferred from labor union work to become head of the Greater Djakarta party committee. In a press conference on December 2 at which the Army Information Centre provided "clarification" of its original presentation to the press, this was changed to refer to his actual office.
2. This membership and size of the Politbureau is repeated in the clarification. It was further emphasized that "Chaired by D. N. Aidit, the Politbureau held discussions concerning the health of His Excellency the President, concerning the state leadership and concerning possible changes in the state leadership. Discussions were held continuously at the PKI Central Committee headquarters in Djakarta. Always present at these discussions were D. N. Aidit, M. H. Lukman, Njoto, Ir. Sakirman, Sudisman, Njono and Anwar Sanusi."
3. The clarification states that Aidit said that although the illness was not mortal, the general condition of the President's health gave cause for concern. The President, according to what the army officers said Njono said, had fallen ill some time in July. /We might remember that Untung claimed the generals had plotted because Soekarno fell ill in August./ The clarification further states that the final Politbureau decision was that it (the Politbureau) would create a new political order by dissolving the cabinet and replacing it by a revolutionary council, this goal to be achieved by a military operation.
4. According to the clarification, the composition of the Dewan Revolusi was determined by the executive committee of the Politbureau, which was also charged with maintaining liaison with major regional PKI committees outside Djakarta.
5. The clarification adds that all this was carried out in complete secrecy, in what the Communists called "a closed-mouth operation". During September, Njono, according to the clarification, made the following preparations: the acceptance of recruits for training at Lubang Buaja; the organization of sectors /sic; armed units? and the appointing of their commandants for the Greater Djakarta area; the giving of briefings to cadres which emphasized the danger of the Dewan Djendral; the launching of political campaigns; and the securing of funds from Sudisman /who was head of the Secretariat of the PKI Central Committee/.
6. In the clarification this is changed to read: "After Njono received the decision about D-day, he issued orders to the cadres, activists and sector commandants under his jurisdiction to stand by on September 30 evening to receive arms, rice, uniforms and other goods which would be sent from Lubang Buaja; to man their respective posts and sectors; and to listen to the radio on October 1, 1965."

7. In the clarification the hour is changed to 4:00 a.m. and the account continues as follows: "Njono confessed that he received reports about the occupation of the RRI and telecommunications buildings, the occupation of the complex around the presidential palace, and about the arrival of supplies of firearms and uniforms. Also received was a report about the capture of a number of generals and the escape of General Nasution. A report received from Suharti, the vice-chairman of the Gerwani Central Executive Board, said that the doctors were ready /sic, nice touch/. A report received from Naibaho of the press and Agitprop group said that they had carried out their activities. A report received from UNRA /PKI-sponsored school system/ said that personnel from UNRA which could be used had been put in readiness. A report was also received from Anwar Sanusi /Politburo member; representative of the PKI on the Front Nasional executive/ about the first announcement which was made by the President." And many others he did not remember.
8. The clarification states that after "an announcement" by General Suharto, Njono kept moving from one place to another in Djakarta. He sent a courier to Lubang Buaja to obtain information about the situation; he could not make contact with either Aidit or Sukatno.

Comment

Perhaps it will strike the reader that Njono's activities of October 1, which seem to have consisted of sitting at home and receiving reports, show a certain lassitude for someone who was launching a revolution. This apparently was appreciated by the army officers who provided clarification of the original account of Njono's confession, for they remarked that "Even if it can be said that the role of manager still can be doubted, it is positive that PKI was the planner, the one which prepared, implemented, and led. The leadership of the overall operation was in Aidit's hands."

Even so, it may be felt on reading the confession that the PKI's preparations for the coup were a frightful muddle, especially for a party that was supposed to be so well organized. Fear not, gentle reader, there was good reason. As you will have noted, the Politburo meetings lasted from mid-July until the end of August, were personally led by Aidit, and were attended by all Politburo members save Rewang and Jusuf Adjitorop. Now it happened that Aidit left Indonesia in June as part of the delegation to the stillborn Algiers A. A. conference; he did not return to Indonesia until August 7. Njoto, another participant in the plotting, was out of the country during the same period, as part of Subandrio's entourage, and returned on August 9. The phone bills must have been enormous. How fortunate that party secretary Sudisman was able to provide limitless funds. The difficulty of obtaining a good telephone connection between Djakarta and, say, Bucharest (where Aidit was attending the Rumanian Communist Party Congress during the second half of July) can well be appreciated; when one considers that these must have been conference calls including Njoto, who during his trip was in four Middle Eastern, eight African and three European countries (H.R. August 10, 1965), one need no longer ponder the source of

confusion. This, obviously, must be why Njono thought Aidit said two thousand people were sufficient to take Djakarta (this being, we might note, the number of arms issued to the Pemuda Rakjat volunteers by the AURI on October 1). Clearly he must have meant two hundred thousand, but the connection was bad. We can well understand that Njono, laboring under this misunderstanding, suggested it might do well to have at least five thousand on hand: For according to the Djakarta garrison commander, there were then sixty thousand troops in the capital area¹ -- which would offer such odds against Aidit's army as have not been seen since the Battle of Thermopylae.

It is possible that the Njono confession was foisted upon his interrogators by Njono himself, in which case we must congratulate him for having preserved an excellent sense of humor during his confinement. It seems more likely, however, that at least the portion concerning the Politburo discussions was presented ready-made for him to sign. We will note that both the statement and clarification list the name and number of Politburo members quite specifically, and it happens that they neglect Peris Pardede, who was appointed candidate member of the Politburo at the May 1965 Central Committee session (that he was a candidate and not a full member presumably made no difference, as Jusuf Adjitorop was also a candidate). This is the sort of mistake that is less likely to be made by a Politburo member than by an intelligence service that has not kept its records up-to-date.

While allowing for the fact that the "devil" image of Communism makes a consistent story unnecessary in the short run, and while granting Njono's confessors an archaizing tendency to ignore the facts of the old zaman while creating the myth of the new, we must nonetheless consider theirs a regrettably inadequate contribution to the falsification of history. To waste the confession of a major party leader in this way after holding him for two months is inexcusable. No doubt something can be rescued by claiming that there was a False Aidit who was sent abroad while the real one stayed home and plotted; this will add to the diabolic public image of the PKI and will further diminish Soekarno's prestige by proving he could not tell a real Aidit from a fake one. However, it is unnecessarily complicated, and one of the requirements of a good Lie is that it has as few awkwardnesses as possible, being composed properly of claims too vast to be denied linked by logic too ironclad to be arguable to facts too obscure to be checked. It is hard not to feel that, if so little talent is displayed in handling such an elementary problem in prevarication, there can be small hope that the problem-solvers of the new regime will be able to deal effectively with such larger fictions as the Indonesian economy.

1. Major General Umar Wirahadikusumah, quoted in Duta Masyarakat, October 1, 1965.