

Display copy

CMIP #14

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE
INDONESIAN-DUTCH NEGOTIATIONS
AND THE HOGE VELUWE TALKS

IDRUS NASIR DJAJADININGRAT

MONOGRAPH SERIES

MODERN INDONESIA PROJECT

Southeast Asia Program
Department of Far Eastern Studies
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York

Price—\$2.50

CMIP #14

SEAP Publications

File Copy

Do not remove from room 213
640 Stewart Avenue

Generated at Columbia University on 2025-02-19 21:13 GMT /
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd
<https://hdl.handle.net/2027/coo.31924019448657>

https://hdl.handle.net/2027/coo.31924019448657

Generated at Columbia University on 2025-02-19 21:13 GMT /
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE INDONESIAN-DUTCH NEGOTIATIONS
AND THE HOGE VELUWE TALKS

IDRUS NASIR DJAJADININGRAT

MONOGRAPH SERIES

MODERN INDONESIA PROJECT

Southeast Asia Program
Department of Far Eastern Studies
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
1958

© 1957 by Idrus Nasir Djajadiningrat

PREFACE

This study by Mr. Idrus Nasir Djajadiningrat covers an important but hitherto virtually unchronicled aspect of modern Indonesia's history--the first period of negotiations between the revolutionary Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands. While a substantial monograph by Dr. Alastair Taylor on the final stages of these negotiations is soon to be published, as yet no serious scholarly study has been written covering the two major previous phases, the initial period of contacts (late 1945 until mid-1946) and the intermediate Linggadjati period (mid-1946 - mid-1947). It is the earliest of these periods, that culminating in the heretofore obscure Hoge Veluwe Conference, which Mr. Djajadiningrat has covered in this study. His research makes clear how important this phase was in setting the stage for the negotiations which were to follow. Indeed, Mr. Djajadiningrat has laid bare facts which demonstrate that by early 1946 attitudes had already emerged which were to influence critically the course of negotiations during the next three years--attitudes which with little change were to endure until early 1949, when successful Indonesian resistance and outside pressures combined to develop the substantially different conditions which made the negotiations at the Round Table Conference of November 1949 successful.

Formerly a medical student at the University of Indonesia, Mr. Djajadiningrat joined the government service of the Republic of Indonesia immediately following its proclamation of independence on August 17, 1945. After periods as press liaison officer and as editor in charge of newscasts in English and Dutch for the Republic's Ministry of Information, he served as interpreter-translator of the Military Committee of the Republic's secretariat assigned to the United Nations' Good Offices Committee in Indonesia. Thereafter, he was posted to the diplomatic staff of the Indonesian delegation to the United Nations. He served in this capacity until August, 1952, when he was put in charge of the North American desk of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Djakarta. In February, 1955, he was awarded a fellowship by the Cornell Southeast Asia Program and subsequently has been undertaking graduate studies in the Department of Government of Cornell University.

Ithaca, New York
January 15, 1958

George McT. Kahin
Director

https://hdl.handle.net/2027/coo.31924019448657

Generated at Columbia University on 2025-02-19 21:13 GMT /
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writer considers himself most fortunate in having had the helpful encouragement, advice and criticism of Professor Kahin in writing his monograph. For this he would like to record his gratitude and indebtedness. His special thanks are due to all those who graciously consented to have him draw upon their valuable time to furnish him with information regarding their personal views and experiences pertaining to the period of the Indonesian-Dutch negotiations treated in this monograph.

To his fellow students, Ngo Ton Dat and Daniel S. Lev, the writer tenders his grateful acknowledgements for their interest and valuable suggestions. Thereby, he cannot omit to offer his warm thanks to the latter for his generous assistance in improving the language and the text of the final draft.

To his sister, Roswitha Tanis, the writer is indebted for patiently bearing with him while he was in the end stage of writing the manuscript.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION	ix
CHAPTER	
I. BACKGROUND	1
II. PRELUDE TO BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN THE INDONESIAN PROBLEM	7
III. TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE BY FORCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES ..	17
IV. THE HOGE VELUWE TALKS	61
APPENDICES	
A. Government Nine Point Proposal	107
B. Text of Dutch Policy Statement.....	108
C. Indonesian Proposals in Answer to the Declaration of Dutch Policy.....	110
D. Provisional Draft Agreement Submitted by Prime Minister Sjahrir to Lieutenant Governor-General Dr. van Mook on March 27, 1946.....	112
E. Netherlands Draft Protocol Submitted to the Indonesian Delegation on April 14, 1946.....	114
F. Some Remarks on Differences Between: The van Mook Proposal of March 25 as Amended by Prime Minister Sjahrir and the Draft Protocol of the Dutch Government of April 14	116
G. Composition of the States-General	123
BIBLIOGRAPHY	125

INTRODUCTION

Although several excellent works on the history of the Indonesian struggle for independence have been published, the earliest diplomatic developments in the Indonesian-Dutch negotiations have had no more than a brief mention, or have been by-passed altogether. In the opinion of the writer, this inadequate coverage extends from the time when the Southeast Asia Command assumed responsibility for the Indonesian area until the United Nations concerned itself with the Netherlands-Indonesian conflict.

In his research, the writer has attempted to fill in this story up through the inconclusive talks between the Dutch and Indonesian delegations in Holland, at Hoge Veluwe in the spring of 1946. Before attempting to describe the confluence of military, political and diplomatic conditions which led the parties concerned to undertake negotiations, he has tried to find an answer to the question of how the British became involved in the Indonesian-Dutch controversy. Why was the Indonesian archipelago suddenly transferred from the U.S. Southwest Pacific Area Command to the British Southeast Asia Command? What were the factors underlying this last minute switch, implemented on the day following the Japanese surrender?

Within limitations imposed by the material available to him, the writer has made an effort to set up a framework for further and more comprehensive research in the period covered in this monograph. He submits with emphasis that it is neither conclusive nor exhaustive. This is true particularly of the Indonesian internal political developments influencing Republican policy in the negotiations. More solid ground has been trodden in tracing the military, diplomatic and internal political factors affecting the Dutch position at that time. From the records of the Dutch Parliamentary debates valuable data have been gleaned pertaining to this early period in the conflict, and some tentative insights have been acquired into political trends and forces then operative in the Netherlands. An account of the military and diplomatic position of the Dutch in Indonesia vis-a-vis the British, containing material regarding the development of their opening gambits on the diplomatic chessboard, has been secured by analyzing the official report of a Dutch Parliamentary Commission charged with looking into the policies of the Dutch Government during this period. /The decision to carry out this official Dutch investigation was taken on November 6, 1947, and those sections of the report concerning Military Policy 1940-1945 ("Militair Beleid 1940-1945"), and Return to the Netherlands Indies ("Terugkeer naar Nederlandsch-Indië") were concluded and published in 1956.⁷ The publication containing these sections were made available to the writer by Dr. Robert C. Bone, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Tulane University.

In the writer's opinion the most significant data upon which his study has drawn are those concerning the proceedings during the Hoge Veluwe talks. The material for the survey of those discussions has been taken from a copy of the summary records of the deliberations held by the Cornell University Library. The importance of these records is that the Dutch proposals tabled on the Hoge Veluwe were to be the basis on which the Netherlands Government moved forward towards the Linggadjati Agreement. Elaboration on this point, however, lies beyond the scope of this report.

To penetrate beyond the written account of the Hoge Veluwe discussions, the writer has attempted to add depth to his analysis by contacting the chief actors in the discussions. He was fortunate enough to have personal interviews with Dr. H. J. van Mook, former Lt. Governor-General of the Indies, and Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo, until recently Director of the Cabinet of the President of the Republic of Indonesia. In addition he has corresponded with Dr. Soedarsono, presently Indonesian Ambassador in Belgrade, and received Mr. Soewandi's personal comments on several aspects of the negotiations in Holland. These last three gentlemen constituted the Republican Delegation to the Hoge Veluwe talks. The writer wishes to record his gratitude to all of these persons for their generous and most helpful cooperation. Where it has been necessary to interpret the data supplied by them he has done so entirely on his own responsibility.

It should be noted that quotations from Dutch and Indonesian sources have been translated by the writer, except when otherwise indicated.

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

Immediately after the Netherlands Indies Government declared war on Japan, early in December 1941, it became apparent what plans the Japanese had for Indonesian nationalism in particular and for anti-colonialism in Southeast Asia, in general. In the period between this declaration of war and the time that the Japanese forces began to attack the Indies, any Indonesian who possessed a wireless and cared to tune in on the powerful shortwave radiostation in Tokyo, could listen to a beautiful recording of the "Indonesia Raya". (1) Each night an Indonesian program began and concluded with the rendition of this song. The period in between was devoted to talks and commentaries in the Indonesian language. The topic invariably concerned the misdeeds and crimes of the Dutch as the colonial masters in Indonesia, the unselfish and gallant fight of Nippon's armed forces to free the Indonesians from the yoke of Dutch enslavement, and the task of Indonesian nationalism to go all out in assisting Japan in winning its war aimed at wiping out all western domination in Asia.

Japanese propaganda received a mixed reception. It varied between ready acceptance, doubt, and outright rejection. Many among the lower echelons of the white-collar workers when asked why they looked forward to a Japanese victory answered: "Whatever happens after the Dutch experience, it can't be worse. Anyway, it will be a change." (2)

For the overwhelming majority of the population war was something vague and incomprehensible. So far as it caused inconveniences in their daily activities, the sooner war was over, the better.

(1) Mohammad Yamin, Sumpah Indonesia Raja, Djakarta, N. V. Nusantara, n.d., pp. 15-16. The Indonesia Raya, composed by R. W. Soepratman, was first presented to the public on October 28, 1928 during an Indonesian Youth Congress in Djakarta. Since then it has become the rallying song for Indonesian nationalism. It is at present the national anthem of the Republic of Indonesia.

At this congress also, an event occurred which in the history of Indonesian nationalism is known as "the Oath of October 28, 1928," or, "the Oath for a Greater Indonesia." The Indonesian youth gathered at the meeting solemnly declared that:

1. they were of one nation, the Indonesian Nation;
2. they served one country, the Indonesian Fatherland; and
3. they accepted the Bahasa Indonesia as the National Language.

(2) Cf. Sjahrazad, Indonesische Overpeinzigen, Amsterdam, De Bezige Bij, 1945, p. 101.

That fighting did end soon in the Indies, is a familiar story. When in early 1942, the Japanese invasion came, the Dutch collapse was even swifter and more complete than the debacle of the British in Burma and in the Malay Peninsula. The highly successful campaign of the Japanese forces left no doubt in the minds of the people as to their formidable strength. This coupled with the crushing defeat which they had dealt the erstwhile Dutch masters made the Japanese in the eyes of the Indonesian multitude conquerors who should be welcomed as liberating heroes. Many Indonesian nationalists flocked to the Japanese standard believing that the Japanese had come to liberate the Indonesians after all. Some accepted at face value the promise of "Asia for the Asians."

Japanese actions soon made clear, however, that their intention was to drain the country to feed the Japanese war machine. Japanese rule proved to be heavy-handed and even more burdensome in nationalists' eyes than the Dutch rule that had preceded it. Profound changes were, nevertheless, brought about by the conditions of the Japanese occupation. Powerful anti-Western propaganda with a strong racist tinge penetrated many remote areas. Indonesians were brought into responsible government posts to a degree never possible under Dutch rule; Indonesian military units were trained, and eventually armed. (3)

Colonial nationalism as the mainspring of Indonesia's national movement, since its inception in the early nineteen hundreds, was in essence a passionate upsurge against the injustices of a colonial system in all its aspects. Politically and psychologically, it was the self-assertion of the people's right and responsibility to live their own life and achieve nationhood. It was a deeply felt resistance against foreign rule motivated by the urge for self-determination. Economically it was a struggle for the improvement of living conditions; a desire to gain a reasonable share of the country's own wealth denied by the exploitation of the ruling power. (4)

As mentioned earlier, Tokyo was clever enough to perceive the political uses to which this Asian revolt against "colonial status" might be put, but not clever enough, when her initial propaganda had done its work, to refrain from exploitation. They compelled forced sales of all exportable crops at fixed prices. They heedlessly brought on serious famine. Their heavy repressive hand on the people forced them to conform rigidly to Japan's concept of its new role as master of Asia. The brutality and contempt with which the Japanese "elder brothers" treated the "genjumin"--natives

(3) Harold Isaacs, edit. New Cycle in Asia, New York, MacMillan 1947, p. 175.

(4) Republic of Indonesia Office, History of Indonesia's National Movement, New York, July 1, 1949, p. 1.

--affected the Indonesians in practically all levels of society. (5) Dutch rule had been replaced by another foreign domination that was considerably worse. Moreover, this time the yoke was imposed by fellow Asians who purported to be the saviors of Asia. Such conditions led to a broader understanding among the Indonesian masses that they would not be able to improve their lot so long as they were not the masters of their own destiny. Most of the support the Japanese had initially won was quickly dissipated, and concomitant with it resentment against the foreign ruler deepened, nurturing Indonesian nationalism into the solid force that spontaneously rallied behind its leaders when they, on behalf of the people, proclaimed Indonesia's independence.

While the war was in their favor the Japanese unequivocally indicated that Indonesia's independence must wait until the end of the war in the Pacific. (6) Instead of fostering genuine national independence, the Japanese offered the nationalists only puppet roles. The nationalists in the course of time mapped out their program for the period of the Japanese occupation accordingly. As ever, the ultimate goal remained emergence into full nationhood and continued movement for independence. In pursuit of these objectives the movement eventually split into two sections. One group was lead by Sutan Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin. These two went underground and organized anti-Japanese movements. Sjarifuddin's activities were detected and he was arrested in 1943. When the Japanese sentenced him to death, Sukarno personally intervened to have the sentence commuted to life imprisonment. He was released soon after the Japanese surrendered in 1945. (7)

The other faction of the nationalist movement, headed by Sukarno and Hatta, played along with the Japanese, and tried to gain the maximum benefits for the movement from the new political structure of the Japanese framework. In so doing they had to cooperate with the Japanese and make an outward pretense of collaboration. As to Hatta's position in this respect, it has been clarified by Sutan Sjahrir who testifies in his book Out of Exile that Hatta had never allied himself with those Indonesians who worked with the Japanese for either material designs or political sympathy. Hatta accepted this position at the behest of the underground movement. (8) With respect to Sukarno's position Sjahrir stated that he regarded the Japanese as fascist die-hards, and that the nationalists would have to avail themselves of the

(5) During the Dutch colonial period the term "native" had the connotation of being inferior to the Netherlanders, or Europeans in general.

(6) Ronald S. Kain, "The Netherlands and Indonesia," Yale Review, XXXVI (December, 1946), pp. 285-302.

(7) Republic of Indonesia Office, op. cit., p. 12.

(8) Soetan Sjahrir, Out of Exile. New York, The John Day Company, 1949, p. 242.

most subtle methods to get around them, such as making an appearance of collaboration. (9)

To enlist popular support for economic measures to bolster the Japanese war effort propaganda campaigns were carried out which apparently did not produce the desired results. For subsequently the Japanese began to woo the nationalist leaders by holding out a promise for self-government in the future. In line with this new policy, on March 9, 1943, an all-inclusive organization, taking in all the former Indonesian political and non-political nationalist associations, was formed. It was called the "Pusat Tenaga Rakjat" ("Center of the People's Power") and became known as the PUTERA. This organization was limited to Java and Madura, which constituted a territorial unit separate from the rest of Indonesia, and administered by the Japanese 16th Army Headquarters in Djakarta. (10) Because of its composition PUTERA became the first formal organization which was nationalistically inclined.

When by the end of 1943 the Japanese came to the conclusion that the PUTERA was more advantageous to the Indonesian nationalist cause than to the Japanese war effort, it was dissolved. On March 1, 1944, it was replaced by the "Perhimpunan Kebaktian Rakjat" ("People's Loyalty Organization"). (11) The leadership of this organization stood under the direct control of the Japanese chief military administrator. (12)

When the Japanese military situation in the South and Southwest Pacific area gradually worsened, and an attack on Indonesia was likely to be the next phase in the Allied counter-offensive, the Japanese began to make concessions progressively to Indonesian Nationalism. After General MacArthur's offensive had gotten well underway, the Koiso Government in Tokyo announced that Indonesia would be given independence "in the near future." (13)

Early in 1945 the Japanese were soundly beaten in the Philippines. By the end of April of the same year the Indonesians were allowed to set up the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan).

(9) George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1952, p. 105; Sjahrir, op. cit., p. 246.

(10) Kahin, op. cit., p. 106, footnote.

(11) Also known as Djawa Hokokai, its Japanese name.

(12) Kahin, op. cit., p. 110.

(13) Kain, op. cit.

On August 6, 1945, the first atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and shortly afterwards Japan made her initial secret surrender offer. (14) A second atom bomb was dropped on August 9, this time on Nagasaki. On the same day Russia declared war on Japan.

Immediately following these, for Japan, disastrous developments, on August 7, Marshal Terauchi, Japanese supreme commander in Southeast Asia (15) from his headquarters in Saigon granted permission to set up a committee representing all of Indonesia with the function to make preparations for the transfer of government from the Japanese forces to the Indonesians. Two days later Sukarno and Hatta accompanied by a third Indonesian leader were flown to Dalat in Indochina for a conference with Marshal Terauchi.

In a meeting on August 12, Marshal Terauchi said: "It is up to you when Indonesia will be independent." (16)

On their return trip Sukarno and Hatta, in Singapore, met with three members of the Independence Preparatory Committee representing Sumatra. When discussing the situation it was ascertained that the latter, too, had received information that Russia had entered the war against Japan. After further consultations the Indonesian leaders came to the conclusion that Japan's defeat was no longer a matter of months but that it could happen within a few weeks.

Back in Djakarta on August 14, in the afternoon of the same day, Sjahrir informed Hatta that news had been received of Japan having made a peace offer to the Allied nations, and inquired how matters stood with the arrangements for Indonesian independence. Sjahrir expressed the opinion that Indonesia's independence must not be proclaimed by the Japanese-sponsored Independence Preparatory Committee because the Allies then would consider a free Indonesia as Japanese inspired. The proper thing to do would be for Sukarno, as leader of the people, to proclaim independence in the name of the Indonesian people. To reach the Indonesians in all corners of the country, and also to inform the world at large, this proclamation had to be broadcast by wireless. However, Sukarno did not agree. He felt that as chairman of the Independence Preparatory Committee, he could not arbitrarily and without consulting this body take such an important step. Furthermore, he first wanted to get some information regarding Japan's surrender from the Japanese Military Administration Headquarters. The next day it was learned that Japan had indeed sued for peace. Moreover, the Indonesian leaders were informed that because of their capitulation

(14) Ibid.

(15) The Japanese called it: Command for the Southern Regions.

(16) Mohammad Hatta, "Legende en Realiteit rondom de Proclamatie van 17 Augustus," Verspreide Geschriften, Djakarta, Amsterdam, Surabaja, C. P. J. van der Peet, 1952, pp. 330-340.

the Japanese forces had been informed that the Allies were holding them responsible for the maintenance of the political status quo in Indonesia. Upon ascertaining this information, Sukarno and Hatta forthwith decided to convoke the Independence Preparatory Committee on August 16. The intention was to resolve, together with this body, that the moment had arrived for Indonesia to proclaim its independence.

Younger and more militant nationalist elements in Djakarta, however, changed the course of events as planned by the two Indonesian leaders. In agreement with Sjahrir that the Japanese-sponsored Independence Preparatory Committee must have no part in the decision to declare Indonesia's freedom, they took matters in their own hands. The upshot was that on August 17, 1945, Sukarno and Hatta, without prior consultations within the Independence Preparatory Committee, proclaimed the independence of Indonesia on behalf of the people. (17)

(17) Ibid.; Kahin, op. cit., pp. 134-136. These references give each a different version of the developments leading up to the Proclamation of Independence. Cf. Sjahrir, op. cit., pp. 253-259.

CHAPTER II

PRELUDE TO BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN THE INDONESIAN PROBLEM

After the Japanese advance through Burma towards the Indo-Burmese border had been checked, the Allied High Command began to make plans to mount a counter offensive. In particular the United States Government "was determined to assist China by launching a combined British-American-Chinese attack in Burma." (1) To that end, the British and United States Governments, at a conference in Washington, D. C. (Trident Conference), in May, 1943, decided to pool the land and air forces of the British Commonwealth, the United States Army and Air Forces, and the British Eastern Fleet, operating in Southeast Asia. (2)

(1) William D. Leahy, I Was There, New York, McGraw Hill, 1950, p. 126.

(2) Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander South East-Asia 1943-1945, of Vice-Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, New York, Philosophical Library, Inc., 1951, p. 3 and Appendix A (This report will be subsequently referred to as: Mountbatten's Report); Enquête Commissie Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945, Militair beleid 1940-1945. Terugkeer naar Nederlandsch Indië, Deel 8 A en B, The Hague, Staatsdrukkerij-en Uitgeversbedrijf, 1956, p. 484.

This document is a report of a Committee set up by the Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal ("Second Chamber of the States General") to inquire into the policies of the Dutch Government in Exile covering the period 1940-1945. The Committee was established by Resolution of the Second Chamber of November 6, 1947. In its introduction the report among others reads:

The Committee has also devoted extensive consideration to the events bearing on the change of the delimitation of the command areas in the Far East. Although it involved vital interests for the Netherlands, the Allies made the change without duly informing the Netherlands of their decision.

The Committee has devoted a final and substantial chapter to the developments in the Netherlands Indies in 1945. Thereby, it has had to focus its attention in particular on the military aspects; however, whereas these aspects were intertwined with the political, the latter need be considered also.

The Committee's investigation in these two areas of study has provided the writer with material for part of his monograph. The data gathered in the document derive from personal testimonies supplied by those who have been directly involved in the events investigated by the Committee.

Further reference to the Committee's report will be indicated as follows: Enquête Commissie, page...., name of the person testifying (if in the context of the monograph considered of significance by this writer).

At the next conference on Allied war strategy, held in Quebec, Canada, in August of the same year, the commander of the British Eastern Fleet, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, was given the task of establishing the South-East Asia Command (S.E.A.C.). The command area included Burma, Siam, Indochina, the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra and the adjoining smaller islands. This delineation left unchanged a division for operational purposes of the Indonesian archipelago into a British and an American sphere. The division was made effective shortly after the occupation of Java by the Japanese, in the first half of 1942. (3) All Indonesian islands, east of a line drawn from Singapore closely around the southern part of Sumatra, were included in the South West Pacific Area (S.W.P.A.) Theatre of War under the command of General MacArthur. The dividing line was drawn so as to place the Sunda Straits under American control. (4)

Shortly after the S.E.A.C. was organized, the British hinted that the command area of Admiral Mountbatten might be revised. It was held that without controlling the Sunda Straits, it would be difficult to recapture Singapore. For that matter, it was necessary to include this sea passage in the S.E.A.C. area. However, to dominate the Sunda Straits one must control the western part of Java. Therefore, the boundaries of the S.E.A.C. should be altered accordingly. (5)

The importance which the British Government attached to retaking Singapore was revealed as early as May, 1943. At the Washington Conference of the Allied High Command, the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, recommended for immediate consideration "a campaign against Sumatra which he believed to be lightly garrisoned by Japanese." His plan involved the placing of "strong air forces on Northern Sumatra from which location attacks could be launched against Malaya, Bangkok, Singapore, the Palembang oil fields, and Japanese shipping in support of Burma." (6)

At the first Quebec Conference in August, 1943, the British Prime Minister went further. He strongly advocated the adoption of his Sumatra-plan rather than going ahead with the invasion of Burma. However, the United States President, F. D. Roosevelt,

(3) Enquête Commissie, p. 485.

(4) Ibid., p. 500, statement of van Mook; ibid., p. 502, statement of Rear-Admiral L. G. L. van der Kun who then was deputy to the Dutch Commander Armed Forces in the East, Admiral C. E. L. Helfrich. Admiral Helfrich had his headquarters attached to that of the S.E.A.C. at Kandy, Ceylon, and was subordinate to Mountbatten.

(5) Ibid., p. 498, statement of N. S. Blom, Director of the Department of Justice under Dr. van Mook.

(6) Leahy, op. cit., pp. 159-162.

opposed the British proposal. Supported by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.O.S.), he moved the conference to accept the United States' plan for a concerted British-American-Chinese counterattack against the Japanese in Burma. "The Sumatra plan was dropped." (7)

At the second Quebec Conference in September, 1944, Prime Minister Churchill again stressed the importance of recapturing Singapore. He "said it was the desire of his government that British ships and troops take part in the war against Japan in order to do Britain's part and share the credit. He said also that it was considered necessary that Great Britain retake Singapore, the 'impregnable' naval base which fell early in the war as the Japanese overran the Malay Peninsula." (8)

Next to regaining control over the tin- and rubber-rich Malay Peninsula as soon as possible, the matter of rehabilitation of British prestige, especially in the eyes of Asians, apparently was also a compelling reason for the British Government to desire an early reoccupation of strategically situated Singapore. (9)

Early in 1944, in London, Admiral Mountbatten intimated to Dr. H. J. van Mook, then holding office of Minister of Colonies of the Dutch Government in Exile, that the British in the Far East desired a command area of the same significance as the S.W.P.A. Van Mook, opposing a transfer of responsibility for Indonesia from the S.W.P.A. to the S.E.A.C., informed the Netherlands Commissioner to General MacArthur's Headquarters, Dr. Ch.O. van der Plas of the possibility that the British would attempt to have the territorial extent of their operational area changed so as to include more territory of the Indies. Van Mook was of the opinion that because of shortage of personnel and equipment of the S.E.A.C., the Dutch cause in Indonesia would be better served if the archipelago remained part of the American command area under MacArthur's Headquarters which was provided with ample supply of material and men. Moreover, he felt that the existing Dutch relations with the Americans were better than those with Mountbatten's command. (10)

Subsequently, by mid-July, 1944, General MacArthur informed van der Plas that the major Allied thrust toward the Indies was

(7) Ibid., p. 176.

(8) Ibid., p. 260.

(9) Enquête Commissie, p. 515, statement of E.N. van Kleffens, then Foreign Minister.

(10) Ibid., p. 486, private letter of van Mook to Ch.O. van der Plas.

about to begin. With regard to the campaign against the Indonesian islands the Australian military command persistently urged the United States commander to use Commonwealth ground and naval forces. The importance the Australians attached to participation in this operation was such that, at first, they even refused the use of Australian troops for the liberation of their own territory, e.g. the Solomons, New Britain and New Ireland. According to MacArthur the attitude of the Australians stemmed from designs of annexation vis-a-vis the Indies fostered by a powerful group centered around the Australian commander-in-chief, General Sir Thomas Blamey.

The Commonwealth Prime Minister, Curtin, on the other hand, had assured MacArthur that he had informed London that his government did not insist on a revision of the existing command areas. (11)

In August, 1944, in Honolulu, President Roosevelt conferred with the United States field commanders of the Pacific area. General MacArthur attended the meeting. Upon his return to Australia, MacArthur sent his secretary, Brigadier General Bonner Fellers to van der Plas. General Fellers informed the Dutch representative of a British proposal which had been discussed at the Honolulu meeting. (12) The British contended that India was a poor base for operations against the Indonesian islands. For that matter, S.E.A.C. headquarters should be moved to Western Australia. The Netherlands East-Indies, with the exception of the north coast of New Guinea, Morotai and the Sangihe Islands, according to the British plan were to be dislodged from MacArthur's command area and to become part of Mountbatten's responsibility. The British then would launch an attack through the Kei and Aru Islands to Amboina and Ceram. The operation would continue via northern Celebes to Tarakan, Balikpapan in East Borneo, and eventually to North Borneo and Sarawak. (13)

President Roosevelt had as yet made no decision regarding the matter. On the other hand, the United States Navy was partial to the British proposal. If the Americans could be relieved of their responsibility for the Indonesian islands, the campaign against the Philippines could finish with the recapture of Mindanao. Operations which might have been contemplated to attack the Japanese in Luzon and Java could be abandoned. Consequently, MacArthur's ground, naval and air forces could be put at the disposal of Admiral Nimitz for a direct attack on Formosa and the main islands of Japan. (14)

(11) Ibid., p. 487, report of van der Plas to the Dutch Minister of Colonies.

(12) Cf. Leahy, op. cit., pp. 251-252.

(13) Enquête Commissie, p. 488, notes of van der Plas on his conversations with Brigadier General Bonner Fellers and General MacArthur.

(14) Ibid.

MacArthur had strongly opposed the suggestion to by-pass Luzon and Java. He was of the opinion that to do so would result in the isolation of the Japanese in these islands. The ensuing situation would victimize not the enemy forces, but the Filipinos, Indonesians and the people interned in the areas concerned. In a letter to MacArthur, relating to the British proposal, Admiral King referred to a British and Australian contention that the richest of all Asian colonies in the hands of a nation as weak as the Netherlands was tantamount to inviting another aggression in the future. For that matter, it was felt necessary to have British-Australian military bases in the Indies permanently for the adequate protection of Singapore and Australia. (15)

General MacArthur considered the British plan an attempt to exclude his command from practically any action in the Indies. It was meant to thwart the American commander's projected operations against the archipelago which were to begin in February, 1945. This campaign would involve, first, the seizure of bridgeheads and airfields along the Macassar Straits, both in Borneo (e.g. Tarakan and Balikpapan) and in Celebes. Second, an attack to capture Java and possibly Bali so as to cut off the Japanese in the Moluccas from the main body of Indonesian islands and, also, from the main rice-producing areas. MacArthur's estimate was that by the end of 1945, all of the Netherlands East-Indies under his command would have been cleared of Japanese resistance. The general pointed out to President Roosevelt that, in making their proposal, the British were after economic and political gains in the Indies. Mr. Roosevelt assured MacArthur that the latter's objections were well taken. However, Prime Minister Churchill had been most emphatic in expressing his desire that the British proposal be accepted. Therefore, the President feared that eventually he would be confronted with the choice of giving in, or risking a break with Churchill. In that case there was no doubt in Mr. Roosevelt's mind that he would have to leave the liberation of the Indies to the British. The Dutch Government's opinion regarding a possible transfer of responsibility for Indonesia from the United States command to that of Mountbatten's, was unknown to the President. (16)

It was General MacArthur's intention to do everything within his power to prevent a change in his operational command area. He would even go to the extent of calling upon American public opinion to decide the issue. He asserted, however, that his efforts could hardly be expected to produce favorable results unless the Netherlands Government would be prepared to express its confidence in the S.W.P.A. command. For that matter, the Dutch should make it clear that they failed to see the efficacy of making changes in the operational boundaries while a successful Allied campaign was progressing towards the liberation of the Indies. (17)

(15) Ibid.

(16) Ibid., p. 489.

(17) Ibid., p. 490.

After his interview with General Bonner Fellers, Mr. van der Plas obtained permission from Dr. van Mook to come to London for personal consultations with the Netherlands Government. This trip was undertaken with the concurrence and in terms of transport facilities, with full cooperation of General MacArthur. Before van der Plas left, the general explained President Roosevelt's position in the matter. If the Netherlands Government would oppose a change of the S.W.P.A., involving the transfer of responsibility for the Indies to the S.E.A.C., on the basis of practical problems, e.g. of supplies, it would suffice to settle the issue in favor of the Dutch. (18)

However, information obtained by the Dutch Government in London indicated that the British had shelved the question for the time being. The existing delimitation was to be maintained. A solution of the problem was envisaged whereby, in Allied operations pertaining to the Indonesian archipelago, MacArthur as commander-in-chief would be assisted by a British deputy. Consequently, when van der Plas told the Netherlands Prime Minister, Professor P. S. Gerbrandy, what he had heard about the matter at MacArthur's headquarters, the information he submitted received only little attention. This apparently was partly caused by the fact that at that time all attention of the Dutch Government in Exile was focussed on the impending Allied operations to liberate Holland.

In a subsequent meeting of the Dutch Commission of Ministers for the Conduct of War, it was doubted whether the information which Dr. van der Plas had to offer was correct. Minister of State, Michiels van Verduynen, long-time Ambassador of the Netherlands at the Court of St. James, submitted that Mr. Churchill had re-assured him that "you will get the Indies back." (19)

It appears that some of the Dutch Cabinet members, like van Mook and his colleague for Foreign Affairs, Mr. E. N. van Kleffens, were in favor of having the Indies remain the responsibility of MacArthur's command, while others were more inclined to have the archipelago included in the S.E.A.C. The latter feared that the effective return of Dutch authority through occupation of the islands by United States troops might be greatly hampered by American public opinion, behind the slogan: "No restoration of colonial empires by American soldiers." (20)

This possibility and the fact that the data on the matter, obtained by the Netherlands Government from various quarters in Britain, were contradictory made the Commission of Ministers for the Conduct of War decide not to act on the information supplied by Mr. van der Plas. The latter's suggestion for the Dutch Government to take up the matter with President Roosevelt was not accept-

(18) Ibid., p. 493, statement of van der Plas.

(19) Ibid.

(20) Ibid., p. 515, statement of van Kleffens.

ed. (21)

When in April, 1945, Rear-Admiral L. G. L. van der Kun, representative of the Netherlands Government to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.O.S.), informed his superiors in London that the issue would be submitted for consideration and decision to the Allied Chiefs of Staff, the Netherlands Government still did not deem it necessary to take any action. (22)

On April 10, 1945, General MacArthur received instructions, presumably from the C.C.O.S., forbidding him to carry out operations against Java. Although the general insisted he could complete a campaign to recapture the bulk of the Indonesian islands, lying within his operational area, without delaying the subsequent major attack against Japan, the C.C.O.S. refused to give the American commander their permission for such action. Since by that time preparations to seize Tarakan and Balikpapan, in East Borneo, had reached an advanced stage the operations involved were carried out according to MacArthur's plans. (23)

In the second half of June, 1945, Dr. van Mook warned his government in London that a decision regarding changes in the delineation of the S.E.A.C. and the S.W.P.A. was impending. (24)

(21) Ibid., p. 494, statement of van der Plas.

(22) Ibid., p. 522.

(23) Ibid., pp. 498-499, statement of van Mook.

(24) When in March, 1942, the total collapse of the Allied defenses in Java was imminent, the Dutch Government in Exile, in London, decided that a few chosen highranking Netherlands Indies administrative officials be sent to England to fortify the Dutch Government machine there. Dr. van Mook was among those selected. In London, he was appointed Minister of Colonies on the understanding that immediately after the end of the war he would return to Indonesia and resume his pre-war duties as Lieutenant Governor-General of the Indies.

Early in 1944, the counter-attack of General MacArthur was gaining momentum. Reoccupation of Japanese-held Netherlands Indies territory was likely to occur at any moment. Van Mook felt that it was urgently necessary to restore the Netherlands Indies Government which could take over the civil administration in the recaptured areas of Indonesia from the Allied military authorities as soon as possible. On September 14, 1944, Dr. van Mook was again charged with the functions of Lieutenant Governor-General of the Indies next to his holding office as Minister of Colonies. In October, 1944, he set up a Netherlands Indies Government in Exile at Brisbane, Australia. In February, 1946, the Dutch Government relieved him of his duties as Minister of Colonies so that he could devote all his attention to his task as Lieutenant Governor-General. H.J. van Mook, Indonesië, Nederland en de Wereld, Amsterdam, De Bezige Bij, 1949, pp. 34, 48, 49; cf. P.S. Gerbrandy, Indonesia, London, New York, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1950, p. 130.

At MacArthur's Headquarters arrangements were made accordingly. Upon receiving van Mook's information the Netherlands Government apparently remained unconcerned about the matter. (25)

On June 24, 1945, the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet was formed after all of the Netherlands had been liberated. With regard to the information supplied by van Mook the new government was of the opinion that the data supplied by the Lieutenant Governor-General were as yet based on hearsay only. Therefore, it had no adequate basis on which to take action. (26) Moreover, the Cabinet held that the inclusion of the East Indies in the S.E.A.C., for political reasons, was not unfavorable. Great Britain was a colonial power, and as such more likely to have a better understanding of the problems which would confront the Dutch in Indonesia after the war. On the other hand, the Americans had clearly shown that they were quite ignorant about such matters. (27) Nevertheless, the Netherlands Government made every effort to obtain reliable information regarding a possible transfer of the Indies from the United States command to Mountbatten's command. However, these attempts were without success. The Dutch also tried to send a representative to Potsdam while the Big Powers Conference was in session, but facilities to do so were refused.

When it was certain that the decision had been made to include practically all of Indonesia in the S.E.A.C. area, the Netherlands Government accepted it. By that time it was clear that the United States wanted to be relieved of the responsibility for the archipelago while the British desired it. (28)

In the first half of June, 1945, Admiral Mountbatten inquired of the C.C.O.S. whether he could safely start planning operations for the period after Singapore had been retaken, on the assumption that the boundaries of his command area would remain unaltered. He needed the information because the impending attack to recapture the island fortress would require the full employment of all S.E.A.C.'s sea, land, and air forces. Therefore, if Mountbatten's task was to be enlarged with additional operations, the admiral deemed it impossible to carry them out rapidly; particularly so, if it involved an extension of his operational area. However, the C.C.O.S. were unable to give a conclusive answer to the question whether the S.E.A.C. area would remain unchanged. Deliberations regarding the matter were still going on both in London and Washington. (29)

(25) This was the transitional Cabinet of Professor P.S. Gerbrandy. The first post-war Cabinet (Schermerhorn-Drees) was next to be in power.

(26) Enquête Commissie, p. 519, statement of Professor W. Schermerhorn.

(27) Ibid., p. 517, statement of Dr. J. H. Logemann.

(28) Ibid.

(29) Mountbatten's Report, Section B, paragraph 623, paragraph 626, p. 180.

About mid-July, 1945, Mountbatten conferred with General MacArthur on forthcoming Allied operations in Southeast Asia. The United States commander, at that time, had returned to Manila after a successful campaign in the Philippines. The general suggested:

...that as he would now be preoccupied with preparations for the assault on Kyushu which was to begin in November, and for the final assault on Honshu, scheduled for the spring of 1946, I (Mountbatten) should take over all of the SWPA south of the Philippines...

However, Mountbatten "was not prepared to assume full responsibility" until he had succeeded "in making Singapore his main base." The "logistical, shipping, and minesweeping difficulties, which this new commitment would entail, would be insuperable so long as" S.E.A.C. was "still entirely dependent on bases in India, Ceylon, and southern Burma." He would accept the task, "if asked to do so by the Combined Chiefs of Staff; on condition that General MacArthur's appropriate intelligence files, as well as those members of his intelligence staff who had specialised in the areas he would be turning over," were put at his disposal in ample time. (30)

On July 23, 1945, Prime Minister Churchill ordered Admiral Mountbatten to come to Potsdam. Here, the C.C.O.S. informed him that an agreement had been reached on enlarging the area of responsibility of the British Commonwealth command, involving a transfer of the greater part of the S.W.P.A. to the S.E.A.C. (31)

(30) Ibid., paragraph 628, p. 181.

(31) Ibid., paragraph 629, p. 181; cf. Leahy, op. cit., p. 410.

The decision of the C.C.O.S. was fully supported by the United States State Department's Bureau for South East Asia affairs. This backing was based on the fact that transferring Indonesia to Mountbatten's command would free the United States of a possible embroilment in foreseeable, postwar colonial troubles in the archipelago (as stated to the writer by Dr. Lauriston Sharp, Professor of Anthropology, Cornell University, who during that period was attached to said Bureau of the Department of State).

The hands-off attitude of the United States vis-a-vis the Indonesian problem was strictly adhered to during the early period of the conflict. Thus, when by the end of October 1945 the Dutch military command requested the United States Government to arm 8,000 Dutch ex-prisoners of war, coming from Japan and China and assembled in Manila, for duty in the Indies, the request was not granted. The United States also refused delivery of 30,000 carbines which the Dutch had ordered in America and for which payment had allegedly already been made. The Dutch needed them to equip other ex-prisoners of war. Enquête Commissie, p. 610, General Schilling.

General Marshall urged the admiral to take over responsibilities for the territories concerned as soon as possible after August 15, 1945.

"On being assured by General Marshall that the US and Australian forces would remain in situ under 'his' orders for the time being," Mountbatten submitted that on these conditions the commitment he was asked to undertake "might be acceptable until such time as he was able to take over effective control." He further mentioned that he needed adequate intelligence about the area which was to be added to his command. Mountbatten hesitated to accept the proposed arrangement immediately. Therefore, he asked and received permission to hold the matter under further consideration. (32)

During his stay at Potsdam, Admiral Mountbatten was informed of the projected use of atomic bombs against Japan. Prime Minister Churchill predicted that because of the new weapon the war in the Pacific would be over by August 15, 1945. On the basis of this supposition the admiral received permission to direct the S.E.A.C. to make plans for the re-occupation of Singapore, which was expected to take place shortly after mid-August, 1945.

(32) Mountbatten's Report, paragraph 630, p. 181.

CHAPTER III

TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE BY FORCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES

The abrupt end of the war against Japan gave rise to great problems for the Allied command in Southeast Asia. The Japanese capitulated on August 14, 1945. On the same day Admiral Mountbatten received orders to assume immediate responsibility for Indochina (south of the sixteenth parallel north) and practically the entire area of the Indies which up to that point had been part of the S.W.P.A. (1) This addition to its operational area caught the S.E.A.C. wholly unprepared for the tremendous task involved in the new directive. All preparations prior to Mountbatten's trip to Potsdam had been concentrated on operations against the Malay Peninsula. Their main objective was to recapture Singapore. To cover the right flank of this action some minor strikes had been planned against Sumatra. Java, let alone the other islands of the Indies, had not been included in any immediate plans of strategy. No new operations were to be carried out until after October, 1945. (2) In order to be in a position to execute his extended task as well as possible, the admiral requested and obtained permission to establish first a forward headquarters of operations in Singapore.

So far as the Netherlands Indies were concerned, S.E.A.C. was greatly hampered by lack of reliable information regarding the existing situation in the islands. At Potsdam, General Marshall promised that pending the actual transfer of the Indies to the S.E.A.C., Admiral Mountbatten would be provided with the necessary intelligence in ample time. Despite the immediacy and the urgency of his new responsibilities, the admiral never received the data he had asked for. Neither was he provided with the pressing-ly needed additional forces and sea-transport facilities which he requested from the C.C.O.S. (3)

The Dutch Intelligence service, the N.E.F.I.S. (Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service) which until August 15, 1945, was attached to the General Headquarters of the S.W.P.A. in Australia, was very poorly informed with regard to the general situation.

-
- (1) David Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia, London, Allen & Unwin, 1948, pp. 31-32. In the period under discussion, Mr. Wehl was chief of the Intelligence Service at Admiral Mountbatten's headquarters. Enquête Commissie, p. 605, Logemann.
- (2) Mountbatten's Report, Section B, paragraph 635, p. 183.
- (3) Ibid.

in Indonesia. As such it was of little help to the S.E.A.C. (4) For lack of trained personnel and the means to transport its agents to the main islands of Indonesia, the knowledge of the N.E.F.I.S., especially regarding conditions in Java, was completely inadequate. This island proved to be impenetrable for its operatives. The few attempts made ended in failure. All information that could be had was gleaned from radio broadcasts emanating from Java. (5)

Efforts of the Dutch armed forces contingent attached to the S.E.A.C. headquarters at Kandy, Ceylon to obtain information regarding conditions in Sumatra, were equally unrewarding. (6) Although sorties were made by commando units, these raids proved unprofitable. The native population was uncooperative. Moreover, the Japanese, soon aware of such activities, doubled their vigilance.

As long as Sumatra was outside the line of operations of the S.E.A.C., submarines to transport the commando units to the island were released with the greatest reluctance. By the end of 1944 and early 1945, all intelligence activities from Kandy directed toward Sumatra were suspended. Only when the time to attack Singapore was approaching did the S.E.A.C. develop more interest in getting information on conditions in the island. (7)

In the second half of June, 1945, Mountbatten's Headquarters landed three intelligence parties in Sumatra, two by parachute and one from a submarine. On the day of Japan's surrender a fourth group was landed near Medan. Three of the parties were under Dutch command and one was headed by a British captain. All groups succeeded in making radio contact forthwith with Headquarters at Kandy. These agents continued operations until the end of the war. After August 15, 1945, they were under the S.E.A.C.'s directives to report to the Japanese commander of their respective localities as R.A.P.W.I. (Relief and Aid for Prisoners of War and Internees) units. (8)

(4) van Mook, *op. cit.*, p. 72. Because the Indonesian islands were not in or near the line of MacArthur's counter-attack the N.E.F.I.S. was denied adequate use of transport facilities for its agents to obtain information regarding the main islands such as Java, Sumatra, etc. Even Dutch submarines and sea-planes could not be utilized.

(5) *Enquête Commissie*, p. 523, statement of van der Plas who was in charge of Allied broadcasts from Australia directed toward the Indies. His government had also instructed him to assist in setting up and organizing the N.E.F.I.S.

(6) *Ibid.*, 562, statement of Admiral Helfrich.

(7) *Ibid.*, p. 553.

(8) *Ibid.*, pp. 561, 571.

On September 1, 1945, Lieutenant Governor-General van Mook and Dr. van der Plas met with Admiral Mountbatten at Kandy. The Dutch representatives strongly objected to the fact that the Japanese in Java allowed the Republic of Indonesia to exist. It was suggested that the admiral issue orders to Marshal Terauchi to restore the status quo in Indonesia of August 15, 1945, the day of the Japanese surrender. Van Mook and van der Plas asserted that the developments in Java after this date would never be accepted by the Netherlands Government. In accordance with the suggestion of the Dutch, Mountbatten cabled a directive to Terauchi in Saigon. However, the latter submitted that he did not know what had happened in Indonesia after August 15. He refused to assume responsibility for developments in Java which occurred after this date. (9)

On September 12, 1945, in Singapore, Admiral Mountbatten formally accepted the surrender of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces of the Southern Regions. On the same day the Allied commander informed Mr. van der Plas, who represented Holland at the surrender ceremony, that S.E.A.C. forces for Java and Sumatra would not be available until the second half of October. When van der Plas urgently requested that arrangements be made for Allied forces to be sent to these islands at an earlier date, the admiral stated that he had been instructed by his government to send many of "the boys" home for a well-earned rest. For that matter, there was no possibility of changing the schedule of operations. (10)

Immediately after the Japanese surrender, Admiral Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander (S.A.C.), assumed responsibility for Sumatra, Java and Madura, Bali and Lombok. Inasmuch as the troops at his disposal were quite inadequate to occupy all of Indonesia, he requested the Australian commander-in-chief to share the Allied task in the archipelago with him. The Australians agreed to accept the surrender of Japanese forces in the Indonesian islands other than those earlier mentioned. (11)

The objectives of the Allied forces were: (12)

- (a) to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces and enforce the unconditional terms of surrender;
- (b) to succour and release the Allied prisoners of war and internees;
- (c) to disarm and concentrate the Japanese, preparatory to

(9) Ibid., p. 675, statement of van der Plas.

(10) Ibid., p. 676, statement of van der Plas.

(11) van Mook, op. cit., p. 78.

(12) Wehl, op. cit., p. 32.

their repatriation;

- (d) to establish and maintain peaceful conditions, preparatory to handing over the territories to their respective civil governments; (13)
- (e) to collect information about, and try, war criminals.

(13) The transfer of authority in territories of Indonesia from the Allied Military Administration to the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (N.I.C.A.) was regulated by the Civil Affairs agreement concluded between the British and Dutch governments on August 24, 1945 in London.

The agreement contained "principles designed to provide a practical solution of immediate problems and to facilitate as far as possible the task of the Allied Commander in Chief and of the Netherlands Government in the achievement of their common purpose." It was further stipulated that it "is understood that these arrangements, being purely provisional in character, in no way affect the sovereignty of the Netherlands Government."

In terms of the objective under (d) the most important provisions, in the opinion of this writer, are:

1. In areas where military operations are being carried out it is necessary to consider an initial or military phase during which the Allied Commander in Chief will, to the extent necessitated by the military situation, possess *de facto* authority to take all necessary measures. During this first phase the Dutch Government will, in order to assist the Allied Commander in Chief in the execution of his authority, make available to accompany his armed forces a sufficient number of Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs Officers to take charge of the administration in liberated Netherlands Indies territory under the general supervision of the Military Commander Allied Forces in the area concerned. In administrative matters pertaining to the civilian population, including relative plans to exploit the resources in liberated Netherlands Indies territory as warranted by military demands during the initial phase, the services of the Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs Officers will be utilized as much as possible. It is understood that the Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs Officers will be fully authorized to take all necessary measures. The conscription of civilian workers, billeting and supplies, the use of real estate, buildings, means of transportation and other services which the Allied Commander in Chief may deem necessary for the military requirements of his command, will wherever possible be carried out through the intermediary of Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs Officers and in accordance with Netherlands Indies Law.
2. It is agreed that the Netherlands Indies Government will resume as rapidly as practicable full responsibility for the civil administration of Netherlands Indies territory. The Allied Commander in Chief will, as rapidly and as fully as the military situation in his judgement permits, not-

Under priorities fixed by the C.C.O.S., the S.E.A.C. was to execute the Allied task in Indonesia as the last in its schedule of operations. (14)

The first Allied representatives to enter Java after the proclamation of Indonesia's independence were landed by parachute at Djakarta's airport, Kemajoran, on September 8, 1945. As an advance party this Allied Mission was to report on the situation pending the arrival of a major Allied group sent to Djakarta by the S.E.A.C. to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces in Java. The Mission reported among other things: (15)

The bulk of the native population in Java are indifferent to all political movements. The political problem is principally one of the towns. It is most acute in Batavia. The problem follows pre-war patterns. Most Nationalist leaders draw their following from the intellectuals and semi-educated, and of these the intellectuals are the worst. They are very anti-Japanese, most of them... The Nationalists are undoubtedly organizing for recognition.

On September 16, 1945, the first post-war Allied Military Mission to enter Java arrived in Djakarta. It was headed by Rear-Admiral Patterson, deputy to Admiral Mountbatten. Besides accepting the surrender of the Japanese forces, his task was to make arrangements for the implementation of the surrender terms. Meanwhile, Dr. van Mook had suggested to the S.E.A.C. that it "have one or more experienced Netherlands Indies political advisers attached to every group that enters Java ahead of the arrival of the occupation force and the N.I.C.A. (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration)." Accordingly Mr. van der Plas represented the Lieutenant Governor-General on Admiral Patterson's staff. (16)

The members of the mission found that the attitude of the Indonesian nationalists was not unfriendly. In anticipation of the arrival of the Allied occupation forces the responsibility for

ify the Lieutenant Governor-General of the extent to which such responsibility should be resumed.

-----Enquête Commissie, pp. 634-635, as quoted from Indisch Staatsblad ("Indies Gazette"), 1946, No. 111, trans. by the writer.

(14) Kain, op. cit.

(15) Wehl, op. cit., p. 37. Cf. Enquête Commissie, p. 563; van Mook, op. cit., p. 78.

(16) W. H. van Helsdingen, Op weg naar een Nederlandsch-Indonesische Unie, 's-Gravenhage, W. van Hoeve, 1947, p. 24, from a Note of Dr. van Mook dated Kandy, 3 September 1945, to Admiral Mountbatten.

security remained in the hands of the Japanese troops upon orders of the S.E.A.C. (17)

In the latter half of August, 1945, the Republic of Indonesia began the task of "organizing for recognition." At that time the only existing institution representative of Indonesia as a whole was the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia). It was established by decree of Marshal Terauchi, Supreme Commander, Japanese Expeditionary Forces, Southern Regions, on August 7, 1945. The Committee was constituted of twenty-one members "drawn from all parts of Indonesia on a basis of representation roughly proportional to population." The representatives were designated "on nomination by the local Japanese military commanders." Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta were appointed Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively. (18)

The day following the Proclamation of Indonesian Independence the membership of the Committee was strengthened with six additional members. (19) In this composition the Committee,

- (1) considered and approved the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia;
- (2) elected Sukarno and Hatta, President and Vice-President of the Republic;
- (3) resolved that the President, in the execution of his duties, was to be assisted by a National Committee for the time being.

Twelve ministries were set up. The territory of the Republic, comprised of the area of the former Netherlands East Indies, was divided into eight provinces each to be administered by a governor appointed by the President. Further, the Independence Preparatory Committee which, conforming to the new situation, was then called the "Independence Committee,"

- (1) decided on the form and composition of local National Committees to be set up all over Indonesia, and of the Central National Committee which would reside in Djakarta; the aims and objectives of these representative institutions were defined;
- (2) decided to establish the "Partai Nasional Indonesia" (Indonesian Nationalist Party); its aim was the perpetuation of the sovereign Republic of Indonesia based on social justice, social welfare and the sovereignty of the people;

- (17) Frederick E. Crockett, "How the Trouble Began in Java," Harper's Magazine, Vol. 192 (March 1946), pp. 279-284.
- (18) Kahin, op. cit., p. 127; Willard H. Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940-45, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1953, pp. 94-95.
- (19) Kahin, op. cit., p. 138.

- (3) approved the foundation of the "Badan Keamanan Rakjat," (People's Peace Corps) as a subsidiary of the "Badan Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang" (Committee for aid to Families of War Victims) which was the main organization charged with the maintenance of public peace.

By the end of August, preparations for organizing the Indonesian Nationalist Party were temporarily suspended in order to concentrate all activities on the setting up of local National Committees.

On September 5, 1945, President Sukarno announced the composition of his Cabinet. The Central Indonesian National Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat--K.N.I.P.) which had been inaugurated on August 29, replacing the defunct Independence Committee, was strengthened by broadening the basis of its membership. (20) Sukarno, in collaboration with Hatta, appointed "135 members (including those of the Independence Preparatory Committee), whom they deemed to be outstanding Indonesian nationalists and the most important leaders of the chief ethnic, religious, social and economic groups in Indonesia." (21)

In the meantime the functions of government in Djakarta had passed quietly and without interruption to public utilities and other services to the Republic of Indonesia. (22)

Van der Plas, observing the situation in Djakarta as a member of Admiral Patterson's Mission, came to the conclusion that the first task of the Allied occupation forces should be to "act against the terrorism of the Sukarno-group aimed at all moderate nationalists." Therefore, he felt that stronger efforts must be made to expedite the despatch of S.E.A.C. troops to Java. Thus dismissing the Indonesian Republic as a mere terror gang, van der Plas proceeded to make preparations for the N.I.C.A. to take over the administration of the Indies from the Japanese military government. (23) However, all departments of the civil government were already in Republican hands. As such, the transfer of the administrative machinery from the Japanese to the N.I.C.A., as envisaged by the Indies Government in Exile was no longer possible. (24)

(20) These developments in the Republican Government are recorded in: Documenta Historica, collected by Osman Raliby, Djakarta, Bulan-Bintang, 1953.

(21) Kahin, op. cit., p. 140.

(22) Crockett, op. cit.

(23) Enquête Commissie, p. 653, report of van der Plas.

(24) Crockett, op. cit.

Subsequently, on the persistent urging of the Dutch, the S.E.A.C. advanced the date of sending Allied troops to Java. On September 23, 1945, Mountbatten informed Admiral Patterson that on September 28 a company of Seaforth Highlanders would arrive in Djakarta. In view of their small number of Allied Military Mission was faced with the problem of safeguarding the Allied force against a possible attack from the Indonesians. Van der Plas then persuaded Admiral Patterson to order the responsible Japanese commander to arrest and imprison all "terrorist leaders" in Java. Sukarno and Hatta, by implication, were most likely included in the list of persons to be apprehended. The order was to be carried out on the day prior to the landing of the Allied troops.

On September 26, van der Plas received a cable from the Netherlands Minister of Colonies, Professor Dr. J. H. A. Logemann, instructing him to meet with Admiral Mountbatten at the S.E.A.C. headquarters in Singapore. The main task of van der Plas was to: (25)

...try arrange meeting to explain political situation Java. Stress fact that Japanese secretly support nationalist movements, thus not...conforming orders s.a.c. (supreme allied commander). Van Mook has numerous proofs. Try to obtain from s.a.c. change of attitude re british non-interference internal political affairs... ()

This directive was conveyed through British forces communications facilities. For that matter, Admiral Patterson found out what he had not known when he accepted van der Plas' advice to imprison Indonesian leaders; his government's policy with regard to the situation in Indonesia was one of non-interference in the internal political affairs. Consequently, he immediately rescinded his order to have the Japanese arrest Indonesian nationalist leaders.

The meeting between Admiral Mountbatten and Dr. van der Plas was held on September 27 and 28. The discussions were partly attended by Mr. J. J. Lawson, British Minister of War. It was asserted that Mr. Lawson was in Singapore primarily to confer on matters pertaining to developments in Indonesia. The Dutch repre-

(25) Enquête Commissie, p. 676, statement of van der Plas. The gross misappreciation of the strength of the Indonesian nationalist movement of the Netherlands Indies Government in Exile was demonstrated in a cabled report of Lieutenant Governor-General van Mook to the Minister of Colonies, Logemann. Van Mook at that time was still in Brisbane. He informed his government in Holland that judging from recent reports of Dutch observers in Djakarta--apparently among others also van der Plas--

"...it is of the utmost importance to imprison the leadership of the so-called Republic of Indonesia immediately, because apprehension of the leading persons and a show of force will strip the movement of its strength." Ibid., p. 653, cable of van Mook to the Dutch Minister of Colonies.

sentative was informed of the British Government's decision that not a single British soldier should be used to impose Dutch authority on Indonesian nationalists. His Majesty's forces were to be utilized exclusively to rescue Allied prisoners of war and internees, and for the occupation of limited perimeters around Djakarta and Surabaya. No British soldier would be allowed to go beyond the limits of such areas. It was up to the Dutch themselves to reoccupy the rest of Java. (26)

Subsequently Mountbatten stated that he was prepared to speed up the sending of more Allied troops to Java if the Netherlands Indies Government was willing to begin discussions with Sukarno and his adherents immediately. The admiral reminded van der Plas of the British Government's policy with regard to the nationalist movement in Burma. Initially, General Aung San, the Burmese nationalist leader, was hostile to the British. However, he attacked the Japanese eventually. Moreover, Sukarno's group was the only organized movement among the Indonesian nationalists. (27)

Van der Plas submitted that his government would absolutely refuse to negotiate with Sukarno. The Dutch representative said that comparison of the Republic of Indonesia with the nationalists in Burma was ill-chosen inasmuch as Sukarno had never turned against the Japanese. Despite these assertions Admiral Mountbatten stated that if the Netherlands East Indies Government refused to begin discussions with the Indonesian nationalists, he would, first, direct Lieutenant-General Sir Philip Christison, commander-designate of Allied Forces in the Netherlands East Indies (A.F.N.E.I.) to open talks with the Republicans. Second, Mountbatten would refuse the Dutch any assistance, if through their uncompromising attitude they should meet with serious difficulties. It appears that this statement made van der Plas realize that in view of the British mood it was necessary for him to make a concession. Therefore, he declared his willingness to ask Lieutenant Governor-General van Mook's permission and summon Indonesian leaders, not excluding Sukarno, for talks on future Indonesian-Dutch relations. (28)

Admiral Mountbatten began to appreciate the gravity of the situation that confronted the Allied forces in the islands. After consultation with, and obtaining permission from London the S.A.C. had decided to limit Allied operations in Indonesia to occupying large cities in Java and Sumatra. Mountbatten had also come to the conclusion that in the execution of their task the Allied forces had to take the existence of the Republic into account from the

(26) Ibid., p. 677, statement of van der Plas.

(27) Ibid., p. 655, written report of van der Plas.

(28) Ibid., p. 655-656, written report of van der Plas.

very beginning. (29)

Upon his return to Djakarta, van der Plas "convened on September 29 and 30 several meetings with police officials in Batavia and with other Indonesians of moderate outlook,..." (30) He tried to persuade them to abandon the Republic and join the Allied Military Administration Civil Affairs Branch (A.M.A.C.A.B.). However, these overtures were rebuffed by the Republican officials.

The unbending attitude of the Netherlands Government with respect to the Indonesian Republic was adamantly maintained during this period. Therefore, when information about the activities of Dr. van der Plas reached The Hague he was immediately rebuked by his government. (31)

On the eve of General Sir Philip Christison's arrival in Djakarta, Radio S.E.A.C. in Singapore announced a statement said to have been made by him. In addition to giving an enumeration of the Allied objectives in Indonesia, it was asserted that the A.F.N.E.I. command had no intention of interfering in matters of domestic politics. On the other hand, General Christison would request the leaders of all Indonesian groups with a substantial following "to prepare the way, for issue by the Dutch, of an authoritative inclusive statement on the future of the Netherlands Indies." (32)

Aware of the formidable task ahead of him and of the inadequacy of the forces at his disposal, General Christison apparently sought to allay further Indonesian suspicion as to the objective of Allied forces in Indonesia. Immediately after he entered Djakarta on September 29, 1945, he issued a proclamation containing a request to Indonesian leaders to support him in the exercise of his task. Since only limited operations could be undertaken by the Allied forces "the present Indonesian authorities (would remain) responsible for the government in the areas under Republican control." (33) The British command appeared to fear an attack of the Indonesian armed forces which at that time were estimated at 80,000 men. The Allied position was aggravated by the fact that all public utilities were in Republican hands. Disruption of such services could for public health reasons result in disastrous consequences for the inhabitants of Djakarta, which had greatly increased in number by thousands of former prisoners of war and

(29) Wehl, op. cit., p. 46.

(30) Ibid., p. 45.

(31) Merdeka, October 4, 1945, an Indonesian language newspaper published in Djakarta; Enquête Commissie, p. 678, statement of van der Plas.

(32) Wehl, op. cit., p. 42.

(33) C. Smit, De Indonesische Quaestie, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1952,

internees. Moreover, the main water reservoir supplying the city and Djakarta's hydro-electric station were in Republican-held territory. (34)

However, from the point of view of the Dutch the British commander's decision, conclusion and pronouncements, were highly objectionable. They felt it implied recognition of the Indonesian authorities and their Republic. Both the Dutch Government in The Hague and public opinion in the Netherlands were strongly against having anything to do with the Indonesian Republic, which they considered as Japanese inspired and headed by a group of Japanese collaborators. Official Dutch protests were lodged in Singapore and London against the S.E.A.C.'s policy. (35)

The Indonesian leaders soon found out that small contingents of Dutch troops had been landed in Java as part of the incoming Allied forces. Sukarno and other nationalist leaders forthwith protested against the presence of Netherlands forces. The British were warned that if more Dutch soldiers entered Java, the Indonesian population would become openly hostile to all Allied forces. The Indonesians were already distrustful of the Allied command's intention since it became known that it had allowed N.I.C.A. officers, like van der Plas, to come to Djakarta as members of Admiral Patterson's Mission. The Republican leaders feared that further landing of Dutch troops under cover of the Allied forces would result in armed clashes with the Indonesian people. Under such circumstances there would be no doubt on the Indonesian side that the British and Indian soldiers were hand in glove with the Dutch in trying to destroy the Republic. The ensuing situation would result in violent reaction against thousands of Dutch internees still in Republican-held territory. (36)

p. 56; New York Times, September 30, 1945. Cf. Enquête Commissie, p. 657.

(34) Enquête Commissie, p. 606, statement by General Schilling.

(35) van Mook, op. cit., p. 89; Gerbrandy, op. cit., p. 99; Enquête Commissie, p. 700, statement of van Kleffens. It was submitted that the S.E.A.C. with its policy violated the Civil Affairs agreement of August 24, 1945.

(36) Kahin, op. cit., pp. 142-143. This warning was given in a statement of President Sukarno to General Christison to protest against activities of N.I.C.A. officers and the landing of Dutch troops - Merdeka, October 11, 1945.

The most influential Republican newspaper in Djakarta at that time, Merdeka, asserted in an editorial entitled "Suara Rakjat" ("The People's Voice") on October 10:

...although the facts indicate that our existence as a sovereign and independent nation is threatened...our government wishes us to restrain ourselves...

...the Republican Government urges the people to refrain from any action against Dutch troops because...it means

The misgivings of the Indonesian leaders proved true. Fighting broke out between Indonesians and the Allied forces. Developments followed which made it impossible for the British to fulfill their military commitments "without touching on the thorny problems of colonialism and imperialism among a sensitive people and in a sensitive world." In other words, the Allied command found itself in a position wherein for the successful execution of its task "a policy of non-intervention in the Republican-Dutch political relations" could no longer be maintained. (37)

Subsequently, both Admiral Mountbatten and General Christison began to impress, with more urgency, upon the Dutch as well as on the Republicans, how important it was for the two parties to resolve their conflict by peaceful means. It was asserted that the successful execution of the Allied task was contingent upon a rapid solution of the controversy. Therefore, the British commanders made it abundantly clear that a settlement between the Dutch and the Indonesians must be a peaceful one. (38) British Government spokesmen, in language necessarily cautious in view of the Anglo-Dutch wartime alliance, reiterated the same view. (39)

An important determinant of the British policy of pressing for Dutch-Indonesian talks was their unenviable position in Asia. The Labour Government which had come into power shortly after the German defeat, had to take the existing sentiment with respect to Asian movements of independence, both at home and abroad, into serious and careful consideration. In particular, such sentiments as expressed by Labour back-benchers in Commons had to be reckoned with. (40)

action against Allied forces. So far the people have indeed not undertaken any concrete steps against Dutch troops. However, the government will surely understand that the people cannot follow its orders in this respect forever. It should be borne in mind that the patience of the people is not limitless...

- (37) Charles Wolf, Jr., The Indonesian Story, New York, John Day, 1948, p. 18.
- (38) Editorial, "The Awakening of Asia," The New Statesman and Nation, XXX, (December 29, 1945), p. 433.
- (39) Parliamentary Debates Commons, 1945-1946, Vol. 414, column 1152, Prime Minister Attlee's statement on October 17, 1945.
- (40) Such as: Tom Driberg, Harold Davies and Woodrow Wyatt, who through Dorothy Woodman received on-the-spot accounts from two Englishmen with the British forces in Djakarta, Peter Humphries and Tom Atkinson.
- John Coast, Recruit to Revolution, London, Christophers, 1952, p. 19. Mr. Atkinson was an editor of the daily for the personnel of the British division in Djakarta.

Moreover, as an aftermath of the war, in the Middle East, in Iran, India, Burma and Malaya, conditions had developed necessitating the use of substantial numbers of British armed forces. The new tasks which these troops had to shoulder were hardly popular. Especially so because their objectives were felt to be outside the immediate sphere of British interests. Further, the army personnel in general strongly desired to be demobilized and sent home.

Lastly, the forces made available for the Allied task in Indonesia were mostly Indian troops. For that matter the developments in the archipelago could not escape being influenced by the new relationship which was emerging in India between Great Britain and the peoples of that subcontinent.

With emotions more and more aroused, the frequency of armed clashes between Allied forces, in particular Dutch soldiers, and Republicans increased. Meanwhile the Dutch Government remained adamant in its attitude of refusing to talk with the "Japanese collaborator" Sukarno. Under these circumstances Dr. van Mook became convinced that persisting in such an attitude would make it impossible to arrive at a solution to the conflict.

The first step in breaking the stalemate was a conference held October 10-11, 1945 in Singapore. Attending the meeting were Admiral Mountbatten, General Christison, Rear-Admiral Patterson, Lieutenant Governor-General van Mook, Dr. van der Plas and Vice-Admiral Helfrich, commander of the Netherlands forces in the Far East. The S.A.C. explained that the British policy in Indonesia was influenced by two major factors. First, the Labour Government had the gravest misgivings vis-a-vis drastic actions of the British forces in Indonesia lest such actions would result in a situation which could be termed "a second Greece." When, immediately following the conclusion of the war in Europe, the political confusion in Greece created a big uproar in Britain, the Labour Party, as the opposition, sharply criticized the Churchill Government's policy relating to that country. The Labour Government insisted that in carrying out the Allied task in the Indies the British forces must avoid violence as much as possible. Second, the S.E.A.C. was completely unprepared for the tasks assigned to it after the sudden capitulation of Japan. The problem was mainly that of an acute shortage of transport facilities. (41)

Mountbatten informed the Dutch that he had decided to speed up the sending of additional Allied forces to Indonesia. Four brigades, each of 4,000 to 5,000 men would be made available for the occupation of Java and Sumatra. The British and Dutch representatives further discussed principles of general policy which they would submit to their respective governments for approval. It was agreed that the Netherlands Indies Government was the only legitimate authority in Indonesia. In accordance with Mountbatten's viewpoint it was decided that all activities of the Allied forces would be carried out as R.A.P.W.I. operations. The Admiral asserted

(41) Enquête Commissie, p. 658; cf. Wehl, op. cit., p. 45.

that the sole purpose of the British troops was to accept the Japanese surrender and implement the Allied task. Therefore, all military operations considered necessary to accomplish this were the responsibility of the British and not of the Dutch. The conference also agreed to hold a meeting in Djakarta which would be announced as a deliberation on R.A.P.W.I. matters in general. It was decided to step up measures for the release of Allied prisoners of war and internees still quartered in internment camps on Republican territory. In return the British demanded that the Dutch abandon their negative attitude toward political discussions with the leaders of the Republic. Without this concession Mountbatten feared that increased military operations by the British and Indian forces to achieve the contemplated objective would meet with insurmountable difficulties emanating from London and India. (42) Despite van Mook's protests the S.A.C. insisted that the leaders of all Indonesian groups should be invited to attend the meeting. Sukarno must not be excluded.

Under such circumstances, van Mook could not but conclude that talking with the Republican leaders was a conditio sine qua non for more activity on the part of the British. He then submitted a proposal to his government at The Hague to abandon its stubborn attitude of refusing to hold discussions with the Indonesian leaders. (43)

Realizing that the rigid policy of, first, complete submission of the Republicans, and then, perhaps, taking up discussions with the Indonesians, could no longer be maintained, the Netherlands Government accepted van Mook's proposal. (44) However, it still insisted that the Lieutenant Governor-General should only have talks with "good" Indonesians. Persons like Sukarno, Hatta, and "other Japanese collaborators" were absolutely unacceptable because discussions "with the Sukarno régime" would be "both undignified and fruitless." (45) It was stipulated that the Dutch basis for negotiations must be Queen Wilhelmina's speech of December 6, 1942. (46)

(42) Smit, op. cit., p. 63.

(43) Enquête Commissie, p. 698, statement of van Mook.

(44) Because of this decision Governor-General van Starckenborgh, who was recuperating from privations suffered in a Japanese internment camp, resigned in protest.

(45) Verslag der Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 1945-1946, (Dutch parliamentary debates; further referred to as Handelingen) Tijdelijke Zitting, pp. 85-86. The quotations are from a statement in the Second Chamber by the Minister of Overseas Territories (formerly: Minister of Colonies) Logemann on October 16, 1945.

(46) Wolf, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

On October 17, 1945, van Mook reported to his government there was a possibility that Sukarno might lose power and "soon disappear from the scene" if the Dutch continued to refuse any dealings with him. The Lieutenant Governor-General had come to that conclusion because the Republican leader was gradually losing his popularity with both the extremists and the moderates. (47)

However, van Mook's advice to his government soon proved to be unworkable. Sukarno was the head of the Republican Government. To refuse to have talks with him was tantamount to rejecting all contact with the Republic. Persistence in this attitude would give rise to difficulties with the British. The Dutch were in no position to risk the loss of Britain's goodwill. Therefore, van Mook was forced to admit that it was impossible for him to follow strictly the directives of his government. (48)

On October 23, General Christison arranged for him to meet Indonesian leaders, among whom was President Sukarno. Van Mook attended the gathering which was informal in character. Mountbatten's Adviser for Political Affairs, Mr. Maberly E. Dening was also present. This official of the British Foreign Office had been sent to Djakarta to assist the Allied commander in his attempts to bring the Dutch and the Indonesians together. (49) At this meeting Dening informed the Republican leaders of the fact that the Allied command recognized the Netherlands Indies Government as the legitimate authority in Indonesia. The information provoked strong protests from the Indonesians.

Apparently in fear of possible repercussions from the Republicans, the British may have felt it necessary to indicate that their recognition of Dutch sovereignty did not mean supporting the Dutch in their conflict with the Indonesian nationalists. For soon afterwards, the Allied command announced that further landings of Dutch troops in Java and Sumatra had been suspended for the time being. (50)

On October 25 the Republican Government issued a statement to let the British and the Dutch know on what terms it was prepared to negotiate. The communique asserted:

....that Indonesia's interests do not only concern the development of a new world structure but also the achievement of a basis for lasting peace in the Pacific.

(47) Enquête Commissie, p. 663, cable of van Mook to the Dutch Government, dated October 17, 1945.

(48) Ibid., p. 698.

(49) Raliby, op. cit., pp. 62-63.

(50) Enquête Commissie, p. 610, statement of General Schilling, Royal Netherlands Indies Army, commander of the Dutch contingent Allied Forces in Djakarta. The announcement was made at A.F.N.E.I. headquarters in Djakarta on October 25, 1945.

Based on this precept the Government of the Republic of Indonesia is of the opinion that discussions to solve the Indonesian problem can only succeed and guarantee lasting peace if they are conducted before the world at large.

For that matter preliminary and unofficial talks concerning a conference to finalize matters, according to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, need be carried out between the two parties involved in the presence of a third party acting as a mediator.

The Indonesian Government wishes to make it clear that it is prepared to have discussions with anyone provided such discussions are based on the right of self-determination of the Indonesian people. (51)

Thus, the Republican Government conditioned its willingness to negotiate upon "the presence of a third party as mediator." From then on the Republic pursued this diplomatic policy until it achieved international recognition. (52)

The second meeting between President Sukarno and Dr. van Mook took place on October 31, 1945. When news about this meeting reached the Netherlands it caused a great commotion. The adverse reaction was so vehement that the Dutch Government deemed it necessary to issue an official and sharp rebuff to van Mook's action without awaiting an explanation from Djakarta. (53)

Undiscouraged by the reverberations that the Dutch-Indonesian talks had caused in Holland, General Christison planned another meeting for early November. However, Sukarno informed the Allied commander that arrangements had been made for him to attend conferences in the interior of Java. Therefore, he would not be available for some time. (54)

It could be suggested that by this time Sukarno had begun to doubt the efficacy of his participation in any further talks with van Mook, so long as the Dutch Government allowed the Lieutenant

(51) Merdeka, October 27, 1945.

(52) The talks on the Hoge Veluwe in April 1946 were held without a "third party." However, so far as the Republicans were concerned, these discussions were meant to finalize matters which in their basic issues had been agreed upon in Djakarta. As we shall see, this agreement was achieved through negotiations in which a British diplomat, Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, rendered his assistance.

(53) van Mook, op. cit., p. 105.

(54) Parliamentary Debates Commons, 1945-1946, Vol. 414, column 1727.

Governor-General to hold discussions with "good" Indonesians only. Also, possibly the Republican President was becoming sensitive to Indonesian criticism of dealings with the Dutch prior to their recognition of Indonesian independence. (55)

In the meantime a profound change had occurred in the set up of the Republican Government. Dissatisfied with the pattern of government which concentrated too much power in the hands of Sukarno and his Cabinet, almost to the extent of a dictatorship, a group of younger, more dynamic and militant nationalists spearheaded a movement for radical change in the structure and powers of the K.N.I.P. Several among them had had a hand also in preventing the Independence Preparatory Committee from playing a role in the final developments of the events leading to the Proclamation of Indonesian Independence. (56)

From a purely advisory body, the K.N.I.P. became an institution with real legislative power which was held jointly with the President. In the Presidential Decree No. 10 of October, 1945, promulgating the modifications, it was stipulated that the K.N.I.P. would delegate its day-to-day task to a small representative body, the Working Committee (Badan Pekerdja K.N.I.P.). It was responsible to and composed of members designated from the parent body. (56a) Sutan Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin were elected the first chairman and vice-chairman. Both were known to be free of any stigma of Japanese collaboration.

On October 17, 1945, the Plenary Session of the K.N.I.P. approved the changes in the structure of the Republican Government. Vice-President Hatta commented on the occasion that with the formation of the Working Committee, the fight for the recognition of

- (55) By November 6, 1945, reporting on the general situation in Indonesia, van Mook stated: "Sukarno's meeting with me has hurt his position vis-a-vis the extremists." - Enquête Commissie, p. 664, van Mook's cable to the Dutch Government.
- (56) Muhammad Dimiyati, Sedjarah Perdjuangan Indonesia, Djakarta, Widjaya, 1951, p. 120. See also: Kahin, op. cit., p. 147. For a comprehensive and detailed account of background and developments resulting in the change from presidential to parliamentary government, vide pp. 147-153.
- (56a) An official Republican statement on the matter asserted that the change served to strengthen the domestic as well as the international position of the Republic. The Dutch accused the Republic of being fascistic. This change would show the world that the Dutch were wrong. It would prove that the Indonesians were cherishing the principles of democracy. - Berita Republik Indonesia (Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia), Tahoen II, No. 2, December 1, 1945.

Indonesia's independence had entered a new phase. (57)

The same could be said for the developments that subsequently led to formal negotiations between the Dutch and the Indonesians.

On November 1, 1945, the Indonesian Government issued a Political Manifesto drafted by Sjahrir. This document was accepted by the Working Committee as the official statement of government policy. The Manifesto stated among other things: (58)

...The tribulations felt by our people, physically as well as spiritually, during these three and a half years [Japanese occupation], can be termed boundless. Our entire population was forced to report and become subject to the military orders of the Japanese. It is this stamp of Japanese Militarism which the Japanese overlord has left on the minds of our people and especially our youth. For this Dutch Colonialism is responsible, in that it left our 70,000,000 people to the mercies of Japanese Militarism without any means of protecting themselves since they had never been entrusted with firearms and the education necessary to use them in the turning point of history on March 9, 1942.

It was made clear that although the Indonesians wanted complete independence they did not ask for an isolated or autarchic state. They understood that without foreign aid they were doomed to remain without wealth, technical development or the fruits of Western civilization. They wanted to develop both their agriculture and industry and knew this meant loans, credits, foreign advice, technicians, etc. They knew that to have these they must have law and order, and that anti-foreign prejudices, then fostered by extremists, must disappear. It was pointed out that owing to their tradition and special knowledge of the Indies, the Dutch must inevitably have a predominant place in Indonesia. However, this was possible only if Dutch political domination ended.

At about the same time a booklet was published, written by Sjahrir, entitled Perjuangan Kita ("Our Struggle"). It was a frank criticism of the extremist manifestations among the Indonesian youths. He called upon them to act with responsibility commensurate with their revolutionary importance. Sjahrir warned that the continuance of murder and robbery of foreigners and other Indonesians by nationalists invited military intervention which "equals selfdestruction."

(57) Merdeka, October 19, 1945.

(58) Wolf, op. cit., Appendix, p. 172. For a complete translation of the Political Manifesto see pp. 172-175.

Striking at the régime of President Sukarno, Sjahrir charged that the Government had failed to gain popular respect and acceptance because it was weak. Because it did not know better, its methods of propaganda and agitation were copied and learned from the Japanese and therefore fascistic.

Through the march of events which clearly showed confusion among the Indonesians, and which could hardly be considered an expression of a fight for freedom inasmuch as it was accompanied with murder and brigandage, world opinion with regard to the Indonesian revolution was changing. (59) Sjahrir deplored the expressions of racial hatred which he observed in his country. He felt that as long as the people of one district could be incited against that of another, it would be very difficult for international opinion to recognize the existence of a solid feeling of Indonesian nationalism.

Speaking of "nationalist groups, which have let themselves be used as servants of fascism, whether Dutch-colonial, or Japanese-military fascism," Sjahrir stated:

Thus all the collaborators referred to must be considered as our own fascists, as accomplices and tools of Japanese fascism, who bear a heavy guilt and have committed treason to our struggle and our people's revolution.

This demand for a purge was part of Sjahrir's policy to try to remove the taint of Japanese collaboration from the Republican leadership. (60)

On October 25, 1945, the 49th Indian Infantry Brigade landed at Surabaya. The operation proceeded smoothly and without opposition from the population. However, unknown to the commanding officer, Brigadier A. W. S. Mallaby, tension had been building up in that city which by the time of the Allied forces' arrival had reached a danger point. (61)

(59) Soetan Sjahrir, Onze Strijd, Amsterdam, Uitgeverij "Vrij Nederland," 1946, pp. 14-16.

(60) The writer obtained this information from Dr. Soedarsono, Sjahrir's close associate in underground activities during the Japanese occupation. Dr. Soedarsono after the Proclamation of Independence continued this relationship with Sjahrir as fellow-members of the Partai Sosialis (Socialist Party). Representing his party in the K.N.I.P., he was subsequently elected to membership of the Working Committee. (B.P.K.N.I.P. - Raliby, op. cit., p. 132) In March, 1946, he became Minister for Home Affairs in the second Sjahrir Cabinet. He participated in the Djakarta negotiations which resulted in the Hoge Veluwe Conference. Thereafter Dr. Soedarsono was appointed member of the Republican Delegation to this conference.

(61) Wehl, op. cit., p. 52.

By the end of September, 1945, an Allied party, commanded by Captain P. J. G. Huijer, Royal Netherlands Navy, arrived in Surabaya. Under directives of Admiral Patterson, it was to observe and report on conditions in this port-city pending the landing of the Allied occupation forces. After October 1, developments arose involving an all-out attack by the Republicans on the Japanese army and navy garrisons to seize arms and ammunition. Finally, the events led Captain Huijer to assume responsibilities beyond the instructions of the Allied command. He apparently decided to take matters into his own hands, realizing that the activities of the Indonesians were highly detrimental to Dutch interests in Indonesia. The temper of the aroused population subsequently turned against the Dutch naval officer and his Allied team, and they were arrested and imprisoned by the Republican authorities. (62)

Immediately after his arrival in Surabaya, Brigadier Mallaby had Huijer and his colleagues released. It appears that the coming of the British-Indian brigade was unopposed thanks to its commander's statement issued shortly after he entered the city. The British Commander asserted that he had no orders to disarm the Republicans. However, on October 27, the R.A.F. dropped leaflets over Surabaya containing an order of the A.F.N.E.I. command for all Indonesians to disarm within 24 hours. This operation was allegedly carried out without Mallaby's previous knowledge of the matter. Afterwards, the Brigadier announced that he had obtained 4 days' grace from Djakarta for the Indonesians to give up their arms. (63)

The Republicans ignored the order, and subsequent events pushed the situation from bad to worse. On the afternoon of October 28, 1945, the Indonesians launched a large-scale attack on the Allied forces. Twenty-four hours after the battle had begun, the British-Indian brigade stood in danger of annihilation. (64)

Under the circumstances the A.F.N.E.I. command had no other choice but to turn to the Republican Government for assistance to try to come to the rescue of Mallaby and his men. Through the personal intervention of President Sukarno a temporary truce was arranged between the Republican and the Allied forces, effective shortly after the arrival of the Republican leader in Surabaya on October 29. The terms were:

1. The agreement was concluded between President Sukarno and Brigadier Mallaby to preserve peace in Surabaya.

(62) Enquête Commissie, pp. 594-602, statement of Huijer.

(63) Arthur D. Clegg, "Indonesia," The New Statesman and Nation XXX (December 22, 1945), pp. 425-426. A "first-hand British report." quoted by Clegg in a letter to the Editor. Cf. Wehl, op. cit., p. 54.

(64) Ibid., p. 56.

2. To achieve peace and order both parties would cease hostilities.
3. The safety of all persons including ex-internees would be guaranteed by both parties.
4. Conditions laid down in the leaflets signed by the Allied commander in Java, General Hawthorn, and dropped over the city would be a matter of discussion between President Sukarno and Hawthorn on the following day.
5. On the night of October 29, both parties were allowed freedom of movement.
6. All military personnel were to be confined to their barracks. All wounded persons were to be taken to hospitals. The unhampered execution of this operation would be guaranteed by both parties. (65)

The following day a meeting was held between President Sukarno, Major-General D. C. Hawthorn representing Allied Headquarters in Djakarta, and Brigadier Mallaby. An agreement was reached stipulating: (66)

...that fighting should cease immediately, that a "Contact Bureau" should meet for liaison work; that all personal arms and equipment captured by both sides should be restored immediately; that free movement by road should be permitted by the Indonesians for bringing APWI /Allied Prisoners-of-War and Internees/ refugees to safety and taking supplies to the camps; that the British should be responsible for law and order in the docks area and the camps; that a party of equal strength from British and Indonesians should patrol the town; and that any major differences that might arise should be submitted to Batavia /Djakarta/ for decision to be arrived at between General Hawthorn and Soekarno.

However, the truce was short-lived. The next day fighting broke out again, resulting in the death of Brigadier Mallaby.

Discussing this incident in Commons on February 20, 1946, the Labour Backbencher, Mr. T. E. N. Driberg stated: (67)

...some of the Press reports from Indonesia have not

(65) Merdeka, October 30, 1945.

(66) Wehl, op. cit., p. 58. Cf. Merdeka, November 1, 1945.

(67) Parliamentary Debates Commons, 1945-1946, Vol. 419, columns 1213, 1214 and 1215. For a British account of the incident claiming that Mallaby was shot to death by Indonesians, see: Wehl, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

After a visit to Surabaya for a personal investigation into Mallaby's death, the Republican Minister of Information, Amir Sjarifuddin, stated to the press on November 7, 1945, there was no evidence to show that the British officer had been killed by the Indonesians. However, it had been established that the car occupied by Mallaby had been damaged by an exploding shell. Merdeka, November 8 and 14, 1945.

been entirely responsible. In particular, I have learned from officers who have recently returned that some of the stories which have been told, not only in the newspapers, but, I am sorry to say, from the Government Front Bench in this House, have been very far from accurate and have unnecessarily imported prejudice and blackened the character of the Indonesians. One story in particular concerns the lamented death of Brigadier Mallaby. That was announced to us as a foul murder, and we accepted it as such. I have learned from officers who were present when it happened the exact details and it is perfectly clear that Brigadier Mallaby was not murdered but was honourably killed in action....

Turning to the details of the case Mr. Driberg said:

The incident was somewhat confused--as such incidents are--but it took place in and near Union Square in Surabaya. There had been discussions about a truce earlier in the day. A large crowd of Indonesians--a mob, if you like--had gathered in the square and were in a rather excited state. About 20 Indians, in a building on the other side of the square, had been cut off from telephonic communication and did not know about the truce. They were firing sporadically on the mob. Brigadier Mallaby came out from the discussions walked straight into the crowd, with great courage, and shouted to the Indians to cease fire. They obeyed him. Possibly half an hour later the mob in the square became turbulent again. Brigadier Mallaby, at a certain point in the proceedings, ordered the Indians to open fire again. They opened fire with two Bren guns, and the mob dispersed and went to cover; then fighting broke out again in good earnest. It is apparent that when Brigadier Mallaby gave the order to open fire again, the truce was in fact broken, at any rate locally. Twenty minutes to half an hour after that, he was, most unfortunately, killed in his car--although even now it is not absolutely certain whether he was killed by Indonesians or by a grenade thrown by an Indian officer at some Indonesians who were approaching his car, which exploded simultaneously with the attack on him....

I do not think that the circumstances in which Mallaby was killed amount to a charge of foul murder...because my information came absolutely at first-hand from a British officer who was actually on the spot at the moment, whose bona fides I have no reason to question....

On November 4, 1945, van Mook reported to his government that "in the coming days the potential of the extremist armed forces" was to be tested. Two days later he submitted that the British had decided to take drastic action against the Republicans in Surabaya. The Allied command was contemplating a "showdown" with the Republican leaders. It appears that the Allied defeat at Surabaya had become a matter of prestige for the British command. In view of

the situation the Dutch apparently nurtured the hope that after Mallaby's death, which General Christison immediately labeled "foul murder" committed by the Indonesians, (68) the British were more inclined to support the Dutch position in the Indonesian conflict. This could serve to explain why van Mook decided on the date of November 6, 1945, to announce a Statement of Dutch Policy with regard to future political reforms for Indonesia. The "strategic moment" to do so had apparently arrived. (69)

Van Mook expressed grave concern about the fact that the Dutch position was too dependent upon the British. If this state of affairs were to continue for a long period of time, and if the British in their military operations to implement the Allied task should meet with more serious set-backs, it was feared that they would hesitate to resort further to such action. Consequently, the Dutch position would be rendered more difficult. Thus, van Mook considered it of the utmost urgency to expedite the sending of Dutch forces to the archipelago. Chaos and resistance would increase with every lost minute in having Netherlands troops available to take over from the British in Indonesia. (70)

The implication is clear. Whatever overt moves the Dutch Government made to show their willingness to negotiate with the Indonesian nationalists, it seems that their policy was aimed at finding a rapid solution of the Indonesian problem by forceful methods.

As a measure of the potential of Indonesian armed resistance, the events in Surabaya left Dr. van Mook not unimpressed. He reported to his government that the resistance in Java had deeper roots and was more wide-spread than could be surmised from the pre-war situation. Nevertheless, it was as yet impossible to estimate the fighting strength of the Indonesian armed organizations. "However, it was certainly much greater than that of Javanese gangs in the past." (71)

In the beginning of November, 1945, the Allied command resumed operations to occupy Surabaya. On November 9, the 5th Indian Division was ready to disembark and enter the city. Prior to ordering his troops to land, the British commander, Major-General E. C. Mansergh, issued an ultimatum to the population of Surabaya. The main conditions were:

(68) Wehl., op. cit., p. 62.

(69) Enquête Commissie, p. 705, letter of Logemann.

(70) Ibid., p. 663, cable of van Mook to the Dutch Government, November 4, 1945.

(71) Ibid., p. 664, cable of van Mook to the Dutch Government, November 6 and 7, 1945.

1. for all Indonesian leaders to surrender themselves upon which they would be taken into custody;
2. for all Indonesian Irregulars to surrender their arms.

When no heed was given the ultimatum, the Allied division launched its attack on the following day. Soon it became obvious to General Mansergh that in face of the resistance encountered, "infantry alone could not succeed, and naval, artillery, and air support was ordered." (72)

The Allied operation to occupy Surabaya lasted until the end of November before finally succeeding. Concerning the battle for this city it has been said: (73)

Had similar risings taken place all over Java millions would have died, and the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands East Indies would alike have been drowned in blood. This possibility lay always before the eyes of the Allied commanders at that time, and considerably influenced their policy, an influence not always appreciated in Holland.

On the diplomatic scene, the British continued to press for Dutch-Indonesian talks. The Dutch first insisted on a greater measure of security around Djakarta so as to create an atmosphere conducive to the holding of such talks. However, by the beginning of November they realized that they could no longer refuse to start the discussions. From the Republican side a move to reveal their standpoint in the controversy had been made by the publication of the November 1, Political Manifesto. The Dutch view was that they could hope for a more satisfactory development in the situation only after they had given the Indonesians an opportunity to take note of the Dutch viewpoint. The reaction of the Republicans to the wishes of the Netherlands Government could then be ascertained. (74)

By this time, shortly after Brigadier Mallaby's death, British feelings against the Indonesians were strong. General Christison had intimated to the Dutch that the situation in Surabaya "could be a turning point" in British policy vis-a-vis the Republic. The Allied commander appeared to be in favor of backing

(72) Wehl, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

(73) Ibid., p. 67; cf.. Enquête Commissie, p. 632, statement of Schermerhorn.

(74) Handelingen, Bijlagen, Regeerings Nota, ("Appendices, Government Note"), 11 December 1945, 123-2, p. 4.

the Dutch. (75)

It seems that the circumstances were advantageous for the Netherlands Government to disclose the basis upon which it was willing to negotiate with the Republic. On November 6, 1945, Lieutenant Governor-General van Mook obtained permission from his government to publish a statement on the Netherlands policy and its objectives with regard to Indonesia. These objectives were based on principles of policy laid down in Queen Wilhelmina's speech of December, 1942. The Queen's statement was interpreted to mean that in the restored pre-war Volksraad (People's Council) the Indonesians would be given a "substantial majority." Before the Japanese invasion the Indonesians were allowed to hold 30 out of a total of 61 seats. Van Mook expressed the opinion that there would be no objection for the Indonesians to have even four-fifths of the votes. (76) He was willing to go further. The directors of departments would henceforth be "ministers." Ministries would be created, but they would remain under the jurisdiction of the Governor-General. This in effect meant that there would be no ministerial responsibility. The "Volksraad" would remain a pseudo-parliament, and the Governor-General the actual ruler in Indonesia. (77)

These were the maximum concessions which the Dutch were willing to offer. The Dutch policy completely ignored the reality of the Republic as the embodiment of the will of the Indonesian people to be independent. In point of fact the Dutch statement was an invitation to return to the old colonial relationship.

Regarding van Mook's statement President Sukarno declared in a press conference that he was not in the least impressed by it. "It is only a going-over of the old familiar statement of the Queen." For the Republican position he referred to the Political Manifesto. (78)

As van Mook himself admits on p. 106 in his book Indonesië, Nederland en de Wereld, the Netherlands proposal was handicapped by its vagueness "in the cardinal points on the formation of an Indonesian state."

(75) Enquête Commissie, p. 610, statement of General Schilling. In a report to his government dated November 6-7, 1945, van Mook stated that the British command was willing to force a "show-down" with the Republic. This would be staged as soon as a meeting could be held between the British, the Dutch and the Indonesians. On that occasion the Dutch were expected to table their proposals to the Republicans. The British would support the position of the Netherlands Government. Ibid., p. 665.

(76) J. de Kadt, De Indonesische Tragedie, Amsterdam, G. A. van Oorschot, 1949, p. 113.

(77) Ibid. For the Dutch proposals of November 6, 1945, see Appendix I.

(78) New York Times, November 7, 1945.

The absolute rejection of the proposals contained in the Dutch statement of November 6, was a foregone conclusion.

In taking stock of the military situation in Indonesia and the Dutch position in this respect, van Mook, on November 6, 1945, suggested to his government that it change its military policy, which so far was aimed at concentrating as many of the available Dutch forces as possible in Java. Contingent upon an early withdrawal of the British troops, and, if by that time the available Dutch forces would prove inadequate to control Java while no arrangements had been made to re-establish Netherlands authority in the Greater East, Borneo, Banka, Billiton and the Riouw islands, the Dutch might find themselves holding no important area in the archipelago. Van Mook was confident that with about 8,000 troops at his disposal he could regain authority over the above islands, Java and Sumatra excepted, in two months. In doing so the Dutch could get rid of the Australians who were then occupying the areas. It was felt that the "pacification" of Sumatra would need more troops as conditions in the island were "rapidly deteriorating." Van Mook's suggested change in the Dutch military policy involved a complete suspension of all troop concentration in Java. In this territory the British would be requested to maintain their positions. He submitted that for the execution of this strategy it was of vital importance to be certain of two factors:

1. how big an army would the Netherlands be able to raise for duties in Indonesia, and how soon could it be trained, equipped and made available?;
2. For how long were the British prepared to give active support to the Dutch, and with how many forces? (79)

Prior to submitting these questions, the Lieutenant Governor-General reported to his government that he and the Dutch military commanders were agreed on the total number of forces necessary firmly to re-establish Netherlands authority throughout the archipelago. An estimated 75,000 men were urgently needed for immediate operations in the islands. Postponement of drastic action would give the Republic time to organize. Consequently, it would be more difficult to break down the insurgent resistance. (80)

On November 12, 1945, upon examination of the possibilities of complying with van Mook's request, the Dutch Government arrived at a most unpleasant and startling discovery. After careful investigation and consideration of technical factors supplied by the military, it was ascertained that until October, 1946, no more than

(79) Enquête Commissie, p. 665.

(80) Ibid., p. 664.

30,000 troops would be available for duty in the Indies. (81) On December 31, 1945, the military strength of the Dutch in Indonesia amounted to approximately 15,000 men of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army and 5,000 of the Netherlands Navy. (82)

It appears that in the period under discussion the Dutch position in Indonesia depended in great measure upon the goodwill of the British. With vested interests in nearby Malaya and North Borneo, and their problems in India and Burma as yet unsolved, the British Government, possibly because of a feeling of sympathy with other colonial powers thought themselves obliged to aid the Dutch. Moreover, socialist affinity between the Labour Government in London and the Socialist Cabinet in The Hague might have been another factor beneficial to the Dutch cause in the Indies.

Van Mook's proposed military policy of leaving the responsibility for Java and Sumatra temporarily in British hands was apparently a matter of necessity. The A.F.N.E.I. continued to bar further landings of Dutch troops in these islands. Therefore, it seems that van Mook sought to employ the available Dutch forces for immediate gains in the other islands of Indonesia. He hoped to achieve a speedy economic rehabilitation of, and to start constructive reforms in, the Outer Islands as soon as Dutch control had been returned to these territories. In contrast to the prevalent chaotic situation in the archipelago, such achievements, as proof of the efficacious influence of the Dutch Government's policy, would be highly important to hold before the eyes of the people in Java and Sumatra. It would also be an effective show-case to present to the public in Holland, and to the world in general. (83) However, the Dutch military commanders in Indonesia opposed van Mook's suggestion. On November 17, 1945, the Netherlands Government informed the Lieutenant Governor-General that the "Council for the General Conduct of War of the Realm" (Raad voor Algemene Oorlogvoering van het Koninkrijk) had decided: (84)

1. Java must not be abandoned, but must be occupied with as many Dutch troops as possible. The occupation of Riouw, Borneo and the Greater East should be implemented as soon as possible, and in accordance with Dr. van Mook's ideas on the matter. The necessary troops for the operation could be recruited from among former prisoners-of-war. Sumatra must be shelved for reconsideration at a later stage.

(81) Ibid., p. 706, statement of Schermerhorn. He further stated that it was not merely a matter of the number of men but also of equipment. "It should never be forgotten that the (Dutch) Government must get everything, from the first trouserbutton to the last bullet, from the British."

(82) Ibid., p. 709, W. Drees, in a letter dated March 7, 1956.

(83) Ibid., p. 668, cable of van Mook to the Dutch Government, November 10, 1945.

(84) Ibid., pp. 668-669, cable of Minister of Overseas Territories Logemann to van Mook, November 17, 1945.

2. According to Foreign Minister van Kleffens there was as yet no ground for the assumption that the British would prematurely abandon their task of occupation. Meanwhile the matter would be investigated. The limited possibilities of the Dutch military establishment would be frankly admitted to the British War Office. In so doing, the Dutch Government hoped to arrive at a definite plan for the closest cooperation with the British.

Within the Republic, a struggle for political power had developed. The contest resulted in another basic change in the Republican Government. The Presidential Cabinet was abolished. It was replaced by a Council of Ministers responsible to Parliament (K.N.I.P.). The Working Committee was retained. (85)

On November 9, President Sukarno designated Sjahrir to form a Cabinet. Five days later Sjahrir announced the composition of the first Parliamentary Government of the Republic as approved by the President. In the plenary sessions of the K.N.I.P. of November 25 to 27, the Working Committee's decisions that had brought about the change from a presidential Cabinet to a parliamentary one, were considered and approved. The Sjahrir Cabinet, by a vote of confidence of 81 to 8, with 15 abstentions, was given the greenlight to continue in office. (86)

Prior to these developments, the suspension of political party formation was rescinded by Presidential Decree of November 3. The decision was made in compliance with a proposal of the Working Committee. This institution adopted a resolution stating that "the time has arrived to organize the people politically." Accordingly, the people were urged to form political parties. (87)

The Dutch received the reorganization in the Republican Government with some satisfaction. Sjahrir was considered a man with whom they might be able to negotiate. This anticipation was substantiated when the Indonesian Prime Minister stated at a press conference: "The new government will be just as strongly nationalist as the old. But if we can find common ground between ourselves and the Dutch in which we can mutually help solve the Indonesian problem, I shall encourage our getting together." (88)

On November 17, General Christison arranged for the first more or less formal meeting between van Mook and Sjahrir. The

(85) For an account of developments resulting in this change see: Kahin, op. cit., pp. 168-169.

(86) Merdeka, November 28, 1945; Raliby, op. cit., p. 120.

(87) Ibid., November 3, 1945. See also: Communique No. 3 of the Working Committee, Berita Repoeblik Indonesia, I, No. 1 (November 17, 1945).

(88) New York Times, November 14, 1945.

Allied commander chaired the meeting, and was assisted by Mr. M. E. Denning. Concerning this meeting the British had promised that in case the Republican leaders proved uncooperative and unwilling to discuss proposals tabled by the Netherlands representatives, the Allied command was prepared to take more active measures to carry out its assigned task. Mr. Denning, expressing a more positive standpoint of the British Government, urged in the strongest terms that the Republicans recognize the sovereignty of the Netherlands. (89) The talks did not go beyond an informal exchange of views. In a statement before the Second Chamber on December 11, 1945, the Minister of Overseas Territories, Dr. J. H. Logemann, commented on the discussions that the members of the new Republican Government could not be prevailed upon to give "any positive pronouncement." (90)

The second meeting between Sjahrir and van Mook was scheduled for November 22. However, the Republicans suspended the conference when shortly before the day of talks bloody clashes occurred in Djakarta between Dutch forces and Indonesians. A Republican Civil Police barracks was attacked by Netherlands Indies troops. A considerable number of policemen were killed. In the ensuing wave of indiscriminate shooting, Netherlands Indies soldiers seriously wounded one of the top leaders of the Masjumi Party, Mr. Mohammad Rum. (91)

On November 27, the K.N.I.P. expressed its confidence in the Sjahrir Cabinet.

With the following inactivity in the field of Dutch-Indonesian talks, the Netherlands Government diverted the attention of an inquisitive parliament and public in Holland to what it called "the gravest problem of the moment." In a government statement of December 21 this problem was submitted for information to the Second Chamber. It concerned the safety of Netherlands, Indies Netherlands (Eurasian), and other minority groups' ex-internees who had been released and were now domiciled in camps, or areas, in cities not under complete control of the Allied forces. On December 6, Admiral Mountbatten, Dr. van Mook, and British and Dutch military commanders conferred on the matter in Singapore. The subject discussed was the military aspect of the problem. It was decided that, within the scope of the Allied task, the British would extend their perimeters of control for providing the greater measure of security requested by the Dutch authorities. Wherever necessary, military operations would be carried out to achieve the objective. (92)

(89) Enquête Commissie, p. 703, statement of Logemann.

(90) Handelingen, Nota omtrent een aantal punten van regeeringsbeleid, ("Note on several aspects of the policy of the Government"), Bijlagen 123, p. 4.

(91) Merdeka, November 23, 1945.

(92) Handelingen, p. 138. From a statement of the Minister of Overseas Territories before the Second Chamber on December 21, 1945.

Concerning the conference a S.E.A.C. spokesman stated that the British policy in Indonesia followed the lines stipulated by the Labour Government in London.

On October 17, 1945, Mr. Noel-Baker, Minister of State, speaking in the House of Commons stated: (93)

...His Majesty's Government, of course, recognize no authority but that of the Netherlands Government in all territories which are under the sovereignty of our Dutch Allies.

On November 23, 1945, Mr. Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, declared: (94)

...Our military tasks were, first, to disarm and concentrate the Japanese forces; secondly, to rescue and bring home our prisoners of war; and thirdly, to rescue the thousands of internees in camps throughout the large island. We had no intention of using any British forces for any other purpose or against the inhabitants. Indeed, our efforts to avoid the shedding of blood have resulted in our being accused of weakness. ...It is essential for the fulfilment of our military task to secure and maintain law and order, and naturally General Christison has authority to use his forces for that purpose.....It must be remembered however, that the Netherlands Government stood by us when we were attacked by Japan.... It is therefore quite clear that the British Government had a definite agreement providing for the Netherlands East Indies Government to assume as rapidly as practicable the full responsibility for the administration of the Netherlands Indies territory...

..We have no intention of being involved in any constitutional dispute between the Netherlands and the people of the Netherlands East Indies....

...We began, however, to advise that negotiations should be opened, and I do not propose to go into any controversy about personalities--of this individual or the other. The Netherlands Government refused to negotiate with Dr. Sukarno. On the other hand, our generals met him and had a talk with him.....The quicker the Indonesians stop fighting and begin talking with the Dutch Government, aided by us, the better it will be for the country....

It was felt that the British had a moral and military obligation which included the establishment of a condition of law and order "in which discussions between the Dutch and the new Indones-

(93) Parliamentary Debates Commons, 1945-1946, Vol. 414, p. 398.

(94) The Times, London, November 24, 1945.

ian Cabinet could take place without fear or violence." (95) In other words, any expansion of territorial control of the Allied forces would eventually be to the benefit of the Dutch as the recognized sovereign in Indonesia.

Sjahrir's reaction to Mountbatten's spokesman was immediate. If the British would bring in more troops and use more force the Indonesians would resist. On the political negotiations he asserted that "as things stand now discussions are fruitless unless a clear statement is made, approaching our standpoint." (96)

At the Singapore conference of December 6, the Supreme Allied Commander also informed the Dutch representatives of his decision to continue a policy of barring entrance into Java and Sumatra of any additional Netherlands forces. Despite the strongest protests of the Dutch military commanders, Mountbatten remained adamant on this point. (97)

The Allied command's persistent refusal seems to have decisively influenced the subsequent course of Dutch policy in Indonesia. Until early December, 1945, the Netherlands Government contemplated the use of military force against the Republic. However, afterwards it was realized under the prevailing circumstances such a policy had to be abandoned. Three factors determined the issue: (98)

1. The Civil Affairs Agreement, signed between the British and the Netherlands Governments in London, on August 24, 1945, provided that de facto authority would remain in British hands so long as they were in Indonesia to carry out the Allied task. This reduced to nought all factual authority which the Dutch legally possessed in the territories under the operational command of Admiral Mountbatten. The practical consequence was that for Java and Sumatra the authority rested with the British until they would evacuate the islands. (99)
2. Until February, 1946, the Dutch had no merchant fleet available to transport troops from Holland to the

(95) New York Times, December 9, 1945, statement of a S.E.A.C. spokesman after the December 6, 1945 Conference in Singapore between Mountbatten and van Mook.

(96) Ibid., December 12, 1945.

(97) Enquête Commissie, p. 623, statement of Admiral Helfrich; statement of van Mook. p. 626.

(98) Ibid., pp. 706-707, statement of Schermerhorn.

(99) This did not take place until November 30, 1946.

archipelago. (100)

3. The war years had left the Dutch economy completely exhausted.

In Indonesia the British command was strictly limiting its military operations to activities necessary for the execution of the Allied tasks. In doing so the British were observing great caution lest the Allied military movements should provoke another "battle of Surabaya." Moreover, sharp criticism against the activities of British-Indian troops in Indonesia was voiced in the British Parliament, to a lesser degree in the United States Congress, and by political leaders in India. (101)

It appears that there was reason to believe that the implementation of the Allied tasks would require much time. In terms of van Mook's appreciation of the situation, this state of affairs would provide the Republic with ample and valuable opportunity to organize and consolidate its position. Thus it could fortify its resistance considerably. Consequently, it could be conjectured that in the Lieutenant Governor-General's calculation, the future policy of the Dutch in regard to the Republic should have three main objectives:

1. Begin negotiations with the Republic as soon as possible and attempt to achieve an agreement rapidly;

(100) Under an agreement with the Supreme Allied Command the Dutch merchant fleet continued to be part of the Allied sea-transport pool until February, 1946. During this period it remained under orders of the C.C.O.S. - Enquête Commissie, p. 706, statement of Schermerhorn.

(101) In the House of Commons it was the Labour backbencher, Tom Driberg. - Parliamentary Debates Commons, Vol. 417, pp. 300-306.

In the United States Congress criticism against the British policy in Indonesia was voiced by Representative Patterson of California. - New York Times, December 12, 1945.

In India, Nehru stated:

"We have watched British intervention there (Indonesia and Indochina) with growing anger, shame and helplessness that Indian troops should thus be used for doing Britain's dirty work against our friends who are fighting the same fight as we." - New York Times, January 1, 1946.

In England, Mr. Harold Laski, chairman of the British Labour Party Executive, addressing the Sussex Federation of Labour Parties, stated:

"We must be careful not to become the agents of Dutch Imperialism in Indonesia or of that monarchical type of reaction so dear to Mr. Churchill's heart in Greece." - New York Times, January 16, 1946.

2. continue pressure on the British to lift the ban on landing more Dutch troops in Java and Sumatra;
3. make every effort to have the British remain in Indonesia until the Dutch were ready to take over with their own armed forces. (102)

In the second half of December, 1945, it must have been apparent to Dr. van Mook that the initiative to break the deadlock in the talks had to come from the Dutch. The statement of policy of the Netherlands Government, published on November 6, was too equivocal for the Indonesians to make "positive pronouncements." The British were getting impatient. It had been made clear that the S.E.A.C. had no intention of keeping British and Indian forces in Indonesia a moment longer than was necessary for the fulfilment of the Allied task. (103) Furthermore, by December 21, the A.F.N.E.I. command, in Djakarta, began to explore the possibilities for the Republican armed forces, the Tentara Keamanan Rakjat ("People's Peace Preservation Army"), disarming and evacuating the Japanese forces which were confined in camps, in isolation, on Republican-held territory. (104)

It seems that these factors made the Dutch Government aware of the necessity of formulating a positive program with regard to the aspirations of the Indonesians for national independence. Moreover, the program would have to be sufficiently attractive for the Republicans to make it the basis upon which to resume the discussions.

At this juncture van Mook decided to go to Holland for personal consultations with his government. Subsequently, a conference was held between the British and the Netherlands Governments at Chequers, the official country residence of the British Prime Minister, on December 25, 1945. Upon the conclusion of the meeting, a joint communique was issued, stating inter alia: (105)

(102) In a letter to the Chairman of the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee, Logemann stated that it would take months before the Dutch could build up their own machinery adequate to enforce authority in Indonesia. Therefore it was necessary, on the one hand, to secure whole-hearted British support for the Dutch position in the Indies with sufficient troops, while on the other hand a policy of political reforms needed to be formulated in order to inspire confidence (with the Indonesian nationalists) but which remained within limitations to be observed by the Dutch Government. - Enquête Commissie, p. 704.

(103) New York Times, December 2, 1945.

(104) Merdeka, December 22, 1945. Cf., van Mook, op. cit., p. 115.

(105) van Helsdingen, op. cit., p. 69.

The respective Governments were agreed that a solution of the political problem should be considered as an essential contribution to the successful implementation of the task entrusted by the Supreme Allied command to Great Britain in order to liquidate the Japanese occupation of these territories, and, so far as this is concerned, it is the joint task of the British and the Netherlands Governments and of the Indonesian people. The British and Netherlands Governments are therefore agreed on the course of conduct to promote that the leaders of the nationalist movement will come to an agreement with the Netherlands authorities.

A few days before the publication of the Anglo-Dutch communique, the United States State Department issued a statement urging all parties in the Indonesian question to resume conversations, which it seemed had been broken off, at an early date. The parties were also urged to seek a peaceful solution of the problem in harmony with the Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations. (106)

In Holland, this statement was interpreted as a friendly but not to be misjudged firm suggestion that the Dutch return to the conference table, and with acceptable conditions for the Indonesian nationalists. The British Government also urged a re-orientation in the Dutch policy. (107) So far, the Netherlands Government had offered nothing but vague promises.

Under the prevailing circumstances, the Minister of Overseas Territories, J. H. Logemann, deemed it necessary to sound out the Second Chamber. In a statement before Parliament on December 21, he requested special attention for the international aspect of the Indonesian problem. He submitted: (103)

For those who still hold that it is possible--whether proper or desirable--to postpone the contact with the Indonesian leaders until after law and order have been restored, the words expressed by Minister Noel-Baker in the British Parliament and the recently published statement of the State Department in Washington must certainly speak plain language.

The Anglo-Dutch accord reached at Chequers included consent on the part of the Dutch Government to have a first-class British diplomat assist the parties in the forthcoming Dutch-Indonesian talks in Djakarta. This task fell to Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr (later Lord Inverchapel). From his Ambassador's post in Moscow, Sir Archibald had recently been transferred to replace Lord Halifax in Washington. Before taking up his duties in the United States,

(106) New York Times, December 20, 1945.

(107) Handelingen, p. 232, from a speech of Mr. J. E. Stokvis, member of the S.D.A.P. ("Social Democratic Labor Party") which shortly afterwards merged into the newly established Partij van de Arbeid ("Labor Party").

(108) Ibid., p. 138.

Clark-Kerr would lend his advice and assistance in the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations in Djakarta.

When Dr. van Mook was on his way to Indonesia, developments arose in the Dutch Parliament which compromised his position as negotiator in the projected Dutch-Indonesian talks. Spearheaded by a small group of arch-conservatives (members of the Anti Revolutionary Party, the Christian Historic Union, and the Liberal Center) strong attacks had been leveled against the Dutch Government for its policy in Indonesia. In particular, van Mook's role in the implementation of that policy was severely criticized. Following a two day debate, Mr. M. J. M. van Poll, member of the Catholic Party, introduced a motion demanding that a Parliamentary Inquiry Commission be sent to Indonesia for an on-the-spot investigation. The supporters of the motion were highly dissatisfied with the information which the Government was able, or willing, to submit relative to the situation in the Indies. Therefore, it was felt necessary to send a parliamentary commission to collect its own data in Indonesia. This would enable Parliament to form an "independent" opinion with regard to the developments in the archipelago. However, the strong implication was that the majority of the Second Chamber desired a parliamentary inquiry into the handling of the Indonesian problem by Lieutenant Governor-General van Mook. The van Poll Motion was adopted by a vote of 50 to 29. (109)

The motion was opposed by Minister of Overseas Territories Logemann. It was not clear to him what purpose could be served by sending an inquiry commission to the Indies at that juncture, However, inasmuch as it did not express criticism of the Government's policy the Minister was prepared to abide by the Second Chamber's decision.

Apparently alarmed by the portent of the van Poll motion, the Government then deemed it necessary to convene the States-General in secret session on February 7, 1946. This joint-session of the First and Second Chambers discussed the proposals which Dr. van Mook would submit to the Sjahrir Government upon his return in Djakarta. (110)

On February 10, 1946, the Dutch-Indonesian talks were resumed. At this meeting, attended by Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, van Mook submitted to Sjahrir the proposals which he had brought with him from The Hague. The heart of the proposals was the Dutch offer

(109) Ibid., p. 134.

(110) A. Stempels, De Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Indonésische Vraagstuk, Amsterdam, N. V. De Arbeiderspers, 1950, p. 31.

contained in the following provisions: (111)

1. In consultation with authoritative representatives of Indonesia, elected from a large variety of groups, a political structure for the Kingdom and for Indonesia would be drafted, based on democratic partnership.
2. This structure would remain in force for a given period of time during which it was believed that the conditions could be fulfilled to enable the peoples of Indonesia freely to decide on their political destiny.
3. After that period, the partners would independently decide upon the continuance of their relations on the basis of a complete and voluntary partnership.
4. Difference of opinion regarding the question whether that period should be further extended, before a free decision could be taken, would be submitted to a procedure of conciliation or, if necessary, of arbitration.

In an explanatory statement by the Netherlands Indies Government, issued on February 26, the Dutch estimated the limit of the transitional period to be "within the period of the working capacity of the coming generation." (112)

The February 10 meeting was concluded on the promise of the Sjahrir Government that it would study the Dutch proposals and would submit its views and comments regarding them at the next session.

Within the Republic, political trouble had been brewing since the K.N.I.P.'s approval of doing away with the Presidential Cabinet. Some members of the ousted government, for reasons of personal ambition, were extremely bitter about the matter. They blamed their political misfortune on Sjahrir. At the instigation of these former members of the deposed Sukarno Cabinet, the Sjahrir Government was under constant attack for its willingness to negotiate with the Dutch. The political malcontents allied themselves

(111) van Mook, op. cit., p. 117. Cf. New York Times, February 11, 1945. See Appendix B.

(112) Handelingen, Bijlagen (Appendices) 155-3, from an Explanatory Statement on the February 10, 1946 proposals of the Dutch Government issued by the Netherlands Indies Government on February 26, 1946.

with Tan Malaka and his group. (113) In this combination they based their agitation against Sjahrir's policy on demands for a "monolithic political solidarity during the struggle for freedom, the abolishment of the recently established political parties, and an end to all political division." Most effective in terms of popular appeal was the opposition's demand "to negotiate upon the basis of 100 per cent recognition, after foreign troops have left the shores and the seas of Indonesia." Riding the crest of popular emotions fired by the slogan, "Nothing short of 100% independence," Tan Malaka and his associates managed to forge an alliance of 141 organizations. The political parties, their affiliated groups, and armed, or other organizations which joined the mass movement ranged from far left to the extreme right, as represented by orthodox Moslems. The alliance was called the Persatuan Perjuangan ("United Front"). (114a)

The majority of the members of the Sjahrir Cabinet were non-party. One line of attack against the government was the demand that it be dismissed and replaced by a coalition Cabinet "national" in character. When criticism directed at his government's policy continued unabated, Sjahrir suddenly resigned on February 28. The alliance which caused Sjahrir's resignation was charged with the formation of a new Cabinet, but it was not able to do so. Consequently President Sukarno felt free to reappoint Sjahrir as formateur of the succeeding government. The Second Sjahrir Cabinet received a five-point mandate. One directive read:

To conduct discussions with the Dutch authorities based on the recognition of the Republic of Indonesia. (114)

The failure of the United Front to form a government, and subsequent developments, resulted in a considerable strengthening of the position of Sjahrir and his new cabinet. Fully supported by both the K.N.I.P. and President Sukarno the Republican Government was now ready to resume negotiations. (115)

(113) In the early days of the Republic, Tan Malaka aspired after the presidency. He tried to recruit Sjahrir to assist him in reaching his objective. Sjahrir, however, flatly refused to cooperate since he had ascertained that no Indonesian nationalist leader could remotely equal Sukarno as the mainstay for national solidarity thanks to his tremendous popularity with the masses. Tan Malaka's resentment because of Sjahrir's refusal apparently increased when the latter chose to accept the office of prime minister from President Sukarno. This information has been obtained from Dr. Soedarsono (personal letter).

(114a) For details, see: Kahin, op. cit., pp. 172-177.

(114) Merdeka, March 6, 1946.

(115) Kahin, op. cit., p. 177. See also: Kabinet Baroe (The New Cabinet), Merdeka, March 12, 1946.

The second Sjahrir Government came into office on March 12, 1946. The next day, it submitted to van Mook a set of counter-proposals in answer to the Dutch Statement of Policy of February 10. (116) The Indonesians demanded recognition of the Republic as vested with sovereign power over the entire former Netherlands East-Indies. They rejected a transitional period under Dutch sovereignty. As immediate recognition of the Republic's sovereignty was completely unacceptable to the Dutch Government a deadlock in the negotiations seemed unavoidable. (117)

By sheer coincidence, shortly afterwards a document was published that provided the Dutch and Indonesians with a way out of their impasse. The agreement concluded between France and Viet Nam on March 6, 1946, was made public. In Indochina, a difficulty similar to that which had occurred between the Indonesians and the Dutch, had been apparently solved between the Vietnamese and the French by determining that Viet Nam would be a Free State in the Indochinese Federation.

On this episode in the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations the Minister of Overseas Territories, Logemann, stated before the Netherlands parliament:

A way out of the threatening deadlock entangling the efforts to arrive at an amicable settlement of the conflict seemed to be afforded by the appreciation felt in Indonesian circles of the way in which a similar problem in Indo-China has been solved by France and the Viet Nam Republic, into which the former Annam Empire had been transformed. The Lieutenant Governor-General subsequently took the initiative of approaching the problem along the same lines, thereby stressing the point that he had no powers of going beyond the limits of the declaration of February 10, 1946, and that the only implication that might be derived from his cooperation was that he wished, in a combined effort with the Indonesians, to explore the way to a solution which would help to avoid the risk of the discussions being broken off. (118)

The statement seems to imply that the Indonesians were first to allude to the Franco-Vietnamese agreement as a desirable example to follow. This has been emphatically denied by former members of the Republican delegation negotiating with the Dutch at that time. (119)

(116) See Appendix C.

(117) van Mook, op. cit., p. 125.

(118) Handelingen, p. 699, trans. Netherlands News Letter, New York City, No. 4, May 10, 1946.

(119) Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono (personal letter) and Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo (personal interview).

In his book, The Birth of Indonesia, on page 122, David Wehl writes on this matter:

Van Mook had a translation of the Viet-Nam settlement handed to the Indonesian representatives at the Clark-Kerr talks, as a suggestion for a possible basis for negotiations, 'stressing the point that he had no powers to go beyond the limits of the declaration of the 10th of February, 1946, and that the only implication that could be drawn from his co-operation was that he wished in a combined effort with the Indonesians to explore the way to a solution which would help to avoid the risk of the discussions under Clark-Kerr being broken off,' (Official statement by the Minister for Overseas Territories at The Hague.)

This approach by the Lieutenant Governor-General was received by the Indonesians with appreciation and understanding, and the result was a draft preliminary agreement of a somewhat more pliable nature than the previous rigid and uncompromising insistence upon complete independence of the Republic of Indonesia. Van Mook greeted this new approach with pleasure and relief, and exclaimed that at last there was something upon which both sides could get together. This was the hopeful moment of light that led van Mook to believe that the dawn was coming...

Dr. van Mook's own account of the situation reads: (120)

I was then of the opinion that on my part a step had to be made thereby stressing the point, however, that it must not be considered a Dutch proposal, but that it was merely designed to find a way out of the blind alley. With the Viet Nam agreement as inspiration I formulated four articles.....

The four articles were:

1. The Republic, for Java, would be a partner in a federative Indonesian Free State;
2. the Republic would agree to the landing of Netherlands forces for the implementation of the Allied tasks;
3. the Republic would agree to cease hostilities; and
4. the Republic would join in the holding of general consultations with representatives of all parts of the Netherlands Indies, and of minority groups, to deliberate on the political structure of the future Indonesian State and its relations with the Netherlands Kingdom.

(120) van Mook, op. cit., p. 126.

For Dr. van Mook, reference to the Franco-Vietnamese agreement was a purely fortuitous matter. The accord happened to be released for publication at a time that the Indonesian-Dutch negotiations had bogged down. It provided the Lieutenant Governor-General with an opportunity to try to get the talks past the bottleneck. He was impressed by the striking similarities in the circumstances involved in the Indochinese and Indonesian problems. He therefore, hoped that he could persuade his government to seek a solution along the same lines as France had done in Indochina. He believed that for both the Dutch Government and the Republic to follow a precedent established in conditions similar to those in Indonesia, would be more attractive than to accept a novel plan introduced by either of the parties. Consequently, he took the initiative to draft his four articles, and submitted them to Sjahrir without prior consultations with his government. (121)

It seems that the possibility of a complete breakdown in the negotiations with the Sjahrir Government deeply disturbed the Lieutenant Governor-General. He was convinced that this government represented that part of the Republic which genuinely believed in the desirability and necessity of future cooperation between the Indonesians and the Dutch without, however, abandoning the Republican standpoint. (122) Therefore, the best hope for the Dutch of rapidly coming to terms with the Republic would be through negotiations with the Sjahrir Government. The gravity of a possible breakdown in the talks between Sjahrir and van Mook was stressed before the Dutch Parliament on January 16, 1946. The Minister of Overseas Territories emphasized that failure to reach an agreement with the Sjahrir group would have serious consequences both nationally and internationally. (123)

The Dutch proposals contained in the February 10 Statement of Policy appeared to receive international acclaim. It was contended that "an almost worldwide recognition of the Dutch offer as a generous one" had resulted in "the greatest pressure for peace in Java." (124) If the Dutch had submitted the proposals sooner, much bloodshed would have been avoided and the British would have been spared much embarrassment. (125)

(121) Information derived from an interview of the writer with Dr. van Mook.

(122) van Mook, op. cit., p. 105.

(123) Handelingen, p. 294.

(124) New York Times, editorial, February 17, 1946.

(125) Christian Science Monitor, February 10, 1946.
Manchester Guardian, March 13, 1946. The Dutch proposals were referred to as "promising."

The Sjahrir Government noticed that the effect of these proposals was to improve considerably the diplomatic position of the Dutch in the Indonesian conflict. It seemed that world opinion began to believe in the "honest" intentions of the Dutch; that in the eyes of international public opinion, the Dutch were reasonable after all. If the Indonesians would consider the Netherlands proposals with an open mind, there was a good chance of settling the controversy amicably. Internationally, a feeling of anticipation had been created that a turn for the better was imminent in the Indonesian situation. Confronted with these developments, the Sjahrir Government thought it advisable not to contradict prevailing world sentiment. If the Indonesians would persist in an uncompromising attitude, it was believed that the Republic would cause grave disappointment internationally, particularly in the United States and Great Britain. At that time, the international scene showed an increasing rivalry between the Western Democracies and the Communist countries. Mainly designed as a political move against Britain, the Soviet bloc had made an unsuccessful attempt to have the Security Council of the United Nations intervene in the Indonesian conflict. The elimination of this controversy involving the Netherlands and Great Britain would be highly desirable to the Western Democracies. It would deprive the Soviet bloc of the opportunity to try again to make capital out of a colonial conflict situation in Asia.

After the "generous" offer of the Dutch, it would be risking the loss of much international sympathy for Indonesia's fight for independence, if the Republic refused to budge from its initial stand of demanding immediate recognition. The Indonesians, therefore, sought to adjust their policy of negotiation to the requirements of the situation. (126) The Sjahrir Government was convinced that the Dutch would never agree to immediate independence for Indonesia. Thus, it appeared that a more conciliatory attitude of the Republic must necessarily involve some retreat from its original demand of forthwith recognition of its sovereignty.

The propitious moment to make the adjustment apparently occurred when Dr. van Mook submitted his 4-point plan. The Republican Government made counter-proposals on March 27, 1946. (127) The Lieutenant Governor-General was rather surprised to find that the Republican standpoint had undergone a radical change. From out-

(126) Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono.

(127) See Appendix D.

By the end of 1945 the Sjahrir Government still hoped that it could organize the Republic also in territories outside Java and Sumatra. To that end small parties of Republican representatives were sent from Java to among others Borneo and Celebes. Their efforts, however, could not stop the developments which by March, 1946, resulted in a firm re-establishment of Dutch authority in Borneo and the Greater East. (Cf. Enquête Commissie, p. 577) Subsequently, the Dutch started military operations to regain control in the

right recognition of its sovereignty the Republic had altered its demand to recognition of its de facto authority in Java-Madura and Sumatra with the exception of areas under control of the Allied Military Administration. By implication the Republican Government was willing to accept the de jure sovereignty of the Dutch in Indonesia.

The Republican counter-proposals were van Mook's four articles as amended by Sjahrir. (128) They contained in essence the following:

1. The Netherlands Government would recognize the Republic as exercising de facto authority in Java-Madura and Sumatra, except in areas under Allied control. The Republic would cooperate in the formation of an Indonesian federative Free State, composed of all parts of the Netherlands East-Indies, as partner of the Netherlands, Surinam and Curaçao in a political union, and in concurrence with the general principles of the Netherlands Government's Statement of Policy of February 10, 1946.
2. The Republic would welcome in a friendly manner all Allied and as such Netherlands forces in Java-Madura and Sumatra, and would assist them in the implementation of the Allied tasks.

Riouw Islands, Banka-Billiton and Bali-Lombok.

It was apparently in view of this situation that the Sjahrir Government decided to take a realistic stand and limit its demand to recognition of de facto Republican authority in Java and Sumatra. Restricting its claim for recognition to these islands would appear as a far-reaching concession of the Republic which previously had insisted on recognition for all of Indonesia. Further, although the Republic's de facto recognition would only be for Java and Sumatra, the fact of a recognition would enhance its international status greatly. (note: Dr. Soedarsono pointed out that the Republic's de facto recognition--provided for in the Linggadjati agreement --was invaluable when the Indonesians appealed to the United Nations Security Council for intervention in the Indonesian conflict, after the Dutch tried to impose their will on the Republic by military force in the second half of 1947.)

Another factor underlying the acceptance of the Sjahrir Government to have the de facto recognition of Republican authority limited to Java and Sumatra was the need to allow the Republic some "breathing spell" to intensify its process of consolidation in the political, economic and military fields. It was apparently felt that efforts to that effect would be more rewarding if confined to the Java-Sumatra area. (Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono, personal letter).

(128) Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono, personal letter.

3. The Republic would agree to cease hostilities immediately after the agreement became effective.
4. The Republic would undertake to uphold the rights of minority groups.

The Sjahrir Government agreed to the main principle involved in the political reforms projected in the Dutch Statement of Policy of February 10, to wit, self-determination for Indonesia after an interim period under Netherlands sovereignty. By the end of March, a tentative agreement was reached. This accord was to be the basis upon which the procedure to implement that principle would be negotiated.

On March 31, 1946, the Indonesian Government issued a communiqué stating: (129)

1. a further exchange of views revealed that the viewpoints of the Dutch and Indonesian delegations with respect to the future status of Indonesia had approached each other sufficiently to justify Dr. van Mook's departure for the Netherlands to consult with his government;
2. to facilitate the discussions and to find ways for solving the remaining difficulties, Mr. Soewandi (Minister of Justice), Dr. Soedarsono (Minister for Internal Affairs) and Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo (Secretary of the Council of Ministers) would also go to Holland.

The developments in the negotiations resulting in the March 27 counter-proposals of the Republic were in the opinion of Dr. van Mook apparently of such significance that he did not think it advisable to report them immediately to his government in The Hague. He doubted the adequacy of wireless communications to convey the unexpected changes in the Republican standpoint in all their ramifications. Misunderstanding between him and his government at the current stage of negotiations could lead to undesirable consequences, even disruption, in the talks. Therefore, he decided to wait to submit his report until the viewpoints of the parties had approached one another to a degree where personal consultations with The Hague were in order. When that juncture was reached, on March 31, van Mook suggested to the Sjahrir Government that it send a Republican delegation to Holland. This delegation would join the Lieutenant Governor-General in clarifying to the Dutch Government the point of view of the Republicans. (130)

At the final session of the negotiations in Djakarta Dr. van (129) Merdeka, April 1, 1946.

(130) Information obtained from Dr. van Mook, personal interview.

Mook asserted that there were still some "more or less" important differences to be ironed out between the viewpoints of the Dutch and the Indonesians. He also reiterated that the final decision regarding the preliminary agreement rested with The Hague. (131) Nevertheless, the parties to the Djakarta talks were rather optimistic as to the ultimate outcome of the negotiations. Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, the impartial mediator in the discussions, was of the same sentiment. So presumably, was his government in London.

The members of the Indonesian delegation were confident that their mission in Holland would be successful. In this general mood of optimism, the scene of Indonesian-Dutch negotiations shifted from Djakarta to the "Hoge Veluwe." (132)

(131) van Mook, op. cit., p. 129.

(132) As asserted to the writer by Dr. Soedarsono (personal letter) and Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo (personal interview).

CHAPTER IV

THE HOGE VELUWE TALKS

The talks in the Netherlands were held at the St. Hubertus Hunting Lodge on the "Hoge Veluwe," near the City of Arnhem, Province of Gelderland. The delegations met on April 14, 21, 22 and 24, 1946. (1)

On the first day of the meeting the Netherlands was represented by:

Prime Minister, Professor Ir. W. Schermerhorn, chief delegate

Minister of Social Affairs W. Drees

Minister of Overseas Territories Professor Dr. J. H. Logemann

Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. J. H. van Royen

Lieutenant Governor-General Dr. H. J. van Mook.

The delegation of the Republic of Indonesia was composed of:

Minister of Justice Soewandi

Minister of Internal Affairs Dr. Soedarsono

Secretary of the Council of Ministers Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo

Immediately after opening the conference, Professor Schermerhorn submitted a draft protocol to the Indonesian delegation. (2) The Dutch chief delegate stated that the proposals contained in the document had been drawn up as much as possible

(1) The first part of this chapter is a survey of matters discussed at the Hoge Veluwe Conference. The writer's main source on this subject has been a copy of the Summary Records of the sessions held at the St. Hubertus Hunting Lodge on the Hoge Veluwe, and of the final session convened at The Hague. The talks were recorded by the Dutch.

A copy of these records is held by the Cornell University Library.

Where this study refers to issues as they were discussed at the sessions of the Hoge Veluwe Conference, only occasional reference has been made to the Summary Records. (Where referred to, they have been indicated as: Summary Records H. V.)

(2) See Appendix E.

in concurrence with those of the preliminary agreement arrived at in Djakarta. However, upon examination of the draft protocol the Indonesians quickly saw that the implication of its terms was such as to render them unacceptable to the Sjahrir Government. "After five minutes" of the first session of the Hoge Veluwe Conference, it was clear to the Republican delegation that its mission was doomed to failure. (3) The developments anticipated by the Republican and Dutch delegations in Djakarta did not materialize.

Despite Dutch assertions to the contrary, the Republicans insisted that the proposals contained in the Djakarta preliminary agreement were not originally submitted by the Indonesians. They were based on the four articles drawn up by Dr. van Mook and patterned after the Franco-Vietnamese agreement of March 6, 1946. The Sjahrir Government had amended the van Mook articles, resulting in the Republican counter-proposals of March 27, 1946. Subsequently, the Indonesian draft was referred to a mixed Indonesian-Dutch subcommittee. Through deliberations in this committee agreement was reached on the above proposals. On the strength of the fact that van Mook and his colleagues considered the Djakarta draft acceptable, the Indonesian delegation anticipated that the Dutch Government eventually would approve of it also. The Dutch negotiators in Djakarta were optimistic regarding the outcome of the talks in Holland, and this enhanced the Republican expectation that the Netherlands Government would be willing to accept the preliminary agreement.

The sequence of developments in Holland, as envisaged by the negotiating parties in Djakarta, was, first, for van Mook to submit the preliminary agreement to his government. In case the Dutch Government should desire further clarification of the Republican point of view vis-a-vis the proposals contained therein, the three-man Republican delegation would be called upon to supply the necessary information. If the proposals were then acceptable to the Netherlands Government, it was to make an offer to the Republic along the lines of the Djakarta draft. The acceptance of this offer by the Republic, perhaps with a few minor negotiated adjustments, would be immediate. (4)

Therefore, when at the beginning of the Hoge Veluwe Conference the Netherlands delegation tabled its draft protocol, so far as the Indonesians were concerned, the outcome of the discussions had been prejudiced. The terms contained in the document differed from those of the Djakarta draft to an extent which could not be encompassed by the mandate of the Indonesian delegation. The Sjahrir Government had authorized its delegation to sign an agreement with the Dutch. However, the mandate was conditioned upon developments which had been anticipated in Djakarta. With regard to the basic

(3) Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono, personal letter.

(4) Information obtained from Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo, personal interview. Cf., Summary Records H. V., first session, April 14, 1946.

principles of the Djakarta proposals, Sjahrir's directive to the Republican delegation was to stand firm and insist on the maximum. (5)

Thus, from the very outset, the Hoge Veluwe talks never assumed the character of negotiations aimed at achieving concrete results. All that came to pass between the Indonesian and Dutch delegations was in the nature of discussions, exchange of views, clarifications and exploratory talks.

In submitting their draft protocol the Dutch stated that the most important difference between this document and the Djakarta preliminary agreement was in their respective forms. The treaty form of the latter, desired by the Republic, was unacceptable to the Netherlands Government. If the Dutch were to conclude a treaty with the Indonesian Government, it would be tantamount to providing the opposition in the Dutch Parliament with ammunition which it could readily use against the Government. The treaty form of an agreement between the Dutch Government and the Republic was unconstitutional, (6) and as such it would never be accepted by the States-General. Therefore, the Dutch had drafted their proposals in the form of a protocol.

Insisting that the Djakarta draft was based on Dr. van Mook's four articles, the Republican delegation asserted that its treaty form was modeled after the Franco-Vietnamese agreement. The form of an international agreement was of essential importance to the Sjahrir Government in that it was considered necessary to make the status of the Republic, as a party to a settlement with the Netherlands, acceptable to the Indonesian people. For the Republicans to accept the terms of the preliminary agreement a great measure of persuasion was already necessary. If the treaty form of the agreement were changed to that of a protocol, it was feared that it would be impossible to make the accord acceptable to the Indonesians. (7)

The Dutch delegation stated that the bilateral protocol form, providing for the recognition of the Republic, had been decided upon in order to make the draft attractive to the Republicans.

(5) Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono, personal letter.

(6) W. A. Engelbrecht, De Nederlandsch-Indische Wetboeken, Engelbrecht, E. M. L., ed., Leiden, A. W. Sijthoff's Uitg. Mij N. V., 1932, p. 9.

Article 58 (in 1953 amended to be Article 60) of the Dutch Constitution states:

"The King shall conclude and ratify all treaties with foreign Powers." Thus, according to Dutch law an **international** instrument of agreement can only be concluded with "foreign Powers."

(7) Summary Records H. V., first session, April 14, 1946, statement of Soewandi.

For many in Holland this decision already represented a revolutionary act since it involved the acceptance, as a party to an agreement, of a government which after the war had been established by revolutionary methods. The Dutch refused to recognize the validity of the comparison between the Djakarta draft and the Franco-Vietnamese agreement, inasmuch as the latter derived from an existing international agreement between France and the former Annam Empire, the Republic of Vietnam being the successor of Annam.

In answer to this argument the Republican delegation reiterated that reference to the Indochinese precedent had originated with Dr. van Mook. Moreover, the Dutch negotiators in Djakarta had expected that the preliminary agreement resulting from the Lieutenant Governor-General's ideas would be acceptable to their government in The Hague.

A major condition underlying the Republican Government's acceptance of the preliminary agreement was that the Republic of Indonesia would be recognized as the de facto authority in Java-Madura and Sumatra. In the draft protocol such recognition was limited to the Java-Madura area. The Republican delegation emphasized the point that the Sjahrir Government considered its authority in Sumatra to be the only effective one over the island. Regarding Sumatra, the Indonesian delegation had received a restricted mandate. If the Sjahrir Government were to make concessions on this matter, it would not survive the consequences.

Opposing the Indonesian viewpoint, the Dutch delegation maintained that the people of Sumatra must decide by democratic procedure what its status in the new political structure of Indonesia should be. The Dutch alleged that antagonistic forces were active on the island. Therefore, the outcome of this contest should not be prejudiced. Until the people concerned had clearly indicated to the Dutch Government that they desired to join the Republic, the Dutch objected to having Sumatra placed under the jurisdiction of Java. (8)

It was understood by the Republican Government that an arbitration clause was to be added to the terms of the Djakarta draft. The draft protocol did not contain such a provision. The Indonesians considered it necessary to cover cases of conflict in interpretation of the agreement which could not be settled by the parties themselves. The Republican delegation visualized the establishment of a permanent commission of arbitration consisting of one member designated by the Republic, one by the Dutch, and a third member to be elected by the representatives of the two parties. Pending the admission of Indonesia to membership in the

(8) Ibid., second session, April 14, 1946, statements of Schermerhorn and Logemann.

United Nations Organization, the Sjahrir Government felt that the Republic could not dispense with an arbitration clause.

In view of the Republican position in this matter, Minister Drees pointed out that an arbitration clause would inevitably involve international intervention. This was inconsistent with the intention of the negotiating parties to come to a settlement without the assistance of a third party. Furthermore, it was not necessary to worry about possible difficulties in interpreting the terms of an agreement. In case of a settlement, there would be daily contact between the Republican and Dutch authorities regarding the implementation of any policy stipulated in the accord. If no cooperation were achieved, the result would be failure to solve the conflict anyway. In that case, arbitration would be of no use. (9)

With respect to controversies over interpretation of an agreement, Prime Minister Schermerhorn could envisage the services of a "contact body." Its activities, however, could never be called "arbitration." As the parties in the conflict would be the Governments of the Republic and of the Netherlands themselves, reference of such cases to an arbitration commission would not be equal to the standing of the parties. The deciding agency must be one of a higher level, e.g. the International Court of Justice. Minister Logemann preferred to resort to a conciliation commission. Dr. van Mook was of the same opinion.

The Indonesian delegation admitted that in terms of the draft protocol an arbitration commission would be incongruous. That, however, was not the case if considered within the framework of the preliminary agreement. For it served to emphasize the fact that the status of the Republic as proposed in the draft protocol was an inferior one, if compared with the Republican position projected in the Djakarta preliminary agreement.

The Indonesian delegation voiced its objection to the term "commonwealth" in the draft protocol as the name of the future political structure which would encompass the entire archipelago. The Sjahrir Government had proposed to use the term "Indonesian Federative Free State." In Djakarta, a mixed Indonesian-Dutch subcommittee had studied the matter, and subsequently it was agreed to use the term "free State." Underlying this decision was the intention to avoid using a term of restricted definition. "Free State," as suggested by the Sjahrir Government, referred to a political structure similar to that of the Orange Free State, or of the Irish Free State. In using this term the Republicans sought to stress the element of independence, of the non-colonial rather than the federative element represented therein. The Indonesian delegation reminded its counterpart that what the Indonesian people wanted was independence. Republican sentiment to that effect would be better served by the name "Free State,"

(9) Ibid., third session, April 14, 1946.

or, "free State" than by the term "Commonwealth." (10)

Minister Logemann submitted that the term "Commonwealth" underscored the federative nature of the political structure envisaged by the Netherlands Government. "Free State" in the framework of constitutional law had no specific meaning, as contrasted with "republic" or "autonomy," connoting "being part of a whole." (11) Minister Drees observed that it might be preferable simply to use the name "Indonesian Federation." Surinam and Curaçao, for that matter, had no further qualification either.

If the use of the term "Free State" was of particular importance to the Republicans, Minister Logemann would not oppose it. The translation of the word in the Indonesian language (Negara Merdeka) would be acceptable. However, he would object if "Free State", were translated to mean "an independent State" (negara jang merdeka) implying the severance of relations with the Dutch Realm.

In Article 1 of the draft protocol, where it stated "and in which Java (included Madura) as part of the Commonwealth, shall constitute an autonomous republic," the Indonesian delegation noted a further difference between this document and the Djakarta draft. Article 1 of the preliminary agreement stipulated that the Indonesian Republic would be recognized as exercising de facto authority in Java-Madura and Sumatra, without qualification of the word "Republic." Moreover, it was definitely not proposed to restrict the Republic to Java-Madura.

Dr. van Mook admitted that in this respect the Indonesians were right. The phrase referred to had been newly inserted and it acted to define the future status of Java. Minister Drees stated that the passage was meant to define and recognize the Republic for Java immediately. The Republican delegation then submitted that in that case its objection was nevertheless justified inasmuch as the intention was to limit the Republic to Java.

Article 5 of the Djakarta preliminary agreement provided a regulation, to be agreed upon by the contracting parties, for the appointment of representatives of territories other than the Republic to the Conference of the Realm. The Indonesian delegation remarked that the draft protocol provided only that the Republic be informed of such a regulation and of the resulting appointments. It was feared that if this procedure were applied, the designation

(10) Ibid., second session, April 14, 1946, statement of Pringgodigdo.

(11) Apparently quoted in reference to Article 1 of the Dutch draft protocol where Java is referred to as an "autonomous republic." - See Appendix E.

of the representatives in question would be dominated by the Dutch local administrative officers.

Minister Logemann held that the territories concerned would object to having appointment of their representatives regulated by agreement between the Dutch and the Republic, and not between the Netherlands Government and the areas themselves. The Dutch were not demanding the right of say-so in the appointment. They desired a voice in regulating the procedure of designation. Further, the matter would be arranged between the Dutch Government and the several territories. Local administrators would have no decisive position in the affair. The fact that the Dutch Government would consult the areas about the matter was sufficient guarantee for satisfactory results. (12)

The Sjahrir Government was of the opinion that the main objective of the preliminary agreement was to create peaceful conditions in Indonesia as soon as possible. Beyond establishing the basis upon which this goal could be achieved, the negotiating parties did not seek to include in their draft, provisions for regulating relations between the Republic and the Dutch which did not directly relate to the purported aim of the agreement. These were to be the subject of subsequent negotiations. Some provisions of the draft protocol impressed the Republican delegation as going beyond the purpose of the Djakarta draft. They were aimed at establishing regulatory arrangements for the administration of Indonesia before an agreement had been reached on the procedure of implementing projected political reforms for the archipelago. The Indonesian delegation could undertake to discuss such matters, but it was made clear that in doing so it would be exceeding its mandate.

Prime Minister Schermerhorn declared that the draft protocol too was meant to provide for difficulties of the moment. It was preliminary in nature, and it represented the limit the Dutch Government was authorized to go.

Article 8 of the draft protocol provided for such a regulatory arrangement. It determined the general administration of the Indies after the signing of the protocol, pending final agreement on the implementation of future political reforms and on the definite structure of the Commonwealth. Dr. van Mook asserted that from the viewpoint of international economics this provision was most important for Indonesia. In the interim period, the Dutch Government and the Republic would cooperate in the central administration of the islands. The Dutch hoped that by this procedure Republican demands for an adequate share in the Government of the Netherlands East-Indies would be satisfied. The Council of Department Chiefs (Raad van Departements Hoofden) would be constituted in cooperation with the Republic. The same proposition was

(12) Summary Records H. V., second session, April 14, 1946.

envisaged for the establishment of a provisional parliament.

The Indonesian delegation submitted that according to Article 8 of the draft protocol the Republican Government in the interim period would, in fact, be no more than a provincial administration for Java. As for the general administration mentioned in the article, Prime Minister Sjahrir discussed the matter with the Republican delegation shortly before it left for Holland. Sjahrir preferred an amalgamation of the Dutch East-Indies administrative organization with that of the Republic to the setting up of a superstructure. It was feared that the latter arrangement would lead strong nationalist elements to isolate themselves, within the Republic, from other groups in the Indonesian community. This would result in the persistence of the antithesis: N.I.C.A. versus the Republic.

In reviewing the general implications of the draft protocol, the Indonesian delegation wondered what in actuality had been achieved by the Indonesian people in its struggle for independence, if the results were to be measured in terms of the provisions of that document. The status of the Republic proposed in the draft protocol was "tragically insignificant." (13) After the promise made by the Queen of the Netherlands in her speech of December 6, 1942, the creation of an Indonesian Commonwealth had long ceased to be an innovation in Dutch policy vis-a-vis the archipelago.

Minister Drees observed that the Republic had achieved a substantial gain in the measure of independence it would receive in the political structure projected by the draft protocol. If developments had been different, the Indonesian people, with best intentions, would never have reached the status attained at that moment.

Prime Minister Schermerhorn expressed the opinion that the achievements of the Republic could only be weighed by considering the alternatives to success or failure in reaching a peaceful settlement in the Indies. On the positive side, there was the recognition of the Republican Government for Java-Madura, and provision of opportunity for other areas of the archipelago to join the Republic if they wished to do so. Recognition of the Republic also availed it of opportunities for international economic assistance which Holland could arrange for Indonesia. Further, a settlement rapidly accomplished would prevent international intervention in the Indies. On the negative side loomed the inevitability, in the absence of a settlement, of a military conflict with its disastrous consequences of bitterness, rancor, and retrogression in Indonesian-Dutch relations for perhaps decades to come. The Dutch, it was said, would take the decision to resort to force with a heavy heart. However, if it proved impossible to achieve a nego-

(13) As expressed by Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo. - Summary Records H.V., first session April 14, 1946.

tiated settlement, they would be compelled to use the military. Another possibility would be international interposition, and as was known to the Republicans, certain quarters were advocating this course. (14)

The Indonesian chief delegate, Mr. Soewandi, stated that the Republican Government was well aware of these alternatives. It was, therefore, making an all-out effort to contribute to a peaceful solution of the conflict. It must be understood, however, that in doing so the Sjahrir Government was bound by certain restrictions. The Republicans felt that in the Djakarta preliminary agreement they had gone as far as their power permitted. In view of the restricted mandate of the Indonesian delegation, the Republicans could not go beyond the observations they had submitted on various aspects of the draft protocol. They had taken note of the ideas underlying the articles of that document, and also of the motives which had led the Netherlands Government to substitute its draft protocol for the Djakarta proposals.

As the last speaker of the day's meeting, Prime Minister Schermerhorn informed the Republican delegation that he and his colleagues would like to continue the discussions. The purpose of further talks was to explore the possibilities for a Dutch approach to the Indonesian position on the draft protocol. However, the Dutch Government had to exercise caution in making concessions lest it spoil the chance to make its policy acceptable to the Dutch people. The Dutch Prime Minister expressed the opinion that there was a striking similarity in the situations of the Republican and Netherlands Governments. If the Netherlands Government were to accept proposals agreeable to the Republic but not to the Dutch Parliament, it would have to resign. The Indonesians then would likely be confronted with a new Dutch Government which would offer no prospects for a solution satisfactory to the Republic. On the other hand, if the Sjahrir Government had to resign because it agreed to Dutch proposals which proved objectionable to the Indonesians, the succeeding Republican Cabinet would probably be unable to come to a pacific settlement with the Dutch. In both cases violence and chaos would ensue. (15)

On this note of warning, emphasizing the grave responsibility of the negotiating governments, the meeting of April 14, 1946, was concluded. The first day of talks on the Hoge Veluwe was also to be the last one of a formal character held at this locality. Subsequent discussions at the St. Hubertus Hunting Lodge were informal affairs not originally scheduled. The final session of the conference was convened at The Hague on April 24, 1946.

(14) Prime Minister Schermerhorn apparently referred to the Soviet bloc action in the London session of the United Nations Security Council in February, 1946.

(15) Summary Records H. V., third session, April 14, 1946.

Captain Tahya, Royal Netherlands Indies Army, of Amboina, the Moluccas. During the Japanese occupation of the archipelago, Captain Tahya was with the Dutch Indies Army contingent in Australia.

Messrs. Alkadrie and Tahya collaborated with the Dutch. Apparently, they had come to Holland to represent the people of their respective areas, where the Dutch, backed by adequate military force, had firmly re-established their authority.

Referring to the private conversations with the Indonesian representatives, Prime Minister Schermerhorn stated that he had been convinced of the extreme importance the Republicans attached to the status envisaged for the Republic. In his opinion the matter was one of those significant imponderables and intangible factors dominant among the Indonesians. Minister Logemann submitted that in an eventual agreement there would be no objection to having the existence of the Republic brought sharply into focus. However, this must be conditioned on a provision clearly defining the place of the Republic within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Considered in the context of their relative definitions, the term "Free State" (Vrijstaat) could be substituted for "Commonwealth." But the term "Free State" (vrije staat) was objectionable inasmuch as it did not connote the type of political relationship between the Indies and the Netherlands which the Dutch Government had in mind.

As for the Sumatra issue, additional arguments supporting the Dutch point of view that the island should not be placed immediately under the de facto authority of the Republic were offered by Foreign Minister van Royen. In his opinion, the Republic stood to lose international prestige if it were to assume responsibility for territory wherein it would prove unable to exercise its authority effectively. This might be an obstacle to the admission of the proposed Free State to membership in the United Nations Organization.

Considering that many large groups of Sumatra's population were unwilling to recognize Republican authority, Prime Minister Schermerhorn felt it would be irresponsible for the Dutch to agree to place the area under the jurisdiction of the Republic. There was no intention on the part of the Netherlands Government to construe its immediate recognition of the Republic's de facto authority over Java-Madura, as automatically limiting the Republic to this territory. Eventually, it would be decided by democratic procedure whether the other territories of Indonesia, including Sumatra, wanted to join the Republic or not.

During the discussion of the problem, the Sultan of Pontianak and Captain Tahya, intervened in support of the Dutch viewpoint. The former asserted that he and other like-minded Indonesians had

no quarrel with the Republic as to the ultimate aim of its policy. However, there was quite definitely a difference of opinion with respect to the procedure of reaching the common goal. The people of Borneo were afraid that their political destiny would be determined without their having a say in the matter. They were generally not pro-Republic. Close ties with the Republic, established through a political structure which would give the impression of being imposed by the Republic, would be unacceptable to them. They would only agree to an amalgamation with the Republic, "conceived and developed in freedom."

Captain Tahya submitted a similar point of view for the Moluccas. He stated that the people of the islands were as yet unwilling to accept the idea of immediately joining the Republic. Apparently in reference to alleged discriminatory treatment of people from Amboina, Timor and the Minahasa within Republican-controlled territory, he asserted that the people of the Moluccas doubted the competency of the Republican Government to implement its announced policy of protection of minority rights. However, the educated people of the area were convinced that close bonds with the Republic were desirable. (20)

Prime Minister Schermerhorn interjected the statement that recognition of the Republic of Java alone already involved the Dutch Government in a test-of-strength with a bitter opposition.

The Indonesian chief delegate felt he should not fail to stress emphatically that the Sjahrir Government had committed itself too firmly to inclusion of Sumatra even to contemplate a concession in the matter. A change of Republican policy in this respect would be practically impossible. "Leakage" of the provision in the Djakarta preliminary agreement limiting the de facto authority of the Republic to Java-Madura and Sumatra had set in motion an Indonesian propaganda campaign against the policy of the Sjahrir Government. (21)

It seems that the Netherlands delegation realized that so far as Sumatra was concerned, its inclusion in the Republic was a con-

(20) For generations the inhabitants of the Moluccas (especially of Amboina and adjacent islands, and Timor) had provided the Dutch colonial army with recruits who made loyal Netherlands Indies army personnel. They were mostly drawn from the less educated part of the population.

In the Dutch army contingent which entered Djakarta under the Allied flag many Moluccan soldiers were included. The bloodiest clashes occurred between these soldiers and the Republicans. The strong anti-Republican sentiments among the Moluccan soldiers and their families apparently made Captain Tahya draw the distinction between the "educated" people of the Moluccas and the rest of the population of these islands.

(21) The government was being accused of having betrayed "the Minahasa and the Moluccas." Merdeka, April 17 and 20, 1946.

ditio sine qua non for Sjahrir's willingness to come to terms with the Dutch. Subsequently, the Dutch delegates began to make small excursions beyond their original stand on the Sumatra issue. Minister Logemann suggested a possible solution by providing that:

1. The Netherlands Government would recognize the Republic as exercising de facto authority in Java;
2. The Netherlands Government would take note of the claim that the Republic was also exercising de facto authority in Sumatra; and
3. As soon as possible, Sumatra and the other territories of the archipelago would have the opportunity freely to express whether or not they desired to join the Republic.

It was asserted that by these means the Republic would not have to "give up anything."

However, the Indonesian delegation disagreed, since under point 3 Sumatra was given the same status as the other territories. The Republic would not represent the island at the Conference of the Realm.

Minister Logemann said that in that case he was willing to go a step further. He would have no objection if in regard to Sumatra the regulations for appointing the island's representatives to the Realm Conference were determined by agreement between the Republic and the Dutch Government. However, similar regulations for other territories were to be decided by the Dutch in consultation with the areas concerned. In this respect the Republic would only be informed of the rules agreed upon.

The Indonesians pointed out that the administrative machinery currently effective in Sumatra was in Republican hands. The Minister of Defense, Amir Sjarifuddin, and a staff of civil servants had been dispatched to the island. Their task was to improve the organization and efficiency of the Sumatra administration. The question was submitted whether in the solution as suggested by Minister Logemann it would be possible for the Republican administration to continue its functions.

The Minister of Overseas Territories stated that under the existing circumstances there would be no objection to the Republican Government's continuing to function on the island. It must be understood, however, that concomitant with the increase of the Netherlands contingent in the Allied Military forces in Indonesia, the international responsibility of the Dutch for developments in the archipelago would also grow. Internationally, the Netherlands would be responsible for law and order in the Indies. Therefore, Republican activities must contribute to the restoration of peaceful conditions in the archipelago. Otherwise, it would be impossible

for the Dutch to remain "the passive bystander." Concurring with Prime Minister Schermerhorn in this respect, Professor Logemann said that if Chinese and United States interests in Sumatra were, or continued to be, damaged, these powers would blame the Netherlands exclusively for it. If the Republic wished to undertake to restore law and order on the island, the Dutch would have no objection. However, the time given the Republic to carry out this task satisfactorily could not be unlimited. If it should take too long, the Dutch Government would be forced to intervene.

Taking up point III of the Republican memorandum, referred to as "The Colijn partition," (22) Minister Logemann stated that there was much misunderstanding in the Republic regarding two aspects of the Netherlands Government's policy, to wit:

1. the reason underlying the Dutch Government's decision to advocate the federative structure for Indonesia, and
2. the nature of the projected political structure.

The basis for the decision in point 1 was "the stark reality" that several territories strenuously objected to being incorporated in the Republic. Motivated by realization of this fact, the Dutch had chosen the federative system as the future political structure of the Indies. The choice had no connection whatsoever with the divide-and-rule policy referred to in the Republican memorandum. Financially, culturally, and in terms of its capacity to meet the administrative requirements involved, the Netherlands East-Indies could not afford the intensive decentralization program advocated by the late Dr. Colijn. Minister Logemann personally had always opposed it. He wished to emphasize that the principles of democracy, good faith and the prevailing circumstances had impelled the Netherlands Government to advocate the federative system. This had been decided upon even though a unitary political structure appeared to him and his colleagues the most attractive one for Indonesia in the future. To advocate the federative structure in the prevailing situation would provide the centrifugal forces discernible within the community of Indonesian peoples with room for relaxation. If such forces were to be curbed rigidly by the imposition of a unitary Indonesian State, their reaction would be to assert themselves to the fullest extent.

As to the nature of the political structure which the Dutch proposed for the Indies, Minister Logemann denied that it still contained elements of colonialism. He dismissed such allegations by referring to the Netherlands Statement of Policy of February 10, 1946. Therein it was clearly stated that in the future Government of Indonesia the Indonesians would have a "preponderant" position.

Prime Minister Schermerhorn observed that in the private discussions, the Republicans made remarks to the effect that free

(22) See Appendix F.

expression of the Indonesian people's will would be possible only after all N.I.C.A. officers and Dutch forces had evacuated the archipelago. He considered this distrust of the honest intentions of the Dutch Government wholly unfounded. It must be understood that the Netherlands could not shirk its responsibility for the future development of Indonesia. Neither should the Republic monopolize that responsibility. The duty to guide the destiny of the islands must be a common task, shared by both the Dutch and the Indonesians.

From Minister Logemann's statement the Indonesian delegation inferred that the federative structure proposed for Indonesia was not an essential condition in the Netherlands proposals. Neither did it constitute a final objective in the political reforms projected by the Dutch. It was rather a means to attain a future goal, i.e. an intermediate phase in the evolution of the archipelago toward complete independence. For that matter, if at the Conference of the Realm all of Indonesia expressed the desire to be united in the Republic, the Dutch would not oppose it. (23)

The Netherlands delegation affirmed these conclusions of the Indonesians and submitted that the form of a federation had been proposed in order to prevent the possibility of coercive inclusion of other territories in the Republic. Viewed in this context, the federative structure referred to in the Netherlands proposals must be considered a matter of principle, namely, a guarantee against Republican encroachments in areas which did not wish to join the Republic.

At the closing session on April 24 at The Hague, Prime Minister Schermerhorn, reviewing the talks, stated that so far as the human aspects of the meetings were concerned he was of the opinion that positive results had been achieved. A greater mutual understanding had been created between the negotiating parties. In terms of concrete achievements, however, not much had been accomplished. The preliminary agreement had been too readily accepted as conclusive by the negotiating parties in Djakarta. Neither was the Dutch draft protocol intended to commit the parties to definite proposals. Its purpose was to provide guidance in the discussions, which were aimed at finding a way out of the impasse in the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations. Professor Schermerhorn further stressed that the draft protocol must not be considered a proposal of the Netherlands Government. It had not been submitted to the Council of Ministers for prior consideration and approval. It contained several points of disagreement between him and his colleagues. His government was in no position to submit definite proposals. It had no mandate to do so. As soon as possible the government would consult the States General on the matter, and the Prime Minister hoped that his government then would be able to formulate such proposals as were contained in the

(23) Summary Records H. V., fourth session, April 21, 1946, statement of Soewandi.

draft protocol.

The Indonesian delegation submitted that the discussions had provided it with significant information. They had revealed the various factors which influenced the Dutch Government in its efforts to find a solution to the Indonesian conflict. It was observed that upon leaving for the Netherlands the Republicans had expected too much. (24)

By comparing the Republican proposals of March 13 and the counter-proposals of March 27, it can be seen that the achievement of the preliminary agreement was made possible after the Sjahrir Government had taken a long step forward to meet the Dutch viewpoint in the Indonesian controversy. During the Djakarta talks leading up to the decision to transfer the scene of negotiations to Holland, the Indonesians had found reason to believe that the Netherlands Government would be prepared to balance the substantial Republican concessions by accepting the preliminary agreement. However, the developments on the Hoge Veluwe proved the case to be otherwise.

At the conclusion of the Hoge Veluwe talks, the press reported that they had ended in failure. It would be equally valid to state that so far as the Indonesians were concerned the conference had commenced with a failure. Republican expectations as to the outcome of the discussions had been built on a faulty premise. Despite van Mook's assertion that his four articles must not be construed as representative of the view of his government, and should be considered merely as an instrument to avoid an impending deadlock, the Republican negotiators nevertheless believed that the ideas of the Lieutenant Governor-General were yet within the scope of the mandate he had received from his government. Therefore, it was felt that the preliminary agreement, perhaps with a few minor adjustments, would be acceptable to the Dutch Government. (25) Moreover, the Netherlands negotiators themselves were apparently quite confident that the Djakarta proposals would be agreeable to their government. (26) The Republican delegation's optimism as to the successful outcome of its mission was further buttressed by information received from quarters close to Dr. van Mook. Mr. Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo, a highranking Indonesian N.I.C.A. official and close associate of the Lieutenant Governor-General, intimated to the Republican delegation that the developments in the Holland talks anticipated by the negotiating parties

(24) Ibid., final session, April 24, 1946, statements of Soewandi and Soedarsono.

(25) Information obtained from Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo, personal interview.

(26) On March 31, 1946, in a press interview, Dr. van Mook stated that an agreement could possibly be achieved within a week after he and the Indonesian Delegation had arrived in The Hague. - Merdeka, April 1, 1946.

in Djakarta, were practically certain. (27)

But the Indonesian delegation was keenly disappointed when the Dutch submitted their draft protocol. The document, Prime Minister Schermerhorn stated, was to be no more than the subject for discussions with the Republicans.

Subsequently, the Netherlands ministers explained the position they had taken with regard to the Hoge Veluwe Conference. Their rejection of the preliminary agreement had not been for lack of cooperation. They had attempted to make the Djakarta proposals acceptable to the Netherlands people (in other words to the Dutch Parliament). In this effort they had deemed it of the highest importance to render the terms of the preliminary agreement in harmony with Dutch constitutional procedure. Especially the matter of procedure had had first priority as a factor to be reckoned with in making the adjustments. (28) The slightest deviation from constitutional processes would have the Netherlands parliament, acutely sensitive in this respect, up in arms immediately. In fact, the sharpest criticism from the Second Chamber against the Indonesia policy of the Schermerhorn-Drees Government had been in view of its procedural aspect. (29)

The Netherlands delegation further seized upon the character of the parliamentary opposition to explain Dr. van Mook's error in appraising the Djakarta agreement as likely to be acceptable to the Dutch Government. It was claimed that the Dutch negotiators in Indonesia had misjudged the depth of the feelings which the people in Holland attached to conformance with their Constitution. Clark-Kerr made the same mistake when he remarked that the Djakarta proposals were not unreasonable. (30)

It appears that in weighing the pros and cons of accepting the preliminary agreement the Netherlands ministers had been mainly, if not exclusively, preoccupied with the problem of how to reconcile its terms with the narrow, formalistic and legalistic stand prevalent in the Dutch parliament with respect to handling

(27) Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono, personal letter.

(28) Summary Records H. V., fourth session, April 21, 1946, and final session, April 24, 1946, statements of Schermerhorn.

(29) See Dutch parliamentary debates pertaining to the period under discussion e.g. *Handelingen*, p. 143 and pp. 259-263, statement of Meijerink (Anti Revolutionary Party). *Ibid.*, pp. 256-257, statement of van Poll (Catholic Party). *Ibid.*, pp. 266-269, statement of van Kempen (Liberal). *et passim*.

(30) Andrew Roth, "Holland's Last Chance," *The Nation*, Vol. 163 (August 10, 1946), pp. 153-155.

"Lord Inverchapel...made it clear he felt 'the proposed solution was a good one'."

the Indonesia question. (31)

The Dutch chief negotiator in Indonesia, Dr. van Mook, on the other hand, had evaluated the acceptability of the preliminary agreement in terms quite different from those of his superiors in The Hague. He preferred to consider the document as representing the maximum in concessions which the Sjahrir Government could make acceptable to the Indonesian Parliament. By setting aside the various important legal and practical objections which the Dutch might have against the preliminary agreement, they could fundamentally change their diplomatic position, with respect to Indonesia as well as to the rest of the world, by accepting the Djakarta proposals. Thereby, the Dutch Government could also benefit from the fact that it would have contributed to the success of Clark-Kerr's mission. This was important in view of the British attitude toward the Dutch Government and its subsequent policies in the Indies. Of greater significance, however, would be the enhancement of the Dutch diplomatic position. If the Netherlands Government were to accept the Djakarta agreement, a future breakdown in the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations would then be considered against the background of an accord based on proposals of Republican origin. (32)

In Dr. van Mook's opinion, Dutch policy in Indonesia should have been aimed at achieving an agreement between his government and the Republic as soon as possible. He hoped that this objective could be reached at the Hoge Veluwe. Subsequently, preparation to convoke the Conference of the Realm could be made. The sooner this conference could start, the better. These developments were uppermost in his mind when negotiations in Djakarta had reached a stage where it was necessary for him to consult with his government in Holland. Van Mook felt that the Dutch Government should be prepared to make a concession and agree to the treaty form for the preliminary agreement as insisted upon by the Republic. Accordingly, he thought that the Sumatra issue could be worked out easily between the negotiating parties. (33)

The reason van Mook attached so much importance to a speedy settlement in the Indonesian conflict appears to have been his fear that a delayed solution would provide the Republic with time further to organize and strengthen its administrative and military apparatus. This would result in a more radical attitude on the

(31) Over 60% of the Second Chamber. (The K.V.P., A.R.P., C.H.U. and the Liberal Center.)

(32) van Mook, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

The Republican delegation at the Hoge Veluwe Conference emphatically denied that the preliminary agreement was of Indonesian origin. The Indonesians insisted that it was based on the four articles of Dr. van Mook.

(33) Information obtained from Dr. van Mook, personal interview.

part of the Republicans in their negotiating position.

By the end of 1945, most of the Government Offices of the Republic had been moved from Djakarta to Jogjakarta in Central Java. Early in January, 1946, this shift of the Republican political center, deeper into Indonesian-held territory, was finalized by the transfer of the residence of both President Sukarno and Vice-President Hatta to Jogjakarta. (34) Dr. van Mook considered the departure of the two top Republican leaders a deplorable event, for it separated the Republican Government: Sukarno-Hatta and the legislature (K.N.I.P.) in Central Java, and Prime Minister Sjahrir in Djakarta. The Lieutenant Governor-General feared that this situation would give rise to complications in the negotiating policy of the Indonesians. (35) However, with respect to the nego-

(34) Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, Deputy Minister of Information, stated that this step had been taken because:

1. in Djakarta the safety of the Republican leaders was in jeopardy, and
2. their presence in Jogjakarta would help to improve the internal organization of the Republic. Merdeka, January 5, 1945.

By that time indiscriminate acts of violence by Dutch troops in Djakarta against Republicans in general and their leaders in particular were increasing. On December 26, Prime Minister Sjahrir's car, while he was on his way home from his office, was stopped by a group of Eurasian and Surinam soldiers of the Dutch army. Mr. Sjahrir was ordered out of his car. After a brief exchange of words with his detainers, he escaped death miraculously when the gun with which one of the soldiers suddenly tried to shoot him misfired. The timely arrival of a British military patrol saved Mr. Sjahrir's life. - Merdeka, December 27, 1945.

Dr. Soedarsono asserted that engineering the move--the Republican leaders left Djakarta under great secrecy--to spare Sukarno and Hatta from possible harm or capture by either the British on the instigation of the Dutch, or by the Dutch themselves, was a major success of the Sjahrir Government. (personal letter). Deep within Republican territory Sukarno and Hatta were safe to carry on as the "living symbols" of the Indonesian Revolution.

Since the Sjahrir Government had assumed responsibility for the negotiations, President Sukarno on a few occasions publicly and emphatically expressed complete confidence in his government's policy. (e.g. Merdeka, February 13 and 18, 1946, press interviews in Jogjakarta). The stand taken by the President was apparently a very important factor in the general expression of support by the people of the Republic for the diplomatic policy of Sjahrir and his cabinet. There seemed to exist a pattern of close cooperation between Sukarno in Jogjakarta and Sjahrir in Djakarta. While the latter negotiated with the Dutch, the former, by coming out squarely in favor of his government's policy, rallied the home front behind it.

tiations resulting in the Hoge Veluwe Conference and the unexpected developments in the talks in Holland, it appears that the situation was exactly the reverse. It was not a lack of concurrence in the Republican camp, but rather between the Netherlands Government at The Hague and the Netherlands Indies Government in Djakarta which caused unforeseen complications in the progress of the negotiations. The center of gravity in the Indonesia policy of the Netherlands Government was determined by Dutch parliamentary opinion. The Indies Government's, i.e., van Mook's, policy, on the other hand, was mainly influenced by the immediacy and sequence of changing situations in the archipelago which the people in Holland could only occasionally comprehend, if at all. (36) Because of this polarity in the Dutch camp, it was possible for van Mook and his colleagues in Djakarta to feel optimistic about the outcome of the negotiations in Holland, while it subsequently developed that so far as the Dutch Government was concerned, there was little reason for such optimism.

It has been said that the Hoge Veluwe Conference could have been of decisive influence on further developments in the Indonesian problem. However, all expectations regarding its outcome did not materialize. This negative result has been blamed on the attitude of the Schermerhorn-Drees Government. It was too cautious and lacked the courage to assert its leadership in determining Dutch policy vis-a-vis Indonesia. In this respect it did not govern; it merely obeyed public opinion instead of guiding it. (37)

This was another advantage of having Sukarno and Hatta move to Jogjakarta.

The Republican legislature, too, fully supported the policy of the Sjahrir Cabinet. - See: Communiqués Nos. 20 and 23 of the Working Committee, *Berita Repoeblik Indonesia*, II, No. 4 (January 1-15, 1946) and II, No. 8 (March 1, 1946).

(35) van Mook, op. cit., p. 106.

(36) Ibid., p. 107.

(37) Sal Tas, "Hangende de Overeenstemming," De Brug - Djembatan, (Amsterdam) I, No. 2, (Mei 1946) 7-8.

Sal Tas joined the left wing socialist, J. de Kadet, in publishing the monthly, De Nieuwe Kern ("The New Core"), for "socialist intellectuals" which existed from 1936 to 1940. After World War II, Tas was one of those socialists who considered the Nederlandse Volksbeweging (N.V.B.) as a transitional phase toward the establishment of a new political party, i.e. the Partij van de Arbeid (Labor Party). - H.M. Ruitenbeek, Het ontstaan van de Partij van de Arbeid, Amsterdam, N.V. De Arbeiderspers, 1955, p. 34 (footnote) and p. 196.

Dr. van Mook expressed a similar opinion to this writer.

It was perhaps this cardinal point where there was a significant difference between the Dutch and the Republican Governments' procedures to reach common ground in the negotiations. The Schermerhorn Cabinet was unable or unwilling

The attitude of the Dutch Government has been attributed to the character of this administration.

Shortly after the total liberation of Holland in June, 1945, the Queen set a new precedent by consulting with prominent leaders of the former resistance movement on the formation of an interim Cabinet. She did not summon the political leaders who were her advisers on such matters in pre-war days. The Queen's talks resulted in the appointment of Mr. W. Drees and Professor Ir. W. Schermerhorn. The purpose in designating two formateurs was to have the first represent the political parties as organized before the war; the second was appointed as chief proponent of a trend in Dutch politics which began just before World War II. During the German occupation this movement grew strong in the underground. It had emerged as the most powerful group in the resistance and was organized in the "Netherlands People's Movement" (Nederlandse Volksbeweging--N.V.B.). The appointees succeeded in forming a Cabinet, "hailed as leftist, broadly based, and co-opted largely from the underground." (38)

The States General was still suspended. Consequently, normal political activities, prohibited shortly after the Germans occupied the country, had not yet resumed. Thus, the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet was truly an extra-parliamentary affair. According to Dutch constitutional law, it was a Royal Cabinet. When this provisional government was formed, no one in Holland could possibly foresee that within two months the war in the Pacific would be over. The Queen's mandate to the first post-war Cabinet was specifically for "rehabilitation and reconstruction" (herstel en vernieuwing) of war-ravaged Holland. (39)

An important aspect of the government's task was to restore normal parliamentary processes. The restoration of the national legislature involved the setting up of a Parliamentary Purging Committee. This committee investigated collaborationist charges against members of the States General who had been elected in the last general elections before the war, in 1937. Subsequently

to assume the task of guiding Dutch public opinion to suit a policy which would be acceptable to the Indonesian Government. Sjahrir and his colleagues, on the other hand, were prepared to make substantial concessions to approach the Dutch viewpoint, despite the fact that they knew quite well it would involve a severe test of their political strength to make such concessions acceptable to the Republicans. - Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono, personal letter.

- (38) Samuel J. Eldersveld, "Government and Politics in the Netherlands during Reconstruction," Change and Crisis in European Government, James Kerr Pollock, ed., New York, Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1947, p. 125.
- (39) G.J. Lammers, De Kroon en de Kabinetsformatie, IJmuiden, Vermande Zonen, 1952, p. 124.

an approved list was issued, and, on September 25, 1945, the purged Second Chamber was convened. About a month later, the First Chamber resumed its activities. (40)

This parliament (Twede Kamer, Tijdelijke Staten Generaal) was an emergency legislature. Its membership had been determined by Royal Decree of August 2, 1945 (Staatsblad No. F 131). Its task was limited to consideration and approval of a draft law concerning Regulations for the Provisional States General (Voorlopige Staten Generaal). This law was to establish an interim legislature. Its members were the members of parliament elected in 1937. The seats vacated by death or purging were filled through appointment by Royal Decree. (41) The Provisional States General was meant to be a legislature which could function with the least possible deviation from normal constitutional procedure. It was provisional in nature because, pending general elections, its parliamentary powers were not completely restored. Underlying its establishment was a national emergency. The Netherlands was in a political maze. The mandate of the members of the Second Chamber elected in 1937 had expired in 1941. To hold general elections in the confused situation immediately following the liberation of the country was not possible. By setting up the Provisional States General the Dutch Government attempted to provide for the emergency. (42)

The return of pre-war representatives to the national legislature restored the political pattern in the States General which existed before the German invasion. (43) The distinction between sectarian parties making up the Right Wing and non-sectarian parties forming the Left Wing, peculiar to Dutch domestic politics since the second half of the 19th Century, was re-established. (44)

After decades of Cabinets dominated by Christian coalitions (mainly the Anti-Revolutionary Party or A.R.P., the Catholics and the Christian Historical Union or C.H.U., from 1888 to 1939), a milestone had been reached in Dutch parliamentary history in 1939. The first so-called "democratic coalition" was formed.

(40) Eldersveld, op. cit., p. 129.

(41) Handelingen, Tijdelijke Zitting, pp. 13-14.

Provisional States General:	elected (in 1937)	appointed (post-war)
Second Chamber:	75	25
First Chamber:	34	16

(42) Ibid., p. 21.

(43) With the exception of the Dutch fascist party. (Nationaal Socialistische Bond). See Appendix G.

(44) Lammers, op. cit., pp. 72-101. To this day the seats in both Chambers of the States General are still arranged in accordance with this division.

Generated at Columbia University on 2025-02-19 21:13 GMT / https://hdl.handle.net/2027/coo.31924019448657 / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Under a C.H.U. Prime Minister a Cabinet was constituted of Catholics, C.H.U., Liberal Democrats (Vrijzinnig Democraten), and Social Democrats (Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij--S.D.A.P.). Consequently, the A.R.P. went into opposition after a long period of participation in the government. (45)

The "Cabinet for reconstruction" of Messrs. Schermerhorn and Drees was presented as a national one. In the emergency legislature it soon appeared that the parties on the far Right had different ideas about the matter. Mr. Drees was a prominent member of the S.D.A.P., and the government was made up of persons "hailed as leftist...." Therefore, the conservatives in general considered the Cabinet as representative of the social democrats and leftist political reformers. (46)

The first to criticize and oppose the government's policy was the A.R.P. The occasion was also taken advantage of to introduce the Indonesian problem in the parliamentary debates. The question at issue was the procedure proposed by the Cabinet to restore normal parliamentary processes. At the second session of the post-war legislature, on October 9, 1945, an A.R.P. spokesman made an interpellation on the situation in Indonesia. He knew that in doing so he was out of order, inasmuch as the sitting legislature was not empowered to go beyond discussing the item of Regulations for the Provisional States General. He apparently wanted to indicate the inadequacy of the government's policy. His action exposed the fact that the Indonesian situation, a question so vital to the nation, could not be discussed by what purported to be the Netherlands Parliament. (47) The Chairman of the Second Chamber declared the interpellation out of order. However, it resulted in a chain reaction of references to developments in the archipelago in the following speeches by representatives of other parties. Under the prevailing circumstances the government could legally ignore the wish of parliament for discussions of the Indonesian question. But it apparently deemed it advisable to make an immediate concession in this respect. Prime Minister Schermerhorn promised that the government would seek a procedure by Royal Decree permitting other issues to be submitted to the emergency legislature for consideration. He would do so because recent events had increased the need for consultations between government and parliament, especially in view of developments in Indonesia. (48)

(45) Ibid., pp. 72-120.

(46) Handelingen, Tijdelijke Zitting, p. 119, W. C. Wendelaar for the Liberals; p. 308, Jan Schouten for the A.R.P.; p. 741, H. W. Tilanus for the C.H.U.

(47) Ibid., p. 13, J. A. de Wilde of the A.R.P.; Stempels, op. cit., p. I.

(48) Handelingen, Tijdelijke Zitting, p. 57.

In subsequent debates on Indonesia, the policy of the government received the support of the S.D.A.P., the Liberal Democrats and the Christian Democrats (C.D.U.). On February 9, 1946, these parties merged with the Netherlands People's Movement, and dissident Catholic and Protestant groups, to form the Labor Party (Partij van de Arbeid). (49) The government could also count on the Communist Party's (C.P.N.) support. So far as its policy on Indonesia was concerned, the number of votes on which the Cabinet could depend was approximately 35. In its search for a solution of the Indonesian problem the Schermerhorn-Drees Government was handicapped by the lack of a parliamentary majority.

Strong and consistent opposition to the government's policy came from the A.R.P., the C.H.U. and the Liberal Center (Liberalen). However, their combined strength, of about 29 votes, was not sufficient to challenge the position of the Cabinet.

The key position was occupied by the Catholics (Katholieke Volkspartij--K.V.P.). Since 1918, they had been the strongest party in parliament. (50) The last pre-war elections in 1937 showed the Catholics still in their leading position. They received 31 seats in the Second Chamber. The significance of the Catholics' position was demonstrated when the Van Poll Motion was adopted. It was passed by a vote of 50 against 29 on January 17, 1946. On this occasion the Catholics received the support of the A.R.P., the C.H.U. and the Liberal Center. Mr. M.J.M. van Poll, then the leading spokesman of the K.V.P. and sponsor of the motion, asserted that it must not be construed as an expression of no confidence in the government's policy. Nevertheless, it obviously implied that the K.V.P. was not completely satisfied with the Indonesia policy of the Cabinet. Moreover, the motion was introduced despite the fact that two prominent Catholics, Messrs. H. J. M. Beel and H. A. M. F. Kolfschoten were holding Cabinet ranks in the government, the former as Minister of Home Affairs, the latter as Minister of Justice. Mr. van Poll's action apparently served to emphasize the independent position of the K.V.P. It has been said that in this period the Catholics persisted in a noncommittal attitude. (51)

During the tenure of office of the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet, the K.V.P.'s position was further complicated by the extra-parliamentary activity of Professor C. P. M. Romme, a leading member of the party. The importance of his influence in the K.V.P., already at that time, is evidenced by the fact that after the general elections of May, 1946, Mr. Romme became the leader of his party in parliament. As the political editor of the K.V.P.

(49) Ruitenbeek, op. cit., pp. 274-275; Stempels, op. cit., p. 29.

(50) Lammers, op. cit., p. 85. Before World War II the Catholic party was called the (Roman) Catholic State Party (Rooms--Katholieke Staatspartij).

(51) Stempels, op. cit., p. 11.

daily, De Volkskrant, he published editorials which were violently opposed to the Indonesia policy of the interim Cabinet. In October 1945, he referred to the government's policy as "the culmination of national betrayal" (rijksverraad in optima forma). (52) When the Hoge Veluwe Conference was in session, Professor Romme expressed his views on the discussions in an article entitled: "The Week of Humiliation" (De Week der Schande). (53)

There is reason to believe that the Cabinet's decision to reject the Djakarta preliminary agreement was partly influenced by party politics. Because of its mandate for reconstruction and rehabilitation, the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet was called a national government. By the choice of its formateurs, the Cabinet's main political trend was socialist. However, it also included two Catholics and a Protestant (Mr. J. Meynen, Minister of War). (54)

In the parliamentary debates, it was soon apparent that the policy of the Cabinet was considered to be that of the socialists. By the time of the Hoge Veluwe Conference, the policies of the Schermerhorn-Drees Government were identified with those of the newly founded Labor Party. Therefore, in deciding its attitude regarding the Djakarta proposals, an important consideration must have been to what extent acceptance of the preliminary agreement would influence the position of that party. An appraisal of the matter is complicated by the fact that by the time of the Hoge Veluwe talks the Labor Party was only two months old. It was established on February 9, 1946. This event was hailed as a unique and major event in the history of Dutch domestic politics. It was the embodiment of the so-called "breakthrough" (doorbraak) idea. (55) It was the realization of the desire for cooperation on a single and broad political basis of persons divergent in

(52) Handelingen, Tijdelijke Zitting, p. 101, statement of Roestam Effendi, an Indonesian, member of the Dutch Communist Party (Communistische Partij Nederland).

(53) Referred to by van Mook, op. cit., p. 123; de Kadt, op. cit., p. 128.

(54) In the general elections of May 17, 1946, of the 16-man Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet, 8 were elected on the Labor Party's electoral list. Among them were Messrs. Schermerhorn, Drees and Logemann. - Netherlands News Letter, New York City, No. 5, June 1, 1946.

(55) A comprehensive and detailed study of this matter can be found in a monograph on the foundation of the Labor Party (Partij van de Arbeid) by H.M. Ruitenbeek, op. cit.

This monograph was presented to the Faculty of Law, Leiden University as a dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, on June 29, 1955.

their philosophic outlook, but united in their political ideals.

For the last 50 years the system of Dutch political party formation had been dominated by the doctrine of the antithesis: Christian sectarian versus non-sectarian. In this context, Professor P. S. Gerbrandy, member of the Calvinist Anti Revolutionary Party, has asserted that: (56)

religion and party go hand in hand. The two are inseparable... Individuals support the Catholic or Protestant Parties for the simple reason that they have been nurtured in the Catholic or Protestant faiths. Socialists support the Party of Labour as members of industrial organizations. Liberals are Liberals because they are not dogmatic.

In those 50 years, several non-sectarian parties were established. However, they did not claim thereby to initiate a reform in the existing political party system. Instead, they accepted it. If they had been willing to try to change the system, they probably would have lacked the power to overcome the opposition of the religious parties. When gradually it became clear that the principle of Christian antithesis caused a stultification of Dutch political life, the need to reform the party system was felt. Before World War II, the idea of such a change was already gaining ground within some sectarian parties. Among the Protestant Christian groups, the Dialectical Theology of the Swiss theologian, Karl Barth, paved the way for the reform idea to win adherents. "No longer did Karl Barth's followers see the Christian Party as a necessary consequence of a positive Christian faith." In these groups, e.g. the C.H.U., recruits for the "breakthrough" movement were found primarily among the younger elements. (57)

During the occupation, the underground organizations intensely debated the question of post-war Dutch politics. It appeared that a good part of the resistance movement was in favor of the radical reform of the party system. A progressive national movement was envisaged uniting people of different philosophies who held the same political ideas. The strongest group to represent this view was the Netherlands People's Movement (N.V.B. - Nederlandse Volksbeweging). Influenced by French Personalism, its post-war objective was the setting up of a national party based on personalistic socialism. As to the question whether after the war a Catholic party was necessary, a split developed in the Catholic resistance groups. One section advocated a progressive reform of the pre-war Catholic party. The other adhered to the principle that political parties should be non-sectarian. (58)

(56) Gerbrandy, op. cit., p. 81.

(57) Ruitenbeek, op. cit., p. 274.

(58) Ibid., p. 275.

When immediately after the partial liberation of the Netherlands in May, 1945, the Nederlandse Volksbeweging presented itself as the proponent of the reform idea, of a renovation in Dutch political thinking, it received widespread and enthusiastic popular support. However, the movement did not retain this backing. Partially because it lacked efficient organization, and also because it became involved in practical politics, its popularity soon began rapidly to decline. When Schermerhorn, the leader of the N.V.B., agreed to form a cabinet along with Mr. Drees, a Social Democrat, he could not help but involve the N.V.B. in everyday Dutch politics. It was also known that some of the Cabinet members co-opted from the underground were strong supporters of the N.V.B.'s ideas. The dichotomy in the objectives of the movement did not remain unnoticed. On the one hand, it aimed for a spiritual change in Dutch political life, and on the other, it sought to achieve the formation of a socialist people's party cutting through the religious, social and cultural sections of society. Owing to this dualism, the N.V.B. lost its bonafide status of a popular reform movement, and with it, much of its public appeal. With the return of the pre-war political parties, the N.V.B.'s position further deteriorated. (59) Although Prime Minister Schermerhorn denied that the former underground sought to become a factor in practical politics, his position in the government apparently was taken to prove the contrary. (60)

Eventually, the political objective gained the upper hand. In October, 1945, the N.V.B. took the initiative in arranging for consultations between the existing political parties and former underground organizations. The meeting was arranged in order to discuss the possibilities of forming the type of political party envisaged by the movement. The S.D.A.P., the Liberal Democrats (V.D.B.), who with their social-economic ideas stood politically close to the Social Democrats, and the Christian Democrats (C.D.U.), sectarian but advocating "modern-progressive social-economic concepts," accepted the invitation. (61)

It appears that the S.D.A.P. had to overcome several difficulties before it decided to merge into the new socialist party. Initially it refused to consider a fusion with the N.V.B. The traditional Social Democratic leadership apparently was willing to accept the amalgamation provided it would have a dominant position in the new party. Another condition was that the S.D.A.P.

(59) Ibid., pp. 184-185.

(60) Handelingen, Tijdelijke Zitting, p. 55, statement of Schermerhorn.

(61) Ruitenbeek, op. cit., p. 275. The A.R.P. had indicated that it opposed the reform idea. The C.H.U. did not react on the invitation to attend the conference. The K.V.P. was prepared to send observers only. However, the sponsors of the conference refused to admit observers.

cadre must also have an important role in the new set-up. (62)

An additional difficult problem for the S.D.A.P. leaders was the fact that a significant Protestant group of "new" democratic socialists objected to joining the S.D.A.P. because of its anti-clerical attitude in earlier days. They argued for the establishment of a "Dutch Labor Party." Concerning this matter, it took the Social Democrats some time to realize that to achieve a socialist party supported by people drawn from all sectors of society, they had to sacrifice the S.D.A.P. (63)

There was also the problem of the working-class in general. Strongly radicalized during the war, they might object to giving up the S.D.A.P. for a new socialist party which in their opinion would include too much of the middle-class element. Finally, several prominent members of the S.D.A.P. were ardent advocates of the N.V.B. ideas. They were strongly urging their party's leadership to solve the problem of the formation of a new socialist party as soon as possible. (64)

By the time of the merger, popular support for the N.V.B. had dwindled to such a degree that the movement had become a "forgotten and unimportant group." (65) The consequences of this for the power position of the former S.D.A.P. within the new Labor Party can be easily seen. Immediately after the liberation, popular support for the N.V.B. was at its peak. This movement, advocating socialist concepts on the broadest national basis possible, apparently could become a threat to the position of the S.D.A.P., if no agreement were achieved to combine their respective strengths. By the time the new Labor Party was formed the position of the N.V.B. had radically changed. It appears that at that juncture the S.D.A.P. was assured of its leading position within the new party.

For the reformers the realization of the "breakthrough" idea appeared to have become wholly dependent upon the support of the former S.D.A.P. In this respect three factors probably decided the issue. First, the former S.D.A.P. had established itself as the second strongest party in parliament since 1918; second, it had mass support among the workers; and third, it possessed a political organization with experience dating back to the turn of the century. The significance of these assets for the implementation of the reform idea in face of opposition from the re-entrenched pre-war sectarian parties needs no elaboration. Relegated to a

(62) Sal Tas, De Politieke Crisis van Nederland, Amsterdam, J. M. Meulenhoff, (1945?), pp. 19-20.

(63) Ruitenbeek, op. cit., p. 200.

(64) Ibid., p. 201.

(65) Ibid., p. 185.

position of insignificance politically, (66) Professor Schermerhorn and his associates of the former underground apparently had no choice but to tie themselves to the apronstrings of the traditional leadership of the S.D.A.P. in order to save their "breakthrough" attempt from total collapse.

As the embodiment of the "breakthrough" idea the Labor Party brought together groups of different philosophic background. All accepted the principles of socialism advocated by the party. Each group based the justification for these principles upon its own philosophy. Democratic socialism was the common guide for political action. The party was an alliance of groups sharing the same social and political objectives; and, in fact, the Labor Party has been referred to as a "federalist" party. (67)

The role played by the S.D.A.P. in the foundation of the new socialist party was made possible by historical developments in its political ideology since its establishment in 1894. Originally its main aim was the political emancipation of the working class. At that time Dutch social democracy was strongly influenced by its German counterpart, which stood close to Marxism. Although the S.D.A.P. included in its principles the doctrines of historical materialism and class-struggle, it was never typically Marxist. Following the first World War, in particular after the defeat of German social democracy in 1933, the S.D.A.P. broke away gradually from Marxist influence. In 1937, this trend culminated in the complete abandonment of historical materialism and the theory of class-struggle. No longer bound by the idea of class distinction, the S.D.A.P. thereafter sought to become a people's party, recruiting its members from all strata of society. It started on a course which eventually led to the complete acceptance of parliamentary democracy as the only means to achieve the ideal of a socialist State. (68)

In 1939, for the first time in its history, the S.D.A.P. joined in the formation of a Cabinet. A "democratic coalition" was constituted by the C.H.U., the K.V.P., the V.D.B. and the Social Democrats. (69) This government was immediately opposed by the A.R.P. Its parliamentary leader, Mr. J. Schouten, refused to

(66) Supra, p. 87.

(67) Ruitenbeek, op. cit., p. 15.

(68) Ibid., pp. 23-41; cf. Tas, De Politieke Crisis van Nederland, pp. 11-13.

(69) In 1913 the Liberal Democrats (V.D.B.) invited the S.D.A.P. to form a Left coalition Cabinet. The Social Democrats, however, refused to cooperate because they felt that their position, both within and outside parliament, was not strong enough to dispel the bourgeois onus that would accompany participation in such an alliance. - Lammers, op. cit., p. 83.

believe that because of its participation in a Cabinet with parties of the Right, the S.D.A.P. had abandoned its intention to achieve its political and social objectives by revolutionary methods. To stress his point he referred to a recent speech of Mr. Drees, in which the Social Democratic leader asserted: (70)

The question whether social democracy should be revolutionary or evolutionary is, actually, no longer a problem. It is and will remain revolutionary in the sense that it aims at a complete reform of society; however, the means to achieve the objective are dependent upon the circumstances in which it is placed, and on the situation in the country in which it fights for its ideal. In countries where democracy does not exist, or, where evolution is obstructed, social democracy must avail itself of revolutionary methods, but where evolutionary procedure is possible, revolutionary means are useless, harmful, and must be rejected.

Mr. Schouten concluded from this statement that the Social Democrats had abandoned their revolutionary standpoint "purely for the sake of expediency."

The Liberal Democrats (V.D.B.), however, interpreted Mr. Drees' position as a rejection in principle of the use of revolutionary methods in States with democratic institutions. (71) With this shift in its political ideology from social democracy to democratic socialism the possibility had been created for the S.D.A.P. to play its part in the foundation of the new Labor Party.

In the period under discussion the parliamentary situation relative to the Indonesian question was highly complicated by the interim nature of both the Cabinet and the legislature. In this context, the Catholic Party's fence-sitting attitude presented the government with a complicated problem. On its parliamentary strength resulting from the 1937 general elections, the Catholic Party commanded the deciding vote on the Indonesia policy of the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet. However, the political division in the provisional parliament did not accurately reflect post-war popular opinion in this respect. Of more importance, it seems, was the fact that the strength of the new Labor Party was as yet

(70) P. J. Oud, Het Jongste Verleden, Parlementaire Geschiedenis van Nederland, Vol. VI, 1937-1940, Aan den Brink--Assen, Van Gorcum & Comp. N. V., 1951, p. 166.

(71) Ibid., pp. 166-167. This Liberal Democrat view is that of Mr. P. J. Oud. When the Labor Party was established, Mr. Oud joined the new socialist party. However, on the eve of the first post-war general elections, in May, 1946, he joined a group of younger members of the Liberal Center, among them Mr. D.U. Stikker, in setting up a new party, the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie. (V.V.D. = "Freedom Party"; presently known as the party of the Dutch industrialists.)

an unknown quantity. Stability in the unsettled political situation could not be expected until general elections had been held. When Dr. van Mook submitted the Djakarta proposals to his government, the projected elections were only one month away.

Given the fluid domestic political situation, with the first post-war general elections not far off, it appears that the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet had ample reason to shun any conclusive arrangements with the Sjahrir Government at that juncture. That this was the position of the Dutch Government is indicated by a remark made by Dr. L. J. M. Beel, Minister of Home Affairs, after the Hoge Veluwe talks had been concluded. When a member of parliament made reference to "the failure at St. Hubertus," Dr. Beel observed that one could not speak of failure "because there was as yet no intention to achieve concrete results." (72)

The same can be inferred from an assertion of the Dutch Prime Minister at the final meeting of the Dutch-Indonesian talks held in the Netherlands. Professor Schermerhorn stated that the draft protocol had not been previously discussed in the Council of Ministers. As such it could not be considered a proposal of the Dutch Government. Furthermore, the Prime Minister's opinion regarding several items in the protocol differed from those of his colleagues. Therefore, the Dutch proposals constituted merely a subject to be discussed by the Netherlands and Indonesian delegations. The informal character of the draft protocol and the pronouncements of the Dutch Ministers referred to appear to indicate clearly that so far as the Netherlands Government was concerned, its delegation to the Hoge Veluwe Conference had no mandate whatsoever to arrive at conclusive arrangements with the Republic. (73)

For the very reason of its interim nature, Dr. van Mook hoped that his government would be prepared to accept the preliminary agreement and attempt to force its acceptance on the provisional legislature. The Lieutenant Governor-General felt that if the

(72) Handelingen, p. 716.

(73) At the final session of the Hoge Veluwe Conference, convoked in The Hague, Prime Minister Schermerhorn on the other hand implied that the discussions in Holland could not produce concrete achievements because the Republican delegation was not in a position to make decisions. He stated that definite results could not be arrived at because the Indonesian delegation had received no mandate whatsoever.

This assertion is incorrect. The Indonesians had been authorized to sign an agreement with the Dutch Government. However, it had been anticipated that the proposals which the Dutch would submit to the Republicans would be in harmony with the Djakarta proposals. This was not the case with the draft protocol of the Netherlands delegation. Consequently, the Republican delegation was confronted with a situation not covered by the mandate received from the Sjahrir Government.

Labor Party were willing to endorse the Djakarta proposals, the contest for their passage through parliament could be changed; "the campaign to persuade the K.V.P. /Catholics/ could begin." However, when he submitted the preliminary agreement to his government, Minister Drees and "others conversant with the domestic political situation" considered the objections to the terms of the accord fundamental and, therefore, insurmountable. (74) Subsequently, Dr. van Mook himself arrived at the conclusion that the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet would not survive the acceptance of the Djakarta proposals in their major points. (75)

The influence of Labor Party politics on the Dutch Government's decision to reject the Djakarta proposals appears to be a significant one. Since the adoption of the van Poll Motion, the responsibility for the Cabinet's policy had come to rest exclusively with the socialists. Defeat of the government would be taken as a failure of the Labor Party, and this failure would be attributed to a policy of wanting to give too many political concessions to the Republic. Public opinion, antagonistic to the Indonesians, would consequently turn against the Labor Party. As such the party's position in the general elections could be greatly impaired. The Labor Party was newly constituted. So far as general elections were concerned, the groups that had merged in the party formed an untried combination. The "federative" Labor Party had yet to prove its cohesive strength. The possible disadvantages for the future of their party apparently discouraged the socialists from risking a showdown in the legislature.

Another compelling reason for the Labor Party leaders not to force the issue seems to be the possible consequence for party alignment which would result from an adverse reaction of the Catholics to the Cabinet's acceptance of the Djakarta proposals. If the Catholics were pushed into opposition, the result would be the resignation of the Schermerhorn-Drees Government. The succeeding Cabinet would most probably be formed by the Catholic Party in combination with the A.R.P., and the C.H.U. Participation of the Liberal Center in this government would not be unlikely. (76) This alliance would mean the return of the coalition of the Right and the

(74) Information obtained from Dr. van Mook, personal interview.

(75) van Mook, op. cit., p. 131.

(76) L. N. Palar, "Indonesië" na de verkiezingen," (Indonesia after the elections), De Brug--Djembatan, (Amsterdam), I, No. 3 (Juni 1946), 5.

Mr. Palar, an Indonesian hailing from Menado, North Celebes, living in Holland since the 1930's, remained there throughout the German occupation. He joined the underground activities of the S.D.A.P., of which he was a member. Before World War II, he was secretary of the Colonial Commission of that party and of the Federation of Netherlands Labor Unions (N.V.V.--Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen). At the time of publication of the above article he was in charge of managing

break-up of the democratic coalition. That the former Social Democrats would strongly oppose a policy leading to this can easily be imagined. For it was only after decades of isolation on the Left that the S.D.A.P. finally succeeded in forging a democratic coalition. (77) In addition, the "breakthrough" idea would, it seems, sustain a serious set-back if the coalition of the Right were to be revived.

Relevant to the Indonesian situation, the consequence of a possible defeat of the Schermerhorn-Drees Government was mentioned at the Hoge Veluwe Conference. The Dutch delegation asserted that the Republic could "expect nothing" from the succeeding government. "The result would be violence and chaos." (78)

The Netherlands delegation appeared to be convinced that with a Right coalition government in power the Dutch policy in Indonesia would be radical and forceful. If under the prevailing circumstances such a government were to press for drastic action, apparently it was feared that the consequences would likely be harmful to the Dutch position in the conflict. So far as the writer can ascertain from the available material, this fear did not stem from any aversion to violence, but rather from the realization that the Dutch did not then have adequate forces to make a military policy profitable. In military terms, the Dutch in the archipelago were still

Indonesian Affairs in the Bureau of the Labor Party (Partij van de Arbeid). He was then a member of the Second Chamber for the Labor Party. In pre-World War II days he had already been a member of Parliament for the S.D.A.P.

When the Dutch launched their first military campaign against the Republic, Mr. Palar immediately resigned his membership in the Labor Party. (This party supported the Dutch Government's decision to use military force against the Indonesians.) Subsequently he left for New York, where, upon appointment by the Republican Government, he became Permanent Observer of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations. In September 1950, when Indonesia was admitted to membership in the United Nations, he was designated Permanent Delegate of his country to that organization. Mr. Palar is presently Indonesian Ambassador to Canada.

Mr. Palar's article was published shortly after the first post-World War II general elections in Holland in May, 1946. The Catholics (Katholieke Volkspartij), winning 32 seats out of one hundred in the Second Chamber, had emerged as the strongest party. Writing of a possible formation of a Right Wing coalition led by the Catholics, Mr. Palar did not doubt that "a...Right Wing Cabinet in which the Anti Revolutionaries and the Christian Historical Union (C.H.U.)--and probably also the Liberals--will have a significant voice..." would fail to find a solution to the Indonesian problem. "It will pursue a policy which will provoke the Indonesians to the limit" and would have consequences difficult to foresee. He was of the opinion that such a development would not be tolerated by the Big Powers. Therefore he believed that a Right Wing coalition government would be short-lived. - Cf. infra.

(77) See supra, pp. 89-90.

very much dependent upon British forces. (79) And, moreover, the islands remained under de facto British authority. If the Dutch were to antagonize the British, the result might be the enhancement of the Republican diplomatic position.

Moreover, it was possible that a deterioration of the situation in Indonesia would bring world opinion around to supporting a plan for international interposition. But the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet quite definitely did not want international intervention in the Indonesian question. (80)

The Dutch Government's objection to the treaty form of the Djakarta draft was based on its unconstitutionality. Another important factor leading to rejection of the treaty form seems to be that it implied recognition of the Republic, which was established by a revolution against the "legitimate authority." This implication apparently was felt to be a fundamental objection within the Labor Party itself. If the former Social Democrats had been willing to make the concession, it would be tantamount on their part to admitting that Dutch parliamentary democracy had failed with regard to the Netherlands East-Indies; that it was obstructing the political evolution of the Indonesian people. Further, it should be borne in mind that the S.D.A.P., since 1937, had renounced the use of revolutionary methods and had committed itself to uphold parliamentary democracy. It was for this reason that its participation in the foundation of the Labor Party had been made possible. A start had been made in realizing the "breakthrough" idea. The long-standing desire of the former S.D.A.P. to become a people's party was materializing.

During the Hoge Veluwe talks, Minister Logemann underscored the revolutionary character of the Republic as the greatest obstacle to arriving at peaceful conditions in Indonesia. In this respect, the problem for the Dutch Government was how to liquidate the revolutionary situation so as to make the Republic acceptable to the Dutch people. (81)

(78) Summary Records H.V., third session, April 14, 1946, statement of Prime Minister Schermerhorn.

(79) On April 13, 1946, Lieutenant General S.H. Spoor, Dutch army commander in Indonesia, stated to a United Press correspondent that Dutch troops would gradually replace the British forces. However, the general said, with the forces then under his command he would be unable to control Java. Therefore, he did not wish the British to leave Indonesia too soon. - Merdeka, April 15, 1946.

(80) Summary Records H.V., third session, April 14, 1946, statement of Prime Minister Schermerhorn.

(81) Ibid., final meeting, April 24, 1946.

Prime Minister Schermerhorn expressed a similar view when he explained the purpose in having three Indonesians who had been in Holland during the German occupation join the Republican delegation on its way back to Djakarta. These Indonesians, Messrs. Setyadjit, Maroeto Daroesman and Saroso Wirodihardjo, had participated in the underground. Therefore, Professor Schermerhorn felt that they were well qualified to explain to the Republican leaders in Indonesia the political situation and sentiments in Holland. Among other things, they would explain the circumstances of a group united by bonds which had developed historically and which had been strengthened during the war years. For this group the revolutionary situation in Indonesia was "difficult to digest." (82) The Dutch Prime Minister obviously referred to the newly established Labor Party.

At the Hoge Veluwe Conference the dominance of Labor Party politics was made manifest by the participation of Minister Drees in the talks. Mr. Drees had been a member of the Second Chamber for the S.D.A.P. since 1933. Highly respected in social democratic circles, he was top-ranking in his party long before World War II. His position was equally prominent in the Labor Party. (83) The significance of his presence as a member of the Dutch delegation was made evident when Prime Minister Schermerhorn introduced him to the Republicans as "our political mentor." (84) During the discussions, Mr. Drees appeared to be opposed to any positive pronouncements by the Dutch delegation regarding the negotiating position of the Netherlands Government. (85)

The degree of importance of Dutch public opinion as a deterrent to the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet's taking decisive action in the Indonesian situation can be illustrated with the following. The revolution against what the Dutch generally considered an enlightened and beneficent colonial rule, public anxiety about the fate of ex-internees still confined in Republican-controlled territory, and reports of atrocities allegedly committed by Indonesian nationalists, had given rise to a public feeling violently opposed to any dealings with the Republic. Further impassioned by extra-parliamentary agitation of colonial die-hards and arch conservatives, the anti-Republican sentiment apparently deeply

(82) Ibid. A perusal of the Dutch draft protocol will reveal that in this document any implication of recognizing the Republic as an established fact has been avoided.

(83) This was confirmed by Mr. Setyadjit Soegondo. - Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono, personal letter.

(84) Information obtained from Mr. Soewandi and Dr. Soedarsono, personal letters.

(85) Information obtained from Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo (personal interview) and Mr. Soewandi (personal letter).

impressed the Netherlands Government. During the conference on the Hoge Veluwe, the St. Hubertus Hunting Lodge was guarded by police and soldiers in a way which Dr. van Mook thought highly exaggerated. The Dutch Government seemed to fear an outburst of public violence while the talks were in progress. (86)

The last series of public debates on Indonesia in the Dutch Provisional Parliament before the Hoge Veluwe talks began, were held on January 15, 16 and 17, 1946. During the discussions, the A.R.P., the C.H.U., the State Reformed Party and the Liberal Center continued strongly to criticize the government's policy. The controversy did not concern the substance of the Cabinet's policy. Rather, the opposition was mainly to the procedure for seeking to realize the substantive objectives. (87) In this respect two factors rendered the standpoint of the Right rigid and inflexible. First, basing the legitimacy of Dutch authority on their religious convictions, they insisted that any dealings with the Republic must necessarily be conditioned upon recognition of that authority by the Indonesians. Second, inasmuch as the Republic had been established by a revolt against the legitimate authority, any action of the Netherlands Government which could be construed as conferring recognition upon the Republic must be rejected. (88)

The Catholic Party's position was explained by Mr. M.J.M. van

(86) Information obtained from Dr. van Mook, personal interview. While the Hoge Veluwe talks were in progress, Mr. Romme published his editorial, "Week der Schande."

(87) Handelingen, p. 305, statement by Mr. M.J.M. van Poll.

(88) Mr. M.J.M. van Poll (K.V.P.) stated:
 "...all authority derives from God...therefore, Dutch authority in the Netherlands East-Indies is willed by God;...charged with the mandate to serve the peoples of Indonesia...this authority is called upon to guide the development of the Indonesian peoples toward complete self-government...The Dutch cannot abandon this task under pressure of violence availed of to defy their legitimate authority..." Mr. van Poll did not deny that history was replete with events whereby people revolted against the authority placed over them. This occurred when the authority abused its power to serve. In that case, the development leading to such an event was a matter known by God only. It was then no longer a matter of law. Handelingen, pp. 304-305.

Mr. J.J.W.A. Meijerink (A.R.P.) stated:
 "To maintain God's authority, the (Dutch) government may consider itself in God's servitude...It must not hesitate to wield the sword, if necessary." Ibid., Tijdelijke Zitting, p. 97.

Poll. (89) The K.V.P. supported the government's aim of autonomy for Indonesia within the Dutch Realm. It also agreed to negotiations with moderate nationalists. This was considered both a necessity and a moral duty. It was necessary because the restoration of Dutch authority and law and order by forceful action proved unworkable under the existing circumstances, despite the fact that "quite a few" were in favor of such a method. To try to negotiate with moderate nationalists was a moral duty because the utmost had to be done to avoid bloodshed, which could only result in alienation of the Dutch from the Indonesians. However, the Netherlands authorities must not hold discussions with people who refuse to recognize Dutch sovereignty in the archipelago. In this connection the propriety of the talks between the Sjahrir Government and Dr. van Mook was questioned. The Republican Prime Minister had stated repeatedly that he was willing to negotiate if the Republic of Indonesia were recognized as the de facto authority. So far, the Catholic Party was dissatisfied with Dutch policy in the Indies. The existence of the Dutch Empire was at stake. Therefore, it must be made absolutely certain that the man charged with safeguarding Netherlands interests in Indonesia was the best available. Mr. van Poll doubted whether Dr. van Mook was the right man. The Catholics' spokesman submitted that the reason for his criticism was not so much that negotiations had been held with Sjahrir. The views and ideas of the Republican Prime Minister as revealed in his book *Indonesische Overpeinzingen* (English translation entitled "Out of Exile") showed him "completely occidental" in his thinking. Besides, Sjahrir, as early as 1938, appeared to be convinced that in view of the international situation Dutch-Indonesian cooperation was essential. (90) Mr. van Poll stated that "one could reason with someone like Sjahrir." (91)

Speaking for the Anti-Revolutionary Party, Mr. J. Schouten declared that "understanding must be shown for the aspirations manifest in Indonesian nationalism." The ultimate objective of Dutch policy should be complete independence of the Indies in domestic affairs. To begin with, "an important measure of

(89) For the percentage of membership in the Second Chamber of the parties the attitudes of which are referred to here, see: Appendix G.

(90) Soetan Sjahrir, *Out of Exile*, p. 211. Mr. van Poll thought the talks between van Mook and Sjahrir questionable apparently because of statements of the Republican Prime Minister like the following:

"Sjahrir asserted the belief that no settlement was possible 'unless it is made by a joint agreement between the United Nations and us'. By implication he refused recognition of the Netherlands interest in Indonesia as being any way different from that of other nations. 'We are willing to consider and welcome Dr. van Mook as the first envoy of a foreign but well known country to discuss with us, we hope, in the friendliest way, Dutch interests and the Dutch point of view'." - *New York Times*, January 16, 1946.

(91) *Handelingen*, pp. 256-257.

further independence" in such matters must immediately be granted. Plans to that effect should be worked out and implemented as soon as possible. Concerning future political reforms for Indonesia, all blueprints for their realization must be based on the principles contained in the Queen's speech of December 6, 1942. Subsequently, proposals for reforms must be submitted for the consideration and approval of the Dutch legislature.

For the Anti-Revolutionaries, recognition of the "so-called Republic of Indonesia" would mean disintegration of the Kingdom and abandonment of the plan for union within the Dutch Realm. Negotiations with Sjahrir were rejected because he was Sukarno's "partisan." Distrust of the Cabinet's policy was implied when Mr. Schouten reproached the government for its refusal to disclose information regarding the Chequers Conference. The strong dissatisfaction with the government's policy led the A.R.P. to conclude that it could not support this policy. Mr. Schouten vigorously expressed his disapproval of Dr. van Mook's conduct of affairs in Djakarta. It was stated that if the government would dismiss Dr. van Mook, the Anti-Revolutionaries would be willing to construe this measure as a revision in the trend of the Cabinet's policy. The A.R.P. would consequently be much more inclined to consider that policy favorable. (92)

The Christian Historical Union and the State Reformed Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerden) took a stand similar to that of the Anti-Revolutionary Party. (93)

The Liberal Center adamantly held that the Republicans were nothing but Japanese puppets. The Dutch Government's policy must be aimed at returning law and order by force. (94)

Eventually, the debates resulted in the adoption of the van Poll Motion. As mentioned earlier, this situation apparently was a factor in the Cabinet's decision to convene the States General in secret session on February 7, 1946. The main topic of deliberations was said to have been the Dutch Statement of Policy which the Lieutenant Governor-General submitted to the Sjahrir Government on February 10. These secret discussions, it seems, provided the Dutch Government with guidance to judge how far parliament would go to meet the negotiating position of the Republic.

It has been contended that with regard to its Indonesia policy the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet should have defied the interim legislature. However, the Netherlands Government did not have the courage to do so. Instead it justified its indecision in terms of the

(92) Ibid., pp. 282, 284, 285.

(93) Ibid., pp. 291-292.

(94) Ibid., pp. 266-267.

parliamentary majority which was opposed to the Cabinet's policy. Its alibi was a hostile provisional legislature which represented an outdated political situation. Moreover, the emergency parliament had little public support, while the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet enjoyed popular confidence and prestige which in the early period following its inception were almost limitless. (95)

However, to project this situation into the period under discussion would be incorrect. The Nederlandse Volksbeweging as a source of popular support for the Cabinet had lost its significance. The extra parliamentary Schermerhorn-Drees Government had for all practical purposes become a Labor Party Government. The position of the new Socialist Party derived mainly from the pre-war status of the Social Democrats, the leadership of which was dominant in the new Labor Party. This appears to have been an important factor for the Labor Party, and as such for the Schermerhorn-Drees Government, in being so much concerned with the opinion of a legislature which obviously was not representative of contemporary political conditions. Nevertheless, the former Social Democrats apparently felt that this seemingly incongruent political situation would not differ too much from what they expected after the general elections. The Labor Party leaders did not anticipate a victory in the elections. (96) These circumstances may help to explain why the provisional parliament exerted such a dominant influence on the Indonesia policy of the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet.

The reappearance of party politics in the pre-war pattern had become apparent even before parliamentary activities were restored. Developments which made this possible were as follows.

The first post-liberation representative institution was a Council of Trustees organized by the underground. Originally it was set up to advise the Dutch Government, which would return from exile in London. The Council was composed of Catholics, Social Democrats and Protestants. In May, 1945, it assumed its functions. After the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet was formed in the following month, the Council was replaced by a National Advisory Committee (Nationale Advies Commissie - N.A.C.) made up of 43 members drawn from among the pre-war political parties and the new resistance leaders. This Committee was the second stage in the restoration of the national legislature. (97) Developments in this Committee apparently were of decisive influence in the trend of Dutch post-war politics. The majority of the N.A.C. were members of parliament elected before 1940. Although it resembled somewhat the representative institution which had been the subject of many discussions in the underground, it was not in the interest of the pre-war parliamentary members to build up the N.A.C. into

(95) J. de Kadt, op. cit., pp. 128-129.

(96) Information obtained from Dr. van Mook, personal interview.

(97) Eldersveld, op. cit., p. 129.

a powerful representative body. On the contrary, as members of established political parties it would be to their benefit to play down the significance of the Committee. They did so by voting against public debates in the N.A.C. Consequently it appears that whatever progressive thinking may have been developed by the leaders of the former resistance in the Committee, it never reached the public. In the meantime parliamentary activity was resumed. The debates in the interim legislature, which were open to the public, provided pre-war politics with the opportunity to re-assert itself to the fullest extent. (98) In other words the responsible politicians in Dutch post-war politics were those who had dominated the scene since 1937. Therefore, it seems that these responsible politicians in their view vis-a-vis the Indonesian situation oriented themselves within the frame of reference which had guided Dutch policy in the Indies before the war. So far as the Republic was concerned, it appears that they considered its existence mainly in terms of a revolt against the legitimate authority which was sponsored by the Japanese and incited by a few extremist nationalists. Dutch politicians were simply incapable of viewing the matter in its broader implications, namely as a facet of the post-war upsurge of colonial peoples over all of Asia determined to regain their freedom.

Apparently overwhelmed by the factors which in its opinion militated against acceptance of the Djakarta proposals, the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet could consider the Hoge Veluwe Conference only as an opportunity to get first-hand information from the visiting Republicans concerning views and sentiments in the Republic with respect to Indonesian aspirations for independence. (99)

As an immediate and concrete gain arising from the talks Prime Minister Schermerhorn mentioned the fact that the Dutch Government "is now in a better position to defend its policy with more color and background" before parliament. This was done by Minister Logemann on May 2, 1946. What the Minister of Overseas

(98) Tas, De Politieke Crisis van Nederland, p. 7.

(99) That the Dutch thereby possibly employed a questionable method may appear from the following.

The Republican delegation had been instructed to keep the Sjahrir Government in Djakarta constantly informed about the developments of the Hoge Veluwe Conference. The Indonesian delegation sent several cabled reports through Dutch facilities. However, these reports were never received by Sjahrir. (Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono, personal letter.) If the Republican Government had immediately been informed of the Dutch draft protocol, it might have forthwith recalled its delegation. The Dutch then would have had no opportunity for further discussions with the Republican ministers.

During the writer's interview with Dr. van Mook, the latter volunteered the information that "there was some difficulty about communications" between the Indonesian delegation and Sjahrir.

Territories had to say about the Republic was now given substance by information received directly from Republican leaders themselves. The data submitted by the government to the Second Chamber could no longer be considered as having first gone "through the filter" of the mistrusted Dr. van Mook in Djakarta. (100)

Concerning the Hoge Veluwe Conference, Minister Logemann declared that "the discussions have not led as yet to a complete agreement... This means that the discussions are not over and that they will have to be continued without delay." (101)

When the Republican delegation left for the Netherlands, Sjahrir apparently did not share in his colleagues' optimism about the outcome of their mission. Prior to the Indonesian delegation's departure for Holland, the Republicans decided that while the Hoge Veluwe talks were in progress Prime Minister Sjahrir and the remaining members of his Cabinet would try to prepare public opinion in the Republic for acceptance of the preliminary agreement. (102) However, efforts in that direction were never made. This is mentioned to show that Sjahrir did not believe the Dutch Government would accept the Djakarta proposals. (103)

Upon its return to Djakarta the Indonesian delegation, in submitting its report to the Sjahrir Cabinet, confined itself to explaining the position of the Schermerhorn-Drees Government relative to the Indonesian problem in general, and vis-a-vis the Djakarta proposals in particular. So far as the Republican Government was concerned this report was the last to refer to the Hoge Veluwe talks in its efforts to come to a settlement with the Dutch. For the Republic, the next stage in the Indonesian-Dutch negotiations developed with practically no bearing whatsoever on what had come to pass at the St. Hubertus Hunting Lodge. (104)

(100) Handelingen, p. 258, statement by Mr. M.J.M. van Poll.

(101) Ibid., p. 698.

(102) Information obtained from Mr. Soewandi, personal letter.

(103) Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono, personal letter. To the press Sjahrir merely stated that negotiations thus far had not gone beyond the stage of "comparison between the Indonesian and the Dutch viewpoints." This procedure was to be continued by sending a Republican Delegation to Holland.

When asked to confirm a rumor that the talks in Djakarta had resulted in a provisional agreement, Sjahrir dismissed it as incorrect. - Merdeka, April 2 and 3, 1946.

(104) Information obtained from Mr. Soewandi, personal letter. In a public statement Mr. Soewandi declared that the Indonesian Delegation "had clarified the standpoint of the Republic, while the Dutch Government had explained their point of view." - Merdeka, April 30, 1946.

In the period immediately following the Hoge Veluwe talks, the Sjahrir Government was quite uncertain about further developments in the Indonesian-Dutch conflict. The attitude of the Dutch Government with respect to the preliminary agreement, however, had made it clear to the Indonesians that their controversy with the Netherlands most likely could not be solved by negotiations involving only the parties directly concerned. (105) It was apparently this that made Sjahrir pursue with more vigor a policy aimed at strengthening the Republic's diplomatic position through international contacts. The first step in that direction was to implement as soon as possible the Republic's offer, made in April, 1946, to supply rice to India, which at that time was suffering from a serious shortage of food. (106)

In his statement of May 2, 1946, before the Second Chamber (107) reporting on the Hoge Veluwe Conference, Minister Logemann submitted that the talks in Djakarta had "led to the conclusion that the Indonesian Republic might be recognized as part of the Federal Commonwealth" which the Dutch envisaged for Indonesia. Underlying this viewpoint was the fact that the Indonesian nationalists considered the Republic "as the realization of the eager desire for national self-expression and independence, this view being held generally in Javanese nationalist circles and also partly beyond the (island)." For that matter, the "idea of abandoning the Republic surely may be regarded as being one that could not be digested by any Javanese nationalist." Moreover, despite the fact that the Republicans felt they had the support of the entire archipelago, they were willing to admit that they had only a limited *de facto* authority. This development appealed to the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet because it implied the end of the revolution. The Dutch Government was of the opinion that the Republic, though not explicitly, had expressed its willingness to recognize Netherlands sovereignty in the Indies. It was also ready to accept the principles set forth in the Dutch Government Declaration of February 10, 1946, as the basis for the future political structure of Indonesia. On the strength of this declaration the Dutch reserved the right to confer upon the representative of the Crown, proposed to head the Commonwealth of Indonesia, such special powers as it deemed necessary "to assume final responsibility with respect to fundamental rights, for proper administration and sound finances (applied) to the entire Commonwealth of Indonesia and also to its constituent parts

(105) Information obtained from Dr. Soedarsono, personal letter.

(106) van Mook, *op. cit.*, p. 135; Raliby, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

(107) Shortly following Logemann's statement the Government of the Republic issued a communique to the effect that this statement was the responsibility of the Dutch Cabinet exclusively. Thus, the Sjahrir Government apparently wished to indicate that whatever declaration made by the Republican representatives on the Hoge Veluwe, it felt itself free of any commitment. - Rakjat, May 4, 1946, (Indonesian language newspaper in Jogjakarta, Central Java).

(separately)." The willingness of the Dutch Government to recognize the Republic as a constituent part of the Commonwealth, therefore, did not "imply that the Kingdom would abandon such powers..." Logemann asserted that in "adhering to the views expressed in the February 10 Declaration, the only question that may arise is whether for certain territory it might be regarded as being the autonomous organization of one of the constituent (parts) of the Commonwealth." The Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet felt "that this concept may be acceptable indeed in so far as Java is concerned." (108)

However, many objections still existed to the Republic in its then current form. If it succeeded in eliminating "the sinister elements playing a major part" in the Republic, it could become "the materialization of the political desires of the entire Indonesian population." When the Republicans, together with "true nationalists," were willing to take a firm stand against the extremists, it "stands to reason that the armed forces of the Kingdom will then be charged with the maintenance of law and order wherever the local authorities of the Commonwealth and its (constituent) parts prove unable to maintain them by normal means." (109)

In a cautious move apparently meant "to get approval of the (legislature) for lifting the cover of the inverted commas from the words 'Republic of Indonesia'," (110) Logemann submitted that the "Republic being the exponent of their national ambitions," it was understandable that the Indonesians stressed the term "Republic." (111)

Further obstacles in the way of Dutch recognition of the Republic as representative of Indonesian nationalism were, first, that it must be purged of all Japanese influence still prevalent in the Republic; second, the Dutch refused to make any commitment before the "liberation and safety of (Dutch) internees who are still in the non-occupied (Republican) area of Java," had been secured. (112)

Despite the fact that the Government Statement, as far as can be ascertained, reduced the Republic to one in name only which amounted to no more than "administrative organization" in the Commonwealth under complete control of the representative of the Dutch Crown (as such, dominated by the Dutch parliament), it was

(108) Handelingen, p. 699.

(109) Ibid., p. 700.

(110) I. Chaudhry, The Indonesian Struggle, Lahore, Pakistan, Feroz Sons, 1950.

(111) Handelingen, p. 700.

(112) Ibid., p. 701.

sharply criticized by the Right Wing parties such as the Anti-Revolutionaries and the Christian Historical Union. The so-called Liberal Center joined in the criticism. The opposition held that the policy of the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet was a deviation from the principles laid down in the Queen's speech of December, 1942. It stubbornly contended that recognition of the Republic would mean the disintegration of the Dutch Empire. (113)

The Catholics were of the opinion that although the Government Statement was open to sharp criticism, they felt it advisable to avoid extensive debates on the matter. Further deliberations on the Cabinet's policy would lead the legislature to express an opinion. After ten days the first post-World War II general elections were to be held (May 17, 1946). A vote in parliament at that juncture on the Indonesia policy of the government might prejudice the position of the Cabinet to be formed after the elections. Whatever the judgement pronounced on this policy, it must be admitted that, (114)

- (1) it had not resulted in a situation which could not be undone;
- (2) an advantage had been gained in that the Indonesian representatives on the Hoge Veluwe had declared the Republic was prepared to recognize Dutch sovereignty in the Indies;
- (3) the government had given assurances that "as yet many things are obstructing" the achievement of a favorable outcome of the discussions with the Republicans, such as Japanese influence on the Republic, etc.;
- (4) provision had been made for a Conference of the Realm to have the final decision on an agreement reached between the Dutch Government and the Republic.

From the above Mr. M.J.M. van Poll, the Catholic's spokesman, failed to see the necessity of any hasty action of the legislature on the Indonesia policy of the Government in power. In summing up the issues concerning which virtual concurrence existed in the Second Chamber, van Poll submitted that, (115)

- (1) so far as could be ascertained there was no opposition to giving a form of autonomous government to the Indies;

(113) Ibid., p. 723, statement of Schouten (Anti-Revolutionary Party); p. 739, statement of Tilanus (Christian Historical Union).

(114) Ibid., p. 751, statement of van Poll.

(115) Ibid.

- (2) both the Second Chamber and the government felt that continued presence of Japanese troops in Indonesia would perpetuate their undesirable influence on the "leadership" of the Republic;
- (3) as long as the Dutch ex-prisoners-of-war and internees, still detained in camps on Indonesian-held territories, were not set free, no sphere of mutual confidence could be created between the Dutch and the Republic;
- (4) the legislature and the Cabinet shared the view that the peoples of the islands outside of Java-Madura must have a vote in deciding the future political status of Indonesia as a whole; that, therefore, they must be given the measure of independence due to them;
- (5) that to implement the above, the Conference of the Realm should be convoked as soon as possible.

As to the problem whether the name "republic" could be given to all or part of Indonesia, van Poll stated it did not apply to the Republic with which discussions were being held, at least not "in its present form." In exploring the question whether or not part or all of an autonomous Indonesia could be named "republic" the Catholics' spokesman referred to examples of republics which constituted part of a larger political entity, to wit: "Eire, Vietnam, the Soviet Union, the German Federation among others consisting of the Kingdom of Bavaria, Saxony and Würtemberg, but also of the Free Cities of Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck...." (116)

Upon the basis of these observations van Poll introduced the following Motion: (117)

The Chamber, on the basis of (deliberations) held today /May 7, 1946/ and previously, being of the opinion that an autonomous form of administration should be granted to the Netherlands Indies territory as a partner of the Kingdom and considering -

That the discussions are in progress regarding the form and the degree of this autonomy, for the entire territory as well as for its parts;

That it must be deemed necessary to hold such discussions also with representatives of the Outer Territories (islands other than Java and Sumatra) and that meanwhile the establishment of autonomous organs for those territories should be striven for energetically;

That, consequently, it is desirable to convoke as quickly as possible the Conference of the Realm which has been in preparation for a considerable time;

(116) Ibid., p. 752.

(117) Ibid. Tr., Netherlands Information Bureau, Netherlands News Letter, New York, June 1, 1946.

That, in deciding the form of the aforementioned autonomy, some kind of republican form for the internal organization of the autonomous territory or one of its parts--provided it is purged of Japanese influence--need not be excluded in advance;

That, however, in continuing the discussions first of all it should be determined that the liberation of Netherlands subjects still detained in internment camps shall be brought to its conclusion quickly and (in a well-regulated manner);

That, failure of this liberation to materialize would be an obstacle to continuance of the discussions;

Resolves to request the Government most strongly to continue the discussions now taking place in accordance with the directives contained in the above considerations.

When, depending on whether the view was that of a party pro or contra the Cabinet's policy, it appeared that the Motion was considered either as an expression of confidence or of no-confidence, van Poll emphatically stated the purport of the Motion to be: the maintenance of the existing status quo until a new government would have been formed after the elections. (118)

The Schermerhorn-Drees Government considered the Motion a listing of matters on which the majority of the Second Chamber agreed with the Cabinet, and was therefore welcome. It did not, however, view the Motion as a program binding on the Dutch Government. Meanwhile, discussions with the Republic would be continued on the basis of the February 10, 1946 Declaration. The debates on the Motion were concluded with its acceptance by 45 votes to 25. In favor were the Catholics, the Labor Party and the Communists. The Anti-Revolutionaries, the Christian Historical Union and the Liberals rejected it. (119)

After the general elections on May 17, 1946, the Schermerhorn-Drees Cabinet, then a caretaker government, made the first move beyond the Hoge Veluwe phase in the Indonesian-Dutch negotiations. In answer to the Republic's proposals of March 27, 1946, and as the basis on which the Dutch proposed to continue negotiations, Lieutenant Governor-General van Mook submitted the draft protocol of the Netherlands Government to the Sjahrir Cabinet on May 19, 1946. Although actual negotiations did not begin until after the formation of a new Dutch government, this was the initial step that eventually led to the Linggadjati Agreement of November, 1946. (120)

(118) Handelingen, p. 785.

(119) Ibid.

(120) van Mook, op. cit., pp. 138-139.

APPENDIX A

DUTCH GOVERNMENT NINE POINT PROPOSAL

6 November 1945

- (1) A Central Indies Government consisting of a democratic representative body with a substantial majority of Indonesian members, and a Council of Ministers under a Governor-General as a representative of the Netherlands Crown. That body will govern internal affairs.
- (2) Indonesia is to become a full partner in the Commonwealth, and the machinery for the Commonwealth is to be decided at a round table conference to be held as soon as possible.
- (3) Suffrage will be a subject of consultation, but it will rest on adequate representation of all groups.
- (4) An increase of Indonesian and other non-Netherlands citizens in the general service of the Kingdom. Regulations based on racial discrimination shall be abrogated, along with the distinction between the Netherlands and Indonesian civil service.
- (5) No separate penal laws.
- (6) A reform of the educational system to cut down illiteracy to a minimum.
- (7) Recognition of the Indonesian language as official along with the Dutch.
- (8) Encouragement of increased industrial effort by all racial groups; increased production and improved distribution of income.
- (9) A strong armed force built upon militia defense, with all groups participating.

"The reconstruction of Indonesia will have to be quickly taken in hand; otherwise the general impoverishment and lawlessness will have grown to such an extent that recovery may be hardly possible," the statement said.

New York Times, November 7, 1945

APPENDIX B
TEXT OF DUTCH POLICY STATEMENT

10 February 1946

In their policy regarding Indonesia the Netherlands Government are inspired by the conviction expressed in the address delivered by Her Majesty the Queen on December 6, 1942, by the following words:

"I know that no political unity nor national cohesion can continue to exist which is not supported by the voluntary acceptance and the faith of the great majority of the citizenry."

The Netherlands Government consequently take the view that the peoples of Indonesia should, after a given preparatory period, be enabled freely to decide their political destiny. Therefore, the Netherlands Government, deeply conscious of their responsibility, consider it their duty to do everything in their power in order to create and to fulfill as soon as possible the conditions which will permit such a free decision to be taken and which will assure its international recognition, thereby complying with Article 73 of the United Nations Charter.

Without derogating in any way from the above-mentioned principle, the Netherlands Government are furthermore convinced that the true interests of the country and of the respective peoples of Indonesia will thereafter find their best guarantee in the voluntary continuation, in the words of Her Majesty, of:

"A realm in which the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam and Curaçao will participate with complete self-reliance and freedom of conduct for each part regarding its internal affairs, but with the readiness to render mutual assistance."

The Netherlands Government, therefore, intend, in consultation with authoritative representatives of Indonesia elected from a large variety of groups, to draft a structure for the Kingdom and for Indonesia based upon democratic partnership. This structure will remain in force for a given period of time, during which it is believed that the conditions which will make possible the taking of the above-mentioned free decision will be fulfilled; after that period the partners shall independently decide upon the continuance of their relations on the basis of a then complete and voluntary partnership. Difference of opinion regarding the question whether that period should be further extended before a free decision can be taken shall be submitted to a procedure of conciliation or, if necessary, arbitration.

With respect to the structure mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, discussions will be held in accordance with the following main points:

- (A) There shall be a Commonwealth of Indonesia, a partner in the Kingdom, composed of territories possessing different degrees of autonomy.
- (B) There shall be established an Indonesian citizenship for all born in Indonesia; Netherlands and Indonesian citizens shall be entitled to exercise all civic rights in all parts of the Kingdom.
- (C) The domestic affairs of the Commonwealth of Indonesia shall be managed independently by the Commonwealth's own institutions; for the Commonwealth as a whole the creation of a democratic representative body containing, therefore, a substantial Indonesian majority, is contemplated, and furthermore a Cabinet formed in political harmony with the representative body, and a representative of the Crown as the head of the Government's executive.
- (D) To be enabled to fulfill the obligations incumbent upon the Kingdom as a result of Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations, the representative of the Crown shall possess under his responsibility to the Government of the Kingdom, special powers to guarantee fundamental rights, an efficient administration and sound financial management. These powers shall be exercised only when these rights and interests are affected.
- (E) The envisaged Constitution containing the above-mentioned structure shall comprise guarantees for fundamental rights such as freedom of worship, legal equality without discrimination as to creed or race, protection of person and property, independence of the judiciary, protection of the rights of minorities, freedom of education and freedom of opinion and expression.
- (F) The central institutions functioning for the entire Kingdom shall be composed of representatives of the constituent parts of the Kingdom. The establishment of a Commonwealth Cabinet composed of Ministers from the constituent parts of the Kingdom is contemplated, as also Commonwealth legislation requiring the agreement of the Parliaments of the respective constituent parts of the Kingdom.
- (G) After the entry into force of the above-mentioned Constitution the Netherlands Government shall promote the early admission of the Commonwealth of Indonesia as a member of the United Nations Organization.

Cf. Wehl, op. cit., pp. 110-111.

APPENDIX C
INDONESIAN PROPOSALS IN ANSWER
TO THE DECLARATION OF DUTCH POLICY

13 March 1946

1. The Republic of Indonesia shall be recognized as exercising the sovereign authority in the territory of the former Netherlands Indies.
2. The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia shall, if necessary, be rendered in complete harmony with fundamental principles prevailing in a democratic state; in so doing due consideration shall be given to the protection of minorities.
3. In accordance with these principles the requirements for citizenship shall be determined on the most liberal basis possible; however, those among the non-Indonesians who prefer to remain aliens shall not be prevented from doing so.
4. On the premise to be guided by public welfare, the policy followed with respect to admittance of aliens for domicile and labor, as of investment and operation for foreign capital, shall be the open door policy.
5. Debts of the Netherlands Indies and of the autonomous territories incurred prior to March, 1942, shall for the remainder be transferred to the Republic of Indonesia.
6. Agreements shall be concluded with the Kingdom of the Netherlands to regulate Netherlands interests in matter of personnel, finance, economy and others in an equitable manner.
7. For a defined period a federative union shall be constituted, composed of the Netherlands and Indonesia, whereby the conduct of foreign relations and of the defense of both countries shall be entrusted to a federal institution comprised of Dutch and Indonesian representatives.
8. The federal institution has the additional task of assuring that in both states the fundamental (human) rights shall be respected, that an efficient administration and a sound financial management are guaranteed and the agreements referred to under point 6 are adhered to.
9. Immediately after this agreement becomes effective the Netherlands forces shall be withdrawn from Indonesia. Wherever necessary, they shall be replaced by the forces of the Republic.

10. Likewise, general amnesty shall be granted to persons convicted or prosecuted because of political and related offenses.
11. The Netherlands Government shall promote the admission of Indonesia as a member of the UNO.
12. Pending these discussions all military movements shall be suspended and the Indonesian Government shall undertake to devote special attention to the protection and evacuation of Dutch and other internees.

Van Mook, op. cit., pp. 123-124, trans. by the writer.

APPENDIX D

PROVISIONAL DRAFT AGREEMENT SUBMITTED BY PRIME MINISTER SJAHIR
TO LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR-GENERAL DR. VAN MOOK ON MARCH 27, 1946.
(The Amended van Mook Proposals of March 25, 1946).

The Netherlands Government represented by Dr. Hubertus van Mook, Lieutenant Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies, and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, represented by its President, Ir. Soekarno and Prime Minister, Soetan Sjahrir, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Netherlands Government recognizes the Government of the Republic of Indonesia as exercising de facto authority in Java and Sumatra exclusive of areas under control of the Allied Military Administration. It agrees to cooperate with the Government of the Republic in the rapid formation of an Indonesian federative Free State, composed of all parts of the Netherlands Indies, partner in a political union with the Netherlands, Surinam and Curaçao, and in concurrence with the general principles of the Statement of the Netherlands Government of February 10, 1946.

Article 2

The Government of the Republic of Indonesia undertakes to welcome in a friendly manner the Allied Forces, inclusive of those of the Netherlands, which are in or will enter Java and Sumatra, and to assist them in the execution of their task of accepting the surrender of and evacuating the Japanese forces, and of releasing the former internees and prisoners of war. The procedure to execute this task shall be a matter of subsequent consultation between the parties.

Article 3

Immediately after the agreement becomes effective, the parties shall cease hostilities and in so doing maintain their present positions, except as provided for under Article 2. As soon as possible there shall be consultations between the two parties on the cooperation necessary for the factual implementation of this provision.

Article 4

As soon as possible the Government of the Netherlands shall begin negotiations with the Government of the Republic on the structure of the Indonesian Free State referred to in Article 1, its status in the Union, its relations with foreign powers, its

cooperation with the Netherlands and the promotion of material and cultural interests of the Dutch and aliens in Indonesia. The negotiations may be held in Jogjakarta, Batavia or The Hague.

Article 5

Representatives of territories other than Java and Sumatra, and of the most important non-Indonesian communities, shall be admitted to participate in the negotiations mentioned in the preceding Article. The territories and communities which have been considered for special representation are defined in the appendix to this agreement. Regulations concerning the designation of these representatives shall be stipulated in an agreement between the Government of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. The territories and communities referred to in this Article shall have the authority to delegate their right of representation to the Republic.

Article 6

If a territory, through its representatives, expresses the opinion that it provisionally objects to joining unconditionally the Free State to be constituted, allowing for such objections provisions shall be made for the territory concerned to have a temporarily special status within the Free State and with respect to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. After a period of three years a plebiscite shall be held to determine the future relationship.

Article 7

This agreement shall be drawn up in the Dutch and Indonesian languages. In case of a difference of opinion regarding the meaning of the text, the Dutch text shall prevail.

The agreement becomes effective upon signature.

Van Mook, op. cit., pp. 126-129, trans. by the writer.

APPENDIX E
 NETHERLANDS DRAFT PROTOCOL SUBMITTED
 TO THE INDONESIAN DELEGATION ON APRIL 14, 1946

Protocol

On March..., 1946, a Netherlands delegation and an Indonesian delegation met in Batavia to discuss the current difficulties.

Subsequently, these discussions were continued until April..., 1946, and, after consultations with the Netherlands Government in Holland, led to the following conclusions.

- (1) The Netherlands Government shall promote that, in accordance with constitutional procedure and as soon as possible, a federative Commonwealth of Indonesia shall be established, as a partner of the Netherlands, Surinam and Curaçao in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, in which Java (Madura included) as component part of the Commonwealth shall constitute an autonomous republic, and in concurrence with the principles of the Statement of the Netherlands Government of February 10, 1946.
- (2) The Government of the Republic of Indonesia proclaimed on August 17, 1945, shall on behalf of the Indonesian population of Java take part in the formation of the Commonwealth and also exert its influence for the realization of the structure defined under (1).

Pending the legitimate formation of the Commonwealth, the administration in Java, with the exception of the territories occupied by the Allied military administration, shall be carried out by the above-mentioned government which is responsible for the restoration and the maintenance of order, and the protection of life and property, inclusive of immediately releasing and safeguarding persons presently interned, if necessary in cooperation with the organs of the Netherlands Government.

- (3) The other parts of the Netherlands Indies shall be given the opportunity to freely express their wishes with respect to their status within the Commonwealth.
- (4) In preparation of the Realm Conference the Netherlands Government shall, as soon as possible, begin consultations with the representatives of the several parts, and of the non-Indonesian communities of Indonesia, on the structure of the Indonesian Commonwealth and its status within the political union (gemeenschappelijk staatsverband). Consultations shall take place either in Indonesia, or in the Netherlands.

- (5) The representatives of the several parts and of the non-Indonesian communities of Indonesia shall freely be designated by their own organizations.
- (6) The provisional government referred to under (2) shall welcome in a friendly manner the Allied and Netherlands forces which in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Allied Command are in or will enter Java, and, shall assist them in the execution of their task of liberating the ex-internees and the ex-prisoners of war, and of detaining and evacuating the Japanese troops with their armament. The procedure and execution of this task shall be subjected to subsequent regulation by the authorities concerned.
- (7) Hostilities shall be suspended immediately, whereby both parties, except as provided for under the preceding article, shall maintain their present positions and their lines of communications. They shall, as soon as possible, have consultations on the cooperation necessary for the implementation of this provision.
- (8) Pending the legitimate formation of the Indonesian Commonwealth, and in order to render the general administration of the Netherlands Indies as much as possible in accordance with the above-mentioned provisions, the Council of the Department Heads shall again be constituted and a provisional People's Council (Volksraad) shall be formed based on Royal Decree of December 23, 1943, (Stbl.D.66) and in cooperation with the provisional government referred to under (2), and with representatives of other parts of Indonesia.
- (9) This Protocol is drafted in Dutch and in the Indonesian language. In case of a difference of opinion regarding the meaning of the text, the Dutch text shall prevail.

Appendix Summary Records H.V., trans. by the writer.

APPENDIX F

SOME REMARKS ON DIFFERENCES BETWEEN:

THE VAN MOOK PROPOSAL OF MARCH 25 AS AMENDED BY PRIME MINISTER
SJAHRIR AND THE DRAFT PROTOCOL OF THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT
OF APRIL 14.

The remarks are made under the headings:

1. the proposed status;
2. Commonwealth, Free State, free State;
3. partition of Indonesia as suggested by Colijn;
4. the territory of the Republic at present.

These remarks will make it clear that the draft protocol means a considerable retrogression, not only in form, but also in substance. This is a grave disappointment because for that reason the protocol will probably not be acceptable to the Republican Government despite the fact that it is aware of the possible alternative of the use of force if the protocol is not accepted. On the other hand it is felt that such an alternative will have a boomerang-effect. Moreover, in Indonesia it is generally expected that the amended van Mook proposal has been accepted here (in Holland). This document in itself contains provisions which will be very difficult to make acceptable to the Republicans. It is likely, therefore, that in order to prepare the public in Indonesia for acceptance of the van Mook proposal, leakage to the press regarding some aspects of the proposal has already been allowed (e.g. that the Republic shall be recognized for Java and Sumatra). Lord Inverchapel who was fully informed of the developments leading to the result achieved on March 27, as based on the Vietnam treaty, also thought that everything would be all right. For that matter, the British Government would be disappointed too.

I. The Proposed Status.

The Indonesian delegation has noted the differences which exist between:

- (1) the substance of the proposed status as can be derived from the provisions of the draft proposals, and
- (2) its name which, to be sure, should not be too incongruous with its substance, but which need not completely cover the substance. Besides, the import of a term is not always clearly defined: thus the term self-determination, so frequently referred to in international literature, does not mean the right of complete self-determination.

In the counterproposals of the Republic of March 13, the independence of Indonesia was insisted on. The independence, however,

was already very much limited by restrictions which had been subsequently proposed (confederation, extreme authority of the confederation's institutions, excessive treaty provisions). This curtailment was real and the independence unsubstantial. However, the term (independence) was preferred because it conforms best to the ideal; that would be the best way to make the settlement acceptable to the Indonesian people without thereby neglecting the necessary caution vis-a-vis the matter of substance.

The discussions finally resulted in the fact that the term independence was abandoned also. This was conditioned on giving satisfaction to the nationalist sentiment by a frank, open and direct recognition of the Republic (which would be in a political union /Staatsverband/ with the Netherlands).

This satisfaction (although barely adequate) can be found in the van Mook draft of March 25, based on the Vietnam treaty. On the other hand, the so-called "recognition of the Republic" referred to in the draft protocol of April 14 is too rudimentary to be satisfactory. The status of the Republic projected in the Dutch proposal would put her on a lower level than France had done with Vietnam. This standing is too inferior for any Republican Government to agree to.

Recapitulation of the differences:

Republican proposal of March 13, 1946:

sovereignty, therefore complete equality with the Netherlands in a confederation (Art. 1, 6, and 7), although with adequate limitation (Art. 6, 7 and 8) to guarantee Dutch interests, etc.

Amended van Mook proposal of March 25:

recognition of the Republican Government as exercising de facto authority in Java and Sumatra (Art. 1). From the wording of the other articles it is clear that the Republican Government is a party to the agreement (Art. 2 and 4) even though it is evident that it is under the suzerainty of the Netherlands (Art. 1). Reference is frequently made to the "Republican Government." The form of the agreement is such that the Indonesians can still consider the solution as honorable.

Netherlands Government draft protocol of April 14:

Java as an autonomous republic (Art. 1) representing the Indonesian part of the population of that island, may take part in the formation of the Indonesian Commonwealth (Art. 2). This government constitutes the "provisional administration of Java," (Art. 2, 5, 6 and 8). Immediately following the signing of the document, an administrative superstructure is to be set up (Art. 8). This institution can relegate the position of the Java Republic to that of a provincial organization. In another article the Republic is put on equal footing with the

other territories (Art. 4) and with the non-Indonesian communities...This "treatment" of the Republic cannot be qualified as honorable. It is further underscored by the fact that the form of the Dutch proposal is not that of an international agreement but rather that of a protocol, in which the Republican Government is not referred to as such, but deliberately as a "provisional administration" (Art. 5, 6 and 8).

II. Commonwealth, Free State, and free State.

Inasmuch as the term "Commonwealth" is considered undesirable by Indonesian intellectuals because it stands for the federative idea, and reminds one too much of the Colijn-partition idea (which is identified with the divide-and-rule idea);

inasmuch as its meaning is indeterminate and does not offer any guarantee against the return of a colonial structure;

inasmuch as it cannot be translated into the Indonesian language, this term is probably unacceptable to the Republican Government as the name for the political superstructure in Indonesia.

The term "Free State" can be translated (negara merdeka), it holds a guarantee against colonialism and signifies a large measure of independence.

The term "Free State" has been changed into "free State" in the amended van Mook proposal (Art. 1, 4 and 6) to preserve the possibility of calling the political superstructure a "republic." This would be the case when the entire territory of Indonesia, or almost all of it expresses the desire to join the Republic. A separate name for the superstructure would then be senseless.

Further, it is deplorable that in the draft protocol the structure of the Commonwealth and its status in the political union (staatsverband) are only mentioned and every indication with respect to its independence has been omitted (Art. 4).

Recapitulation of the differences:

Amended van Mook proposals of March 25:

"free State" (Art. 1, 4 and 6) can result in a "Republic" or in a "Free State"; negotiations will be held with the Republican Government regarding the structure of the free State, its status in the political union, its relations with foreign powers, and its cooperation with the Netherlands, etc. (Art. 4).

Netherlands Government draft protocol of April 14:

"Commonwealth" (Art. 1, 3, 4 and 8). The Dutch Government will hold consultations with the several territories concerning the structure of the Commonwealth and its status in the political union (staatsverband) (Art. 4).

III. The Colijn Partition of Indonesia.

Sometimes with the argument of fear of domination by Javanese, and again with other arguments drawn from the arsenal of democracy, the partition of Indonesia into separate areas is championed. At first such efforts give rise to amazement for an Indonesia divided into parts possessing provincial autonomy, and all under a single superstructure, existed in the former Netherlands Indies and is present in the Republican organization!

A partition of Indonesia can, therefore, be viewed only as a measure to prevent (at least reduce the chance to the minimum) that the Republic, which is referred to as Javanese, will extend over all territories: the intention is not to have the Republican Government (strengthened by the Dutch), but the N.I.C.A. organization (fortified with Indonesians) as the administrative superstructure!!

The Republic may continue to exist, but as an autonomous subdivision in some form of provincial organization (Art. 8). If that is not the intention, Indonesia in the immediate future would have two Cabinets, two sets of government departments, etc. which would involve a most expensive organization. Shortage of funds and personnel and waste which would result from such a situation is too obvious to make it acceptable. If it is indeed the intention to make a province out of the Republic it can never result in a satisfactory settlement because the Indonesian people will feel thoroughly deluded and peace achieved in this manner will never bring contentment. Hence, the subordination of the Republic to an administrative superstructure is less recommendable.

What, then, is to be done?

According to Mr. Sjahrir the best policy would be to have the Republic on a level of importance whereby its government can form a constituent part of the proposed superstructure. It is thereby understood that all parts of Indonesia shall have adequate representation. In this respect sufficient guarantees shall be created for the minority groups.

That in the meanwhile the Republic has already been recognized as the most important organized part of the Indonesian people, appears both from the van Mook proposal of March 25, and from the draft protocol of the Dutch Government of April 14, although the measure and the form of recognition reveal outstanding differences; this will appear from the following.

Recapitulation of the areas of agreement and of difference:

Amended van Mook proposal of March 25:

the agreement is concluded with the Republic (as indicated at the beginning); with the Republic an agreement is made to set up an independent State which comprises the whole of Indonesia (Art. 1); the other territories shall be admitted to participate in the negotiations (Art. 5). Regulations to designate representatives of the other

territories shall be determined by agreement between the Dutch and the Republican Governments. (Art. 5).

Netherlands Government draft protocol of April 14:

The protocol will be signed by representatives of the Dutch and of the Republican Governments. However: the Netherlands Government promotes the formation of an Indonesian Commonwealth, and the Republican Government "takes part in it" (Art. 2). No "negotiations" but "consultations" will be held with the Indonesians. The Republic is thereby placed on the same level with the other territories (Art. 4). The Republic will only be informed of the names of the representatives of the other territories (Art. 5). It stands out clearly that the protocol does not mention which territories and minorities shall be represented, while the van Mook proposal of March 25 does mention them (Art. 5).

IV. The Territory of the Republic (At Present).

There are two points of view regarding the matter based on the following:

- (1) how far has the Republic penetrated into the hearts of the people (Sjahrir's standpoint);
- (2) how much real authority (militarily and administratively) does the Republic exercise (van Mook's standpoint).

If (1) is taken as the point of departure, then there is no doubt whatsoever that not only Java and Sumatra but also Celebes, Bali, Lombok and other islands will have to be considered as Republican territory; dispatches (letters, by couriers, etc.) have revealed that the opinion of the people in those areas is preponderantly Republican although this may seem only partially true from the sporadic attacks on Dutch army patrols which apparently is due to the fact that the people lack arms to put up large-scale resistance. Basing one's conclusion on the viewpoint under (2), then the non-Republican territory would be those areas where Republican feelings cannot (or, can no longer) contribute to Republican authority because of the penetration of Allied power. For that matter, the greater part of Celebes should be added to Java and Sumatra to comprise Republican territory.

Although the Republican Government is as a matter of course given to base its standpoint on (1) (as is the case with its counter-proposals of March 13) which is in harmony with the Indonesian Constitution, the discussions in Djakarta eventually resulted in its acceptance (vide: report of joint sub-committee of March 27) of (2) as the starting point (factual authority). Consequently, Mr. Sjahrir has agreed to having the territory of the Republic limited to Java and Sumatra, while noting that on this basis the greater part of Celebes should actually be under the jurisdiction of the Republic.

It should be noted that in taking (2) as the point of departure, which as a policy of the Sjahrir Government can be clearly explained and be made acceptable to the Republicans, the problem of "being able to accept all consequences" (viewpoint of Schermerhorn) has, correctly so, never been brought up inasmuch as this matter was provided for by a projected increase of Republican capacity to do so through assistance of the Dutch.

In conclusion it is noted that because of "leakage" to the public the territorial delimitation "Java and Sumatra," has already found acceptance with the Indonesian people. Thereby, considerable alarm was apparent among the Menadonese and Amboinese communities. They considered its acceptance as a betrayal of those parts of the Indonesian people as represented by them.

From the above it can be concluded that the limitation of Republican territory to Java alone, as proposed in the draft protocol of the Dutch Government, will probably be unacceptable to the Republican Government. It would result, either in a void of authority, or, in a clash between Republican authority and the authority to be newly introduced. The latter would likely be vested in N.I.C.A. personnel. It should never be forgotten that however weak Republican authority in Sumatra may be, it is the only authority effective in the island, and, which if strengthened can easily be perfected. Justice is administered on behalf of the Republic, taxes are levied, and concessions granted in the name of the Republic. In Sumatra the T.R.I. (Republican army) too, is the only organized armed force. How could the Republican Government give it all up without losing face?

Recapitulation of the differences:

Republican proposal of March 13, 1946:
all of Indonesia is to be Republican territory.

Amended van Mook proposal of March 25:
Java and Sumatra are to be under the jurisdiction of the Republic; in the other territories after three years a plebiscite will be held to decide whether these areas want to join the Republic or not (Art. 1, 2 and 6).

Netherlands Government draft protocol of April 14:
the Republic is limited to Java.

Appendix Summary Records H.V., trans. by the writer.

Note on the "Colijn partition," Arthur A. Schiller, The Formation of Federal Indonesia, The Hague, Bandung, W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1955, pp. 15-16.

"A more serious proposal was outlined in 1917. This time the plan came from Dr. Hendrik Colijn, a respected figure who was subsequently several times Prime Minister of the Netherlands. The

government had earlier proposed the establishment of a People's Council (Volksraad) to act as an advisory body to the government of the Netherlands Indies. The plan called for a council which was representative of the entire Indies. The council was to be partly elected and partly appointed. Colijn strongly advocated a wholly different set-up. It was first necessary, he said, to build autonomy and self-rule from the bottom up and thus to establish homogeneous ethnic groups which in the course of time could be combined to form 'island' provinces. These provinces were to be charged with complete control of internal affairs, including the local budget. Imperial and foreign affairs only remained under the central government, the Netherlands Indies administration. The time to consider the formation of a Provincial Council representing the individual island governments would be when the 'island' provinces demonstrated their ability to govern themselves. Colijn insisted that a People's Council of the type proposed would result only in the control of the whole of Indonesia coming under the largest ethnic group, the Javanese."

APPENDIX G

COMPOSITION OF THE STATES-GENERAL*

Political Parties	First (Upper) Chamber	Second (Lower) Chamber
	1937	1937
Roman Catholics (K.V.P.)	16	31
Anti-Revolutionaries (A.R.P.)	7	17
Christian Historic Union (C.H.U.)	6	8
State Reformed Party	-	2
Christian Democrats (C.D.U.)	-	2
Rightwing total	29	60
Liberals (Liberal Center)	3	4
Liberal Democrats	2	6
Social Democrats (S.D.A.P.)	12	23
Communists	-	3
Leftwing total	17	36
National Socialists	4	4

*From: P. J. Oud, Het Jongste Verleden, Parlementaire Geschiedenis van Nederland, Assen, Van Gorcum & Co. N.V., 1951, Vol. VI, Bijlage II, p. 237.

RESULT OF FIRST POSTWAR GENERAL ELECTIONS OF MAY 17, 1946

FOR SECOND CHAMBER**

Catholic People's Party (K.V.P.)	32 seats
Labor Party (Partij van de Arbeid)	29 seats
Anti-Revolutionary Party (A.R.P.)	13 seats
Communist Party	10 seats
Christian Historic Party (C.H.U.)	8 seats
Freedom Party (V.V.D.)	6 seats
State Reformed Party	2 seats

**Netherlands News Letter, published by the Netherlands Information Bureau, 10 Rockefeller Plaza, New York City, No 5, June 1, 1946.

https://hdl.handle.net/2027/coo.31924019448657

Generated at Columbia University on 2025-02-19 21:13 GMT /
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Books

- Chaudhry, I. The Indonesian Struggle. Lahore, Pakistan: Feroz Sons, 1950.
- Coast, John. Recruit to Revolution. London: Christophers, 1952.
- Documenta Historica. Compiled by Osman Raliby. Djakarta: Bulan-Bintang, 1953.
- Eldersveld, Samuel J. "Government and Politics in the Netherlands during Reconstruction," Change and Crisis in European Government. Edited by James Kerr Pollock. New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1947.
- Elsbree, Willard H. Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940 to 1945. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1953.
- Engelbrecht, W.A. De Nederlandsch-Indische Wetboeken. Edited by E.M.L. Engelbrecht. Leiden, Holland: A.W. Sijthoff's Uitg. Mij. N.V., 1932.
- Gerbrandy, P.S. Indonesia. London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1950.
- Hatta, Mohammad. "Legende en Realiteit rondom de Proclamatie van 17 Augustus," Verspreide Geschriften. Djakarta: C.P.J. van der Peet, 1952.
- Helsdingen, W.H. van. Op weg naar een Nederlandsch-Indonesische Unie. The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1947.
- Isaacs, Harold (ed.). New Cycle in Asia. New York: Macmillan Co., 1947.
- Kadt, J. de. De Indonesische Tragedie. Amsterdam: G.A. van Oorschot, 1949.
- Kahin, George McTurnan. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1950.
- Lammers, G.J. De Kroon en de Kabinetsformatie. IJmuiden, Holland: Vermande Zonen, 1952.
- Leahy, William D. I Was There. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1950.
- Mook, H.J., v. Indonesië, Nederland en de Wereld. Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 1949.

Muhammad Dimiyati. Sedjarah Perdjuangan Indonesia. Djakarta: Widjaya, 1951.

Oud, P.J. Het Jongste Verleden: Parlementaire Geschiedenis van Nederland. Vol. VI, 1937-1940. Aan den Brink-Assen, Holland: Van Gorcum & Comp., N.V., 1951.

Ruitenbeek, H.M. Het ontstaan van de Partij van de Arbeid. Amsterdam: N.V. De Arbeiderspers, 1955.

Schiller, Arthur A. The Formation of Federal Indonesia. The Hague: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1955.

Sjahrazad. Indonesische Overpeinzingen. Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 1945.

Sjahrir, Soetan. Onze Strijd. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij "Vrij Nederland," 1946.

_____. Out of Exile, tr., with an introd., by Charles Wolf Jr. New York: The John Day Company, 1949.

Smit, C. De Indonesische Quaestie. Leiden, Holland: E.J. Brill, 1952.

Stempels, A. De Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het Indonesische Vraagstuk. Amsterdam: N.V. De Arbeiderspers, 1950.

Tas, Sal. De Politieke Crisis van Nederland. Amsterdam: J.M. Meulenhoff, n.d. (pamphlet, probably 1945).

Wehl, David. The Birth of Indonesia. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1948.

Wolf, Charles, Jr. The Indonesian Story. New York: The John Day Company, 1948.

Yamin, Muhammad. Sumpah Indonesia Raja. Djakarta: N.V. Nusantara, n.d.

B. Public Documents

Berita Repoeblik Indonesia (Official Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia), 1945 and 1946.

Hansard. Parliamentary Debates (fifth series). Vol. 414, vol. 417 (1945), and vol. 419 (1945-1946).

Netherlands Information Bureau. Netherlands News Letter. New York: 1946.

Republic of Indonesia Office. History of Indonesia's National Movement. New York: 1949.

Staten Generaal, Tweede Kamer, Verslag van de Handelingen, Tijdelijke Zitting, 1945. The Hague: Algemene Landsdrukkerij, 1945.

_____, Tweede Kamer, Verslag van de Handelingen, zitting 20 November 1945-1 Juni 1945. The Hague: Algemene Landsdrukkerij, 1946.

_____, Tweede Kamer, Bijlagen van het Verslag der Handelingen, 1945-1946. The Hague: Algemene Landsdrukkerij, 1946.

_____, Tweede Kamer, Enquêtecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945, Verslag houdende de Uitkomsten van het Onderzoek, Militair Beleid 1940-1945, Terugkeer naar Nederlandsch-Indie. The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij-en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1956.

C. Report

Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. A Report by the Supreme Allied Commander in South-East Asia, 1943-1945, Vice-Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1951.

D. Articles

Clegg, Arthur D. "Indonesia," The New Statesman and Nation, XXX (December 22, 1945), 425-26.

Crockett, Frederick E. "How the Trouble Began in Java," Harper's Magazine, Vol. 192 (March 1946), 279-84.

Kain, Ronald S. "The Netherlands and Indonesia," Yale Review, XXXVI (December, 1946), 285-302.

Palar, L.N. "Indonesië na de verkiezingen," De Brug - Djembatan, (Amsterdam), I (Juni, 1946), 5.

Roth, Andrew. "Holland's Last Chance," The Nation, Vol. 163 (August 10, 1946), 153-155.

Tas, Sal. "Hangende de Overeenstemming," De Brug - Djembatan, (Amsterdam), I (Mei, 1946), 7-8.

The New Statesman and Nation, XXX (December 29, 1945), 433.
Editorial "The Awakening of Asia."

E. Unpublished Material

Besprekingen Hooge Veluwe, Summary Records Hoge Veluwe Conference, April 14, 21, 22 and the Final Session at The Hague, April 24, 1946, and Appendices. Compiled by Messrs. P. Sanders and K. Verboeket, Secretaries of the Dutch delegation.

F. Newspapers

Christian Science Monitor, (Boston, Massachusetts).

Manchester Guardian, (Manchester, Great Britain).

Merdeka, (Djakarta, Indonesia).

New York Times.

Rakjat, (Jogjakarta, Indonesia).

The Times, (London).