

GOLKAR AND THE INDONESIAN ELECTIONS OF 1971

by
MASASHI NISHIHARA

MONOGRAPH SERIES

Modern Indonesia Project
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction.....	1
I. The Making of the Election Laws, 1966-1969.....	4
II. Preparations for Administering the Elections, 1970.....	11
III. Golkar, A Party Built from Above.....	17
IV. Screening of Candidates, January-April 1971....	24
V. The Official Campaign, April 27 to June 25.....	32
VI. Electoral Results.....	40
VII. Pemilu in a Larger Context.....	51
Tables I-XIII.....	57

INTRODUCTION*

Golkar, which might be described as a recently established party of the government,¹ won an impressive victory in the long-awaited (pemilihan umum-general elections) of July 3, 1971. The newly composed House of Representatives, known as the DPR,² has 460 seats, of which 360 were contested in the

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- * The writer expresses his deep appreciation to the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, for a research fellowship which made possible his stay in Djakarta at the time of the elections. All the views expressed herein are solely his and in no way represent those of the Center. His thanks also go to Mrs. Molly Bondan for her critical reading of the original manuscript as well as her assistance in improving its style. It should also be noted that the writer is fully aware that there are many statements made herein which require more critical documentation and further elaboration. Hopefully, this will be done at a later date since it is feared that such attempt here might blur this paper's focus on the subject of the elections.
1. Golkar is an acronym of Golongan Karya, which is usually translated as "Functional Group." It is essentially a loose confederation of occupational groups of all kinds, ranging from civil servants to betjak (tricycle-taxi) drivers. Since the ill-fated Communist coup of 1965 Golkar has grown fast mainly as a result of strong support from the Departments of Defense and Security and of Home Affairs. Golkar is also referred to as Sekber Golkar since its coordinating body is called Sekber, an acronym of Sekretariat Bersama or Joint Secretariat. Thus in this paper Golkar and Sekber Golkar are used interchangeably unless otherwise specified. The Suharto government and Golkar claim that Golkar is a political group and not a political party: however, in actual practice, it has functioned as a party. For this reason Golkar is treated here as a party except where it is necessary to distinguish it from the other parties as the government does. For further details, see Chapter III.
 2. This DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat) replaced the previous legislative body, named the DPR-GR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat--Gotong-Rojong), which was installed by President Sukarno in 1960 after he dissolved the DPR created by the 1955 general elections. The 1971 elections were also conducted for local legislative councils called

elections. In 25 provinces, where 351 seats were contested in direct elections, Golkar won 227; in the twenty-sixth province, West Irian, whose seats were contested by an indirect method, Golkar won all 9. Furthermore, in line with the 1969 election law the remaining 100 seats have been allotted to Golkar by appointment.

The emergence of a party with such a clear parliamentary majority (336 out of 460 members or 73 percent) is unprecedented in Indonesian legislative history. Since it was only the second general election held in the twenty-six years since the nation became independent and since it was conducted in a most orderly manner, this election attests convincingly to President Suharto's grip on national power and to his administrative competence.

Certainly, Golkar's electoral success was in part a popular endorsement of Suharto's effective halt to inflation and his relatively successful economic rehabilitation programs. Yet it would be perhaps naive to conclude that Golkar's 63 percent of the vote reflected overwhelming voluntary support of the Suharto regime. The high voting rate of 94 percent, in addition to the triumph of the military-controlled government party demand that close attention be paid to the government's electoral strategy.

At the outset it must be borne in mind that analyses of the 1971 Indonesian elections inevitably suffer from methodological limitations. Public opinion surveys are far from feasible in contemporary Indonesia where many people fear that any record made of their criticisms of the Suharto government may serve to identify them as opponents.³ Students of Indonesian elections are deprived of behavioral studies which

DPRD (DPR Daerah), which exist at two administrative levels: first-level (province), and second-level (kotamadya/kabupatèn --municipal/regency) monograph. This deals primarily with the national-level parliamentary elections.

3. Two opinion surveys conducted in December 1970 support this point. One of them, undertaken by the Press and Public Opinion Institute of the Department of Information, is reported in Antara Warta Berita, April 20, 1971 (evening edition). The other study, executed by a private group, P. T. Inscore Indonesia, asked the respondents only general political questions, such as on the relative importance of general elections, political parties, foreign aid, etc. Neither study sought critical views on the ruling group of Indonesia.

relate voting decisions to voters' age, sex, education, religion, occupation, political awareness, political affiliations, and so forth, which are possible in other places where there is greater freedom of expression.

A comparison of these elections with those of 1955, the only other national elections held in Indonesia, would not prove very meaningful, since the two elections were held under very different circumstances. The 1955 elections saw some forty political parties and groups freely campaigning for legislative seats, while in 1971 the participating groups were limited to ten parties including the government's Golkar. The Communist Party (PKI), generally regarded as the largest party by late 1957, has been banned since 1966. The youngest voter in 1955, who would then have been 18 years old, was 34 years old in 1971, and voters between 17 and 33 years old in 1971 cast ballots for the first time in their lives.

Thus, in studying the 1971 elections, it is appropriate to emphasize the means by which the Suharto government tried to organize its electoral victory rather than the manner in which the Indonesian voter responded to the election campaign.

The official campaign period was set for sixty days from April 27 through June 25, 1971. Djakarta newspapers carried some reports of violence during the campaign, and there were constant complaints and protests by the parties over the "unfair" nature of the campaign, particularly by the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). What happened during this campaign period, however, seems to have been of less significance for the elections than government efforts prior to the official campaign. President Suharto and his closest military associates had worked so strenuously at an electoral strategy which mobilized virtually all the offices of the government--civilian and military, national and local--for support of Golkar, that, by the time the formal campaign period began, Golkar had finished its essential electioneering effort.

Indisputably this was a formidable operation for Suharto and his military colleagues, for they sought thereby to legitimize the socio-political role of the Armed Forces (ABRI). The difficulty involved in attaining this objective was amply demonstrated by the fact that, in the period of 1966 to 1971, ABRI had to shift its strategy drastically with regard to Golkar and other political parties. Up to the end of 1969, the Suharto group did not seem to have a clear idea of how best to seek a popular mandate to establish their own legitimacy. During this period they evidently had little confidence in the efficacy of Golkar and tended instead to "court" as possible partners such

political parties as the PNI and the new Moslem party, Parmusi. Indeed, one of the most interesting points of ABRI's success story lies in the fact that ABRI first wooed the political parties, then switched to Golkar, and in the process, "tamed" and eventually "deserted" the political parties.

The three periods of courting, taming, and deserting the political parties seem to coincide with three stages of the government's administrative preparedness for the general elections which may be seen as: (1) the making of the election laws (1966-1969); (2) the technical preparations for the elections (1970); and (3) the administration of the elections (first half of 1971). These periods were by no means clear-cut; nevertheless, the general correspondence of timing between the government's plan for electoral preparations and ABRI's relations with political parties is indicative of the government's sophisticated efforts in synchronizing the two matters effectively.

I. The Making of the Election Laws, 1966-1969

Restoring political stability was a paramount task for General Suharto when he obtained the now-famous March 11, 1966 order, which transferred power to him from President Sukarno. At that time Moslem and other anti-communist groups were assisting the military in hunting down PKI members, while civil servants were being screened for security clearances. Many mass organizations affiliated with the PNI and the outlawed PKI were being subjected to military pressure for their dissolution, while student groups such as KAMI and KAPPI were demanding the public trial of President Sukarno for his alleged complicity in the Gestapu/PKI affair. The NU, quickly gathering political support for its anti-PKI stand, urged that general elections be held immediately.

In session from June 20 through July 5, 1966, the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS)⁴ passed a

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4. The People's Consultative Assembly or MPR (Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat) is a constitutional organ that functions as a medium for the exercise of the people's sovereignty, determining the broad lines of national policy and electing a President and a Vice-President. The MPR consists of the members of the DPR, delegates from the regions, and representatives of other groups. A provisional form of this body, MPRS, which had been installed by President Sukarno in 1959, functioned until the 1971 elections produced an MPR.

resolution which required that general elections be held by July 5, 1968. The resolution (No. 11/MPRS/1966) also stated that the new DPR, DPRD, and MPR were to be composed of "Golongan Politik dan Karya" (political parties and functional groups).⁵ In this way the government and the parties agreed to limits on the number of electoral competitors and the scope of competition. The resolution further stipulated that all election laws be passed within six months after July 5, 1966. But in fact parliamentary debates did not begin until November 24, 1966, when the President sent the necessary bills to the DPR-GR. The prevailing political turmoil prevented intelligent deliberations on these proposals, and debate was finally suspended for an indefinite period on November 27, 1967.⁶ Nevertheless, the fact that parliamentary debate had at least begun satisfied the political groups demanding general elections, and thus contributed to the restoration of political order.

In January 1968, Suharto, by then Acting President, declared that the lack of technical preparations would make it impossible for elections to be conducted by the existing deadline of July 5, 1968.⁷ The fifth session of the MPRS, which met from March 20-27 that year, adopted a resolution⁸ (No. 42/MPRS/1968), setting a new deadline of July 5, 1971. The administration of national elections, it was argued, would impose a huge financial burden on the government. All technical preparations would have to be made from scratch; for example, the previous registration of voters, used sixteen years before, and the last census in 1961 would be of no use. Election costs were estimated at Rp. 10 billion, or some US \$40 million, equivalent to about five percent of Indonesia's total expenditures for 1968, or over 28 percent of the country's development expenditures.⁹ Another

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5. The full text of this resolution appears, for instance, in the General Elections Institute's manual for the 1971 general elections, Bekal Pemilu 1971 (Jakarta: State Printing Office, 1970), pp. 249-251.
 6. Ichtiisar Tahunan 1967 (Antara news digest, 1967), p. 101.
 7. Ichtiisar Tahunan 1968, p. 3.
 8. For the full text of the resolution, see Bekal Pemilu 1971, pp. 299-302.
 9. Angkatan Bersendjata, March 1, 1968. Government expenditures for 1968 were Rp. 185,283 million, of which development expenditures were Rp. 35,537 million. (See Bank of Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics,

deterrent to the holding of elections in 1968 was the belief that sufficient security for orderly elections was still lacking. It is probable that yet another important reason for delaying the elections was Suharto's desire to keep political tensions to a minimum. The postponement of Pemilu would serve this purpose. The new Indonesian leader's strategy was to depoliticize the prevailing tense political atmosphere by giving all-out emphasis to economic rehabilitation. Sukarno had made fiery political speeches and had diverted popular attention from the nation's economic difficulties by creating intermittent external political and military threats. General Suharto wanted to do just the contrary. He began implementation of the Repelita, or Five-Year Development Plan, in April 1969. If there was to be a choice between Repelita and Pemilu, it was easy for him to choose. Swift rehabilitation and its subsequent contribution to political order would lead to firmer popular support than could be expected from general elections without concomitant economic reconstruction.

After the MPRS had decided to postpone the elections, a special parliamentary commission resumed debates on the election bills. Deliberations dragged on until November 22, 1969 when the bills were finally adopted. What were called the "crucial points" of disagreement over the election laws concerned: (1) the numerical balance between political parties and functional groups in the MPR; (2) the numerical balance between military and non-military members of functional groups in the MPR, DPR, and DPRD; (3) the number of appointed members in the DPRD; (4) who would have the right to nominate non-military members of functional groups for the MPR, DPR, and DPRD; (5) the number of regional delegates in the MPR; (6) the

December 1970, p. 66.) The exchange rate for the period December 1967-December 1968 was US \$1 = Rp. 250. (Ibid., p. 128). In the 1968 budget Rp. 10 billion was appropriated for election purposes, but evidently it was not expended. So far as is known the actual cost of the election turned out to be: Rp. 2,762 million or \$8.49 million for 1969-1970 (\$1 = Rp. 325); Rp. 10,958 million or \$28.98 million for 1970-1971 (\$1 = Rp. 378); and Rp. 4,250 million or \$11.22 million for the first six months of fiscal year 1971-1972 (\$1 = Rp. 378). This totals to Rp. 18,420 million or about \$49.69 million. Rupiah figures are taken from Indonesian Financial Statistics, May 1972, pp. 76-77. According to Suluh Marhaen, June 3, 1971, the total cost of the elections, including security costs, would be approximately Rp. 20 billion.

replacement of members of the MPR and DPR; and (7) the status of those central government officials--military or non-military--who would become members of the MPR, DPR, and DPRD.¹⁰ This monograph cannot go into the details of each of these points; but it is clear that the parliamentary deliberations were protracted because of the battle over the allocation of seats in the MPR, DPR, and DPRD. In a sense, then, the electoral campaign began as early as November 1966 when the bills were first presented. This initial phase of the campaign ended with a government victory. Suharto secured a strong position for functional groups by obtaining appointed quotas in parliamentary bodies at all levels: one-third of the 920-member MPR (307 seats), 22 percent of the 460-member DPR (100 seats), and 22 percent of the membership of local representative bodies both at the provincial and the kabupaten/kotamadya levels.

When legislative discussion of the election bills became protracted, there was talk in some quarters that the Suharto regime had intentionally delayed their passage in order to buy time to build up a strong, competitive Golkar. This allegation may not be accurate, but the fact cannot be ignored that, once the MPRS session of 1968 had postponed general elections until 1971, Suharto and his associates took the greatest possible advantage of the situation. It was apparent, however, that Suharto did not intend to put off the general elections too long, since he also wished to establish his own political legitimacy. Already in September 1969, before the election laws were passed, the Minister for Home Affairs, General Amir Machmud, declared that the government would begin to prepare for general elections anyway.¹¹

The long parliamentary battle between the ABRI-dominated functional groups and the political parties from 1966 to 1969 reflected uncertainty on the part of ABRI concerning the electoral popularity of Golkar. It was because of this lack of confidence that the authorities initially considered partnership with either the PNI, Parmusi, or both, while persistently demanding legislation that would secure a substantial number of appointive seats for Golkar. From 1965 through 1967 the authorities also made efforts to strengthen Golkar, and Golkar's share of the seats in the DPR-GR slowly increased during this period, that is, from 53.8 percent (161 seats) in pre-Gestapu 1965, to 54.9 percent (133 seats) in 1966, to 55.5 percent (194 seats) in 1967. However, in 1968 the proportion of Golkar seats decreased to 40.4

10. Bekal Pemilu 1971, pp. 8-9.

11. Sinar Harapan, September 8, 1969.

percent (167 seats) and the conventional parties took 59.6 percent or 247 seats, an increase of 99 seats from 1967 (see Table I). The government permitted this since it hoped to gain advantages by drawing the major parties to its side in case Golkar failed to demonstrate real strength.

ABRI's policy toward the PNI and Parmusi should be seen in this context. In December 1967, Suharto gave strong encouragement to the formation of a new PNI out of the Gestapu-shattered PNI and some of its affiliated organizations.¹² He issued instructions to all government employees--both civil and military--to give the PNI a chance to "consolidate and crystallize the spirit of the New Order" by its own methods. The acting president also appealed to all parties, mass organizations, and occupational groups not to disturb any PNI efforts to that end.

In August 1966, the Muhammadiyah leadership was reportedly considering the formation of a new Islamic party, integrating "all Islamic forces" in the country. About a year later, in September 1967, nine Moslem organizations, headed by the Muhammadiyah, agreed to the idea of a new Moslem party. On the basis of a presidential decree (No. 70, of February 20, 1968), the Indonesian Moslem Party (PMI), later known as Parmusi, was then established under the chairmanship of Djarnawi Hadikusumo.¹³ The new party was immediately given 18 seats in the DPR-GR. Suharto and the military thereby provided a political outlet for those Moslem forces that were not attracted to the existing Islamic political parties such as the conservative NU.

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12. Ichtisar Tahunan 1967, p. 107. Talk about the formation of a new party on the basis of PNI elements started in August 1966, but it received no encouragement from President Sukarno. See Ichtisar Tahunan 1966, p. 114.
13. Ichtisar Tahunan 1968, p. 8. The other eight component organizations were: (1) Al-Djamiatul Waslijah; (2) Gasbiindo; (3) Persatuan Islam; (4) Nahdatul Wathan; (5) Mathalaul Anwar; (6) Sarekat Nelajan Islam Indonesia; (7) Kesatuan Buruh Indonesia Muslimin; and (8) Persatuan Ummat Islam. See DPR-GR, Secretariat, Seperempat Abad Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia (Jakarta, 1971), p. 383. For discussions of the formation of the PMI, see Allan A. Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," Asian Survey, VIII, no. 12 (December 1968), pp. 1001-1017; and K. E. Ward, The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Report Series, 1970).

The integration of the nine Moslem groups also constituted a move toward simplification of the political structure, a step that the authorities favored. Suharto, however, did not want the new party to fall under the control of the former leaders of Masjumi;¹⁴ accordingly, when Parmusi's first national congress, which opened in Malang, East Java, on November 6, 1968, elected Mohammad Rum, an ex-Masjumi leader as chairman, Suharto made his disapproval known, saying that Parmusi should not simply be a rehabilitation of Masjumi. But despite presidential disapproval, more ex-Masjumi members, including prominent personalities such as Mohammad Natsir and Kasman Singodimedjo, joined the party. To contain their influence, the government pressed for inclusion in the 1969 election law of a stipulation that all persons involved in the 1958 rebellion be disqualified from becoming candidates. (Thus the former Masjumi leaders were permitted a role in Parmusi only in the very early stages.)

Attention should also be called to efforts made from late 1968 by some of those in power, especially by Major-General H. R. Dharsono,¹⁵ to promote a sort of two-party system. This was referred to as the "two-group" system, since, according to New Order ideology, Golkar was not to be thought of as a political party. The system was seen as one way of containing the activities of the political parties and drawing them into the framework of the government's emphasis on policy, rather than ideological, debates.

The Catholic Party expressed its support for political restructuring and even stated that it would be willing to dissolve itself for the sake of a new system of political groupings.¹⁶ The independent newspaper Indonesia Raya urged that the political structure be reformed before the general elections; it pointed out that the government would face great difficulties in carrying out its programs if the ongoing system continued and the government had constantly to work on a coalition basis.¹⁷ However, Duta Masjarakat,

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14. Masjumi had been one of the "big four" parties of the 1955 general elections, but it was banned in 1960 because a number of its leaders were involved in the PRRI regional rebellion that broke out in February 1958.
 15. Dharsono was then panglima of the Siliwangi Division and territorial commander for West Java. He was known as an outspoken critic of Sukarno and the PKI.
 16. Berita Yudha, December 12, 1968.
 17. Indonesia Raya, November 11, 1968.

the official organ of the NU, argued against this view, saying that an artificial system would be too risky.¹⁸

The military leadership apparently felt that such ideas should be tried out at the local level before being implemented nationally. In January 1969, a two-group system was introduced, at Dharsono's instructions, in the regional representative council (DPRD-GR), of Tjiamis, a kabupaten in West Java.¹⁹ The central government kept its distance, however, merely stating, in May, that what was being tried out in West Java was not an overhaul of the political structure but rather a new method of working, in which a "development group" (the government) and a "guidance group" (for correction) worked together.²⁰ The Tjiamis experiment ended inconclusively; its relevance was undermined by a report in February 1970 that President Suharto was entertaining the idea of a three-group system, composed of a "material development" (nationalist) group, a "spiritual development" (religious) group, and Golkar.²¹ But, even in early 1969, Dharsono and other "liberal" generals associated with him were reportedly out of favor with Suharto, and this may account for the two-group system's demise.²²

An important element common to both Dharsono's and Suharto's ideas, nonetheless, was the special status assigned

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18. Duta Masyarakat, December 10, 1968.
 19. Kompas, January 9, 1969.
 20. Kompas, May 28, 1969.
 21. Parenthetically, this idea of Suharto's was realized after the 1971 elections in the revised form of a four-fraction system for the DPR: a "Development Democracy (Demokrasi Pembangunan)" fraction; a "Development Unity (Persatuan Pembangunan)" fraction; a "Functional Group (Golongan Karya)" fraction; and an Armed Services (Golongan ABRI) fraction. See Antara Warta Berita, October 29, 1971 (morning edition). However, since the last fraction did not participate in the elections and currently works closely with the Golkar fraction, the four-fraction system is in actual practice a three-group system--particularly in the eyes of the electorate.
 22. Robert Shaplen, Time out of Hand (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 181. Dharsono himself was soon displaced as West Java commander and was posted as ambassador to Thailand in September 1969.

to Golkar. It signified that both expected to use Golkar although they evidently did not yet place great confidence in its parliamentary and electoral competence. Yet it is true that at the same time that the military leadership was considering partnership with the PNI and Parmusi, it was also gradually placing greater hopes on Golkar.²³

II. Preparations for Administering the Elections, 1970

With the enactment of the two election laws in December 1969, the Suharto government moved quickly to issue the implementing ordinances and presidential decrees, and to build up a structure to administer the elections. Both the implementing regulations and the administrative structure became vital factors contributing to the government party's eventual election victory. The two election laws of 1969 were respectively Law No. 15/1969, which concerned the general election of members of representative bodies, and Law No. 16/1969, which dealt with the composition and position of the MPR, DPR, and DPRD.²⁴

The first of these laws laid out the basic framework for the organization and scope of the general elections. By its terms, all Indonesian nationals who were over 17 years old, or who were married, had the right to vote (Article 9), while those over 21 years of age were eligible as candidates for election (Article 16). Two important exceptions were made to these provisions: members of the former PKI and other banned organizations (Articles 2 and 16), and members of ABRI were deprived of the right to vote and the right to stand for election (Articles 11 and 14).²⁵ These provisions of the law provoked a public controversy over whether former members of Masjumi and the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party--banned along with Masjumi in 1960) possessed electoral rights. On February 4, 1970, Home Affairs Minister Amir Machmud

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23. Debate on this kind of structural reform died down when the government and the political parties became absorbed in developing and implementing their respective electioneering strategies.
 24. The texts of these laws are given in Bekal Pemilu 1971, pp. 313-332, and 353-375 respectively.
 25. Civilian employees of the Ministry of Defense and Security, however, were not covered by these articles.

clarified this point, stating that they might vote, but that former leaders of these parties could not run for election.²⁶ Those former members of banned communist organizations who had once been arrested in connection with the Gestapu affair but who had since been released were also given voting rights.²⁷ In addition, all candidates had to be nominated by legal organizations (Article 17). The law approved the participation only of political and functional groups already represented in the DPR-GR at the time of the elections (Article 34). In effect, then, severe limits were set on electoral participation. Both the election of independent candidates and of candidates of new political organizations were legally ruled out.

The same law prescribed an organizational framework for administering the elections which proved very favorable to Golkar. The General Elections Institute (LPU), an autonomous body placed administratively within the Ministry of Home Affairs, was to be directly responsible for the whole electoral administration. The Minister of Home Affairs would serve ex officio as chairman of the Institute, chairman of its executive board, and chairman of the National Elections Committee (see below). The Institute's functions were primarily to supervise and guide the work of national and local election committees which would handle day-to-day tasks (Article 8). In Djakarta a National Elections Committee (PPI) was to be set up under the Home Affairs Minister. The Committee was to "plan and supervise" elections for the DPR and the first-level and second-level DPRD, and to "administer" the elections for the DPR (Article 8). To assist this national committee, in each provincial capital there was to be a first-level local elections committee (PPD-I), chaired by the governor (the chief provincial executive), and in each kabupaten capital and kotamadya there was to be a second-level local elections committee (PPD-II), chaired by the bupati or mayor (chief executive of second-level local government). Under these local committees, in the capital of each ketjamatan (third-level of local government) there was to be a polling committee (PPS), headed by the tjabat (chief official of the ketjamatan), and in each desa (village--fourth and lowest level of local government) there was to be an electors' registration committee (PPP), headed by the lurah

26. Angkatan Bersendjata, February 6, 1970.

27. The total number of those deprived of voting rights for various reasons was eventually recorded officially as 2,123,747. Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, "Daftar W.N.R.I. jang tidak berhak memilih, Tiap Daerah Tingkat-I di Seluruh Indonesia" (mimeo.), July 29, 1971.

(village chief) (Article 8). There were thus to be 26 first-level local elections committees, 281 second-level local elections committees, 3,184 polling committees, and 48,471 electors' registration committees.²⁸ The vertical lines of Indonesia's local government organization under the Home Affairs Department were thus utilized in setting up the administrative organization for the elections. While it ensured administrative efficiency, this structure no less certainly guaranteed effective governmental intervention and control, since local government chief executives were ex officio the chairmen of local election committees, and the members of these committees were "appointed and discharged" by the chief executives of the next higher levels of government. Specifically, members of the National Elections Committee were appointed and discharged by the President; members of first-level and second-level local elections committees by the Minister of Home Affairs on the advice of the governors; and members of polling committees and electors' registration committees by the bupati or mayors on the advice of the tjamat (Article 8). In effect, the General Elections Institute assumed the character of a military command with local chief executives as local commanders and election committees as their staffs.

The executive board of the General Elections Institute was composed of the Ministers of Home Affairs (Lieutenant-General Amir Machmud), Justice (Prof. Umar Senoadji), Information (Air Vice-Marshal Budiardjo), Finance (Prof. Ali Wardhana), Defense and Security (President Suharto, represented by General Panggabean, Deputy Commander of the Armed Services with the then status of minister), Communications (Frans Seda), and Foreign Affairs (Adam Malik) (Article 5, Government Ordinance No. 1/1970). The 20-member National Elections Committee was composed of all the executive board members of the Institute plus the members of the Institute's other committee, the Appeals Committee, which was intended to deal with any complaints about administrative procedures in the elections (Article 5, Supplement, Presidential Decree No. 3/January 15, 1970).

Military officers were to be found buttressing this civilian bureaucratic organization from within and without. Within, of 26 first-level and 281 second-level local elections committee chairmen (53 mayors and 228 bupati), for example, 20 first-level and 142 second-level chairmen (26 mayors and 116 bupati) held military ranks.²⁹ Without,

28. Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Siaran Pemilihan Umum, no. 9 (March 8, 1971), p. 4.

29. Sinar Harapan, February 1, 1971.

there was the State Intelligence Coordinating Body (Bakin), headed by Major-General Sutopo Juwono. Bakin not only collected intelligence on national security but constantly assessed the popularity of Golkar. Cabinet Secretary Brigadier-General Sudharmono also appeared to play an active role in the electoral administration.

Working closely with Bakin and the General Elections Institute was the whole body of ABRI, comprising some six-hundred thousand men, under the leadership of the Department of Defense and Security (Hankam).³⁰ This ministry headed by Suharto himself, had the task of maintaining public order. In addition, the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib) led by General Panggabean and Lieutenant-General Sumitro, had responsibility for screening the qualifications of voters and candidates (Articles 23 and 49, Government Ordinance No. 1/1970), while continuing to search for remaining Gestapu elements. Major-General Yoga Sugomo, head of Hankam's G-I (intelligence) section, and Lieutenant-General Darjatmo, head of G-III (personnel) assisted these efforts. Further, the Civil Defense Corps (Hansip) and the People's Resistance Corps (Wanra) in all desa were assigned to maintain public order at the polling stations. Comprising some two million people, Hansip and Wanra function as auxiliary forces to ABRI; while not part of the Armed Services, they act under ABRI's command. Similar to the home guard units created by the Japanese occupation authorities during World War II, they work as security forces at the desa level under Hankam territorial commanders.

A very important role in organizing the elections was also played by Brigadier-General Ali Murtopo. Since his appointment in June 1968 as the President's personal assistant for special political operations (Operasi Khusus, commonly abbreviated as Opsus), Ali Murtopo's chief task had been to collect political intelligence at home and abroad, to advise the President thereon, and sometimes to undertake covert operations. Soon after the 1969 election laws were enacted, the President issued Decree No. 4 of January 15, 1970,³¹ in which he authorized the creation of a Logistics and Supplies

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30. In his Independence Day speech on August 16, 1968, President Suharto gave the figure of 597,540 as the extent of ABRI membership. Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden Republik Indonesia Djenderal Soeharto didepan Sidang DPR-GR 16 Agustus 1968 (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, n.d.), p. 38.
31. The text of the decree is contained in Bekal Pemilu 1971, pp. 583-592.

Board within the General Elections Institute, the personnel of which were to be recruited from the civil service or the military (Article 4). Furthermore, by another presidential decree (No. 8/M/1970), which was issued on the same day, he appointed Ali Murtopo as head of this board.³² His responsibility for the procurement and allocation of such election materials as motor transport, ships, typewriters, and the transportation of election forms and documents gave Ali Murtopo a strong position in the electoral administration, which was consolidated by his supervisory role in relation to Golkar's General Elections Board (Bapilu), a role which will be discussed later. No provision was made in the 1969 election laws for the important Logistics and Supplies Board. The President simply made use of Paragraph 4, Article 4 of Government Ordinance No. 1 of January 13, 1970, which authorized the President, or the Chairman of the General Elections Institute with presidential approval, to establish other organs within the Institute in order to ensure smooth operations of the general elections.

The General Elections Institute and the National Elections Committee were formed on January 17, 1970, and their common leader, Amir Machmud, then worked out detailed and energetic work schedules through the end of 1973.³³ Information and "coaching" activities were among his most important responsibilities as the supervisor of Pemilu. He prepared three phases of informational activities: dissemination of the idea of Pantja Sila democracy (January to May 1970); dissemination of the five principles of public order called Pantja Krida (July to September 1970); and explanations of technical aspects of the general elections (October 1970 to March 1971). Explanations were to be given down to the desa level. Coaching activities were to be conducted at national, kabupaten, and ketjamatan levels between February 15, 1970 and June 10, 1971, and were intended primarily to train election officials. A Pemilu song was also composed and broadcast on every radio news program from late June, 1970 onward.³⁴

32. Ibid., pp. 615-616.

33. Ibid., pp. 72-77. Even after the elections were over, the General Elections Institute was to be responsible for making preparations for establishing the membership of the MPR (due to assemble in March 1973) and for collecting all the available election data and information for analysis in preparation for the next general elections, scheduled for 1976.

34. Berita Yudha, June 24, 1970.

For a month after July 5, 1970, Electors Registration Committees throughout the Republic conducted house-to-house surveys to produce lists of eligible voters. These surveys recorded a total of 114,972,428 Indonesian citizens, of whom 57,750,615, or some 50.2 percent were registered as eligible.³⁵

On May 23, 1970, all nine political parties together with the functional groups represented in the DPR-GR were pronounced eligible for participation in the elections (Presidential Decree No. 43/1970, based on Article 34 of Law No. 15/1969).³⁶ In this decree it was also recognized that the functional groups might participate as one body, namely, the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups, or Sekber-Golkar (Article 3). This indeed occurred, and emblems for the (now ten) organizations contesting the elections were officially approved by the General Elections Institute on August 21.³⁷ By law, no organization could use Indonesia's national coat of arms, flag, and the like as its electoral emblem (Article 18, Law No. 15/1960). However, Golkar adopted an electoral emblem containing two of the five symbols of the Pantja Sila principles used in the national coat of arms. In the center of the Golkar emblem there was a banyan tree (waringin), symbolizing national consciousness; below, on either side, were the sheaves of rice and cotton which, in the national coat of arms, represent social justice. The whole emblem was enclosed in a pentagon, which, according to one Golkar official, signified the Pantja Sila. Despite this obvious copying, the Golkar emblem was still legal, since it contained symbols of only two of the five Pantja Sila principles and omitted a major element in the national coat of arms, the Garuda bird. It is noteworthy, too, that the banyan tree is a common element in the coats of arms of such powerful government bodies as the Departments of Home Affairs and Justice, while the pentagon is featured in that of the Department of Defense and Security. In fact, the Golkar emblem was clearly a selective combination of Hankam and Home Affairs Department symbols. The electorate was thus given the distinct impression that Golkar was the official electoral contender, to be accepted by all Indonesian citizens.

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35. Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Djumlah Penduduk dan Pemilih Warga Negara Indonesia Berdasarkan Hasil Pendaftaran Penduduk Jang Dilakukan Mulai Tanggal 5 Djuli 1970 s/d Tanggal 5 Agustus 1970 Diperintji per Propinsi dan Kabupaten/Kotamadya (mimeo: n.d.), p. 1. These figures were later slightly revised.
36. Merdeka, June 4, 1970.
37. Ibid., August 22, 1970.

On September 23, the official listing order (serial order) of the ten contenders was determined by lot, resulting in the following sequence: (1) Catholic Party; (2) PSII; (3) NU; (4) Parmusi; (5) Golkar; (6) Parkindo; (7) Murba; (8) PNI; (9) Perti; and (10) IPKI.³⁸ On this and other such occasions, Golkar officials always urged that, in any election materials, Golkar be placed apart from the other nine organizations since it was not a party. Although this demand was not met, it helped to further the idea that Golkar should be distinguished as a government group, separate from the parties, and thus especially deserving of popular support in this period of the "development-oriented" New Order.

III. Golkar, A Party Built from Above

Historically, the functional groups (*golongan karya*) have long enjoyed the Indonesian Army's favor. The military had supported the idea of parliamentary representation of occupational groups as early as 1957, regarding them as a potential counterforce to the fast-growing PKI. They had welcomed Sukarno's decision in 1960 to grant functional groups seats in the DPR-GR on the basis of Article 2 of the 1945 Constitution which refers to golongan-golongan (groups) and their representation in the MPR.³⁹ Through such groups, the Army intended to exert influence on the mass organizations

38. Ibid., September 24, 1970.

39. Sukarno was known to favor representation of functional groups in the Indonesian parliament ever since his 1956 visit to the CPR where he had observed the role of such groups in the Chinese political structure. He evidently hoped thereby to weaken the power of the political parties and increase his own. An Indonesian scholar has inform the writer that as early as 1959 the Army had begun to study the role of functional groups in the Yugoslav parliament. Non-geographical representation was not unprecedented in Indonesian legislative history. Ethnic groups were represented in the *Volksraad* of the Dutch colonial era and the *Chuō Sangi-in* of the Japanese occupation period; and such occupational groups as farmers and workers, as well as ethnic groups, were represented at the Sixth Session of the Central National Committee of Indonesia (KNIP), the quasi-representative legislative organ of the revolutionary period (1945-1949). See Table I.

affiliated with the political parties. First, it initiated and controlled the anti-PKI "labor" federation Soksi (All-Indonesia Organization of Socialist Functionaries), composed of twenty-five organizations representing the workers and officials of government-run plantations and industries. In October 1964, with Soksi as core, several such occupational groups established a joint secretariat under Army leadership. Over the next few years many different organizations joined this secretariat (referred to as Sekber-Golkar), including Kosgoro (Koperasi Serba-Guna Gotong-Rojong--Association of Mutual Assistance Cooperatives), MKGR (Musjawarah Keluarga Gotong-Rojong--Council of the Mutual Assistance Family), as well as certain youth and women's organizations once affiliated with the banned Masjumi and PSI that were seeking a protective umbrella.

It was this body that became the prototype of the "banyan tree" party of 1970. Two points should be made clear in this connection. First, the Army's attempt to foster and reinforce Sekber-Golkar was made outside the formal parliamentary framework. Technically speaking, the functional groups within the national legislature did not act as one group until after the 1971 elections. In 1960, when functional groups were first represented in the DPR-GR, there were 21 occupational groups, including farmers, workers, teachers of various religions, artists, the Armed Forces, and so forth. There was then no parliamentary joint council or secretariat. Second, it was only after 1965 that the government, in which the military was now dominant, began to conceive of the Army's Sekber-Golkar as the core of the parliamentary functional representatives and to encourage as many occupational groups as possible to join it.⁴⁰ In the post-Gestapu period, the military placed great importance on Sekber-Golkar's potential parliamentary power in opposition to the existing "ideology-oriented" parties--just as Sukarno had done previously. To fight the parties, the military authorities emphasized Golkar's concern for economic development, and they denounced the party politics of the past.

In the light of the informational and coaching activities conducted under the General Elections Institute, it is not surprising that the Suharto regime decided to give its full support to Golkar from the beginning of 1970 and soon after to move decisively to weaken the other political

40. According to a Golkar report, the number of groups affiliated with Sekber-Golkar in 1965 was 64, increasing to 128 in 1966, and 252 in 1967. As of August 1968, the number had slightly decreased to 249. See Peranan Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya dalam Pembangunan (Jakarta: Sekber-Golkar, 1968 [?]), p. 40.

parties. All those government employees who were assigned to these informational activities could (and were) used as field campaigners for Golkar. While the Minister of Home Affairs pushed a drive to support Golkar through the structure of his department, the military, which by law, was not allowed to participate in the elections, was likewise mobilized for "maintaining security and order at village level." In February 1970 all the Golkar leaders, including its general chairman, Major-General Suprpto Sokowati, made field trips to explain Golkar's cause to regional commanders, governors, mayors, and so forth.

Before 1970, Sekber-Golkar was said to have had little influence outside Djakarta, although on paper it had provincial branches throughout the country. In late 1969, there were over 200 occupational groups affiliated with Golkar's joint secretariat, and on November 22, 1969, they were clustered under seven parental bodies called Kino (Kelompok Induk Organisasi--lit., mother group of organizations). The seven Kino were: Soksi, Kosgoro, MKGR, Gerakan Karya Rakjat (People's Working Movement--a cluster of civil service associations), Ormas Hankam (Hankam Mass Organizations--a group of Hankam-related organizations, including an association of ABRI wives, and one for civilian employees of the Ministry of Defense and Security), Professi (a cluster of professional organizations, such as those of economists, doctors and engineers), and Gerakan Pembangunan (Development Movement--a group of business and other development-related organizations).⁴¹

All of the parental bodies mentioned above, except for the last, were headed by military men with the rank of brigadier-general or major-general. However, it should be noted that in the Central Joint Secretariat there were many active civilian intellectuals, among whom were Sumiskum and Sulistio, both members of the DPR-GR, and Cosmas Batubara and David Napitupulu, who both were former KAMI leaders.

Despite the presence of such civilian leaders in the secretariat, the influence of the military leaders over Sekber-Golkar was firmly entrenched. Among the most prominent military personnel were Generals Amir Machmud and Ali Murtopo. Following the passage of the election laws in late November 1969, Amir Machmud issued Ministerial Order No. 12/1969 on December 4, which prohibited all functional group members in local representative councils from retaining membership in political parties. The order also stipulated

41. Antara Warta Berita, November 22, 1969 (evening edition).

that members of parties and those of functional groups must be of equal number and that an odd member, if there was one, must be from the functional groups; furthermore, all functional group appointments had to be made by local branches of Sekber-Golkar. Although this order was effective only until a new parliament was established by the 1971 elections, the Home Affairs Minister's measure "purifying local functional group members" was seen by the political parties as actually "purifying" themselves. The measure was certainly instrumental in strengthening the authority of local-level Sekber-Golkar leaders as spokesmen for the functional groups. This part of the measure appears to have been more important than the action prohibiting functional group members from affiliating with parties, particularly in view of the fact that before 1970 Sekber-Golkar had had little influence outside Djakarta.

Amir Machmud, a one-time territorial commander in South Kalimantan and in Djakarta, began to act "like a good troop commandant," as a Djakarta daily commented in February 1970.⁴² He pushed forward with Government Ordinance No. 6/1970, dated February 11, concerning the political activities of civil servants.⁴³ This ordinance prohibited all civil servants from engaging in political activities that might damage their positions as civil servants and barred all ABRI members and top-ranking civil servants, such as cabinet ministers, from joining "political organizations." The ordinance did not necessarily prohibit party affiliation for lower-ranking government officials. However, Amir Machmud soon moved to force officials in his own department to sever their ties with any party except Golkar and also to encourage them to join two new organizations under his control, namely, Kokarmendagri (Home Affairs Department Employees' Association) for all male employees, and Pertiwi for their wives and female officials of the department. As this measure became known outside the department, Amir Machmud was subjected to heavy criticism by party leaders. On July 5, 22 members of the DPR-GR expressed their concern about "overacting" (misuse of authority) by governors toward their subordinates.⁴⁴ A few days later, the NU's second chairman, Sjaichu, threatened to make public evidence of government "intimidation."⁴⁵ These protests did not seem to affect the minister, who said that political struggle was not

42. Pedoman, February 18, 1970.

43. The text can be found in Bekal Pemilu 1971, pp. 673-677.

44. Djakarta Times, July 6, 1970.

45. Merdeka, July 9, 1970.

a monopoly of the parties, and that he, too, would fight,⁴⁶ for the victory of Pantja Sila and the 1945 Constitution.

Equally indispensable for the electioneering strategy of Sekber-Golkar was Brigadier-General Ali Murtopo, chief of Opsus, to whom reference has already been made in connection with his appointment as chief of supplies for the general elections. Ali Murtopo was one of the President's closest confidants and also acted as adviser to Sekber-Golkar's General Elections Board. Some observers indeed believe that it was originally his idea to develop Sekber-Golkar into a government party. Thus, as a point of linkage between the civilian bureaucracy, the military, the Presidential office, and the government party, Ali Murtopo came to assume a key supervisory role over the whole administration of the elections and all Golkar campaign operations.

While reinforcing Sekber-Golkar, Ali Murtopo's Opsus teams also began to "soften up" the political parties and professional organizations. They intervened in party caucuses and manipulated party conventions to create leadership crises, thus helping to demoralize the parties and other independent organizations.⁴⁷ The first clear instance occurred at the national convention of the PNI, held in April 1970. Despite wide belief in the popularity of Acting General Chairman Hardi, the fifth deputy chairman, Hadisubeno, was elected permanent chairman of the party. Hadisubeno was widely reported to be the Army's choice, because Hardi was known to be critical of the socio-political role (dwifungsi) claimed by the military. A second target of Opsus was the minor nationalist party, IPKI (League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence), which held its annual congress in May 1970 and produced a pro-government leadership. A third operation was conducted within the Indonesian Journalists' Association (PWI), whose Palembang convention of October 22, 1970 ended abruptly in great confusion, with two executive boards, one led by Rosihan Anwar of Pedoman and Jacob Utama of Kompas, and another, reported to have the backing of Opsus, by B. M. Diah of Merdeka. This confusion was further aggravated by the Information Minister's recognition of the Diah-led board, an unusual intervention by the government in the internal affairs of a professional organization.⁴⁸ The

46. Indonesia Raya, July 10, 1970.

47. Rusadi Kantaprawira, "Situasi Mendjelang Pemilu: Suhu 'Power Politics' Menaik?" Kompas, November 27, 1970; and Alfian, "Suharto and the Question of Political Stability," Pacific Community (Tokyo), II, no. 3 (April 1971), pp. 536-548.

48. Djakarta Times, October 28, 1970.

Indonesian Doctors' Association (IDI) met from October 13 to 19, 1970, and "decided" to continue its affiliation with Sekber-Golkar. The Indonesian Lawyers' Association (Persahi) followed suit.

A very conspicuous Opsus operation was also launched against Parmusi. When first established with Presidential endorsement in February 1968, the party had been expected to inherit the Islamic reformist and anti-Communist stances of the defunct Masjumi. The government saw it as a means of ensuring the cooperation of the old Masjumi constituency.⁴⁹ Its first chairman and secretary-general, Djarnawi Hadikusumo and Lukman Harun, were both endorsed by Acting President Suharto. By 1970, however, this leadership had evidently become less acceptable to the military than hitherto. The party split and on October 17, 1970, John Naro and Ali Imran Kadir, both of whom were supporters of the Army's socio-political role, announced a new executive board for Parmusi. They then visited Home Affairs Minister Amir Machmud and Hankam personnel chief Darjatmo, apparently to obtain recognition.⁵⁰ The rival executives blamed each other for the crisis, the Djarnawi-Lukman group also blaming government intervention. The confusion lasted until November 20, when Mintaredja, a prominent member of Muhammadiyah and Minister for Liaison between the Government and the Representative Organs of the State, who had been called in by Suharto to lead the party from November 14, announced a new executive board and gained official endorsement by Presidential Decree No. 77.⁵¹ It was said that Opsus operatives were responsible for the scenario of the Parmusi leadership crisis; and it was widely commented on that, although the Djarnawi executive had been approved by the President in 1968, it had subsequently opposed or resisted the electioneering strategy of the military.⁵² Thus, the government had itself taken over the leadership of one of the

49. Some ex-Masjumi leaders, such as Mohammad Natsir and Mohammad Rum, had indeed initially been encouraged by the Suharto group to help build up the party. But their outspoken remarks about the military authorities and their organizing skills soon appeared as challenging to the Suharto regime as they had once been to Sukarno's. As we have seen, the military responded by insisting on their exclusion from leadership positions in Parmusi.

50. Djakarta Times and Kompas, October 24, 1970.

51. Djakarta Times, November 23, 1970. The Presidential Decree was dated November 20.

52. Rusadi, "Situasi Mendjelang Pemilu."

country's two largest Islamic parties and had inserted as party chairman a minister on active duty in the cabinet.

To avoid such governmental interference, the NU leadership postponed the party's national congress, originally scheduled for December 1970. Yet it found itself nonetheless being undermined by government intervention. Guppi (Gabungan Usaha Perbaikan Pendidikan Islam--Islamic Education Improvement Federation), founded in Sukabumi in 1952 and long a relatively unimportant Islamic organization, was reactivated at the initiative of presidential special assistant Brigadier-General Sudjono Humardani in about November 1970. The organization, composed primarily of Islamic teachers, was then headed by H. Sjarifuddin, Director-General for Religious Education in the Department of Religious Affairs and an NU leader. On January 23, a newspaper sympathetic to Parmusi reported that Sjarifuddin was already inviting heads of local Religious Education offices to represent Guppi.⁵³ Some NU leaders, such as H. Tubagus, complained that their names appeared on the list of Guppi's executive committee without their agreement. On January 27, Abadi carried an editorial expressing concern that "the UN [was] being destroyed by Golkar." Guppi was reported as claiming it had the teachers of some 3,000 pesantren (religious boarding-schools for Moslems) in its ranks. At its national conference the organization adopted an ambiguous policy statement to the effect that since it adhered to Islamic teachings within the realm of the spirit of the Pantja Sila and the 1945 Constitution, it had decided to join Sekber-Golkar.⁵⁴ On January 28, 1971, after the conference, Guppi representatives received the blessing of the President himself at a meeting in the presidential palace attended also by many of Suharto's top aides including Ali Murtopo, Sudjono Humardani, Adam Malik and Budiardjo.⁵⁵

In short, there are sufficient grounds to suspect that Opsus workers were attempting to "divide and rule" the parties and professional organizations in order to keep them at the disposal of the authorities. This constituted an obvious shift in electioneering strategy since 1969, when the government had been willing to maintain cooperative contacts with the parties. That Sekber-Golkar was concurrently being strenuously built up from the top by high-ranking military figures with sophisticated political engineering skills was equally apparent.

53. Abadi, January 23, 1971.

54. Ibid., January 27 and 29, 1971.

55. Ibid., January 29, 1971.

IV. Screening of Candidates, January-April 1971

Although everyone knew that election day would fall on or just before July 5, 1971, it was not until March 30 that Saturday, July 3, was formally fixed as polling day.⁵⁶

The official campaign period began on April 27. From January through April 26, the government apparatus, especially the departments of Home Affairs, Defense and Security, and Information, made final preparations for the administration of the elections. The major concern of the government seemed to be with internal security. On January 27 the Home Affairs Minister convened in Djakarta a meeting of all the governors, mayors, and bupati for a final "coaching" on electoral administration. After the conference was over, rumors arose that local government heads at all levels down to the village had been told that they must achieve a quota of 30 percent of the vote for Golkar on polling day.⁵⁷ Hansip and Wanra, both important--though unofficial--wings of the Defense and Security Department as well as of Sekber-Golkar, were assigned to work as "capable and talented instruments for making a success of the 1971 general elections."⁵⁸ The 1971 Armed Services Commanders' Call was convened on February 22 in order to tackle possible emergencies. The local leadership councils known as Muspida (Musjawarah Pimpinan Daerah), consisting of the heads of local government, police, prosecution, and Army, also functioned to help maintain local electoral security. Thus, a security system was established at the lowest administrative level, coordinated by Hansip, Wanra, and Muspida, and ultimately supervised by the Hankam and the Home Affairs departments, headed by Suharto and Amir Machmud.

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56. The Home Affairs Minister had announced this date on March 10, but it was not until the cabinet meeting of March 30 that it was officially settled. See Antara Warta Berita, March 30, 1971 (evening edition). For the text of the minister's decision (No. 31/1971), see Siaran Pemilihan Umum, no. 13/14 (May 10, 1971), p. 4.
57. To the writer's knowledge, this rumor has never been proved; but if it were true, it would have meant a theoretical guarantee of Golkar majorities in all local assemblies, since by the 1969 election law (No. 16) all local legislative bodies had to reserve one-fifth of their seats for functional groups by appointment, and this one-fifth plus one-third of the remaining (elected) four-fifths of the seats would make almost 50 percent.
58. Berita Yudha, January 15, 1971.

Candidates Screened

A far more important task assumed by the government in the first four months of 1971 was the screening and endorsement of candidates nominated by the ten electoral contenders. Responsibility for screening candidates fell upon Lieutenant-General Sumitro, deputy commander of Kopkamtib (Article 49, Government Ordinance No. 1/1970 and Article 12 [3], Government Ordinance No. 2/1970). But in practice, others besides Sumitro were actively involved in the selection of candidates, the most notable of whom were Amir Machmud, Ali Murtopo, Major-General Yoga Sugomo, Major-General Sunandar (Secretary of the National Elections Committee), and Brigadier-General Wang Suwandi (chief of the special affairs section of the Home Affairs Department).⁵⁹

Between January 13 and February 13, 1971 the ten participating organizations submitted their respective lists of candidates for 25 provinces, i.e., the 25 ordinary constituencies for the DPR. (In the province of West Irian different arrangements were followed.) An initial table of 3,789 candidates, broken down by party and constituency but without the names of the candidates, was given in the January 18 issue of Merdeka.⁶⁰ After screening by Kopkamtib between February 14 and 28, the initial list of January 18 was pared to a total of 3,105 candidates, and announced to the public on March 13 as the Provisional List.⁶¹ After further screening, an Official List of 3,021 candidates was made public on April 20.⁶² Thus 768 candidates were disqualified between the initial and Official lists.

The initial, Provisional, and Official lists (compared in Table II), show the two-stage selection of candidates: 684 candidates from the initial list, and an additional 84 from the Provisional List were deleted. Because the authorities did not make the initial list public, it is difficult to

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59. Sinar Harapan, March 4, 1971.
60. Merdeka, January 15, 1971, and Indonesia Raya, January 16, 1971, reported a total figure of 3,797, but the figures given in a table in Merdeka, January 18, 1971, add up to 3,789. Sinar Harapan, March 4, 1971, gave the number of candidates initially nominated as 3,840.
61. Siaran Pemilihan Umum, no. 10 (March 17, 1971), pp. 3-4.
62. Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Daftar Tjalon Tetap Pemilihan Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Tahun 1971 dari Orpol/Golkar (mimeo., 1971).

identify just who had been deleted from the initial list. However, judging from the statement given by Amir Machmud to the effect that most of those deleted from the Provisional List were those who failed to complete the necessary documents,⁶³ a more substantial screening must have been made at the first stage of elimination.

The criteria for screening were involvement in Gestapu, lack of positive support for development, and lack of support for Pantja Sila democracy and the 1945 Constitution.⁶⁴ The last criterion referred to rebellious activities against the central government in the past, including the 1958 Sumatra and Sulawesi rebellions, the Free Papua Movement, Moluccan secessionist movements, and so forth.

The elimination of candidates once nominated meant more than just depriving them of the right to be elected. It meant prohibiting them from taking part in the electoral campaign (Article 54 of Government Ordinance No. 1/1970). In October 1970, it was stipulated that disqualified candidates could not engage in electoral campaigns nor attend or be introduced "in a conspicuous manner (setjara menjolok)" to public campaign rallies (Article 4, Presidential Order No. 68/October 27, 1970). Thus, the screening of candidates had an indirect but decisive role in inhibiting party activities.

According to Sinar Harapan, 13 Golkar candidates likely to be disqualified were ex-PRRI members from Djambi, South Sumatra, and North Sumatra.⁶⁵ According to this report, most of the PNI candidates who might meet negative judgment were government officials and "ex-collaborators with the Dutch." Some 30 Parkindo candidates too were likely to lose the right of candidacy because of their past connections with Permesta. Candidates of Parmusi identified with the leadership of Masjumi or the PRRI, or both, were also eliminated in the screening, including Natsir, Rum and Kasman Singodimedjo.

By comparing the initial with the Official List (see Table III), it can be seen that, while only eleven Golkar candidates were disqualified, PNI and Parmusi lost respectively 164 and 131 candidates, the largest number of deletions. They were followed by the PSII and IPKI, which lost 112 and

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63. Siaran Pemilihan Umum, no. 13/14 (May 10, 1971), pp. 3-4.
64. Statement of Major-General Yoga Sugomo, Hankam intelligence chief, reported in Sinar Harapan, March 4, 1971, and Merdeka, March 5, 1971.
65. Sinar Harapan, March 3, 1971.

111 candidates respectively. The large losses of PNI and Parmusi candidates reinforced the popular view that they were the main targets of Kopkamtib's activities. It is important to note in this regard that the NU had the smallest loss, only 18--far less than the other two parties of the "big three." Perhaps this signifies that Kopkamtib had little hostility to the candidates of this conservative Moslem party, even though it might have wished to weaken the party as a whole by other means.

That the Indonesian military did intend to keep close watch over PNI and Parmusi is further confirmed by examining the disqualified candidates of these parties in terms of their electoral constituency. The PNI was most tightly screened in Java, especially in its strongholds, Central and East Java. In these two constituencies alone, the PNI lost 76 candidates (out of 164); similarly, Parmusi lost 51 (out of 131) candidates in Java.

The Suharto regime's fears of the PNI in Central and East Java were also manifested in another interesting fact: while in most provinces Golkar put up almost as many candidates as the maximum number permitted by the regulations for each particular province, Central and East Java were exceptions (see Table IV). In these provinces, Golkar nominated 53 and 59 candidates, respectively, where 114 and 126 persons might run for the DPR. This can be regarded as indicative of a lack of confidence on the part of Sekber-Golkar in these areas, where the candidates of both the NU and the PNI outnumbered Golkar's by impressive margins. In Central Java, the NU had 63 and the PNI 111 candidates; in East Java, the NU had 84 candidates and the PNI 125. The severe cut of PNI and Parmusi candidates in Central and East Java may thus be explained by the need to compensate for the limited self-confidence on the part of ABRI and Sekber-Golkar in these provinces. More generally, however, ABRI leaders were growing increasingly confident of Golkar's success, and were even beginning to denigrate in public the idea of partnership with the parties (the idea had in practice, of course, been abandoned for some time.)

In mid-January, PNI Chairman Hadisubeno, who had been installed by the Opsus-manipulated party congress of the previous year, declared that Marhaenism (the party's official ideology) stood for the teachings of Bung Karno and was the basis of the PNI line of thought. If the teachings of Sukarno were to be banned, he challenged President Sunarto to dissolve the PNI as well. He was immediately reprimanded for this statement by Lieutenant-General Surono, the Java-Madura Territorial Defense Commander. To ease tensions with the military, the PNI leadership then began to accentuate a

PNI-Golkar partnership, which Surono again denounced.⁶⁶ Within the Parmusi, Suharto-picked Mintaredja also played up to the military. In early March, he renewed the intra-party controversy by publicly criticising the entry of ex-Masjumi members into the new Moslem party.⁶⁷ Although by mid-April, Parmusi was reported to have succeeded in integrating itself again,⁶⁸ Mintaredja never appeared to have a grip upon the party machinery. Inside the organization he spoke for the Suharto regime, not for the party.⁶⁹ The NU as well seemed cowed and began to emphasize its denial that the party's ultimate purpose was to build an Islamic state.⁷⁰

By this time the parties were clearly fighting more to survive than to win the elections. When Ali Murtopo and Amir Machmud remarked that there would have to be a change in the political structure after Pemilu, their remarks caused serious concern among party leaders, some of whom interpreted them to mean that the government would actually dissolve the parties. There were continued reports about a "PNI exodus to Golkar," as many local government employees, who had, for the most part, been PNI members, were apparently forced to switch to Kokarmendagri, the employees' association of the Home Affairs Department. There were also reports that 30,000 NU members joined Kokarmendagri in early April and that Hassan, a prominent Islamic leader in West Java, had led his 850,000 followers into Golkar in late May.⁷¹ Political parties protested against the "Golkar offensive," and criticized Amir Machmud for being a "bulldozer," crushing political parties and cultivating the rough political soil for Golkar's easy growth. In mid-April there was even a short-lived anti-Amir Machmud movement (Gemud--from Gerakan Anti-Amir Machmud) in Wonogiri, Central Java, to protest the minister's pressure tactics,

66. Harian Kami, January 28, 1971.

67. Abadi, March 5, 1971.

68. Indonesia Raya, April 13, 1971.

69. In early May, Mintaredja stated during a local Parmusi meeting that, no matter what happened to Parmusi in the elections, Suharto must be kept as President. Kompas, May 11, 1971.

70. Indonesia Raya, April 5, 1971.

71. Antara Warta Berita, April 13, 1971 (morning edition) and May 29, 1971 (evening edition).

but it bore no fruit.⁷² All these protests, however, seemed to have little, if any, effect.

Party Images Shown by Candidate Lists

Under the proportional representation system, the Indonesian voter casts his ballot for an entire party list and has no way of expressing preferences among the party's candidates. This means that it pays the party to include well-known and popular figures on its lists, since these figures will help ensure the election of more obscure party candidates.⁷³ The political logic of this system was well understood by the campaign strategists of all the parties contesting the 1971 elections.

Sekber-Golkar strategists, for instance, attempted to put up well-known personalities such as Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX for the province of Central Java, Foreign Minister Adam Malik for North Sumatra, his wife for West Java, Mrs. Ali Sadikin (wife of the popular Governor of Djakarta) for Djakarta, and so forth.⁷⁴ Professor Widjojo Nitisastro, chairman of the National Development Planning Board (Bappenas), Professor Ali Wardhana, Minister of Finance, and Professor Sumantri Brodjonegoro, Minister of Mines, were also nominated, although they withdrew their candidacies when President Suharto indicated his disapproval to them.⁷⁵ Sekber-Golkar also made conscious efforts to find candidates with prestigious academic degrees.

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72. Reports on Gemud originally appeared in Antara on April 13. It was suspended very quickly. On April 14, General Surono remarked that Gemud was not a movement, but consisted of the activities of only eight persons. The Central Java Territorial Commander, Major-General Widodo, stated that Gemud was detected "before it became significant." Abadi, April 15, 1971.
73. Such well-known figures do not necessarily end up with legislative seats, even if the party is successful in the elections. Though it is understood that their popularity may have helped the party, the ballots, of course, show no preferences for particular party candidates. When the party learns the number of seats it is entitled to on the basis of its proportion of the total vote, it fills these seats according to the choice of the party executive.
74. Merdeka, January 15, 1971.
75. Sinar Harapan, March 16, 1971.

These features illustrate the nature and scope of Golkar's nomination policy and the kind of image that the government party wished to convey to the electorate. With so many of the nation's prominent personalities listed as candidates, it hoped to give the impression that the party enjoyed the support of the nation's elite. Similarly, in nominating technocrats, Golkar strategists must have hoped to impress the voters with the seriousness of Golkar's commitment to development.

Given the nature of the available data, there is no way of knowing how effective Golkar's policy was among the electorate. Nevertheless, it may be worthwhile to compare the profiles of Golkar candidates with those of other parties, on the basis of the official published data on the 3,021 candidates in the Official List of April 20.⁷⁶ In the first place, Golkar was the most adept at procuring local candidates in the provinces. As shown in Table V, 94 percent of Golkar's 538 candidates were put up in the province where they resided, whereas the other nine parties found only 72 to 89 percent of their candidates in their home provinces, and had to depend upon Djakarta as a source of candidate recruitment for the rest. Murba showed itself the least able to procure "home-grown" provincial candidates (72.4 percent); 50 of its 147 candidates (24.6 percent) were recruited in Djakarta. In fact, Murba did not contest the elections at all in the provinces of Bengkulu, Central and Southeast Sulawesi, and East Nusatenggara. The Big Three--the PNI, the NU, and Parmusi--showed a relatively high ability to recruit provincial candidates in the regions. Together with Golkar, they pictured themselves as national parties.

When the number of candidates is examined by constituency, it is apparent that in most constituencies Golkar was able to put up almost as many candidates as the maximum number of nominees permitted (see Table IV). Initially, the Big Three also had comparable numbers of candidates; the PNI had 669, the NU had 415, and Parmusi had 458 candidates (compared to Golkar's 549). But, as was mentioned earlier, the PNI and Parmusi were handicapped by Kopkamtib's activities, and as a result were not able to run as energetic and serious a campaign as they had wished.

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76. The writer is fully aware that since 768 candidates were screened out of the initial list, it is not very fair to proceed with this part of the analysis only on the basis of the Official List. He is very grateful to his research assistant Mr. Fadjar Suryono for undertaking the tiring work of computing the information on all the Official List candidates contained in the Daftar Tjalon Tetap cited above.

Out of a total of 156 hadji candidates, 84 were nominated by the NU, comprising about 20 percent of the NU's total of 397 candidates.⁷⁷ Among these hadji 35 were kjai (heads of traditional Moslem schools) (see Table V). The high proportion of hadji among NU candidates is not surprising in the light of the nature of the party's organization, but it is interesting to observe that Golkar also nominated 17 hadji among its candidates, a larger number than that put up by Parmusi.

Out of the total 3,021 candidates, those with some sort of academic degree numbered 781; of these the largest portion belonged to Golkar, which nominated 201 degree-holders, or 37.3 percent of its 538 nominees (see Table V).⁷⁸ Twelve Golkar candidates had professorial titles; 18 Golkar nominees had titles of Doctor or Ph.D. Of the 781 degree-holding candidates, 531, or 67.6 percent had the Indonesian degrees of Insinjur (natural science), Doktorandus (or Doktoranda in the case of females--mainly social science), Sardjana Hukum (law), and Sardjana Theologi (theology), all roughly equivalent to the American degrees of masters of arts and sciences. Of these degree-holders 150 were nominated by Golkar. The proportions of technocrat candidates among PNI, NU, and Parmusi candidates were 23.5 percent, 20 percent and 33.6 percent respectively. Academic degrees are not the sole criteria for determining which candidates were technocrats, but if the parties wished to demonstrate their seriousness about national development, selecting candidates on the basis of their technical and academic skills would obviously be an effective way to impress the electorate. In this light, several parties, such as the PSII, Murba, and Perti, appeared highly unqualified.

With regard to sex, Golkar put up the largest number of women candidates: 44 out of the total of 121 women contestants, or 36.3 percent of all women nominated by the ten

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77. The figure of 156 is based on those names in the Official List that have a clear indication of titles such as "Hadji," "Kjai Hadji," or "K.H." Those candidates with merely an "H." before their names are not included, since the letter might stand for a personal name, e.g., Hassan. Thus, the real number of hadji candidates is probably somewhat higher than 156.
78. Another study gives different figures, although the total number of degree-holders cited (780) is almost the same as the total given here. See Zaibidin Jacob, "Factor Kesardjanaan Dalam Tjalon2 Pemilu 1971," Sinar Harapan, May 18, 1971.

parties in the Official List. In terms of male-female ratios, however, Parkindo did better than the other parties: 15 women or 8.2 percent of its 182 candidates, which was slightly higher than Golkar's 44 women, or 8.1 percent of its 538 nominees. The Big Three had only a negligible number of female nominees: 17 of the PNI's 505, 7 of the NU's 397, and 11 of Parmusi's 327.⁷⁹ It is difficult to evaluate the meaning of the relatively large number of female candidates. It may indicate that Golkar was attempting to display the concern of women about national development, or that since most women's organizations joined Golkar, the other parties lost their own sources of female recruitment.

Once again, though it is difficult to make up party profiles on the limited data available, what has been discerned so far suggests the superior quality of Golkar's candidates. To say the least, Golkar was the most national party, recruiting the highest number of candidates, as close as possible to the legal maximum number in most constituencies, and in addition, recruiting the largest percentage of college graduates. The other parties failed to present a forward-looking and energetic image to the electorate. Perhaps this was the result of less competent leadership in the remaining parties, but there can be no doubt that in large part it was also due to the "bandwagon" effect created by the Golkar drive.

V. The Official Campaign, April 27 to June 25

With their official candidates approved and announced on April 20, the ten organizations readied themselves for their electoral campaigns. The government apparatus made "final check-ups" on their preparations. On April 25, two days before the election campaign commenced, Amir Machmud made a television speech in which he appealed for the campaigns to be conducted within the framework of the Pantja Sila and for all organizations to struggle for the sake of promoting

79. It may be of interest to note that of the 121 female candidates of all ten parties, a little over half, namely 62, were selected from Java, 22 from Sumatra, 24 from Sulawesi, 8 from Kalimantan, 2 from Nusatenggara, and 3 from Maluku. These figures may reflect the varying social status that women enjoy in different parts of contemporary Indonesia.

national, not partisan, interests.⁸⁰ On the same day, General Panggabean, commander of Kopkamtib, also spoke on television and instructed the members of the Armed Forces to fulfill their duties; he appealed especially to the Civil Defense Corps and the People's Resistance Corps to guard polling stations against possible disturbances on the election day.⁸¹

On the following day, April 26, some 20,000 heads of neighborhood communities throughout Djakarta were summoned to the Senajan sports stadium and given instructions by Amir Machmud, Ali Murtopo, and others. On the same day, all regional police chiefs gathered in Djakarta to discuss the security measures to be taken in conjunction with campaign tensions. Also on that day, Ali Murtopo recalled that President Suharto had once proposed the idea of a "three-group system," a system with one "material" development (nationalist) group, one "spiritual" development (religious) group, and one functional group. While this idea would not necessarily involve the dissolution of the political parties and so, in that sense, it gave some guarantee of their continuing existence, it is uncertain why Ali Murtopo brought up the idea of a tri-party system at that time. It is likely, however, that, anticipating a smashing electoral victory for Golkar and the elimination of some minor parties from Indonesian politics, he wished to keep the subject of post-Pemilu political restructuring alive during the campaign period. In any case, this was the actual outcome of his comment.

The official campaign finally began on April 27. It was clear from the beginning that there was no balance in campaign funds between Golkar and the other parties.⁸² Golkar pins

80. The text of his speech appears in Siaran Pemilihan Umum, no. 13/14 (May 10, 1971), pp. 1-2.

81. The text of his speech is reproduced in Siaran Pemilihan Umum, no. 15 (May 17, 1971), pp. 1-3.

82. It would be a formidable task to work out the size of Golkar's campaign fund, since the fund was closely tied in with money from the Home Affairs Department and the General Elections Institute appropriated for electoral administration, as well as with the Defense and Security Department's security maintenance expenses. Informed sources in Djakarta regarded the "private contribution" of Lieutenant-General Ibnu Sutowo, president-director of the state oil company Pertamina, as a major source of Golkar funds. Other

and posters soon flooded Djakarta streets. Betjak drivers were given free supplies of shirts with the Golkar symbol printed on them. On the other hand, the rest of the parties made only modest starts.

Besides limited campaign funds, the strict restrictions on campaign activities seem to have affected their postures. Government Ordinance No. 1 of January 1970 prohibited any election campaigning that might discredit the Pantja Sila and the 1945 Constitution (Article 55), or that made contemptuous and discourteous remarks about the Indonesian government and its officials as well as foreign nations and groups (Article 56). These restrictions were certainly enough to discourage all parties from criticizing or even evaluating the Suharto-government's policies and from discussing Indonesia's international relations. The ordinance also stipulated that any organizations involved in sponsoring a campaign rally had to obtain in advance a permit from the authorities, who retained the power to decide upon the time and place for such rallies, giving due consideration to security conditions (Article 58). Furthermore, the ordinance provided that all posters, leaflets, slides, slogans, brochures, and other materials to be used for campaigns had to be submitted in advance to the authorities (Article 59). This last article did not say that such campaign material had to be "approved," but the implications were clear. This ordinance was further clarified by Presidential Decree No. 68 of October 27, 1970, and by the Home Affairs Minister's Order No. 39 of April 22, 1971. The latter for instance, prohibited "partisan use" of the name of the former President [Sukarno] as the Proclaimer of Independence of the State of the Republic of Indonesia (Article 3). This seriously hampered the PNI campaign in particular. On April 21, the Direct Security Command (Komando Keamanan Langsung, or Kokamsung) of the Djakarta Metropolitan Police issued

sources told the writer that Golkar asked foreign companies operating in Indonesia for contributions. On at least one occasion, Golkar collected money by an American-style fund-raising dinner at which each guest donated Rp. 200,000 (some \$530). See Sinar Harapan, June 15, 1971. According to Marzuki Arifin, "Orang2 Indonesia di Djepang," Harian Kami, April 18, 1967, as early as 1967 some parties were seeking funds in Tokyo, New York and Bonn because their domestic resources were so slim. The Indonesian government officially provided each party with Rp. 10 million plus two jeeps and other minor materiel for use in the election campaign. See Antara Warta Berita, April 29, 1971 (evening edition).

a list of thirteen prohibited actions and their penalties, which included five-year jail sentences for forging or destroying ballot papers, three-year jail sentences for bribery and trickery, and Rp. 1000 fines for delinquency by election officials.⁸³

Golkar put forward a five-point program in its organ Suara Karya of May 1, 1971.⁸⁴ It summed up what Ali Murtopo and Amir Machmud had previously been advocating: (1) to practice Pantja Sila democracy; (2) to build a new political structure without conflicts of ideology but with the aim of executing the development programs; (3) to administer an honest, competent government, with public servants who feel a single loyalty; (4) to continue to fight for these causes through five future general elections; and (5) to ensure that the outcome of these struggles benefits the whole people. The third point supported the idea being pushed by the military leaders that all government officials should join Golkar and avoid any "party" affiliations. The fourth point represented Golkar's 25-year strategy for "acceleration of modernization."

Like Golkar, the other parties made radio and television campaign speeches, but they were obviously censored in advance and only prepared texts were read.⁸⁵ Presenting no

83. Merdeka, April 22, 1971.

84. A more comprehensive version of Golkar's program describing its positions on spiritual, financial, political, economic, social and cultural questions in Indonesia, had appeared earlier. See Sinar Harapan, March 18, 1971.

85. The full texts of the radio speeches given by the ten parties can be found in the following issues of Antara Warta Berita: the Catholic Party, April 29, 1971 (evening edition), pp. 15-17; the PSII, April 30, 1971 (evening edition), pp. 13-16; the NU, April 30, 1971 (evening edition), pp. 17-19; Parmusi, May 1, 1971 (morning edition), pp. 23-25; Golkar, May 2, 1971 (morning edition), pp. 15-19; Parkindo, May 3, 1971 (morning edition), pp. 16-17; Murba, May 4, 1971 (morning edition), pp. 14-16; the PNI, May 5, 1971 (morning edition), pp. 17-20; Perti, May 6, 1971 (morning edition), pp. 18-21; and IPKI, May 7, 1971 (morning edition), pp. 11-13. The texts were examined by the General Elections Institute under Article 7 of the Information Minister's Decision No. 5/1971 (January 11, 1971). See Siaran Pemilihan Umum, no. 8 (February 15, 1971), pp. 3-4.

alternative programs, the parties merely expressed support for General Suharto as President, Pantja Sila democracy, the 1945 Constitution, and development programs.

The military authorities meanwhile tightened their security measures. In early May, naval ships conducted exercises off Semarang "in order to safeguard the general elections."⁸⁶ In mid-May General Panggabean inspected air force activities to "face possible trouble spots in connection with the general elections." In the capital, an annual Djakarta Fair, which usually takes place in June, was postponed until two weeks after the elections to avoid possible disturbances.

The military also appeared to be employing the tactic of "discrediting" the Big Three in Java. In Central Java, there were reports in mid-May about arms smuggled into the area from the outside; on May 18 a Kopkamtib team conducted a simultaneous raid throughout the province. The following day, the Central Java chairman of Parmusi was arrested on a charge of arms smuggling, and his arrest was supported by Parmusi Chairman Mintaredja. On May 23, the homes of a number of PNI leaders in Wonogiri, Central Java, were suddenly searched on similar charges. In late May, the secretary of Achmad Sjaichu, Chairman of the DPR-GR and a prominent NU leader, was arrested for alleged involvement in the 1965 communist upheaval. Numerous complaints came from the NU, the PNI, and Parmusi, as well as from minor parties, pointing to the obstruction of party campaign rallies by Golkar and military men through such means as blocking roads and destroying bridges leading to rally sites. On June 6, PNI campaigns by Sukarno's son, Guntur, and daughter, Rachmawati, were prohibited in Central Java "because of their agitation for Sukarnoism."

Centered in Djakarta, students and young intellectuals attempted courageous but unsuccessful moves to make an effective protest against the "intimidation" they alleged was being practiced by Golkar and the authorities. On May 31, they formed a Committee to Establish Popular Sovereignty, but it was banned the following day. On June 3, a similar group of liberal youths organized a movement which was called "Golput," an acronym of Golongan Putih (white group) that played on the name of Golkar. The young people appealed to people critical of the government to punch not a symbol but a blank space on their ballots as an expression of protest. Their "symbol"--necessarily unofficial--was a pentagon just like Golkar's, except that there was no banyan tree, but a blank, inside the pentagon. On the campus of the University of Indonesia students were seen wearing Golput buttons. But Golput posters in the streets were quickly taken down by officials.

86. Merdeka, May 10, 1971.

In the meantime, Golkar's organization was being further reinforced. Many organizations, including Chinese and Moslem groups, made public their switch to Golkar. This news occupied considerable space in pro-Golkar newspapers; Merdeka of May 10, for instance, reported that an Association of Indonesian Citizens of Chinese Origin (MKWI), claiming a membership of two and a half million people, had joined Golkar. There were continuing pressures upon all government departments, both at the national and the local level, to follow the example of the Home Affairs Department in organizing a departmental association of employees (Kokar) affiliated with Golkar. By the end of the campaign period, practically all departments had organized such associations. The one notable exception was the NU-dominated Department of Religious Affairs. But the atmosphere was such that the department issued a defensive statement on May 30 maintaining that it had had an employees' association called Ikdam (Ikatan Karyawan Departemen Agama) since 1968 with even a separate wing for female employees and male officials' wives.⁸⁷ But the department evidently did nothing to promote the Golkar cause.

In an effort to create a bandwagon effect, the "Golkar Safari" was organized, representing a strange, un-Indonesian campaign tactic. Between May 10 and June 20 thirteen teams of young pop singers and other entertainers, recruited in the Djakarta area, were sent out to 272 constituencies, that is, all the constituencies except for the nine in West Irian.⁸⁸ The Java teams moved around by car, and the Outer Island teams by a private plane supplied by Brigadier-General Sofjar's Mandala Airline Company. Foreign correspondents were also invited to accompany this political safari. Officials of the Golkar Safari had set East and Central Java as their main target areas.⁸⁹ But while these officials boasted about the success of their Safari, this writer learned during a journey to the region, that the rural population in East and Central Java responded poorly to it. Teams of pop singers, clad in hotpants and mini-skirts, playing steel guitars and cymbals in Djakarta fashion, looked so odd in the quiet and slow-paced rural setting that village communities did not find them acceptable, it was explained. Asked to comment on the Safari, most of the local party leaders that this writer met invariably smiled first and then remarked cuttingly, "That is a Djakarta-centered idea!"

87. Abadi, June 1, 1971.

88. Interview with a "Safari" official, Djakarta, June 14, 1971.

89. Ibid.

A more effective electioneering maneuver, undertaken by Amir Machmud, was the laying down of a requirement that government and company employees cast their ballots in their offices rather than in their areas of residence. This circular was issued on April 14 and a further explanatory circular followed on May 3.⁹⁰ The reasoning was, that, since July 3 was Saturday, and therefore still a workday, government and company workers should be able to vote at their places of employment, so they could go back to work right after polling without wasting much time. These circulars immediately stirred public controversy, because many people felt that such a procedure would intimidate voters, who otherwise might not wish to vote for Golkar, into succumbing to group pressure from their office associates.

In fact, one of the most impressive aspects of the government's campaign in general was the sophisticated and subtle use by the government of group pressure upon individual voters. Each polling place, whether in offices or in residential areas, was to handle only 200 to 300 eligible voters, "so that polling can be completed by two o'clock in the afternoon on July 3."⁹¹ Since voters were grouped as voting units according to residential districts or offices, it was feared that the outcome of polling done in such small units would easily enable the members of each polling unit to tell generally who voted for which party. There was even talk that non-Golkar voters, if later identified, might lose their jobs and that all ballot papers would be secretly numbered for later identification. Whether or not such rumors were well founded is beside the point. What mattered was the fear itself, which would have been enough to influence at least some, and possibly many, voting decisions. In a large number of localities eligible voters were summoned by a voting committee to be briefed on voting procedures and even to conduct mock voting.⁹² In some areas this mock voting helped local authorities to assess the popularity of Golkar and to exert communal pressures on anti-Golkar residents.

Toward the end of the campaign period, government departments in Djakarta, as well as the Bank of Indonesia, held

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90. Ordinances of the Minister of Home Affairs No. 56/22 (April 14, 1971) and No. 211/11 (May 3, 1971); the latter is reprinted in Siaran Pemilihan Umum, no. 13/14 (May 10, 1971), p. 8.
91. Article 2 of Ordinance of the Minister of Home Affairs/Chairman of the General Elections Institute No. 211/11/1971 cited above.
92. See, for instance, Merdeka, May 10, 1971.

pep rallies in support of Golkar. The parties also sponsored parades and public rallies in towns and villages "for a show of force," as an NU officer told this writer in Semarang. But people predicted a Golkar victory with understandable confidence. Seasoned observers commented that Golkar should win, because, if it did not, the military might go wild to make up for their electoral loss. But it was also hoped that Golkar would not win by too large a margin, for then the military might become dictatorial.

Before and during the official campaign period, President Suharto and his cabinet ministers were supposed to stay aloof from campaign politics,⁹³ but, in actual practice, they intensified their campaign efforts as election day approached. They often combined their campaigning with official duties. From April 12 to 17, Suharto visited Maluku, Flores, West Irian, and Sulawesi. On April 26, Adam Malik went off to Nusatenggara for a week and Ali Murtopo toured Tegal and its environs in West and Central Java. On May 12, the President flew to Sumatra, touring even such remote areas as Bangka and the Riau archipelago. On May 16, Ali Murtopo flew to Medan and Atjeh. On June 7, a Presidential party left for Semarang, Solo, and Tjilatjap in Central Java. On June 16, Adam Malik and Ali Murtopo went to Menado. The Foreign Minister and Amir Machmud visited Surabaya on June 25, the last day of the campaign. Everywhere they inspected and inaugurated development projects, attended Moslem functions, and contributed public and private funds to local activities.

The campaign period was followed by a week of "calming down."⁹⁴ During this time no campaigning was allowed and all posters within 300 meters of any polling booth had to be taken down. Government authorities, however, took advantage of this period and continued to campaign for Golkar by "fulfilling official duties" and attending ceremonial functions.

93. Sinar Harapan, April 22, 1971.

94. To set such a long period between the end of the campaign and the opening of the polls is probably a rare experiment in the electoral history of any country. In the elections of 1955, Indonesians went to the polls two days after the last day of the campaign. (See Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 [Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1957], p. 48. He reports high tensions in the last few days before the polling day of September 29, 1955). How far the "calming-down week" of 1971 accomplished its purpose is difficult to judge due to the lack of comparable cases.

Amir Machmud and Ali Murtopo went to West Sumatra and Bengkulu to attend inauguration ceremonies for new governors.

A few days before election day, eligible voters had to be on hand at their respective voting committees (KPPS), so they might receive voting permits by showing their residential identity card (kartu penduduk) (Article 63, Government Ordinance No. 1/1970). All eligible voters had thus to return home to be able to vote. Djakarta saw a massive exodus of betjak drivers and domestic servants to the countryside.⁹⁵ In many localities, during the cooling-off week, voting committees continued their "coaching" activities.

On the eve of election day, President Suharto made a solemn radio and television speech, appealing to the people to exercise their constitutional right to free and secret balloting in an orderly manner and to reinforce the basis of the New Order.⁹⁶

VI. Electoral Results⁹⁷

The morning of election day, Djakarta experienced its quietest and cleanest day ever, with no public transportation running. Particularly striking was the temporary disappearance of betjak from the streets. Practically all stores were closed. Polling stations became the scene of a sort of "community gathering," with a mixed flavor of solemnity and festivity. The Civil Defense Corps worked as special guards at polling stations. Police were out and all military stations were on the alert for possible mishaps. In Djakarta, as in

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95. This indicates not only their migrant origins but also the fact that they had not taken the trouble to have their addresses changed to allow them to vote in Djakarta.
96. The text of the speech is printed in Siaran Pemilihan Umum, no. 18 (July 5, 1971), pp. 1 and 3.
97. Unless otherwise indicated, all statistical data in this section are drawn from Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Daftar Pembagian Kursi Hasil Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Tahun 1971 Terperintji Untuk Masing-Masing Organisasi Bagi Tiap Daerah Pemilihan Serta Penjebarannya Untuk Tiap Daerah Tingkat II (mimeo., August 1971).

many other places throughout the country, all government employees were instructed to report to their offices by half past seven in the morning. There they heard the taped speech of the President made the previous night as well as the polling instructions. At most of the polling places voting began soon after eight o'clock and the ballot boxes were closed by noon. The ballot-counting committees, with party men participating as witnesses, opened each ballot paper from the boxes and announced the name of the party punched therein by loud speaker so that ordinary electors around the station could hear.

The official outcome of the 1971 elections was not released to the public by the General Elections Institute until August 7.⁹⁸ But the victory of Golkar was generally recognized as early as July 5, two days after election day, when President Suharto received reports on the elections by all the "commanders" of the elections, including Generals Ali Murtopo, Amir Machmud, Sumitro, Darjatmo, Yoga Sugomo, Wang Suwandi, Sutopo Juwono, and Sudharmono.⁹⁹ The General Chairman of Golkar remarked on July 6 that Golkar won "because people love development," and government leaders carried the line that "Golkar's victory is the people's victory." Parmusi's Chairman Mintaredja went so far as to state that "Golkar's victory is Parmusi's victory."¹⁰⁰

On election day, the vote was taken at 235,983 places¹⁰¹ to elect 351 representatives for the new national parliament

98. A tentative list of newly elected DPR members was announced on August 14, just before Independence Day. See Siaran Pemilihan Umum, no. 20/21 (August 14, 1971), pp. 3-8. However, the list was later revised, and the final list, including the 100 appointed members, and the 9 representatives from West Irian, was announced on October 13, 1971. See Siaran Pemilihan Umum, no. 23 (September 29, 1971), p. 3, and no. 24 (October 27, 1971), pp. 2-4. According to a report by the Secretary to the Cabinet, the number of DPR-GR members who retained their seats in the new DPR was 114. Their breakdown by party was: Catholic Party 2, PSII 7, NU 20, Parmusi 2, Golkar 67, Parkindo 1, PNI 14, and Perti 1.
99. Antara Warta Berita, July 4, 1971 (evening edition).
100. Ibid., July 6, 1971 (evening edition).
101. Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Daftar Djumlah Penduduk/Pemilih dan Tempat Pemungutan Suara Pemilihan Umum 1971 (mimeo., June 17, 1971). The 235,983 polling stations consisted of 232,045 ordinary stations, 3,443 office stations, and 497 mobile stations.

(DPR), 884 representatives for 25 provincial legislative councils (first-level DPRD), and 6,432 representatives for 272 kotamadya or kabupaten councils (second-level DPRD).¹⁰² Where the elections for the national parliament were concerned, 54,699,509 valid votes were cast. No figure on invalid votes has so far been announced, and there is no way of knowing the exact rate of voting turnout. But the valid votes constituted 94.02 percent of the eligible voters, that is, 58,179,245 people. This was over six percent higher than the voting rate in the 1955 parliamentary elections, which was 87.6 percent. In 1971, of all the provinces, Djakarta showed the lowest level of participation, as it did in 1955; but this was still as high as 87.99 percent (see Table VI).

Golkar attracted over 34 million votes, or 62.80 percent of the total valid vote; the NU, 10.2 million votes or 18.67 percent; the PNI, 3.8 million votes, or 6.94 percent; and Parmusi, 2.9 million votes or 5.36 percent. The balance, 6.21 percent, was divided among the remaining six parties. The distribution of the 351 seats was: Golkar 227; NU 58; Parmusi 24; PNI 20; PSII 10; Parkindo 7; Catholic Party 3; and Perti 2. Murba and IPKI suffered total failure (see Table VII).

Thus, Golkar won a land-slide victory, while the once major parties--the NU, the PNI, and Parmusi--were demoted, and minor parties came even to doubt their own survival. Ali Murtopo's pre-election prediction that there would be a new political structure after the general elections which would not result in the dissolution of the parties, indeed came true. Golkar's total parliamentary strength is now 336, combining 227 by election, 100 by appointment, plus 9 more by indirect election in West Irian.¹⁰³ It occupies 73 percent of the total 460 seats (see Table VIII).

The parties' pre-election estimates of their future parliamentary strength had been: the PNI, 80 to 100 seats; the NU, 65 seats; Parmusi, 50 to 79 seats; Parkindo, 35 seats;

102. As stated earlier, indirect elections were held in West Irian from July 3 to July 26, 1971. The province has 9 representatives in the DPR, 32 in its first-level DPRD, and 144 in its 9 second-level DPRD. The number of appointed members for Indonesia's three levels of legislative body are: 100 members for the DPR; 229 members for 25 first-level DPRD; and 1,640 members for 272 second-level DPRD. Thus, altogether, throughout the Republic, there are supposed to be 460 members for the DPR; 1,145 for 26 first-level DPRD; and 8,216 members for 281 second-level DPRD. See Siaran Pemilihan Umum, no. 18 (July 5, 1971), p. 4.

103. Lembaga Pemilihan Umum press release of August 19, 1971.

Murba, 20 seats.¹⁰⁴ Of all the parties, the NU made the most accurate assessment of its own electoral strength. Golkar's estimate had varied since 1969. It began with a modest estimate of some 35 seats, at a time when it had little self-confidence and considered partnership with other parties. After early 1970, it talked about controlling one-third of the elective parliamentary seats, namely, 120 to 130 seats; this target was based on the calculation that 130 elected seats, combined with the 100 appointed seats, would give it a majority of 230 in the new 460-member DPR. In early May 1971, after the electoral campaign started, Golkar boasted about having every chance of surpassing the original 30 percent to 35 percent target.¹⁰⁵ On election eve, however, Liem Bian Koen, a member of Golkar's General Elections Board (Bapilu) predicted no more than 35 percent of the vote would go to Golkar.¹⁰⁶ Since Golkar won 63 percent of the vote the next day, the question arises as to whether Golkar genuinely underestimated its own strength, or merely lowered its public estimates to solicit greater public sympathy. Neither speculation has thus far been confirmed.¹⁰⁷

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104. These figures are taken from newspapers: the PNI's from Sinar Harapan, March 3 and May 4, 1971; the NU's from Sinar Harapan, May 18, 1971; Parmusi's from Antara Warta Berita, April 29, 1971 (evening edition), and Sinar Harapan, May 18, 1971; Parkindo's from Djakarta Times, May 1, 1971; and Murba's from Sinar Harapan, May 12, 1971.
105. At about the same time, former PNI chairman Hardi expressed the view that Golkar, together with ABRI, would control about 235 seats in the new parliament--a forecast close to Golkar's own public pre-campaign estimate. See Sinar Harapan, May 6, 1971.
106. Sinar Harapan, July 2, 1971.
107. A certain classified Djakarta report of mid-1970 that came to the writer's attention said that the State Intelligence Coordinating Body (Bakin) made the optimistic estimate in mid-1970 that Golkar might win some two-thirds of the elective seats, i.e., about 240 seats. Since this estimate subsequently proved to be accurate, it suggests that Golkar was in reality confident of a big victory, but for tactical reasons did not wish to reveal this confidence publicly. On the other hand, Sinar Harapan (July 1, 1971) reported that on June 29 Bakin had given the President its electoral estimate that 65 percent of the vote would be shared by the "big four"--the PNI, the NU, Golkar and Parmusi--with respective percentages of 21, 19, 15, and 10. The

High Voting Turnout

The high level of voting participation and Golkar's huge victory raised suspicions with regard to the fairness of the election. In the immediate post-election days, NU, PNI, and Parmusi leaders made charges that the election was invalid, although later they were forced by the authorities to withdraw such allegations. While the parties criticized the electoral outcome as the product of military and governmental intimidation, which could hardly be denied, Indonesia's high voting turnout should not be interpreted as stemming primarily from intimidation. The first Indonesian elections of 1955, which, under Government Ordinance No. 47 of 1954, had prohibited military intervention in the electoral campaign, produced a similarly high voting turnout of some 91.5 percent, calculated by adding the estimated invalid votes to the valid voting rate of 87.6 percent.¹⁰⁸ This situation suggests that there is a need to look for reasons for the high turnout other than government intimidation.

The organizing of polling places mainly a community basis, with each polling place receiving some 300 to 1,000 eligible voters, was a feature common to both the 1955 and the 1971 elections in Indonesia. Under this arrangement, ordinary voters would go to the polls because of their sense of communal obligation, or to avoid a subsequent feeling of embarrassment for not having voted; both these motives must have been reinforced by pressure exerted through village heads. Added to this communal obligation, there was some fear of subsequent retaliation by local authorities for not voting, possibly in the form of dismissal from a job, of difficulties put in the way of having a residential identity card renewed, and the like.¹⁰⁹

This type of communal pressure usually works more effectively in rural than urban areas, for in the latter communal ties often suffer erosion and dilution. As Table IX shows, in all of the four sampled constituencies of Djakarta,

authenticity of this report, particularly with regard to the figure of 15 percent for Golkar, remains questionable. It was refuted the next day by Golkar's Liem Bian Koen.

108. Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955, p. 51.

109. Some observers of both elections seem to agree that this fear was distinctly lacking in 1955. Yet they also stress that in both elections voters had a sense of pride in choosing their representatives.

Jogjakarta, South Sumatra, and West Kalimantan, urban areas (kotamadya) had lower voting rates than rural ones (kabupaten), with the exceptions of the kotamadya of Pangkal Pinang and the kabupaten of Bangka in the province of South Sumatra. The table shows that all kabupaten had a minimum voting rate of 90 percent, except for Bangka, whereas the large metropolitan areas of Djakarta and Jogjakarta had the lowest voting rates among the kotamadya. This urban-rural difference in voting accords turnout with voting behavior in many other political systems.¹¹⁰

Another factor promoting a high degree of electoral participation in Indonesia may have been the continuing relationship between village leaders and the local population based on traditional authoritarian concepts. Most telling was a Western journalist's report of a peasant in Central

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110. In the British general elections of 1966 many metropolitan electoral districts had low voting turnouts--no higher than 60 percent, which was several percent below the national average. See Nishihira Shigeki, Senkyo no kokusai hikaku [International Comparison of Elections] (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 1969), p. 5. In the 1965 West German elections, the four districts with the lowest turnout (between 70 and 80 percent) were one district in Cologne City, and three in Munich City. See ibid., pp. 39-40. In the August 29, 1971 South Vietnamese elections for the lower house, the Saigon turnout was only 59.4 percent compared to the national average of 78.5 percent. See Asahi Shinbun, August 30, 1971. The South Korean presidential elections of 1971 witnessed a national average turnout of 79.9 percent, but Seoul's voting rate was only 71.2 percent. See C. I. Eugene Kim, "The Meaning of the 1971 Korean Elections: A Pattern of Political Development," Asian Survey, XII, 3 (March 1972), p. 217. The Japanese electoral experience also confirms this pattern. In the general elections of 1969, the national turnout was 68.5 percent, but the rate of voting in urban districts was only 64.9 percent, while that in rural districts was 77.4 percent. Tokyo's turnout was 56.5 percent, the lowest in the country. See Japan, Prime Minister's Office, Japan Statistical Yearbook 1970, pp. 598 and 600. The American experience seems rather exceptional, in that the metropolitan voting rate is slightly higher than the non-metropolitan rate: 68.0 percent vs. 67.3 percent in the 1968 presidential elections, and 55.3 percent vs. 53.2 percent in the 1970 congressional elections. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstracts of the United States 1971, p. 365.

Java who said, "We are all going to vote for Golkar, because the headman has told us we must. . . . We are told by the headman when we should harvest the rice and when we should pay our taxes. We are used to doing what the headman tells us, so I do not understand why I should object to him telling us how to vote."¹¹¹ Under such circumstances as these, it is hardly possible to draw the line between official pressure and voluntary support.

Golkar Votes in Urban-Rural Dimensions

Golkar's vote was positively correlated with high voting participation. Table IX shows the relative voting rate for Golkar in urban and rural districts in contrast to the total vote. Areas of high voting rates, mainly kabupaten, tend also to be areas with a high vote percentage for Golkar. This is also true of the five kotamadya listed. The two cities (Jogjakarta and Djakarta) which had the lowest voting rates, 86.8 percent and 87.9 percent respectively, also had the lowest vote for Golkar, 45.1 percent and 46.6 percent respectively; kotamadya in South Sumatra and West Kalimantan, which had voting rates of over 90 percent, had higher Golkar votes than the two large cities of Java. Table X, which provides a national picture of Golkar's relative success in urban-rural dimensions, generally supports the above proposition. Exceptional constituencies were Atjeh, Central Java, East Java, and East Kalimantan, where urban districts showed a higher Golkar vote than their rural counterparts. Further inquiry into local political conditions would be necessary to explain what happened in these areas.

Djakarta's comparatively low Golkar vote (46.6 percent) invites a comment on the effect of office voting. During the campaign period, the Home Affairs Minister's announcement that office workers would vote in ballot boxes installed in their offices, was strongly criticized as a tactic to coerce civil servants to support Golkar. Virtually all major departments of the Indonesian government did in fact vote strongly for Golkar: for example, Defense and Security (civilian employees only), 95 percent; Home Affairs, 80 percent; Information, 75 percent; Finance, 80 percent; and Republic of Indonesia Radio (RRI), 66 percent. (A notable exception was the Department of Religious Affairs, which gave only 25 percent of its ballots to Golkar, and understandably supported the NU and Parmusi with votes of 37.4 percent and 23.9 percent, respectively).¹¹² It is

111. Tony Clifton, "A Peasant's Life in Java," Newsweek, July 12, 1971, p. 12.

112. Not all departmental results were announced. Results for the Departments of Religious Affairs, Information,

nonetheless interesting to note that the core government agencies responsible for the general elections, namely, the Departments of Home Affairs and Information, still had some 20 to 25 percent of their votes cast against Golkar.

Since the voting percentage for Golkar in the entire Djakarta area was 47 percent, office voting, producing an estimated average of 75 to 80 percent voting rate for Golkar, probably did have some effect in persuading or "coercing" government employees. However, since 664 of the total of 3,268 polling stations installed in offices throughout the country were set up in Djakarta, and since each polling station handled some 300 eligible voters, Djakarta's office voters can be estimated to have been approximately 199,200 persons, assuming that all eligible voters actually cast their ballots. This figure constitutes less than one-tenth of Djakarta's total of 2.2 million votes cast. Assuming that as many as 25 to 33 percent of these office voters may have voted for the government party against their wish, they still would have constituted only 2.5 to 3 percent of Djakarta's total vote. This is admittedly a highly crude estimate of the possible effect of alleged government coercion through office voting, but the point of the argument here is only to make it plain that office voting could have had little influence on the overall outcome of the elections in Djakarta.

The 1971 elections for the DPR were conducted with provinces used as electoral constituencies. The parties' shares of the DPR representatives from each constituency, however, were determined on the basis of the extent of the vote they scored in the kotamadya and kabupaten, with final adjustments under the proportional representation system in the reallocation of votes. Consequently, although Golkar occupied first place in 50 out of 54 kotamadya, and in 197 out of 218 kabupaten throughout the country, its resultant 227 representatives consisted of 199 members determined on a kabupaten basis and 28 members from kotamadya. In the process of vote-reallocation adjustments, Golkar gave away many of its kotamadya votes to other parties, in exchange for kabupaten victories (Table XI).

and Finance, as well as for the RRI, appeared in Antara Warta Berita, July 4, 1971 (morning edition); those for the Departments of Agriculture and Social Affairs in ibid., July 6, 1971 (morning edition); and for the Department of Defense and Security in ibid., July 6, 1971 (evening edition). The results for the Department of Home Affairs were given to the writer orally by an official.

A close examination of electoral statistics shows further that, out of the 4 kotamadya and 21 kabupaten where Golkar failed to win, it was the runner-up in all, except for one kabupaten (see Table XII). In other words, Golkar finished first in 247 out of 272 sub-provincial electoral districts, second in 24 districts, and third in the 1 remaining district. All these findings simply reinforce the point that Golkar ran successfully in both rural and urban districts.

Golkar in Ambon and Central and East Java

Among the 25 constituencies, the province of Maluku made the least contribution to Golkar's victory. Though the voting rate there was as high as 95.6 percent (see Table VI), Golkar gained only 32.2 percent in the kotamadya and 46.9 percent in the kabupaten areas (see Table X). Further, Ambon was the only provincial capital where Golkar did not win; Parkindo won a majority (see Table XII). On August 5, a month after the general elections, the mayor of Ambon, M. H. Manuffy, related that Golkar's defeat was due to the lack of direction from Bapilu.¹¹³ He also said that there had been no active campaign there, except for that by the local branch of the Employees' Association of the Home Affairs Department (Kokar-mendagri) and its female partner (Pertiwi), and that the candidates, who were mostly selected from outside the province, had very little familiarity with local conditions. The mayor mentioned further that Parkindo's success was achieved by vigorous and well-coordinated campaigns, penetrating to the lowest levels. The mayor's reasons for Golkar's failure in the capital of Maluku provides a valuable insight into how Golkar fought and won in other districts.

East Nusatenggara was another constituency that failed to provide a full Golkar victory, although the party did win 8 out of the 12 DPR seats allocated to this province. The Catholic Party and Parkindo finished first in 5 out of 12 kabupaten, with their vote in some kabupaten, such as Alor and Sikka, having a wide margin over that for Golkar (see Table XII).

The most challenging regions for Golkar were Central and East Java, where the PNI, the NU, and Parmusi claimed major strength. These two provinces reportedly felt the strongest military pressure against the parties; and compared with West Java and Djakarta, they witnessed more intensive campaign activities by Golkar, the PNI, the NU, and Parmusi, as the writer himself observed on a tour during the campaign

113. Ibid., August 5, 1971 (evening edition).

period. The electoral strength claimed by the PNI, the NU, and Parmusi, however, was seriously overestimated. Golkar took 50.3 percent of the Central and 54.9 percent of the East Java vote, with a wide margin over the runner-up, the NU, which had 23.1 percent and 35.1 percent of the votes, respectively. In these two provinces, Golkar obtained 64 seats, or 28.1 percent of its total elected parliamentary members (see Table XIII).

In Central Java, a Golkar official told the writer that Golkar might win in the cities but perhaps would not in rural areas; he admitted that Golkar was a new political group, while the parties had traditional footholds, better organizers, and more effective speech-makers. It turned out that he was somewhat too modest. Golkar not only won in all major cities of Central and East Java, including Jogjakarta, Semarang, Surakarta, Magelang, Surabaya, Malang, Madiun, and Kediri, even carrying Sukarno's birthplace, Blitar; it also got the highest number of votes in 23 out of the 29 Central Java kabupaten and 19 out of the 27 East Java kabupaten.

Nevertheless, Golkar did not do as well in these provinces as it did in some other constituencies. Its percentage votes in Central and East Java kotamadya were 55.1 percent and 57.8 percent respectively, and, in the kabupaten, 49.9 percent and 54.6 percent. Kabupaten support for Golkar was much lower than the national kabupaten average of 64.1 percent (see Table X). In Central Java, Golkar lost to the PNI in five kabupaten and to the NU in one kabupaten and one kotamadya; in East Java, Golkar lost to the NU in eight kabupaten and one kotamadya (see Table XII). Golkar's difficulties in Central and East Java are evident from the fact that, out of the 25 subprovincial electoral districts throughout the country where it failed to win, 16 were in Central and East Java.

The NU demonstrated considerable strength in Central and East Java, taking 23.1 percent of the Central Java and 35.1 percent of the East Java vote. The NU's vote in Central and East Java together made up 66.2 percent of the party's national voting strength and provided 35 out of its total of 58 seats in the DPR (see Table XIII). The PNI area of greatest strength was Central Java, where the party earned 52.8 percent of its total votes. The PNI's Central Java vote brought the party 11 seats, over half of its total parliamentary representation. However, in the over-all national picture, the PNI gained much less than its original target of 80 to 100 seats. It had hoped to obtain some 75 seats from Java and at least one seat from every Outer Island constituency. But in fact it gained only 17 seats from Java, 2 from Sumatra, and 1 from Nusatenggara (see Table VII).

On July 19, some two weeks after the polling, a deputy chairman of the PNI, Prof. Sunawar Sukowati, attributed the PNI's failure to the shortage of time to recover from the impact of the 1965 communist upheaval and to the loss of support of local civil servants.¹¹⁴ The party also suffered from the untimely death of Chairman Hadisubeno on April 24, just prior to the commencement of the electoral campaign. An additional factor in the PNI's failure to achieve its goals in Central Java may have been the nomination by Golkar of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX as its pre-eminent candidate. The PNI had also planned to make use of the Sultan's name and had intended to nominate him as the PNI candidate for Vice-President, but this never materialized.

Parmusi made a surprisingly poor showing except in the kabupaten of Pidië in Atjeh, where it finished first (see Table XII). Since its formation in February 1968 the party had suffered from constant leadership crises and organizational weakness. When some 700 NU leaders met in Djombang, East Java, from April 15-18, and issued a fatwa (binding religious opinion) that it was obligatory for Moslems to vote for an Islamic party in the elections, Mintaredja, the Suharto-picked chairman of Parmusi, disagreed.¹¹⁵ In late April, he demoralized and divided his party further by stating in public that a number of former Masjumi leaders, such as Natsir, Rum and Sjafrudin Prawiranegara, were "failures."¹¹⁶ Since these men were still revered by large sections of Parmusi's membership, Mintaredja's remarks aroused considerable intra-party bitterness, and left many uncertain of what the party now really stood for. In addition, the ex-Masjumi leaders could do little to bolster Parmusi's electioneering drive since, by Article 4 of Presidential Decision No. 68 of 1970, those who lost the right to be elected were prohibited from actively participating in campaigns and even from attending campaigns "in a conspicuous manner (setjara menjolok)."¹¹⁷ As a result of all this, Parmusi was not able to recover more than a part of Masjumi's former electoral strength.

114. Ibid., July 19, 1971 (morning edition).

115. Suluh Marhaen, April 22, 1971. Guppi, now within the Golkar fold, also disagreed with the Djombang fatwa, maintaining that the Holy Koran had no connection with political parties. See Suara Karya, April 23, 1971.

116. Djakarta Times, April 28, 1971.

117. The text of this Decision appears in Siaran Pemilihan Umum, no. 8 (February 15, 1971), p. 2. Article 4

VII. Pemilu in a Larger Context

The national picture of Golkar's electoral success can be drawn from an examination of the election statistics available to date. A more detailed study, dealing with the fuller implications of Indonesian voting behavior in 1971, must await the release of additional local data. Yet it should be borne in mind that Golkar's success story can only in part be told by the analysis of election statistics. As the writer has attempted to demonstrate, Golkar's electioneering, or more accurately, the military's electioneering, began as early as 1966, when General Suharto's government first presented election bills to the DPR-GR, and the military finished its essential preparations for an electoral victory through the instrument of Golkar before the official campaign even began in late April 1971. In effect, Golkar was a party based on the organizational support of the government bureaucracy, particularly of the Departments of Home Affairs and of Defense and Security. At the beginning, the military had considered partnership with the major existing parties, but then moved to weaken them and finally to discredit them, as Golkar steadily gained strength. This process of governmental preparation prior to the election campaign is essential for an understanding of Golkar's victory.

The emergence of a pro-government majority party in the Indonesian parliament is unprecedented. It is indeed impressive for such a majority to be produced under a system of proportional representation. Most Indonesians do not favor "50 percent plus 1" Western-style democracy, for that does not accord with the Indonesian spirit of musjawarah, or the reaching of consensus by mutual consultation; they prefer to have "50 percent plus 1 plus x" as a decision-making formula closer to that of musjawarah--so Ali Murtopo argued in pre-election days. Indeed, Sukarno had earlier made a similar contention in establishing Guided Democracy and the Nasakom system, as will be discussed below.

Yet the significance of the 1971 general elections did not lie just in the creation of a majority party, but rather

specifies that "those who were not given the right to be elected according to the Laws concerned, or those whose right to be elected was denied by Court decisions and not yet regained, or those effected by Kopkamtib decisions," were prohibited from conducting election campaigns. Ex-Masjumi leaders who had wished to become candidates but who had been screened out by Kopkamtib continued to be watched by Kopkamtib during the campaign period.

in the fact that, through this party, the military has entered into the central arena of parliamentary politics. As the real power-holders in contemporary Indonesia, they have nonetheless sought some popular sanction for their control. This is the most important aspect of the election. In 1955, the military stayed out of the parliamentary electoral process. As a result, parliament was never stable and never functioned productively, since the military exerted its influence over the parliament from outside. That a military-dominated government party now controls parliament increases the chance for greater legislative productivity, and in this sense, the functioning of the Indonesian parliament may be improved after this election.

The smooth execution of the elections was an impressive political accomplishment. Not a single major incident was reported on election day. The successful maintenance of order for elections in an archipelago as large as Indonesia, where communications are a major obstacle to national development, provided promising signs of a growing governmental efficiency, which had appeared so doubtful during the last days of Sukarno's presidency.

Statistical data from the elections reveal that Golkar is a national party in a geographical sense, not a Djakarta-centered one nor a regional one. Golkar was "supported" in practically all constituencies of Indonesia, even more strongly by the rural than by the urban electorate. At least on the surface, this is also a new and healthy portent for Indonesia's development as a nation, since the country is still predominantly agricultural. In this sense, the Suharto regime has established its political legitimacy and enhanced its prestige abroad.

In spite of its electoral success, Golkar nevertheless faces many intractable problems in the future. One major question is whether it can become a national party not only in a geographical, but also in a political sense. Created by the military authorities and expanded by the Home Affairs Minister's instructions, Golkar is a party built from above as a vote-getting instrument. But is it to activate itself only once every five years when general elections are held, serving as a legislative rubber-stamp for government programs in between, or can it transform itself into a party that can meet the needs of the people?

As soon as the general elections were over, Sekber-Golkar underwent significant organizational change. On July 17, three weeks before the official results of the elections were announced on August 7, it was renamed Golongan Karya Pusat (Central Golongan Karya), as opposed to local

Golkar offices. According to its own statement, Golkar was being reorganized "in order to increase its organizational efficiency."¹¹⁸ The seven parental bodies (Kino), under which some 250 occupational groups had been clustered, were replaced by 13 coordinating bodies; these, in turn, were grouped under five secretariats, responsible, respectively, for civil service and labor affairs, cultural and spiritual affairs, economic and production affairs, Hankam affairs, and youth, women's and intellectuals' affairs. The organization is now run by a national council of five members headed by Lieutenant-General Sokowati, and a 17-member advisory board which includes the Sultan, Adam Malik, Amir Machmud, Ali Murtopo, Panggabean, and other influential personages of the present regime.

The five secretariats and the thirteen coordinating bodies have yet to be tested for their capacity to absorb the occupational and regional interests articulated in the Indonesian political system and to translate them into governmental outputs. They need to recruit specialists in party policy research and to train leaders who can communicate with the people. In this regard, Golkar made a most encouraging start at the time of the elections by nominating the largest number of college graduates as its candidates.

No less important than Golkar's problematic prospects as a party may be an organizational dilemma that it faces. Aiming at crushing the existing political parties, Golkar has claimed that it is not a political party but an aggregate of functional groups concerned with development. But the definition of "functional group" (golongan karya) is so diffuse that it even includes groups of housewives and artists. If this organizational logic were carried too far, Golkar could include every Indonesian group under the rubric "functional group" and in the process lose its organizational identity. While its organizational boundaries are diffuse, Golkar has so far operated as a kind of military hierarchy in which orders come only from the top. The organizational change

118. Golkar Decision No. KEP-101/VII/Golongan Karya/1971, issued July 17, 1971, announced July 20. See Antara Warta Berita, July 20 (evening edition) and 21 (morning edition), 1971. According to Antara Warta Berita, July 21, 1971 (morning edition), this "consolidation" of Golkar was based on the "mandate" given by member organizations to the General Chairman, and would remain effective until the Golkar national congress (musjawarah nasional), scheduled to be held some time before the coming MPR session of March 1973.

of July 17 mentioned above was no exception: there was no public debate prior to the announcement of the change. This aspect of Golkar, if further reinforced, may come to resemble the centralist character of a communist party. Still in an embryonic stage, Golkar's organization is marked by ambivalence: a diffuse membership is coupled with a strict command system. This contradiction will have to be dealt with eventually.

The 1971 elections have created a situation in which a one-party system could emerge. If the present electoral system of proportional representation is replaced by a single-member constituency system, such as the Suharto government first favored in 1967, Golkar's success may be even more decisive in the 1976 general elections than in 1971. Indeed, in 1971, Golkar would have won 247 out of 272 constituencies if the 54 kotamadya and 218 kabupaten had been treated as electoral units (see Table XI). Whatever the case, Golkar's ambivalent character should still receive particular attention. If its "command system" aspects are reinforced, it may grow into a monolithic party, which would do little to encourage the initiative and creativity of its membership, and might even become a dictatorial party under a one-party system. On the other hand, if its "diffuse membership" aspects persist in the future, Golkar may find difficulty in sustaining internal unity and organizational loyalty. The current organizational structure of Golkar is such that it appears to be both a party organization and an affiliation of separate organizations, with the national council and five secretariats of Golkar today resembling the former, and the thirteen coordinating bodies and their respective groups the latter. The maintenance of a diffuse membership could either generate factional strife, or could bring about a split within Golkar, leading to a new party with its affiliated mass organizations, as was the case when past Indonesian political parties found their internal disagreements insurmountable.

Further, the Golkar leadership cannot avoid the highly sensitive problem of civil-military relationships within the organization. Civilian control over the military is a remote prospect in contemporary Indonesia, where the latter claim a dual role in politics and defense. Golkar today simply mirrors this situation. Civil-military relationships in the Indonesian political system can hardly be understood without some knowledge of the historical background of the post-1945 years. In the sense that the present relationships have been established through a long series of political events, the Suharto regime cannot sever itself from the past. Indeed, the rise of civilian control may well be preceded by a transformation of the military into a civilian bureaucracy, just as the Japanese samurai class came to assume administrative functions in the Tokugawa period.

The fact is that there are more points of resemblance than of difference between the Suharto and Sukarno presidencies. While there is a contrast in the style of leadership between that of the flamboyant Sukarno and that of the "Smiling General," both appeal to the same state ideologies of the 1945 Constitution and Pantja Sila. Although the Suharto group maintains that the Sukarno leadership "deviated" from such state doctrines, the similarities persist. Just as the nation's first president increased his political power in 1959 by calling for a "return to the 1945 Constitution," so did the second president rise to power after 1965 by calling for a "return to the 1945 Constitution in all its purity." Suharto consigned his predecessor's "Guided Democracy" to the grave, yet he himself advocates Pantja Sila Democracy; by providing an official and indisputable interpretation of what Pantja Sila Democracy is, the Suharto leadership is, in a sense, defining a new form of "Guided Democracy."

The New Order leaders buried the Nasakom system of cooperation between nationalist (Nas), religious (A), and communist (Kom) groups by outlawing the PKI. However, they had maintained the Nasakom spirit of reaching decisions by consultation among major contending political groups. When President Suharto proposed the idea of a three-group system in February 1970 and when, after Pemilu, he clustered the eight surviving parties and the ABRI group within the DPR into four "fractions," this system closely resembled its predecessor.¹¹⁹ The PNI, Parkindo, and the Catholic Party were grouped as the Democracy Development fraction; and the Islamic parties namely, the NU, Parmusi, the PSII, and Perti, were grouped as the Unity Development fraction. Golkar and ABRI were the two other fractions, but both actually operate under the same Suharto leadership. Earlier, they were referred to as the "materialist development group," the "spiritual development group," and the "functional group." Thus, in reality, Nasakom has been resurrected since Pemilu as what might be called "Nasagolab," although Gol (Golkar) and AB (ABRI) have much greater weight than NASA. Just as Nasakom was a system of support for President Sukarno, so "Nasagolab" is for Suharto: all parties that participated in the 1971 elections

119. The four-group system, however, functions in effect as a three-group system (see above, note 21). Furthermore, President Suharto stated on October 28, 1971, when all the new DPR members were officially installed, that there would be only three organizational emblems in the 1976 general elections, i.e., the emblems of Golkar, the Development Democracy Group, and the Development Unity Group. See Antara Warta Berita, October 29, 1971 (morning edition).

pledged their support to Suharto as President and to his development programs.

While Suharto and his military associates engineered Golkar's electoral victory and sought to create a strong majority party within the Indonesian parliament, they tried to practice musjawarah outside the DPR-GR. Between 1966 and 1971, Suharto often met with party leaders and discussed the future political structure and other current political issues. (Here again there is a similarity between the Suharto and Sukarno leaderships, except that the former tends to give more form than substance to musjawarah in his meetings; probably reflecting his character as a military leader, he appears to be more authoritarian than Sukarno in practicing his version of "guided democracy.") The newly revised Golkar organization also claims to maintain the spirit of musjawarah, since it calls its general congress a "National Musjawarah," although the exact function and composition of this body lacks clarity at present.

What makes the New Order distinctive from the Old Order is the new regime's intense concern for political order and national consensus. Sukarno and the political parties of the past failed to develop a national consensus on the priority of goals and the use of scarce resources. The military authorities have such a sense of urgency for building a national consensus that they have determined what it should be for themselves, and then pressed the rest of society to conform to it. The military pressure and intimidation that reportedly occurred during the 1971 elections can best be understood in this light and can be viewed with sympathy. And the efforts have borne fruit in the form of a victory for Golkar.

TABLE I. CHANGES IN SIZE AND GROUP REPRESENTATION OF INDONESIAN PARLIAMENTS, 1949-1971

	KNIP 1949	DPRS 1950	DPR 1956	DPR-GR 1960	DPR-GR 1965	DPR-GR 1966	DPR-GR 1967	DPR-GR 1968	DPR 1971
1. Political Parties									
PNI	45	42	57	44	44	44	47	78	20
Murba	12	4	2	1	1	x	4	4	-
Partindo	x	x	x	1	1	2	2	x	x
IPKI	x	x	4	x	2	2	9	11	-
PKI	32	17	39	30	30	x	x	x	x
NU	-	8	45	36	36	36	46	75	58
Masjumi	60	43	57	x	x	x	x	x	x
Parmusi	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	18	24
PSII	12	4	8	5	5	5	12	20	10
Perti	-	1	-	2	2	2	6	9	2
Catholic	12	9	6	5	5	5	11	15	3
Parkindo	12	5	8	6	6	6	11	17	7
Others	178	102	31	-	-	-	-	-	x
Subtotal	363(67.3%)	235(100%)	257(94.4%)	130(46.2%)	132(44.1%)	102(42.1%)	148(42.2%)	247(59.6%)	124(26.9%)
2. Functional Groups									
Military	-	-	-	37(24.6%)	39(13.0%)	39(16.1%)	43(12.2%)	75(18.1%)	75(16.3%)
Religious	-	-	-	31	31	31	42	Grp A 32	
Material Dev.	78	-	-	55	59	36	51	Grp B 32	261(56.7%)
Spiritual Dev.	-	-	-	27	32	27	58	Grp C 28	
Subtotal	78(14.4%)	-	-	150(53.3%)	161(53.8%)	133(54.9%)	194(55.4%)	167(40.4%)	336(73.0%)
3. Ethnic Groups									
Europeans	1	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chinese	6	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Arabs	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Subtotal	10(1.8%)	-	12(4.4%)	-	-	-	-	-	-
4. Regional Groups									
Subtotal	88(16.3%)	-	3(1.1%)	1(0.5%)	6(2.1%)	7(3.0%)	8(2.4%)	-	-
TOTAL	539(100%)	235(100%)	272(100%)	281(100%)	299(100%)	242(100%)	350(100%)	414(100%)	460(100%)

Source: based on DPR-GR Secretariat, comp., Seperempat Abad Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Republik Indonesia (1970)

Notes: x = nonexistent, banned, suspended temporarily, etc.
- = no seats obtained.

TABLE II. INITIAL, PROVISIONAL, AND OFFICIAL LISTS OF PARTY CANDIDATES FOR 1971 DPR ELECTIONS

	Initial List (Jan. 18)	Net reduction ^a	Provisional List (Mar. 13)	Net reduction	Official List (April 20)
1. Catholic	145	-26	119	-4	115
2. PSII	421	-99	322	-13	309
3. NU	415	-12	403	-6	397
4. Parmusi	458	-125	333	-6	327
5. Golkar	549	-10	539	-1	538
6. Parkindo	233	-47	186	-4	182
7. Murba	290	-83	207	-4	203
8. PNI	669	-143	526	-21	505
9. Perti	203	-47	156	-6	150
10. IPKI	<u>406</u>	<u>-92</u>	<u>314</u>	<u>-19</u>	<u>295</u>
TOTAL	3,789	-684	3,105	-84	3,021

Sources: "Initial List" adopted from Merdeka, January 18, 1971; Provisional List published in Siaran Pemilihan Umum, no. 10 (March 17, 1971), pp. 3-4; and Official List printed as Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Daftar Tjalon Tetap Pemilihan Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Tahun 1971 dari Orpol/Golkar (mimeo., April 20, 1971).

Notes: ^aFigures of net reduction are given here since there were some additions of candidates by respective parties in the process of screening candidates. These additions were, however, negligible, as is indicated in Table III.

TABLE III. REDUCTION AND ADDITION OF PARTY CANDIDATES BETWEEN INITIAL AND OFFICIAL LISTS BY CONSTITUENCY

	Catholic	PSII	NU	Parmusi	Golkar	Parkindo	Murba	PNI	Perti	IPKI	Total reduc.	Total addit.	NET CHANGE
1. Atjeh	-	-	3	-1	-	-2	1	-1	-2	-2	-8	4	-4
2. N. Sumatra	-1	-9	-1	-14	-	-3	-	-11	-1	10	-40	10	-30
3. W. Sumatra	-	-9	-3	-5	-	-2	3	-	-8	5	-27	8	-19
4. Riau	-	-3	-	-5	-	-	-1	-5	-3	-1	-18	-	-18
5. S. Sumatra	-4	-5	-2	-6	-	-1	3	-2	-	-13	-33	3	-30
6. Djambi	-1	-7	4	-3	-	-	1	-3	-3	-3	-20	5	-15
7. Bengkulu	-	-1	-	-3	-1	-	-3	-3	-3	-	-14	-	-14
8. Lampung	-1	-5	-	-5	-	-2	-	-	-	-4	-17	-	-17
9. W. Java	-1	-1	-3	-13	-1	-	-19	-18	-2	-20	-78	-	-78
10. Djakarta	-4	-	-1	4	-1	-1	-6	-	-4	-5	-22	4	-18
11. Central Java	-1	-35	-4	-11	-1	1	-16	-43	-5	-12	-128	1	-127
12. Jogjakarta	-1	-	-	-10	-1	-	-4	-2	-1	-3	-22	-	-22
13. East Java	-1	-5	-1	-13	-1	-4	-27	-33	-2	-6	-93	-	-93
14. W. Kalimantan	-3	-	-1	-4	-	-2	-2	-2	-	-6	-20	-	-20
15. Central K'tan	-	-1	-1	-4	-1	-4	-3	-6	-	-10	-30	-	-30
16. S. K'tan	-	-2	-	-3	-	-	-6	-3	-4	-2	-20	-	-20
17. E. K'tan	-	-5	-	-5	-1	-3	3	-1	-4	-10	-29	3	-26
18. N. Sulawesi	-	-1	-4	-4	-	-1	-2	-1	-1	-1	-15	-	-15
19. C. Sulawesi	-1	-2	1	-	-1	-2	-1	-1	-1	-5	-14	1	-13
20. Southeast S.	1	-3	-1	-3	-	-2	-5	-3	-	-1	-18	1	-17
21. S. Sulawesi	-6	-10	-3	-6	-1	-15	-1	-13	-1	-19	-75	-	-75
22. Bali	-	-	-	-3	-	-	-	-5	-	-	-8	-	-8
23. W. Nusateng.	-1	-2	-1	-8	-1	-	-3	-3	-5	-2	-26	-	-26
24. E. Nusateng.	-5	-3	-	-3	-	-8	-	-5	-2	-	-26	-	-26
25. Maluku	-	-3	-	-3	-	-	1	-	-1	-1	-8	1	-7
Total reduction	-31	-112	-26	-135	-11	-52	-99	-164	-53	-126	-809		
Total addition	1	-	8	4	-	1	12	-	-	15		41	
NET CHANGE	-30	-112	-18	-131	-11	-51	-87	-164	-53	-111			-768

Sources: Same as those for Table II.

TABLE IV. INITIAL, PROVISIONAL, AND OFFICIAL CANDIDATES OF GOLKAR, NU, PARMUSI, PNI, AND TOTAL TEN PARTIES BY CONSTITUENCY AS COMPARED WITH NUMBER OF DPR MEMBERS TO BE ELECTED AND MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CANDIDATES PERMITTED

Constituency	DPR Member	Maximum Candidates	GOLKAR			NU			PARMUSI			PNI			Ten Parties		
			I ^a	P ^b	O ^c	I	P	O	I	P	O	I	P	O	I	P	O
1. Atjeh	9	18	18	18	18	5	8	8	18	17	17	18	17	17	112	107	108
2. N. Sumatra	17	34	32	32	32	18	18	17	34	19	20	34	21	23	209	178	179
3. W. Sumatra	14	28	25	25	25	13	10	10	23	18	18	20	18	20	168	150	149
4. Riau	6	12	12	12	12	6	6	6	12	7	7	12	10	7	81	66	63
5. S. Sumatra	10	20	20	20	20	14	12	12	20	14	14	20	18	18	140	110	110
6. Djambi	6	12	12	12	12	6	10	10	12	9	9	8	6	5	73	60	58
7. Bengkulu	4	8	7	6	6	8	8	8	8	5	5	8	4	5	61	47	47
8. Lampung	7	14	11	12	11	8	8	8	14	9	9	14	14	14	98	83	81
9. West Java	46	92	92	91	91	53	50	50	53	43	40	88	74	70	501	433	423
10. Djakarta	9	18	18	17	17	12	11	11	8	13	12	17	17	17	145	132	127
11. Central Java	57	114	53	52	52	63	62	59	42	31	31	111	85	68	458	358	331
12. Jogjakarta	7	14	13	12	12	4	4	4	15	5	5	14	13	12	98	78	76
13. East Java	63	126	59	58	58	84	84	83	38	26	25	125	98	92	437	359	344
14. W. Kalimantan	7	14	14	14	14	8	7	7	14	11	10	14	13	12	100	87	80
15. Central K'tan	6	12	9	8	8	8	7	7	12	8	8	12	6	6	77	46	47
16. S. Kalimantan	10	20	18	18	18	20	20	20	20	18	17	14	10	11	124	106	104
17. E. Kalimantan	6	12	13	12	12	4	4	4	12	7	7	11	10	10	83	63	57
18. N. Sulawesi	6	12	12	12	12	10	6	6	12	8	8	11	11	10	93	80	78
19. Central S'si	4	8	8	7	7	2	3	3	8	8	8	8	6	7	54	42	41
20. Southeast S.	4	8	8	8	8	7	6	6	8	5	5	8	5	5	56	39	39
21. South S'si	23	46	39	38	38	40	37	37	41	35	35	46	27	33	305	231	230
22. Bali	8	16	13	13	13	2	2	2	6	3	3	16	12	11	59	52	51
23. W. Nusatenggara	6	12	12	11	11	10	10	9	12	4	4	11	8	8	85	58	59
24. E. Nusatenggara	12	24	23	23	23	4	4	4	8	5	5	21	15	16	114	90	88
25. Maluku	4	8	8	8	8	6	6	6	8	5	5	8	8	8	58	50	51
TOTAL	351	702	549	539	538	415	403	397	458	333	327	669	526	505	3789	3105	3021

Sources: same as those for Table II.

Notes: ^aInitial candidates; ^bProvisional candidates; ^cOfficial candidates.

TABLE V. REGULAR RESIDENCE, MOSLEM STATUS, ACADEMIC DEGREES, AND SEX OF OFFICIAL CANDIDATES (APRIL 20)

	Catholic	PSII	NU	Parmusi	Golkar	Parkindo	Murba	PNI	Perti	IPKI	TOTAL
TOTAL CANDIDATES	115	309	397	327	538	182	203	505	150	295	3021
(a) Residence											
same consti.	91	275	353	281	506	161	147	440	123	238	2615
outside con.	24	34	44	46	32	21	56	65	27	57	406
(in Djakarta)	(21)	(30)	(41)	(41)	(30)	(17)	(50)	(60)	(25)	(55)	(370)
In percentage											
same consti.	79%	89%	89%	86%	94%	88%	72%	87%	82%	81%	87%
outside	21%	11%	11%	14%	6%	12%	28%	13%	18%	19%	13%
(in Djakarta)	(18%)	(10%)	(10%)	(13%)	(5%)	(9%)	(25%)	(12%)	(17%)	(19%)	(12%)
(b) Moslem status											
Total hadji	-	18	84	15	17	-	-	9	7	6	156
(Kjai hadji)	-	(12)	(35)	(11)	(3)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(4)	(-)	(65)
Regional distr.											
Sumatra	-	6(3)	11(3)	9(6)	4(2)	-	-	2(-)	2(2)	-	34(16)
Java	-	6(5)	37(23)	6(5)	3(1)	-	-	4(-)	2(1)	5(-)	63(35)
Kalimantan	-	3(2)	13(1)	-	3(-)	-	-	2(-)	-	-	21(3)
Sulawesi	-	3(2)	20(7)	-	-	-	-	1(-)	1(1)	-	25(10)
The rest	-	-	3(1)	-	7(-)	-	-	-	2	1	13(1)
(c) Academic degrees											
Total degr.	37	53	80	110	201	53	30	119	26	72	781(100%)
Prof.	-	-	-	1	12	1	-	3	-	2	19(2.4%)
Dr.(Ph.D.)	-	2	2	2	18	7	-	11	1	5	49(6.2%)
M.A.	1	1	-	3	4	-	-	-	-	-	9(1.1%)
Ir.	-	2	1	4	22	3	1	5	-	2	40(5.1%)
Drs. Dra.	15	24	31	51	80	23	10	55	8	22	319(40.8%)
S.H.	11	3	13	32	48	6	9	20	8	20	170(21.7%)
S.Th.	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2(0.0%)
B.A.	10	21	33	17	17	11	9	25	9	21	173(22.5%)
(d) Sex											
Male candid.	111	295	390	316	494	167	198	488	150	291	2900
Female	4	14	7	11	44	15	5	17	-	4	121

Source: based on Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Daftar Tjalon Tetap Pemilihan Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Tahun 1971 Dari Orpol/Golkar (mimeo., April 20, 1971).

TABLE VI. THE 1971 ELECTIONS COMPARED WITH 1955 IN ELIGIBLE VOTERS, VALID VOTES, VOTING RATE, AND DPR MEMBERS BY CONSTITUENCY

Constituency of 1971	THE 1955 GENERAL ELECTIONS				THE 1971 GENERAL ELECTIONS				
	Eligible Voters(a)	Total Votes (b)	Voting Rate(b/a)	DPR Members	Population	Eligible Voters(c)	Total Votes (d)	Voting Rate(c/d)	DPR Members
Atjeh	2,474,305	2,134,817	86.2%	16	1,969,417	1,031,602	971,834	94.21%	9
N. Sumatra					6,247,898	2,725,843	2,546,564	93.42	17
W. Sumatra					2,719,028	1,312,189	1,205,995	91.75	14
Riau	1,906,727	1,571,133	82.3	11	1,477,155	718,104	671,914	93.57	16
Djambi					979,613	490,949	462,900	94.29	6
S. Sumatra					3,239,839	1,554,290	1,414,446	91.00	10
Bengkulu	1,731,332	1,457,112	84.1	10	506,720	235,666	223,501	94.84	4
Lampung					2,664,491	1,265,502	1,211,124	95.70	7
West Java	7,868,286	6,969,536	88.5	47	20,965,775	10,487,120	10,017,708	95.52	46
Djakarta	951,130	767,124	80.6	6	4,304,553	2,221,732	1,955,010	87.99	9
Central Java	10,101,816	9,000,573	89.0	57	21,326,413	11,019,628	10,283,307	93.32	57
Jogjakarta					2,437,273	1,247,970	1,162,654	93.16	7
East Java	10,961,181	9,875,598	90.0	58	24,808,152	13,285,676	12,462,917	93.81	63
W. Kalimantan	554,701	466,663	84.1	4	1,736,535	880,612	829,333	94.18	7
Central K'tan	901,699	792,576	87.8	6	702,703	345,395	331,247	95.90	6
S. Kalimantan					1,655,701	854,776	796,620	93.20	10
E. Kalimantan	194,162	174,572	89.9	3	680,429	359,422	328,898	91.50	6
North Sulawesi	831,160	756,130	90.9	6	1,659,780	808,951	778,939	96.29	6
Central Sulawesi					907,226	442,241	424,836	96.06	4
Southeast Sulawesi	1,630,963	1,116,158	68.4	14	707,651	345,802	342,202	98.96	4
South Sulawesi					4,980,823	2,614,235	2,514,648	96.19	23
Bali					2,061,160	1,105,552	1,049,864	94.96	8
W. Nusatenggara	1,424,470	1,250,251	87.7	8	2,152,380	1,114,777	1,055,217	94.66	6
E. Nusatenggara	1,203,867	1,123,152	93.2	8	2,242,237	1,177,043	1,149,176	97.62	12
Maluku	368,575	332,174	90.1	3	1,057,266	534,168	510,645	95.60	4
TOTAL	43,104,374	37,787,569	87.6%	257	114,190,163	58,179,245	54,699,509	94.02%	351

Note : The 1955 elections were conducted for 15 provincial constituencies, which were subdivided into 25 in 1971; the corresponding constituencies are grouped by lines.

Source: Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Daftar Pembagian Kursi Hasil Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Tahun 1971 Terperintji Untuk Masing-Masing Organisasi Bagi Tiap Daerah Pemilihan Serta Penjebarnya Untuk Tiap Daerah Tingkat II (Djakarta, 1971); and National Election Committee (PPI), Indonesia Memilih (Djakarta, 1958).

TABLE VII. PARTY VOTES AND SEATS IN NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE BY REGION

Parties	Total Votes	Percentage	Java	Sumatra	Kalimantan	Sulawesi	Nusa-tenggara ^a	Maluku	TOTAL
Catholic	603,740	1.10	33.6%	13.0%	10.7%	4.5%	35.3%	2.7%	100.0%
PSII	1,308,237	2.39	47.1	24.8	2.2	19.5	5.0	1.1	100.0%
NU	10,213,650	18.67	84.8	6.1	3.9	2.9	1.7	0.3	100.0%
Parmusi	2,930,746	5.36	50.0	33.8	4.7	6.4	2.2	2.5	100.0%
Golkar	34,348,673	62.80	61.9	17.1	4.4	8.9	6.7	0.7	100.0%
Parkindo	733,359	1.34	28.0	19.2	4.0	13.4	21.8	13.4	100.0%
Murba	48,126	0.09	59.4	21.4	0.9	2.5	3.2	4.1	100.0%
PNI	3,793,266	6.94	82.9	8.1	1.2	1.5	5.6	0.5	100.0%
Perti	381,309	0.70	25.9	68.0	0.7	2.4	2.2	0.6	100.0%
IPKI	338,403	0.62	46.6	19.5	12.5	11.3	9.4	0.4	100.0%
TOTAL	54,699,509	100.00	65.6%	15.9%	4.1%	7.4%	5.9%	0.9%	100.0%

Parties	Total Seats	Percentage	Java	Sumatra	Kalimantan	Sulawesi	Nusa-tenggara	Maluku
Catholic	3	0.8	-	-	1	-	2	-
PSII	10	2.8	4	3	-	3	-	-
NU	58	16.5	44	6	5	2	1	-
Parmusi	24	6.8	9	9	2	2	1	1
Golkar	227	64.6	107	50	20	29	19	2
Parkindo	7	1.9	1	1	1	1	2	1
Murba	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PNI	20	5.6	17	2	-	-	1	-
Perti	2	0.5	-	2	-	-	-	-
IPKI	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	351	100.0	182	73	29	37	26	4

Source: Based on Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Daftar Pembagian Kursi Hasil Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Tahun 1971 Terperinci Untuk Masing-Masing Organisasi Bagi Tiap Daerah Pemilihan Serta Penjebarnya Untuk Tiap Daerah Tingkat II (Jakarta, 1971).

Note: ^aincludes East and West Nusatenggara and Bali.

TABLE VIII. PARTY CANDIDATES AND SEATS IN NEW DPR

	Candidates (Official List from 25 prov- inces) (1)	DPR members elected from 25 prov. (2)	DPR members indirectly elected from W. Irian (3)	DPR members appointed by 1969 law (4)	Total DPR members (2+3+4)	Per- cent
Golkar	538	227	9	100*	336	73.0
NU	397	58	-	-	58	12.6
Parmusi	327	24	-	-	24	5.2
PNI	505	20	-	-	20	4.3
PSII	309	10	-	-	10	2.1
Parkindo	182	7	-	-	7	1.5
Catholic	115	3	-	-	3	0.6
Perti	150	2	-	-	2	0.4
Murba	203	-	-	-	-	-
IPKI	295	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	3,021	351	9	100	460	100.0

* Consists of 75 members from the Armed Forces and 25 from non-military Golkar.

TABLE IX. URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES OF VOTING RATE AND PERCENTAGE GOLKAR VOTE AS SEEN AT KOTAMADYA/KABUPATÈN LEVEL OF DJAKARTA, JOGJAKARTA, SOUTH SUMATRA, AND WEST KALIMANTAN^a

Constituencies	Eligible voters	Voting rate percent	Golkar vote in percent
DJAKARTA ^b	2,221,732	87.9	46.6
JOGJAKARTA ^c	1,260,810	92.2	63.3
<u>Kotamadya</u> Jogjakarta	175,976	86.8	45.1
<u>Kabupatèn</u> Sleman	305,196	92.5	62.6
Gunung Kidul	290,634	95.0	79.8
Bantul	296,556	92.6	62.6
Kulon Progo	192,448	91.5	65.4
SOUTH SUMATRA ^d	1,554,290	91.0	62.6
<u>Kotamadya</u> Palembang	247,771	90.7	52.2
Pangkal Pinang	21,730	92.6	52.1
<u>Kabupatèn</u> Lahat	172,038	94.1	67.5
Belitung	53,478	92.7	78.9
OKU	255,702	93.4	63.0
LIOT	167,477	92.7	67.1
Bangka	107,935	88.5	62.0
Musi Rawas	112,880	95.2	77.4
WEST KALIMANTAN ^e	873,658	94.3	67.1
<u>Kotamadya</u> Pontianak	82,282	92.0	60.8
<u>Kabupatèn</u> Pontianak	204,032	94.2	53.5
Sambas	202,149	93.0	59.5
Sanggau	130,299	97.2	81.5
Sintang	104,617	97.6	79.6
Kapuas Hulu	55,542	97.2	68.9
Ketapang	94,737	95.3	77.3

Notes: ^aKotamadya and Kabupatèn are subprovincial administrative districts, referring to urban and rural areas, respectively.

^bDjakarta consists of five kotamadya, but no separate electoral data are available.

^cAntara Warta Berita, July 6, 1971 (morning edition)

^dIbid., July 8, 1971 (morning edition).

^eIbid., July 17, 1971 (evening edition).

TABLE X. COMPARISON OF GOLKAR VOTE BETWEEN KOTAMADYA AND KABUPATEN BY CONSTITUENCY AND REGION

Constituencies	KOTAMADYA		KABUPATEN	
	Total votes	Golkar vote in percent	Total votes	Golkar vote in percent
Atjeh	30,651	52.4	941,183	49.6
North Sumatra	327,905	56.0	2,218,659	72.2
West Sumatra	155,314	48.4	1,048,681	65.4
Riau	50,079	48.7	621,835	78.9
South Sumatra	244,867	52.2	1,169,579	64.8
Djambi	55,138	70.9	407,762	90.5
Bengkulu	12,120	70.6	211,304	83.4
Lampung	79,402	53.7	1,131,722	73.0
West Java	702,388	63.0	9,315,320	77.1
Djakarta	1,955,010	46.6	--	--
Central Java	649,465	55.1	9,633,842	49.9
Jogjakarta	152,787	45.1	1,009,867	66.0
East Java	1,153,798	57.8	11,309,114	54.6
W. Kalimantan	75,711	60.8	753,622	67.2
Central K'tan	12,765	75.9	318,384	81.6
S. Kalimantan	118,619	39.2	678,011	69.3
E. Kalimantan	117,578	55.2	211,320	54.5
North Sulawesi	115,879	44.5	663,060	63.5
Central S'wesi	--	--	424,777	76.8
Southeast S'si	--	--	341,759	92.4
South Sulawesi	203,048	28.0	2,311,600	82.7
Bali	--	--	1,048,090	82.9
West Nusatenggara	--	--	1,055,217	69.8
East Nusatenggara	--	--	1,149,176	61.4
Maluku	35,961	32.2	474,684	46.9
<u>Regions</u>				
SUMATRA	955,476	54.1	7,750,725	69.3
JAVA	4,613,448	53.0	31,268,143	60.2
KALIMANTAN	324,673	51.5	1,961,337	68.9
SULAWESI	318,927	34.0	3,741,196	79.5
NUSATENGGARA	--	--	3,252,483	71.1
MALUKU	35,961	32.2	474,684	46.9
TOTAL	6,248,485	52.0	48,448,568	64.1

Source: Based on Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Daftar Pembagian Kursi Hasil Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Tahun 1971 Terperintji Untuk Masing-Masing Organisasi Bagi Tiap Daerah Pemilihan Serta Penjebarannya Untuk Tiap Daerah Tingkat II (Djakarta, 1971).

TABLE XI. GOLKAR MEMBERS IN DPR AT KOTAMADYA/KABUPATEN LEVEL BY NUMBER OF DPR MEMBERS ALLOCATED, NUMBER OF GOLKAR MEMBERS ELECTED, AND NUMBER OF DISTRICTS WON BY GOLKAR WITH HIGHEST VOTE, ACCORDING TO REGION

Regions	Total no. of kodya/kabupt.	DPR mem- bers allo- cated	Golkar members elected	Total no. of kodya/ kbt. Golkar won first	KOTAMADYA				KABUPATEN			
					No. of kodya	No. of DPR mem- bers allo- cated	No. of Golkar mem- bers	No. of Golkar kodya	No. of kabpt.	No. of DPR mem- bers allo- cated	No. of Golkar mem- bers	No. of Golkar kabpt.
SUMATRA	70	73	50	69	20	20	4	20	50	53	46	49
JAVA	106	182	107	90	24	33	21	22	82	149	86	68
KALIMANTAN	29	29	20	27	5	5	2	4	24	24	18	23
SULAWESI	37	37	29	37	4	4	1	4	33	33	28	33
NUSATENGARA	26	26	19	21	-	-	-	-	26	26	19	21
MALUKU	4	4	2	3	1	1	-	-	3	3	2	3
TOTAL	272	351	227	247	54	63	28	50	218	288	199	197

Source: Based on Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Daftar Pembagian Kursi Hasil Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Tahun 1971 Terperintji Untuk Masing-Masing Organisasi Bagi Tiap Daerah Pemilihan Serta Penje- barannya Untuk Tiap Daerah Tingkat II (Djakarta, 1971).

TABLE XII. 25 KOTAMADYA AND KABUPATEN WHERE GOLKAR FAILED TO WIN FIRST AND PERCENTAGE VOTE OF WINNER AND RUNNER-UP

Constituencies	Kodya/Kabpt	Total votes	Winner	% vote	Runner-up	% vote
	<u>Kotamadya</u>					
Central Java	Pekalongan	52,164	NU	34.6	Golkar	31.4
East Java	Pasuruan	34,614	NU	50.2	Golkar	39.8
S. Kalimantan	Bandjarmasin	118,619	NU	43.1	Golkar	39.2
Maluku	Ambon	35,961	Parkindo	34.3	Golkar	32.2
	<u>Kabupaten</u>					
Atjeh	Pidie	151,168	Parmusi	31.8	Golkar	28.4
Central Java	Tegal	410,843	NU	40.9	PNI	29.6
	Purbolinggo	295,636	PNI	34.5	Golkar	29.6
	Bandjarnegara	293,199	PNI	39.7	Golkar	25.0
	Magelang	412,623	NU	43.3	Golkar	41.9
	Sragen	307,461	PNI	57.0	Golkar	26.9
	Karanganjar	238,428	PNI	47.3	Golkar	44.0
East Java	Surabaya	277,588	NU	54.6	Golkar	36.5
	Pasuruan	433,187	NU	58.1	Golkar	37.4
	Bondowoso	321,373	NU	55.4	Golkar	33.9
	Panarukan	276,453	NU	55.4	Golkar	36.4
	Pamekasan	233,067	NU	48.6	Golkar	28.7
	Bangkalan	302,978	NU	75.9	Golkar	21.1
	Sampang	260,289	NU	73.5	Golkar	18.8
	Sumenep	433,225	NU	65.5	Golkar	27.4
S. Kalimantan	Bandjar	128,418	NU	47.7	Golkar	44.2
E. Nusatenggara	Timor Tengah Utara	58,628	Catholic	49.1	Golkar	48.7
	Alor	56,005	Parkindo	55.6	Golkar	15.3
	Sikka	98,921	Catholic	86.8	Golkar	8.1
	Sumba Timur	59,271	Parkindo	49.3	Golkar	23.0
	Sumba Barat	92,636	Parkindo	39.3	Golkar	26.4

Source: Based on Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Daftar Pembagian Kursi Hasil Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Tahun 1971 Terperintji Untuk Masing-Masing Organisasi Bagi Tiap Daerah Pemilihan Serta Penjebarannya Untuk Tiap Daerah Tingkat II (Djakarta, 1971).

TABLE XIII. GOLKAR'S ELECTORAL POSITION IN CENTRAL AND EAST JAVA AS COMPARED TO OTHER PARTIES

CENTRAL JAVA					
Parties	Total votes	In %	DPR seats	% of national votes	% of national seats
Golkar	5,174,182	50.3	29	15.0	12.7
PNI	2,003,177	19.4	11	52.8	55.0
NU	2,382,462	23.1	13	23.3	22.4
Parmusi	468,753	4.5	3	15.9	12.5
PSII	90,466	0.8	1	6.9	10.0
IPKI	36,053	0.3	-	9.4	--
Others	128,214	1.2	-	7.4	--
Total	10,283,307	100.0	57	18.7	16.2

EAST JAVA					
Parties	Total votes	In %	DPR seats	% of national votes	% of national seats
Golkar	6,843,977	54.9	35	19.9	15.4
PNI	622,746	4.9	3	16.4	15.0
NU	4,382,607	35.1	22	42.9	37.9
Parmusi	339,919	2.7	2	11.5	8.3
PSII	154,707	1.2	1	11.8	10.0
IPKI	31,691	0.2	-	8.3	--
Others	87,270	0.8	-	4.7	--
Total	12,462,917	99.6	63	22.7	17.9

Source: Based on Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, Daftar Pembagian Kursi Hasil Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Tahun 1971 Terperintji Untuk Masing-Masing Organisasi Bagi Tiap Daerah Pemilihan Serta Penjabarannya Untuk Tiap Daerah Tingkat II (Djakarta, 1971).

