

PERSATUAN ISLAM
ISLAMIC REFORM IN TWENTIETH CENTURY INDONESIA

by
HOWARD M. FEDERSPIEL

MONOGRAPH SERIES

Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
1970

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PREFACE

Three basic concerns have absorbed the attention of Indonesian Muslims in the twentieth century: response to local non-Muslim culture, concern for basic Islamic belief and practice, and accommodation with modern thought and technology. Like Muslims elsewhere, Indonesian Muslims have responded in different ways to these concerns. One group has identified itself closely with traditional Middle Eastern Islamic beliefs, ritual and jurisprudence and attempted to make local culture and modern thought conform to it. A second group has continued to identify with indigenous Southeast Asian religious values and with locally evolved customary law and has reshaped Islamic beliefs and ritual to coincide with these indigenous values. A third group has responded to Western secularism and attempted to relegate formal religion to the realm of private worship and belief with only a moral and ethical influence on society and government. The interaction of these three attitudes has been a primary factor in the particular development of Indonesian social and political life over the past seventy years.

The major Islamic organizations that have appeared in Indonesia in the twentieth century--Sarekat Islam, Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama and Masjumi--have all been representatives of the group that emphasizes traditional Middle Eastern Islamic beliefs and practices. All have been concerned with the primacy of Islamic law, even though their concepts of just what constituted that law were vague and different from one another. All have maintained that religious values are so important that the state should be responsible for assuring the adoption of such values throughout Indonesian society, although again there has been no common concept of what these values actually are or just what the state was to do about them. All have been convinced that the traditional Islamic values are correct and that all of Indonesian society should come to accept this premise, but there has been a wide variety of interpretations as to just how these traditional values should be implemented in contemporary Indonesian life.

The reasons for failure to agree rested primarily on differences of just what constituted proper Islamic religious sources, although there was some disagreement of interpretation of those sources. The traditionalists (*kaum tua*), represented by the Nahdlatul Ulama, believed that religious truth is contained in the writings of past Muslim scholars, particularly those of several noted jurists and theologians. The modernists

(*kaum muda*), represented by the Muhammadiyah, held that new investigation and interpretation (*ijtihad*) of religious fundamentals was necessary rather than relying on the tradition of past interpreters. A third approach--perhaps more correctly a variation of the modernist approach--represented by the Persatuan Islam (Persis), the subject of this paper, lays particular stress on the importance of Qur'ān and *Sunnah* (traditions of the Prophet Muhammad) as sources of religious investigation.

The value of the Persatuan Islam as a topic for scholarly research lies not in its organization, for it was small and loosely knit, nor does it lie in its participation in Indonesian political life over the past forty-five years, for its activity was incidental and peripheral to the mainstream of political developments. Although its role in religious education made some impact on Indonesian Muslims, it has been far less influential than several other organizations. In the same manner, its press has been influential at times but has never attained the stature and readership among Indonesians accorded the publications of several other Muslim organizations. Rather, the Persatuan Islam is important because it has attempted to define for Indonesian society just what it is that constitutes Islam, what the basic principles of that religion are, and what constitutes proper religious behavior for Muslims. In this presentation, the Persatuan Islam has avoided vague concepts and generalizations--somewhat unusual in Indonesia--and has dealt with the details and substance of religious behavior in Indonesia. Its members have propounded very definite views toward traditional Indonesian culture, toward developments occurring in the twentieth century, toward "Western" culture and toward traditional Muslim religious thought and practices.

What emerges from the study is a profile of a fundamentalist Muslim group, similar in outlook to that of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwān al-Muslimūn) in the United Arab Republic and to Mawlānā Sayyid Abū-l-A'la Mawdūdī's Jamā'at-i-Islāmī in Pakistan. Like those two movements, it also rejected the secular concept of the nation-state and called for establishment of a state and society structured to implement its concept of Islamic values. The insistence on Muslim unity in a single international community and on the necessity for a harsh form of Islamic religious law has been so dominant in the social and political viewpoint of the organization that it emerges as ideology. In Indonesia, a nation marked by a variety of political and social thought, this uncompromising political stance has not been popular, yet it has attracted a significant number of followers and its message has had an impact on the formulations of the noted Islamic political parties.

The Persatuan Islam then is similar to other Indonesian Muslim movements in that it has similar concerns. At the same time, it is distinctive in that it has its own solutions for outstanding problems confronting Indonesian Muslims in the

twentieth century. A study of the Persatuan Islam allows author and reader an opportunity to review the common problems confronting all Indonesian Muslims, to note how one group chose to resolve these problems, and to compare the solutions of the Persatuan Islam with those of other organizations. The net result should be an understanding of the Indonesian Muslim community and its place in Indonesian national life.

The Indonesian spelling of personal names and the use of many terms with an Arabic root is often confusing, owing to differences in transliteration from Arabic. While some Indonesians use the system common to Dutch scholars, others employ a system generally consistent with Bahasa Indonesia sounds and letters, and still others have developed their own transliteration systems. Consequently, names and terms often are spelled with minor modifications at different times. In this essay personal names are rendered according to the most common usage without regard for the Arabic derivation of those names. Place names are spelled according to the system employed by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names, which follows current spellings in Indonesian government regulations and decrees. Terms in common use in Bahasa Indonesia are rendered in that form, while technical religious terms and terminology derived from Arabic are rendered according to the transliteration system employed by the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University. Beyond this, footnotes and parenthetical notes are used whenever special problems arise or further clarification seems necessary.

Indonesian language materials, largely pamphlets, books and periodicals written by members of the Persatuan Islam, were the chief source of material for this essay. These works can be found scattered among several Indonesian libraries, and partly in United States and Canadian libraries. Early in its existence, the Persatuan Islam established a publishing house and issued a large number of works by its own members outlining the beliefs and attitudes of the Persatuan Islam on a variety of subjects. These works in particular served as basic source material for this study.

My appreciation for aid and assistance go to many individuals and institutions. In Indonesia, I am indebted to Ustadz Abdulkadir Hassan, Abdullah Musa and their many associates at the Pesantren Persatuan Islam in Bangil, East Java; to Muhammad Sofwanhadi, one-time publisher of the *Suara Rakjat* in Surabaya; to Ustadz E. Abdurrahman, the chairman of the Persatuan Islam and his assistant Junus Anis at Bandung; to Dr. Deliar Noer in Medan; to Hadji Aboebakar Atjeh, Dr. Hadji Abdulmalik Karim Amrullah (Hamka) and Zainal Arifin in Djakarta; to Timur Jaylani in the Ministry of Religious Affairs; to the Museum Library in Djakarta and the Islamic Library in Jogjakarta. My special thanks to Dr. Hadji Muhammad Rasjidi, my friend and adviser at McGill University, for his general guidance. In the United States, the Library of Congress, the Wason Library at Cornell

University, the U.S. Department of State Library, the Library of the Islamic Center in Washington and the Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam (Washington Center) all provided material that was of value in the preparation of this study. In Canada I would like to express my thanks to Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith, former director of the Institute of Islamic Studies, to Dr. Charles Adams, the present director, to Mr. William Watson, the librarian and to Dr. John A. Williams, my dissertation adviser. My thanks also go to Professor George Kahin and to my many friends associated with the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project who have encouraged me over the years to continue my research in the field of Indonesian Islam. Finally, my gratitude to my wife Johanna who put up with my eccentricities during the long research period.

Howard M. Federspiel

Hickory, North Carolina
November 1969

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The dominant religious pattern at the time Islam entered the Indonesian Archipelago--between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries--was a mixture of pagan animism and a mysticism superimposed on it during the Buddhist and Hindu periods.¹ Animism found expression primarily in spirit worship which acknowledged the existence of spirits in living persons, in the dead, and in inanimate objects. During the ascendancy of Hinduism and Buddhism in the archipelago, between the ninth and thirteenth centuries, this animistic belief survived in a subdued form and exercised some considerable influence on these new religions. Hinduistic practices, notably those of the Shaivistic sect, and Mahayana Buddhism, entering the archipelago through Indian and Malay trade exchange, succeeded in large part because they incorporated and adapted to these indigenous religious beliefs. The traditional *wayang* shows and the *gamelan* orchestras, which developed their strong ties with mystical practices and Hindu mythology during this period, continued to reflect Javanese values and to mirror the Javanese outlook on life.² The great Borobudur monument near Jogjakarta also shows considerable concern for ancestor worship and animism in its bas reliefs and ornamentation, despite its many stupas and its claim to be a Buddhist shrine.³

Islam was acceptable to the Indonesians only in so far as it was able to accept the old religious patterns and associate itself with existing practices and beliefs. In this respect, Islam was fortunate, for it was introduced into the Malay area by traders from Gujerat, on the West coast of India, where Islam had been subject to Hindu and *Ismā'īlī Shī'ah* influences

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1. Kenneth P. Landon, Southeast Asia: Crossroad of Religions (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1949), pp. 138-139.
 2. Daniel George Edward Hall, A History of Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1955), pp. 9, 67.
 3. Ibid., pp. 48, 53. A stupa in architecture is a specific type of Buddhist religious building, consisting of a solid mass of masonry built above a receptacle containing a sacred relic. Encyclopedia Britannica.

and consequently also gave considerable stress to mystical form. This Gujarati version of Islam struck a responsive chord among the Indonesians, and it "was easy for the Indonesians to understand it, appreciate it, and use it."⁴

Many indigenous religious practices continued after Islam's arrival, some openly, but most under the guise of being part of Islam itself. Veneration of saints and heroes continued, with the addition of new personalities associated with Islam. The belief that certain numbers and names have magical and mystical qualities took on an Islamic appearance by including the names of "the first four caliphs, the four Arabic letters that spelled the name of the Prophet and of Allah, the twelve signs of the zodiac, the twelve imams of the Shiahs, and others." Exorcism was held in high regard, and Islamic prescriptions and references were introduced into the practice. Indonesian charms took on an Islamic look, by attaching to them the confession of faith and citations from the Qur'ān.⁵

Taking over where Buddhism had left off, Islamic mysticism (*taṣawwuf*) was able to make considerable impact on the Indonesians, and, in the early period, the Muslim mystic (*ṣūfī*) was highly regarded and honored. In north Sumatra in the last half of the sixteenth century, the most highly respected religious scholars were all mystics,⁶ and on Java, the nine *walīs* who, according to Javanese history, were responsible for the spread of Islam on that island, were also mystics.⁷ The theologians and jurists, so influential in the Middle Eastern variety of Islam, took second place to the *ṣūfīs* in the early period, and, even until the twentieth century, Indonesian (*ulamā'*) noted for legal or theological knowledge were also *ṣūfīs*.

That Islam compromised with existing religious patterns when it was introduced into the archipelago is not surprising, since Muslims, from the time of the Prophet Muḥammad, have been content with nominal Islamization of the inhabitants in any new area. This was the pattern in the first great expansion of Islam in the first century A.H., when Syria, Egypt and Persia came into the Muslim sphere of influence through warfare; in the succeeding centuries, the population was induced

4. Landon, Southeast Asia, p. 139.

5. Ibid.

6. G. W. J. Drewes, "Indonesia: Mysticism and Activism" in Gustav E. von Grunebaum, Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1955), pp. 287-290.

7. C. C. Berg, "The Islamization of Java," Studia Islamica, IV (1950), pp. 111-142.

to accept Islam for political and economic reasons. So far as faith is concerned, Muslims traditionally accept the confession of faith as sufficient for considering a person a fellow Muslim. So far as Muslim society is concerned, however, this tolerance, while extended during proselytization, does not imply eternal acceptance or permanent compromise with practices regarded by the (*ulamā*) as contrary to Islamic teachings, but rather only a temporary truce. The establishment of schools, contact with other Muslim areas, and the guidance of Muslim rulers are intended to deepen religious belief and practice with each succeeding generation. This development is still taking place in Indonesia, and over the past four hundred years Islam in Indonesia has slowly altered its form; the heterodox religious trends of the early period have slowed in momentum, and more orthodox Islamic practices and patterns have slowly gained in importance. This trend is clearly discernible when the areas longest under the influence of Islam--Atjeh and north Sumatra--are compared with Java, where Islam entered considerably later. In Atjeh and North Sumatra, religion assumes a significant role in community affairs and in the private lives of individuals, and Islam is recognized as equal to, and sometimes takes precedence over, custom. Among the Javanese, where professed Muslims generally are only nominal Muslims, *adat*, or custom, has clear precedence over Islam.⁸ In all areas, the trend over the past few hundred years has been for orthodox Muslim values to assume greater importance as Indonesians learned more about orthodox Islam and became more interested in its teachings. The process, however, is long in terms of time, and slow in making perceptible gains, and in Indonesia it has had to contend with several factors that have complicated its development.

The arrival of the Europeans in Southeast Asia and the establishment of Portuguese, Dutch and British colonial rule in that area shortly after the initial contact of Islam had a severe impact on the new religion. When the Europeans first arrived, Islam was already associated with the royal courts but had not yet attained mass appeal. The conversion of the population from nominal Buddhism and Hinduism to nominal Islam because of the royalty's conversion was considerably accelerated by the threat posed by European traders and soldiers following a religion opposed to Islam.⁹ Islam clearly was associated with Indonesian interests and served as a rallying point against the "infidel" invader, an association that was to continue through the various revolts and uprisings of the Dutch period until independence was achieved in 1950.

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8. Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, The Achehnese, trans. R. J. Wilkinson (London: Luzac and Leyden: E. J. Brill, 1906), I, p. 72.
 9. See, for example, Bernhard H. M. Vlekke, Nusantara, A History of Indonesia (The Hague and Bandung: Van Hoeve, 1943), pp. 97-98.

The establishment of Dutch rule over the Indonesian Archipelago, while initially speeding the conversion to Islam, impeded--sometimes intentionally and at other times inevitably--the development of this nominal acceptance of Islam into a more serious regard for Islamic belief and practice. European economic domination, with its mercantilistic practices of monopoly and close regulation of trade, inadvertently curtailed the influence of the foreign Muslim trader on the Indonesian believer. The Netherlands became Indonesia's primary trading partner, and trade with India and the Middle East was severely curtailed.¹⁰ Moreover, foreign trade was almost completely controlled by the Dutch themselves thereby further reducing the need for contact between the foreign Muslim trader and the Indonesian Muslim. Within Indonesia, the local Muslim trader continued to play an important religious role, but after the arrival of the Dutch, foreign Muslim traders dropped appreciably in numbers and, consequently, in influence.

Indonesian Muslims continued, however, to have some contact with the outside Muslim world through the large number of Indonesian Muslims participating in the *hajj* (pilgrimage to Makkah required of all Muslims), and by a small number of students who studied at the Dār al-'Ulūm in Makkah, at Al-Azhar in Cairo, and at other centers of learning in the Near and Middle East.¹¹ At the same time, a limited number of Muslim scholars from other areas, particularly from the Arab world, also traveled to Indonesia to teach at the courts and at various religious schools.¹² These contacts seem to have had a considerable impact on Indonesian Islam, and they were responsible for the introduction of many new religious ideas into the archipelago. Sometimes, as in the early nineteenth century when *Wahhābism*, brought in by returning pilgrims, produced the *Padri* wars,¹³

10. Hall, *A History of Southeast Asia*, p. 312; Bertran Johannes Otto Schrieke, "The Seventeenth Century: The Downfall of Javanese Trade" in *Indonesian Sociological Studies* (Bandung and The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1957), II, pp. 49-79.
11. Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka in the Nineteenth Century*, trans. J. H. Monahan (London: Luzac, 1931), p. 291.
12. Schrieke, "Ruler and Realm in Early Java," *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, II, pp. 239-240.
13. The *Padri* wars occurred in the Minangkabau area of Sumatra between the years 1785 and 1838. The cause of these wars, which resulted in the extension of Dutch political control over West Sumatra, was the attempt of an Islamic group, influenced by *Wahhābī* ideals brought back from the pilgrimage, to convert the local population to its own brand of Islam. The *Padri* movement was particularly opposed to customary law (*adat*), and sought to establish a severe form

the ideas reflected militant trends that sought to spread particular beliefs through force. At other times, as in the late nineteenth century when *Aḥmadīyah* beliefs were introduced by students returning from India, the ideas were contrary to generally accepted *Sunnī* Muslim belief.¹⁴ Generally, however, as Snouck Hurgronje noted in his report to the Netherlands Indies Administration on this problem, the contact with the outside Muslim world provided by the pilgrimage and students served to strengthen *Sunnī* Muslim religious patterns and worked against heterodoxy.¹⁵ It can only be speculated as to how much greater the pressure for reform toward orthopraxy would have been had the various Indonesian kingdoms not come under Dutch colonial rule. The Dutch destruction of the several Indonesian trading fleets and a reorientation of trade away from the rest of Asia certainly destroyed a most significant means for the passage of religious ideas. The loss of this form of contact, so important throughout Muslim history, must be regarded as having slowed the maturing process in Indonesian Islam.

The Dutch colonial administration also limited the deepening of religious belief by rigidly maintaining a political and economic system that limited the role of the local rulers, and inadvertently prevented the adoption of social and political reforms that, from a religious viewpoint, would have intensified Islam among the general population. The traditional village unit was maintained wherein the rights of the individual were subordinated to village community obligations, both in everyday practice and according to Muslim law. The importance of the individual believer, the priority of Islamic religious law, the spiritual responsibility to a source outside the community, were all contradictory to the concept of the all-encompassing, closed community. In accepting Islamic religious dogma, therefore, the average peasant found it difficult to adopt Islamic social principles as well, or to abandon the customs and practices common to the community, even though they were often contrary to Islamic practices.¹⁶

of the *sharī'ah*. See Ph. S. Van Ronkel, *De Roman van Amir Hamzah* (Leiden: University of Leiden, 1895); and R. A. Kern, "Padris," *Encyclopedia of Islam* (London: Luzac, and Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1913-1938).

14. *Aḥmadīyah* beliefs were introduced into Indonesia by Indonesian students studying in India at the *Aḥmadīyah* school there.
15. Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, "Het Mohammedanisme," in *Verspreide Geschriften* (Bonn and Leipzig: Kurt Schroeder, 1923-1927), VI, ii, pp. 219-220.
16. Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun* (The Hague and Bandung: Van Hoeve, 1958), p. 82.

Within this *adat* system, Islam was only acceptable in so far as it was able to exist alongside custom and to provide religious sanction for many non-Islamic practices. For example, the celebration of *Maulud* (*mawlid* or *mawlūd* in Arabic--the birthday celebration for the Prophet Muhammad) was regarded as not conflicting with *adat* and in many places was observed with feasts and celebration that had a distinct animistic flavor. *Kenduris* and *slametans*, both meals celebrating animistic occasions, were given sanction by the inclusion of Muslim prayers and readings from religious texts. The *pitrah*, or rice tax, roughly corresponding to *zakāt*, early became very popular since its distribution to the poor enabled them to take part in the general feasting marking *Hari Raja* (*Id al-fiṭr*). Marriage, circumcision, funerals and several other ceremonies were sanctioned by religion, but much of the content of these rites was *adat* common to these ceremonies before Islam arrived in the archipelago. On the other hand, Islam encountered considerable resistance in the execution of its legal prescriptions, which were more often than not at variance with established *adat*. Land laws and inheritance were the most troublesome areas, and Islam made very little progress in displacing *adat* on these matters.¹⁷

Two groups of persons were responsible for developing orthodox *Sunnī* religious thought in Indonesia: the religious officials in the schools and mosques, and the merchants. The religious schools taught a very rudimentary form of Islam. In the lower classes, instruction consisted primarily of memorizing passages from the Qur'ān in Arabic, with little regard for the students' comprehension or understanding of the subject matter. At the higher levels, in the *pondoks* and *pesantrens*, it consisted of more memory work in various religious sciences, but primarily in *fiqh* and *taṣawwuf* (mysticism) with little interpretative work or application of religious principles and practices to Indonesia.¹⁸ The religious schools ultimately produced persons who viewed religion as more important than custom, and must be regarded as having made a distinct contribution to the development of Indonesian Islam. This group of religiously oriented persons came to be known as *santri*, while those who were nominally Muslim but clung to custom and animistic practices were known as *abangan*.¹⁹

Islam made its best progress among the merchant class which consisted for the most part of persons who had broken away from

17. Landon, *Southeast Asia*, pp. 159-163.

18. R. A. Kern, "Pasantren," *Encyclopedia of Islam*.

19. For a full explanation of these two terms see Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960), esp. pp. 121-130.

the closed community for economic reasons and were not bound by the customs and laws of usage that impeded Islam's progress in the village. Freed from the narrow concepts of village custom, the merchant class sought ideas and concepts that fit with their own more diverse experiences and found them in Islam.²⁰ As middle class merchants they had wealth that could be expended on the education of their children and on fulfilling their religious obligation to undertake the pilgrimage, which consequently brought them into closer contact with religion. Significantly, it had been merchants who had been responsible for the initial spread of Islam throughout Indonesia, and it was perhaps natural that their successors should also be interested in furthering religious development. The Indonesian nobility, on the other hand, while adopting Islam as a religion and sometimes acting as patrons for religious scholars, was generally more concerned with *prijaji* (court ritual) forms of behavior which took emphasis away from strict religious behavior.²¹

A final factor affecting the development of Islam in Indonesia was the immigration of a considerable number of Ḥaḍramī Arabs to Indonesia throughout the Dutch period, and particularly during the latter half of the nineteenth century. These Arabs brought with them a brand of *Sunnī* Islamic belief and practice that, while marked by some heterodox practices, had some positive influence on the development of orthopraxy in Indonesia. A significant number of these Arabs became religious teachers, and a large number of them became traders, thus fortifying the two groups already concerned with deepening Islamic belief in Indonesia. This advantage was clearly offset, however, by the Arab tendency to stress their racial association with the Prophet Muḥammad (and frequently to use it to attain status among Indonesian Muslims), a factor that frequently detracted from their effectiveness as reformers of Indonesian Islam.²²

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the work of the Dutch scholars Van Vollenhoven and Snouck Hurgronje on the role of religion and custom in the lives of Indonesians resulted in the adoption of an official policy designed to encourage some aspects of religious activity, but giving custom clear

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20. Cf. Clifford Geertz, *Modjokuto: Religion in Java* (Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1958), pp. 217, 231.
 21. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*, p. 14; Berend ter Haar, *Adat Law in Indonesia*, trans. A. Arthur Schiller and E. Adamson Hoebel (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948), pp. 74-77.
 22. For a study of Arabs in the Indonesian archipelago, see Justus M. van der Kroef, *Indonesia in the Modern World* (Bandung: Masa Baru, 1954), I, pp. 253-255.

precedence over religion.²³ The *hajj* and social and educational activities were encouraged, since they were considered to increase orthodox religious belief and lessen the chances of adopting fanatical religious beliefs inimical to Dutch rule. At the same time, the government was to suppress sternly those new ideas and activities among Muslims that could threaten Dutch control over the Indonesians.²⁴ This new policy also set aside religious law that had come into limited use in several courts of law during the Dutch colonial period, on grounds that administration of justice should rest on the mores and customs of the various areas. This new policy confirmed Dutch preference for limited, controlled contact between Indonesian Muslims and Muslims outside Indonesia, and for the closed community regulated by custom that limited Islam's hold in the villages.²⁵

Such was the religious situation in Indonesia at the turn of the present century when new religious ideas were once again introduced into the archipelago by returning pilgrims and students. These new ideas, propounded by such men as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad 'Abduh, maintained that religious reform would revitalize Islam, and called for Muslims to unite in a single community (*ummah*).²⁶ The Dutch, and indeed most colonial nations, saw these modernist Muslim principles as antithetical to their own interests and attempted to keep such influence from penetrating Indonesia. Books and pamphlets advocating these ideas were banned for some time, though Dutch control over their entry was far from successful. The ideas continued to arrive through returning pilgrims and students.²⁷

Modernist Muslim thought arrived in Indonesia primarily through the influence of several Indonesian Muslim teachers in

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23. For a brief survey of these scholars' influence on Dutch policy in Indonesia see Vlekke, *Nusantara*, pp. 323-328.
 24. Snouck Hurgronje, "Het Mohammedanisme," *Verspreide Geschriften*, VI, pp. 219-220. See also Georges Henri Bousquet, *A French View of the Netherlands Indies*, trans. Philip E. Lilienthal (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), pp. 6-21.
 25. See H. Westra, "Customs and Muslim Law in the Netherlands East Indies," *Transactions of the Grotius Society*, XXV (1939), pp. 151-167.
 26. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 54-58; 62-63 (references are to Mentor Book edition, 1950).
 27. Oemar Amin Hoesin, "Sedjarah perkembangan politik modern di Indonesia," *Hikmah*, VIII, No. 20/21 (May 21, 1955), pp. 24-26.

Makkah who laid particular stress on the importance of *uṣūl al-fiqh* in studying the Qur'ān and *sunnah*. Ahmad al-Khaṭīb, from the Minangkabau area of Sumatra, was perhaps the most influential; through his own writings and the activity of several of his students, particularly Hadji Rasul and Ahmad Taher, his ideas gained considerable following. These modernists in Sumatra played down the pan-Islamic content of the modernist Muslim viewpoint and concentrated their efforts on internal religious reform, a factor which probably led to Dutch willingness to allow them to continue their activities. The modernists attacked those aspects of mysticism which they regarded as excessive and non-Islamic, certain practices in ritual worship they believed to be accretions, and the *madhhabs* (schools of jurisprudence) as the final authority in matters of Muslim behavior. This modernist activity was not only suspect by the Dutch, and consequently closely observed by the authorities, but by the traditional '*ulamā*' as well, who regarded the modernists as emasculating Islamic teachings by deemphasizing the interpretations of classical and medieval theologians and jurists. The traditionalists' response--never well articulated--stated that the subservient political and social position of the Muslims throughout the world was caused by Muslim failure to follow the prescriptions of Islam as laid down by the four *madhhabs*.²⁸ The dispute between the modernists and traditionalists had no early resolution; as modernist ideas gradually spread throughout Indonesia during the first quarter of the twentieth century, the struggle between the two groups continued in every region.

The appearance of modernist Islam in Indonesia corresponded with the rise of nationalist feeling among the Indonesians and contributed to the growth of that feeling into the nationalist movement of the 1920's and 1930's. The Sarekat Islam, formed in 1912, generally subscribed to modernist Muslim principles and was the primary vehicle of Indonesian nationalist political aspirations until the early 1920's. The downfall of the Sarekat Islam was caused by its failure to resolve the differences between religion on the one hand and nationalism and Communism on the other. These differences led to a fragmentation of the Sarekat Islam in 1925, and consequently marked the beginning of secular nationalism and Muslim nationalism along completely separate lines.²⁹ Like the *kaum tua-kaum muda* (traditionalist-modernist Muslims) split, this development also had serious implications for the development of Islam in Indonesia and has been a focal point of Muslim interest until the present.

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28. Hamka (Hadji Abdulmalik Karim Amrullah), *Ajahku* (Djakarta: Widjaya, 1958), pp. 46-47, 76-84.
 29. Fred A. von der Mehden, *Religion and Nationalism in South-east Asia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1963), pp. 74-76.

The remainder of this essay is given to the study of the Persatuan Islam which was clearly committed to a modernist view of Islam. This organization played an important role in the debate between the traditionalist and modernist viewpoints in the religious field, and a significant role in the struggle between secular nationalists and Muslim nationalists in the political field. This essay will outline the Persis view toward the various problems confronting Islam in Indonesia during the twentieth century, indicate how these views differed from those of other Indonesian Muslims, and examine the effect of these views in its educational activity, its political viewpoint and its relations with other Muslim and non-Muslim groups. The value of such a study lies in the insight it affords into the development of Indonesian Islam in this century, and should reveal whether the trend toward orthodox Islam that has been evident in Indonesian history is continuing, has been arrested, or has taken some diverse course.

CHAPTER II

THE PERSATUAN ISLAM PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II

Beginnings

The Persatuan Islam was founded formally on September 12, 1923 in Bandung by a group of Muslims interested in religious study and activity.¹ The founding of a religious organization at this time was not unusual since numerous other organizations, movements and clubs had been organized for religious, social, educational, economic and political purposes in Indonesia during the first quarter of the century. The Budi Utomo (High Endeavor),² founded in 1908 for the advancement of native education, the Sarekat Islam,³ organized in 1912 for Muslim trade and political advancement, and the Muhammadiyah,⁴ founded in 1912 for Muslim social welfare and educational activity, were perhaps the most important of the early movements. Several hundred more clubs were organized in the period between 1920 and 1935, most with little appeal beyond their own limited circles, and consequently few survived more than a few years. The most prominent of these local organizations were the study groups formed in the major cities in the 1920's, particularly at Bandung, Djakarta and Surabaya, which came together in 1930 and formed

1. The Netherlands, Department van Kolonien, "Mohammedaansche Eeredienst," Indische Verslag, 1930, pp. 310-311.
2. See for example: "Budi Oetomo," Encyclopaedië van Nederlandsch Oost-Indië; L. N. Sitorus, Sedjarah Pergerakan Kebangsaan Indonesia (Djakarta: Pustaka Rakjat, 1951), pp. 9-10; S. Suryaningrat, Het herdenkingfeest van het 10-jarig bestaan den vereniging "Budi Oetomo", 1908-Mei 20-1918 (Amsterdam: Oud en Nieuw, 1918).
3. Timur Jaylani, "The Sarekat Islam: its contribution to Indonesian nationalism" (Montreal: McGill University thesis, 1959); C. C. Berg, "Sarekat Islam," Encyclopedia of Islam.
4. See 'Abdu-l Mu'tî 'Alî, "The Muhammadiyah: A Bibliographical Introduction" (Montreal: McGill University thesis, 1957); Georges-Henri Bousquet, "Muhammadiya," Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam.

the Partai Nasional Indonesia.⁵ The Jong Islamieten Bond⁶ was probably the most well known among the religious groups organized during that period, and the Persatuan Islam was in that tradition.

The founding of the Persatuan Islam was an effort by several Muslims to enlarge discussions on religious topics that had been undertaken on an informal basis for several months. The Muslims involved in these discussions all belonged to the merchant class, and came from three family groups that two generations earlier had immigrated, for reasons of trade, from the Palembang region on Sumatra to the West Java area where they had come to regard themselves as Sundanese, the dominant ethnic group in the West Java region. The two leading figures in these discussions were Hadji Zamzam and Hadji Muhammad Junus. Hadji Zamzam had spent three and a half years studying at the Dār al-'Ulūm in Makkah and then had been a teacher at the Darul Muta'allimun religious school in Bandung about 1910. He was acquainted with Ahmad al-Surkati, the founder of the Al-Irsjad (Guidance) and an early advocate of fundamentalist Islamic thought in Indonesia. Muhammad Junus, while primarily a trader by occupation, was interested in religious matters and had collected a library of works on Islam.⁷

The discussions that led to the founding of the Persatuan Islam centered not so much on actual religious teachings as on the new reformist ideas that were then enjoying considerable popularity on Sumatra, with some following on Java, and on the conflict of these new ideas with the established religious system. They discussed the contents of *al-Manār* (The Beacon),⁸ the modernist Muslim publication printed in Cairo, and *al-Munir* (The Light),⁹ a periodical of similar bent published in Singapore and smuggled into Indonesia. They also followed the debate between Al-Irsjad and the Djamijat Chair (also al-Djamiyat

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5. See Sitorus, Sedjarah Pergerakan Kebangsaan Indonesia, p. 44; J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie (Haarlem: H. D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, 1931).
 6. See J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, "Jeudbeweging--Inlandsche," Encyclopaedië van Nederlandsch Oost-Indië.
 7. Deliar Noer, "The Rise and Development of the Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia during the Dutch Colonial Period (1910-1942)" (Ithaca: Cornell University thesis, 1963), pp. 132-134.
 8. Charles Clarence Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), pp. 180-187.
 9. Hamka, Ajahku, pp. 73, 86.

al-Chairiya), the principal organizations for Arabs resident in Indonesia, concerning status of Arabs among non-Arab Muslims. The issue of Communism, communist infiltration of the Sarekat Islam, and Muslim efforts to remove communist influence from that Muslim political movement also came under discussion.¹⁰

Initial membership in the Persatuan Islam was less than twenty persons; in the early years, activity centered about Friday community prayer when the members came together and on courses of religious instruction given by several Persis members.¹¹ The only requirement for membership during this early period was an interest in religion, and Muslims representing both the *kaum muda* and *kaum tua* factions originally were listed among its members. Prior to 1926, Persis did not espouse modernist principles as an organization, but in keeping with its mixed membership promoted the study of Islam in general terms.¹² There seems to have been an inclination on the part of Hadji Zamzam and others to promote fundamentalist ideas, and there was resentment by those members favoring a traditionalist viewpoint about the development of the Persatuan Islam in the modernist direction.

Ahmad Hassan, who joined the movement in 1924, was the member whose viewpoint gave real format and individuality to the Persatuan Islam and clearly placed it in the modernist Muslim camp.¹³ Ahmad Hassan was born in 1887 in Singapore, the son of a Tamil scholar and a Javanese mother. He received a classical religious education from his father, who placed emphasis on language, and consequently Ahmad learned Malay, English, Arabic and Tamil as well as the usual religious subjects. After completing his schooling, he taught at several religious schools in Singapore and Johore and later wrote daily articles for the *Utusan Melayu* (Malay Messenger) newspaper of Singapore.

10. Ali, "The Muhammadijah Movement," p. 49.
11. Noer, "The Rise of the Modernist Muslim Movement," p. 134.
12. "Mohammedaansche Eeredienst," Indische Verslag (1930), p. 311.
13. Short studies of Ahmad Hassan include: Nawawi Dusky, "A. Hassan: Kenang-Kenangan kita terachir dengan ulama besar ini," Hikmah, Tahun XI, No. 32 (November 1958), pp. 13-15; Roebaie Widjaya, "Biografia--A. Hassan: Pengarang, kritikus dan debat Islam," Hudjdjatul Islam, I, No. 1 (August 1956), pp. 35-41 and Buku Kita, II, No. 5 (May 1956), pp. 195-199; Hadji Tamar Djaja, "Tokoh kita A. Hassan," Daulah Islamyah, I, No. 8 (August 1957), pp. 6-14; and M. Jasir, "A. Hassan: Dokumentator surat-surat Islam dari Endeh," Gema Islam, IV, No. 74 (May 15, 1965), pp. 12-14, 26.

Sometime in the early 1920's he visited Surabaya in connection with the family's batik business and while there had discussions with an Indonesian religious scholar on the issues of difference between the *kaum muda* and *kaum tua*. His father had been inclined toward many modernist Islamic viewpoints, and these discussions in Surabaya apparently struck a responsive chord in Ahmad, so that he subsequently developed a viewpoint that was in basic conformity with the *kaum muda*. He then moved to Bandung, entered the Persatuan Islam, and centered his life increasingly on religion and what he considered to be the defense of Islam.

Ahmad Hassan's religious system emphasized that man's relationship with God depended vitally on the correct interpretation and implementation of religious law. Roebaie Widjaja, writing at a later date, succinctly summarized Ahmad Hassan's religious belief in a biographical sketch.

The life of a Muslim according to the view of A. Hassan is not separated from the laws of Islam [and] as a consequence mankind must value the Islamic life. The individual Muslim must . . . worship *Allāh*, purified from the elements of disbelief coming from outside Islam or from traditions which Islam did not command.

. . . the famous '*ulamā*' and great *imāms* of Islam . . . were only considered "teachers" whose views should not be accepted unquestioningly. For this reason A. Hassan does not follow any of the *madhhabs* of the four great schools. . . however, the opinions of the four great schools are [not] wrong, so long as their viewpoints on a question are not in conflict with the sources of Islamic law (i.e., Qur'ān and *sunnah*).

Life in general, according to A. Hassan, depends on the will [*taqdīr*] of *Allāh*. "If people want to place themselves in a particular place that placing is because of *taqdīr*; if they do not want to be in a particular place that attitude is because of *taqdīr*.¹⁴

This orientation came to be generally accepted by a large segment of the Persatuan Islam, but alienated those members who held the *madhhabs* to be the chief guide for religious life. By 1926 the differences between the two trends within the Persatuan Islam were sufficiently great for a split to occur. The secessionist group, composed of the *kaum tua*, founded a rival organization known as the Permoefakatan Islam (Islamic Association), while the rump group retained the name Persatuan Islam and

14. Widjaja, "Biografia--A. Hassan," p. 36.

declared itself to be a modernist Islamic movement.¹⁵

The statutes of the Persatuan Islam adopted after this split called for "furthering Islam on the basis of Qur'ān and *sunnah*" and for "the propagation and instruction of Islam."¹⁶ Among Persatuan Islam leaders "furthering Islam" generally came to mean scholarly research in religious studies, particularly proper religious ritual and the regulations surrounding such ritual, followed by instruction to the general Muslim public, through *fatwās* and courses of instruction, about the results of that research. Its leaders pictured themselves as a new brand of (*ulamā*) whose *fatwās* would cleanse religion of unauthorized innovation (*bid'ah*) and adapt religious principles to contemporary conditions. The major religious-oriented organizations existing in the pre-war period were not fitted for the role the Persatuan Islam chose for itself. Al-Irsjad, which had a similar purpose, limited its endeavors to the Arab population of the Indies and was plagued for years by internal dissension in the Arab community over the question of Arab prerogatives in the Muslim community in Indonesia.¹⁷ The Muhammadiyah espoused modernist Muslim principles but, during the first twenty years, concentrated on educational and social welfare activities, and it was not until 1935 that attention was given to improving the religious belief and behavior of its members.¹⁸ The Sarekat Islam was almost always more concerned with political activities and gave only secondary attention to the purely religious aspects of the Islamic movement.¹⁹

There was in Persis little emphasis on expanding its membership, and prior to World War II, it remained a relatively small, loose-knit organization. Deliar Noer in his dissertation on modernist Muslim movements in Indonesia stated that the membership of the Persatuan Islam never rose above 300 at

15. "Mohammedaansche Eeredienst," Indische Verslag (1930), p. 311. Usual references on Muslim organizations existing at that time reveal no further information about the Permoefakatan Islam. It is likely that the organization either passed out of existence, or was absorbed into the Nahdlatul Ulama, founded in 1926 by several *kaum tua* leaders in Central Java.
16. Ibid.
17. Van der Kroef, "The Arab Minority," Indonesia in the Modern World, I, p. 257.
18. Muhammadiyah, Panitia Pusat Perajaan 40 Tahun Berdirinja Perserikatan, Kitab 40 Tahun Muhammadiyah (Djakarta, 1952), p. 32.
19. Cf. Jaylani, "Sarekat Islam."

Bandung, but that it was popular in that city and by 1942 controlled six mosques in the city, each serving over 500 Muslims. A number of branches were established by sympathizers in various cities and towns, mostly in West and Central Java, and according to Deliar Noer, the membership of the larger organization was less than a thousand persons.²⁰ The popularity enjoyed by the Persatuan Islam appears to have centered on the religious education the Persatuan Islam offered, on its clear position regarding controversial issues, and on the social contact and entertainment offered by the many meetings, lectures and debates organized by the Persatuan Islam. The reputation of the Persatuan Islam, however, lay less with its organizational accomplishments than with the achievements of its individual leaders. Ahmad Hassan, Hadji Moehammad Moenawar Chalil and Hadji Mahmoed 'Aziz were known for their many *fatwās* on all facets of Muslim behavior. Sabirin and Fachroeddin al-Kahiri edited the controversial *Pembela Islam*, a periodical that attacked and castigated groups holding views contrary to those of the Persatuan Islam.²¹ Moehammad Natsir, often writing under the pseudonym A. Muchlis, expressed a viewpoint that had a very considerable influence on Muslim nationalism in Indonesia.²²

20. Noer, "The Rise of the Modernist Muslim Movement," p. 134. Branches were established at Bogor, Djakarta, Leles, Bandung, Surabaja, Malang, Bangil, Sibolga, Kotaradja and Gorontalo.
21. Hadji Aboebakar Atjeh, *Sedjarah Hidup K. H. M. Wahid Hasjim dan karangan tersiar* (Djakarta: Panitya, 1957), p. 221. There is little biographical material on Hadji Mahmoed 'Aziz, Fachroeddin al-Kahiri and Sabirin.
22. Moehammad Natsir's basic education was in the secular schools established by the Dutch, supplemented with some religion courses. He undertook intensive training in religious subjects from Ahmad Hassan. This blend of religious and secular training probably accounts for writings defending basic Islamic values against the impact of "Western" influences in terms capable of being understood by Indonesians educated in secular schools. His most important articles, including many of those written under the pseudonym A. Muchlis and appearing in *Pandji Islam*, appear in Moehammad Natsir, *Capita Selecta*, ed. D. P. Sati Alimin (Djakarta, The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1954 and 1957), 2 vols. A presentation of Natsir's political outlook appears in Deliar Noer, "Masjumi: Its Organization, Ideology and Political Role in Indonesia" (Ithaca: Cornell University thesis, 1960), pp. 150-152; 171-180. Other biographical descriptions are found in Aboebakar Atjeh, *Sedjarah Hidup Wahid Hasjim*, pp. 217-221; and Parlaungan, *Hasil Rakjat memilih Tokoh-tokoh Parlemen* (Djakarta: C. V. Gita, 1956), pp. 175-176; Sutan Rais Alamsjah, *10 Orang Indonesia*

Hamka (Hadji Abdulmalik Karim Amrullah), noted after Indonesian independence was attained for his exposition of Islam as a social force, was associated with Persis in this early period.²³ Muhammad Hasbi Ash-Shiddiqy, who won some renown for his *fatwā* stating that blood transfusion was permitted by Islamic law, also belonged to the Persatuan Islam during this period.²⁴

It must be noted that many persons belonging to the Persatuan Islam during this period were influential members of other religious, political and social organizations as well. Sabirin was a prominent member of the Sarekat Islam,²⁵ Hadji Moenawar Chalil was a leading member of the Muhammadiyah in Samarang,²⁶ and Moehammad Natsir belonged to the Jong Islamieten Bond.²⁷ This dual membership by many members perhaps indicates that the members regarded Persis as a religious study and educa-

Terbesar Sekarang (Bukittingi and Djakarta: Mutiara, 1952), pp. 83-102.

23. Hamka's major works were written after World War II and attempted to explain Islam in a sociological framework rather than the legalistic outlook of the Persatuan Islam. Peladjaran Agama Islam (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1956) contains his major teachings, which reflect the influence on Hamka of the Egyptian Muslim modernist al-Manfalūṭī. A list of Hamka's major religious works appears in John M. Echols, Preliminary Checklist of Indonesian Imprints (1945-1949) with Cornell University Holdings (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1965), pp. 7-8. In his formative years prior to the war, he wrote several novels (see below, p. 25 and Junus Anis Hamzah, Hamka sebagai Pengarang Roman: sebuah studio sastra [Djakarta: Mega Bookstore, 1964]) and various works of religious subjects. "Kemenangan," Pembela Islam, No. 46 (May 1932), pp. 16-23, expressed basic fundamentalist Muslim beliefs, and "Persatuan," Pembela Islam, No. 34 (September 1931), pp. 2-7, advocated Pan-Islamism. Both articles reflected a viewpoint in conformity with the Persatuan Islam. Some biographical material may be found in his autobiographical work Pribadi (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1957).
24. Muhammad Hasbi Ash-Shiddiqy is perhaps better known for his work on translating and compiling a collection of *hadīth* into Bahasa Indonesia. 2002 Mutiara Hadīts (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1954), 6 vols. His major works are listed in the bibliography attached to this essay.
25. Pembela Islam, No. 34 (September 1931), frontispiece.
26. 'Alī, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," p. 80.
27. Aboebakar Atjeh, Sedjarah Hidup Wahid Hasjim, p. 80.

tional group, and that other groups could be used to attain other goals. The similarity of the religious viewpoints of these members, and particularly the consensus on political matters, seems to indicate that these members took the Persis outlook with them to other organizations, and/or that it was that outlook which attracted them to Persis in the first place.

The composition of Persis membership also shows a peculiar development in Indonesian Islam, i.e., the greater ease with which non-Javanese Muslims accepted a *santri* orientation while Javanese usually remained only nominal Muslims (*abangan*). The organization was founded by Sumatrans; and as it developed, it found its greatest support among the Sundanese. This is not to say, however, that there were no Javanese members of the Persatuan Islam, for there were--such as Hadji Moenawar Chalil--but only that, as in other *santri* movements, non-Javanese elements played the leading role.²⁸

Stress on Education

From the very beginning, instruction in Islam and its sciences was offered at the meeting place of the Persatuan Islam in Bandung, but the courses and classes were operated by individuals or groups of individuals rather than by the organization itself.²⁹ This was an extension of the time-hallowed *pesantren* system in which religious teachers attached themselves to a mosque and taught voluntarily, depending on gifts from the students, and on a rice field or trade for their livelihood. In this traditional system, the student was free to choose his own subjects, and teachers and students would often travel from one center to another to study special subjects or hear renowned lecturers.³⁰

In the case of the Persatuan Islam, Hadji Zamzam, first alone and then after 1924 in conjunction with Ahmad Hassan, gave lectures and talks to adult classes concerning Islamic belief and proper observance of religious ritual. In 1927, and possibly before, classes were also operated for Muslim students studying at Dutch schools; a law of 1915 allowed optional religious instruction to be given as part of the public educational

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28. Robert R. Jay, Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).
 29. "Perkembangan Pesantren Persatuan Islam," Risalah, Tahun 1, No. 1 (June 1962), p. 10.
 30. R. A. Kern, "Pesantren," Encyclopedia of Islam.

system.³¹ In 1930, the Pendidikan Islam (Islamic Education) was founded by Persis member A. A. Banaama, who used Persis facilities to conduct his first elementary school classes. This educational organization, which came under Moehammad Natsir's leadership in 1932, established a MULO (*Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs*--More Extended Lower Instruction) junior high school and a teachers' training school in Bandung, and by 1938, had started schools in five other locations on Java.³² Persis facilities were also used by other teachers to give religious instruction, and some of these came under attack after the split in the organization in 1926, and were charged with giving "opiniated teachings and the viewpoint of the people of ignorance," a direct reference to the *kaum tua*.³³

In March 1936, the educational system of the Persatuan Islam underwent a reorganization to make the education uniform and to regulate the form and standardize the content of the teachers' lectures. A brochure, issued by the school at a later date, stated that "the purpose of the founding of the 'Pesantren' was to produce propagandists (*muballighien*) capable of spreading, teaching and defending and maintaining Islam, wherever they were." The subject matter taught after the reorganization probably changed only slightly from what it had been prior to the reorganization, but Persis leaders were assured that the modernist Islamic viewpoint would be presented in all courses of instruction. Some general subjects and basic science courses were added at this time, but stress remained overwhelmingly on religious subjects. Ahmad Hassan became the director and principal teacher of the new school, and Moehammad Natsir, who had completed a teachers' training course sponsored by the Dutch Administration, served as adviser and teacher. At the time of the establishment of the new school, which was named the Pesantren Persatuan Islam, there were forty students, mostly from Java, but with a few from other parts of Indonesia as well.³⁴

During the same reorganization, an afternoon class was established for elementary school children, both boys and girls,

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31. Noer, "The Rise of the Modernist Muslim Movement," p. 140; Amry Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1942), p. 47.
 32. Noer, "The Rise of the Modernist Muslim Movement," p. 141; *Pembela Islam*, No. 45 (April 1932), inside cover--front and back.
 33. *Risalah*, Tahun I, No. 1 (May 1963), p. 10.
 34. Persatuan Islam, *Jajasan Pesantren di Bangil, Pesantren: Bagian Putera dan Puteri* (Bangil: Persatuan Islam, 1960), pp. 2-3.

who attended secular schools in the morning.³⁵ The director and principal teacher of the afternoon class, which came to be called the Pesantren Ketjil (Small Pesantren), was Ustadz Hasan Hamid, who had formerly been a teacher at the Al-Irsjad school in Djakarta. E. Abdurrahman was a teacher in the afternoon classes. The initial enrollment was about 100 pupils.

In March 1940, the seminary section of the Pesantren relocated to Bangil in East Java, and the Pesantren Ketjil remained in Bandung. The move was apparently prompted by family considerations on the part of Ahmad Hassan who had relatives living in the Surabaya area. A group of twenty-five graduated students accompanied Ahmad Hassan and served as a cadre for the new school. Although the Pesantren was reestablished in Bangil and a new section for girls was added in February 1941, the Japanese Occupation, beginning in early 1942, forced the school to close.³⁶ The course work given in Persatuan Islam schools is discussed in the chapter concerning activities of the organization after World War II.

Publications

The first regular periodical published by the Persatuan Islam, entitled *Pembela Islam* (Defense of Islam), first appeared in 1929, had a circulation of about 2,000, and was properly licensed by the authorities.³⁷ It was intended to be a bi-monthly magazine, and during the six years it was published a total of 71 numbers was issued. Articles appearing in *Pembela Islam* were written either by the members of the organization or by other prominent Muslims, reflecting a viewpoint similar to that of the Persatuan Islam. The primary emphasis in *Pembela Islam* was on proper observance of religious behavior and ritual in the lives of Muslims, and on the role of religion in the politics of the nationalist movement and in international affairs. The magazine was proscribed by the Dutch Administration in 1935 for allegedly slandering the Christian writers of *Belanda A.I.D.* in an article attacking Christianity.³⁸

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35. A., "Pesantren Persis di Bangil," Dunia Madrasah, No. 5 (January 5, 1955), p. 17.
 36. J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, "Moehammadijah," Encyclopaedië van Nederlandsch Oost-Indië.
 37. "Moehammedaansche Eeredienst," Indische Verslag (1930), p. 310. All circulation figures for this and following periodicals are as given in Noer, "The Rise of the Modernist Muslim Movement," pp. 142-145.
 38. Aboebakar Atjeh, Sedjarah Hidup Wahid Hasjim, p. 221.

In 1931, the magazine *Al-Fatwaa* (Legal Opinion [see glossary]) was undertaken in addition to *Pembela Islam*. *Al-Fatwaa* consisted largely of reprints of articles from *Pembela Islam*, transliterated in *djawi* (Malay written in an adapted Arabic script), which was used among Malays of Singapore and Malaya and by some groups in Indonesia. Twenty numbers of this monthly magazine were issued before it ceased publication in 1933. It had a readership of approximately 1000 and was distributed on Sumatra, Kalimantan, and throughout Java.

After 1935, with the closing of *Pembela Islam*, the *Persatuan Islam* issued a new periodical named *Al-Lisan* (The Tongue). The preface of the opening issue in December 1935 stated that the new magazine was to be a continuation of *Pembela Islam* and *Al-Fatwaa*, but would attempt to develop new materials as well; in practice it differed little from its predecessor.³⁹ The periodical continued to appear until the beginning of 1942 when the Japanese Occupation began.

Beginning in 1937 and continuing through 1941, the *Persatuan Islam* Bandung branch published a periodical entitled *At-Taqwa* (Devotion), a Sundanese language publication. This was largely a collection of articles from *Pembela Islam* and *Al-Lisan*, but laid special stress on removing Hindu and pagan observances from religion.⁴⁰ *At-Taqwa* had a circulation of 1000 and was edited by E. Abdurrahman and Qamaruddin. Also in 1937, *Lasjkar Islam* (Islamic Defender) was published, consisting of a collection of leading articles from *Pembela Islam*, and two years later a similar collection of articles from *Al-Lisan* was issued under the title *Al-Hikam* (Wisdom).

An important part of all these periodicals was the *sual-djawab* (question-answer) section in which one member of the editorial staff, usually Ahmad Hassan, but sometimes Hadji Mahmoed 'Aziz or Moehammad Moenawar Chalil, answered the questions of readers on matters of religious importance, ranging from ritual worship to social and political behavior. They were really observing the old practice of issuing a religious decision, or *fatwā*, since religious sources were used as the basis for the decision.⁴¹ The format of the decisions was quite simple. The question was stated, then all of the religious sources employed were written out, first in Arabic and then, after the interjection of the word *artinja* ("its meaning") translated into

39. *Al-Lisan*, No. 1 (December 1935), p. 1.

40. Conversation with Junus Anis, Chairman of the *Pemuda Persatuan Islam*, at Bandung on July 21, 1963.

41. See below, pp. 48-52, for the *Persatuan Islam*'s view on what qualifications and training were considered necessary for issuing *fatwās*.

Indonesian. Finally, the opinion of the writer was expressed. Quotation from religious sources was intended to encourage the reader to study the origin if he was able, and to indicate the original reference, free of translation difficulties. This *sual-djawab* section was not a unique development since similar columns appeared in several other Muslim periodicals of that period. The Persatuan Islam probably developed this form of writing more fully than other groups did, however, and increasing emphasis was placed on these *fatwās* as time passed, even to the detriment of other forms of writing. Readers' letters to *Pembela Islam* indicate that the *sual-djawab* section was well read, and apparently in response to a demand for such decisions, a collection of those *fatwās* appearing in Persis publications was published in several volumes throughout the 1930's under the collective title of *Sual-Djawab*.⁴²

In addition to periodical publications, the Persatuan published pamphlets and short monographs by its own members and other Muslim groups and individuals reflecting the philosophy and viewpoint of the organization. *Pengadjaran Shalat* (Teachings of Worship) and *At-Tauhid* (Unity of God [see glossary]), both subsequently reprinted several times, contained a complete outline of all orthodox *Sunnī* Muslim beliefs, annotated with numerous references to Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth*. Several other works, such as *Kitab Zakat* (Book on *Zakāt*) and *Risalah Djoem'ah* (Book on Friday Worship), were intended to outline a Muslim's religious obligations and describe proper religious behavior. A series of books, notably *Kesopanan Tinggi* (High Civilization) and *Al-Mochtar* (The Digest), outlined Islamic history and glorified the history of Islam, apparently with the purpose of convincing Indonesian Muslims of past Muslim glories and of countering the secular nationalists, who looked to the Hindu past of Java as the golden age of Indonesia. Several books were written to urge reforms in contemporary religious practice Persis members regarded as wrong, such practices as those described in *Kitab Talqien orang wet* (Book of *Talqīn* according to law) which contained an outline of accepted burial practices and was aimed at refuting certain practices condoned by the *kaum tua*. The Persatuan Islam had little to say on economics, but did publish two books, *Kitab Ribaa* (Book on Usury) and *Risalah Pendjawab debatan T. Soelaiman Thojib . . . terhadap Kitab Ribaa* (Book of reply to the debate of T. Soelaiman Thojib . . . concerning *Kitab Ribaa*), to explain fully its own position regarding the question of interest and usury which came under considerable discussion among Muslims in the 1930's because of the introduction of banks, savings accounts, and insurance policies. *Qamoes al-Baja'* (Dictionary of Terms), a short dictionary of Arabic terms in use in Malay, and *Al-Furqan* (The Criterion), a many-volumed commentary on the Qur'ān in both Malay and

42. Sual-Djawab (Bandoeng: Persatoean Islam, 1931-1940), 15 vols.

Sundanese, were the first of several dictionaries and religious commentaries prepared by the Persatuan Islam. Several works, such as a pamphlet written by Sabirin entitled *Poeasa, mengandoeng pendidikan hygiene (kesehatan toeboeh) physiek (tabi'at), moreele discipline (boedi pekerti), psychologie (ruh)* (Fasting, containing the lessons of hygiene, nature, moral discipline and psychology), reflected the concern of Persis members for reconciling religion with contemporary scientific knowledge.⁴³

To facilitate the understanding of religious terms, Ahmad Hassan developed a transliteration system by which untranslated Arabic religious terms could be assigned Indonesian letters which would aid the reader in pronunciation. The transliteration system, although probably not widely used beyond the members of the Persatuan Islam, did correspond in many important respects with a more widely accepted transliteration system developed by A. M. A. Temvang, and, indeed, may have had a considerable influence on Temvang's system.⁴⁴

Persatuan Islam publications filled a need for basic books on religion written in the vernacular. For several centuries,

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43. Ahmad Hassan, Pengadjaran Shalat (Bandoeng: Persatoean Islam, 1935-1937), 4 vols.; Ahmad Hassan, At-Tauhid (at-Tawhid) (Bandoeng: Persatoean Islam, 1937), published in both the Roman and *djawi* script; Ahmad Hassan, Sabirin and Fachroeddin al-Kahiri, Kitab Zakat (Bandoeng: Persatoean Islam, 1934); Persatoean Islam, Risalah Djoem'ah (Bandoeng: Persatoean Islam, 1931); Ahmad Hassan, Kesopanan Tinggi (Bandoeng: Persatoean Islam, 1930), translated into Sundanese under the title Kitab Kasopanan Islam (Bandoeng: Persatoean Islam, 1931); Ahmad Hassan and Hadji Mahmoed 'Aziz, Al-Mochtar (Bandoeng: Persatoean Islam, 1931), 2 vols.; Ahmad Hassan, Kitab Talqien orang wet (Bandoeng: Persatoean Islam, 1931); Ahmad Hassan, Kitab Ribaa (Bandoeng: Persatoean Islam, 1932), originally published in two parts in Pembela Islam, Nos. 51 (October 1932) and 52 (November 1932); Ahmad Hassan, Risalah Pendjawab Debatan T. Soelaiman Thojib . . . terhadap Kitab Ribaa (Bandoeng: Persatoean Islam, 1936); Ahmad Hassan, Qamoos al-Baja' (Bandoeng: Persatoean Islam, 1928); Ahmad Hassan, Al-Furqan (Bandoeng: Persatoean Islam, 1931); Sabirin, Poeasa, mengandoeng pendidikan hygiene (kesehatan toeboeh), physiek (tabi'at), moreele discipline (boedi pekerti), psychologie (ruh) (Bandoeng: Persatoean Islam, 1934).
44. Roebaie Widjaja discusses this transliteration system briefly in his biography of Ahmad Hassan in Rudjdjatul Islam, I, No. 1 (August 1956), p. 39. This transliteration system is outlined in Ahmad Hassan, Edjaan (Bangil: Persatuan Islam, n.d.). See also A. M. A. Temvang, Beladjar Huruf Al-Quran (Djakarta: N. V. Versluiys, n.d.).

works on Muslim law, theology, and mysticism had been written in Malay, but these works were so interspaced with Arabic religious terms--and even entire sections written in Arabic--that they were read only by scholars. The Persatuan Islam leaders sought to widen the readership of religious works by developing a new kind of religious text--one which would be entirely comprehensible to a person who knew only Bahasa Indonesia. Notable in almost all books published by the Persatuan Islam was the search for brevity and clarity. In the preface to *At-Tauhied*, for example, Ahmad Hassan stated that he would employ the *sual-djawab* method throughout the book "in order that the reader not become bored." ". . . the reader will be able to understand, . . . and if . . . not . . . he will not be so bored as not to read it once or twice."⁴⁵ Clarity was achieved by simple sentences, by defining all religious terms used in the discussion, and by avoiding time-consuming lateral problems. The result was usually a clear explanation of basic religious doctrine, comprehensible to the uninformed layman and student for whom Persatuan Islam publications were intended.

Persatuan Islam efforts to write about religion came during a period when there was a great wave of literary activity among Indonesians.⁴⁶ Several literary groups appeared during this period, and a rash of newspapers, periodicals and books were published by the various political, social and religious clubs, organizations and movements. The Persatuan Islam's efforts were a part of this greater activity, and while it produced no outstanding literary works, Persis developed a simplicity of style in its textbooks that facilitated the study of religion in schools and by persons interested in religion. Moreover, the writing of Indonesian religious textbooks had some impact on the development of Bahasa Indonesia, by defining and using religious terms in Indonesian language works.

Defense of Islam

A final aspect of the Persatuan Islam's activity was the effort by its members to defend Islam from what they regarded as threats to the existence or purity of Islam. Consequently they publicly challenged any individual or group who they believed misunderstood, misinterpreted or distorted proper religious belief and practice. The secular nationalists, led by Sukarno, were challenged for refusing to recognize the political role of Islam and for rejecting religious law as national law

45. Ahmad Hassan, *At-Tauhied*, pp. I-II.

46. See for example, Anthony H. Johns, "Genesis of a Modern Literature" in Ruth T. McVey, ed., *Indonesia* (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1963), pp. 410-437.

in an independent Indonesia. The Nahdlatul Ulama was attacked for adhering to classical jurisprudence, and for maintaining traditional views on some matters of ritual, particularly regarding the burial ceremony. The Ahmadiyah Qadriyah was challenged for its stand in maintaining that a prophet existed after Muhammad. Christianity, as has already been mentioned, was bitterly attacked for its belief that Jesus was divine and a messiah, instead of a prophet as Muslims believed.⁴⁷

The Persatuan Islam also debated other modernist Muslim groups whenever their interpretation of particular religious principles differed from its own. Abdulkarim Amrullah, the leading religious reformer on Sumatra was attacked for a particular *fatwā* regarding woman's attire,⁴⁸ and Hamka's novels *Dibawah Lindungan Ka'bah* (In the Shadow of the Ka'abah) and *Tenggelamnya Kapal van der Wyck* (Sinking of the Ship Van der Wyck) were called indecent because they dealt lightly with religious subjects.⁴⁹

Pembela Islam and *Al-Lisan* were, of course, the prime vehicles for conducting polemic, and Persis members, writing under the initials M.S. hit at their adversaries in short, pointed articles.⁵⁰ For example, on the subject of nationalist attitudes toward religion, one particular article in *Pembela Islam* stated: "[Previously] the nationalists did not ever mention Islam, its movements or even its shortcomings . . . but now there is frequent use of . . . Islamic matters. . . . We hope Islam will no longer be used as an instrument for gaining

47. These differences with other organizations are dealt with more fully in later chapters.

48. Hamka, *Ajahku*, p. 167.

49. Hamka, *Dibawah Lindungan Kabah* (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1956, 6th ed.). Roebai Widjaja, "Biografia A. Hassan," *Hudjdjatul Islam*, I, No. 1 (August 1956), p. 38. In general the members of the Persatuan Islam were suspicious of novels, which they may have seen as frivolous. They did, however, recognize Moehammad Dimyatie's *Anak Jatim* (Bandoeng: Persatoean Islam, 1935) as a good novel, possibly because it dealt with the issue of independence and had been banned by the Dutch; Hamka, *Tenggelamnya Kapal van der Wyck* (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1961, 6th ed.). See also, Junus Anis Hamzah, *Tenggelamnya kapal Van der Wyck dalam polemik dengan bantuan H. B. Jasin* (Jakarta: Mega Bookstore, 1963).

50. Many of these short items were collected into a two volume publication. M.S., *Kitab Pepetah* (Bandoeng: Persatoean Islam, n.d.).

freedom, but rather that freedom will be attained for Islam."⁵¹ Similarly, in another article appearing in *Pembela Islam* the following opinion was expressed regarding the struggle between the *kaum muda* and the *kaum tua*: "If we combat innovation (*bid'ah*) which is clearly forbidden by Allāh and the Prophet and clearly causes the destruction of Islam, several Muslim leaders make accusations and propaganda charging that we are splitting the *ummah*. . . If splitting of this type is wrong, then the Prophet Muhammad was the greatest splitter of all!"⁵²

In addition to these short, vigorous notes signed with the initials M.S., letters were often printed which challenged opponents to public debate and which were polemic in themselves. This sort of polemic was well illustrated in the letter from the Islamic Committee of Surabaya challenging Pastor Ten Berge to public debate because he printed an article containing uncompimentary remarks about the Prophet Muhammad. "From these words it is clear that you have a confused viewpoint concerning our reverence of the Prophet Muhammad . . . , or, otherwise you obviously intend deliberately to speak slander and hatred toward our Religion."⁵³

The Persatuan Islam also used the public debate to make its opposition known toward viewpoints it regarded as wrong. In the ten years preceding World War II, Persis had debates with the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Ittihadijatul Ulama on the subjects of *taqlīd* and *talqīn*, with the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan on prophethood and *Nabī 'Isā*,⁵⁴ with the Seventh Day Adventists on Christianity, and with a nationalist leader on secular theories of law and government.⁵⁵ Large audiences attended these debates, probably because they were well publicized by the Persatuan Islam, and because the debates centered on controversial issues then drawing considerable public attention. Ahmad Hassan usually represented the Persatuan Islam in these debates, and proved effective since he was able to formulate arguments using both religious texts and reason to refute the positions taken by Persis opponents. These debates, while of marginal value in reconciling

51. *Pembela Islam*, No. 56 (December 1932), p. 6.

52. *Pembela Islam*, No. 29 (July 1931), p. 9.

53. *Pembela Islam*, No. 32 (August 1931), p. 27.

54. *Pembela Islam*, No. 57 (January 1933), p. 41.

55. Noer, "The Rise of Modernist Muslim Movement," pp. 143-144; Djaja lists a debate between Ahmad Hassan and the Christian scholars Diernhuis, Eisink and Schoemaker, and makes reference to debates with "atheists" in Djakarta and Malang. Djaja, "Tokoh kita A. Hassan," *Daulah Islamyah*, I, No. 8 (August 1957), p. 12.

the differences between the debating factions, did give the Persatuan Islam a forum in which to propound its viewpoint, and Persis--and Ahmad Hassan in particular--gained a reputation for formulating lucid and cogent arguments in defense of modernist Muslim principles. The minutes of these debates were usually printed in *Pembela Islam* and *Al-Lisan*, and several also appeared as separate publications.

Finally, to promote similar activity among other groups in Indonesia holding a viewpoint similar to that held by the Persatuan Islam, editorials appearing in *Pembela Islam* urged that "Pembela Islam" committees be set up throughout Indonesia to counter "threats to Islam."⁵⁶ Persis leadership apparently conceived these committees as being local clubs promoting the study of religion and defending modernist Muslim principles. Numerous "Pembela Islam" committees were apparently founded, but none survived for any great length of time or rose to any position of importance, perhaps because they had no central organization to offer guidance and coordinate a definite program.

56. Pembela Islam, No. 31 (August 1931), p. 40.

CHAPTER III

THE BASIC BELIEFS OF AHMAD HASSAN

Ahmad Hassan was the chief figure in the Persatuan Islam and was responsible for its particular orientation on Islamic questions. Writings of other Persis leaders indicate a basic agreement with his stated beliefs although no one else in the organization expressed himself as fully as Ahmad Hassan did. There is value, therefore, in outlining Ahmad Hassan's religious beliefs and philosophy, for such an outline aids in understanding the criteria that he, and with him the Persatuan Islam, employed in regard to politics, social life and worship.

The formulation of Ahmad Hassan's doctrine and religious belief was not gathered into one work, but was scattered throughout a number of important books, each written for a particular purpose. *At-Tauhid* explained his belief concerning God and man's relationship with Him, and was intended to refute the Christian concept of the Trinity, the worship of saints, and certain animistic practices prevalent on Java. *An-Nubuwwah* (Prophethood) outlined his conception of the Prophet to demonstrate to the secular nationalists and to Christians that Muhammad--and by implication Islam--was progressive and in conformity with scientific thought. *Islam dan Kebangsaan* (Islam and Nationalism) explained his view of man's obligation to God and his fellow man, and was intended to show Muslims the proper role of Islam in public life. In drawing these works together, one risks the danger of emphasizing what is not intended to be emphasized. Yet a look at Ahmad Hassan's basic religious beliefs, *in toto*, is vital to understanding the Persatuan Islam's particular views.

The first section of Ahmad Hassan's basic religious beliefs is concerned with defining the concepts "God," "prophet" and "holy scripture," examining the attributes and purpose of each, and finally presenting evidence for the genuineness of each in the Muslim context. There is no speculation concerning these fundamental beliefs, and his understanding is within the *Sunnī* Muslim tradition and conforms closely with the exposition of basic beliefs made by Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashīd Riḍā. Ahmad Hassan made no attempt to probe into the nature of religion or speculate upon any facet of belief, but accepted those beliefs as genuine and as a necessary part of a Muslim's religious life.

God and His Attributes

Ahmad Hassan approached the study of the nature of God with great reverence. In the introduction to *At-Tauhied*, his major work on the nature of God and man's relationship with Him, he stated that "if the science of religion is viewed as holy because it contains the laws of Allāh, then the science of *tawhīd* [God's nature] is more holy (and indeed there is no real comparison) for its contents concern the attributes of God Who reveals that religion."¹ A proper understanding of the nature of God is valuable to all Muslims, he maintained, so that they may attain a proper relationship with God.² By acquainting himself with the knowledge of God's nature, the informed Muslim becomes aware of His greatness, and of the folly of fearing any creature other than God,³ while improper understanding of God's nature causes man to err and transgress His commands. The worship of saints by Christians and some Muslims,⁴ and the Javanese practice of consulting sorcerers for performing miraculous feats were cited by Ahmad Hassan as examples of an improper comprehension of the nature of God because such acts disregarded God's power, and were contrary to His commands. He concluded that for their own spiritual well-being and eternal reward, Muslims should study and try to comprehend God's nature.⁵

Ahmad Hassan began his discussion on the nature of God with a clear definition of God; a definition acceptable to both modernist and traditionalist elements of the Indonesian Muslim community.

A. Clarify for me who Allāh is?

B. Allāh is God Who creates, sustains and grants sustenance to everything that we see and do not see, that we know and do not know, in heaven, in the air, on the face of the earth, in the earth, in the water and everywhere.

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1. Ahmad Hassan, *At-Tauhied*, p. I. For two studies of this subject by contemporaries of Ahmad Hassan, see Hadji Agus Salim, "Tauhid (De belijdenis van de Enige God)," in *Djedjak Langkah Hadji A. Salim*, ed. Moehammad Rum and others (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1954), pp. 245-256; Hadji Abdul Karim Amrullah, "Hanja Allah," in *Hamka, Ajahku*, pp. 263-277. See also Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt*, pp. 144-148.
 2. Ahmad Hassan, *At-Tauhied*, p. I.
 3. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
 4. *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.
 5. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-51.

- A. Are we able to see Allāh with our eyes or experience His existence with the other senses?
- B. We are not able to know the essence of Allāh with our five senses, and it is only necessary for us to believe on Him through the knowledge of His attributes alone.
- A. What do we believe about Allāh? . . .
- B. We believe that there is no other God than Him, and that He possesses all the attributes of divinity and perfection, as well as great holiness. Regarding His attributes He is not needy, not weak, not submissive and nothing is like unto Him. . . .
- A. Why are we obliged to believe this?
- B. Common sense leads us to believe this, as well as (the words and statements) of Allāh and His prophet, since these godly attributes are mentioned in the Qur'ān and in the *ḥadīths*.⁶

Concerning God's existence and His attributes, Ahmad Hassan put forth a proof long expounded among *Sunnī* Muslim theologians. The very existence of things, he stated, indicates the existence of a God to the reason of man. Man knows, for example, that the plain objects he views in everyday life, such as "a pen, a book, a table" do not exist by themselves, but are the product of the artisan who created them." In the same manner man reasons that there must also be a creator for man, for animals and for all plantlife on the earth. Continuing with this argument, i.e., that all things must have a beginning, Ahmad Hassan concluded that "our common sense is not able to accept the fact that any object could exist without a creator." For example, plants grow from seeds, and seeds come from plants, but at some point there must have been a plant that did not come from a seed. Likewise, in the case of man, Ahmad Hassan queried, "who made the first mother and father, if it was not Allāh?" Carrying the argument to its logical conclusion, Ahmad Hassan stated that after having traced creation to its beginnings any continued speculation leads only to a dead end. The only possible solution is that God is a being, able to create, Who has not been created Himself, and that beyond such a conclusion man's reason is unable to go.⁷

Having established to his own satisfaction that God exists, Ahmad Hassan examined each attribute necessary to life, and maintained that all such attributes must also belong to God

6. Ahmad Hassan, At-Tauhīd, pp. 3-4.

7. Ibid., pp. 4-6.

since not to have them would make God less than perfect. "It is unthinkable that God is not powerful, because one who is not powerful is weak. One who is weak could not be Allāh." In the same way, God must be alive for to be dead is to lack power which is impossible in God. For the same reason, it is unthinkable that Allāh could be plural or multiple, for in a situation where two gods exist one of them would certainly be weak, or their very equality would limit the power of each.⁸

In making rational assumptions on the nature of God, *At-Tauhied* warned the reader not to fall into a trap of comparing human attributes with divine attributes. The nature of God (i.e., His attributes, such as hearing, seeing, living) stated Ahmad Hassan, is similar to that of man; yet, at the same time, the divine and human forms are not identical, and God remains unique and distinct from His creation. The difference is one of degree since man's life is limited, while God is eternal. Man has certain powers, but they are limited in comparison with the power of God that is capable of producing whatever He desires. In the same way, man is an individual, but has an equal in other men, while God's individuality cannot be paralleled. Therefore, despite the similarity of attributes, concluded *At-Tauhied*, "our attributes are not like the attributes of Allāh and Allāh is not like us."⁹

Concerning the age old problem of reconciling God's power with man's independent will, Ahmad Hassan stated that "we all believe that the world and all its contents were formed and created by God."¹⁰ The problem, as he saw it, was whether God knew when He created the world that "we would perform this and that, and whether this and that would happen to us." He rejected the notion that events could occur without God's willing them, since all creation had been willed by God, and therefore, by definition, the will of man as well. Ahmad Hassan rejected the argument that God had created man but is not actively involved in what man does, for if He were not involved, it would mean that God's power was limited, an attribute impossible in God. Rather, Ahmad Hassan accepted the reasoning that events cannot occur without God willing them. All events, he stated in the *fatwā* "Nasib" (Fate), "occur with the will of God. . . . This is called *taqdīr*." In support of this conclusion he cited *An-Nisā'* (Women) 4:78, which states: "Say that everything comes from Allah," and *al-Ḥadīd* (Iron) 57:22, stating: "Naught of disaster befallerth in the earth or in yourselves but it is

8. Ahmad Hassan, *At-Tauhied*, pp. 10, 11, 13.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

10. (Ahmad Hassan), "Nasib," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 12, p. 84. See also Ahmad Hassan, *Pengadjaran Shalat*, II, p. 31.

in a Book before We bring it into being."¹¹

Ahmad Hassan recognized that to accept this particular view of *taqdīr* raised many problems in regard to the purpose of religion and of life itself. "If all these matters occur with the will of God, then why did God send a message, establish Religion and give laws to mankind, whereas creatures perform those commands and prohibitions according to the will of God himself?" He also admitted that there were a number of other difficult problems, such as "sorrow and happiness, heaven and hell" that also appear contradictory to men. Despite this belief that all things are determined by God, Ahmad Hassan gives the impression throughout his works that Muslims are not to allow this belief in God's complete control over creation to lead to resignation and a blind acceptance of fate. He constantly reiterated his belief that man should strive and use his reason to do those things he knew to be right and correct.¹² In *At-Tauhied*, for example, he stated that if an evil man (*ṣālim*) does wrong against a Muslim by attempting to steal his rights, it is necessary to "respond with . . . strength sufficient for achieving the return of our rights." In the same manner when one is unarmed and meets a tiger he runs, but when the tiger is in the village and endangers its members, "it is certain we will respond by building a trap, preparing a snare."¹³ He concluded that "we may not continuously run from the *ṣālim* or the wild beast," but must respond, and that response "may not be with the bare hands, but rather it is necessary that we respond seriously [with thought], strongly."¹⁴ While this description appears only incidentally concerned with the problem of *taqdīr*, it illustrates Ahmad Hassan's thinking regarding man's ability to shape his environment, and how his own efforts affect his own fate in some way. However, when called upon to reconcile complete determinism with his belief in man's ability to change things through effort, Ahmad Hassan would always fall back on his answer that God is always involved; and that when people desire to do something, that desire is willed by God; and when they decide not to do something, that attitude is also willed by God.¹⁵

11. (Ahmad Hassan), "Nasib," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 12, p. 85.

12. *Ibid.* See also his references to reason and *ijtihād* below, p. 49; also Mochtar Naim, "The Nahdlatul Ulama Party (1952-1955)" (Montreal: McGill University thesis, 1960), p. 145.

13. Ahmad Hassan, *At-Tauhied*, p. 48.

14. *Ibid.*; cf. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt*, p. 153.

15. Roebaie Widjaja, "Biografie A. Hassan," *Hudjdjatul Islam*, I, No. 1 (August 1956), p. 36.

Ahmad Hassan's presentation of *qadar* is certainly a weak point in his theological exposition. Unlike many modernist Muslim thinkers, such as Muḥammad 'Abduh who devoted considerable attention to this problem,¹⁶ Ahmad Hassan made almost no effort to explain this thorny problem to his readers. He touched on it only in relation to the power of God, unlike his contemporary Agus Salim who dealt with it in several works and attempted to clarify the problem by examining the problem from the viewpoint of man, nature and society as well as from the viewpoint of God's power.¹⁷ In many respects, Ahmad Hassan's approach is more like that of the conservative Muslim (*ulamā'*) in Indonesia who place emphasis on the predetermination of all things without attempting to reconcile such a viewpoint with the problems it creates.¹⁸ Throughout Ahmad Hassan's works, however, there is the underlying emphasis on action and individual choice--as in the example of the tiger in the village--both marks of the modernist Muslim, and in several works, he implies that eternal rewards and punishments are a result of man's own free choice.¹⁹

Prophethood

The pamphlet *Benarkah Muhammad itu Rasul?* (Was Muḥammad truly a Prophet?)²⁰ was written to point out "that the Prophet Muḥammad is truly a Messenger commissioned by Allāh to guide human beings in matters temporal and spiritual." Ahmad Hassan stated in the preface that he had derived his evidence and proofs from the Qur'ān and *ṣaḥīḥ ḥadīth*, and that the arguments he presents were not only acceptable by faith, but were "actual

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16. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, pp. 152-155.
 17. Hadji Agus Salim, Gods laaste boodschap, De universele godsdienst (Djakarta: Sumber Ilmu, 1937). Reprinted in part in Djedjak Langkah Hadji A. Salim, pp. 257-288. See also Muhammad Hasbi Ash-Shiddieqy, Al-Islam: Tugas Hidup seorang Muslim (Medan: Islamyah, 1952), I, pp. 81-83; Hamka, Peladjaran Agama Islam, pp. 83-86.
 18. Cf. Geertz, Religion of Java, pp. 150-152; Naim, "The Nahdlatul Ulama Party," p. 145. Cf. the official Sarekat Islam view in "Tafsir Program asas 'Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia' (1931) in Amelz, H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto, hidup dan perdjuangannya (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1952), II, p. 19.
 19. See, for example, Ahmad Hassan, Islam dan Kebangsaan, p. 27.
 20. Ahmad Hassan, Benarkah Muhammad itu Rasul? (Bangil: Persatuan Islam, n.d.).

proofs that stand the test of reason and investigation."²¹ In a later revision of his work on Muḥammad, titled *An-Nubuwwah* (Prophethood),²² Ahmad Hassan described first the general attributes and characteristics of prophethood in the tradition of *Sunnī* Islam and then proceeded to outline Muḥammad's life as the fulfillment of these conditions. *An-Nubuwwah* is a highly idealized study of Muḥammad, and deliberately so, for it was conceived as a reply to criticism from many secular nationalists, and from some Christians, that Islam was decadent and hide-bound, preserving a way of life set down by a seventh-century desert ruler.²³ To refute arguments of this type, Ahmad Hassan emphasized those aspects and actions of Muḥammad's life that were unusual for Muḥammad's age but in conformity with current knowledge and reasoning, and cited such instances as evidence of Islam's capability to adapt to, and prosper in, the twentieth century. While adapted to his own style and format, Ahmad Hassan's study followed much the same basic argument put forward by Muḥammad 'Abduh, and later by Rashīd Riḍā.²⁴

In *Risalah al-Madz-hab* (Study on the schools of Muslim jurisprudence), Ahmad Hassan stated that man is unable to know by his own mental capabilities just what God's purpose was in placing mankind upon the earth. To give man an infallible guide, God has sent numerous prophets with holy books to explain the divine purpose and outline mankind's duties, both in relation to God and toward other creatures.²⁵ Ahmad Hassan explained further in *An-Nubuwwah* that the Qur'ān lists twenty-five prophets--although he recognized that this was not an exclusive

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21. Ahmad Hassan, *Is Muhammad a True Prophet?*, trans. K. A. Abdul Wahid (Bangil: Persatuan Islam, 1951), p. 3.
 22. Ahmad Hassan, *An-Nubuwwah* (Bangil: Persatocan Islam, 1941).
 23. H. A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1947), pp. 74-75; Ameer Ali, *The Spirit of Islam* (London: Christophers, 1922), is perhaps the best effort of a modernist Muslim to present the Prophet's actions as compatible with modern values.
 24. See, for example, the presentations in Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt*, pp. 155-161, 201-202. The most complete study of the Prophet in Indonesian by a contemporary of Ahmad Hassan was Zainal 'Arifin Abbas, *Peri Hidup Muhammad Rasulullah*, s. a. w. (Medan: Islamyah, 1952), 3 vols.; cf. also Hamka, *Peladjaran Agama Islam*, pp. 147-201.
 25. Ahmad Hassan, *Risalah al-Madz-hab* (Bangil: Persatuan Islam, 1956), p. 1. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam*, p. 87, comments briefly on this argument presented by most modernist Muslim thinkers.

list and that there had been many more--who were sent to mankind in the past.²⁶ Each prophet was sent to a particular community (*ummah*), but the Prophet Muhammad, as the final emissary who carried the complete message sufficient to guide man to the end of time, had been made a messenger to all mankind.²⁷ Ahmad Hassan emphasized, undoubtedly as a refutation of the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan's belief that their founder was a prophet, that there had been no other prophets--nor would there ever be--after Muhammad.²⁸

Concerning prophecy, Ahmad Hassan noted that it was a condition unable to be inherited, or earned through pious life, and was not to be confused with magic or fortune-telling, which could be learned.²⁹ Revelation³⁰ in its highest form is generally confined to males, but on occasion it has been given in limited form to women as well.³¹ The message entrusted to the prophets through revelation, Ahmad Hassan stated, was always concerned with matters of law and worship. The message informed mankind just what God regarded as good and as evil so that he could give proper emphasis to life and prepare himself for final judgment.³² To protect mankind from committing error, Allāh protected the Prophet Muhammad--and indeed, all prophets before him--from making any wrong actions or statements in matter involving religious affairs. In matters of earthly affairs, and in *ijtihād*, prophets were subject to forgetfulness or able to do wrong, but Allāh did not allow this wrong to stand and admonished them through inspiration or the reminder of other men. If this were not so, it would have been possible for them to have introduced mistakes into religion or even for them to have concealed or distorted the religious message itself.³³

26. Ahmad Hassan, An-Nubuwwah, p. 21.

27. Ibid., p. 16.

28. Inspiration after the prophet Muhammad became limited to good dreams only, according to an *ḥadīth* of Bukhārī. Ibid., p. 5.

29. Ibid., pp. 18, 7, 25.

30. "Wahy," Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam. *Wahy*, and not *ilhām* (inspiration) is the term used by Ahmad Hassan in both instances.

31. Namely to the mothers of Mūsā and 'Īsā. Ahmad Hassan, An-Nubuwwah, p. 4.

32. Ibid., p. 19. "... what is viewed as good by one group of men is not necessarily viewed as good by another group. The same is true of evil. . . ."

33. Ibid., pp. 10-11, 167.

The second section of *An-Nubuwwah* narrowed the range of the topic from prophethood in general to a specific discussion of the Prophet Muḥammad. A highly idealized picture of the Prophet emerged. Short chapters individually described his many virtues and elaborated anecdotes designed to depict his generosity, good will, hospitality, steadfastness, self-control, forgiveness, bravery and trustworthiness.³⁴ The theme that emerged in *An-Nubuwwah* was that throughout his life the behavior of the Prophet was impeccable. His actions differed radically from the customs of the people of his day, for he never "worshipped idols, fornicated, drank alcohol or gambled" from childhood until he died. Ahmad Hassan concluded that this abstention, despite a lack of education and living among people who considered such actions normal, could not have been a coincidence and was more likely due to his having been a chosen instrument of God, protected from intentional and unintentional sin and given a character containing only the noblest of qualities.³⁵

In a parallel argument, Ahmad Hassan stressed that Muḥammad was illiterate in the meaning that he could not read or write and therefore had no access to the scriptures of other religions. He stated further that Muḥammad was never known to have associated with persons of other religions, and was never charged by his enemies among the *Quraysh* with having derived his teachings from those of the Christians and Jews. Indeed, the message Muḥammad revealed was different from that of the Christians and Jews; it criticized the other two religions on many points, and for those reasons could hardly have been an attempt on Muḥammad's part to appeal to those religious groups for political reasons as some Western writers have maintained. Rather the message must have genuinely come from God.³⁶

In a third argument, Ahmad Hassan stated that "in Islam there are several matters that are perfectly ordered, such as worship, culture, society, marriage, trade, personal care, care of orphans, management of education, household affairs, national life, etc., which are necessary for orderly human living." The overwhelming success of this system--so different from the practices of the Arab tribes of that day, certainly not established by any other religion, and achieved only through the Prophet's efforts--could hardly have occurred by accident and must be viewed as another proof of Muḥammad's extraordinary guidance from God.³⁷

34. Ahmad Hassan, *An-Nubuwwah*, pp. 42, 48.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-46.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

As further proof of Muḥammad's genuineness as a prophet, Ahmad Hassan noted that, like other prophets before him, Muḥammad had access to certain secret matters and was able to perform miracles. For example, Muḥammad prophesied the success of Islam and the peace it would bring to Arabia, forecast that many of his tormenters would embrace Islam and become its staunch defenders, and foresaw plots against his own life.³⁸ Among the miracles ascribed to him were cases of healing, destruction of idols, and feeding of multitudes.³⁹ The most spectacular miracle was the *isrā'* and *mi'rāj*, in which Allāh took Muḥammad, both his body and spirit, into heaven and conversed with him.⁴⁰ On this point, Ahmad Hassan differed from most other modernist Muslim writers outside of Indonesia who generally did not emphasize the claim of the Prophet to predict events and to perform miracles.

According to *An-Nubuwwah*, the genuineness of the Prophet's mission is also shown by the great difference between the language of the Qur'ān and the arrangement of *ḥadīth*, both of which came to mankind through the same voice. Ahmad Hassan argued that if the Qur'ān were not from God, but only a creation of Muḥammad, it would not be so essentially different from the style and form of *ḥadīths* as it actually is. "We know, according to the Muslim faith, that the Qur'ān, its words, its arrangements, its composition, its compilation, its contents, its meaning, is from God. As for *ḥadīths* which are related to this religion, then their content and meaning is from God, but the compilation, composition and words are from the Prophet Muḥammad himself."⁴¹

Qur'ān and Ḥadīth

Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* were of great importance to Ahmad Hassan and the Persatuan Islam for the fundamentalist Muslim viewpoint stressed that these sources presented Islam in its pristine form

38. Ahmad Hassan, *An-Nubuwwah*, pp. 197, 199, 203.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 222, 225.

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 233-234. The *isrā'* and *mi'rāj* has been a popular subject for Indonesian Muslim writers. See, for example, K. H. Moehammed Moenawar Chalil, *Peristiwa Isra' dan Miradj* (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1961); Ahmad Hassan, *Sedjarah Isra' dan Miradj* (Bangil: Persatuan Islam, 1949); Hadji Agus Salim, "Tjeritera Isra dan Miradj Nabi Muhammad ḥlm" (Djakarta: Sumber Ilmu, 1935), also found in *Djedjak Langkah Hadji A. Salim*, pp. 207-244.

41. Ahmad Hassan, *An-Nubuwwah*, pp. 166-167.

and in that form could be adapted to conditions and concepts prevailing in the modern world.⁴² Like Rashīd Riḍā, Ahmad Hassan charged the traditionalist (*ulamā*) with having neglected these two sources, and wrongly stressing the interpretations of legalists and theologians. The Persatuan Islam, perhaps more than any other modernist Muslim group in Indonesia, drew heavily on Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* to provide evidence for the correctness of its position on religious, social, economic and political issues. It is not surprising then that considerable space was given in *An-Nubuwwah*--and in several other works as well⁴³--to prove that Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* were genuine, to show that they both were God-inspired, and that they both were suitable to be used as the mainsprings of Islam.

The Qur'ān is unique, Ahmad Hassan maintained, in that it is different from any other writing, and mankind has been unable to produce anything similar or equal to it in either style or content. The Qur'ān itself contains the challenge, made originally to the Arabs--but to all mankind as well--to create a chapter like one of the chapters of the Qur'ān. But until the present age, "there has been none who can take that challenge. And the Qur'ān specified that they cannot and will not be able to do so."⁴⁴

A second indication of the holiness of the Qur'ān, according to Ahmad Hassan, is its appeal to mankind; the beauty of its style has an attraction for mankind unlike the poetry or writings of mortal man. In *Benarkah Muhammad itu Rasul?*, he asked: "Is there any other book which is read and listened to by its followers with such delight and respect?"⁴⁵ Beyond the claim of having an inimitable style, Ahmad Hassan saw two other proofs that bore witness to the Qur'ān's authenticity as a holy book, i.e., the fulfilled prophecies it forecast and its conformity with modern scientific thought. Ahmad Hassan maintained that the Qur'ān foretold certain events that were to occur during the lifetime of the Prophet and subsequently did. In *al-Fath* (Victory), 48:27, for example, it was foretold that

42. See below pp. 137-145.

43. Hadji Moenawar Chalil, *Al-Qur'an dari masa ke masa* (Jakarta and Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1954); see also the comments on these two sources by Hadji Abdulkarim Amrullah in *Pengantar Usul Fiqh* (Jakarta: Djajamurni, 1961), pp. 31-63; the official view of the Sarekat Islam is cited in Amelz, H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto, II, pp. 17-19.

44. Ahmad Hassan, *Is Muhammad a True Prophet?*, p. 52; see also pp. 35-37.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

Muhammad would enter Makkah in peace, even though at the time the prophecy was revealed Muhammad was residing in Madīnah, and there was warfare with the *Quraysh*. In several other places, there are forecasts citing Muhammad's eventual victory over the *Quraysh* and the Jews, and in *al-Rūm* (The Romans), an *āyah* (30:3) accurately forecast a later Roman victory over the Persians.⁴⁶ Ahmad Hassan concluded that since Muhammad was human, he had no way of accurately forecasting such events and that the uncanny accuracy of the forecasts was proof that the Qur'ān was the product of divine inspiration.⁴⁷

Another proof put forth by Ahmad Hassan for the authenticity of the Qur'ān was the claim that it conformed with reason, and particularly with modern scientific thought. He cited an *āyah* in *al-Nūr* (Light), 24:45, stating "and Allāh has created every creeping animal from water: as a reference to modern scientific thinking that all life originated from water."⁴⁸ He pointed to Qur'ānic references to the movement of the earth and heavenly bodies and stated that such passages were consistent with modern astronomical theory, even though these theories were completely unknown to mankind when the Qur'ān was revealed. Similarly, the Qur'ān mentions wind as the carrier of pollen and as aiding in the reproduction of plant life, a remarkable observation since this was not yet realized by humans at the time of the Prophet.⁴⁹ Finally, the Qur'ān speaks of smallpox, or the pest -- in symbolic terms to be sure, but nevertheless with an understanding comprehensible to modern scientific thinking. Since the Prophet Muhammad was an ignorant man, stated Ahmad Hassan, and lived in an age before scientific enlightenment, he could have only received this knowledge that is so in harmony with modern thinking through divine inspiration.⁵⁰

Ahmad Hassan described *sunnah* as "the speech of the Prophet, behavior of the Prophet and behavior of other persons which was permitted by him."⁵¹ In matters of religious affairs, such as worship, prayer, etc., the Prophet's words and actions were regulated by revelation from God and laid down the proper manner in which these religious duties are to be performed. Besides these matters of religious ritual, that is, in matters of personal behavior and in secular affairs, the Prophet was not

46. Ahmad Hassan, *Is Muhammad a True Prophet?*, pp. 37-38.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

49. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 54. Cf. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam*, p. 72.

51. Ahmad Hassan, *An-Nubuwwah*, p. 32.

guided by revelation but regulated his performance by *ijtihād*, or mental exertion, which was considered correct so long as revelation was not sent to change that interpretation. Ahmad Hassan noted that Muslims accepted all the actions and behavior of the Prophet--whether sent by revelation or derived through *ijtihād*--as part of their religion.⁵²

Man's Relationship with God

The second part of Ahmad Hassan's religious belief was directly concerned with man's relationship with God and with his fellow man. Ahmad Hassan's belief concerning God, prophets and sacred scriptures generally conformed with *Sunnī* Muslim tradition, and it is not surprising, therefore, that his beliefs concerning man's relationship with God and his fellow man emphasized the legal obligations of Islam.

In the view of Ahmad Hassan, man's relationship to God, to his fellow creatures, and to the world about him is all regulated by law. Ahmad Hassan stated that law is not a single, all-embracing system, but is actually several different systems, each regulating a portion of man's life. *Sharī'ah* law regulates his relationship with God, commanding him to perform certain actions and abstain from others. *Hukum waḍ'ī*, or created law, shapes the relationship and interrelationship of man with other men and regulates the progress and status of his society. The laws of nature regulate the working of natural phenomena and determine many of man's actions and behavior. Ahmad Hassan believed that it is important for man to perceive the difference between these various law systems so that man would not confuse them in his thinking and behavior, and so that he would know what he is able and not able to do in each aspect of his life.⁵³

The *Sharī'ah*, regulating man's relationship with God, is, of course, the most important of the legal systems regulating mankind, according to Ahmad Hassan. "To worship Allāh," he stated in *At-Tauhīd*, "is to humble oneself in order to perform a task in the manner ordered and desired by Allāh." The purpose of the *Sharī'ah* is to outline the commands and desires of God so that mankind is able to execute them, for without the *Sharī'ah* man has no real way of knowing just what God desires men to do. For this reason, God has given man this divine law,

52. Ahmad Hassan, *An-Nubuwwah*, p. 18.

53. Ahmad Hassan, *At-Tauhīd*, pp. 60, 67-68. This latter analysis is also presented in Abdulkadir Hassan, *U-Shul-Fiqih* (Surabaya: Al-Muslimun, 1956), pp. 20-21.

in the form of the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*, as a guide and a directive.⁵⁴

The *Sharī'ah*, Ahmad Hassan explained, divides all human action into five parts. There are those acts that must be performed and constitute a sin if they are not. There are those acts which are commended with reward by Allāh if performed, but which do not constitute a sin if they are not. There are acts which are neutral, that is, they are neither worthy of praise nor in any way reprehensible. Then there are those acts not pleasing to God, but if performed do not constitute a sin, and finally, there are acts forbidden by God, and if performed constitute a sin.⁵⁵ Beyond this general classification of all human actions, the *Sharī'ah* is concerned with worship, temporal affairs and personal behavior, according to Ahmad Hassan. Regarding these, he explained in *Pemerintahan Tjara Islam* (Government according to Islam), that so far as worship is concerned, the *Sharī'ah* regulates most ritual and order of worship, such as "prayer, fasting, the pilgrimage, burial rites, vows and sacrificial offerings."⁵⁶ These matters of worship in fact make up the larger part of the *Sharī'ah* because they are concerned with rules and regulations that cannot be derived by human reasoning but only through the revelation from God to man.

The temporal aspects of *Sharī'ah* law were broken by Ahmad Hassan into two parts. The first part is concerned with matters that pertain to Muslims alone--marriage, the tax for charitable purposes, inheritance, dietary laws, *jihād*, and everything else relating to these matters--and are not binding on non-Muslims living in a Muslim area. The second part are laws binding on Muslims and on all non-Muslims living in Muslim areas, such as matters of trade, labor relations, contracts, peace accords, wages, associations, legal representation, guarantees, securities, bankruptcy and other legal affairs generally regarded as civic matters. Finally, Ahmad Hassan stated, the *Sharī'ah* furnishes criminal law for all mankind, by listing the manner and amount of punishment for such crimes as "wounding, murder,

54. Ahmad Hassan, *At-Tauhīd*, p. 70. A good analysis of the *Sharī'ah*, its general makeup and its role in Muslim society is found in Joseph Schacht, "The Law" in Gustav von Grunebaum, *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization*, pp. 65-86. See also Mejid Khadduri and Herbert J. Liebesny, *Law in the Middle East* (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1955), esp. pp. 85-112; and Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam*, pp. 85-105.

55. Ahmad Hassan, *At-Tauhīd*, p. 60.

56. Ahmad Hassan, *Pemerintahan Tjara Islam* (Malang and Bangil: Toko Timoer, 1946), p. 8.

swindle, recrimination, drunkenness and fornication."⁵⁷ He noted that beyond such legalistic aspects of the *Sharī'ah*, each Muslim has the additional responsibility, transcending all phases of *Sharī'ah* law, to "promote the good and banish evil" (*nahī anna al-munkar wa amar al-ma'rūf*). This, as a personal function, is one in which every Muslim must be given the widest authority.⁵⁸ Ahmad Hassan concluded that the proper observance of the *Sharī'ah* is important since it marks the believer from the unbeliever (*kāfir*), sinner (*fāsiq*) and hypocrite (*munāfiq*).⁵⁹

Ahmad Hassan explained that beyond the *Sharī'ah* man is also regulated by certain laws of nature, which he divided into two parts, i.e., law acceptable to reason (*ḥukum 'aqlī*), and law accepted by custom (*ḥukum 'ādī*). According to *ḥukum 'aqlī*, for example, "a father must be older than his son" and contrariwise, it is impossible that "a child is older than his father." *Ḥukum 'ādī* is similar to that perceived by reason, and is derived by man "after witnessing a particular occurrence repeatedly, such as 'fire burns' or 'knife cuts.'" These two classifications are concerned with man's observance of natural phenomena, and since Ahmad Hassan gave no criterion for dealing with such law, he presumably meant only to show that it cannot but be observed and is generally beyond man's ability to control. Finally, Ahmad Hassan noted that there is *ḥukum waḍ'ī*, which is created law, a type of law used by nations, societies, organizations and households and includes customary or *'ādat* law. It is a type of law created according to need, and binding on all members of the group holding the law to be valid. Unlike *Sharī'atic* law, matters of *'ādat* may be changed, added to, or lessened according to the desires of mankind.⁶⁰

After having perceived the differences among these various types of law, Ahmad Hassan stated that man is better able to realize the difference between what cannot be changed, what can be changed but should not for religious reasons, and what can be changed depending on current social and political mores. Man must then be aware of the dangers of change, or innovation (*bid'ah*), only in so far as it affects the *Sharī'ah*. In matters

57. Ahmad Hassan, Pemerintahan Tjara Islam, pp. 8-9.

58. Ibid., p. 15.

59. Ahmad Hassan, Islam dan Kebangsaan (Bangil: Persatuan Islam, 1941), p. 1.

60. Ahmad Hassan, At-Tauhied, pp. 61-67. He did note that some variance in *ḥukum 'ādī* was possible for "generally fire must burn, but it can occur that it does not burn," and "there are knives that do not cut" (p. 63). See also Shamoan T. Lokhandwalla and Jan Prins, "'Āda," Encyclopedia of Islam (New Edition).

of *'ibādāt*, i.e., ritual worship, there could be no deviation, addition or omission of the precise order and content of worship as prescribed by Qur'ān and *sunnah*. In a *fatwā* on the subject, Ahmad Hassan clarified this point by stating that "God has stated that He has perfected our Religion . . . and there is no innovation (*bid'ah*) in *'ibādāt*, except that it is wrong."⁶¹

In secular matters regulated by the *Sharī'ah*, Ahmad Hassan stated that there is room for some change in the execution of particular laws, but the law itself is not subject to change. In a second *fatwā* on this subject, he attempted to show just how free man is to amend procedure connected with the *Sharī'ah*.

Now religion has commanded us to learn, to aid people and fight. Then the commanding of the order to learn, give aid, and the command to fight are called commands of *'ibādāt*, but its performance is the way of *'ādāt*, that is, its way may be changed according to time and necessity, in accordance with the knowledge then on earth.⁶²

Thus, while man is generally free to change *hukum waq'ī*, i.e., social and political mores, with impunity, Ahmad Hassan cautioned lest such laws conflict with the *Sharī'ah* which lays down minimum regulations for the proper conduct of human affairs. In *Islam dan Kebangsaan* (Islam and Nationalism) Ahmad Hassan dealt with the possible conflict between these two types of law and warned that whoever does not give proper place to the laws of God (*Sharī'ah*) "on earth and in the Hereafter is a *kāfir*, a *ḡālim* and a *fāsiq*." According to Ahmad Hassan, such a person is an unbeliever (*kāfir*) if he holds that a law exists better than the law of God, a wrongdoer (*ḡālim*) if he makes an unsuitable law, i.e., one contrary to the *Sharī'ah* when one should be made, and a transgressor (*fāsiq*) if "he knows of the existence of the law of God in a particular matter, but somehow, either deliberately or by necessity, judges with laws that were not revealed by God." Ahmad Hassan recognized, however, that the *Sharī'ah* and *hukum waq'ī* were sometimes closely related, that it was difficult to perceive the difference on occasion, and that confusion sometimes resulted among sincere Muslims.⁶³

61. Ahmad Hassan, "Mas-alah membagi bid'ah kepada bahagian," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 7, p. 37. See also a later appraisal of this problem in Muhammad Hasbi Ash-Shiddieqy, "Bid'ah lebih berbahaja dari Ma'shiat," *Hudjdjatul Islam*, I, No. 1 (August 1956), pp. 26-29.
62. Ahmad Hassan, "Memegang ubun-ubun lepas salam," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 3, pp. 23-24; for a general discussion of the relationship between *Sharī'ah* and customary laws see, Reuben Levy, *The Social Structure of Islam* (Cambridge: University Press, 1957), pp. 260-262.
63. Ahmad Hassan, *Islam dan Kebangsaan*, pp. 5-6.

On Being a Muslim

A question of importance throughout Muslim history, and one of equal importance in Indonesia where a considerable portion of the population is only nominally Muslim, is who is actually a believer and who is not. On this question Ahmad Hassan was lenient. In reply to the question "how does an unbeliever [*kāfir*] become a believer [*mu'min*]?" he stated: "[He is a believer] if he believes on Allāh, on the angels, on Allāh's books of religion, on the prophets, on the day of judgment, and on good and bad fortune." He added, however, that it is necessary only for a person to recite the confession of faith (*shahādah*), that there is no God but Allāh and Muḥammad is the prophet of God, to be considered a Muslim by other Muslims. The reasoning for this argument, according to Ahmad Hassan, is that "*īmān* means faith, and faith is in the heart, therefore we are not able to know the heart of anyone. This situation is surrendered to God." Ahmad Hassan pointed out that such practice was in accordance with the practice of Muḥammad--as recorded in *ḥadīth*--who accepted converts to Islam on the basis of reciting the creed alone.⁶⁴

Ahmad Hassan recognized that there are four remaining obligations for Muslims beyond recitation of the creed, namely, prayer, alms (*zakāt*), fasting during *Ramādān* and the *ḥajj*. He also recognized that these four are "important obligations that must be performed by people who have already recited the confession." But even though they are required of all Muslims, not to have performed them does not indicate that a person is not a Muslim; for if such were the case, a person who had not performed the *ḥajj* or given *zakāt*, even though he possessed no wealth, would not be considered a Muslim. Ahmad Hassan concluded that the significance of these four pillars is not like confession in marking the believer off from the unbeliever.⁶⁵

In the same vein, Ahmad Hassan maintained that a person could not be judged an unbeliever unless he undertook some very specific and significant act by which he clearly denied Islam.

Considering a person a *kāfir* is not a small matter. A person who confesses Islam may not be considered a *kāfir* unless he continuously and clearly denies the Qur'ān, the Prophet, any one of the laws of Islam mentioned in religion, [such as] clearly [and unmistakably] worshipping

64. Ahmad Hassan, "Darihal meng-qadla sembahjang," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 2, pp. 43-44.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

idols, paying homage to spirits, or other matters that clearly constitute disbelief [*kufr*].⁶⁶

As for the believer who holds mistaken ideas on religious questions--even if the question is one of belief--he may not be considered a *kāfir*. As proof of this stand, Ahmad Hassan stated that seventy-three persons were mentioned in *ḥadīths* as committing errors in religious matters, and that the Prophet--although reprimanding them for their mistakes--regarded them still as members of his community (*ummah*) and not as *kāfirs*. He also quoted several other *ḥadīths* stating that falsely to accuse a person of disbelief (*kufr*) is to make a *kāfir* out of the person making the false accusation, and concluded his argument on the note that judging a person's religious faith is a matter for God and not for man.⁶⁷

66. Ahmad Hassan, "Meng-kafirkan," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 3, p. 30. See also Ahmad Hassan, *At-Tauhid*, pp. 46-48, for a listing of actions which constitute *shirk* (polytheism).

67. Ahmad Hassan, "Meng-kafirkan," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 3, p. 31.

CHAPTER IV

MODERNIST MUSLIMS AND TRADITIONALIST MUSLIMS

Members of the Persatuan Islam belonged almost exclusively to the modernist school of Islamic thinking and generally followed the religious thinking of Muḥammad 'Abduh as developed by the al-Manār school.¹ 'Abduh's teaching called for a revival of Islam by emphasizing the Qur'ān and ḥadīth as the prime sources of religious law without the accompanying compendia of interpretation that had grown up around them over the centuries. *Taqīd*, or unquestioning obedience to the interpretation and teachings of religious law expounded by the four classical schools of Muslim jurisprudence and their systems, was regarded as the prime cause for stagnation of Muslim religious life and consequently the cause for the loss of Muslim political power in their own lands to the Europeans.² In Indonesia the followers of this modernist religious thought became known as the *kaum muda*, or "young group," because they advocated radical changes in religious thought and practice then existing in the Archipelago.

Opposing the changes advocated by the *kaum muda* and defending the established religious system in Indonesia, was the *kaum tua*, or "old group." The *kaum tua* believed that the truth expressed in the teachings of the great Islamic scholars of classical and medieval Islam--such as Ghazālī, Mātūrīdī, and al-Ash'arī in theology, and the *imāms* of the great *madhhab*s in jurisprudence--did not change. That truth, the *kaum tua* argued, did not ever need to be brought to trial since it was not ever altered by change in time and conditions and was as valid in the twentieth century as when it was formulated. A reexamination

1. The best single source in English for 'Abduh's thought is Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt.
2. This viewpoint became quite popular in Indonesia, and the works of Amīr Shakīb Arslān were quite popular. His book Limā dhā ta'akhkharah al-Muslimūn was translated into Indonesian with the title Kenapa orang Islam Moendoer and appeared in serial form in Pembela Islam during 1932 and 1933. Another translation with the title Mengapa kaum Muslimun Mundur appeared in 1957 with an introduction by Hadji Moenawar Chalil (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang).

of Qur'ān and ḥadīth was not only unnecessary but also dangerous since it could lead to misinterpretation and error.³

Beginning with the efforts of Ahmad Taher and Hadji Rasul at the turn of the century, the *kaum muda* undertook vigorous polemic against the *kaum tua* for defending certain religious practices that the *kaum muda* found objectionable. These objectionable practices included the emphasis on mysticism, adherence to the *madhhab*s, the performance of "unauthorized" ritual, and prayers intended to pass merit to the spirits of recently deceased Muslims. The *kaum muda* marshalled considerable evidence from religious sources, primarily Qur'ān and ḥadīth, supported it with the arguments of the modernist Muslims of the Middle East, and argued it with force and reason to prove the validity of their own viewpoint and to dispute the stand of their adversaries.

There were few leaders of the *kaum tua* in the early period intellectually prepared to refute either the *kaum muda*'s arguments or approach, and it was seldom that the *kaum tua* responded with well-reasoned arguments. To the conservative Muslim, religious knowledge, learned almost entirely by rote in the pondok school, was a matter of faith, was infallible, and not necessarily meant to be subject to the scrutiny of reason. Any attack on any part of the religious system was consequently regarded by the *kaum tua* as denying religion itself, and they responded by charging that the *kaum muda* were unbelievers (*kāfirs*) and blasphemers. The depth of feeling among the *kaum tua* is apparent in an emotional attack leveled against Ahmad Dachlan, the founder of the Muhammadiyah, in which Dachlan was described as a "*Wahhābī*, who had deviated from the path of the *ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamā'ah*, rejected the accepted schools of thought (*madhhab*s), ruined the religion, a *Mu'tazilī*, a *Khārijī* . . . nay a *kāfir*, whose tongue, when he died, would come out two meters from his mouth."⁴

3. Nahdlatul Ulama, Verslag-Congress Nahdlatul-'Oelama' Jang ke 14 di Kota Malang 6-7 Juli 1939 (Surabaya, 1940), p. 19.
4. 'Alī, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," p. 32. Similar in content was the admonishment of a member of the traditionalist Bā 'Alawī group against the works of the Pembela Islam: "Fellow Muslims, beware of the works published by 'Pembela Islam' such as *Al Fatwaa*, . . . which are false, and quote *āyats* out of context. Friends, do not read, accept or buy those books for they lead astray and induce one to become a *Wahhābī* and a *kaum muda*. Whether *Wahhābī* or *kaum muda* we may not approach them or eat with them for they are more wicked than the Chinese and the Dutch." Pembela Islam, No. 57 (January 1933), p. 27.

The modernist Muslims were also given to irrational reply and unsubstantiated fact in countering these emotional outbursts, and charged that the traditionalist Muslims were not only ignorant in religious matters, but were unwilling to change their outlook because of vested political, social and economic interests. The *kaum muda* pointed to the many "conservative 'ulamā' who held positions of responsibility in the Dutch colonial administrative structure,⁵ and to their positions of influence and status in the rural villages, and charged that the *kaum muda* feared loss of these positions and status if they altered their religious views. A terse article appearing in *Pembela Islam* in 1930 followed this line of attack against the *kaum tua*.

Do not trouble your hearts colleagues about those who err . . . [in religious matters] for they collide with the laws of God and the Prophet like the dumb and blind because of their *taqlīd*, because they want money, because they want fame, because of selfishness.⁶

One of the fundamental issues between the *kaum muda* and the *kaum tua* revolved about the use of reason in religious matters. The traditionalist Muslims believed that the human mind was generally incapable of grasping the patterns and intricacies of God's commands without a reliable guide. They maintained that the founders of the great *madhhabs*--who had examined, compiled, explained and interpreted these patterns and intricacies when Islam was still young--had provided such a reliable guide, which needed no alteration. In their system reason was, in general, limited to the application of the *madhhabs'* teachings in the special problems of life in any particular period of time.⁷

5. For the positions of responsibility held by the Muslim learned see the following works: H. Westra, "Custom and Muslim Law in the Netherlands East-Indies," Transactions of the Grotius Society, vol. 25 (1939), pp. 151-167; R. A. Kern, "Pangulu," Encyclopedia of Islam; and J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, "Islam II," Encyclopaedië van Nederlandsch Oost-Indië.
6. Sual-Djawab, No. 2, p. 15. Similar in tone was the following admonition: "There are not a few people writing books, suggesting that it is not necessary to worship, not necessary to fast, etc., and every day these books pass under the noses of the [traditionalist 'ulamā'] on the Religious Council of Preanger, but they all remain sitting.
"Is this the way approved by the *Shāfi* 'ī madhhab?"
Pembela Islam, No. 42 (January 1932), p. 36.
7. "Speech of Kijai Hadji Machfoezh Shiddieq" in Verslag Congress, p. 19; Mochtar Naim, "The Nahdlatul Ulama Party," p. 152; Al-Lisan, No. 5 (April 1936), p. 35.

The *kaum muda*, on the other hand, believed that only the fundamental truths had been set down in the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* and that in every age these truths had to be applied anew to current conditions. The *kaum muda* held that this could best be accomplished through *ijtihād*, which they defined as examining the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* to discover the legal prescriptions and moral teachings contained therein, and through reason, applying them to the contemporary situation.⁸ The *kaum muda* recognized that there was considerable danger in the use of reason, and stressed that reason was only a tool for religious analysis, and not a source of religious knowledge in itself.⁹ To lessen the dangers of error, most modernist Muslim groups insisted that *ijtihād* should be undertaken only by those trained in this science of religious investigation. "A *mujtahid*," stated Ahmad Hassan, "must know Arabic and its sciences (*ʿilm al-tafsīr*, *ʿilm al-usūl*, *ʿilm al-muṣṭalāḥ al-ḥadīth*) sufficient for . . . understanding the meaning and intention of Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*."¹⁰ The Muhammadiyah considered it necessary to establish a council on Muslim law, *Madjlis Tardjih*, which was instructed to "examine the problems of religious law whose solutions is necessary to eliminate confusion in the community,"¹¹ i.e., to prevent its members from adopting unorthodox views because of lack of rational insight or misguided reason.

To the *kaum tua* the term *ijtihād* denoted an unbridled use of reason which they could not accept, and their frequent charge that the *kaum muda* were *Mu'tazilī* was a reflection of their belief that, like the rationalist movement in early Islamic history, the *kaum muda* subordinated religion to reason.¹² The

8. D. B. MacDonald, "Ijtihād," *Encyclopedia of Islam*; Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt*, pp. 191-193.
9. Moehammad Natsir, "Sikap 'Islam' terhadap 'Kemerdekaan-berfikir,'" *Capita Selecta* (Bandung, The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1954), I, pp. 206-229.
10. Ahmad Hassan, *Risalah al-Madz-hab*, p. 6; cf. Abdur Rahim, *Principles of Muhammedan Jurisprudence* (London: Luzac, 1911), p. 119.
11. Pengurus Besar Muhammadiyah, *Anggaran Dasar Muhammadiyah dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga* (Djokjakarta: 1952), p. 30; Ali, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," pp. 52-53.
12. The *Mu'tazilāh* were a theological and philosophical school, originally within orthodox *Sunnī* Islam, who advocated the use of reason above faith. Under the Khalīf Ma'mūn (813-833 A.D.) their preachments on religious doctrine were given the official sanction of the 'Abbāsī state, and all religious leaders refusing to accept this doctrine were subject to imprisonment. After the death of Khalīf

kaum tua maintained that *ijtihād*, although a legitimate device employed by the founders of the Muslim schools of jurisprudence, could no longer be used, and insisted that *taqlīd* was the proper method for determining religious truth. In 1935, however, K. H. Machfoed Shiddieq, a leader of the Nahdlatul Ulama, adopted a slightly different tactic and announced that *ijtihād* was a legitimate practice in researching religious problems. In his speeches on the subject and in a pamphlet issued at this time, Machfoed revealed, however, that his concept of *ijtihād* differed considerably from that held by the *kaum muda* and certainly by the Persatuan Islam.¹³ Citing the study of the traditionalist *Shāfi'ī* scholar al-Maqahādus Sadīd, Shiddieq noted that every Muslim was expected fully to employ his capability to determine religious truth, and that some had the capability of becoming *mujtahids*, while others reached lower levels of competence such as *aṣḥāb al-wujūb*, *ahl al-tarjīh* and *kiai*.¹⁴ At the *mujtahid* level, however, Machfoed differentiated between *mujtahid mustaqill* and *mujtahid muntaṣib* and maintained that it was impossible for Muslims to become *mujtahid mustaqill*, as this class, which has direct access to religious sources, was limited to the first great *imāms* who first began the systemization of the *Sharī'ah*. He stated that Muslims were capable of becoming only *mujtahid muntaṣib*, i.e., those who accepted the principles already formulated by those first great *imāms*, and applied those principles to more practical problems.¹⁵ This approach was rejected by the *kaum muda* on the basis that it attempted to equate *ijtihād* to *taqlīd* by denying Muslims direct access to the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* and insisted on the validity of interpretation set down by previous '*ulamā*'; and this the *kaum muda* would not completely accept.¹⁶

al-Wāthiq, several succeeding *khalīfs* persecuted the *Mu'tazilah*. The *Mu'tazilah* viewpoint on the importance of reason was refuted by al-Ash'arī who used reason and logic in the rebuttal. See Claude Huarte, "Kalam," *Encyclopedia of Islam*; and Melville Patton, *Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and the Mihna* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1897), pp. 57-61.

13. *Al-Lisan* (Extraordinary issue) (December 1935), p. 7; *Al-Lisan*, No. 5 (April 1936), p. 35; K. H. Machfoedz Shiddieq, *Di Sekitar Soal Idjtihad dan Taqlid* (Djakarta: Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama, 1959), pp. 64-65.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 64; the classifications of jurists is given in *Abdur Rahim, Principles of Muhammedan Jurisprudence*, pp. 182-184.
15. Shiddieq, *Di Sekitar Soal Idjtihad dan Taqlid*, p. 64; cf., *Abdur Rahim, Principles of Muhammedan Jurisprudence*, p. 169.
16. *Al-Lisan*, No. 5 (February 1936), pp. 35-36.

The *kaum muda*'s stress on direct access to basic religious sources did not mean a total rejection of religious decisions made in the classical or medieval periods, and they frequently stated that such decisions should be used as an aid in deriving new religious decisions. For example, the statutes of the Muhammadiyah's Madjlis Tardjih stated that all of its legal decisions were to be based on Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*, but that every precaution was to be taken so that rational interpretation not take precedence over the traditional.¹⁷ The Persatuan Islam, like the Muhammadiyah, reviewed the important decisions of past '*ulamā*'--classical, medieval and modern--before rendering a decision on any subject. *Fatwās* issued by members of the Persatuan Islam, although stressing Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*, frequently reviewed previous *fatwās* on subject being examined, noted the differences in interpretation among the '*ulamā*', and listed their own preference given current conditions.¹⁸ This regard for the teachings of past Muslims tended to inhibit any radical departures from past Muslim practices and kept the *kaum muda* essentially conservative despite their emphasis on *ijtihād*.

This difference of attitude between the *kaum muda* and the *kaum tua* was also carried over into their respective attitudes toward the role of the unlearned in religious affairs. The *kaum tua* insisted that the religious teacher is the only qualified interpreter of the teachings on religious law and doctrine, and that the unlearned are obliged to accept those interpretations without question and without further proof.¹⁹ The modernist Muslims, on the other hand, held that while only the learned are capable of authoritative interpretation of religious sources, the unlearned also have a duty to exercise mental effort. The Persatuan Islam believed that those not trained to undertake *ijtihād* might undertake *ittibā'*, whereby a lay Muslim made a religious decision on the basis of the *fatwās* of several *mujtahids*. The Persatuan Islam stated that the lay Muslim undertaking *ittibā'* should secure several *fatwās* from *mujtahids* who listed specific references (Qur'ān, *ḥadīth*, *ijmā'* and *qiyās*) used as the basis for their decisions, and, after comparing such *fatwās*, make his own decision as to which one he would follow.²⁰ Persis writers stressed that the responsibility for the correctness of the decision lay with the giver of the original *fatwā* and the receiver did not sin if the decision was in

17. Anggaran Dasar Muhammadiyah, p. 31.

18. See, for example, Ahmad Hassan, "Gambar," Sual-Djawab, No. 2, pp. 1-3.

19. Al-Lisan (Extraordinary issue) (December 1935), p. 7.

20. Ibid.; Ahmad Hassan, Risalah al-Madz-hab, p. 14.

error.²¹ Machfoed Shiddieq charged that *ittibā'* gave the Muslim little opportunity to look into religious sources, and was certainly below the level of the *kiai*.²² In replying to Shiddieq's argument, the Persatuan Islam stated that while *ittibā'* was not a very learned type of religious research, it did promote individual investigation and discourage total reliance on a single religious scholar.

The *kaum tua* employed a process known as *taqlīd* to determine proper religious behavior for particular situations. *Taqlīd* consisted of research in the accepted law texts of a recognized *madhhab*, and following the decision cited therein.²³ The *kaum tua* recognized the existence of four law schools, *Shāfi'ī*, *Mālikī*, *Ḥanafī* and *Ḥanbalī*, although the *Shāfi'ī* *madhhab* was by far the most widely accepted among Indonesian Muslims. For example, the Nahdlatul Ulama statutes allowed NU members to follow any one of the four,²⁴ while the statutes of the Pergerakan Tarbijah Islam (Perti) mentions only the *Shāfi'ī* *madhhab*.²⁵ The Nahdlatul Ulama stressed, however, that a Muslim had to adhere to the prescriptions of a single *madhhab*--although he was free to choose the particular one he wanted to follow--and could not exercise *talfīz*, i.e., following prescriptions from different *madhhabs* on different occasions usually in order to find the easiest way. The Persatuan Islam, believing that selection among several choices encouraged research by the individual believer, attacked the Nahdlatul Ulama for refusing to allow *talfīz*.²⁶ This stand was consistent with the Persis belief that the *madhhabs'* decisions were useful for comparison

21. Ibid.; the Muhammadiyah did not advocate *ittibā'*, although it did not forbid it. A prime purpose in establishing its Majelis Tardjih was to give guidance in matters of Islamic law so that its members would no longer exercise *taqlīd*, or be tied to the *Shāfi'ī* *madhhab*, and so that its members would be encouraged to exercise freedom in matters of religious law. Kitab 40 Tahun Muhammadiyah, p. 32.
22. Shiddieq, Di Sekitar Soal Idjtihad dan Taqlid, pp. 59, 169.
23. See for example, Abdur Rahim, Principles of Muhammedan Jurisprudence, p. 171; Joseph Schacht, "Taklid," Encyclopedia of Islam.
24. Nahdlatul Ulama, Anggaran Dasar dan Peraturan Rumah Tangga, given in full in Hadji Aboebakar Atjeh, Sedjarah Hidup K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, p. 520.
25. Pergerakan Tarbijah Islamijah, Undung-undung Dasar Partai Islam "Perti" in Kementerian Penerangan, Kepartaian dan Parleментарia Indonesia (Djakarta: 1954), p. 434.
26. Ahmad Hassan, Risalah Madz-hab, p. 12.

and guidance in exercising *ijtihād*, and so naturally wanted access to all viewpoints instead of just one.

The *kaum muda* saw *taqlīd* as blind obedience to outmoded legal prescriptions, and generally centered their attacks against the *kaum muda* on its use. The Persatuan Islam, using the general arguments put forth by other *kaum muda* organizations, attacked the use of *taqlīd* on three different bases--by citing Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* as forbidding it, by refuting the *kaum tua*'s arguments defending *taqlīd*, and through an historical interpretation of Muslim jurisprudence. The Persatuan Islam's challenge to the Nahdlatul Ulama in 1935 to meet and debate the validity of *taqlīd* succinctly summarized the basic Persis arguments on the subject and illustrated how interlocked were the three bases of the attack.²⁷

The statement of challenge to debate claimed that several *āyāt* from the Qur'ān, particularly *Banī Isrā'īl* (The Children of Israel), 17:36, "clearly forbid us to employ *taqlīd* toward anyone." It also maintained that several *ḥadīth* of the Prophet state that accepting the teachings of religious teachers without question is forbidden. The statement claimed that the Companions of the Prophet did not employ *taqlīd* toward each other, and "if they wanted to know a law, they asked [one another] 'What was the law of Allāh [Qur'ān] and His Prophet [the *ḥadīth*] in this instance?'" The statement also noted that the four great *imāms*, whose teachings the members of the *madhhabs* supposedly follow "forbid and condemn people who employed *taqlīd*."²⁸

The Persatuan Islam's historical interpretation maintained that the *madhhabs* had their beginnings about the end of the first century A.H., and that they only arose because of the circumstances prevailing in that period.²⁹ During the lifetime of the Prophet, and throughout the first century, Muslims fulfilled their legal requirements in both "matters of worship and behavior" by referring to the Qur'ān and *sunnah* of the Prophet. At the beginning of the second century, the most knowledgeable group concerning Islam, the Companions, were all dead, and the few Followers (first generation after Muḥammad) who remained were spread throughout the Islamic world. Thus the situation arose whereby Muslims came to accept the decisions of the followers of the Followers (*tāba' al-tāba'īn*) on matters of religious action. Such *fatwās* were always based on Qur'ān and on *ḥadīth* as had been related to the *tāba' al-tāba'īn* by the

27. *Al-Lisan* (Extraordinary issue) (December 1935), pp. 2-4.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3. *Banī Isrā'īl*, 17:36 states: "[O man], follow not that whereof thou hast no knowledge.

29. This historical interpretation is found in Ahmad Hassan, *Risalah al-Madz-hab*, pp. 1-10.

previous generations. The *imāms* of the great *madhhabs*--Abū Ḥanīfah, Mālik ibn Anās, Shāfi'ī and Ibn Ḥanbal--were all within this tradition, as were numerous others whose decisions have not been historically important because they were not recorded. These '*ulamā*' operated under a great handicap since the scattering of the Companions and the Followers during the Muslim conquests also scattered the complete record of Muḥammad's *sunnah*. "It is clear," stated Ahmad Hassan in *Risalah al-Madz-hab*, "that no one of the four *imāms* received the complete *sunnah*, and also that they did not receive the same [material]. . . ." ³⁰ Therefore, according to Ahmad Hassan, the incomplete *sunnah*, combined with the natural tendency by the great *imāms* to err occasionally, account for the differences in the several *madhhabs*. This "historical interpretation" was at odds with the traditionalist Muslim assumption that the entire *sunnah* had been available to all the *madhhabs*' founders. The traditionalist Muslims, when indeed they thought about this problem, saw a line of authority between Muḥammad and the *madhhabs*. There is no record of *kaum tua* response to the Persis "interpretation" as such, but it can reasonably be assumed that conservative Muslims, relying as they did on the line of authority of the *madhhabs*, would reject a viewpoint that suggested that the *madhhabs*' founders did not have the complete message. ³¹

Based on its "historical interpretation," the Persatuan Islam questioned the need for the *madhhabs* when the first three generations of Muslims did not have them to rely on but had direct access to Qur'ān and *sunnah* for solving their problems. ³² The Persatuan Islam argued that the great *imāms* did not mean for others to follow their interpretations blindly, without checking their correctness according to the Qur'ān and *sunnah*. ³³

30. Ahmad Hassan, *Risalah al-Madz-hab*, p. 8.

31. The origins of Islamic jurisprudence has been of great interest--and sometimes a subject of debate--by Western orientalists. The historical exposition of the Persatuan Islam is basically along lines developed by such Western scholars as Joseph Schacht, but does not appear to have been influenced by those scholars. Cf. David Samuel Margiolath, *The Early Development of Mohammedanism* (New York: Scribner Dodd, 1914); Joseph Schacht, *The Origins of Muhammedan Jurisprudence* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), especially pp. 6-10; Gustav Bergsträsser, "Anfänge und Charakter des juristischen Denkens im Islam," *Der Islam*, XIV (1924-1925), pp. 76-81.

32. Ahmad Hassan, *Risalah al-Madz-hab*, p. 33.

33. "The '*ulamā*' of that time, as well as the four *imāms*, continually said: 'No one may imitate us or make *fatwās* on the basis of our *fatwās* before he himself is aware of our derivation [of them] from Qur'ān or *sunnah*.'" *Ibid.*, p. 6.

but that their followers had ignored these admonitions and accepted their decisions as the basis of their own decisions. Increasingly, therefore, explained Persis writers, the learned concentrated on studying the teaching of their own particular *madhhab*, and the source of religious law passed from the Qur'ān and *sunnah* to the pronouncements of the 'ulamā' of the various schools.

The Persatuan Islam maintained that there was no clear reference in the Qur'ān or in *ḥadīth* that ordered the use of *taqlīd*, and cited certain references in those two sources to indicate that *taqlīd* was, in fact, forbidden. *Bani Isrā'īl*, *āyah* 36, stating "Do not follow that which you do not know" was cited by Ahmad Hassan as a clear admonition by Allāh for Muslims not to use *taqlīd*.³⁴ *Al-Tawbah* (Repentance), 9:30, and several *ḥadīths* judged as genuine by Thābārānī and Mālik ibn Anās, were also put forth as similar evidence.³⁵ One particular *ḥadīth* reported the Prophet as stating that if one was commanded to do a wrong act (i.e., follow a *madhhab*) he should refrain from performing it, that he should follow only those who command with the Qur'ān, and that if there was a dispute over any matter, that matter was to be referred to God (Qur'ān) and the Prophet (*ḥadīth*).³⁶ Another *ḥadīth* recorded by Mālik ibn Anās was also used to substantiate the Persatuan Islam's viewpoint.

There remain with you two matters which will not lead you astray so long as you keep hold of them, that is, the Book of God and the *sunnah* of the Prophet.³⁷

On the basis of these references and others like them, the Persatuan Islam concluded that only Qur'ān and *sunnah* had any value

34. Ahmad Hassan, "Bertaqlid kepada 'ulama'," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 1, p. 15. The Qur'ān quote cited in the above text is a translation from Ahmad Hassan's Indonesian rendition. The Pichthall translation of this *āyah* is given in footnote 28 above.

35. *Al-Tawbah*, 9:30. ". . . They [the Jews and Christians] imitate the sayings of those who disbelieved of old. Allāh [Himself] fighteth against them. How perverse are they." The *ḥadīth* recorded by Thābārānī states: "Obey me so long as I am among you and keep hold of the book of God. You are permitted what it permits and forbidden what it forbids." Ahmad Hassan, *Risalah al-Madz-hab*, pp. 21-22.

36. *Al-Lisan* (Extraordinary issue) (December 1935), p. 10.

37. Quoted in Ahmad Hassan, *Risalah al-Madz-hab*, p. 23. See pages 22-24 for other *ḥadīth* cited as evidence against the validity of *taqlīd*.

in making religious decisions, "and nothing else, not the *sunnah* of the *Ṭābā'īn*, the *sunnah* of the *mujtahidīn*, not the *sunnah* of *Ḥanāfi*, or the *sunnah* of *Shāfi'ī*."³⁸

The Persatuan Islam also countered arguments put forward by *kaum tua* to defend *taqlīd*. For example, Persis writers published a pamphlet in 1935 that outlined twenty-one arguments for *taqlīd* and the refutations for each argument.³⁹ For example, the pamphlet took issue with the *kaum tua* interpretation of *An-Nisā'*, 4:59, which admonishes Muslims to obey those in authority over them. The *kaum tua* argued that those in authority included the '*ulamā*', and that to refuse to accept their teachings, or to question the correctness of those teachings constituted disobedience. The Persatuan Islam retorted that the *An-Nisā'* *āyah* was concerned with secular affairs and was limited in scope to rulers, such as "*khālifs*, *radjas*, governors and *amīrs*" and that '*ulamā*' were not included.⁴⁰ The pamphlet also noted the *kaum tua* insistence that *An-Naḥl* (The Bee), 16:43, stating, "ask the followers of the Remembrance if ye know not," was a clear reference to the importance of the '*ālim* and his teaching in religious matters and hence, by analogy, a justification for *taqlīd*. In its response, the Persatuan Islam recognized that the *āyah* did cite the importance of the religious teacher, but noted as well that the *āyah* did not command the Muslims to accept whatever teachings an '*ālim* put forth. The reference, according to the Persatuan Islam, indicated that the '*ālim* was to give an answer based on the Qur'ān and not on

38. Ahmad Hassan, *Risalah al-Madz-hab*, p. 23. This statement by Ahmad Hassan is slightly misleading taken out of context. He did not reject ". . . *sunnah* of the *Ṭābā'īn* etc." as useful for guidance, but in this particular reference is arguing against its use as holy writ, which he believed that the *kaum tua* did through *taqlīd*.
39. This composed the entire contents of *Al-Lisan* (Extraordinary issue) and was also published as a special pamphlet. Persatoean Islam, *Verslag Debat Taqlied--A. Hassan dan H. A. Wahhab* (Bandoeng: 1936). See also, *Al-Lisan*, No. 4 (March 1936), pp. 28-30; No. 5 (April 1936), p. 35. In a mock debate published by the Persatuan Islam, Ahmad Hassan chided the efforts of the traditionalist Muslims to justify *taqlīd* on the basis of Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*: "I want you to realize that the teachers are not consistent in their viewpoint. They are smart enough to become *mujtahidīn* while pursuing the justification for being *muqallidīn*, but they do not want to become *mujtahidīn* to find the justification for becoming a *mujtahid* or *muttabi'*." Ahmad Hassan, *Risalah al-Madz-hab*, p. 35.
40. *Al-Lisan* (Extraordinary issue) (December 1935), pp. 10-11. *Al-Nisā'* 59 states: "O ye who believe! Obey Allah and

his own, or someone's else, speculation and belief.⁴¹ Another justification for *taqlīd* not in the 1935 pamphlet, was presented in 1936 by Machfoed Shiddieq at a lecture summarizing the Indian Muslim thinker Shāh Walīyullāh's *al-Insāf fī Sebāb al-ikhtilāf* (Resolution of the matters of difference)⁴² which pointed out the value of the Companions of the Prophet as sources of interpretation for religious teachings. Shiddieq cited this work as a clear justification for the use of *taqlīd* and the indispensable role of the religious teacher. In response to Shiddieq, the Persatuan Islam pointed out that the book made no mention of the '*ulamā*' as interpreters of religion, but referred only to the Companions' importance as transmitters of the *sunnah*, an importance all *kaum muda* readily recognized.⁴³

The Persatuan Islam's argument with the *kaum tua* was concerned not only with the *taqlīd-ijtihād* dispute, but centered also on certain religious practices condoned by traditionalist '*ulamā*' but considered by the Persatuan Islam and many other *kaum muda* as innovation (*bid'ah*). The Persatuan Islam believed that *bid'ah* in matters of '*ibādāt*' was not permissible, even if the change was seemingly good, since all matters of religious worship had been ordained by God Himself, and man was unable to improve on that system of worship. Persis writers cited the *nīyah*, the reciting of creeds and litanies (*tahlīl* and *talqīn*) during and after burial ceremonies, and the use of Arabic in the *khuṭbah* and the story of the Prophet's birth (*mawlūd*) as examples of innovation in religious matters, and charged that traditionalist '*ulamā*' perpetuated *bid'ah* when they defended these practices. The *khuṭbah*, *talqīn* and *nīyah* disputes are outlined here because they have represented major focal points of difference between the *kaum tua* and *kaum muda* from approximately 1910 until the present. A fourth point, the status of the Arabs among the Indonesian Muslims, was a special point of argument between the *kaum muda* and traditionalist Arab '*ulamā*' residing in Indonesia. While this last point was actually a revolt by Malay Muslims against the status and prerogatives of Arab Muslims in the Malay world, the dispute took place within the framework of the *taqlīd-ijtihād* dispute.

obey the messenger and those of you who are in authority; and if ye have a dispute concerning any matter, refer it to Allah and the messenger if ye are [in truth] believers in Allah and the Last Day. This is better and more seemly in the end."

41. Ahmad Hassan, "Bertaqlīd 'ulama'," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 1, p. 15.
42. *Al-Lisan*, No. 4 (March 1936), pp. 28-30. Cf. M. D. Rahbar, "Shāh Walī Ullāh and Ijtihād," *The Muslim World*, XLIV (1955), pp. 346-358.
43. *Al-Lisan*, No. 4 (March 1936), p. 29.

Khuṭbah

Among the distinct disagreements between the *kaum tua* and the *kaum muda* was the language of the *khuṭbah*, i.e., the sermon given during the Friday community worship.⁴⁴ The standard practice in the Netherlands Indies had always been to read or recite the *khuṭbah* in Arabic; and, if queried, '*ulamā*' would presumably have answered that as part of the ritual of worship it must necessarily be in Arabic. The modernist Muslims, however, maintain that since the purpose of the *khuṭbah* is to inform Muslims concerning proper religious and moral behavior that it should be given in a language understood by the listeners. Many mosques under the influence of the *kaum muda* consequently allowed the *khuṭbah* to be given in the vernacular, claiming that there was no prohibition against it.

Ahmad Hassan reflected the thinking of the modernist Muslims on this subject in two *fatwās* concerning the recitation of the *khuṭbah*. In "Bahasa Chut-bah" (The Language of the *Khuṭbah*), he again explained the important difference between '*ibādāt*' and '*ādat*'. '*Ibādāt*', as ritual established by God, must be performed as the Prophet set it down, and since formal worship utilized Arabic, Arabic had to be used. "*Al-Fātiḥah*, *du'ā*' *iftitāḥ*, *tasbīḥ*, *rukū'*, *tasbīḥ sujūd*" are all included in this category, but other parts of worship, such as individual prayer and *naṣīḥah* (advice) were not fixed by the Prophet, had no exact form, and the language could, therefore, vary for the convenience of the worshipper.⁴⁵ In "Chutbah Bahasa Melayu" (*Khuṭbah* in the Malayan Language), Ahmad Hassan took a rational, rather than a legal, approach and stated that the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* commanded Muslims to "think and understand" and "revile those who do not think and know" when they read religious texts. He stated that the purpose of the *khuṭbah* was to offer advice and allow religious reflection, a state that could only be attained if the *khuṭbah* was understood by those listening to it. The Prophet Muḥammad delivered the *khuṭbah* in Arabic, "because he was an Arab in an Arab land and the people he faced all understood Arabic," stated Ahmad Hassan, and added that there were no references in the Qur'ān or *ḥadīth* commanding that the *khuṭbah* had to be given in Arabic to the exclusion of other languages.⁴⁶

44. A. J. Wensinck, "Khuṭba," Encyclopedia of Islam.

45. Ahmad Hassan, "Bahasa Chut-bah," Sual-Djawab, No. 7, p. 22; see also "Sembahjang dengan Al-Fātiḥah Melayu," Sual-Djawab, No. 12, pp. 58-59 which stated *al-Fātiḥah* may not be cited in Malay during worship.

46. Ahmad Hassan, "Chutbah Bahasa Melayu," Sual-Djawab, No. 4, pp. 4-5.

Ahmad Hassan concluded that the entire argument concerning the language of the *khutbah* was really conditional on the status of Arabic as the official language of the Muslims. He maintained that if it could be argued that the *khutbah* must be delivered only in Arabic because the Prophet delivered his *khutbahs* in Arabic, then it could also be argued that Muslims must speak only Arabic and no other language, since the Prophet spoke only Arabic. Ahmad Hassan acknowledged that while knowledge of Arabic is necessary for study of religious sources, it is not required for everyday usage in Indonesia. He speculated that if a single Muslim *ummaḥ* existed, Arabic would undoubtedly be its official language, and the recitation of the *khutbah* in Arabic would then be logical. In an allusion to the fractionalized situation in the Muslim world and the great obstacles to Muslim unity, he concluded that "in this time, here [in Indonesia] if a person teaches only in Arabic, he will not succeed."⁴⁷

Talqīn

A second specific point of disagreement between the *kaum muda* and the *kaum tua* concerned burial procedure. Muslim belief on death--greatly developed and defined by medieval Muslim theologians--held that immediately after the completion of the burial ceremony, the deceased was visited by the angels *Nakīr* and *Munkar* who asked the deceased questions to determine his real belief and exacted painful retribution if the answers were wrong. While Muslim theologians maintained that the questions posed by the angels could be answered properly only if the deceased had lived a pious life, the practice grew up in Islam of giving one last prompting to the deceased during the burial ceremony by reciting the confession of faith. The practice, known in technical religious terms as *talqīn*, was sanctioned by some 'ulamā' of the *Shāfi'ī madhhab* and formed an integral part of the Indonesian burial custom. The religious official performing the ceremony read or recited the funeral speech in Arabic, and sometimes in Bahasa Indonesia or in the vernacular.⁴⁸

47. Ahmad Hassan, "Chutbah Bahasa Melayu," Sual-Djawab, No. 4, p. 5.
48. For descriptions of the Indonesian funeral practices, see Snouck Hurgronje, The Achehnese, I, pp. 418-434; Clifford Geertz, Religion of Java, pp. 68-76. Geertz (p. 71) has recorded the following oration: "Oh, you are already living in the world of the grave. Do not forget the Confession of Faith. You will shortly be visited by two messengers of God, two angels. (The angels will say): 'O human being, who is your God and what is your religion, and who is your prophet, and what is your religious lodestar, and what is the direction in which you turn to pray, and what

The *kaum muda* generally disapproved of this practice, arguing that it was not commanded in the Qur'ān, *ḥadīth* or in the *sunnah* of the Companions, and charged that it was an accretion, taken into religious practice over the centuries, and hence was an innovation, unacceptable in matters of religious worship.⁴⁹

The Persatuan Islam believed that *talqīn* was a meaningless ritual that Muslims would do well to cast aside. During the early 1930's, *Pembela Islam* and *Al-Fatwaa* frequently printed *fatwās* and other articles critical of the *kaum tua*'s position on this subject which consequently drew heavy criticism from the *kaum tua*, particularly the Bā 'Alawī, the Ittihadijatul Ulama and the Nahdlatul Ulama.⁵⁰ On at least one occasion Persatuan Islam leaders met with Nahdlatul Ulama leaders to debate the validity of *talqīn* as a proper Islamic ceremony. In a *fatwā* entitled "Talkienkan orang sudah mati" (Performing *talqīn* for the dead) Ahmad Hassan stated that "*talqīn* . . . does not exist in the Qur'ān, is not confirmed by *ḥadīth*, was not ever performed by the Companions, and was not mentioned as a valid ceremony by any of the four *imāms*."⁵¹ He stated that all *ḥadīth*

has been commanded of you and who are your brothers.' You must answer clearly and forthrightly; you must not be afraid or startled: 'The Lord Allah is my God: Islam is my religion; Muhammad is my Prophet; the Holy Koran is my lodestar; I turn toward the Black Stone of Mecca to pray; the five daily prayers are what I have been commanded; all Moslems, men and women, are my brothers.' O Pak Tjipto (name of the deceased), you now already know that the questions of the angels do in fact exist, that life in the grave does in fact exist, that the balancing of good and evil deeds does in fact exist, that heaven and hell indeed do in fact exist, and that the Lord Allah will wake each individual in the grave on Judgment Day is a fact as well." See also "Talqīn" in Hughes, *Dictionary of Islam*.

49. See Persatoean Islam, *Boekoe Verslag Debat Talqien antara t. A. Hassan dengan H. Abdoel-Wahhab di Tjledoeng (Cheribon) (Bandoeng, 1932)*; Persatoean Islam, *Kitab Talqien: Djawaban "Persatoean Islam" atas Tulisan t. H. Hoesain Tjitjalengka (Bandoeng, n.d.)*.
50. In Sumatra this subject was of great interest, particularly among the Minangkabaus. The Raad Agama (Religious Council) at Palembang decided on December 23, 1929 that performing *talqīn* for a dead person was permissible because the Prophet performed it. *Sual-Djawab*, No. 2, p. 14. See also G. W. J. Drewes, "Indonesia and Activism" in von Grunebaum, *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization*, p. 294.
51. Ahmad Hassan, "Talkienkan orang sudah mati," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 1, p. 21.

introduced by the *kaum tua* as evidence of the correctness of their position, were considered to be weak by the science of *ḥadīth* examination generally followed by *Sunnī 'ulamā'*, and therefore should not be taken as the basis for religious practice.

In "Mengadjar orang mati" (Teaching the dead), Ahmad Hassan more fully outlined the stand of the Persatuan Islam on the subject of *talqīn*.

. . . We stand on the correctness of what was written in *Pembela Islam* on December 1929.⁵²

- 1) The Qur'ān clarifies that people who are dead cannot be taught anything.
- 2) The *imāms* of the *ahl al-ḥadīth* state that there is not a single firm narrative of the Prophet confirming *talqīn*.
- 3) Imām Aḥmad [Ibn Ḥanbal] said that he did not ever see a person perform *talqīn*, except the people of Syria [*ahl al-Sham*] when Abul Muḥirah died, and that at that time a person came and performed *talqīn*.
- 4) There are no *ḥadīth* that indicate that the Prophet ever performed *talqīn*, or that his Companions, or that the *mujtahidin imāms* did.
- 5) Teaching the dead is not only refuted in Religion, but according to reason it can be seen to be the act of a madman.
- 6) It is according to the Qur'ān that when a person is close to death his repentance is not accepted. If this is true, then how can the teachings of the living to the dead already in the grave have validity?⁵³

Ahmad Hassan also quoted *An-Naml* (The Ant), 27:80, and *Al-Faṭir* (The Creator), 35:22, both of which state that man cannot "create hearing among persons already in the grave," as proof that the deceased can only answer the questions posed by the angels according to the actions of his own life. The dead, he concluded, are unable to be taught or reminded of any religious teaching whatsoever, and he added an ironic suggestion that the traditionalist '*ulamā'*' might better teach the living about

52. *Pembela Islam*, No. 3 (December 1929).

53. Ahmad Hassan, "Mengadjar orang mati," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 2, p. 14.

religion than waste their time in fruitlessly reminding the dead of their teachings.⁵⁴

Niyyah

Another point of contention between the *kaum muda* and the *kaum tua* was concerned with whether the *niat* (*nīyah*), i.e., a short declaration of purpose stated by a Muslim about to perform a required religious act and generally incorporated as part of ritual worship, should be said inwardly or repeated aloud.⁵⁵ The dispute apparently originated on Sumatra about 1910 when Abdul Karim Amrullah declared that the practice of repeating aloud this vow of intention, known among Indonesian '*ulamā*' as *ushalli*, could not be traced back to the Prophet but was an innovation from a later date. Amrullah's opponents maintained that the *nīyah* prepared the worshipper to undertake sincere worship, and in that context was an aid to worship, and hence permissible. Their charges that Amrullah was a heretic because of his stand produced a lively exchange of polemic between his supporters and opponents.⁵⁶

That the Persatuan Islam was concerned with this problem some fifteen years later shows in some respect the slowness of the acceptance of the modernist viewpoint among Indonesian Muslims. The viewpoint of the Persatuan Islam was not different from that of Amrullah, and its efforts were aimed at the large group of traditionalist Javanese '*ulamā*' who disputed the claim of the modernists and maintained that the utterance of the *nīyah* was a legitimate part of ritual worship. Moehammed Moenawar Chalil stated in a *fatwā* entitled "Lafadz Ushalli" (Pronouncing *ushalli*) that the *ḥadīth* used by the *kaum tua* to support their contention was weak, and that several *ṣaḥīḥ ḥadīths* contradicted their viewpoint. On this basis alone, Moenawar Chalil maintained that it should not be performed.⁵⁷

54. Ahmad Hassan, "Talkienkan orang sudah mati," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 1, pp. 19-20. *An-Naml*, 27:80 states: "Lo! Thou canst not make the dead to hear, nor canst thou make the deaf to hear the call when they have turned to flee." *Al-Faṭir*, 35:22 states: "Nor are the living equal with the dead. Lo! Allah maketh whom He will to hear. Thou canst not reach those who are in the graves."
55. G. W. T. Drewes, "Indonesia and Activism" in von Grunebaum, *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization*; see also A. J. Wensinck, "Niya," *Encyclopedia of Islam*.
56. Hamka, *Ajahku*, pp. 72-73.
57. Moehammed Moenawar Chalil, "Lafadz Ushalli," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 8, p. 36.

In another *fatwā*, Ahmad Hassan stated that the practice was condoned only by some 'ulamā' of the *Shāfi'ī madhhab*, but that Shāfi'ī himself had not followed the practice. He countered the arguments that performing *ushalli* aids sincerity by aligning the heart with the lips and was therefore permissible, by stating that "it is the heart that moves the lips, and not the lips that move the heart."⁵⁸ He also rejected the argument that *ushalli* was justified by analogy (*qiyās*) from the example of the Prophet's repetition of *ushalli* in performing the *hajj*, first on the grounds that an *ḥadīth* reporting the Prophet's action was weak, and second, that *qiyās* cannot be used to determine matters of worship. Finally, he countered the argument that it was innovation but permissible because it was a good innovation by reiterating that while *bid'ah* is permissible in secular matters, it can never be incorporated into matters of worship which have been determined by God's clear commands.⁵⁹

Status of Muslim Arabs in the Malay Community

A special problem connected with the struggle between the *kaum muda* and the *kaum tua* revolved about the status of the Arabs in the Malay-Indonesian world, particularly those Arabs claiming descent from the Prophet Muḥammad. This problem was really only an extension of the controversy existing in Islam since the Arab expansion in the seventh century when non-Arabs entered Islam and debate arose as to whether Arabs, as the original people of Muḥammad, should hold a status superior to that of the newcomers. This controversy assumed considerable importance among Indonesians in the first half of the twentieth century because of the sizeable Arabic community--about 71,000 in 1930⁶⁰--and the existence in that community of a large number of persons claiming direct descent from the Prophet.

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58. Ahmad Hassan, "Melafadhkan niat," Sual-Djawab, No. 1, p. 11. Drewes maintains that the practice goes back to the *Shāfi'ī* scholar Nawāwī in the thirteenth century. Drewes, "Indonesia and Activism," in von Grunebaum, Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization, p. 294.
 59. Ahmad Hassan, "Melafadhkan niat," Sual-Djawab, No. 1, pp. 11-12. Hadji Abbas bin Thaha discusses the position of the traditionalist 'ulamā' in an article originally published in Al-Hoeda, the periodical of the Al-Irsjad movement, in 1933. It was reprinted in Malay with the title "Taladfoezh niat" in Pembela Islam, No. 60 (April 1933), pp. 35-39.
 60. Van der Kroef, Indonesia in the Modern World, I, p. 250.

A certain aura of respect and even reverence had grown up around the Arabs in Indonesia--partly because a large number of religious teachers were Arab, partly because the Arabs were more serious about their everyday religious observances than the general Indonesian population and were envied for it, and partly because the Arabs allowed the illusion to grow that the race of the Prophet Muḥammad constituted an aristocracy among Muslims. There was some sentiment for modernist Muslim principles among the *peranakan Arab*, as was evidenced by the success of the Al-Irsjad, but for the most part, the Arab community in Indonesia preferred traditionalist Islam.⁶¹ The chief representative of this conservative viewpoint was the Bā 'Alawī,⁶² a group of *Ḥaḍramī* Arabs claiming descent from the Prophet, who furnished a large number of religious officials in Indonesia. Through such organizations as the al-Djamiat al-chair and the Masjarakat Thaljbīn, this group attacked the modernist Muslims, particularly the Al-Irsjad, and acted as the spokesman for the principle of high status for the Arabs.⁶³

The Persatuan Islam, and more specifically its periodical *Pembela Islam*, was deeply involved in the polemic against the Arabs in the early 1930's, and was in turn a favorite target of Bā 'Alawī polemic and retort. A series of articles bearing the general title "Belief of the Bā 'Alawī concerning their own importance and the dangers of such belief" appeared in *Pembela Islam* during 1933, and outlined the major criticisms of the modernist Muslims toward the views of the Bā 'Alawī.⁶⁴ In general these articles attacked the Bā 'Alawī's adherence to *taqlīd* and rejection of *ijtihād*, its emphasis on the visitation of tombs and consequent approval of saint worship, its insistence that its women not marry except to a *sayyid*, and its belief in the elevated status of the Arab in the Indonesian Muslim community.

The Persatuan Islam repeatedly emphasized its belief that the perpetuation of the class distinctions demanded by the Bā 'Alawī in religion was contrary to Islamic social doctrine,

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61. Van der Kroef, Indonesia in the Modern World, I, p. 270.
 62. For the claims of the Bā 'Alawī to be descended from the Prophet see O. Lofgren, "Bā 'Alawī," Encyclopedia of Islam (New Edition).
 63. A description of this dispute is found in Deliar Noer, "The Modernist Muslim Movement," pp. 99-107.
 64. A., "I'tiqad Al-Ba-'Alwi tentang ketinggian dirinja dan bahaja-bahaja i'tiqad itoe," Pembela Islam, from No. 34 (September 1931) to No. 61 (May 1933).

which the Persatuan Islam claimed propounded equal rights for all men. Persis writers stressed that Islam was a religion for all mankind, and that within religion there were to be no distinctions and prerogatives based on race or ancestry. Ahmad Hassan cited references from the Qur'ān and ḥadīth and stated that the only distinction among believers was in perfecting their worship of God. In one particular argument, he noted his belief that it was contemptible for a person to glorify himself on the basis of his descent. He stated that "if a person feels exalted because of his family, then we answer that it may be considered that there is not a family existing that is not related to prophets," and perhaps even more pointedly that "if a person prides himself that he is an Arab then we remind him that Jews come from the same stock."⁶⁵ In the same vein, an unidentified writer in *Pembela Islam* charged that the Arab insistence on special prerogatives was contrary to the rule of universal equality espoused by Islam. This writer compared the Bā 'Alawī attitude with that of the Dutch in attempting to exploit the Indonesians for their own ends. "The Bā 'Alawī," he stated, perhaps drawing an argument from the nationalist struggle against the Dutch, "are opponents of groups which advocate equal rights and undertake efforts to free themselves of the fetters of servitude." The writer concluded that the Arab opposition to equality was wrong and hinted that it might even be evidence of *shirk*.⁶⁶ Another article in *Pembela Islam* elaborated on the charge of *shirk* by stating that in many cases Arabs, particularly those belonging to the Bā 'Alawī, had attempted to set themselves up as being "blessed" and to make themselves intercessors between other people and God.⁶⁷ This charge, actually more connected with the problems of mysticism and saint worship, is discussed more fully in a later chapter.

The Persatuan Islam apparently regarded *taqḥīl* as a symbol of Arab insistence on status and consequently opposed it. Ahmad Hassan reportedly was compelled by this custom to kiss the hand of an Arab official when he taught at the Assegaf school in Singapore, and later, when he was a daily writer on the *Utusan Melayu*, he wrote an article criticizing the custom.⁶⁸ His

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65. Ahmad Hassan, "Saijid, Raden, 'Arab," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 3, pp. 4, 7. *al-Hujurāt* (The Private Apartments), 49:13, states: "Lo! the noblest of you in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct." *al-Hujurāt*, 49:10, states: "The believers are naught else than brothers." An ḥadīth recorded by Abū Dawūd states: "An Arab is not more noble than a non-Arab unless in conduct."
66. A., "I'tiqad Al-Ba 'Alwi," *Pembela Islam*, No. 58 (February 1933), p. 11.
67. A., "I'tiqad Al-ba 'Alwi," *Pembela Islam*, No. 59 (March 1933), p. 18.
68. Noer, "The Modernist Muslim Movement," p. 138.

thesis in that article was similar to that of the editors of *Pembela Islam* who justified their opposition to *taqbiḷ* on the basis that it was not practiced in the time of the Prophet. ". . . and not ever did they ask a person to kiss their hand, and not ever did people kiss their hand."⁶⁹

The Persatuan Islam rejected the title *sayyid* as having any special religious significance, and generally supported the Al-Irsjad position that *sayyid* could be used in Arabic as a general form of address, similar to "mister."⁷⁰ The Bā 'Alawī believed that *sayyid* was a title denoting "authority, responsibility and property,"⁷¹ and indicated that the person using the title was honored among Muslims.⁷² In 1932 and 1933, Shaykh Muḥammad al-ʿAṭṭās Bā 'Alawī, the Arab representative on the Volksraad, urged that body to recommend enactment of a law limiting use of the title *sayyid* in the Netherlands East Indies to those who already claimed the title. *Pembela Islam* was in the forefront of the modernist Muslim press on this issue and roundly attacked al-ʿAṭṭās's stand.⁷³ Illustrative of the *Pembela Islam* attack was an article written in 1932 which stated that during the time of the Prophet, ʿAlī, his son-in-law, and Ḥasan and Ḥusayn, his grandsons, were never addressed with the title *sayyid*. The article claimed the custom of calling the descendants of the Prophet *sayyid* was a latter day practice, but professed not to know its origin.⁷⁴

Ahmad Hassan, and later his son Abdulkadir Hassan, were particularly opposed to the use of titles denoting religious status, and both refused to use the titles *ḥadji* (*ḥājj*) and *kijai* although qualified to do so.⁷⁵ In a *fatwā* discussing use

69. Saijjid Toelen al-Alawie, "Al-Irsjad in actie?," A letter to *Pembela Islam*, dated March 10, 1932. *Pembela Islam*, No. 45 (April 1932). See the editorial remarks on p. 13.
70. Keng Po 3074 as quoted in *Pembela Islam*, No. 59 (March 9, 1933), p. 27.
71. (non-Arab), "O, itoe tjoema keldai kita," *Pembela Islam*, No. 50 (August 1932), p. 20.
72. A., "I'tiqad Al-Ba-'Alwi," *Pembela Islam*, No. 58 (February 9, 1933), p. 11.
73. (non-Arab), "O, itoe tjoema keldai kita," *Pembela Islam*, No. 50 (August 1932), pp. 10, 20-21.
74. Editorial remarks to Saijjid Toelen Al-Alawi's letter, *Pembela Islam*, No. 45 (April 1932), p. 13.
75. See comments on this subject in Roebaie Widjaya, "Biografie, A. Hassan," *Hudjdjatul Islam*, I, No. 1 (August 1956), p.

of the title *ḥājj*, Ahmad Hassan broadened the subject to include all titles of respect and concluded that "these expressions and names do not harm so long as whoever has the title does not become proud and haughty with the title."⁷⁶

The matter of inter-marriage between Arabs and Malays was also viewed by modernist Muslims as undue Arab concern for status, and consequently this issue became a point of contention between the Bā 'Alawī and modernist Muslim groups. Among the Bā 'Alawī, it was commonly believed that a *sharīfah* (i.e., a title indicating descent of a woman from the Prophet, usually through his grandson Ḥusayn) could marry only an Arab of the *Qurayshī* tribe, preferably tracing his own descent to the Prophet. The Bā 'Alawī also believed that for a *sharīfah* to marry someone not having such exalted antecedents would cast an unfavorable reflection on the status of the Bā 'Alawī, on the *Quraysh*, on Fātimah (the daughter of the Prophet), and even on the Prophet himself. This restriction was not as binding on men, and indeed Arab men frequently married Indonesian women.⁷⁷ In 1933 at least two cases of Bā 'Alawī opposition to particular marriages between a *sharīfah* and an Indonesian received newspaper coverage and produced considerable criticism by modernist Muslim groups.⁷⁸ *Pembela Islam* was very critical of the Arab position on this matter and continually pointed out that the exclusivism on the part of the Arabs was due to an exaggerated belief in their own importance. In a lengthy *fatwā* examining the question of marriage between a *sharīfah* and a non-Arab, Moenawar Chalil noted that Islam did place some restrictions on marrying, but all these restrictions were to prevent marriage between close relatives. Ahmad Hassan stated emphatically that there were no references in the Qur'ān or *ḥadīth* to support the ruling of several 'ulamā' of the *Shāfi'ī madhhab* in this matter. He concluded that marriage should not be based on any such

38. Both Ahmad Hassan and Abdulkadir Hassan have been referred to by others as "kiai," but they themselves have not used the K. H. (*kiai ḥadji*) appellation before their names. This has not, however, been established practice among Persatuan Islam members, for most other scholars in the organization do use the K. H. title.

- 76. Ahmad Hassan, "Titel Hadji," *Pembela Islam*, No. 60 (April 4, 1933), p. 31.
- 77. A., "I'tiqad Al-Ba-'Alwi," *Pembela Islam*, No. 45 (April 1932), pp. 27-31.
- 78. (Moeslim Indonesier), "Perkawinan Sjarifah dengan Indonesier," undated letter appearing in *Pembela Islam*, No. 48 (June 1932), pp. 17-18.

policy of exclusivism that was intended to undermine the Islamic belief in the religious equality of all Muslims.⁷⁹

79. Moehammad Moenawar Chalil, "Halal berkahwin dengan Sjarifah," Sual-Djawab, No. 6, pp. 52-65; see also M. S., "Madz-hab Sja'fii'ie," Pembela Islam, No. 50 (August 1932), p. 21.

CHAPTER V

THE VIEWPOINT TOWARD INDONESIAN RELIGIOUS VALUES

The strength of the Indonesian social system lay in the villages, and there Islam had gained a foothold only by temporizing with many customs that had certain religious significance.¹ It was natural that the Persatuan Islam in searching for a "pure" Islam free of all accretions would oppose these elements of a popular life that it believed conflicted with Islam. Persis opposition never solidified into a major campaign, perhaps because there was no organization identified with local custom that could be the target of propaganda and polemic,² and because the elements that fundamentalist Islam disapproved of were so pervasive in Indonesian life that it was difficult to generate any effective opposition among the Indonesian public. Nonetheless, the members of the Persatuan Islam did take exception in their writings and *fatwās* to specific practices that they believed contravened acceptable religious behavior.

Nearly all *santri* groups expressed opposition to these non-Islamic practices and customs. The Muhammadiyah maintained that superstition, surviving Hindu practices and *adat* contrary to Islam should be eliminated.³ The Nahdlatul Ulama and Perti have always urged the elimination of practices conflicting with Islamic commands and prohibitions. The generally accepted Muslim *şūfī* orders operating in Indonesia condemned many Indonesian mystical practices as heretical. This consensus existed only in theory, but hardly in practice, for the *kaum tua* and the *şūfīs* were very often tolerant of heterodox religious behavior. *Kaum tua* (*ulamā*) maintained their considerable influence over the *abangan* population in many villages because they were willing

1. See above, pp. 5-8.
2. Permai (Persatuan Rakjat Marhaen Indonesia--Organization of the Indonesian Common People) was founded later in December 1945. According to Clifford Geertz, Permai is an *abangan* organization seeking to adjust *abangan* practices with the modern world. See Geertz, *Religion of Java*, pp. 112-118.
3. 'Alī, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," pp. 91, 126; K. H. Mas Mansur, *Risalah Tauhid dan Sjirik* (Surabaja: Peneleh, after 1949).

to tolerate many practices outside the *Sharī'ah*. Some (*ulamā*) apparently believed that such practices would disappear as the *abangan* population became more aware of their religious obligations, and other (*ulamā*) appear to have believed that the inclusion of Islamic recitations and prayers purified many non-Islamic practices having a religious connotation.⁴ The *ṣūfī* orders also adopted a very tolerant attitude toward heterodox mystical behavior although, to the credit of the orthodox orders, many excesses were eliminated as they gained strength in Indonesia.

The *kaum muda*, usually having less contact with the *abangan* population and more concerned with the application of the law than with mystical experience, were uncompromising toward customs and attitudes they saw as conflicting with Islam. Believing that tolerance by the *kaum tua* only diluted Islam and introduced innovation into religious practice, *kaum muda* organizations like the Persatuan Islam directed their opposition against the *kaum tua*. The *kaum muda* were particularly concerned about the use of religious recitations and prayers in non-Islamic rituals and ceremonies and about inclusion of Indonesian custom into such Islamic practices as burial of the dead.

Slametans

The Persatuan Islam generally disapproved of the custom, common to most ethnic groups in Indonesia of giving *slametans*, or communal feasts, to mark festive occasions. The ritual of the *slametan* differed according to its purpose, but an underlying structure always included special ceremonial food, the burning of incense, the recitation of Islamic litanies and a speech in extra-formal language by the host. The *slametan* appears to have some connection with ancient Javanese animism when it probably was a ceremony to propitiate spirits and ward off evil fortune. "A *slametan*," stated Clifford Geertz, "can be given to almost any occurrence one wishes to celebrate, ameliorate, or sanctify."⁵

Birth, marriage, sorcery, death, house moving, bad dreams, harvest, name changing, opening a factory, illness, supplication of the village guardian spirit, circumcision, and starting off a political meeting may all occasion a *slametan*.⁶

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4. Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, De Islam in Nederlandsch-Indië (Baarn: Hollandia Drukkerij, 1913), pp. 41-42.
 5. Geertz, Religion of Java, pp. 11-12.
 6. Ibid., p. 11.

This festival appears to have become confused and integrated with the *kanduri* or *sadakah* (Arabic--*sadaqah*) feast which is mentioned in *Shāfi'ī* books of law in use in Indonesia, to be given at weddings and at other joyous occasions. An important belief attached to the *kanduri* was that it gained religious merit for the host. The food took the form of a gift to the visitors, and, since several poor and destitute persons were generally invited, that portion of the feast given to them was considered to be alms. The religious merit accruing to the host was increased by the recitation of prayers, portions of the Qur'ān and the *dhikr*. As the *kanduri* and the *slametan* became closely identified the religious meaning of the *kanduri* often became obscure, but on some occasions, the feast was regarded as having particular religious significance, such as on *Mawlūd Nabī* and in connection with the burial of the dead.⁷ However, if the religious purpose of the *kanduri* often disappeared, so then also did the *slametan* take on a certain identification with Islam, for Qur'ān recitations, *dhikr* and prayers became an indispensable part of its ceremony.⁸

The Persatuan Islam, like other modernist Muslim groups, rejected the *slametan* because it was tied in with the *abangan's* philosophy of life, his belief in non-Islamic spirits, and his superstitions regarding propitious and unlucky days and numbers. Hadji Moenawar Chalil was explicit in his opposition to the *slametan* and in a *fatwā* on that subject, stated that "performing a *slametan* as it is generally practiced in Indonesia is considered *bid'ah*. . . ."⁹ In a *fatwā* entitled "Selamatan Hamil" (*Slametan* for pregnancy), Ahmad Hassan stated that ". . . from

7. Hurgronje, *De Islam*, p. 31; "Kandoeri," *Encyclopaedië van Nederlandsch Oost-Indië*, II. The use of the terms *kanduri* and *slametan* are somewhat misleading since neither is Indonesian, but rather both are derived from Arabic and Persian. These two titles have, however, come to be attached to the practice of giving festive meals and replaced the older titles of *pesta* and *perdjamaan*.
8. Hurgronje, *The Achehnese*, I, p. 215.
9. Moehammed Moenawar Chalil, "Tahliel dan makan-makan dirumah orang kematian," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 5, p. 37. Moenawar Chalil's argument was actually less concerned with the religious implications than with the serious financial repercussions on persons holding slametans: ". . . and this particular type of *bid'ah* sometimes ruins people who are not well to do, for sometimes they sell their belongings, or place them in pawn, or borrow money to hold a *slametan*, and consequently they go into debt and become poor. Truly sound reasoning tells us that people in debt should not increase debts, but should be happy to liquidate their indebtedness."

conception until birth, there is not a single type of *kanduri*, *slametan*, *pesta* or *perdjamaian* [all feast ceremonies regulated by (*adat*)] that is established by Religion." He stated that Islam commands a feast to be observed at marriage but maintained that the practice of reciting litanies and confessions of faith is not condoned. Ahmad Hassan's *fatwā* also stated that on the seventh day after the birth of a child, Muslims are commanded to make a sacrifice, name the child, and then may make a feast for the immediate family from the meat of the sacrifice. "In this matter there is never a reading of the *selamat* prayer, the *tahlīl*, or the reading of the *berzandji* or anything else."¹⁰

All members of the Persatuan Islam objected strongly to the *slametan* held at a house of mourning on the day of the burial, and on several succeeding days, to recite special prayers for the redemption of the deceased. Usual Indonesian practice was to meet in the house of the deceased immediately after the burial ceremony, and again on the third, seventh, fortieth, one hundredth and one thousandth day after the death.¹¹ The rationale for this practice was that religious merit could be generated by those present through the performance of non-obligatory worship, such as repetition of the *dhikr*, recitations from the Qur'ān and special prayers, and that the merit gained thereby could then be made over to the deceased for his reward.¹²

The *kaum tua* generally insisted that the *slametans* connected with death were a proper religious observance, and cited several *ḥadīth* and references from books of jurisprudence to defend their stand. For example, in 1934 the traditionalist Muslim periodical *Kewadjiban Kita* (Our Obligations) cited an *ḥadīth* stating that on one occasion the Prophet went to the home of the bereaved after a burial and ate food there prepared by the household members.¹³ On the basis of this *ḥadīth*, the Islamic Council at Samalangka, Atjeh later issued a *fatwā* stating that gatherings and eating in the house of the deceased was permissible. In a *fatwā* entitled "Makan-makan di rumah orang

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10. Ahmad Hassan, "Selamatan Hamil," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 7, p. 7.
 11. Geertz, *Religion of Java*, pp. 71-72; "Darihal makan-makan dirumah orang mati," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 12, p. 33; Hurgronje, *The Achehnese*, I, p. 429. The practice is followed in different form in many other Muslim countries. See Maurice Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Muslim Institutions*, trans. John D. MacGregor (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1950), p. 173.
 12. Hurgronje, *The Achehnese*, I, p. 428.
 13. "Darihal makan-makan dirumwah orang mati," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 12, pp. 29-30.

mati dan batas terlarangnja" (Eating in the house of the deceased and the limitations of the prohibition), Ahmad Hassan countered the Atjehnese *fatwā* by stating that on one occasion after a death in the community, the Prophet commanded neighbors to prepare food for the mourners on the day of the burial. Ahmad Hassan noted that this act of the Prophet was contrary to the usual Indonesian practice and stated that the Prophet had ordered it out of consideration for the deceased's family at a time when their grief made normal household functions difficult. Ahmad Hassan rejected as weak the *ḥadīth* presented by the *kaum tua* in defense of their position because of a fault in the *sanad* that was not strengthened by another *ḥadīth*. He stated that, in his own opinion, the family of the deceased should be left alone with its grief for several days and that the neighbors should prepare food for them up to three days, depending on the sorrow caused by the death of the deceased, but that no *slametan* should be held at that time.¹⁴

Although opposed to the *slametan* on all occasions, Ahmad Hassan was most concerned with religious recitations and prayers at the death *slametans* intended to aid the deceased. Conservative (*ulamā*) maintained that non-obligatory prayers to obtain merit for the deceased at those gatherings was justified on the basis of several *ḥadīth* that indicate that a young man could undertake the *ḥajj* or the fast in the name of an older person unable to perform these religious requirements himself. They reasoned that other matters of religious merit might likewise be transferred. Ahmad Hassan denied that the practice of praying and reciting religious texts at the *slametan* had any historical justification. In a *fatwā* on the subject, he stated that neither the Qur'ān nor *ḥadīth* commanded Muslims to engage in this practice, and that it was never performed by the Companions, by the Followers, by followers of the Followers, or by any of the four great *imāms*.¹⁵ In another *fatwā*, an unknown Persis writer quoted the *fatwās* of prominent Makkah *muftīs* as confirming this stand.¹⁶ Ahmad Hassan also rejected the contention that merit obtained by one Muslim could under any circumstances be transferred to another Muslim, and particularly to the deceased. He stated that there was no clear reference in the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* to this problem and maintained that, in order for a specific practice of religious worship to have merit, it must be defined in those sources. ". . . Every reading and action may be said to be good if it is performed according to the time and conditions defined by Religion." Since there is no

14. Ahmad Hassan, "Makan-makan dirumah orang mati dan batas terlarangnja," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 8, pp. 64-66.

15. Ahmad Hassan, "Tahliel," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 8, pp. 62-63.

16. "Darihal makan-makan dirumah orang mati," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 12, pp. 32-33.

set procedure of worship prescribed for performance in the house of the bereaved, such action cannot be regarded as producing merit for those who perform the practice. Ahmad Hassan also denied that merit could be passed to the dead, stating that reason impels one to realize that only one's own actions can cleanse him from his sins. In a rhetorical question, he queried that if it were possible to transfer merit from one person to another, why then did Allāh make worship compulsory at all since He could have transferred it from anyone who had it to anyone who needed it without any worship having been performed at all? He argued further that if merit could be transferred to the dead, why not also to the living?¹⁷ Finally, he cited *Al-Najm* (The Star), 53:39 and *Yā Sīn* (Oh Man), 36:54, both of which make reference to God's judging only on the basis of that which the individual himself has done.¹⁸

Magic, Soothsaying and Amulets

The Persatuan Islam saw the belief in magic, soothsaying and amulets, so popular in Indonesia, as evidence of *shirk* (i.e., ascribing the powers of God to other than God), since these practices ascribed to certain men the power to alter and affect men's lives in a manner it believed only God was powerful enough to accomplish. The focal point of the Indonesian belief in magic are the *dukuns*, the practitioners of magic who claim to possess secret power and who perform a large variety of functions ranging from the treatment of illness with herbs and native medicine to the casting of spells for good and bad fortune.¹⁹ The *dukuns* do not usually claim to be connected with

17. Ahmad Hassan, "Tahlil," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 8, pp. 63-64.
18. Ahmad Hassan, "Tahlil dan Chandoeri," *Pembela Islam*, No. 59 (March 9, 1933), p. 39. *Al-Najm*, 53:39, states: "And that man hath only that for which he maketh effort." *Yā Sīn*, 36:54 (Pickthall translation 53), states: "Nor are ye requited aught save what ye used to do."
19. There are various kinds of *dukuns*, bearing titles according to their sphere of activity and their manner of approach. There are midwives, masseurs, mediums, circumcisors, harvest ritual specialists, wedding specialists, experts in numerical divination, sorcerers, specialists who cure by inserting golden needles under the skin, curers who rely on spells, curers who employ herbs and other native medicines, specialists in preventing natural misfortune, and curers whose powers are temporary and result of their having been entered by a spirit. Geertz, *Religion of Java*, pp. 86-87; cf., K. H. Mas Mansur, *Risalah Tauhid dan Sjikrik*, pp. 43-61, who, as Muhammadiyah leader undertook an active campaign to remove the influence of the *dukun* among Indonesian Muslims.

Islam, and they seldom have any contact with traditionalist religious officials; yet they do not exclude the use of Arabic phrases and terminology from their ritual and mystical formulae. This inclusion of religious terminology leads many persons to believe, and many others to rationalize, that the magic practiced by *dukuns* does indeed have some connection with religion.

In *At-Tauhied*, Ahmad Hassan warned Muslims not to invoke secret oaths and curses meant to harm and cause loss to other persons and their possessions. In this obvious attack on the *dukuns*, he also warned Muslims not to ask the aid of "creatures and objects believed to have miraculous power," for such favors as "asking for a child, asking to be liked by people, asking to become rich." He clarified that there was no harm in wanting those things, which he regarded as natural human desires, but maintained that such requests should be asked only of God and that to ask them of other "creatures and objects" was to place such "creatures and objects" on a par with God. Ahmad Hassan pointedly stated that any person who made such a comparison was an idolator (*mushrik*), and that his very standing as a Muslim and a believer was in jeopardy.²⁰

Hadji Moenawar Chalil, in a *fatwā* on a related subject, admonished Muslims not to confuse the practices of the *dukuns*, particularly in regard to amulets, with proper religious behavior. He stressed that even though the *dukun* attempted to associate amulets with Islam by including Qur'ānic texts and religious phrases, such practices had no religious foundation whatsoever and were to be disregarded as a means of obtaining spiritual aid. Moenawar Chalil warned particularly against the practice of reciting a portion of *Sūrah Yā Sīn* before a container of water and then using the water as a medicine to cure a sick person.²¹ Hadji Mahmood 'Aziz agreed with Moenawar Chalil and particularly cited "amulets, charms and blessed objects" as being in the category which constitute *shirk*.²²

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20. Ahmad Hassan, *At-Tauhied*, pp. 48-49. "Not a few people in Indonesia ask favors at graves which are considered to be holy, so also there are those who ask favors of guns, stones, wood, etc." (p. 51).
 21. Moehammad Moenawar Chalil, "Air Jaa-sien," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 3, pp. 39-41. "*Santris* [i.e., *dukuns* who claim to be *santris*] usually employ changed passages from the Koran interpreted mystically, or magic bits of carefully drawn Arabic script chewed up and swallowed, or the like; and some *santris* claim that whatever curing 'real Moslems' do is based on scientific medical knowledge included in the Koran hundreds of years before it was 'discovered' in the West." Geertz, *Religion of Java*, p. 87.
 22. Hadji Mahmood 'Aziz, "Tachijul, 'Azimah, Keramat," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 4, pp. 25-26.

Mystical Practices

Mystical practice, such as the trance-state, and the repetition of formulae intended to induce the trance-state, has a long history on Java and in several other Indonesian areas. Shamanistic practices preceded Islam in the Archipelago, influenced and were influenced by Buddhism and Hinduism during the dominance of these two religions in the Malay area, and in turn accepted concepts and contributed to Muslim mystical practices when Islam finally arrived. A large number of Muslim brotherhoods have existed in Indonesia--the Naqshabandīyah, the Shaṭṭarīyah, the Qādirīyah and the Tijānīyah--representing the mainstream of Muslim mystical practice. A large number of heterodox orders that mix Islamic *ṣūfī* practices with Buddhist, Christian and shamanistic practices have also come into existence, while practitioners of magic, the *dukuns*, also use trance-states and repetition of formulae as part of their ritual.²³ These *dukuns* are eclectic and they select those practices, regardless of the source, that appear to strengthen their magical powers and aid them in affecting cures, predicting future events and casting spells. In this manner, several practices common to Islamic mysticism, such as the various forms of the *dhikr* (*tahlīl*, *takbīr*, and *tasbīh*) have come to be used by many *dukuns* as part of their own ritual, even though *dukuns* rarely claim that their mystical practices have any connection with Islam, or even that the powers they supposedly receive from the performance of such mystical practices come from God.²⁴

The Persatuan Islam generally held mysticism suspect, whether autochthonous or *taṣawwuf*, and maintained that it was at best innovation (*bid'ah*) in worship, and at its worst, idolatry. It viewed the mysticism practiced by the *ṣūfī* orders as far removed from the simplicity and purity of early Muslim *ṣūfī* practice because of its accretion of alien practices and customs,²⁵ and the emphasis on mystical practice to the exclusion of other religious obligations.

Specifically the Persatuan Islam attacked the *ṣūfī* contention that mystical experience revealed "the truth of a thing" and was therefore more important than the regular manner of worship, i.e., prayer, fasting and the *ḥajj*. Absorbed as it

23. Hurgronje, *De Islam*, pp. 41-42. See Georges Henri Bousquet, *Introduction à l'étude de l'Islam indonésien* (Paris: Paul Guenther, 1938), pp. 201-202, who has some brief remarks on the status of mystic orders in Indonesia.

24. Geertz, "Modjokuto," p. 146.

25. Hadji Mahmoed 'Aziz, "Haqiqat, Marifat, Sjari'at dan Thariqat," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 1, p. 31.

was in the observance of correct religious behavior, the Persatuan Islam found the frequent *ṣūfī* omission of prescribed religious ritual as contrary to Islamic law, and the substitution of *ṣūfī* mystical practice as *bid'ah*. The proper role for mysticism, according to the Persatuan Islam, was for *ṣūfīs* to recognize the overriding importance of proper ritual and to abandon those practices not in accord with Qur'ān and the *sunnah* of the Prophet. Hadji Mahmoed 'Aziz concluded that the proper role for mysticism was not the full-blown, all-embracing institution it had developed into over the centuries, but only a process to prepare man's soul for worship, and to allow religious contemplation.²⁶

Persis writers, concerned as they were with a description of Islam, had little to say about the practices of *dukuns* since they clearly regarded them as outside Islam.²⁷ In separate *fatwās*, however, both Moenawar Chalil and Ahmad Hassan stated that recitation of the *dhikr*, although a good act, has no validity unless performed at the proper time and in the proper place.²⁸ Presumably this argument was used as a condemnation of the *dukun's* practice of repeating the *dhikr* in his mystical practices. Persis leaders probably believed, however, that reform in the *ṣūfī* brotherhoods would define the limits of mystical practice acceptable to Islam, and clearly indicate that other mystical practices outside such defined limits were not to be associated with Islam.

Intercession and Saint Worship

As in most countries of the world, the worship of saints is not uncommon in Indonesia. In ancient times, the Indonesians apparently honored ancestors and during the Hindu and Buddhist periods religious images. Such practices continued after Islam arrived, and Indonesian Muslims visited the tombs of holy men, such as those of the nine *walīs*, the first propagators of Islam on Java, or of sainted mystics to ask their favor and intercession. The usual practice is to visit the tomb of a saint and make a vow to perform a certain deed if the saint will cause certain favorable events to come to pass. Incense, rice and flowers are taken to the tomb as an offering, and an Arabic

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26. Hadji Mahmoed 'Aziz, "Haqiqat, Marifat, Sjari'at dan Thariqat," Sual-Djawab, No. 1, p. 31.
 27. Hadji Mahmoed 'Aziz, "Tachijul, 'Azimah, Keramat," Sual-Djawab, No. 4, pp. 25-26.
 28. Ahmad Hassan, "Tahliel," Sual-Djawab, No. 8, p. 62; Moehammed Moenawar Chalil, "Tahliel dan makan-makan dirumah orang kematian," Sual-Djawab, No. 5, p. 37.

incantation, usually a portion of the Qur'ān, is recited, thus giving an Islamic color to the custom.²⁹

The Persatuan Islam regarded saint worship as un-Islamic and attacked the practice in several *fatwās*, in several periodical articles, and in at least one major theological work.³⁰ In general, the Persis attack centered on the problem of intercession and on what it regarded as the proper manner in which Muslims were permitted to visit and pray at tombs. In *At-Tauhied*, Ahmad Hassan stated that the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* command that prayer be addressed directly to Allāh without any such formula as "with the blessing of the Prophet."³¹ He further stated that during the Prophet's lifetime, the Companions asked Muḥammad to pray for them but "after he died they did not ever ask his spirit, or at his grave. . . ."³² Ahmad Hassan argued that if it would have been correct to ask for the Prophet's intercession after his death, the Companions would have done so. However, the actual practice of the Companions was to ask a leading member of their group to conduct prayers on their behalf, and that member then prayed direct to Allāh and never invoked the Prophet as an intercessor.³³

According to Ahmad Hassan, these two clarifications, i.e., the virtual prohibition of intercession in the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*, and its non-existence among the Companions, also clarifies the matter of intercession with the names of holy men. Prayers should not be "clothed with intercession, such as: 'O God, grant me . . . with the blessedness of the Apostle of God or 'Abdul Qādir Jalānī, or others.'"³⁴ Ahmad Hassan gave further clarification of the Persatuan Islam's viewpoint concerning

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29. Landon, *Southeast Asia*, pp. 155-156; Bousquet, *Introduction a l'etude de l'Islam indonesien*, pp. 202-207; see also Mansur, *Risalah Tauhid dan Sjiirik*, pp. 16-21 for a condemnation of such practices.
 30. See for example, *Pembela Islam*, No. 61 (May 1933), pp. 23-26.
 31. Ahmad Hassan, "Tawassul," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 3, p. 15. Ahmad Hassan clarified that there is only one *ḥadīth*, regarded as weak by the original collectors of *ḥadīth*, which justifies a contrary stand. al-Jawhār al-Munadhdhan related that the Prophet once said "After Adam did wrong he called 'O God, I ask you through Muḥammad to forgive me.'" *Ibid.*, p. 11.
 32. Ahmad Hassan, *At-Tauhied*, p. 50.
 33. Ahmad Hassan, "Tawassul," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 3, p. 15.
 34. Ahmad Hassan, *At-Tauhied*, p. 52. "Not a few people of the Hadramaut asked: 'O Muchdlar help me! O 'Aidarus!'" *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

intercession in a short discussion entitled "Praying to Someone other than God." He stated that the problem of intercession has plagued man for centuries, and that the 'ulamā' have constantly brought forth interpretations indicating that intercession is not permitted in Islam. He noted, however, that despite this clarification, many Muslims still have a compulsion to believe that intercession may be valid. Ahmad Hassan stated his concurrence with the 'ulamā's consensus and noted that adherence to the doctrine of intercession could recreate the situation existing in Arabia immediately prior to the arrival of Islam (*Jāhiliyyah*) when men built idols to intercede for them with God and then turned to worshipping the idols themselves.³⁵

The Persatuan Islam pointed out two groups--the *ṣūfīs* and the Bā 'Alawī Arabs--that it regarded as particularly guilty of perpetuating the doctrine of intercession and leading to the worship of idols, in this case, tombs of "holy men." Persis writers stated that the *ṣūfī* practice of a novice relying completely on the spiritual guidance of his teacher to discover the path to God was a form of intercession. This dependence, Persis writers claimed, often placed the teacher in an exalted position and led to the growth of a cult about the persons of famous *ṣūfī* teachers, first by the novices and later by other Muslims as well. After their deaths, not infrequently, the tombs of these saints became sites of visitation where Muslims asked the saint to seek intercession for them with God.³⁶ A writer in *Pembela Islam* in 1933 noted a similar development caused by the Bā 'Alawī Arabs' claim to special blessing and position among Muslims because of their claim of direct descent from the Prophet Muḥammad. The writer noted that several cults had grown up around several Bā 'Alawī personages, such as Shaykh Ḥabshī Ḥaḍramaut, who used his claim to special blessing as a descendent of the Prophet to reinforce his high position as *ṣūfī shaykh*. Persis writers strongly attacked the Bā 'Alawī practice of encouraging Muslims to visit the tombs of Bā 'Alawī saints to pray for the saint's intercession with God.³⁷

35. Ahmad Hassan, "Berdoa kepada jang lain dari Allah," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 1, p. 22. "They knew that these idols were not able to furnish any aid with their own power, but they worshipped the idols with the purpose that these idols would ask God or intercede with God." *Ibid.*, p. 21.
36. Hadji Mahmoed 'Aziz, "Haqiqat, Ma'rifat, Sjari'at dan Thariqat," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 1, p. 31.
37. A., "I'tiqad Al-Ba 'Alwi tentang ziarah qoeboer dan bahaja-bahaja i'tiqad itoe," *Pembela Islam*, No. 61 (May 9, 1933), pp. 23-27. Shaykh al-Ḥabshī's tomb in Surabaya was the site of annual celebrations prior to World War II. Similar celebrations were held at the tombs of other saints, many of them Ḥaḍramī Arabs, at Luar Batang, Djakarta, Tegal,

Despite numerous Persis injunctions against intercession, Ahmad Hassan stated that visiting tombs is permissible for Muslims on the basis that the Prophet visited graveyards and allowed others to do so as well. He described the purpose of the visit as to pray for the deceased and to "recall the Hereafter," and stated that prayers in the graveyard should not be to aid a specific deceased Muslim--which could be done elsewhere--but should be of a general nature and should call for God's blessing on all dead believers. Here again, Ahmad Hassan warned against innovation (*bid'ah*) and cautioned Muslims not to adhere to a regular schedule in their visits, and to avoid visiting particular graves, on the grounds that *ṣaḥīḥ ḥadīth* did not describe or define any established procedure in the matter.³⁸

Wayang and Popular Theaters

The attitude of the Persatuan Islam regarding the Indonesian shadow theater--the *wayang kulit*--and its counterpart, the *wayang orang*, a play performed by human actors, is not stated in the primary works of its major writers. In a single reference pertinent to the subject, Ahmad Hassan stated that it was strongly forbidden for women to appear in public in the garb of men, a decision perhaps aimed against the *wayang orang* where women played all roles, both those of men and women.³⁹ The organization's viewpoint toward the *wayang* theater, however, was probably not fundamentally different from that of the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah which rejected this art form, so popular among the Javanese, on the basis that it was opposed to Islam because of its Hindu content. The *wayang* theater had strong roots in the non-Islamic Javanese past, and the plots and content of the performances usually revolved about tales and allegories from Hindu and early Javanese tradition; all factors accounting for their distastefulness for

Pekalongan and Bogor. Noer, "The Rise of the Modernist Muslim Movement," p. 89; cf. Snouck Hurgronje, The Achehnese, II, pp. 288-300.

38. Ahmad Hassan based this viewpoint on a *ṣaḥīḥ ḥadīth* of Muslim, which states: "A small amount of peace [sent down by God] on them in the grave who are believers and Muslim. If it were desired by Allāh we will meet them. We ask peace for us and for them." Ahmad Hassan, "Sedekah, pasang lampu, lailatul qadar dan ziarah kubur," Sual-Djawab, No. 2, pp. 21-22.
39. Ahmad Hassan, "Perempoean berpakaian laki-laki," Pembela Islam, No. 60 (April 1933), p. 33.

strict Muslim groups.⁴⁰

As for the popular theater (*toneel ma'ruf*), that is, the stage play similar to that found in the West, the Persatuan Islam expressed only a slightly more tolerant attitude. Hadji Mahmoed 'Aziz maintained that it was forbidden for Muslims to see and act in such plays because of the free association of men and women in them which violated Islamic social ethics. As support for his viewpoint, he cited a *ḥadīth*, recorded by Ahmad Ibn Ḥanbal, stating that a good Muslim will not be together alone with a woman not his relative, "because the third person there is a *shayṭān*."⁴¹ Ahmad Hassan defined the problem somewhat differently, and stated that all plays in which men and women (the women not being related to the men) performed could not be seen by men. However, plays in which men alone act, or in which men with women who are their relatives act could be seen by women.⁴² However, in the field of entertainment, theory was quite different from actual practice, and it was not an uncommon practice among *santris*, including members of the Persatuan Islam, to see stage plays and movies without undue concern for religiously unwarranted association of men and women among the actors.⁴³

The Persatuan Islam regarded the use of the drum and *gamelan* as dependent upon the occasion of their use. The practice had grown up in the early days of Islam in the Archipelago of using both of these musical instruments to attract the Indonesians to Islam, and it became the common practice at many mosques throughout Indonesia to use them for the call to worship.⁴⁴ Hadji Mahmoed 'Aziz stated that this particular practice was an innovation in religious matters and maintained in a *fatwā* that drums might not be used to call people to worship,

40. For a description of *wayang* plays see Mantle Hood, "The Enduring Tradition: Music and Theater in Java and Bali" in Ruth McVey, ed., *Indonesia* (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1963), pp. 438-471. For additional comments see also van der Kroef, *Indonesia in the Modern World*, II, pp. 162-181.

41. Hadji Mahmoed 'Aziz, "Main dan Lihat Toneel," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 1, pp. 27-28.

42. Ahmad Hassan, "Toneel," *Pembela Islam*, No. 60 (April 1933), p. 33.

43. See, for example, Ahmad Hassan's preference for plays and movies, as stated by Widjaya, "Biografia--A. Hassan," *Hudjdjatul Islam*, I, No. 1 (August 1956), p. 41.

44. Landon, *Southeast Asia*, p. 149.

since the Prophet had rejected all means except the *adhān*.⁴⁵ Abdulkadir Hassan saw no objection to the use of drums or the *gamelan* at other festivities connected with religious ceremonies such as at a wedding, and stated that the criteria for its permissibility was tied in with the appropriateness of the music itself. He stated that if the music was suggestive, or appealed to the lower emotions, it was wrong, but if it was wholesome there was no objection to its use from a religious standpoint.⁴⁶

Finally, there were several other customs found among the Indonesians that the Persatuan Islam viewed as incompatible with Islam. The practice of men wearing gold and silver ornaments, quite popular on Java, was judged by Ahmad Hassan as wrong because, according to a *ḥadīth*, the Prophet had not allowed it.⁴⁷ He pointed out, however, that for the most part there were no restrictions on the clothing worn by a Muslim, that there was no dress peculiar to a Muslim and that except for the minor restriction on gold in clothing, Muslims had the greatest latitude in wearing apparel. On the same basis, i.e., restriction by *ḥadīth*, the Persatuan Islam also rejected the Indonesian custom of women thinning their eyebrows and filing their front teeth, both practices common throughout the Archipelago as a means to enhance feminine beauty.⁴⁸

These particular customs were representative of the problems that Muslims faced in Indonesia in implementing their religion, i.e., replacing those customs that were objectionable to Islam, and realigning the loyalty of Indonesians from their own *'ādat* system to that of Islam and the *Sharī'ah*. Ahmad Hassan, as we have already stated in the chapter concerning his religious belief, believed that the *Sharī'ah* was not meant to totally displace *'ādat*--and in several *fatwās* on the legality of specific *'ādat* customs he restated his belief that much of

45. Hadji Mahmoed 'Aziz, "Tokok dan Beduk," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 5, p. 28.
46. Abdulkadir Hassan, "Gendang di Perkahwinan," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 14, pp. 79-80.
47. Ahmad Hassan, "Laki-laki pakai emas," *Pembela Islam*, No. 56 (December 1932), pp. 39-40. In another *fatwā*, Ahmad Hassan stated that there is a dispute among *'ulamā'* on whether wearing gold and silver ornaments is forbidden (*ḥaram*) or merely reprehensible (*makrūh*). Ahmad Hassan, "Memakai mas," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 6, p. 8; see also Landon, *Southeast Asia*, p. 153.
48. Ahmad Hassan, "Menghaluskan kening, merenggangkan gigi," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 11, pp. 5-6.

'*adat* law could stand alongside the *Sharī'ah*.⁴⁹ It was apparent, however, by the large number of objections he had to '*adat* --*slametans*, *wayang* theater, *dukuns* and wearing ornaments--that Ahmad Hassan believed that '*adat* would be acceptable only in a thoroughly altered form and totally subservient to the *Sharī'ah*. In the final analysis, it seems that the Persatuan Islam's viewpoint on this matter was not really greatly different from the attitude of the Middle East '*ulamā*' who allowed '*urf* a significant place in law, but also claimed to reject that portion of custom it found in conflict with the revealed law of God.

49. See for example, Ahmad Hassan, "Tanda Perawan," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 13, p. 72, for a specific instance of approval of '*adat*; and Ahmad Hassan, "Kulit ular," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 2, pp. 4-8 for his general comments on '*adat*.

CHAPTER VI

RELIGION AND THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

The Nationalist Movements

It is not the purpose of this essay to relate the history of the nationalist movement in Indonesia, for our concern is limited to the period from about 1928 to 1941 when Persis members participated in the nationalist movement. Studies of that movement and the intricate relationships between various factions can be found in a number of monographs in English, Dutch and Indonesian.¹ In general, there were three streams of political thought among the nationalists of Indonesia: the Muslims following Tjokroaminoto and the Sarekat Islam, the secularists led by Sukarno, and the Communists led by Semaun, Tan Malaka and Alimin.

The Sarekat Islam,² founded in 1912 by Muslim merchants for economic and social purposes, was the first Indonesian mass political movement, and it dominated the nationalist scene for over fifteen years. It initially followed a policy of cooperation with the Dutch, but dissatisfaction with the limited role the Dutch allowed Indonesians in the governing process led to the adoption of a policy of non-cooperation and strikes in the

1. The best of the Indonesian studies is L. M. Sitorus, Sedjarah Pergerakan Kebangsaan Indonesia. A fine Dutch study for the early period is J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch Indie. The events between 1930 and 1942 are analyzed in J. M. Pluvier, Overzicht van de ontwikkeling der Nationalistische Beweging in Indonesie in de Jaren 1930 tot 1942 (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1953). The best study in English is George M. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1952).
2. There are numerous writings on the Sarekat Islam. In addition to the standard works on Indonesian nationalism, see Jaylani, "The Sarekat Islam"; C. C. Berg, "Sarekat Islam," Encyclopedia of Islam; Fred R. von der Mehden, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia; Kepartaian dan Parlemenaria Indonesia, pp. 335-386; and Amelz, H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto, 2 vols.

early 1920's. After 1917, however, much of the Sarekat Islam's effectiveness was dissipated in a struggle for control of the organization between extremists, who wanted to foment revolution and adopt Marxist doctrines, and Muslim moderates, who wanted Muslim principles to prevail. In 1921, the more religious members succeeded in expelling the Communists and extremists from the Sarekat Islam, but in doing this so disoriented the organization that it was unable to quell factionalism among its remaining members or agree on a dynamic program capable of retaining popular support. Nevertheless, until the beginning of the Second World War the Muslims, organized in several parties as a result of schisms in the Sarekat Islam, remained a considerable force in the nationalist movement.

Nationalism based on secularism--as opposed to Muslim nationalism--received its impetus from students sent to the Netherlands to study by the Dutch Colonial Administration.³ These students were impressed with the West's technical progress, its ideals of personal liberty and by socialist concepts of economic justice then under considerable discussion in European schools. Having only a superficial religious training for the most part, these students tended to view religion--specifically Islam--as tied to the past, incapable of providing answers to modern problems, and at least partly responsible for Indonesia's 300 year position as a colony. They came to believe that the best way to achieve independence and build a strong Indonesian state was to follow the secular trend of the West and confine religion to the areas of individual belief and worship. The secular governments established in Persia, Egypt and Turkey, which seemed dynamic and promising in their beginnings, reinforced the viewpoint of these Indonesian students. In Indonesia, these returning students gravitated towards groups, like the Budi Utomo and Soetomo's study clubs, that stressed Javanese values rather than Muslim principles.⁴ Sukarno, an exponent of the Javanese-secularist approach, believed that political cooperation between secularists and Muslims was essential for attaining independence, and in 1931, established the PPPKI (Permoefakatan Perhimpunan2 Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia--Consultation of National Political Organizations in Indonesia) as a united front containing both factions. The experiment failed after

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3. The students club was founded in 1913 as a social organization with the name Indische Vereining (Indies Association). In 1922 it adopted a political program and changed its name to Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Association). It published a periodical called *Hindia Putra* (Young Indies), later titled *Indonesia Merdeka* (Free Indonesia). Sitorus, *Pergerakan Kebangsaan Indonesia*, pp. 34-39.
 4. For an outline of nationalist efforts with a Javanese bent see Vlekke, *Nusantara*, pp. 380-383.

only a few years because Muslim ideals and religious practices clashed sharply with the secularity philosophy and actions, which led to mutual recriminations from the very beginning.⁵ While limited cooperation between the two factions continued on an *ad hoc* basis throughout the colonial period, a debate on what principles should properly underlie the nationalist movement was carried on between the Muslims and the secular nationalists.

The third trend of Indonesian political thought and action was Communism, which tied itself to the Sarekat Islam movement until 1921 and then, until 1926, worked through the trade union movement. Its efforts to promote revolution through a series of nation wide strikes proved unsuccessful in 1927, and Dutch security measures forced the party underground. With its leadership either in prison or in exile, the Communists played only a slight role in the nationalist movement from 1927 to 1942.⁶

Persatuan Islam Views Regarding Nationalism

In its 1931 report, the Dutch East Indies Administration stated that the Persatuan Islam was not a political organization, but that many of its members were active politically and could be found in both the two major parties existing at that time, the Sarekat Islam and the Nationalist Party.⁷ While not a political organization, the Persatuan Islam did advocate a specific political viewpoint, and in the decade of the 1930's, this viewpoint brought it into conflict not only with the secularists, as might have been expected, but with the Sarekat Islam as well.

The Persatuan Islam was committed to the Muslim nationalist viewpoint, and throughout the 1930's, *Pembela Islam* and *Al-Lisan* published numerous articles supporting that viewpoint and condemning those of the secularists. The editorial line, expressed

5. J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, "De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch Indie," Encyclopaedië van Nederlandsch Oost-Indië.
6. In addition to the general works on nationalism which cover the early Communist movement, see also Harry Benda and Ruth McVey, The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell, 1960); D. N. Aidit, Entstehung und Entwicklung der Kommunistischen Partai Indonesiens (Berlin: Dietz, 1956).
7. "Mohammedaansche Eeredienst," Indische Verslag (1931), p. 311.

primarily in the articles of Sabirin, Natsir and Fachroeddin al-Kahiri, followed the viewpoint prevalent in the Sarekat Islam faction led by Hadji Agus Salim and Abdoel Muis which accentuated the religious content of politics and stressed the importance of cooperation among all Muslims of the Middle East and Asia, i.e., Panislamism. In these articles, the secularists were attacked for insisting on law other than the *Sharī'ah* and for limiting the independence movement to Indonesia and not seeking the independence of all Muslim peoples under colonial rule. In short, succinct and penetrating articles entitled "Merdeka buat apa?" (Freedom for what?), "Kebangsaan jangan di bawa-bawa" (Nationalism should not be involved), and similar titles, *Pembela Islam* attacked the nationalists on these two counts. Fachroeddin al-Kahiri's article appearing in *Pembela Islam* in 1933 summed up their attitude very well.

So long as the Muslims of Indonesia consider Indonesian freedom as more important than the freedom of all Muslims, consider politics as more important than worship, . . . exchange obedience to the *kijai* for obedience to the leader, . . . consider emotions more important than examination of substance, . . . and consider the enemies endangering Indonesian freedom more important than the enemies who endanger Islam, . . . so long will Indonesian freedom remain only a phrase on the lips.⁸

Response to Secularist Arguments

Secularists stated that Islam could not be the basis for a united nationalist movement since Christians, Hindus, Buddhists and even animists were also involved and would not support a movement intended to favor Islam and place themselves in a subservient position. Secularism, stated the secularists, would be a logical compromise since it did not favor any religious group, yet allowed every person to follow his own religious principles and obligations.⁹ The Muslims responded that ninety percent of the Indonesian population was Muslim, and such an overwhelming majority should determine the basic principles and direction of the nationalist movement. "Is it fitting," queried Ahmad Hassan in *Islam dan Kebangsaan*, "that we blot out the

8. Fachroeddin al-Kahiri, "Selama Moeslimin Indonesia . . . ," *Pembela Islam*, No. 59 (March 1933), p. 25.
9. See, for example, Tamar Djaja, *Pusaka Indonesia orang-orang Tanah Air* (Bandung: G. Kolff, 1951), pp. 161-162; Sukarno, "Mendjadi Pembantu Pemandangan," in *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi*, Goenadi and Mualliff Nasution, eds. (Jakarta: Panitia Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1963), pp. 507-513.

importance of the 90% majority because of the 10% minority? Would such a settlement be fair?" Moreover, continued the Muslim argument, the adoption of Islamic principles by the nationalist movement was not incompatible with the inclusion of members of other religions whose rights would be respected by Islam. "Like it or not," stated Ahmad Hassan, "a Muslim must always employ Islam in all places and in all things. . . . As for other groups this is not true. Their religion does not forbid them to follow any particular basis. Whoever does so, does it from personal preference, which can be changed."¹⁰ Muslims pointed out that in a Muslim-oriented movement members of other religions would be protected and given certain rights -- a guarantee other religions, particularly the Christians, viewed with suspicion and outright hostility, believing that Muslim guarantees would relegate them to second class membership with little voice in the policy of the movement.

The Muslims attacked the secularist argument that secularism would be acceptable to all groups by stating that Islam placed an obligation on every Muslim to place Islamic principles in effect in the state and society. Muslim writers noted that Islam contained not only rules concerning actual worship, but included rules regulating political, social and economic life as well that would be unable to function through secular law. The Persatuan Islam explained this in terms of its concept of interrelated legal systems and charged that secular concepts were really an attempt to displace the sacred law of the *Shari'ah* with *waq'î* or created law.¹¹

The content of nationalism was a major subject of debate between secularists and Muslims in the late 1920's and early 1930's. In the period between 1912 and 1926, the Sarekat Islam had dominated the political scene in Indonesia, and Islam was consequently recognized as a chief ingredient of nationalism. With the stagnation of the movement in the late 1920's and the rise of new leaders like Sukarno, Hatta and Soetomo, a new meaning was given to nationalism, one not wholly acceptable to Muslims. These leaders saw the Muslim concept of nationalism as incapable of mobilizing enough support to drive out the Dutch despite fifteen years of effort. At the same time, they saw that particularist feeling had grown among certain ethnic groups to a point where it might fragment Indonesian unity. Those leaders, and particularly Sukarno, attempted to synthesize a national culture that would appeal to all Indonesian groups regardless of religious belief or ethnic association. This new Indonesian culture extolled the glories of the empires of Srivijaya and Majapahit and pictured them as having formed an Indonesian nation with a distinctive Indonesian culture. In

10. Ahmad Hassan, Islam dan Kebangsaan, pp. 41, 49.

11. See above pp. 42-43.

this concept, nationalism was presented as the movement which was to usher in a new Indonesia reflecting the glories of those past empires.¹²

Many Muslims never really saw Sukarno's synthesis between secularism and Old Java as representing a culture acceptable to all Indonesians. They labeled the concept "Javanism" and regarded it as another of the many ethnic and regional movements calling itself nationalism.¹³ Moehammad Natsir, writing in *Pembela Islam*, stated that without Islam, there was no Indonesian nationalism since Islam had "first planted the seeds of Indonesian unity, removed the attitudes of isolation of various islands . . . and planted the seeds of brotherhood with [Muslims] outside Indonesia." He stated that nationalism advocated by the secularists broke down on ethnic lines (*suku bangsa*) and that only Islam had an appeal to "hundreds of thousands of people" throughout the whole of Indonesia.¹⁴

There were also differences between the secularists and the Muslims concerning the limits of the nationalist struggle. During the heyday of the Sarekat Islam, Tjokroaminoto argued for Muslim endeavor confined to Indonesia. There was a faction, however, led by Hadji Agus Salim, that saw the Indonesian struggle for independence as only one part of a gigantic effort by Muslims throughout Asia and the Near East to drive out European rule. After its 1921 decision to rid the party of Communists and the consequent loss of a large part of its membership while enforcing party discipline, the Sarekat Islam seized upon panislamic feeling to mobilize Muslim support for the party. The Sarekat Islam sponsored ten Al-Islam congresses and the short-lived MAIHS (Islamic World Council--East Indies Branch) to promote Muslim political efforts in Indonesia and abroad. These congresses passed resolutions on Palestine and the caliphate question, but primary emphasis continued to be on national issues and Indonesian Muslim problems.¹⁵ The secularists, particularly after Sukarno gained control, viewed the Indonesian struggle as limited to Indonesia and solely dependent on

12. Reflections of this appear in Sukarno's speeches before the war. This conception was probably best developed after Indonesian independence by Moehammad Yamin. See D. G. E. Hall, *Historians of Southeast Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 148-149.
13. Moehammad Natsir, "Kebangsaan Moeslimin," *Pembela Islam*, No. 42 (January 1932), pp. 2-3.
14. Moehammad Natsir, "Meninggalkan tahun 1931, menudju tahun 1932," *Pembela Islam*, No. 39 (December 1931), p. 2.
15. Von der Mehden, *Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia*, p. 161.

Indonesian resources and efforts. The secular nationalists stated their sympathy with other movements to gain independence, but maintained that freedom could best be achieved on a national basis, with every people seeking to gain independence in their own land. In a speech in 1928 just after he had gained control of the Nationalist Party, Sukarno confirmed this position by stating that Indonesian national aspirations could only be achieved through Indonesian efforts and that Indonesians could not rely on help coming either from the panislamism of the Muslim world or from the international Communist movement in Moscow.¹⁶

The Persatuan Islam supported the panislamic position in its propaganda and rejected nationalism as advanced by the Sukarno group for placing national goals ahead of religion and creating "artificial" national boundaries that would perpetuate divisions in the Muslim community. The organization's viewpoint was well expressed in a *Pembela Islam* editorial in 1931 which stated that "Islam does not, properly speaking, contain nationalism, or that which leads to a consideration of national importance alone . . . separated from moral law and humanity."¹⁷ In *Islam dan Kebangsaan*, Ahmad Hassan explained that there was no religious prohibition against loving one's country, and he generally recognized that the national state was the practical political organization for the current age. He stated, however, that it was the first duty of all Muslims to form a single community (*ummah*) patterned after the *ummah* organized by Muhammad. He cited several *ṣaḥīḥ ḥadīth* that condemn a narrow partisanship¹⁸ that promotes the interests of a small group or tribe at the expense of the Muslim community as a whole, and concluded

16. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 91.
17. "Kebangsaan," consisting of an undated letter from a PSI-er (Partai Sarekat Islam) and a response by the *Pembela Islam*'s editors. *Pembela Islam*, No. 29 (July 1931), pp. 2-6.
18. The word "partisanship" is used here to denote the Arabic term *ʿasabīyah* referred to in a number of *ḥadīth*, and translated by Ahmad Hassan into Indonesian as "kebangsaan," that is, "nationalism." Ahmad Hassan, *Islam dan Kebangsaan*, pp. 21-25. Similar is another editorial in *Pembela Islam* which stated that "a nationalist worker is prepared to sacrifice his life, his mind, his wealth and his soul for national freedom, because of mother Indonesia" while the Muslim will make the same sacrifice "in the way of Allāh because of Allāh." "*Bangsa* [racial grouping] does not exist in the Qur'ān," the article concluded, "but the principle of nationalism is rejected, forbidden, and cursed by Islam." "*Nasionalisme* tiada bertentangan dengan Islam," *Pembela Islam*, No. 60 (April 9, 1933), pp. 3-4.

that, on that basis, Muslim political efforts were not to be limited by national boundaries but were to be undertaken in such a way as to benefit Muslims everywhere.¹⁹ So convinced were the members of the Persatuan Islam of the validity of this stand that they held firm to it long after many other politically active Muslim groups adopted policies less antagonistic toward the secularists.²⁰ It was only in 1945 that the Persatuan Islam put aside its differences for the sake of national unity, and then agreed to only a temporary truce.

The differences between the secularists and Muslims concerning the limits of nationalistic endeavor eventually centered, in the early 1930's, about the problem of the *hajj*. Dr. Soetomo, an advocate of Javanese culture as the basis of Indonesian nationalism, stated that the *Ka'abah* was an idol of the Arabs and that Digul prison camp, where nationalist leaders had been interned, was better than Makkah. He maintained that people "went to Digul" out of conviction while Muslims went to Makkah only because of a religious obligation.²¹ This charge reflected general secularist thinking about many of the obligations Islam imposed on its followers, and particularly the *hajj*, which drew attention away from nationalist efforts, was viewed as a meaningless ritual connected with another country and of considerably less importance than contemporary Indonesian political endeavors. Consequently, secularist leaders' arguments stressed that the *hajj* was really only an Arab device designed to increase their own wealth at the expense of the non-Arab Muslims.²²

The Muslims considered such statements as an effort to degrade and ridicule a basic tenet of their religion, and numerous protests were made by Muslim organizations and personalities denouncing the nationalist allegations. In *Islam dan Kebangsaan*, Ahmad Hassan warned Muslims to be aware of professions by the nationalists which tended to emphasize things Indonesian and to treat basic practices of Islam as "Arabism" which could be easily and safely dismissed.²³

19. Ahmad Hassan, *Islam dan Kebangsaan*, pp. 45-46.

20. The short article on Ahmad Hassan in *Ensiklopedia Indonesia* cites only his opposition to secular nationalism. See also Tamar Djaja, *Pusaka Indonesia orang-orang besar Tanah Air*, p. 162.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

22. Moehammad Natsir, "Hadji, zakat, fithrah, riba, kawin-tjerai, d.l.l.," *Pembela Islam*, No. 26 (May 1931), pp. 8-9.

23. Ahmad Hassan's uncompromising stand on this issue, and his refusal to drop the subject as a topic of debate at a time Muslims and secularists were looking for a basis of unity,

Believers should mark anyone who speaks of Digul as being better than Makkah! Anyone who orders the moving of the *qiblah* to Demak! Anyone who abuses the Prophet Muhammad and refers to him as the old fellow of the people of Shahwah! Anyone who holds the law of polygamy revealed by God as wrong . . . ! Watch out!²⁴

On another tack, Moehammad Natsir attempted to answer the charge that the *hajj* represented a perennial loss of income to Indonesia that could not be afforded in economic and political terms comprehensible to the secularists. Natsir accused his opponents of following Western theories of mercantilism with their stress on goods and balance of payments, and claimed that a nation's economic wealth was really measured in both "visible and invisible assets." The *hajj*, he stated, was an example of "invisible assets" and as such had tremendous value, particularly in the villages where the enlightened *hadji* worked diligently and without fanfare for religious goals after his return from Makkah. Natsir maintained that the Colonial Administration always feared the *hajj*, even as it feared the "spectre of Pan-Islamism and the development of an Islamic spirit." He stated that Snouck Hurgronje's recommendations were evidence of this, for while Hurgronje had recommended continuation of the *hajj*, he also urged the obstruction of the *hajj*'s influence by initiating widespread Western education. Natsir accused the nationalists of having fallen into the trap, and of obstructing the *hajj* through a "new-type blind imitation" of Western books. Western-style education within Indonesia "devours several million rupiah every year" which is lost to the Dutch. Moreover, he charged, if one talks about loss of money due to the *hajj*, one should also consider the cost of maintaining a student in a Western country. Natsir maintained that the real exploitation in the *hajj* was not by the Arabs, who were fellow Muslims and opposed to colonialism, but by the Dutch, who made profit out of transporting pilgrims. The answer to this problem, explained Natsir, was not to abolish the *hajj* but to establish a Muslim-controlled body to administer pilgrim affairs, including transportation, so that they might reduce the costs and prevent the Europeans from profiting from a religious activity.²⁵

was viewed by many on both sides as detrimental to the struggle for national freedom.

24. Ahmad Hassan, *Islam dan Kebangsaan*, pp. 16-17.
25. Natsir, "Hadji, zakat, fithrah, riba, kawin-tjerai, d.l.l.," *Pembela Islam*, No. 26 (May 1931), pp. 9-12. He specifically mentioned the plans of the Muhammadiyah to form a Badan Penolong Hadji (Hadji's Aid Society). For more on this enterprise, see 'Ali, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," pp. 58, 81; D. van der Meulen, "The Mecca Pilgrimage and its importance to the Netherlands East Indies," *The Asiatic Review*, XXXVI (July 1940), pp. 588-597.

Another point of friction in the Indonesian nationalist movement in the 1930's was the secularist view of Islam as a moribund religion--retrospective of departed glories, unconcerned with, and hence incapable of, providing answers to modern questions. "*Kijahis*," lamented Sukarno in his correspondence with Ahmad Hassan, "often have no feeling for or touch with history," and confuse the past with the present. The secularists argued that the Muslim past could not be recaptured, and that a new culture was needed to take its own place in history. "Society," stated Sukarno, "asks to be developed, to the forefront, onward, upward, to 'the future,' and cannot ever be called upon to 'return'!" The nationalists cited the cases of Egypt, Persia, Iraq, and especially Turkey, as examples of nations with predominantly Muslim populations that had found it necessary to separate "church" from "state" in order to ensure progress and in order to move their nations into contact and harmony with the modern world.²⁶

The Muslims countercharged that secular nationalists knew very little about Islam, certainly did not understand it, and were really imitating the separation of church and state as practiced in Europe. *Kaum muda* Muslims stated that the spirit and content of the Qur'ān was as suited to contemporary life as to the life of Makkah and Madīnah in the seventh century.²⁷ Agus Salim was able to undercut the Communist position at the 1921 Congress of the Sarekat Islam by stating that Marxism had no monopoly on socialism and that socialism was justified in the Qur'ān and had even been practiced by Muḥammad.²⁸ In a like manner, Ahmad Hassan argued ten years later that democracy was supported by the Qur'ān and had been practiced at the time of the Prophet. He stated that with laws revealed to the Prophet, Muslims had established a "government without equal in performance or in length of time."²⁹ He also declared that the principles of Islam, and the laws it prescribed would still function well and effectively in the modern period, for they were adaptable to any time and place. The reason for the backwardness of many Muslim countries--and he specifically indicated Turkey, Egypt and Persia, which had adopted secular legal systems and put aside religious law as antiquated--was caused by the failure of Muslims in those countries to adapt religious

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26. Sukarno, "Surat-surat Islam dari Endeh," Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, I, pp. 332, 334, 336.
 27. Ahmad Hassan, Pemerintahan Tjara Islam, pp. 1-2; Dj., "Penjakit ke-Baratan," Pembela Islam, No. 55 (December 1932), p. 8.
 28. Von der Mehden, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia, pp. 62, 69.
 29. Ahmad Hassan, Pemerintahan Tjara Islam, pp. 2-3.

laws and principles to the contemporary world. Ahmad Hassan charged that secularist leaders, like Kemal Ataturk in Turkey and Riva Pahlevi in Iran, regarded as progressive leaders by the Indonesian secularists, were really ignorant of Islam and afraid that Muslims would displace them in a properly-run Islamic state.³⁰

The separation of "church" and "state" was, therefore, an important part of the polemic between the two groups throughout the twenty years preceding the Second World War. The secularists viewed Ataturk and Pahlevi as reformers who had eliminated foreign influence and introduced modernism and progress in their countries. They tended to ignore or minimize any actions of these leaders which opposed religion, and they charged that Muslims who complained of Ataturk and Pahlevi's harshness toward religious leaders and disregard for Muslim custom were unappreciative of their greatness. In his correspondence with Ahmad Hassan, Sukarno chided the Muslims for that viewpoint.

Ignorance in religious matters was what forced Ibn al-Su'ud to tear down the transmission towers of Radio Madinah and it is ignorance that leads Muslims to misunderstand many of the measures taken by Kemal Ataturk, Riza Khan Pahlevi or Joseph Stalin.³¹

For his part, Ahmad Hassan cited what he regarded as shortcomings in secular Turkey and Persia and stated that the inferiority of those states was shown because "brandy, adultery, gambling and other sins are widespread, even to the extent of actually being permissible." Further proof of their inadequacy, he stated, could clearly be seen in the numerous problems of security which such states had and which the "kingdoms of Afghanistan and Ibn Su'ud, which employ Islamic laws, do not have."³²

On this question of church and state, Moehammad Natsir presented a more reasoned reply designed to undercut secularist arguments. Natsir started from the assumption that a backward state is backward because its leadership and population is not progressive and that merely changing the form of government or separating religious and secular functions would not guarantee progress. "What must be separated out," he argued, "are evil, sin, disobedience, disbelief, and greed that destroy the power of the *ummah*, that lower morals and ethics, that close the gate of earthly glory and the prosperity of the Hereafter." In its

30. Ahmad Hassan, Islam dan Kebangsaan, p. 52.

31. Sukarno, "Surat-surat Islam dari Endeh," Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, I, pp. 336-337.

32. Ahmad Hassan, Islam dan Kebangsaan, pp. 52-53.

place, a relationship between the spirit of man with God, through worship, should be established, and this would lead to a "progress that is true progress." He maintained that since life on earth and life in the Hereafter are really identical in that one leads into the other, the religious and secular should be joined together, to ensure the fulfillment of the religious obligations commanded by religion. Natsir concluded that in such a context the action of Ataturk and Pahlavi was really a step backward for the Muslim populations of their countries.³³

While the Persatuan Islam attacked the nationalists with many of the same arguments used by other Muslim groups, one argument was peculiar to it alone. That argument attacked the nationalists for raising the concept of nationalism above all other values and charged that the adoption of a flag and national anthem and the deference given to national heroes and dead leaders of the movement was apt to take on a meaning rivaling religion and lead individuals to disbelief (*shirk*). Hadji Mahmoed 'Aziz stated that these symbols might soon be regarded as having some special significance, and eventually come to be regarded as serving as a mediary between God and man, even as saints and holy men had been mistakenly regarded by Muslims in the past.³⁴ In Ahmad Hassan's view, there was a possibility that such practices could even create a situation similar to that existing during the pre-Islamic period (*Jāhiliyyah*) when the *Quraysh* honored idols--not to worship them--but in order that the idols intercede with God on the worshippers' behalf.³⁵ While there

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33. Moehammad Natsir (writing under the name A. Muchlis), "Agama dan Negara" in Moehammad Isa Anshary, *Falsafah Perjuangan Islam* (Bandung: "Pasifik," 1949), p. 219. Natsir's many writings on nationalism are worth reading for their rational defense of Islam in this controversy. Several of these articles are outlined in English in Noer, "The Modernist Muslim Movement," pp. 427-432.
34. Hadji Mahmoed 'Aziz, "Memberi salam kepada bendera dan mentjium batu," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 1, p. 35; see also Ahmad Hassan, *Islam dan Kebangsaan*, pp. 58-61. "First they build statues commemorating people, then the statues become places of respect, later they become places for paying homage, and not long after there are those who believe [the statues] to be God.
 "When the flag was originally created . . . it was used in warfare as a symbol where various people or nations united. . . . Gradually the flag acquired a fervent salute, as if it was an actual person, or a very prominent person. It is not impossible that in a short time homage will be given to the flag, and, [eventually], . . . veneration, reverence, and then regarded as God Himself."
35. Ahmad Hassan, *Islam dan Kebangsaan*, p. 44.

is no record of any nationalist reply to this charge, they presumably stressed that religion should be limited to its ceremonial aspects and that the Persatuan Islam's charge was not in line with contemporary thought. In any event, the nationalists used all three--the song, the flag, and the honoring of dead leaders--as emotional rallying devices. These were particularly effective after independence was declared in 1945.

View Toward Participation in Politics

There is evidence that members of the Persatuan Islam belonged to the Nationalist Party and that even those in the Sarekat Islam were in favor of united efforts with the nationalists in the period from 1928 to 1933. However, the development of polemic between the Muslims and the nationalists toward the end of that period, and particularly the heated discussions concerning the *hajj* and polygamy, appear to have set the Persatuan Islam firmly against the nationalists. The movement chided such Muslim organizations as the Persatoean Moeslimoen Indonesia (PMI--Indonesian Muslim Union) which based its organization on "Islam and nationalism" and entered into limited cooperation with the nationalists.³⁶

In *Islam dan Kebangsaan*, Ahmad Hassan stated that it was inconceivable that Muslims would cooperate with the nationalists, since the nationalists were unwilling to allow the Muslims freedom to carry out their religious obligations to their fullest extent. He warned Muslims to be on guard against secularist leaders who asked for cooperation but were really insincere in their approach. Beware of them "who only profess the role of a Muslim when meeting believers, but who, after departing, tighten their lips out of hatred for us because we do not favor their principles of nationalism." Beware of the hypocrite, he continued, for "if they are able to succeed in the struggle, certainly they will suppress us as much as possible!" He also stated that since the secularists actively threatened religion, it was the duty of every Muslim to enter the political arena and help defend Islam. That could best be accomplished, he maintained, by Muslim participation only in Muslim organizations, and by the unification of all Muslim movements in a united front.³⁷

36. Djaja, *Pusaka Indonesia*, p. 162; see also J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, "Persatoean Moeslimin Indonesia (PMI)," *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch Oost-Indie*, VII.

37. Ahmad Hassan, *Islam dan Kebangsaan*, pp. 15, 19.

The Persis Quarrel with the Sarekat Islam

Persis members may have advocated Muslim unity, but their strong insistence on the reform of religious matters according to the Persis way of thinking was viewed by many Muslim leaders as detrimental to Muslim unity. Persis' concern with what constituted proper religious behavior and Persis' insistence that other groups accept their standpoint on such issues as *taqlīd*, *talqīn* and *nāyah* were carried over into the Muslim political movement by Persis members. The Persatuan Islam explained that the decline of Islam's political power had been caused by Muslim neglect of religious principles and the weakening of those principles by innovation. Only by reestablishing these principles in their unaltered form could Islam regain its strength. Persis members believed that to this end, it was necessary that open discussion be allowed in Muslim political groups so that *bid'ah* could be revealed for what it was.³⁸ This stress on airing differences of opinion conflicted sharply with the view of Tjokroaminoto who believed that differences between various Muslim groups, including differences between *kaum muda* and *kaum tua*, should be minimized because such differences created disunity, weakened Muslim political strength, and detracted from efforts against the external threat to Islam.³⁹

Persatuan Islam members belonged, in the large part, to the Sarekat Islam, and the Sarekat Islam in the Bandung area was heavily financed by the Persatuan Islam.⁴⁰ In early 1932, however, a dispute emerged in the Bandung Sarekat Islam, between the members belonging to the Persatuan Islam and its supporters on one side and the followers of Tjokroaminoto's unity view on the other, over the question of differences in religious belief.⁴¹ By June 1932, the dispute had become sufficiently serious to threaten unity and weaken the leadership, and the Tjokroaminoto group in the Bandung organization conducted a "clearing away," expelling a number of members who adhered to the Persis view-

38. M. S., "Selamat Hari Raja," *Pembela Islam*, No. 41 (January 1932), p. 35; Moehammad Natsir, "Keadaan Oedara Moesim Sekarang," *Pembela Islam*, No. 47 (June 1932), pp. I-IX.

39. Amelz, H. O. S. *Tjokroaminoto*, p. 49.

40. Noer, "The Modernist Muslim Movement," p. 390.

41. For the arguments on each side in this dispute see Boekoe *Verslag Openbaar Debat antara PSII dan Kaoem Furu* (Public record of the debate between the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia and the adherents of *furū'*) (Bandung: Persatoean Islam, 1932).

point.⁴² Several members of the Persatuan Islam, including Ahmad Hassan, Moehammad Natsir and Hadji Zamzam, were purged even though they had made no personal attacks on any Sarekat Islam leaders.⁴³ Several other Persis members, including Sabirin, were not purged and continued to hold membership in both the Persatuan Islam and in the Sarekat Islam.

Despite this rebuff from the leading Muslim political organization of the day, the Persatuan Islam did not depart from its viewpoint that Muslim political unity was incumbent on all Muslims. In the MIAI (Madjelis Islam A'la Indonesia--High Islamic Council of Indonesia), established in 1937 as a federation of all Indonesian Muslim organizations, the Persatuan Islam was a prominent member and took part in its religious and political activity until it was dissolved by the Japanese in 1942.⁴⁴

The Dutch analysis that the Persatuan Islam was not a political organization was not quite correct. The organization was not constituted for direct political activity, but its religious viewpoint (perhaps because it was an Islamic one) was so concerned with certain aspects of political behavior that its leaders found it necessary, and desirable, to take a political stand, to participate in politics themselves and to encourage its members--and indeed all Muslims--to participate as well.

42. Noer, "The Modernist Muslim Movement," p. 391; Natsir, "Keadaan Oedara Moesim Sekarang," Pembela Islam, No. 47 (June 1932), p. II.

43. Noer, "The Modernist Muslim Movement," p. 390.

44. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, pp. 115-119; Aboebakar Atjeh, K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, pp. 311-319; Willard Galbraith, "Native Socio-Political Problems of the Netherlands Indies," Basic Report from the American Consulate General in Batavia, Java, March 10, 1941, pp. 41-42.

CHAPTER VII

POLEMIC AGAINST THE AḤMADĪYAH QĀDĪYĀN AND CHRISTIANITY

The appearance of the Aḥmadīyah Qādiyān and the intensification of Christian missionary activity in Indonesia between the two world wars caused considerable concern among Indonesian Muslims. Muslims in both the modernist and traditionalist factions saw these two religious trends as threats to the position of Islam in Indonesia and they consequently issued considerable propaganda, polemic and apologetic to check the activities of the two threatening groups. The problems posed by the Aḥmadīyah Qādiyān and by Christian mission activity were entirely separate matters--and regarded as such by Indonesian Muslims--yet they had similarities in that each came from outside the archipelago, and each disputed the Muslim belief in prophecy, with attendant consequences on other religious beliefs as well.

The Persatuan Islam took part in the activity against these two groups, and through its periodicals and in debate with the Aḥmadīyah and Christian groups, undertook what it believed to be defense of correct faith. Its arguments were again representative of the wider modernist Muslim viewpoint and are worth reviewing for that purpose.

The Aḥmadīyah Qādiyān

The Aḥmadīyah Qādiyān,¹ who held that Mirza Ghulam Aḥmad was a Muslim prophet, first began its efforts to proselytize

1. Actually there are two groups of the Aḥmadīyah who differ on their interpretations of Ghulam Aḥmad's claim. The Qādiyān branch, which is of interest to this paper, maintained that their founder was a prophet, while the Lahore branch claimed that he was only a *mujaddid* (reformer). For further information on both these groups' activities in Indonesia see, J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, "Ahmadyah," *Encyclopaedië van Nederlandsch Oost-Indië*; "Djema'at Ahmadijah" in *Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Timur* (Djakarta: Kementerian Pengerangan, 1953), pp. 805-806; C. F. Pijper, "De Ahmadijah in Indonesië" in *Ringkisan Budi* (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1950), pp. 247-254. For a summary of Aḥmadīyah beliefs see Wilfred

Indonesians in 1925 when several Indonesian students returned from the organization's school in the Panjab where they had studied Ahmadiyah doctrine and been converted to its belief. These students were accompanied by Rahmat 'Alī, representative of the movement from India, who undertook vigorous missionary activity with the aid of the returned students. Initially their activity was limited to Sumatra, particularly the Minangkabau area, where they aroused the opposition of the Muslim ('ulamā') of the region and gained a small number of converts to their belief. The initial response to Ahmadiyah efforts was quite disorganized, and the original counterarguments to Ahmadiyah contentions were generally weak and ineffective. As they became familiar with Ahmadiyah arguments and manner of approach, however, the 'ulamā' of West Sumatra developed arguments that proved effective in countering Rahmat 'Alī's propaganda, and probably greatly checked the rate of conversion of Muslims to the new sect.²

In 1925, Rahmat 'Alī widened the area of his campaign to include Java, and, in the ensuing years, issued religious propaganda and debated religious belief with several Muslim groups, including the Persatuan Islam. In his debates with the Ahmadiyah Qādiyān, Ahmad Hassan apparently drew on the arguments already formulated by the West Sumatran 'ulamā' but appears also to have developed several additional arguments of his own. The most complete record of Ahmad Hassan's argument against Ahmadiyah belief appears in the minutes of his two debates with Rahmat 'Alī in 1933 and 1934, which were subsequently published in pamphlet form.³ In several later works, Ahmad Hassan also included a refutation of specific Ahmadiyah beliefs. In *An-Nubuwwah*, for example, he specifically attacked the belief that Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet,⁴ and his objections to Qādiyānī belief concerning 'Isā were succinctly outlined in a *fatwā* entitled "Prophets who are still living."⁵

In many respects, the religious viewpoint of the Ahmadiyah Qādiyān was not very different from that of the modernist Muslims, for it also called for the removal of non-Islamic practices and beliefs from Islam and was against many of the

Cantwell Smith, "Ahmadiyya," Encyclopedia of Islam (New Edition).

2. Hamka, *Ajahku*, pp. 109-113; "Djema'at Ahmadijah," Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Timur, pp. 805-806.
3. Hamka, *Ajahku*, pp. 112-113.
4. Ahmad Hassan, *An-Nubuwwah*, p. 11.
5. Ahmad Hassan, "Nabi jang masih hidup," Sual-Djawab, No. 12, pp. 80-86.

practices of traditionalist Muslims. On two specific points, however, i.e., the death of the Prophet 'Īsā, and the claim of the Ahmadiyah founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad to be a prophet, there was a total divergence of belief, and the emphasis placed on these differences caused considerable animosity between the Ahmadi and Sunni Muslims.

Ghulam Ahmad's claim to prophethood rested on Ahmadiyah interpretation of *al-Aḥzāb* (The Clans), 33:41 which stated that Muḥammad was the seal of the prophets.⁶ They disputed Sunni Muslim belief that this verse indicated that Muḥammad was the last prophet and claimed that the verse only indicated that Muḥammad was the last prophet who would bring divine law to mankind. The Ahmadiyah claimed that other prophets not bringing a law could appear, and that Ghulam Ahmad was such a prophet. They stated that Ghulam Ahmad had only appeared in order to reform religion but that the *Sharī'ah* introduced by Muḥammad was still sufficient for mankind.⁷

Ahmad Hassan refuted this contention by stating that the indicated *āyah* had been misinterpreted by the Ahmadiyah Qādiyān, that it did not differentiate between types of prophets, but indicated only that Muḥammad was the last of the prophets of any kind. In his 1933 debate with Rahmat 'Alī, Ahmad Hassan suggested that Qādiyānī references to prophets with and without a *Sharī'ah* was really only a confusion of the words *rasūl* and *nabī*, two words that Ahmad Hassan claimed had become almost interchangeable in Muslim theological terminology.⁸ In *An-Nubuwwah*, he flatly rejected Ghulam Ahmad's claim by stating, "There has not been a single prophet [since Muḥammad] either with or without the *Sharī'ah*."⁹

The Ahmadiyah Qādiyān claimed that a new prophet was necessary in order to fulfill references in *ḥadīth* to the return of the "*al-masīh*" on the day of judgment to play a prominent role at the resurrection of the dead. Sunni Muslims generally believed that the Prophet 'Īsā, the last claimed prophet to appear before Muḥammad, who founded the Christian *ummah*, and was also referred to as *al-Masīh*, was the person cited in the *ḥadīth*. It was also generally believed by Sunni Muslims that the Prophet

6. *al-Azhāb*, 33:40, states: "Muḥammad is not the father of any man among you, but he is the messenger of Allāh and the Seal of the Prophets; and Allāh is aware of all things."

7. Hamka, *Ajahku*, p. 110.

8. Persatoean Islam, "Perslag opisil dari Debatan 'Pembela Islam'--'Ahmadiyah Qadian'," *Pembela Islam*, No. 61 (May 1933), p. 29.

9. Ahmad Hassan, *An-Nubuwwah*, p. 11.

‘Īsā had not died a natural death, but had been taken in his earthly form from the earth by God, and was to return in that form on Judgment Day.¹⁰ The Ahmadiyah did not dispute the validity of the belief that "al-masīh" would return on Judgment Day, but claimed that the Prophet ‘Īsā had died "as did all other prophets" and that the "‘Īsā" or "al-masīh" designated for the Judgment Day role was actually Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.¹¹

In his *fatwā* on this topic, Ahmad Hassan noted that all *ḥadīths* dealing with ‘Īsā's return on Judgment Day were weak, and could be rejected as the basis for doctrine according to the generally recognized rules of *ḥadīth* examination among the ‘ulamā’. Ahmad Hassan stated that to reject these *ḥadīth*, however, would leave unexplained several references in the Qur’ān to ‘Īsā's existence as a mortal in God's presence. For that reason alone, he saw value in considering them as valid *ḥadīth*, but contended that there was no reference in any one of them to Ghulam Ahmad as "‘Īsā" or "al-masīh."¹²

In his presentation, Rahmat ‘Alī also cited several *āyāt* as proof that ‘Īsā was actually dead and could not be the "al-masīh" mentioned in the *ḥadīth*. He quoted *al-Mā'idah* (The Table), 5:76 implying that all messengers including ‘Īsā were mortal, and *Āl-‘Imrān* (The Family of ‘Imrān), 3:144 which states that all prophets before Muḥammad were dead as proof of his position. Ahmad Hassan countered that such references were general in nature, but that *al-Nisā'* 4:158 stating, "but Allāh raised him up unto Himself" was a more specific reference to ‘Īsā.¹³ Ahmad Hassan stated that all *ḥadīths* referring to ‘Īsā's return on Judgment Day indicated that he existed as a mortal in the presence of God, for they used the words "will descend." "It is clear" concluded Ahmad Hassan, "that the Prophet ‘Īsā has been taken up and will descend. If we say: 'He will descend,' certainly then he exists above!"¹⁴

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10. D. B. MacDonald, "‘Īsā," *Encyclopedia of Islam*.
 11. "Perslag opisil," *Pembela Islam*, No. 61, p. 37.
 12. Ahmad Hassan, "Nabi jang masih hidup," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 12, pp. 82-83.
 13. *al-Mā'idah* 5:76 states: "The Messiah, son of Mary, was no other than a messenger, messengers [the like of whom] had passed away before him." *Āl-‘Imrān* 3:144 states: "Muḥammad is but a messenger, messengers [the like of whom] have passed away before him." *al-Nisā'* 4:158 states: "But Allāh took him up unto Himself, Allāh was ever Mighty, Wise."
 14. Ahmad Hassan, "Nabi jang masih hidup," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 12, p. 82.

In another argument, the Aḥmadiyyah Qādiyān used reason to establish its position on 'Īsā. This argument stated that "prophets have physical bodies as other men and are not able to live without food. If 'Īsā lives in heaven, certainly he must eat and drink and have bowel movements. . . ." Moreover, the argument ran, there were matters of spiritual concern as well as bodily functions to be considered, such as "where does he face when he prays, for in heaven there is no *qiblah*? Moreover, is there anyone in the blue heaven to whom to give *zakāt*?"¹⁵ Ahmad Hassan responded to this argument by stating that while there certainly were difficulties for a person existing in heaven in physical form, it was not beyond God's power to do it.

Is it inconceivable for a man to be taken by Allāh to a star!? No, not ever! It is not inconceivable that Allāh would take all mankind to another world. But because this has not happened before our eyes, then we feel the matter is exceedingly difficult.¹⁶

As a further example, Ahmad Hassan stated that sixty years previously it was generally believed that to go from Bandung to Djakarta in forty-five minutes time was impossible, but with the advent of the airplane the trip took only half an hour. In a like manner, he maintained, other matters not familiar to man could exist as well, and 'Īsā's sojourn in heaven could well be one of them.¹⁷

The Aḥmadiyyah movement in Indonesian eventually developed good relations with several Muslim groups including the Muhammadiyah.¹⁸ They drew considerably less criticism as they became more and more associated with the modernist Muslim movement, for they opened schools, supported the Muslim viewpoint in politics and engaged in polemic with the Christians.¹⁹ Occasionally, however, an organization like the Persatuan Islam would lose a member to Aḥmadiyyah mission work and a renewal of propaganda would occur briefly, but no large scale campaign was

15. "Perslag opisil," Pembela Islam, No. 61, pp. 38, 40.

16. Ahmad Hassan, "Nabi jang masih hidup," Sual-Djawab, No. 12, p. 82.

17. Ibid.

18. 'Alī, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," pp. 71-72.

19. van Nieuwenhuijze, "Islam in a period of Transition in Indonesia," Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia (The Hague and Bandung: van Hoeve, 1958), pp. 58-59.

renewed.²⁰ The Ahmadiyah was grudgingly accepted, even though its own peculiar doctrines were not.

Muslim Attitudes Toward Christianity

Dutch historians have noted the amazing speed with which Islam spread throughout the Archipelago in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and have maintained that the rapid acceptance of Islam was a reaction to the arrival of the Christian white man to the area.²¹ There is also considerable evidence to support the contention that for the past 350 years, Islam in the Indonesian Archipelago has been identified with the native population, and that Christianity has been considered by its Muslim inhabitants as synonymous with the Dutch. Opposition to the Dutch throughout the colonial period invariably had religious overtones--even though causes might be more mundane in actuality--and were regarded as part of a religious struggle to remove the "non-believing" Dutch from the Indies.²² Muslim polemics against Christianity during a period of nationalistic fervor must also be seen as a native effort to strike at the Dutch in the realm of religion.

The policy of the Dutch East Indies Administration, from the time Snouck Hurgronje in the latter part of the nineteenth century, was not to discriminate against Islam, largely because it feared security problems if the faith of staunch Muslim populations was challenged.²³ The Colonial Administration had never been sympathetic with Christian missionary activities, and had even excluded them from working in such strongly Muslim areas as Atjeh and Bantam, and had made it difficult for them to enter several other areas with large Muslim populations.²⁴ Gottfried

20. See, for example, A., "Letter from A. to K. H. M. A. Sanusi," Al-Muslimun, IV, No. 38 (November 1958), p. 23.
21. See, for example, Schrieke, "The Penetration of Islam in the Archipelago," Indonesian Sociological Studies, II, pp. 232-237.
22. The *Padri* wars (1800 to 1837), the Atjehnese wars (1873 to 1908), the uprising of Diponegoro (1825 to 1830) and the *Samim* peasant revolt (1890 to 1917), *inter alia*, had religious overtones.
23. Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje's recommendations regarding Dutch Islamic policy are outlined above pp.
24. von der Mehden, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia, p. 172; see also Bousquet, Introduction a l'etude de l'Islam indonesien, pp. 162-164 for further comment on the status of missions and their relationship with the Dutch.

Simon, one of the leading mission writers at the turn of the century, denounced the policy of the Administration "which is always that of neutrality, often degenerating into favoritism" for the Muslim, and stated that such an attitude hindered Christian proselytizing efforts.²⁵ Church groups and religious political parties in the Netherlands were sympathetic toward mission activities, and when the Christian coalitions came to power in 1909, active Christianizing of the Indies was a stated government policy.²⁶

Muslims had long believed that the Dutch favored Christianity over Islam and saw the increase in mission activity as an attempt to undermine and destroy Islam. The large amount of government aid given to Christian religious schools because they qualified for government educational grants caused considerable resentment, even though some Muslim institutions received aid as well.²⁷ Throughout the period between the two world wars, Indonesian Muslims wrote articles and held meetings protesting missionary activity and called for a halt in Muslim areas. In 1934, Muhammadiyah leader Hadji Fachroeddin wrote a pamphlet against the Christian mission effort and against Christianity in general which gained considerable readership among Indonesian Muslims.²⁸ The Oemmat Islam organization at Solo held a congress of Indonesian Muslim leaders in 1933 and sent recommendations to the government to continue controls on missionary activities.²⁹ The 1939 Congress of the Madjelis Islam A'la Indonesia passed a resolution against expanded missionary activity in the Indies, which took on added meaning since MIAI was a coalition of all the leading Muslim organizations, political and non-political, in Indonesia.³⁰ Von der Mehden suggests that much of the Muslim concern with nationalism, including the founding of the predecessor organization to the Sarekat Islam, arose from the rise in mission activity and the belief held by many Muslims that a deliberate policy of "Christianizing" the Indies was being followed by the East

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25. Samuel M. Zwemer, Across the World of Islam (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1929), p. 269.
 26. von der Mehden, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia, p. 177.
 27. (Ali, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," p. 56.
 28. Cited in Sukarno, Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, I, p. 330.
 29. "Menentang propaganda Keristen," originally appearing in Adil, No. 152 (April 1933), p. 153 ff., and reprinted in Pembela Islam, No. 61 (May 1933), pp. 30-33.
 30. Hadji Aboebakar Atjeh, K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, p. 315.

Indies Administration.³¹

Dutch missionaries enjoyed their greatest success among those groups still following pagan rites and religions, while their contact with Muslim areas were seldom productive.³² Faced with a hostile attitude on the part of zealous Muslims and aware of the superficial Islamization of a large part of the Indonesian population, many Christian missionary writers were prone to make depreciative statements about Islam and Muslims. Gottfried Simon, for example, revealed a commonly held viewpoint among Christian missionary writers about Islam with such statements as ". . . within Islam animism does not play the part of a barely tolerated slave, rather it receives royal favor."³³ Simon observed further that only by incorporating animism had it been possible for Islam to become a world religion. Other Christian writers in Indonesia attacked Islam for its defense of polygyny, but perhaps most offensive to the Muslims was the denial of Muhammad's prophethood, in sometimes abusive terms by Western orientalisists in general and by several Christian missionaries in particular. In 1931, Joannes Josephus ten Berge,

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31. von der Mehden, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia, pp. 179-180.
 32. 'Alī, "The Muhammadijah Movement," p. 21; Samuel Zwemer hinted at the lack of conversions from Islam to Christianity after his visit to the Dutch Indies mission field in 1929. "During my visit we found unanimity in the testimony of all missionaries in Java and Sumatra that 'Islam can never be a bridge over the gulf that separates the heathen from Christianity'. . . ." Across the World of Islam, p. 269.
 33. The quote continues: "The despised cult of animistic magic receives in Islam the rank of a divine institution. It is the gift of God to His faithful believers." Ibid., p. 270. See also Gottfried Simon, The Progress and Arrest of Islam in Sumatra (London, Edinburgh and New York: Marshall Brothers, 1912). Simon's approach is understandable in light of his zealous missionary background, but he does not show great perception of Islam. He sees the nominal conversion to Islam as compromise with foreign religions, without viewing the emphasis of Islam on the deepening of religious belief that marks the progress of Islam in nearly every place it has established itself. The charges of the Muslims were just as frequently offensive to the Christians. One particular writer cited statistics, which he claimed were official, of illegitimate children, incidence of syphilis, and abortions occurring in America as evidence of the moral bankruptcy of Christianity. Moehammad Natsir, "Zending contra Islam," Pembela Islam, No. 21 (March 1931) pp. 24-29.

a Dutch missionary in Central Java, caused considerable stir when he published an article in a missionary periodical in which he called Muhammad an "anthropomorphist" and suggested that he had been too concerned with women and sex to have founded a higher religion.³⁴

Muslim Reaction to Christian Polemic

For their part, Muslim writers were prone to point out what they regarded as failings of the West and cited them as examples of the failure of Christianity to regulate political and social life. These Muslims charged that the First World War showed Christian society to be bankrupt of fundamental spiritual feeling,³⁵ and maintained that the problems that the European powers were experiencing with their colonies during the 1930's were further evidence of such spiritual bankruptcy.³⁶ They pointed out the crime rate in Western countries, particularly in America, and noted that Christianity permitted the drinking of alcohol and the free association of sexes, which, in these writers' opinions, were the causes of many social crimes.³⁷ This polemic was actually part of the general disdain felt for Western culture by all Indonesians, but expressed as a dislike of Christianity because Muslims thought in religious terms.

Attacks against the Prophet, or unflattering statements made about Muhammad by non-Muslims, aroused Indonesian Muslims several times in the early 1930's. In early April 1931, the ten Berge article appeared, followed in late April by an article by Oei Bee Thay in *Hoakien* characterizing Muhammad as "an

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34. Centraal Comite al-Islam Indonesia (Surabaia), "Surat tantangan ke J. J. Ten Berge di Mantillan, August 17, 1931," Pembela Islam, No. 32 (August 1931), pp. 27-28. The letter quoted Pastor Ten Berge's remarks from the periodical Studien (April 1931) as follows: "Men ziet het . . . Hoe zou hij (Moehammad, W.) de anthropomorphist, de onwetende Arabier, de grove wellusteling, die gewoon was in de armen van vrouwen te liggen, ook een andere en hoogere opvatting van het Vaderschap hebben kunnen vermoeden."
 35. Natsir, "Zending contra Islam," Pembela Islam, No. 21 (March 1931), p. 25.
 36. Si Goblok (pseudonym), "Doenia Islam masa sekarang," Pembela Islam, No. 29 (July 1931), pp. 15-16.
 37. Natsir, "Zending contra Islam," Pembela Islam, No. 21 (March 1931), pp. 26-27; M. T., "Andjing, alcohol, vrijomhang d.s.b.," Pembela Islam, No. 20 (February 1931), pp. 6-7.

aspirant self-murderer," insane and a robber. In 1937, Siti Sumandari and Soeroto published an article in *Bangun* which charged that Islam's views on polygyny and marriage were caused by the Prophet's "desires and jealousy." Muslim reaction to these articles was immediate and hostile. The Komite Al-Islam in Surabaya was established to protest the ten Berge and *Hoakien* articles--and prompted *Hoakien* to retract its article. Sumandari and Soeroto apologized after most leading Muslim organizations protested their article, and the Parindra (Partai Indonesia Raya--Greater Indonesia Party) to which they belonged put pressure on them in the interests of Indonesian nationalist harmony.³⁸ While non-Christians made some of these remarks about the Prophet, Muslims generally associated such attacks with Christianity. The MIAI, in 1939, considered all these uncomplimentary articles at its congress and assigned to the Persatuan Islam the task of preparing a response to Christian attacks on Islam.³⁹

Persis Views of Christianity

In response to the MIAI request Ahmad Hassan wrote *Ketoe-hanan Jesoes menoeroet Bijbel* (The Divinity of Jesus according to the Bible), which presented a number of scholarly and logical arguments in easily understandable terms refuting the divinity of Christ.⁴⁰ While the approach was basically Muslim, Ahmad Hassan made no reference to Islamic scripture in making his points but relied entirely on reason and an analysis of Christian scripture. The following composite of Persis arguments against Christianity draws heavily on Ahmad Hassan's study, but includes other Persis writers which appeared in *Pembela Islam* and *Al-Lisan*.

Persatuan Islam writers maintained that holy writ had been revealed to Jesus in the same manner that the Qur'ān had been revealed to Muḥammad, but complained that the Old and New Testaments bore no relationship to the *Tawrāh* and *Injīl* mentioned in the Qur'ān because of modifications and falsifications made by Jews and Christians. A Persatuan Islam writer in *Al-Lisan* in 1935 stated that the New Testament of the Christians did not contain a single qualification as a holy book. "The original book does not exist, the authors are not known, the contents

38. See: Noer, "The Rise of the Modernist Muslim Movement," pp. 244 and 400-401.

39. Ahmad Hassan, *Ketoe-hanan Jesoes menoeroet Bijbel* (Bandoeng: Persatoean Islam, 1940), p. 1.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

are far from fitting, and one portion conflicts with another in a great many cases."⁴¹

In *Ketoehanan Jesoes menoeroet Bijbel*, Ahmad Hassan stated that Christians completely misunderstood references in the Bible to the mission of Jesus. He maintained that Jesus was a prophet like other prophets before him and Muḥammad after him, and that he had not been crucified to take away the sins of mankind. He suggested that the devotion of the Christians to the personality of Jesus had led to an exaggeration of Jesus' prophetic role into the belief that he was actually God. "We (Muslims) do not believe in Jesus as God, nor as part divine, nor as the son of God, nor as a form combining God and man."⁴²

Ahmad Hassan claimed that several expressions in the New Testament had been poorly translated into European languages: "Lord," "Christ the Lord," and "son of God," were actually titles of respect and probably only referred to Christ's relationship with God--a relationship not exclusively belonging to Jesus alone, but to others as well. ". . . And there are a great many more verses from the Bible indicating that 'Father' means 'God,' and 'son' means a person loved by God."⁴³ David and Adam, Ahmad Hassan pointed out, were also described in Christian and Hebrew scripture as having this same special relationship with God. Likewise, he argued, biblical references to the "holy spirit" really meant "a clean spirit, (i.e.) not a devil or a *shayṭān*." He admitted that a "clean spirit" may have been the device employed in the immaculate conception but stated his opinion that none of the several references to the "holy spirit" in the Old and New Testaments made the holy spirit identical with God.⁴⁴

41. *Al-Lisan*, No. 1 (December 1935), p. 19.

42. Ahmad Hassan, *Ketoehanan Jesoes menoeroet Bijbel*, pp. 5, 2. The citation continues, "We only believe he is a person, prophet and apostle, who was free from sin as were other prophets, and we do not believe that he was crucified, especially crucified to cut away the sins of mankind." *Ibid.*, p. 2. For more on Ahmad Hassan's belief concerning 'Isā, see his *fatwā* entitled "Nabi Isa berbapa?," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 4, pp. 16-18.

43. Ahmad Hassan, *Ketoehanan Jesoes menoeroet Bijbel*, p. 26.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 4. In *An-Nubuwwah*, Ahmad Hassan, arguing from the context of the legitimacy of the Prophet Muḥammad's mission, maintained that Christ's references to a "comforter" in the 16th chapter of St. John, were direct references to Muḥammad, and not to the holy spirit as is generally held among Christians. He stated that the root meaning of the word "paraclet," the Greek word for comforter, means

Persis writers found the Christian belief in the crucifixion of Christ for the expiation of sins unacceptable. Ahmad Hassan lamented, "Does God not know any other way to save mankind except by the sacrifice of flesh and blood?" "Would it not have been easier for Him to forgive mankind [its sins] without shedding the blood of His son? . . ." Even in the story of the crucifixion, Persatuan Islam writers noted what they considered contradictions. They wondered how Jesus could be God and still be killed, when life is an attribute of God. It was equally incomprehensible that Jesus, if he were truly God, could know fear, as when tempted by Satan and while upon the cross, when according to Muslim theological speculation fear is foreign to God's character.⁴⁵ Finally, Persatuan Islam writers regarded the Christian doctrine of the Trinity as beyond their comprehension--a view not uncommon to most non-Christians. "We and all people of the world are not able to fathom the extraordinary method of algebra [used by] the Christians. For instance, how can one equal three and three equal one."⁴⁶ To the members of the Persatuan Islam, as to nearly all Muslim writers, the entire concept of the Trinity violated *tawhīd*, the divine unity.

Persis writers saw the missions as a threat to Islam in Indonesia, but like many other Indonesian Muslims, they occasionally accorded the missions grudging respect. In an unsigned article entitled "Christianity in Indonesia works and Islam merely gapes," the Persatuan Islam noted that the Muslims were no match for the activities of the missions which had "wealth, energy and spirit" and were able to influence young Indonesians in matters of religion through the schools they operated. Muslims on the other hand, the article noted, were disorganized, disinterested and badly led. The Islamic effort "is organized willy-nilly, its capital is the turban [*sorban*], the rosary [*tasbīh*] and amulet [*djimat*], it prefers mysticism [*dhikr*] and sleeping in the religious schools [*langgar*], and it has, for the greater part . . . totally ignorant leaders." According to the article, it was such Muslim shortcomings that aided Christian inroads on Islam and strengthened the Dutch hold on Indonesia. The article concluded that to be successful against a dynamic Christianity, Islam would have to create a new image, characterized by unity of purpose, with emphasis on education and leadership that had capability and knowledge.⁴⁷ Undoubtedly,

"a person who is very much praised," i.e., the same meaning as the name Muḥammad in Arabic. p. 213.

45. Ahmad Hassan, Ketoehanan Jesoes menoeroet Bijbel, pp. 34-35.
46. Ibid., p. 12.
47. "Agama Kristen di Indonesia bekerdja dan Islam boleh nganggoer," Pembela Islam, No. 71 (May 1935), pp. 3-5.

the Persatuan Islam believed that Muslim acceptance of the fundamentalist principles it advocated would aid considerably in the development of that new image.

CHAPTER VIII

CURTAILED ACTIVITY UNDER THE JAPANESE AND DURING THE REVOLUTION

The Japanese occupation, from February 1942 until August 1945, as an event was a turning point in the history of Indonesia. As a time-span, it was a transition period which marked the loss of Dutch control over the area, for all practical purposes, and offered the Indonesians the opportunity to declare national independence and begin the final effort necessary to attain it. For this study, however, a description of that period, and the Muslim activity during it would have only peripheral value, for it also marked a low point in Persatuan Islam activity. A brief look at the occupation period is included here only to indicate some of the difficulties confronting the organization's leaders, and to indicate how they survived into the post-war period.¹

The Japanese Occupation

Immediately upon occupying Indonesia, the Japanese banned all native political and religious organizations, but over the next three years, they allowed several organizations to resume activity. They also created several new organizations and used them to rally support for the Japanese war effort. In late 1942, the Madjelis Islam A'la Indonesia (MIAI) was re-established for the purpose of coordinating the activities of the '*ulamā*', and was encouraged to publish a monthly periodical entitled *Soera MIAI*. Over the next two years four other religious organizations--the Muhammadiyah, the Nahdlatul Ulama, the Perikatan

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1. The four primary works for the Japanese period are: Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun; M. A. Aziz, Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955); Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation, 1944-1945 (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1961); and Okuma Memorial Social Sciences Research Institute of Waseda University, Indonesia ni Okeru Nihon Gunsei no Kenkyu (Tokyo: Kinokuniya Shoten, 1959), trans. Joint Publications Research Service of the U.S. Department of Commerce, October 1963, JPRS #21,359.

Oemmat Islam of Madjalengka and the Persatoean Oemmat Islam Indonesia--were allowed to resume activity.² The Persatuan Islam was not among this selected group, but several of its schools survived, including the Pesantren Ketjil in Bandung. The organization itself, its principal school at Bangil, its periodicals, and all its many other activities, ceased functioning, and members of the Persatuan Islam were able to act only as individuals. Members of the Persatuan Islam therefore could not play the prominent role in national affairs that some of the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama did, but several Persis members occupied responsible positions in regional religious bureaus established by the Japanese.

Like many other Muslim and nationalist groups, the members of the Persatuan Islam outwardly cooperated with the Japanese but engaged in low-level nationalist underground activity--primarily training and indoctrination--aimed at attaining eventual Indonesian independence. Moehammad Isa Anshary, for example, was a member of the Secretariat of the MIAI organization in the Priangan (Greater Bandung) region and later held the same position in Masjoemi, the successor organization to MIAI. Isa Anshary's official biography stated that he was active in organizing youth for anti-Japanese underground activity and, in 1944, was imprisoned for a month when these activities were discovered by the Japanese. The lightness of the sentence indicates that no actual anti-Japanese activities had been undertaken, and it is probable that Isa Anshary's activities were only in the organizational stage.³ Moehammad Natsir was an adviser on educational affairs in the Priangan area and, in 1943, took an active part in organizing training programs for '*ulamā*' from the Java area.⁴ These programs, organized exclusively by the Indonesian '*ulamā*' themselves, were officially intended to provide general instruction on Japanese ideas and beliefs, educational methods and even sports, but apparently there was considerable discussion among participating '*ulamā*' concerning the promotion of Islam--*īmān* and *tawhīd*--among the general Muslim population.⁵ These discussions of Islamic beliefs tended to play down--and often contradict--much of the Japanese public teaching and propaganda, particularly the doctrines of chosen race and the divinity of the emperor. In his study of the Japanese attitude toward Islam in Indonesia, Harry Benda claimed

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2. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, p. 116.
 3. Parlaungan, Hasil Rakjat memilih Tokoh-tokoh Parlemen, pp. 156-158; see also Aboebakar Atjeh, K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, pp. 219-224.
 4. Parlaungan, Hasil Rakjat memilih Tokoh-tokoh Parlemen, p. 221; Deliar Noer, "Masjumi," p. 28.
 5. Noer, "Masjumi," p. 28.

that these cadre courses served as an effective organizing and indoctrinating device for anti-Japanese activity among Indonesian Muslims.⁶

It is somewhat surprising that Ahmad Hassan, who had taken a forthright stand on many issues affecting religion in the fifteen years prior to the war, did not openly object to Japanese efforts to introduce the *sai keirei*, the ritual bowing toward the emperor in Tokyo at the beginning of all official meetings. Early in the Japanese occupation, *keirei* had been introduced at government offices and schools as a patriotic ceremony marking the opening of business. In 1942, Hadji Abdulkarim Amrullah, the leading advocate of Islamic modernism on Sumatra, sent a tract to the Japanese director of religious affairs on Java condemning the practice as contrary to established Islamic practice,⁷ and at a subsequent conference of '*ulamā*' refused to perform this ritual obeisance.⁸ Hamka, writing his father's biography, described the dilemma facing Amrullah before that particular '*ulamā*'s conference, and mentioned that of those most likely to oppose *sai keirei* "Ahmad Hassan was absent and in Bandung."⁹ However, if Ahmad Hassan was against the *sai keirei* he never initiated any crusade against it, nor is there any record of his opposition in the works of the Persatuan Islam members published after the war. If Ahmad Hassan did disapprove of *sai keirei*, he did it privately and avoided taking a public stand on the issue, as his absence from the '*ulamā*'s conference suggests. There is also no record of his participation in any position in the Japanese administration, nor is there any indication that he was actively opposed to the Japanese administration; presumably he remained inactive on the basis of ill health.¹⁰

This then was the sum total of the Persatuan Islam's activity during the period of the Second World War. By losing its organization and, more importantly, its instruments of propaganda, and by being denied the opportunity to speak out on religious and nationalist issues without fear of reprisal, the

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6. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, p. 135; see also Noer, "Masjumi," p. 28.
 7. Hamka, Ajahku, pp. 183-186.
 8. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, p. 130.
 9. Hamka, Ajahku, p. 185.
 10. Ahmad Hassan, Kedaulatan (Malang: Toko "Timoer," 1946), p. 1. "At the time Indonesian independence was originally proclaimed, I was afflicted by several forms of illness which took me from where I was to where I could be cured."

dynamism of the organization's members was stilled. Its only real effort--participation in cadre training courses--was at best only a holding action designed to maintain "true Muslim belief" until a more opportune period would allow a return to more active efforts.

The Revolutionary Years

The Indonesian proclamation of independence made by Sukarno and Hatta on August 17, 1945 was supported by all Indonesian factions existing at that time. Competing political factions put aside their differences in hope that a united front would strengthen the new state to withstand the Dutch attempt to reimpose colonial rule. The coalition stood, although shakily at times, until after the Dutch transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia in 1950.

During this period, between 1945 and 1950, the differences between the Muslims and the secular nationalists over the proper direction and content of an independent Indonesia was not entirely forgotten, despite cooperation of both groups in the republican government. The differences between the two sides had been apparent when the Committee for Preparing Indonesian Independence, formed in the latter days of the Japanese occupation, had debated and considered the matter of the role of Islam in the state.¹¹ Certain Muslim (*ulamā*) on the committee, notably K. H. Mas Mansur, Abdulkahar Muzakkir and Agus Salim, prepared a document known as the Djakarta Charter (*Piagam Djakarta*)¹² which placed Sukarno's Pantja Sila concept¹³ in a

11. For accounts of the committee see Noer, "Masjumi," pp. 30-32; Indonesia ni Okeru Nihon Gunsei no Kenkyu, pp. 418-428; Anderson, Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics, pp. 108-110.
12. "Piagam Djakarta" appears in Republik Indonesia: Kotapradja Djakarta Raya (Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1953), p. 35.
13. Pantja Sila is a Sanskrit term meaning five principles, not to be confused with the *Panch Sila* of the Bandung Conference in 1955. Sukarno's Pantja Sila were *Ketuhanan jang Masa Esa* (The absolute unity of God--implying belief in God), *Kemanusiaan jang adil dan beradab* (humanitarianism based on justice and civility), *Persatuan Indonesia* (the national unity of Indonesia, commonly referred to as nationalism), *Kerakjatan* (democracy) and *Keadilan Sosial* (social justice). There is some discussion of Pantja Sila in most standard works on Indonesia. See, in particular, van der Kroef, Indonesia in the Modern World, II, pp. 198-210 for a sociological study, and C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze,

framework acceptable to Muslims. The crucial portion of the Djakarta Charter stated that "With belief in almighty God and motivated by noble wishes to live as an independent nation, the Indonesian people hereby declare their independence." While Sukarno, Hatta and several other nationalist leaders signed this document, and the major content of the Charter itself was incorporated into the preamble of the 1945 Constitution, the Preparatory Committee, with its predominantly secularist membership, modified the crucial portion to read "With God's Blessing and moved by the high ideal of a free national life, the Indonesian people declare their Independence."¹⁴

This change in stress was less than satisfactory to many Muslim leaders who saw it as a deliberate secularist attempt to undercut the Muslim position. These Muslims believed that the Muslims should organize their own party to express their grievances and strive for Muslim ideals and not join, without party affiliation, in a united front with the secularists. Consequently, in September 1945, a group of prominent Muslim leaders, led by Abdulkahar Muzakkir, Wahid Hasjim and Moehammad Roem, met to reactivate the still existing though largely dormant Masjoemi, established by the Japanese as a Muslim unity organization. They organized a conference of prominent '*ulamā*' later that month at which it was decided to create an entirely new organization called Masjumi with theoretically no connection with the old Masjoemi founded under the Japanese. Nevertheless, the adoption of the same name--with a new spelling to correspond with Bahasa Indonesia orthography rather than Dutch--allowed it to incorporate the old Masjoemi's organization into its new form.¹⁵ Masjumi immediately adopted a policy of cooperation with the secularists then running the Republic of Indonesia government, and until 1952, the governments were coalitions of the Masjumi and the Nationalist Party to which most secularists belonged.

The Persatuan Islam was not reestablished until 1948, but its members supported the republican effort from the very begin-

"The Indonesian state and 'deconfessionalized' Muslim concepts" in *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia* (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1958), pp. 180-243.

14. The 1945 Constitution has been printed in a number of books and has been issued as a pamphlet by various Indonesian organizations. For the Indonesian text see Osman Raliby, *Documenta Historica* (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1953), pp. 489-494. For an English translation, see Charles Wolf Jr., *The Indonesian Story* (New York: John Day, 1948), Appendix, pp. 165-171.
15. Noer, "Masjumi," p. 39; Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, pp. 156-158.

ning. Younger members of the organization actively participated in the Sabillah and Hizbullah, the paramilitary organizations formed by Masjoemi in the latter days of the Japanese occupation. Isa Anshary held posts in the Sabillah organization in the Priangan residency and was also a member of the local "national committee" of the same residency which functioned as a local government of sorts in the early days of the Revolution. Moehammad Natsir was Minister of Information in the republican government until 1947 and thereafter supported the republican effort as editor of the influential daily *Suara Republik*.¹⁶

Ahmad Hassan wrote two pamphlets supporting the republican government in early 1946 that reflected the Muslim leadership's decision to cooperate with the secularists. He stated in *Kedaulatan* (Sovereignty), apparently written to answer impatient criticism by some Muslim factions of the Sukarno government and convince them of the need for unity, that "they [the secularists] proclaimed independence and we [Muslims] sought shelter in an independent nation. . . . We must give them our thanks." Muslims, he stated, should have patience and later, when it would become possible to decide the matter of a permanent state with permanent laws, "we will establish a government for Indonesia on the *Sharī'ah* of Islam." Ahmad Hassan recognized that until that time came Indonesia would be a secular state and that there would be many shortcomings, but added that those shortcomings caused by secularism should be combatted peacefully--"with orderly sermons and advice."¹⁷ Muslims were, for example, to use their influence with local officials and the police to check and eliminate improper behavior among the population. "Using force" to erect an Islamic system in the state at that time, stated Ahmad Hassan, "would result in slander and the heavy outpouring of blood," and cause "civil strife that could be used by our enemies."¹⁸ He concluded in *Mereboet Kekuasaan* (Seizing Power) that until the opportunity arrived for the formulation of a permanent constitution, that it was incumbent upon the Muslim groups to "honor the government and its policies" and not undertake action detrimental to it.¹⁹

While they believed fully in cooperation with Sukarno and the secular nationalists, like other Muslim groups, the members of the Persatuan Islam made plans for the establishment of a national state based on Islamic lines. As early as 1946, Ahmad

16. Parlaungan, Hasil Rakjat memilih Tokoh-tokoh Parlemen, pp. 158, 175-176.

17. Ahmad Hassan, Kedaulatan, pp. 17-19.

18. Ibid., p. 6.

19. Ahmad Hassan, Mereboet Kekuasaan (Malang: Toko "Timoer," 1946), p. 19.

Hassan published a short monograph entitled *Pemerintahan Tjara Islam* (Government according to Islam) which was an attempt to reconcile Islam's political theory with modern democratic theories of government. Ahmad Hassan suggested that democracy had been recognized in early Islam--in the election of the first *khalīfah* Abū Bakr and in a statement made by the *khalīfah* 'Umar, and that actually, the rest of the world had learned about democracy from Islam.²⁰ Islamic government was based both on the Qur'ān and on consultation of the people; because Islam had certain rules that could not be transgressed, it eliminated many of the pitfalls of democracy based merely on the will of the people, which may choose many evils "even drinking alcohol and permitting whoredom (*zinā*)."²¹ He concluded that the forms of Islamic democracy were no different than those of other democracies and that officials like prime ministers and institutions like cabinets and parliaments would be needed, even with Islam.²²

The Persatuan Islam was reestablished as a functioning organization in April 1948,²³ a short time after Isa Anshary and other members who had constituted a republican government for the Priangan region at Garut were allowed by the Dutch to return to Bandung under the terms of the 1948 Renville Agreement between the Dutch and the Republic of Indonesia.²⁴ The proclamation of its founding stated that, like the Persatuan Islam existing before World War II, the new organization would be interested solely in religious matters.²⁵ In 1948, however, the Dutch established a Pasundan state in West Java, supposedly as part of the Renville agreements. The Renville Agreement called for a plebiscite in the West Java area, but the Dutch held several congresses of selected Sundanese nationalists

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20. Ahmad Hassan, Pemerintahan Tjara Islam, pp. 6-8, 3.
 21. Ibid., p. 13.
 22. Ibid., pp. 10-11, 19-21.
 23. Abdul Haris Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia (typescript, no date), vol. VII, unpaginated.
 24. Aboebakar Atjeh, K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, p. 224.
 25. Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, VII. "We, the Central Leadership of the Persatuan Islam announce that as of April 1, 1948, the Persatuan Islam has resumed functioning. It is generally known that before broken by World War II, the Persatuan Islam was known as a movement whose special struggle was in the field of religion alone. With this announcement, we continue that religious struggle. We call to all branches of the Persatuan Islam and their sections to continue their work as usual by observing national laws."

who established a "Sundanese" state without the promised plebiscite. This state, regarded as a Dutch puppet even by large segments of its own population, endured until 1950 when it dissolved itself and was incorporated into the unitary Republic of Indonesia.²⁶ Despite the large number of Sundanese among Persis membership who might be expected to have some sympathy with a Sundanese state, the Persatuan Islam opted for the republican cause. On April 13, 1948, the Persatuan Islam participated in a conference of religious organizations in the Bandung region to discuss the Pasundan State and other matters, and formed a Madjelis Persatuan Ummat Islam (Unitary Council of the Islamic Ummah) which announced its separation from the Pasundan State.²⁷ This federation was replaced later by the Gerakan Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Movement) headed by Persis leader Isa Anshary, which worked for the republican cause in West Java until Pasundan entered the Republic of Indonesia.²⁸

Through his periodical *Aliran Islam* (Basis of Islam), started in 1948 and published in Dutch controlled Bandung, Isa Anshary published articles openly favoring the republican movement. His articles reflected the dislike in West Java for the "second Dutch police action" in 1948 that had captured Sukarno, Hatta and other important republican leaders, and for the subsequent Dutch announcement that the Republic of Indonesia no longer existed.²⁹ When the Dutch proceeded with plans to establish indirect rule over the archipelago by forming a United States of Indonesia (Negara Indonesia Serikat) from fifteen states and special areas recognized by the Dutch, Isa Anshary stated that such a federation should not be formed without participation by the imprisoned republican leaders. ". . . It must be with the knowledge," he stated in "Garis Perdjuangan Kita" (Outline of our Struggle), "that the Indonesian people stand behind the Republic of Indonesia, stand behind Sukarno and Hatta."³⁰ A like attitude on the part of delegates meeting

26. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 368-369, 445.
27. Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, VII.
28. Parlaungan, Hasil Rakjat memilih Tokoh-tokoh Parlemen, p. 158.
29. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 343.
30. Moehammad Isa Anshary, "Garis Perdjuangan Kita," Aliran Islam, No. 3 (January 1949), p. 124. Another example of his support of the Republic of Indonesia appeared in Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam, p. 5, where he referred to ". . . Sukarno and Hatta as the spokesmen of Indonesian independence representing 70 million Indonesians. . . ."

to form the Negara Indonesia Serikat, combined with renewed fighting by republican forces in central Java and United Nations pressure, ultimately succeeded in participation by the imprisoned republican leaders in negotiations with the Dutch that resulted in the creation of an independent Indonesian state in 1950.

Despite his support of the secularist leaders of the Republic of Indonesia, Isa Anshary, like Ahmad Hassan, did not lose sight of the goal of establishing an Indonesian state based on Islamic principles. In Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam (The Philosophy of Islam's Struggle), written in 1949, he noted that Muslims were participating in the struggle for independence to "erect a nation in the grace of God [*keridlaan Allāh*] as fulfilling their responsibility as Muslims."³¹ The nation Muslims strive for, Isa Anshary concluded, "regulates and gives guidance and life concerning the basic truths of the human community, whether in the field of politics, economics or social affairs."³² This was a reiteration of the Muslim political stand made prior to the war and was indicative that no real change of attitude had occurred. Since the secular nationalists led by Sukarno had already created a secular state, beset though it was by an external enemy and only provisional in nature, they had every reason to hold to their stand of secularism, and it was only a matter of time before a clash occurred between the two groups. With the constitutional period (1950 to 1958), when the threat of Dutch intervention was constantly receding, the dispute was provided with conditions for fruition.

31. Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam, p. 13.

32. Moehammad Isa Anshary, "Garis Perdjuangan Kita," Aliran Islam, I, No. 3 (January 1949), pp. 122-125.

CHAPTER IX

ORGANIZATION AFTER WORLD WAR II

Prior to World War II, emphasis in the Persatuan Islam was on individual activity rather than on organization, and this same emphasis was apparent until the mid-1950's, when concern for the direction of the educational program, for the maintenance of uniform standards of quality in those schools, and for following a united policy in all the organization's branches led to the reorganization of the Persatuan Islam on a more formal basis than had existed before that time. The result has been a formalization of the relationship between the branches and the central organization, the establishment of various youth, women and student auxiliaries, the issuing of a house periodical; in general, all the trappings of a regular Indonesian organization seeking to gain its ends through organizational activity rather than through individual action.

Organization and Membership

The membership of the Persatuan Islam in mid-1963 was approximately 10,000, according to officials at its central bureau in Bandung. This figure presumably included members of the women's organization, the Persatuan Islam Isteri (Persatuan Islam Wives), the young women's group, the Djamijatul Banat (Association of Young Women), and the young men's association called the Pemuda Persatuan Islam (Persatuan Islam youth). While attending Persis schools, male students would belong to a student organization called the Ridjalul Ghad (men of tomorrow) and girls to an organization called the Ummatiatul Ghad (Mothers of Tomorrow), both of which were concerned only with student activities at the school and had no other political or social ends. After graduation, all students, both boys and girls, joined the Tanstiqul-Uchuwah (Students' Reunion) which met each year at various locations in West Java to discuss efforts for the spreading and propagation of Islam in Indonesia.¹

1. Interview with K. H. E. Abdurrahman, General Chairman of the Persatuan Islam, and Junus Anis, Chairman of the Pemuda Persatuan Islam at Bandung on July 21, 1963. The Persatuan Islam officially denies that its organization is intended to stifle individual initiative. "The Persatuan Islam does

The organizational structure of the Persatuan Islam was centered in a central board or secretariat (Badan Pusat) at Bandung. At the central headquarters, there were several departments for directing and coordinating the activities of the Persatuan Islam: the Bagian Tabliegh (Information Unit) was responsible for propaganda and spreading the Persis message; the Bagian Pendidikan (Education Unit) regulated the curriculum for the twenty schools of the organization; the Bagian Penjiaran (Distribution Unit) published the periodical *Risalah* and other publications of value to the organization; a Bagian Wanita (Women's Unit) coordinated women's affairs; and the Bagian Pemuda (Youth's Unit) was concerned with the activities of the various student and youth groups.² Branches of the Persatuan Islam were located throughout West and western-Central Java and a few other branches were found outside this area in such places as Palembang on Sumatra and at Bangil in East Java.³ Each

not have a Central Management [Pengurus Besar]. However, the Persatuan Islam has a Central Leadership [Pusat Pimpinan]. The Persatuan Islam does not regulate members, but the Persatuan Islam guides its members. Those who are led are only inanimate objects [*benda-benda mati*] which have no energy of life. But we guide members who have energy of life, members who live, who cannot even be compared with the lifeless forms which have no energy or power, who have no aims, directions or ideals for life. Every branch [of the organization] has similar leadership . . . who guide living members, who are characterized by determination and ideals. All of the [organization's] leadership is like that, and it wants to be "centered" [*berpusat*], not acting on its own and alone without relations of one with another, but rather can be characterized as a power with purpose, aiming toward achieving our goals and ideals." "Amanat K. H. E. Abdurrahman dimuka Tjabang Persatuan Islam Kotapradja Bandung, tanggal 8 Djuli 1962" as quoted in *Risalah*, I, No. 6 (August 1962), p. 56.

2. Interview with K. H. E. Abdurrahman and Junus Anis, July 21, 1963. No mention was made in the interview of a Bagian Sosial dan Ekonomi (Social and Economic Unit), but one probably does exist at Bandung since several of the branches of Persis have such a unit in their own local organizations. *Risalah*, III, No. 20 (April 1965), p. 4; I, No. 1 (June 1962), p. 12.
3. *Risalah*, I, No. 6 (August 1962), p. 57. Branches of the organization were listed as existing in Bandung, Simpang Tjiawi, Tjikalong-Kulon, Tasikmalaja, Soreang, Tjisomang, Sumedang, Tjitjalengka, Lekong-Buahbatu, Radjapolah, Palembang (South Sumatra), Magung, Padalarang, Pinang, Purwakarta, Serang, Tjiandjur. All of the above, except for Palembang, are located in West Java. According to *Risalah*,

branch undertook activities corresponding roughly to those of the central organization, although some branches lacked educational or printing facilities. In general, however, the work of the branches centered about education, with nearly every branch having a school, ranging from elementary in most places, to the teachers' education courses at Sumendang and at Bandung.⁴

Leaders

When the Persatuan Islam was formally reconstituted in 1948, Moehammad Isa Anshary became general chairman and continued in that position until 1961.⁵ Moehammad Natsir, although he became chairman of the Masjumi Party in 1949, still retained ties with Persis and helped re-establish the educational facilities at Bangil in the 1950's.⁶ Ahmad Hassan again became an important figure in Muslim education and, as prior to the war, argued for an emphasis on Islam in national affairs. Ahmad Hassan died in 1958.⁷ Abdurrahman, long associated with the Persis educational system at Bandung, became Secretary General of Persis after the war, and in 1961, succeeded Isa Anshary as General Chairman.⁸ He showed considerable organizational ability in keeping the Persatuan Islam functioning during a period of considerable political instability and rapid national economic decline.⁹ Hadji Moehammad Moenawar Chalil served for a

I, No. 1 (June 1962), p. 13, a branch exists at Pameungpeuk, and Risalah, II, No. 1 (May 1963), p. 20, lists a branch at Matraman Utara in Djakarta and another at Pamaniukan. Risalah, III, No. 20 (April 1965), p. 4, lists the establishment of a new branch at Sambas in the Riau Archipelago.

4. Risalah, I, No. 1 (June 1962), p. 13.
5. Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, VII.
6. Persatuan Islam, Pesantren: Bagian Putera dan Puteri, p. 6.
7. Nawawi Dusky, "A. Hassan," Hikmah, XI, No. 32 (November 22, 1958), p. 13.
8. Interview with K. H. E. Abdurrahman and Junus Anis, July 21, 1963.
9. K. H. E. Abdurrahman has been primarily an educator and administrator for the Persatuan Islam. It was only during his years as General Chairman of the Persatuan Islam, that he did any amount of writing, and all of that in the periodicals of the Persatuan Islam. His writings show deep knowledge of Islamic history and doctrine; his article "Ahliis Sunnah wal Djama'ah," written in 1956, is an outstanding example

considerable period as representative of the Persatuan Islam on the Department of Religious Affairs' board of Islamic scholars until his death in 1962.¹⁰

Several Persis leaders gained prominence only after the Revolutionary Period. Moehammad Ali Alhamidy was from the same mold as Ahmad Hassan and Isa Anshary, and actively advocated intense Muslim activity in every phase of life including politics.¹¹ Abdulkadir Hassan, the son of Ahmad Hassan, operated the schools at Bangil originally established by his father, and continued the practice, initiated by his father, of issuing *fatwās* on a large number of subjects.¹² Several other members also played a prominent role in the organization's development but did not become prominent as individual scholars: at Bandung K. H. E. Abdullah and K. H. I. Sudibjo, and at Bangil Mohammed bin Salim Nabhan, Abdullah Musa and Anwar Katsir.

During his tenure as chairman of Persis, Isa Anshary provided leadership and a point of view, just as Ahmad Hassan had

of how Islamic history can be related to current situations. See below p. 163. For an article outlining some of his teachings see, Hurtlela, "Perpetjahan dalam Persatuan," *Hikmah*, XI, No. 22 (August 2, 1958), pp. 2-21.

10. Hadji Moenawar Chalil was a prolific writer on religious subjects and his articles appeared in several Muslim periodicals including *Hikmah* and *Al-Islam*. A large number of his *fatwās* appeared in *Sual-Djawab*. His chief works, outlining his own religious viewpoint, were *Al-Qur'an dari masa ke masa* and *Kembali kepada Al-Qur'an dan As-Sunnah; Suatu muqaddamah bagi himpunan hadits-hadits melihara* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1961). See the bibliographies attached to this essay for other important works. A biographic sketch of Moenawar Chalil appeared under the title "H. Moenawar Chalil" in *Minggu Abadi*, February 28, 1960.
11. Moehammad Ali Alhamidy is a prolific writer for Islamic periodicals, and an orator of considerable repute. An outline of his basic principles appears in his book entitled *Rukun Hidup* (Jakarta: Al-Ma'arif, 1951). For a personal sketch and partial biography see Nawawi Dusky, "Ulama, rumahnja terbuka buat peminat-peminat agama: Usadz M. Ali Alhamidy dengan tenaga muda jang terlatih," *Hikmah*, XII, No. 6 (March 14, 1959), pp. 11-13.
12. Abdulkadir Hassan's principle work is *U-Shul Fiqih* (Principles of Jurisprudence). A number of his *fatwās* appear in *Sual-Djawab* particularly volumes XIII, XIV and XV.

done in the pre-war years. Isa Anshary was originally from the Minangkabau region in Sumatra where he had been educated in a *madrasah* operated by Muslim modernists. In 1932, at the age of 16, he traveled to Bandung where he entered a political movement headed by Sukarno and undertook religious education from Ahmad Hassan.¹³ He apparently remained in Bandung after Ahmad Hassan moved to Bangil and began writing on religion and politics under the tutelage of Moehammad Natsir.¹⁴

Isa Anshary's basic viewpoint was concerned with what he termed the "modern *Jāhilīyah*," caused by man's departure from spiritual values for the attainment of technical progress. He criticized Western technical progress which has developed the material manifestations of life, but "sink man into the valley of darkness" as far as spiritual values are concerned. The conditions of the *Jāhilīyah* are similar to the modern period, he maintained, in that man's spirit, in the midst of "bombs, artillery and atomic weapons" still thirsts ". . . for eternal concepts." The many "isms" have clouded his vision and led man to confuse his own "desires and passions with the overall good." What man needs, Isa Anshary stated, is an absolute guide, and such a guide is provided by Islam, with its unchanging beliefs in God, its *Sharī'ah* and its *ummah*.¹⁵

Educational Facilities

Persatuan Islam leaders, like most other Indonesian Muslim leaders, believed that a religious oriented education was preferable for all Muslims. Their own schools were necessary because the Indonesian government's education system had almost no religious content and was secularist in outlook.

The Persatuan Islam's educational system had its headquarters at Bandung in the Bagian Pendidikan, which was established in 1955 to standardize all religious instruction in the schools of the Persatuan Islam and maintain the same degree of quality throughout the system. In 1963, the Persatuan Islam operated over twenty schools throughout West and Central Java, a number of special teachers and "informants" courses and two theological

13. Hadji Aboebakar Atjeh, K. H. M. Wahid Hasjim, p. 219.
14. He was apparently on the editorial board of the Persis periodical Lasjkar Islam and wrote articles for the Perbintjangan newspaper and for several periodicals including Pandji Islam, Pedoman Masjarakat, Islam Raya (Solo) and Islam Bergerak (Jogjakarta). Parlaungan, Tokoh-tokoh Parlemen, pp. 156-157.
15. Isa Anshary, Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam, pp. 15, 45.

schools at Bangil. According to Persis statistics, in 1963, there were approximately 6000 students enrolled in its schools. Except for its several teachers and theological training courses, Persis training concentrated on elementary and secondary courses designed to provide a lay Muslim not intending to become a religious official an adequate education with considerable religious content. "It is an ordinary education for ordinary pursuits," stated Junus Anis in an interview in 1963.¹⁶

The Pesantren Ketjil¹⁷ in Bandung provides a good example of the Persis educational system since it had nearly all the types of training afforded by the Persatuan Islam. The elementary school was six years in length. During the first two years of primary school, seventy-five percent of school time was allotted to the study of religious subjects and twenty-five percent to general subjects, while in the last four years the instruction time was equally divided between the two types of study. Religious subjects included Arabic (writing, speaking, syntax and grammar), Qur'ān (content, recitation, commentary and exegesis), *fiqh*, ethics, religious obligations and Muslim history. General subjects included geography, history, arithmetic, Indonesian and language instruction in the vernacular (Javanese and Sundanese). Textbooks were mostly written in Bahasa Indonesia, but a few elementary works in Arabic were also used.¹⁸

16. Interview with K. H. E. Abdurrahman and Junus Anis, July 21, 1963.
17. The Pesantren Ketjil in Bandung was able to function during the Japanese Occupation, but apparently stopped activity in late 1945 when the British occupied Bandung. Several of the teachers conducted classes in other parts of West Java until 1948 when the school in Bandung was reopened. "Perkembangan Pesantren Persatuan Islam," *Risalah*, I, No. 1 (June 1962), p. 10.
18. Mahmud Junus, *Sedjarah Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Pustaka Mahmudiah, 1960), pp. 260-261. Mahmud Junus listed the following texts in use at the Pesantren Ketjil: Ahmad Hassan, *Pengadjaran Shalat*; Ahmad Hassan, *Kesopanan Islam*; Ahmad Hassan, *Al-Mughtar*, Ahmad Hassan, *At-Tauhid*; Ahmad Hassan, *Al-Hidajah* (Bandung: Al-Ma'arif, n.d.); Ahmad Hassan, *Al-Faraaidl* (Bangil and Batavia: Persatuan Islam, 1949); A. D. Hany, *Kursus Bahasa Arab* (Jogjakarta: Walfadjri, n.d.); *Mabādi' qirā'ah rashīdah* (Cairo, n.d.); 'Alī Fikrī, *Al-Samīrāt al-mahazzib* (Cairo, n.d.); Muhammad Farīd Wajdī, *Awḍat al-tafsīr/ al-mushaf al-mufassar* (Cairo, n.d.); 'Umar Abdul Djabar, *Khulāṣat al-Nūr al-Jaqīn* (Cairo, 1925) (Surabaya, 1930); *Al-Akh Bilāj, Baḥr al-Adāb* (Cairo; Al-Jawā'b al-Misriyah, 1905), 3 vols.; *Al-Akh Bilāj, Safīnat al-Nuḥāt* (Cairo: Al-Jawā'b al-Misriyah, 1907), 4 vols.

Sixty percent of the secondary school work at the Bandung school consisted of religious subjects, with a stress on *ḥadīth* (acquaintance and rules of use), Arabic (grammar, syntax, rhetoric and pronunciation) and jurisprudence (*usūl al-fiqh* and *fiqhī*). General subjects consisted of Indonesian, English, arithmetic, geography, psychology, some health and some education. Many textbooks were in Bahasa Indonesia, including several written by Ahmad Hassan, but several Arabic works were used as well. During the first two years of secondary training, courses were predominantly religious in scope and during the last two years the emphasis was on general subjects.¹⁹

The preparatory courses for teachers (*mu'allimin*) and the theological courses (*tadzhizijjah*) were apparently relatively short training courses lasting from six weeks to three months in length. Course work was almost entirely religious in nature since the purpose was to train a person for a religious occupation. These courses were apparently given on an *ad hoc* basis rather than following a regular schedule.

Persatuan Islam schools in other cities in West Java and elsewhere numbered twenty in 1955 and had a total of approximately 6000 students enrolled.²⁰ Some of these schools offered only elementary training, while others offered secondary education as well. Some, such as the Sumendang branch in West Java occasionally operated three month teacher preparatory courses and in 1962 there were plans for developing the schools in all the branches to that level.²¹ Persatuan Islam schools were established either by the branches of the Persatuan Islam located in their respective cities, or by teachers returning to

19. Mahmud Junus, Sedjarah Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia, p. 261. The following texts were used in addition to many of those used in the elementary classes: Ahmad Hassan, Sharaf (Bangil: Persatuan Islam, n.d.); Abdul Hamid Ḥakīm, Al-Bayan (Medan, 1930); Muṣṭafā ibn Muhammad Luṭfī al-Manfalūṭī, Al-Nazarāt (Cairo, Al-Rahmānīyah, 1920), 3 vols.; Abdullah bin Abdūl Kadir Munsji, Kalilah wa dimnah (Djakarta: Balai Pustaka, n.d.); Al-Akh Bīlāj, Safīnat al-Balāghah (Cairo: Al-Jawā'ib al-Misriyan, 1907); Al-Dībāj; Muḥammad Abū Zayd, Hady al-Rasūl (Cairo, 1925); Aḥmad ibn Sharqāwī, Tawhīd (Cairo, n.d.); Husayn ibn Sulaymān al-Rashīdī, Bulūgh al-Marām (Cairo: Al-Wahabīyah, 1881).
20. Interview with K. H. E. Abdurrahman and Junus Anis, July 21, 1963.
21. "Perkembangan Pesantren Persatuan Islam," Risalah, I, No. 1 (June 1962), p. 11.

their villages after having received training at the Bandung or Bangil *pesantrens*. While educational standards originally varied greatly between schools, in the early 1960's, central direction did much to provide minimum standards and a uniform quality of education.²²

The higher education facilities of the Persatuan Islam were located in Bangil where two separate and distinct schools exist. Both were established by Ahmad Hassan before the war, but were forced to close when the Japanese Occupation began. The Pesantren Putera, for young men, was reopened in 1951,²³ and in 1962 it was reorganized and renamed the Universitas Pesantren Persatuan Islam.²⁴ The school for girls, called the Pesantren Puteri was not reopened until 1957.

The Pesantren Puteri had a five year course of instruction to train young Muslim women for becoming religious teachers and informants (*mubalighien*). Entering students were required to have completed elementary schooling and to have a reading and speaking knowledge of Arabic. Seventy percent of the course work concerned Islam and its sciences, including *usūl al-fiqh*, Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* commentary, Arabic and ethics. General subjects included English, Indonesian, education, courses on womanhood, political science, geography, algebra and biology. All girls were required to live in the residence hall (*asrama*), dress in the manner prescribed by Persis, and conduct themselves properly according to general Islamic standards. In August 1963, there were over fifty girls enrolled at the Pesantren Puteri.²⁵

The Universitas Pesantren Persatuan Islam had a five year course of study, and entering students were required to be at least eighteen years of age, have a secondary education or its equivalent, and to be able to read and write Arabic. Subject matter was similar to that of other Persis schools, i.e., Arabic, Qur'ān, *ḥadīth*, *usūl al-fiqh*, *tawhīd*, etc., but greater depth and understanding was required. General subjects included education, political science, cosmography and comparative religion. The school was intended to prepare religious officials, and many did take up posts with the Department of Religion,

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22. Interview with K. H. E. Abdurrahman and Junus Anis, July 21, 1963.
 23. Persatuan Islam, Pesantren: Bagian Putera dan Puteri, pp. 16-17.
 24. Suara Rakjat, September 30, 1962, p. 1.
 25. Persatuan Islam, Pesantren: Bagian Putera dan Puteri, pp. 16-17.

become officials in various schools and mosques; others took additional training at *Al-Azhar* in Cairo.²⁶

In addition to its normal role of educating youth, the Persatuan Islam also undertook some adult education, thus carrying on a tradition started by Ahmad Hassan and Hadji Zamzam in the 1920's. The purpose was to deepen the adult members' understanding of religion and inform them of the proper fulfillment of religious duties. Beyond its own members, special courses were also given in government schools, orphan schools, schools for the blind, in prisons and at hospitals.²⁷ On at least one occasion, in 1961, the school at Bandung conducted a *pesantren kilat* (religious indoctrination course) for students from the Indonesian Air Force Technical School at the request of the commander.²⁸

The Persatuan Islam's educational system operated on funds received from a number of sources. General operating expenses were covered from tuition paid by students' families and from a grant the Indonesian government gave to all schools teaching a required number of general courses.²⁹ Buildings and capital equipment were dependent upon *waqf*, gifts and grants from charitable institutions.³⁰ The mosque and school of the Pesantren Ketjil, for example, was built on *waqf* land, and the Pesantren Putera, which undertook an extensive building program beginning in 1960 several times received grants from Muslim charitable institutions.³¹ The Universitas Pesantren Persatuan Islam also

26. Persatuan Islam, *Pesantren: Bagian Putera dan Puteri*, pp. 6-9. Interview with Abdulkadir Hassan and several other Persatuan Islam officials at Bangil on July 13, 1963.
27. Interview with K. H. E. Abdurrahman and Junus Anis, July 21, 1963.
28. *Risalah*, I, No. 1 (June 1962), p. 13.
29. In general, to be eligible for a government subsidy a Muslim school must provide an education equivalent to that of the public school system. See M. Hutasoit, *Compulsory Education in Indonesia* (UNESCO series on compulsory education) (Paris: UNESCO, 1954), pp. 68-69, which gives the specific criteria governing the granting of subsidies.
30. Interview with K. H. E. Abdurrahman and Junus Anis, July 21, 1963; interview with Tuan Sofwanhadi, publisher of the Surabaya daily *Suara Rakjat*, during an automobile trip from Surabaya to Bangil and return on July 13, 1963.
31. "Perkembangan Pesantren Persatuan Islam," *Risalah*, I, No. 1 (June 1962), p. 11.

received government grants from the Department of Religious Affairs to promote the education of religious officials.³²

The education received at Persatuan Islam schools had more religious content than most other educational systems operating in Indonesia. At the schools operated by the Sarekat Islam and the Muhammadiyah for example, the selection of general subjects was greater, and a more even balance was maintained between religious subjects and general subjects.³³ Persis education utilized Bahasa Indonesia as the language of instruction, while stressing the importance of Arabic for religious sources, in apposition to Perti which believed that Arabic should be the language of instruction in religious subjects.³⁴ Persis education was more diversified than the education offered by the institutes operated by the Department of Religious Affairs which concentrated almost solely on religious subjects.³⁵ Ahmad Hassan appeared to be thinking along similar lines in the last few years of his life and he advocated revision of the organization's university to concentrate more on religious subjects to the exclusion of many general subjects.³⁶ That this did not occur, probably indicates that there was sentiment against it among other leaders of Persis, who saw general subjects of value to modern Indonesian Muslims.

Publications

The high regard for publication that marked the Persatuan Islam prior to the war continued after the organization's re-establishment. The Persatuan Islam published several new periodicals in the period since 1948, republished a number of important studies made before the war, and issued a number of new publications written by its members on problems confronting Islam in an independent Indonesia.

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32. Interview with Timur Jaylani, Director of the Section for Higher Education in the Department of Religious Affairs, in Djakarta, July 9, 1963.
 33. Cf. Mahmud Junus, Sedjarah Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia, pp. 233-248. A survey of general Muslim education is found in M. Hutasoit, Compulsory Education in Indonesia, pp. 74-79.
 34. Mahmud Junus, Sedjarah Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia, pp. 85-87.
 35. Ibid., pp. 354-360.
 36. Nawawi Dusky, "A. Hassan," Hikmah, XI, No. 32 (November 22, 1958), p. 14.

The first periodical associated with the post-war Persatuan Islam was *Aliran Islam*, which began publishing in late 1948; while not issued by the Persatuan Islam itself, it contained the writings of several members, such as Isa Anshary--the periodical's general editor--Moehammad Natsir and E. Abdurrahman. The magazine was in general highly attuned to political affairs, the role of Islam in politics, and followed the thinking of Masjumi on most political issues.

Al-Muslimun, which began publication in 1954 and published until 1963, was a more staid publication and although published in Surabaya was actually the Bangil branch's organ. It was primarily religious-educational in function and contained a large number of *fatwās* and serial articles on religious subjects--*uṣūl al-fiqh*, *muṣṭalah ḥadīth*, studies of the Qur'ān and biographies of the Companions of the Prophet. Its editorials and *fatwās* frequently spoke out against secularism, communism and atheism.

A new series of *Pembela Islam* was published in 1956 at Bangil by Ahmad Hassan, but only a limited number of issues came out before publication ceased. Its format was similar to *Al-Muslimun* in that it concentrated on *fatwās* as its primary mode of expression. Most articles and *fatwās* in *Pembela Islam* expressed either a political viewpoint or were polemics against Muslim and non-Muslim groups who adhered to views not agreeing with Ahmad Hassan's own fundamentalist viewpoint. Like the earlier *Pembela Islam*, the new series contained numerous short, punchy--often sarcastic--paragraphs and articles designed to stimulate thought on particularly controversial issues.

A number of periodicals appeared in Bandung. *Hudjdjatul Islam*, which was listed as the official organ of the movement, published only one number, but contained several outstanding articles relating Islamic history to the current Indonesian situation. The magazine contained no *fatwās* and was apparently designed to serve only as a theoretical journal of the organization.

Risalah, first issued in 1962, became the official publication of the Persatuan Islam. It was primarily a house organ, printing the news and developments of the organization's various branches in both Bahasa Indonesia and in Sundanese. It had a question-answer section, but replies generally were not as authoritative as those published at Bangil and did not cite references from Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*. *Risalah* contained some articles on religious subjects but these were generally informative of historical Islam and did not attempt to prove a political point or take stands on social issues.

Several other periodicals were of importance to the Persatuan Islam. *Suara Ahlis Sunnah wal Djama'ah*, a monthly magazine, was published for a short time in 1956 by the Djakarta

branch of the organization. *Hikmah*, published between the years 1947 and 1960 and reflecting the thinking of the pro-Natsir wing of Masjumi, printed a large number of statements and articles by Persis members, particularly Isa Anshary, Moehammad Natsir (for a time the periodical's general editor), Ali Alhamidy and Moenawar Chalil.

In addition to periodical literature the Persatuan Islam, at Bangil in particular, also was active in the publication of new works and the republication of older works. A brochure issued in 1950 listed over fifty works available from its press, with the larger number reprintings of major works--*Sual-Djawab*, *Pengadjaran Shalat* and *At-Tauhid*--which had appeared before the war. In fact, the basic works published by the organization continued in demand and were used in some schools and as basic reference works for persons interested in religion. *Pengadjaran Shalat* offers a case in point; the fourth printing was made in 1963. *Al-Furqan*, a commentary on the Qur'ān published before the war was expanded, and achieved considerable popularity among Indonesian Muslims.³⁷ New works appearing after the war continued to be in the tradition of Persis writers and were generally instructional in nature. *Kedaulatan* (Sovereignty) by Ahmad Hassan, for example, illustrated to Indonesians just how the democratic process functioned in an independent state; Abdulkadir Hassan's *U Shul Fiqih* was a complete study of classical Muslim jurisprudence; *Hai Tjoetjoe-koe* (O My Grandchildren) by Ahmad Hassan was concerned with proper behavior for young Muslims reminding them not to fall victim to modern secularist behavior; Ali Alhamidy's *Islam dan Perkawinan* (Islam and Marriage) fully explained Muslim marriage procedure and belief, and *Qamus Rampaian A sampai Z tammam* (Dictionary of Terms A to Z inclusive) was a dictionary of foreign terms in use in Indonesian writing and speech, particularly in the area of politics.³⁸

37. Ahmad Hassan, *Al-Furqan (Tafsir Qur'ān)* (Surabaya: Salim Nabhan, 1956, and Djakarta: Tintamas, 1962). This work is apparently a continuation of earlier commentaries made by Ahmad Hassan which were limited to specific *sūrah*s, such as Ahmad Hassan, *Al-Djawahir (Permata-permata) Ajat dan Hadits* (Bangil: Persatuan Islam, 1957); Ahmad Hassan, *Tafsir Surah Jasien dengan keterangan dan ringkasan*; and Ahmad Hassan, *Al-Hidajah (djuz amma)*. The publications are those of available volumes and in every case earlier editions of these works were published.
38. Ahmad Hassan, *Hai Tjoetjoe-koe (Nasihat seorang tua yang telah hidoep lama, banjak melihat, banjak mendengar dan banjak mengalami hal-hal doenia kepada tjoetjoenja yang laki-laki dan yang perempuan dan kepada kanak-kanak yang se'oemoer dengan mereka)* (Surabaya: Salim Nabhan, 1948); Moehammad Ali Alhamidy, *Islam dan Perkawinan* (Djakarta:

There were a number of works published by Persis members that, like Ahmad Hassan's *Islam dan Kebangsaan* before the war, attempted to adapt fundamentalist Islam to the political situation existing in independent Indonesia. Isa Anshary's *Revolusi Islam* (Islamic Revolution), for example, outlined Muslim hopes for the establishment of an Indonesian state based on Islamic principles; his *Bahaya Merah di Indonesia* (The Red Threat in Indonesia) warned Muslims and Indonesians against the ideology and practices of Communism which he saw as contrary to both religion and nation; and his *Islam dan Nasionalisme* (Islam and Nationalism) which indicated the similarities and differences between Muslim and secularist actions and goals. Moenawar Chalil's *Fungsi Ulama dalam Masyarakat dan Negara* (The Function of the 'ulamā' in Society and the Nation), describing the 'ulamā' as a political leadership, also belongs to this series of works.³⁹

A final series of publications was made available from the reports and *fatwās* issued by the congresses of the Persatuan Islam. Lengthy reports were issued after the VI Congress in December 1956, and the VIII Congress in September 1960, containing the *Weltanschauung* of the Persatuan Islam and its views on many specific subjects.⁴⁰ A number of official *fatwās* and

Al-Ma'arif, 1951); Ahmad Hassan, *Qamoos Rampaian A sampai Z tammam* (Malang: Indian League, 1950). In the introduction to this latter volume, Ahmad Hassan stated that the purpose of the book was to give the meaning of foreign words commonly used by Indonesian writers but who do not give their meaning. The selection contained European, Malay, Hebrew, Indonesian, Sundanese, Tamil, Persian, Arabic and Sanskrit terms. Ahmad Hassan stated his intention to publish a second volume using another set of words and terms. See Sabirin, *Kekajaan Basa dan Pengetahoean Oemoem* (Bandoeng: C. T. Van Dorp, 1938).

39. Moehammad Isa Anshary, *Revolusi Islam* (Surabaya: Hasan Aidid, 1953); Moehammad Isa Anshary, Jusuf Wibisono and Sjarief Usman, *Bahaya Merah di Indonesia* (Bandung: Front Anti-Komunis, 1955); Moehammad Isa Anshary, *Islam dan Nasionalisme* (Bandung: Pustaka Djihad, 1954); Moenawar Chalil, *Fungsi Ulama dalam Masyarakat dan Negara* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1957).
40. The 1956 and 1960 reports have only slight differences in text. The original draft, in 1956, was prepared by Moehammad Isa Anshary in his capacity as General Chairman, and adopted by the congress with slight changes. Pusat Pimpinan Persatuan Islam, *Manifes Perdjuangan Persatuan Islam* (Bandung, 1958). The 1960 report, with the same title appears in serial articles in *Hikmah*, X, Nos. 1-2 (January 12, 1957) through No. 6 (February 9, 1957).

memoranda were issued by the Persatuan Islam as an organization in addition to those issued by its individual scholars, and these usually appeared in various Muslim periodicals publishing at the time.⁴¹

The Continued Importance of *Fiqh*

The basic Persis stress on *fiqh* survived the organization's suspension during the war and re-emerged in the post-war period. The *pesantren* at Bangil in particular, where Ahmad Hassan and Abdulkadir Hassan were located, was probably most active in issuing *fatwās* in the period of the 1950's, but the function was by no means limited as to place or persons and several other (*ulamā*) within Persis--Abdullah Ahmad and Hadji Moenawar Chalil for example--also issued *fatwās*. Persis *fatwās* after the war had a slightly different emphasis than during the period of the 1930's, in that more *fatwās* made pronouncements on political subjects, reflecting perhaps greater interest in political affairs by leaders of the Persatuan Islam. It should be noted, however, that Persis *fatwās* only rarely criticized actual government policies; as in the Dutch period, "political" *fatwās* were confined to pronouncements concerning the general content of nationalism, the philosophic basis of a national state, and condemnation of political trends opposed to Muslim political goals. This is not to say, however, that the Persatuan Islam never took a political stand on specific issues of government policy, for Isa Anshary, Moehammad Natsir and Ahmad Hassan frequently did so. They always worked through some political group, such as the Masjumi party or the Anti-Communist Front, or with an article or a book clearly recognized as political in character, while the authoritative *fatwā* was not used. There were two notable exceptions to this generalization: in 1957, when the Persatuan Islam denounced Sukarno's *konsepsi* (conception) for introducing a united front government with Communist participation, and in 1961, when the movement called for active government suppression of Communism in Indonesia.⁴² On both occasions, the Persatuan Islam as an organization issued the *fatwā*--in apposition to the usual practice of individual *fatwās*

41. These *fatwās* and memoranda are cited below in the chapter on politics.
42. Pusat Pimpinan Persatuan Islam, "Persatuan Islam menolak konsepsi Bung Karno," *Suara Masjumi*, March 15, 1957, p. 8. Eighth Congress of the Persatuan Islam, "Persatuan Islam menuntut Penghantjaraan Partai Komunis Indonesia," Bangil, September 4, 1960. Printed in *Harian Abadi*, September 7, 1960, pp. 1-2 (translated into English by the Joint Publication Research Service, JPRS #4369, February 1, 1961).

--and on both occasions, the *fatwās* condemned Communism as such and warned about its effect on the government, and did not directly criticize government policy.

Most of the *fatwās* issued by Persis members after the war were concerned with matters of worship. Largely they reiterated Persis demands made in the 1930's for the exclusion of certain practices the Persatuan Islam believed were not genuinely a part of proper religious practice. In a *fatwā* entitled "Ta'rief Bid'ah" (Definition of *bid'ah*) written in June 1955, an anonymous Persis writer enumerated a list of actions and practices he regarded as unacceptable to good religious practice.

Included in *bid'ah*--particularly in the past--were many things, among them were: *ushalli* [*nīyah*], pronouncing *talqīn* for the dead, reciting *takbīr* at the grave, ignoring ritual washing--prayers while performing ritual washing for every member of the body--asking pardon for sins [*istighfār*] by reciting the *Jamā'ah* prayer after the *salam* prayer--reciting *tahlīl* for the deceased--reciting the *dhikr* while attending a funeral, reading *al-fātiḥah* to the deceased, reading *Sūrah Yā Sīn* and other *sūrahs* while performing general work--using the Qur'ān as a shield--adding the words *sayyidina di shawat* to worship--because none of these practices genuinely belong to Islam.⁴³

Lacking in Persatuan Islam *fatwās*, both prior to the war and afterwards, was any full discussion of the social problems presented by the technological advances and sociological developments of the past fifty years, and the impact of these trends on the religious life of Indonesian Muslims. There is no Persis *fatwā* extant that discussed this problem generally, and *fatwās* dealing with individual problems arising from it were limited only to those problems, such as the efforts to change the status of women in society, occasional *fatwās* on the use of *zakāt* for public projects, the problem of interest and banks, and only rarely *fatwās* on a problem like birth control or blood trans-

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43. "Ta'rief (definisi) Bid'ah," *Al-Muslimun*, II, No. 3 (June 1955), pp. 7-8. A number of *fatwās* from the Bangil group written during the 1950's indicate that Persis thinking on these subjects had not changed from what it had been prior to the war. The following *fatwās* support that conclusion: "Talqin untuk siapa," *Al-Muslimun*, II, No. 7 (October 1955), p. 9; "Niat dalam 'Ibādāt," *Al-Muslimun*, V, No. 43 (November 1960), pp. 8-9; "Mentjium tangan 'ulama'," *Al-Muslimun*, II, No. 1 (April 1955), p. 11; "Kenduri tjukur rambut baji," *Al-Muslimun*, VI, No. 25 (April 1956), p. 7; "Memakai 'Azimat," *Al-Muslimun*, II, No. 4 (June 1955), pp. 10-11; and "Gamelan, Gambus, Orkes, dll," *Al-Muslimun*, II, No. 2 (June 1955), pp. 5-6; "Mendapat ilham untuk menobat," *Al-Muslimun*, III, No. 30 (August 1957), pp. 10-11.

fusion. Even these discussions were kept within a tight religious framework which offered answers for almost all situations in the society, rather than discussed in the context of a world affected by technological advances and sociological developments where the society itself was being transformed, even in the non-industrial areas of the world including Indonesia.

CHAPTER X

ADJUSTMENT TO CONTEMPORARY SCIENTIFIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL TRENDS

The Persatuan Islam has been concerned with the impact of the Twentieth Century, with its technological, scientific and sociological developments, on Muslims and on Islamic principles. Basically Persis members accepted these contemporary developments as beneficial to mankind, but maintained that their true value could only be guaranteed when given guidance by the spiritual and moral values of Islam. There has been no article, *fatwā* or monograph by a Persis member, however, attempting to analyze this subject and define Islam's relationship to modern trends, but several Persis authors have treated the subject casually in their works on other matters.

Persis writers frequently stated their belief that Islam was compatible with Twentieth Century developments. In a *fatwā* with the provocative title "Langit tidak ada" (Heaven does not exist), a Persatuan Islam *ʿālim* stated that "there is no contradiction between belief in science and . . . religious belief," and concluded that a Muslim was free to study science without fear of being branded an apostate (*murtadd*).¹ Ahmad Hassan, writing in *Muhammad benar Rasul itu?*, cited references in the Qur'ān to cross pollination, to virus and bacteria and to the revolution of heavenly bodies as proof that Islam historically has been compatible with science.² One particular *fatwā* admitted that science had changed Muslims' thinking on some subjects, and cited the concept of "heaven" as an example. The *fatwās* noted that Muslims once believed that heaven occupied the space immediately above the earth and was perceptible to the five senses but conceded that science had proven that heaven did not exist in that form or place. The *fatwā* concluded that heaven (*samā'*) did still exist in another place and

1. "Langit tidak Ada," *Al-Muslimun*, II, No. 5 (August 1955), p. 5.
2. Ahmad Hassan, *Is Muhammad a True Prophet?*, p. 53; similar in its effort to show the Qur'ān's compatibility with modern science was "Bumi Bulat," *Al-Muslimun*, II, No. 4 (July 1955), pp. 5-6.

another form and insisted that heaven as such was not contrary to scientific thinking.³

While Persis writers regarded science as beneficial to man and acceptable to Islam, they were somewhat more reserved on the influence of the civilization and culture that science, through technology with accompanying modifications of society, had produced in the West. They stated that Muslims could accept science and even technology but warned Muslims that to follow the example of the West in the way it made use of these benefits was to court disaster. They maintained that technology in the West had not been tied to a system of values, had been disruptive of morality, and threatened the very destruction of Western civilization. "Man climbs the tower of technical development," stated Isa Anshary, ". . . but intellect, reason and thought alone are not capable of providing guidance for . . . life."⁴ In the same vein, Moehammad Natsir, in a speech in the Constituent Assembly, noted that the secularists "claim that knowledge must be separated from the values of life and culture." He admitted that the separation was useful in so far as objectivity was concerned, but stated his belief that science had unfortunately become "science for the sake of science" and the scientists felt no responsibility when their creation was used in a destructive manner.⁵ Both writers concluded that the spiritual

3. "Langit tidak Ada," Al-Muslimun, II, No. 5 (August 1955), p. 5.
4. Moehammad Isa Anshary, Revolusi Islam, p. 24. The complete quote reads as follows: "Man climbs the tower of technical development, solves the power of electricity, raises the highest laws. With his reason man can attain to the highest world, raise the likeness of fire and light. Man can fly in the sky like the *garuda* [mythical bird], he can dive to the bottom of the sea like a fish. With his intellect man has been able to make many things beneficial to his cultural development and for the flowering of humanity. . . . But intellect, reason, thought, are not capable of providing a compass and guidance for . . . life. . . . [Not the intellect but the] spirit is necessary to provide such guidance and leadership."
5. Moehammad Natsir, "Pidato di Komite II Konstituante" in Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante (Bandung, 1958), I, p. 17. This speech was also published separately, Islam sebagai ideologie (Djakarta: Pustaka Aida, [1951]). The complete quote reads as follows: "Toward science colleagues, secularism claims that the sciences [*ilmu-ilmu*] must be separated from the values of life and culture. Ethics, they say, must be separated from science. In this viewpoint the science of economics must be separated from ethics. History must be separated from ethics. Soci-

side of man, properly informed of religious commands and prohibitions, was necessary to give technical advances proper utilization and direction.

In *Revolusi Islam*, Isa Anshary lamented the appearance of an attitude among Indonesians that copies the non-spiritual outlook of the West. He warned Indonesians that by imitating the West and disregarding religion as a guide for life, they were taking the same path to destruction that the West was already following. He saw this reflected in the attitude of Indonesian youth who seemed more sophisticated, yet restless. "Parents are no longer able to control their children, because the children feel more developed, more internationally minded." This attitude could also be seen among women, he maintained, where it was clear in the mode of dress for Muslim women. Even some ('*ulamā*')s wives "dress in frocks, bare in the middle and scant above and below." Isa Anshary stated that Muslims would do well not to allow their standards to degenerate and accept without qualification the many trends and influences brought forth during the modern age. Muslims have freedom of thought, but it is a freedom "to think, to compare and to criticize." He concluded that society would develop correctly if it was cognizant of religion and adopted principles based on a genuine fear and respect of God (*taqwa'llah*).⁶

While there was only limited discussion of modern developments in general, there were many Persis articles and *fatwās* that attempted to deal with the individual problems that arose when these trends came into contact with particular religious beliefs and practices. Health advances had to be adjusted to Muslim dietary regulations; economic thinking and institutions collided with Muslim laws of *zakāt* and usury; and the women's emancipation movement challenged Muslim rules of conduct for its women.

ology must be separated from the norms of morality, culture and [religious belief]. The same with theology, philosophy, law and so forth. For the sake of objectivity this attitude of separating ethics from science has its use, but there is a limit [beyond which] we are not able to separate science and ethics.

"The development of technical science has produced an atom bomb. Should the scientists who contributed their energies to the creation share responsibility for its use, or not?

"For those who separate ethics from science it is easy to free themselves from the responsibility for use of the bomb. Here we see the extent of the influence of secularism. Science has already become an end in itself. 'Science for the sake of science.'"

6. Isa Anshary, *Revolusi Islam*, pp. 36-37.

Modern Medical Practice

Regarding modern medical practice, several *fatwās* pointedly suggest that persons with strange maladies and mental problems would do well to consult medical specialists rather than rely on folk ritual for cure. But while modern medical practice was accepted, several Persis *fatwās* noted the possibility that medical treatment could interfere with religious ritual and transgress religious prohibitions, and attempted to reconcile general religious principles and medical practice. One Persis *ʿālim* noted an *ḥadīth* recorded by Abū Dawūd, which stated that God had put sickness on the earth but had provided a cure for every illness. The *ḥadīth* warned lest sickness be treated with methods and drugs that are forbidden by religion, for permissible drugs and methods did exist for the curing of every illness.⁷ In line with this *ḥadīth*, Persis writers stated that Muslims could not take medicine containing alcohol, but did note that in an emergency where a Muslim's life was at stake medicine containing alcohol could be used, if appropriate and if other medicine was not available.⁸ The drinking of blood for reasons of health was prohibited, but several *fatwās* stated that the characteristics of a blood transfusion were entirely different than that of drinking blood, and judged that transfusion was a permissible act.⁹

Several *fatwās* noted the problem of medical practice during the Fast, and maintained that taking medicine in the daytime during *Ramaḍān* did not negate the Fast for a sick person. The rationale for this judgment was that taking medicine, while similar to eating and drinking in that the substance entered the mouth and passed to the stomach, actually had a different purpose and could not be considered to be either food or drink.¹⁰ Other *fatwās* used parallel arguments to allow injections and enemas for the ill during the Fast.¹¹

7. See for example, "Selamatan Gerhana," *Al-Muslimun*, III, No. 25 (April 1956), p. 4; "Makan Darah (Dīdih)," *Al-Muslimun*, II, No. 3 (June 1955), p. 10.
8. "Obat tjampur arak ketika dlarurat," *Al-Muslimun*, II, No. 8 (November 1955), pp. 5-6.
9. "Memasukkan Darah," *Al-Muslimun*, I, No. 7 (October 1954), p. 5. Cf., Muhammad Hasbi Ash-Shiddieqy, *Pemindahan darah (blood transfusion) dipandjang dari sudut hukm agama Islam* (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1954).
10. "Minum obat waktu puasa," *Al-Muslimun*, III, No. 25 (April 1956), p. 8.
11. "Indjeksi dalam Puasa," *Al-Muslimun*, II, No. 7 (October

In a problem related to medical practice, Persis (*ulamā*) decided that birth control for Muslims was permissible. This decision, recorded in a *fatwā* entitled "Membatas Kelahiran" (Limiting Birth), was based on an *ḥadīth* recorded by Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, Muslim and Abū Dawūd, which cited the Prophet's permission for Muslims to practice *coitus interruptus* for the prevention of pregnancy, and hence, by analogy, concluded that other types of birth control were permitted as well. The same *fatwās* noted that birth control included only the prevention of pregnancy, and that abortion was clearly forbidden by Islam.¹² Several *fatwās* decided that artificial insemination caused considerable problems regarding Muslim family life, inheritance and other matters, and concluded that it would be better not practiced.¹³

Economics

There is some discussion among Persis writings concerning economics and its effects on Indonesian Muslims. Moehammad Natsir, for example, even before he became a government minister, showed considerable awareness of modern economic theory and practice. In an article written in 1932, he explained that in Islam wealth is considered to be a blessing, given by God for the enjoyment of all men. He noted in his speech before the Constituent Assembly that Islam has not provided laws on economics and other subjects to "regulate 1001 detailed circumstances," which would be subject to change in different places and times. Rather, he stated, Islam has provided the basic kernel which, when used in conjunction with man's reason, could be applied at any place in any age.¹⁴ Moehammad Natsir's belief in a socialistic system was based on this principle, and the argument he employed for its adoption by Indonesians was a clear attempt to distill a basic economic principle from Islam and apply it to contemporary life. He quoted *Al-Tawbah* 9:34 promising a painful doom to those who do not use their wealth in a way pleasing to God, and stated that this *āyah* rejected capitalism, which he characterized as a "greedy and covetous soul . . . amassing

1955), p. 7; Ahmad Hassan, "Memasukkan obat di djalan buang air dan di djalan darah, waktu puasa," Sual-Djawab, No. 3, p. 1.

12. "Membatas Kelahiran," Al-Muslimun, II, No. 9 (November 1955), pp. 4-7.
13. "Melahirkan anak dengan orang lain," Al-Muslimun, I, No. 9 (December 1954), p. 10.
14. Moehammad Natsir, "Pidato di Komisi II Konstituante, Tentang Dasar . . . dalam Konstituante, p. 130.

wealth, gold and silver only for his own joy, without considering society." He used analogy to state that wealth should not be concentrated among only a few persons to provide them with luxury while others suffered, but rather should be "turned into the productive process for raising the level of prosperity so that greater equality would exist."¹⁵ This preference for socialist forms of economic systems is common to many newly independent nations who see capitalism connected with colonialism as well as a common modern Muslim interpretation of the traditionally paternalistic and communally based life of Muslim society. Moehammad Natsir's justification was an Indonesian attempt to give socialism religious sanction.

While condemning capitalism, Moehammad Natsir was also clearly opposed to the sort of socialism espoused by Communism. He saw Marxist dialectic, with its insistence on the inevitability of class struggle, as setting one class of Muslims against another, and maintained that this viewpoint was contrary to the Muslim view of the equality and brotherhood of all men. He stated that the Muslim rich were not to be the enemies of the Muslim poor, but rather their guides and benefactors. He admitted, however, that there were many movements--"liberal, radical, fascist and Communist"--that wanted to improve economic and social differences so as to "lessen the differences between men," but claimed that, except for Islam, all of them had defects and none neared perfection. Only Islam, as the religion of God, he declared, was capable of bringing about equality through raising the low economic and social level of the masses to the "level of humanity" and by stripping the aristocrats of their "divinity" and making them common mortals.¹⁶

Natsir's own ideals regarding the equality of mankind, rather than any command of Islam, probably led him to prefer a moderate brand of socialism. His speeches in parliament often supported socialistic measures, but these had no specific characteristics that branded them as Islamic, as opposed to any other socialistic legislation.¹⁷ It appears then that Natsir

15. Al-Tawbah 9:34. "O ye who believe! Lo! Many of the rabbis and the monks devour the wealth of mankind wantonly and debar (men) from the way of Allah. They who hoard up gold and silver and spend it not in the way of Allah, unto them give tidings (O Muhammad) or a painful doom." Natsir cited only the last part as support for his case. Moehammad Natsir, "Pidato di Komisi II Konstituante," Tentang Dasar . . . dalam Konstituante, pp. 134-135.
16. Moehammad Natsir, "Marhaenisme dan Islam," Pembela Islam, No. 56 (December 1932), pp. 3-4.
17. See for example, Mohammad Natsir, "Pidato di Parlemen, tanggal 31 Mei 1951. Menjawab Keterangan Pemerintahan

was not really arguing for a specific system of economics, but rather that any system adopted by Indonesia should be guided by basic Muslim principles.

Indonesian Muslims, like Muslims in other parts of the Islamic world, gave considerable scrutiny to the institution of *zakāt* and the prohibition of usury (*ribā*), in trying to fit them to the contemporary age. Regarding *zakāt*, Persis members were meticulous in working out the formulae laid down in Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* for assessing the amount of tax due from each Muslim.¹⁸ Moehammad Natsir noted that *zakāt* was a social pressure built into Islam to prompt the rich to alleviate the burdens of the poor. As such, he believed that it could play an important role in contemporary Indonesian society.¹⁹ Persis writers made no mention of the suggestions put forward by some Muslims that *zakāt* should be incorporated into the national tax system and the money used for social welfare programs. They did state, however, that it was permissible for *zakāt* to be used for the construction and operation of schools, hospitals and other social welfare projects. These writers interpreted broadly the injunction in the Qur'ān to distribute *zakāt* to the destitute, the wayfarer and "in the way of God," and stated that *zakāt* could be used in any way that would aid the Muslim cause.²⁰

The problem of *ribā*, commonly translated as usury, presented a more difficult problem than *zakāt*, since, at first glance, *ribā* appeared to clash with the operations of several modern interest gathering institutions, such as banks, insurance companies,²¹ and cooperatives. In line with modernist Muslim

Babak Pertama" in Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Republik Indonesia, *Risalah Perundangan*, 1951, X, pp. 4231-4242; reprinted in *Capita Selecta*, II, pp. 19-27.

18. See for example, Ahmad Hassan, Sabirin and Fachroeddin al-Kahiri, *Kitab Zakat*; Abdulkadir Hassan, *Risalah Zakat* (Jakarta: Tintamas, 1961); Ahmad Hassan, *Risalah Zakat liwat setahun* (Bangil: Persatuan Islam, 1955).
19. Moehammad Natsir, "Marhaenisme dan Islam," *Pembela Islam*, No. 56 (December 1932), p. 3; cf. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, pp. 159-160.
20. "Bolehkah uang zakat-wadjiib diberikan untuk keperluan mesdjid-mesdjid dan sekolah-sekolah?" *Al-Muslimun*, I, No. 4 (June 1955), pp. 8-12; Such an interpretation leaves the use of *zakāt* open to abuse in activities quite far removed from the welfare activities that have traditionally marked *zakāt*.
21. Insurance was actually a problem unto itself, for in addition to its interest bearing characteristics, it was con-

thinking in the Arab world, the Persatuan Islam found these financial institutions compatible with Islam. The usual Muslim position since the time of the Prophet, however, had been that the prohibition on *ribā* included not only usury, but any profit by the lender on the goods he lent. However, the need for credit had often led to a circumvention of this rule by the use of the double sale (*mukhāṭarah* contract) and other ruses.²² In contrast to this traditional approach, the Persatuan Islam defined *ribā* merely as "excessive profit" and stated that interest gained from banks and cooperatives was reasonable and should not be considered as included in the Prophet's condemnation of *ribā*. In a *fatwā* entitled "Koperasi" (Cooperatives), a Persis 'ālim stated that the Prophet's condemnation was intended to control the practice common to pre-Islamic Arabia where double the amount of interest was agreed to for lengthening the duration of the loan. "The sum of one hundred *dirham* became two hundred, and so on, several times."²³ The *fatwā* noted that such a practice could easily lead to a considerable loss of wealth on the borrower's part, and having perceived that such loss was unjust, the Prophet had forbidden such practices.

A second *fatwā*, entitled "Mengembalikan sebanjak jang dipindjam" (Returning a sum greater than was borrowed), explained the Persis position further and challenged as invalid the *ḥadīth* used by traditionalist Muslims to justify their stand on *ribā*. The *ḥadīth* stated that repayment of a loan of grain was to be in the same grain with no increase, and that there was to be no dealing in futures (i.e., the success of the next harvest). The writer of the *fatwā* claimed that this *ḥadīth* was not valid because its terms were impossible to fulfill, for one who borrowed grain could not possibly repay in the same grain until after a later harvest. "Is it fitting for the Prophet to have received such guidance from God?" he asked, and then answered his own question by stating, "Certainly not, and we can never accept that the Prophet uttered" such words. This

sidered by many Muslims to be a form of gambling. The Nahdlatul Ulama Congress in Solo in 1935, for example, passed a decision stating that life insurance was forbidden by Islamic law on the basis that it was gambling. Naim, "The Nahdlatul Ulama Party," p. 156.

22. Gaudetfroys-Demombynes, Muslim Institutions, pp. 190-191.
23. "Koperasi," Al-Muslimun, II, No. 6 (September 1955), pp. 7-8. See also Ahmad Hassan, "Ribaa," Pembela Islam, No. 51 (September 1932) and No. 52 (October 1932), which has also appeared under separate cover with the title, Kitab Ribaa; and the section on "Riba, speculatis, dalam dēsa" in Moehammad Natsir, "Hadji, Zakat, fitrah, riba, kawin-tjerai d.l.l.," Pembela Islam (May 1951), pp. 15-16.

fatwā also dismissed other *ḥadīths* presented by traditional Muslims as proof of their position on *ribā* "because they (the *ḥadīths*) conflict with one another."²⁴ A third *fatwā* stated that Muslims were permitted to use modern banks and to accept the interest they gave on savings. This *fatwā* concluded that a Muslim was remiss in his obligations if he failed to accept interest from a bank, and stated that "if a person regards it as unclean, let him give it to an orphanage or a school."²⁵

The Laws of Punishment (*Ḥudūd*)

The punishments prescribed by Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* for certain unrighteous acts have often been difficult for Muslims to adjust with current social norms and behavior. There has been criticism from many quarters--Muslim and non-Muslim--of such punishments as flogging those taken in adultery and severing the hand of the thief.²⁶ Secularists in Indonesia found such punishments to be totally unfitting, and even Muslim organizations attempted to make them less harsh. The Muhammadiyah attempted to distill the spirit of the commands, believed, for example, that theft should be punished by imprisonment, and maintained that such confinement was a limitation on the thief's power to steal, i.e., a figurative way of "severing a man's arm."²⁷ Unlike the Muhammadiyah, the Persatuan Islam interpreted the punishment for theft literally and maintained that a thief's hand should be severed, since God had clearly commanded it. In *Pemerintahan Tjara Islam*, Ahmad Hassan defended this viewpoint by stating that such harsh punishments served as a constant reminder to the criminal and discouraged other persons from committing similar crimes. Ahmad Hassan admitted that Islamic laws of punishment were harsh and stated that they were meant to frighten, but justified such an approach by stating that "90% of the laws of non-Muslim states are intended for that purpose" (i.e., to frighten people) and yet "lawlessness is higher in non-Islamic lands." He concluded that if such laws were applied regularly throughout Indonesia they would cause much initial distress, "but as generations passed, the new groups would be less likely

24. Mengembalikan sebanjak jang dipindjam," *Al-Muslimun*, I, No. 12 (March 1955), p. 7.
25. Ahmad Hassan, "Riba Bank," *Sual-Djawab*, No. 13, pp. 72-73.
26. See for example, *Al-Nūr* 24:2-4; *Al-Baqarah* (The Cow) 2:178; *Al-Mā'idah* 5:38-39.
27. Interview with Fakhri Usman, General Secretary of the Muhammadiyah and one-time Minister of Religious Affairs, in Djakarta on July 10, 1963.

to err and they would be more prosperous."²⁸

It should be noted that Persis *fatwās* and articles never attempted to assign punishments for acts it believed contravened the *Sharī'ah* but only made judgments as to what actions were within the limits of proper behavior and what was not. Nor did the Persatuan Islam agitate for the inclusion of these punishments in national law. Apparently Persis members sought only to defend such punishments as the command of God, but left the implementation to the state. The literal stance taken on this issue by the Persatuan Islam and several other Muslim groups had an unfavorable impact on Muslim political fortunes, and many nominal Muslims and Muslims with secularist tendencies did not give their support to Muslim political parties because they believed that the establishment of an Islamic state might lead to the implementation of such harsh Islamic laws.

Woman's Role in Society

One of the most significant social developments in the past century has been the increased role that women have come to play in society in the West. It is a development that has caused considerable thought among some Muslim women's groups, among Muslim divines, and has prompted the publication of new studies outlining Muslim views toward the role of women in society.²⁹ In Indonesia, the Muslim attitude became a point of serious contention in the 1930's between secularists, who advocated greater matrimonial and social freedom for women, and Muslims, who saw many aspects of the emancipation of women as transgressing religious prohibitions.³⁰ This difference prevailed after the war as well. While most advocates for a less inhibited role for women in society belonged to secularist organizations, there were those within the Muslim community who also wanted to give women a new, more prominent role in national life. This trend was apparent, for example, in the Muhammadiyah where the 'Aisijah, the organization's women's movement, had, over a period of thirty years, made considerable impact on Muhammadiyah leadership and considerably broadened the role of women members within the organization.³¹ These gains, which

28. Ahmad Hassan, Pemerintahan Tjara Islam, pp. 27, 32, 30.

29. Cf., C. C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, pp. 230-239; Ameer Ali, The Spirit of Islam.

30. Blumberger, "Vrouwenbeweging (Inlandsch)," Encyclopaedië van Nederlandsch Oost-Indië.

31. 'Alī, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," pp. 155-157; Blumberger, "Moehammadijah," Encyclopaedië van Nederlandsch Oost-Indië.

still did not allow unrestricted mixing of men and women socially, carried over into Masjumi, and caused some dissension among groups, including Persis, with a more narrow interpretation of women's role in life.

The Persatuan Islam held the viewpoint that there were essential differences of character between men and women that fitted each sex for different functions in life. Muslims, both in Persis and in other organizations, argued that within this division of function the two sexes really only operated in different spheres, and that one sex could not be regarded as superior to the other. "Men have several functions that cannot be performed by women and *vice versa*, . . . but for the wellbeing of both sexes mutual aid and cooperation is essential." Men were regarded as the masters who control the nation, the religious community, and the family, and provide livelihood and sustenance for the family. Woman's role was regarded as being concerned with housekeeping and motherhood. 'Ali Alhamidy, in his monograph *Islam dan Perkawinan* (Islam and Marriage), stressed that the natures of the two sexes were primarily responsible for this particular division of labor; men were assigned intelligence and strength, and women attractiveness.³² Ahmad Hassan, on the other hand, stressed the legal case and stated that such a division of responsibility was set by religious law. "Women must obey," he stated, "and men must provide subsistence."³³

The Persatuan Islam maintained that men and women could not mix socially or associate freely with one another, except within the family circle and through marriage. As the religious basis for the separation of the sexes, Persis ('*ulamā*') cited *Al-Nūr* 24:31, which states that women should dress modestly and

32. Ali Alhamidy, *Islam dan Perkawinan*, p. 5. "Man exceeds women in three matters; strength, thought and intelligence," and because of these characteristics "man is as a pillar which becomes a strong support for woman." Man's superior intelligence and strength have been granted by God so that he could be His vice-regent on earth and control all life and matter on it. In contrast to the intelligence and strength of men, women are characterized by sweetness, softness of form and attractiveness, maintained Ali Al Alhamidy. Woman's principal function is as a "place of enjoyment for man, and a place of his life's contentment. Woman is a blessing of inestimable value from God to man." (pp. 6, 8). See also, Moehammed Aviar A. Sophy, "Orang Isteri itu mendjadi radja dalam roemah tangga lakinja," *Pembela Islam*, No. 35 (October 1931), p. 11.
33. Ahmad Hassan, *Perempuan Islam di Dewan dan Podium* (Bangil: Persatuan Islam, 1940), p. 4. See also "Perempuan tidak memperdulikan suami," *Al-Muslimun*, III, No. 33 (November-December 1957), p. 4.

reveal their charms only to their husbands and close relatives.³⁴ During the lifetime of the Prophet, stated Ahmad Hassan, women were allowed to leave the house, to go to the marketplace, go on the *hajj*, to undertake a large number of everyday tasks and to perform religious obligations that would bring them into the view of men. On the assumption that such actions were proper or they would have been corrected by the Prophet, Ahmad Hassan concluded that women could appear before men while undertaking similar activities at the present time, but nothing more since the Prophet gave no express or implied permission for any other contacts and indicated in a number of instances that the sexes should be kept apart as much as possible.³⁵ Reflecting an argument in common use by modernist Muslims throughout the Muslim world, Ali Alhamidy stated that a chief characteristic of woman is allure, and not properly controlled, this allure could bring harm to both men and women.³⁶ An article signed with the initials M. S. and appearing in *Pembela Islam* echoed the same argument and concluded that women have an allure of sweetness--even if some women are not really sweet--and if they are not properly cherished and protected "can destroy themselves and other people as well."³⁷ In this context, the separation of the sexes, stated Ahmad Hassan, was not intended to be a "humbling or lowering of either sex," but an indication of Islam's awareness of women and at attempt to honor them.³⁸

Persis' regard for the disruptive power of womanhood on mankind dictated the organization's belief on what it regarded

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34. Al-Nūr 24:31. "And say to the believing women, that they cast down their eyes and guard their private parts, and reveal not their adornment save such as is outward; and let them cast their veils over their bosoms, and not reveal their adornment save to their husbands, or fathers, or husband's fathers, or their sons, or step-sons, or brothers, or nephews, or women, or their slaves, or men who attend them who have no sexual desire, or children. . . ."
 35. Ahmad Hassan, *Perempuan Islam di Dewan dan Podium*, pp. 13-14.
 36. Ali Alhamidy, *Islam dan Perkawinan*, pp. 8-9.
 37. M. S., "Perempuan," Part 2, *Pembela Islam* (New Series), No. 2 (April 1956), p. 35.
 38. Ahmad Hassan, *Perempuan Islam di Dewan dan Podium*, p. 8. One Persis article maintained that Islam honored women by reserving special places at *Īd al-Fiṭr* ceremonies and in the mosque for their exclusive use, by providing special entry ways and shielded walks to the mosques, and by bowing in greeting to them. M. S., "Perempuan," Part 1, *Pembela Islam* (New Series), No. 1 (March 1956), p. 10.

as proper clothing for women. "Islam honors women," stated an article in *Pembela Islam*, "by requiring that women wear clothing that covers their bodies and their shapes, in order that they not be appealing to men, and to avoid the temptations "which lead to corruption, perversion and destruction of society." "People who do not sincerely honor women," the article continued, "allow them to dress in provocative Western clothes where the shape of the breasts and thighs are an enticement to men." Coupled with free association with men it could lead to a situation "as in England where up to 70% of the schoolgirls" are no longer virgins.³⁹

In religious matters, Ahmad Hassan noted, "a woman may not become a prophet or a judge, and may not become an *imām* [at the mosque] in public," and "it is forbidden for a woman to become a leader."⁴⁰ Ali Alhamidy explained that men, but never women, had been chosen by God to reveal His religious message to mankind, and accordingly stressed his belief that religious activity was man's responsibility. Alhamidy specifically pointed out, however, that women could undertake to teach and to spread religion among other women and that they could be active in women's affairs. The political role of women was limited to activity among other women while political activity in which women sat with men on political party governing boards, or on elected and appointed government councils, was specifically condemned by Persis.⁴¹ Ahmad Hassan stated that during the time of the Prophet, women did not sit on councils and that to do so in present circumstances would obviously contravene the *Sunnah* of the Prophet. He argued further that Islam forbade women and men to imitate one another, and since the ruling function belonged to man, any attempt by a woman to sit on a council was actually imitating a man and *ipso facto* wrong.⁴² An article

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39. M. S., "Perempuan," Part 1, *Pembela Islam* (New Series), No. 1 (March 1957), p. 10. The article stated that only the hands and the oval of the face are to remain uncovered. See also "Perempuan berkudung," *Al-Muslimun*, I, No. 8 (November 1955), p. 11.
40. Ahmad Hassan, *Perempuan Islam di Dewan dan Podium*, p. 8. Ahmad Hassan stated further that "women are forbidden to perform *jīnāzah* [burial rite] because *jīnāzah* is a male matter and also because of the desire to prevent the meeting of men and women.
"Women may not call the *adhān* and may not call the *iqāmah* and are not permitted to *tasbīh* in response to the *imām* because the female voice easily becomes lost among male voices, and because these tasks are males' work."
41. Ali Alhamidy, *Islam dan Perkawinan*, pp. 6, 89.
42. Ahmad Hassan, *Perempuan Islam di Dewan dan Podium*, pp. 9-11, 14. Similar in content are two *fatwās* by members of

appearing in *Pembela Islam* in 1956, and signed with the anonymous letters M. S., stated that those groups in Indonesia championing free association of men and women and supporting a wider role for women in politics and society were actually hypocrites. Such groups, M. S. maintained, did not really honor women, but only used the "presence of women to attract men to political parties, meetings and conferences," and allowed them to become film stars and to appear in advertisements "only in order to make money."⁴³

This strict view of the role of women in society brought the Persatuan Islam, and especially Ahmad Hassan, into conflict and debate with other Muslim groups on many particular points. There are records of debate between Ahmad Hassan and Hasbi Ash-Shiddieqy and between Ahmad Hassan and Moenawar Chalil on minor differences of interpretation regarding women's status in society. In the debate with Ash-Shiddieqy, Ahmad Hassan argued that it was not permissible for a woman to shake hands while greeting a government or party official,⁴⁴ and in the debate with Moenawar Chalil, Ahmad Hassan maintained that women are excused (but not necessarily excluded) from attending the service at the mosque for Friday community prayers.⁴⁵ In another dispute, Ahmad Hassan questioned the decision of the Madjelis Sjuro (Legal Council) of the Masjumi Party in June 1956 stating that women could travel outside the country without being accompanied by their male relatives (*maḥram*).⁴⁶ Ahmad

the Persatuan Islam: Abdullah Ahmad, "Bolehkah wanita berbitjara dihadapan umum?" *Pembela Islam* (New Series), No. 1 (March 1956), p. 26; "Perempuan berpidato dihadapan laki-laki," *Al-Muslimun*, I, No. 2 (May 1954), pp. 10-12.

43. M. S., "Perempuan," Part 2, *Pembela Islam* (New Series), No. 2 (April 1956), p. 35.
44. Djaja, "Tokoh kita A. Hassan," *Daulah Islamyah*, I, No. 8 (August 1957), p. 12; see also, "Berdjabatatan tangan dengan perempuan," *Al-Muslimun*, I, No. 7 (September 1956), pp. 8-10.
45. Ahmad Hassan, *Wadjibkan Perempuan Berdjumah?* (Bangil: Persatuan Islam, 1959). See also "Sembahjang wanita dirumah/dimesdjid," *Al-Muslimun*, III, No. 29 (July 1957), p. 11.
46. The Madjelis Sjuro's decision was intended to sanction the trip of leading women members of Masjumi to Communist China and the Soviet Union. The *fatwā* maintained that these women could go unaccompanied so long as several Muslim women journeyed together and seclusion was maintained. The *fatwā* justified its stand on the basis that the trip was for national and party interests and could be considered as a *jihād* when normal legal proscriptions could be set

Hassan called for debate with the (*ulamā*) of the Madjelis Sjuro on this issue, but as his challenge went unanswered, he contented himself with issuing a *fatwā* refuting the Masjumi decision.⁴⁷

The number of women in the Persis organization, in its schools, and the sort of activity these women might participate in, perhaps better indicates the real attitude of the Persatuan Islam toward women. In 1963 dress for women and girls was standard at all Persis schools, with the body completely covered except for the oval of the face and the hands.⁴⁸ At Bangil, where separate schools were maintained for boys and girls, male teachers were employed in the girls' school and male visitors were granted full access to the classrooms while classes were in session.⁴⁹ At Bandung separation was more liberally interpreted and boys and girls sat in the same class but on different sides of the room, a device used by several Indonesian religious organizations, notably the Muhammadiyah, while holding meetings which both men and women attend. The level of education was the same for both boys and girls at all but the highest levels. Young ladies, moreover, trained at Bandung to become teachers, and at Bangil to become informants and propagandists, an indication that the organization did not believe that woman is strictly limited to the household but can engage in some teaching and religious activities, as Ali Alhamidy has pointed out.⁵⁰ Finally, the women and girls have their own autonomous organizations, following the organization's recognition that women may be socially active among other women.⁵¹

It is apparent, however, that some members of Persis, perhaps those who were influenced by the liberal modernists in Masjumi, did not entirely agree with stringent Persis views

aside. The main points of this decision are recorded in Ahmad Hassan, "Hukum Perempuan Islam berpergian (*safar*) tidak dengan mahramnja," *Al-Muslimun*, III, No. 28 (July 1956), p. 5.

47. Djaja, "Tokoh kita A. Hassan," *Daulah Islamyah*, I, No. 8 (August 1957), p. 12. See Ahmad Hassan's argumentation of this subject in "Hukum Perempuan Islam berpergian (*safar*) tidak dengan mahramnja," *Al-Muslimun*, III, No. 28 (July 1956), pp. 5-9.
48. See *Pesantren: Bagian Putera dan Puteri*, p. 12, for an illustration showing proper dress according to Persis standards.
49. Interview with Abdulkadir Hassan . . . and others at Bangil on July 13, 1963.
50. Ali Alhamidy, *Islam dan Perkawinan*, p. 89.
51. See above, pp. 121-122.

concerning women, and advocated--and even allowed--their daughters to dress in Western clothes, and to associate with boys in the Western manner. A 1956 issue of *Pembela Islam* carried an article, again signed with the initials M. S., which chided the members of the Persatuan Islam for "new *bid'ah*." The *bid'ah*, as the article saw it, was imitation of Westernism, and particularly its manifestations toward womanhood. The article stated that the members of the Persatuan Islam were no longer guilty of such things as prayers for the dead, making the *khuṭbah* too long, and other old *bid'ah*. However, M. S. stated, "In Persis there are not a few who allow their daughters to dress modern . . . with chests and posteriors protruding, . . . allowing them to become guides [scouts] and associate with boys, . . . and even, on one occasion . . . one member's house was used by young men and women for a dance."⁵² Probably few such persons in Persis would defend an attitude of greater freedom for women in society and attempt to justify it with a *fatwā*.

Defense of Polygyny

The Muslim practice of polygyny was also a target of the secularists before and after the war. In 1930 the Isteri Sedar (Conscious Womanhood), a secularist women's organization, was founded and its program specifically attacked "polygamy, child marriages and prostitution."⁵³ While Muslim women's groups agreed with other parts of the Isteri Sedar's program, most found it impossible for religious reasons to agree with the condemnation of polygyny the program called for. In 1929, the Muhammadiyah's woman's organization 'Aisijah maintained that polygyny was beneficial in that it had proven successful in preventing the increase of prostitution.⁵⁴ Most Muslim women's groups thereafter urged legal restraints to prevent "illegal" polygyny, which they defined as marriage not sanctioned by Islam or incorrectly performed according to their conception of what

52. M. S., "Kembali Lagi," *Pembela Islam* (New Series), No. 1 (March 1956), pp. 6-7. Similar is Isa Anshary's lament: "I once asked a *guru* [religious teacher] who taught here, and once also asked an important person in the *Persjari-katan Islam* which has a middle level school: 'What is the dress of the girl students like?'

"They answered: 'If we were strict in matters of dress, eventually our school would not be able to find students.'

"This is a sign of the 'moral crisis' which threatens the Islamic community." *Revolusi Islam*, p. 36.

53. Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies*, p. 338.

54. Blumberger, "Moehammadijah," *Encyclopaedië van Nederlandsch Oost-Indië*.

the proper ceremony should be. Several Muslim women's organizations maintained that while polygyny was sanctioned by religion, monogamy was better suited to most Muslims because of economic necessity.⁵⁵

The Persatuan Islam itself had little to say regarding polygyny, but did defend the practice because it was permitted in Qur'ān and *Sunnah*. In the debate between Muslims and secularists in the 1930's, the Persatuan Islam countered secularist statements that monogamy was more suited to past Indonesian practice, by countering that the secularists were not really basing their arguments on Indonesian considerations but rather on an imitation of Western practice. "They who are afflicted with Westernism," a writer in *Pembela Islam* states, do not understand that polygyny "is confirmed by Islam," and that the matter was not subject to debate or change.⁵⁶ Another article sought to counter secularist statements that polygyny was open to abuse by stating that many other situations were also open to abuse as well. "We confess," the article ran, "that polygamy is a danger, like a knife in the hand of a housewife in the kitchen," but that in itself is little enough reason for stopping polygamy, or "removing the knife from the kitchen."⁵⁷

55. J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, "Vrouwenbeweging (Inlandsch)," Encyclopaedië van Nederlandsch Oost-Indië.

56. Dj., "Penjakit ke-Baratan," Pembela Islam, No. 55 (December 1932), p. 9.

57. M. S., "Permadoean," Pembela Islam, No. 55 (December 1932), p. 11.

CHAPTER XI

POLITICS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD

If the Persatuan Islam prior to the Second World War had had a direct interest in furthering Muslim political goals, it was even more politically committed after independence. Its leaders stressed that the Persatuan Islam was primarily a religious organization, but to establish Islamic ideology in society it was necessary to engage in political activity.¹ Persis members speaking or acting politically generally did so through the medium of some other Muslim political organization such as Masjumi or the Anti-Communist Front. The nature of the post-independence political dispute between Muslims and secular nationalists, and among Muslims themselves, occasionally brought a response from the Persatuan Islam, however, and on those occasions, the organization issued statements, manifestos and *fatwās* that had, and were meant to have, directly political consequences.

During the years of the Revolution (1945 to 1949), it was generally agreed by the various political factions supporting the republican government that after Indonesian independence was secured, still outstanding questions--including the federal-provincial relationship and the role of religion in the state--would be resolved by democratic means. With the transfer of sovereignty in 1950, a provisional constitution was adopted that called for elections and for the convening of a constituent assembly to resolve these controversies and to incorporate solutions in a new constitution.² The formulation of an elec-

1. Manifes Perdjuangan Persatuan Islam, 1956, p. 24.
2. The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia was actually placed in effect in August 1950, some seven months after the transfer of sovereignty. For a detailed study of that constitution and some information on the Indonesian plans to convene a constituent assembly, see Prof. Dr. R. Supomo, The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, trans. Garth N. Jones (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1964), esp. pp. 10, 78-81; for a brief discussion of the problems facing the nation and the political parties see Herbert Feith, "Toward Elections in Indonesia," Pacific Affairs, XXVII, No. 3 (September 1954), pp. 236-254; for

tion law, the preparing of voting lists and other preparations for elections, coupled with frequent changes of government and, at times, deliberate stalling by political groups to gain better advantage, delayed parliamentary elections until 1955, and the Constituent Assembly did not meet until 1956. Two major political developments occurred during this pre-election period: the breakup of the Muslim unity party Masjumi along liberal and conservative lines, and the renewal of open polemic between Muslims and secularists on the role of religion in the state. Of the two developments, the split in Muslim unity had the more serious repercussions for Muslim activists, for, thereafter, Muslims had to contend with each other as well as to combat non-Muslim opponents.

The Persatuan Islam's Role in Masjumi

Persis leaders, as individual religious scholars, participated in the November 1945 Muslim conference that established Masjumi as the unity political party of all Indonesian Muslims.³ When the Persatuan Islam was formally reestablished in 1948, it entered Masjumi as an extraordinary member, just as the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama, among others, had already done before it. Members of Persis were urged--and later almost required--to join Masjumi on an individual basis, and several of the Persis leaders were selected by the Masjumi leadership as *anggota kern* (core members) who were respected (*ulamā*) and lay leaders chosen to serve as guides for the larger party membership.⁴

The Persatuan Islam held the viewpoint that all Muslims had a duty to engage in political activity as part of their religious duties. This was apparent in the writings of Ahmad Hassan, reiterated in the writings and speeches of Isa Anshary and Moehammad Natsir, implied in the manifestos of the organization, and fully outlined in several *fatwās* of its *ulamā*. The 1956 manifesto stated, for example, that the efforts of the Persatuan Islam were "not limited to creed [*'aqīdah*] and worship [*'ibādah*]," but also "to struggle in the political realm for achieving victory for Islamic ideology."⁵ Isa Anshary expressed

the Muslim understanding of the purpose of the Constituent Assembly see Manifes Perdjuangan Persatuan Islam, 1956, p. 22.

3. Manifes Perdjuangan Persatuan Islam, 1956, p. 36.
4. Aboebakar Atjeh, K. H. M. Wahid Hasjim, pp. 216, 285.
5. Manifes Perdjuangan Persatuan Islam, 1956, p. 24.

the same thought in *Islam dan Nasionalisme* when he stated that "politics itself is an instrument by which to achieve Muslim ideals."⁶

In his discussion of the political obligations of a Muslim, Isa Anshary drew a distinction along the time-honored lines of *farḍ kifāyah* and *farḍ 'ain*. *Farḍ kifāyah* designated a specific religious obligation which could be brought to completion for the community by the efforts of a few people, so that other Muslims were accordingly freed from performing that action. *Farḍ 'ain*, as a designation indicated that the religious obligation was essential and general, so that all Muslims were required to strive for its fulfillment. Isa Anshary maintained that the effort to institute Islamic laws and ideals in society and nation could not be accomplished only by a few people, and indeed, "even with the efforts of the entire *ummah* it will not easily be achieved." He concluded that political activity constituted *farḍ 'ain* and was an obligation placed equally on every Muslim, "whether a leader or one who is led."⁷

Moehammad Natsir justified political activity for Muslims as Muslims on the argument that Islam was a "philosophy of life" that dictated Muslims' actions in every endeavor and could not be excluded from any human activity including politics. In 1950, he stated that "we Muslims do not separate ourselves from politics, and as political activists we are unable to separate ourselves from our ideology which is Islam. For us, the establishment of Islam cannot be separated from the establishment of society, of nation, of freedom."⁸

On the basis of such arguments, most Persis members did apparently join Masjumi, and several even achieved some distinction as leaders. Immediately after the war, Moehammad Natsir became prominent in Masjumi, and in 1949, after holding several junior cabinet positions in the republican government, he became general chairman of Masjumi and generally accepted leader of the modernist faction of the party. In 1951, as party leader, he formed a cabinet which lasted until the following year and was noted for its businesslike approach to the administrative and economic problems then facing the Indonesian nation.⁹

6. Isa Anshary, *Revolusi Islam*, p. 30.
7. Moehammed Isa Anshary, *Islam dan Nasionalisme* (Bandung: Pustaka Djihad, 1954), pp. 59-60; cf., Moehammad Natsir, "Revolusi Indonesia" in *Capita Selecta*, II, pp. 136-137 for use of these terms in a broader context.
8. Moehammad Natsir, "Agama dan Politik," *Capita Selecta*, II, p. 157.
9. This essay will not deal with the Natsir cabinet since a

Isa Anshary became a member of the leadership council of Masjumi, was party provincial leader in West Java, and leader of the small fundamentalist faction of Masjumi. Ahmad Hassan did not play a prominent political role, possibly because of health problems, but more probably because of his own deep interest in rebuilding the Persatuan Islam's educational system. He did, however, write several articles and *fatwās* on political matters that firmly supported Isa Anshary's position, and later he served as a member of the important Madjelis Sjiuro, the '*ulamā*' advisory council of Masjumi.

Since Masjumi was a unity organization, among its members there were many viewpoints on religion, politics, economics and social problems. Moreover, Muslim organizations which often represented mutually contrary views were also federated members and held disciplinary control over many members of Masjumi, thus ensuring a permanent mechanism within Masjumi for the perpetuation of difference and factionalism. The Muhammadiyah, with its concern for social progress and its modernist viewpoint in religious matters, was almost the exact opposite of the Nahdlatul Ulama, which wanted to preserve the traditional religious system that had been dominant in Indonesia before the entry of modernist Muslim thought. These two groups formed the nucleus for two wings or factions within the party, with the Muhammadiyah representing what came to be known as the moderate wing and the Nahdlatul Ulama representing the conservative wing. It was typical of the Persatuan Islam that while it was fundamentalist in religious matters and thus frequently allied with the reforming or moderate wing on many points, it was so uncompromising on other matters that it often was regarded as an arch-conservative faction. A Persis manifesto in 1953 called its own viewpoint "revolutionary-radical," and described itself as "wanting to change society to its very roots," and wanting to "shatter the illness of the Muslims in a radical and revolutionary manner; clearly, without disguise, without hesitancy, with firmness."¹⁰

The Persis mission, although termed "revolutionary-radical" by some of its leaders, can perhaps best be described as an effort to ensure that what it regarded as the fundamentals of religion were operative throughout society. Persis emphasized--even as it had before the war--that the performance of basic

study would shed no light on the Persatuan Islam. Natsir regarded his cabinet as an administrative cabinet with the responsibility for correcting many administrative weaknesses in the state, a task the cabinet was unable to fulfill because of its short duration. See Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 146-176.

10. Manifes Perdjuangan Persatuan Islam, 1956, p. 26.

religious obligations, i.e., prayer, alms-giving and the pilgrimage, and particularly the performance of these obligations in the prescribed manner, free of all "innovations," was an essential step in creating a strong, healthy and effective Muslim body politic. Persis leaders believed that an important purpose of Masjumi was to bring Muslim factions together where differences of principle (*khilāfīyah*) and associated problems (*furū'*) between the various groups might be solved through consultation.¹¹ Several Persis manifestos noted that solutions to problems dividing the Muslim community could easily be found and a clear and effective Muslim viewpoint established if all Muslims would accept the Qur'ān and *Sunnah* as the ultimate guides in their consultations.¹²

There was a sizeable group within Masjumi that believed that discussions of religious differences would produce no result and were likely to produce ill will that would harm Muslim political unity. This group, called the "liberal-moderate" element by Isa Anshary, generally controlled Masjumi and usually headed off attempts to discuss points of religious difference,

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11. *Khilāfīyah* is literally "differences of principles" and among Indonesian Muslims the dispute concerning *taqlīd* and *ijtihād* (see above pp. 46-57) was considered to be a difference of principle. *Furū'* is the consequent disputes growing out of the differences of principle, but not differences of principle themselves. The disputes concerning *talqīn* and *ushalli*, for example, were considered to be *furū'*, that is, an outgrowth of the dispute over *taqlīd* and *ijtihād*. In a short essay on the subject Ahmad Hassan attempted to provide guidance for eliminating many of the differences among various Muslim groups.

1) When there are contradictory views on a religious subject it is necessary to examine the Qur'ān and *Sunnah*. Whatever these sources confirm "we accept" and "that which has no basis we reject."

2) In a matter in which conflicting views are supported by *ḥadīth* (with no Qur'ānic clarification), it is necessary to reject the weak *ḥadīths*, and to take the viewpoint of the *ḥadīths* which have the better claim to be genuine.

3) When Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* conflict on a matter, it is necessary to reject the *ḥadīth*.

Paraphrased from Ahmad Hassan, "Mas-alah Chilafiyah," *Hikmah*, IX, No. 37-38 (October 12, 1956), p. 34. Acceptance of Ahmad Hassan's suggestions would of course follow the doctrine of the Persatuan Islam and would exclude the commentary of the *madhhabs*.

12. *Manifes Perduangan Persatuan Islam*, 1956, p. 64; Isa Anshary, *Falsafah Perdjuaan Islam*, p. 73.

whether they came from the Persatuan Islam or from more traditionalist groups. Persis congress resolutions noted this desire to block discussion on the part of the "liberal-moderate" element and stated that the Persis' willingness to cooperate with other Muslim groups could never mean a halt in its efforts to cleanse religion of innovation and to resolve matters of difference in the Muslim community. "The Persatuan Islam cannot accept the standpoint that to strengthen unity, questions of *furū'* and *khilāfīyah* should be frozen. The Persatuan Islam cannot remain quiet toward any such betrayal [of its religious principles]." ¹³ Nor was the Persatuan Islam's insistence on debating religious differences with other Muslim groups much different from the practice of several other Muslim groups within Masjumi. The Masjumi policy, formulated by the Central Leadership Council, even cut across Muhammadiyah interests at times, and on at least two occasions, there was consideration by Muhammadiyah leaders of whether to leave Masjumi. ¹⁴ The Nahdlatul Ulama, for as long as it remained in Masjumi, also believed that its own viewpoint was made subservient to that of other factions. Eventually, it became convinced that it suffered too much for the case of Muslim unity and left the organization. ¹⁵ Like Persis leaders, both the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama leaders maintained the right to speak out for their organizations' interests, and rejected the contention that to contest issues destroyed Muslim unity.

The challenging tone of Persis manifestos in maintaining the organization's right to speak out on religious differences within the Muslim community may have been politically oriented as well as religious in nature. Isa Anshary was frequently criticized in Masjumi for striking too hard a line in politics, particularly in his vitriolic attacks against secularists which made working relationship with them difficult for Masjumi leadership. He received further criticism for implying that those Muslims who did not completely agree with his line of thinking were apostate (*murtadd*). ¹⁶ While the issue of *furū'* and

13. Manifes Perdjuangan Persatuan Islam, 1956, pp. 25, 26. The Persatuan Islam charged that the "liberal-moderate" group was fully aware of what constituted *bid'ah* but did not "actively and positively combat *bid'ah*," believing that to discuss the differences in *furū'* and *khilāfīyah* "only divides Muslim unity." The Persatuan Islam believed that discussion could have led to a resolution of the differences.
14. Times of Indonesia, July 7, 1956; Merdeka, April 12, 1956.
15. Naim, "The Nahdlatul Ulama Party," pp. 1-11.
16. Haluan, April 5, 1957.

khilāfīyah was only a minor controversy within Masjumi, Isa Anshary, who was the principal drafter of Persis manifestos, may have directed the statements on *furū'* and *khilāfīyah* primarily as a riposte to his critics, whom he probably saw as desiring to stifle all his religious and political pronouncements.

While the majority of Persis members did follow Isa Anshary's approach in politics, there were many who chose the more moderate approach of Moehammad Natsir. Even this latter group and Moehammad Natsir himself agreed, however, that the matters of *furū'* and *khilāfīyah* should not be frozen in the interests of political unity, but implied that discussions could be two-sided and friendly, whereas Isa Anshary's approach often conveyed the impression of an ultimatum.

Polemic Against the Nahdlatul Ulama

Factionalism in Masjumi reached its peak in 1952 when the Nahdlatul Ulama, the Pergerakan Tarbijah Islamijah (Perti) and the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia withdrew from the party. The primary complaint of the seceding groups centered on party leadership, which they claimed was dominated by the Western educated and modernist-inclined faction to the virtual exclusion of conservative leaders. Nahdlatul Ulama leaders were particularly bitter concerning the 1949 reorganization of Masjumi in which party control was centered in the modernist dominated Central Leadership Council. The reorganization stripped all but advisory functions from the conservative dominated Madjelis Sjuro, which conservatives claimed had been established in 1945 to function as a senate of prominent (*uḷamā'*) to review the Leadership Council's decisions and policies against Muslim legal standards. Nahdlatul Ulama leaders also complained that the considerable influence of NU (*uḷamā'*) among the rural populations of Java and Borneo warranted their organization a greater voice in Masjumi and in the formulation of party policies. The NU leaders charged that their organization's role during the Revolution--when its (*uḷamā'*) provided leadership in the towns and villages and its young men were the mainstay of Hizbullah, Masjumi's paramilitary organization--was unappreciated. The Nahdlatul Ulama concluded that the modernist faction was actively seeking to keep Nahdlatul Ulama members out of party leadership and from Masjumi posts in the government.¹⁷

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17. The following works discuss the Nahdlatul Ulama's action in withdrawing from Masjumi: Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, pp. 233-237; Naim, "The Nahdlatul Ulama Party," pp. 1-25; Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama, "Pedoman Kampanje Pemilihan Umum untuk Madjlis Konstituante, 20 Oktober 1953," Risalah, No. 5 (1955); Deliar Nur, "Masjumi," pp. 50-51.

Nahdlatul Ulama leaders, particularly on the highest levels, were '*ulamā*' steeped in traditionalist religious teachings. The graduates of the NU school system with its somewhat liberalized curriculum had not in 1952 yet begun to emerge in the party. Consequently, there were few NU leaders who would have been suited by education to assume a cabinet position or a principal party post. The modernist faction, on the other hand, had an abundance of persons with Western-based educations who were interested in authority and, in Indonesian terms, capable of exercising it.

The actual NU decision to break with Masjumi centered on the selection of a Muhammadiyah '*ālim*' for the post of Religious Affairs minister in the Masjumi-Nationalist Party (PNI) coalition cabinet formed by Wilopo. The NU candidate, Wachid Hasjim, who had held the post in two previous cabinets, was opposed by the modernist faction led by Moehammad Natsir because of charges circulating at that time that Wachid Hasjim had been involved in the mismanagement of funds during his previous appointment as minister.¹⁸ The Nahdlatul Ulama regarded modernist Muslim refusal to allow Wachid Hasjim to be appointed as another in a series of modernist discriminations against the traditionalist elements of Masjumi, and decided to withdraw from Masjumi. Within several months, the Nahdlatul Ulama and several other seceding organizations established the rival Liga Muslimun Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim League).

The Nahdlatul Ulama congress at Surabaya in 1952 cited its many complaints against Masjumi, and emphasized that the Madjelis Sjiro-Central Leadership Council dispute and the Masjumi refusal to reorganize as a federation were actually the reasons for the NU withdrawal. That congress also reaffirmed the traditional NU position on the importance of the *madhhabs* as the source of Islamic teachings and doctrine. A resolution was passed declaring that Muslims must follow a *madhhab*, that *talfīz* was not permitted, and that Muslims could only enter political parties that followed the teachings of the *madhhabs*.¹⁹ The Persatuan Islam, more sensitive to the religious differences of the dispute than to political differences and long annoyed with the persistence of the NU in emphasizing the traditional importance of the *madhhabs*, saw this NU resolution as the chief issue in the dispute between the Nahdlatul Ulama and Masjumi.

In *Risalah al-Madz-hab*, Ahmad Hassan stated that the Nahdlatul Ulama knew--"and knew quite well"--when it joined Masjumi in 1945 that many other organizations and persons in Masjumi did not share the NU regard for the *madhhabs*. Ahmad

18. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, pp. 234-235.

19. See above pp. 52-53 for definition of these terms.

Hassan pointed out that Hadji Muhammad Hasjim Asj'ari Tebu-Ireng, the noted NU leader who had brought the NU into Masjumi, had agreed that religious decisions would be made by the Madjelis Sjuro, composed of competent (*ulamā'*), some of whom followed a *madhhab* and others who did not.²⁰ Ahmad Hassan wryly noted that six years was certainly a long time for the Nahdlatul Ulama to be a member of Masjumi if the NU leadership really could not tolerate Masjumi refusal to accept the *madhhabs* as final authority on religious matters. He suggested that if membership in Masjumi was as reprehensible as stated in NU resolutions and statements made after NU separation in 1952, then the NU leaders responsible for bringing the Nahdlatul Ulama into Masjumi were guilty of sin, at the very least.²¹ Realizing that the NU leaders would not denigrate Hadji Hasjim Asj'ari for taking the NU into Masjumi, Ahmad Hassan implied that the NU decision to leave Masjumi was not based on a regard for correct religious principles, but only as a political expedient.

In *Risalah al-Madz-hab*, Ahmad Hassan rejected the new Nahdlatul Ulama declaration on the importance of the *madhhabs* and reiterated arguments he had used twenty years earlier in debates with NU leaders to prove his case. As in his earlier debates he declared that Qur'ān and *Sunnah* did not even mention the *madhhabs*, and again outlined his theory on how the *madhhabs* actually came into being.²² His presentation severely castigated all groups that regarded the *madhhabs* as the final arbiter of religious matters, and he implied that anyone who followed a *madhhab* was wrong and a misinterpreter of religious doctrine, whether or not such a Muslim belonged to Masjumi. Ahmad Hassan did state, however, that despite differences on the *madhhab* issue that political cooperation by all Muslims was desirable and possible. He pointed out--correctly--that even after the Nahdlatul Ulama withdrawal, Masjumi still had many traditionalists among its members and that Masjumi attempted to accommodate the religious views of those members as well as those of the modernist Muslims.²³

20. Ahmad Hassan, *Risalah al-Madz-hab*, p. 117. There is a discussion of Hadji Asj'arie Tebu-Ireng and his school, considered to be the first of the modern *pesantrens* (yet *kaum tua*!) in Mahmud Junus, *Sedjarah Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia*, pp. 204-208.

21. Ahmad Hassan, *Risalah al-Madz-hab*, pp. 20, 118.

22. See above Chapter IV and pp.

23. Ahmad Hassan's statement was correct, since even after the secession of the Nahdlatul Ulama many individuals and organizations remained with Masjumi who favored the *madhhab* position. Al-Djam'iatul Washlijah, for example, remained a special member of Masjumi until 1958 when all the special members left the organization.

In 1956, K. H. E. Abdurrahman, then Secretary General of the Persatuan Islam, published a well written and well argued article in the Persatuan Islam's theoretical journal *Hudjdjatul Islam* which also attacked Nahdlatul Ulama refusal to cooperate politically with Masjumi. Abdurrahman lamented that the Nahdlatul Ulama had taken the term *ahl al-sunnah wa al-djamā'ah* (the traditional term used for orthodox *Sunnī* Muslims) as a party symbol and by using it in its propaganda had "spread slander and calumny, divided the unity of the Islamic *ummah* and generated a feud among the Muslims themselves." Abdurrahman maintained that by playing upon the religious implications of the phrase and claiming Masjumi did not belong to the *ahl al-sunnah wa al-djamā'ah*, the Nahdlatul Ulama sought to slander Masjumi and suggest that Masjumi was outside the pale of Islam. The epithet, he maintained, "is not a guaranty for entering paradise; the name is only a name without any special value . . . [and if it has any value, it] lies in the behavior, actions, capabilities and energy which fit the title." Abdurrahman then considered the historical origin of the term and stated that it had been assigned by al-Ash'arī to those persons who based their faith on the *Sunnah* of the Prophet rather than on unbridled reason as the *Mu'tazilah* did. Abdurrahman concluded that the term *ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamā'ah* should not be applied to any group that followed a *madhhab* since the legal formulations of the *madhhabs* were the product of man's reason and did not have the sanction of Qur'ān and *Sunnah*. He restated the Persis stand that Muslims could only make decisions regarding religious matters on the revealed law as found in Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*. He concluded that the Persatuan Islam, and not the Nahdlatul Ulama, belonged to the *ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamā'ah*, because Persis had always worked against the perpetuation of *bid'ah* in religious matters, while confirming correct religious doctrine and behavior.²⁴

The call to unity of all Muslims continued to be a Persatuan Islam slogan throughout the constitutional period. Particularly in the period before the general elections in 1955, Persis leaders tended to deemphasize the *madhhab* issue, which they realized was a source of contention unlikely to be easily resolved. In a speech at Bandjarmasin in February 1955, for example, Isa Anshary urged political cooperation of all Indonesian Muslims in the face of the approaching elections. He ignored the *madhhab* problem and stated that Muslims were divided only on minor problems (*furū'*), such as *talqīn* and *ushalli*, and that these were not great enough to cause division in the Muslim community.²⁵ His speech was explicit, however, that there could

24. K. H. E. Abdurrahman, "Ahli Sunnah wal Djama'ah," *Hudjdjatul Islam*, I, No. 1 (August 1956), pp. 12-20. This article was incorporated into the Persatuan Islam's 1956 manifesto; see *Manifes Perdjuangan Persatuan Islam*, pp. 28-35.

25. *Suara Masjumi*, March 1, 1955, p. 1.

not be a moratorium on attempts to resolve these differences between *kaum muda* and *kaum tua*, and that he was only asking that both groups cooperate politically while working for the resolution of differences within the Muslim community.

There were many differences that militated against an NU return to Masjumi--personality problems, political issues, and in general a different *Weltanschauung*. While all Muslim elements spoke of eventual Muslim reunification, no real progress was made throughout the constitutional period. Even such cooperation as was achieved among Muslim parties in the Constituent Assembly sessions in 1956 was tenuous and functioned only on the common goal of establishing an Islamic state. No real attempt was ever made to resolve basic political and religious differences so that an accommodation would have been possible. Persis insistence on a resolution of differences of religious principles on its own terms typified the general attitude among all Muslim groups. The statements of Ahmad Hassan, Abdurrahman and Isa Anshary certainly did clarify the "revolutionary-radical" position of the Persatuan Islam, but all three writers demonstrated that what Persis really wanted was adoption of its viewpoint by the opposition, not any sort of compromise.

Attitudes Toward an Islamic State and the Darul Islam

In the parliamentary period, most politically active Muslim groups maintained that their political goal was the establishment of an Islamic state (*negara Islam*).²⁶ In the years prior to the 1955 elections, and even afterward in 1956 when the Constituent Assembly considered the issue, these Muslims saw the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly as the way to establish the principle that Islam would become the guiding philosophy of the Republic of Indonesia. There were two basic viewpoints prevalent among the Muslims as to just how Islamic principles and behavior could be placed into practice in Indonesian society so that an Islamic state could be said to exist. The first viewpoint, held by the Muhammadiyah, maintained that an Islamic society wherein Islamic principles and practices functioned, was all that was really important and that after a proper society had been founded, the spirit generated by that

26. The term *negara Islam* (*negara* meaning state or nation) was common among Indonesian Muslims during this period. Occasionally there was reference to *Dar al-Islam*, but this was usually avoided because of possible identification with the rebel group of the same name. Sometimes, apparently to assuage the feelings of non-Muslims, Muslims spoke of a "state based on Islam" (*negara berdasarkan Islam*).

society would directly determine the content and form of an Islamic state. Although the Muhammadiyah argued that the basic principles of Islam should be the basic guide for an Indonesian state, it was less concerned than many other Muslim groups by the necessity of living under secular law for a temporary period, since it believed that with the development of an Islamic society the outlook of the state would change as well and eventually an Islamic system of law would be fully operative.²⁷

The second viewpoint, espoused by the Nahdlatul Ulama and most other traditionalist groups, believed that the declaration of an Islamic state had necessarily to come before creation of an Islamic society, and that only after such a state had been formally established would it be possible to give it real religious content. Adherents of this viewpoint believed that a declaration calling an Islamic state into existence would create an atmosphere which would allow Islamic law to be more easily established throughout society and the nation. These groups, moreover, believed that Islamic law as defined in the books of *Shāfi'i* jurisprudence--some would say books of the four *madhabs*--could immediately become operative in the courts, without any discussion of the difficulties of such a move.²⁸

The Persis viewpoint regarding an Islamic state was similar to that of the Muhammadiyah in that Persis leaders believed society had to first be molded before an Islamic state could really be strong and effective. Isa Anshary stated that Muslim goals, whether political, religious, social or economic, would be successful only if a society, developed spiritually by its individual members, was created first.²⁹ Persis saw political activity as useful in promoting religious principles throughout society and for combatting what it regarded as confusing tendencies of secularism promoted by non-Muslim political parties. Persis believed that certain clear commands and prohibitions spelled out in the Qur'ān and *Sunnah*--prohibition of alcoholic

27. See A. R. Sutan Mansur's discussion of state and society in "Ringkasan Pidato Ketua Pusat Pimpinan Muhammadiyah Indonesia A. R. Sutan Mansur" in Universitas Muhammadiyah Pembukaan Fakultas Falsafah dan Hukum Muhammadiyah (Sumatera Tengah, 1955 or 1956), pp. 43-44; Pusat Pimpinan Muhammadiyah, Tafsir Anggaran Dasar Muhammadiyah (Djogjakarta, 1954), pp. 23-24.
28. Pengurus Besar Partai Nahdlatul Ulama, Pokok-pokok Uraian didalam Pidato Kampanje Pemilihan Umum untuk Konstituante, 20 Oktober 1955 in Risalah, No. 5 (1955), p. 11.
29. Isa Anshary, Revolusi Islam, pp. 18-24.

drink, gambling, and immorality--should be placed in operation in the state immediately.³⁰ The remainder of the law of an Islamic state, stressed Persis (*ulamā*), would be defined by legislatures and courts, learned in religion, who would make law by applying religious principles to contemporary situations.³¹ Not stated, but obvious here, was that the (*ulamā*), as the interpreters of religious sources would have to play the leading, and perhaps the dominant, role in councils and courts.

Regardless of which viewpoint the various Muslim groups ascribed to, most were convinced that the ultimate establishment of an Islamic state could be achieved by democratic means in the Republic of Indonesia. From the beginning of the Indonesian Revolution, the Muslims had generally regarded the secular government established in 1945 as an expedient for gaining political independence. Most Muslims believed that general elections would give the Muslims control of the government and allow steps to be taken for implementing Islamic principles as part of the Indonesian government's official policy. This policy of cooperation in a secularist state in hope of changing the existing order was not shared by all Muslim groups. A small but significant number refused to recognize the Republic of Indonesia as the legal government of Indonesia. The Darul Islam in West Java, the Persatuan Ulama-ulama Seluruh Atjeh (Union of *ulamā* from throughout Atjeh--PUSA), Kahar Mudzakkar's Momoc Ansjarullah (Spirits of the Helpers of God) in Central Celebes and Ibnu Hadjar's Kesatuan Rakjat Jang Tertindas (Union of Oppressed Peoples--KRJT) in South Kalimantan, all believed that the immediate declaration of an Islamic state was necessary and that to live in a non-Muslim state was contrary to religious principles.³² Each of these groups declared itself

30. Moehammad Natsir, Islam Sebagai Ideologie, p. 53.

31. Ahmad Hassan, Islam dan Kebangsaan, p. 36.

32. Sources on the Darul Islam of West Java are listed in several following footnotes. For further details on the Atjeh-nese group see A. H. Gelanggang, Rahsia Pemberontakan Atjeh dan Kegagalan Politik Mr S. M. Amin (Kutaradja: Murni Hati, 1956); A. J. Piekaar, "Atjeh," Encyclopedia of Islam (New Edition). For further details on the Celebes group, see 'Abdul Qahar Mudzakkar, "Konsepsi Negara Demokrasi Indonesia," 1960 (typescript); Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, pp. 212-214; and Kementerian Penerangan, Sekitar Pemeriksaan Perkara-perkara Affandi Ridhwan dan Achmad Buchari (Djakarta, 1954). There is reference to Ibnu Hadjar's group in "Indonesian Army report on the restoration of security," Selected Translations on Indonesia, No. 4 (Washington: U.S. Joint Publication Research Service, May 1961 [JPRS #8286]), pp. 5-6.

to be a government based on Islam--the Darul Islam in 1948, and the others between 1951 and 1954. Except for the Darul Islam, these groups attached themselves to regional autonomist goals so that the support received from local populations was not always strictly for religious reasons. All these movements were able to exist despite the Indonesian government's military operations against them because they operated in mountainous and tropical terrain and enjoyed the covert support of the populations in those regions in which they operated. This essay will treat briefly only the Darul Islam because it existed in West Java in the area where the Persatuan Islam had several branches and schools and because several Persatuan Islam leaders were accused of supporting Darul Islam goals.

During the first few years after the proclamation of Indonesian independence (1945), the Darul Islam, then only a paramilitary unit of Masjumi, had fought against the Dutch in the mountainous West Java area. The Renville Treaty of January 1948 defined the territories of the Republic of Indonesia and the Dutch forces, and the cease-fire left this particular unit in an area assigned to the Dutch. S. M. Kartosuwirjo, the unit's commander, then dissociated the unit from both Masjumi and the Republic of Indonesia, presumably so as not to embarrass them, and continued to fight the Dutch.³³ Kartosuwirjo had voiced strong beliefs on the necessity of declaring an Islamic state in Indonesia, by force of arms if necessary, even prior to the war, and after the Renville Treaty, he apparently decided that the moment had arrived for such a state to be established. In March 1948, he declared the area of West Java that his forces occupied to be a provisional Islamic state with himself as head of state (*imām*).³⁴ When hostilities between Dutch and Indonesian forces began again in late 1949, Kartosuwirjo received support from several other Indonesian Islamic groups, but his forces were hostile to any military forces, whether Dutch or republican, that attempted to enter his area of occupation.³⁵ By late 1949, Kartosuwirjo apparently believed his influence was strong enough to declare an Islamic state

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33. C. A. O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, "The Dar ul-Islam Movement in Western Java," Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia, pp. 168-170.
 34. "Testimony of Kiyai Jusuf Taudjiri" as quoted in Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Barat, p. 215.
 35. In 1948 during the Second Dutch Police Action, for example, the Siliwangi Division, loyal to the Republic of Indonesia, retreated into Darul Islam territory because of the press of the Dutch action at Jogjakarta, and was attacked by Darul Islam guerrilla units throughout their stay. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 409.

embracing the whole of Indonesia, and on August 7, 1949, he issued his proclamation establishing the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia). The proclamation declared that the aim of the new state was to establish its power "one hundred percent *de facto* and *de jure* in all of Indonesia," and that the laws of Islam would be operative within all the territory held by this state.³⁶

Even as early as 1948, the Republic of Indonesia had trouble with the Darul Islam. In that year, the government decided to create a national army responsive to central control, and as a first step decided to disarm all guerrilla groups. Like the Communists at Madiun that year, the Darul Islam, by then heavily infiltrated by bandits and adventurers, refused to lay down their arms and announce support for the Republic of Indonesia. Eventually the republican government decided that the terrorist activities, the announced goals, and the refusal to recognize the republic government constituted rebellion and declared the Darul Islam to be an illegal organization.³⁷ A parliamentary investigation in 1948, led by Moehammad Natsir, was less severe in its judgments and recommended that the government differentiate between renegade groups conducting terror in the countryside and the true Darul Islam with its concept of an Islamic state.³⁸ Natsir's recommendation reflected the viewpoint of many Muslim groups within the Republic, in that they did not support Kartosuwirjo and disapproved of his approach to the problem of an Islamic state but were reluctant to either condemn him or have the government take decisive action against his movement. Many Muslims feared that to condemn the Darul Islam was really a move against the principle of an Islamic state and believed that persuasion could ultimately bring Kartosuwirjo into the republican fold.

Throughout the 1950's, Moehammad Natsir, speaking as the Masjumi leader, deplored the many government attempts to resolve the Darul Islam problem by force of arms. In 1952, for example, he stated that the rebels should not be dealt with harshly since they had aided in the struggle against the Dutch and that the very existence of the rebel groups was due to the revolution. Natsir recognized that the attitudes and actions of the

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36. "Keterangan ringkas. Dari Proklamasi Karto Suwirjo" in A. H. Gelanggang, Rahsia Pemberontakan Atjeh dan Kegagalan Politik Mr S. M. Amin, p. 29.
 37. "Peraturan Panglima Tentara dan Territorium III Djawa Barat, No. 25, December 9, 1950" in Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Barat, p. 215.
 38. Van Nieuwenhuijze, "The Dar ul-Islam Movement in Western Java," Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia, pp. 173-174.

rebel groups did conflict with those of the Indonesian Republic but stated his belief that through discussion and a sincere effort to understand the rebel problem on the part of the government, a solution acceptable to both sides might be found.³⁹

Natsir was strongly criticized by Nationalist Party (PNI) leaders who believed that negotiations with rebels was useless. Although the Nationalist Party government of Ali Sastroamidjojo (1953 to 1955) made occasional attempts to negotiate differences with several rebel groups, the Nationalist Party and the Ali government appear to have preferred a policy of military action to halt guerrilla activity. The Communists charged that Natsir and Masjumi followed a conciliatory approach toward the rebels because Masjumi was in fact in league with Darul Islam and other Muslim dissident groups.⁴⁰ Although Masjumi spokesmen constantly reiterated that it was not connected with the Darul Islam, its soft stand on the rebel issue allowed Communist propaganda to build a popular image that Masjumi and the rebel movements were connected in some way.

Where Moehammad Natsir only favored reconciliation between rebels and the government, Isa Anshary attempted to show that the rebel problem was a fault of the unresolved political problems facing Indonesia. During Constituent Assembly hearings in 1957, he contended that the adoption of Islam as the state philosophy would satisfy rebel demands, and that the fighting, which had no prospect of ending as long as Indonesia was a secular state, could then be halted. Throughout the early 1950's, when elections were stalled for various political reasons, Isa Anshary remarked on several occasions that the delays were disappointing to the Muslims and made many Muslims wonder if the Darul Islam was not correct in its contention that the nationalists would never permit an Islamic state to be established in Indonesia.⁴¹ Such statements, made by Ahmad Hassan and Isa Anshary, were probably the reason for their arrest in August 1951 when the Sukiman government conducted a general razzia against the Communists and against Muslims believed to be conspiring with the Darul Islam. Ahmad Hassan and Isa Anshary

39. Moehammad Natsir, "Soal 'Gerilja'," Capita Selecta, II, p. 196; see also "Lagi Soal 'Gerilja'," Capita Selecta, II, pp. 198-200.

40. See for example, D. N. Aidit, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Indonesian Communist Party Central Committee on November 8 and 10, 1954," Harian Rakjat, November 11, 1954 (unknown translator), p. 9.

41. Isa Anshary, "Kami menudju Republik Indonesia berdasarkan Islam," speech in Komisi II Konstituante, Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante, II, pp. 205-206.

were released within three days of their arrest and charges against them were never substantiated.⁴²

There may have been some contacts between the Darul Islam and Persis members from time to time throughout the constitutional period, but it is highly unlikely that Persis, committed as it was to achieving its goals through peaceful means and having considerable reason prior to 1956 for believing that peaceful means could be successful, actually aided the Darul Islam. Contact with the Darul Islam, if it occurred, would have been as a means of keeping lines of communication open, with an eye toward promoting eventual rebel reconciliation with the government. Even such contact must have been exceedingly limited. In 1949, Moehammad Natsir led a Muslim sponsored education program in territory controlled by the Darul Islam⁴³ and there may have been later attempts by Persis members to contact Darul Islam groups for similar activity. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that Persis efforts ever extended beyond this exploratory stage. It is unlikely that Persis branch membership in West Java, coming as it did from middle class Muslim traders, had much to do with the Darul Islam, which was given to brigandage and disruption of security, whatever religious principles were involved.

Quarrel with the Secularists

All political parties, regardless of ideology, looked forward to the first national elections which were finally held, after many delays, in 1955. The Muslims when united, before 1952, were in favor of immediate elections, believing that the Muslim complexion of Indonesia would give Masjumi a majority in parliament and in the Constituent Assembly. After 1952, the split in Muslim ranks led Muslim parties and Muslim controlled governments to be more cautious about elections, yet believed that Muslims would still increase their parliamentary strength in a fair election. Since a Muslim victory depended on a solid Muslim front, most Muslim parties based their election campaigning on religion and attempted to convince anyone who regarded himself as a Muslim that it was a religious obligation to vote for Muslim candidates.⁴⁴

42. H. Siradjuddin Abbas, "Pidato di Parlemen tanggal 20 Oktober 1951" in Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, Risalah Perundangan 1951, XIV, p. 7142.
43. George Kahin, "Indonesian Politics and Nationalism" in William L. Holland, ed., Asian Nationalism and the West (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 109.
44. Willard Hanna, "Indonesia's Political Parties I," American Universities Field Staff Reports, December 27, 1956, p. 18.

The secularists, less sure of their support among the populace in 1950, favored elections at a later date, believing that a delay would strengthen their position.⁴⁵ Since a secular government was already in existence and Nationalist Party participation in early governments assured secularists of a number of administrative posts, these secular nationalist groups saw no pressing need to hold immediate elections. The Nahdlatul Ulama's secession from Masjumi in 1952 and its cooperation with the Nationalist Party allowed the Nationalist Party to form a government without Masjumi support, and the entry of President Sukarno into active politics on the secularists side in 1953 considerably improved the Nationalist Party's position. The Nationalist Party, as the chief representative of the secularists, bolstered its popular image in the pre-election period by urging chauvinistic nationalism, particularly the acquisition of West Irian by force, and severance of remaining Indonesian-Dutch ties.⁴⁶

Differences between Masjumi and the Nationalist Party rapidly strained working relations between these two parties after 1953. The excessive derogations and insinuations made by both sides during this period dashed any prospect of post-election cooperation and, in large measure, contributed to the antagonistic atmosphere of 1958 that prompted elements of Masjumi to join the Outer Areas rebellion in that year. The differences covered a host of subjects, including the basic differences on the form of state Indonesia should have. The prime cause of the dispute, however, seemed to center on political control of the government and the patronage that went with that control.

Members of the Persatuan Islam were quite active in polemic against the Nationalist Party, particularly those who subscribed to Isa Anshary's "revolutionary-radical" approach. While Isa Anshary's arguments were not greatly different in fundamentals than those of the more moderate faction of Masjumi led by Natsir, they contained a strain of radicalism, and often intolerance, less evident in the arguments of the moderates. The "revolutionary-radicals" pointed out that Muslims were permitted by their religion "to treasure race and land" and that Indonesian Muslims held just as high a regard for Indonesia as did the secularists. Isa Anshary stated that Islam commanded Muslims to demonstrate their support of the land in which they

45. Herbert Feith, "Toward Elections in Indonesia," Pacific Affairs, XXVII, No. 3 (September 1954), pp. 236-254.

46. Willard A. Hanna, "Indonesia's Political Parties, I," American Universities Field Staff Report, December 27, 1956, pp. 4-13, outlines the Nationalist Party's program, attitudes and tendencies.

lived by actions, "with *jihād*, with struggle and sacrifice." He stated that the secular nationalists and Muslims had the same outlook "toward social justice, prosperity of society and national security," but that the two groups differed on the exact approach needed to achieve such goals.⁴⁷ The point at which Muslims and secular nationalists parted, stated Isa Anshary, was on the type of law that was to be operative in the Indonesian state. Like Ahmad Hassan before the war, Isa Anshary argued that Muslim law had to be made operative in society and that Muslims were opposed to any movement which rejected religious law and advocated secular law for Indonesia.

The "revolutionary-radical" group believed that the struggle for independence would not be complete and the revolution would not be ended until some sort of Muslim control over the state was established. In *Revolusi Islam*, for example, Isa Anshary stated that the "Islamic revolution" was not a national revolution, limited to national boundaries, but rather was a revolution "to release man from physical and spiritual exploitation." "The theory, character, nature, characteristics and philosophy of this revolution," he maintained, "were determined by God through revelation in the form of the *Sunnah*!" The Indonesian revolution, Isa Anshary exhorted, had stopped before it had completed its task because it had fallen under control of "unbelievers" (*kāfirs*) and hypocrites (*munāfiq*).⁴⁸ He urged that the Indonesian revolution be continued, but that it be given spiritual content to achieve its goal of establishing Islam and its laws in the state and society.⁴⁸

In 1953, President Sukarno, who had until then avoided taking a public stand on the issue of an Islamic state, declared in a speech at Amuntai that "if we establish a state based on Islam, many areas whose population is not Islamic . . . will secede." He made several other speeches of a similar nature designed to play down the Islamic state. Most Muslim leaders made restrained responses, but several secondary Masjumi leaders, including Isa Anshary, responded with harsh invective. Despite efforts from Masjumi leadership to quiet him, Isa Anshary stated that "there is a cold war between Islam on the one hand and on the other are those who call themselves Islamic and are not." In a reference widely interpreted as aimed at Sukarno, Isa Anshary stated that the Islamic state, as it had been established by the Prophet at Madīnah, insured the rights of members of other religions but gave no protection to *munāfiq* Muslims.⁴⁹ As might be expected, this sort of invective was

47. Isa Anshary, *Islam dan Nasionalisme*, pp. 59-60.

48. Isa Anshary, *Revolusi Islam*, pp. 15-16, 12.

49. Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, pp. 281, 283. See also Boyd R. Compton, "President

not well received by either Sukarno or by the Nationalist Party, and there were many Muslims who believed that Isa Anshary had overstepped the bounds of propriety. While some elements in Masjumi favored disciplinary action against Isa Anshary for this and similar statements, there was a sizeable group which saw Sukarno at fault; a showdown was avoided in the interests of party unity. Isa Anshary's outburst, however, came under strong attack by the Nationalist Party and by the Communists and was presented by them as evidence of Muslim political and religious intolerance.

Another source of dispute between Muslims and secularists centered on the unique and peculiar position in Indonesian politics occupied by Sukarno's Pantja Sila concept. All groups, including the Muslim community, had accepted the Pantja Sila as a symbol of cooperation among Indonesians and as a statement of Indonesian goals during the Revolution. Consequently, after the Revolution there had been considerable sentiment for its retention as a state motto or expression of national ideals. Moehammad Natsir, for example, spoke highly of Pantja Sila in a speech at Lahore, Pakistan in 1953 and referred to it as containing the founding principles of the Indonesian nation.⁵⁰

After 1953, those elements in Indonesia that preferred the retention of a secular based state--the secular nationalists, the Communists and the Christians--began to promote Pantja Sila as the philosophical basis of the state. An organization was founded for the "Defence of Pantja Sila," and when Sukarno returned to active politics in 1953, Pantja Sila was promoted in opposition to the concept of an Islamic state. By 1956, when the Constituent Assembly met, Muslim support for Pantja Sila had almost entirely disappeared and the terms Pantja Sila and "Islamic state" were mentioned as diametrically opposed concepts.

It was typical of Persis that its members saw Islam as an ideology with a transcending claim to loyalty and Pantja Sila as a competing, and hence false, ideology in a society that could rightly be only Islamic. In his address before the Constituent Assembly, Moehammad Natsir stated that Pantja Sila was not suitable as a state ideology because it consisted of five relative terms, because no one of the five could be considered to be absolute in nature, and because the *sīlas* were all relative, in themselves and one to another. He stated that in contrast to Pantja Sila, Islam had laws, given to man by God

Sukarno and the Islamic State," Newsletter of the Institute of Current World Affairs, March 8, 1953; Isa Anshary, Revolusi Islam, p. 52.

50. Moehammad Natsir, Some Observations Concerning the Role of Islam in National and International Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1954).

through revelation, which provided an absolute criterion by which to regulate human affairs. Natsir noted that Sukarno himself did not view Pantja Sila as a deep rooted philosophy but only a compromise or meeting place for all the viewpoints of differing Indonesian factions. It was Natsir's judgment that as pure concepts, the *silas* were incapable of shaping reality in actual situations, and he argued that if they did, they would no longer be neutral. The vagueness and sterility of Pantja Sila, Natsir concluded, could not convince Muslims who already had a clear ideology to support Pantja Sila instead of Islam, for to "go from Islam to Pantja Sila . . . is the same as springing from earth . . . into a vacuum."⁵¹

As Natsir stated, the principles enumerated in Pantja Sila were vague terms, and deliberately so, since they had been intended from the first as a compromise which would rally all political groups regardless of ideology to the republican government. The interpretation and definition of each of the five principles was left to each faction, and because of differing ideologies and outlook, there was no consensus on any of the five points. Isa Anshary and his "revolutionary-radical" following, with their fixed views regarding the role of Islam in politics, were among the first Muslim groups to attack this vagueness as weakness. In *Ummat Islam menghadapi Pemilihan Umum* (The Islamic Community faces the General Elections) Isa Anshary charged that Pantja Sila was a vague ideology with no real interpretation, used only as a slogan. He cited the *sila* of democracy, and asked whether such democracy was to be "Western democracy or the democratic centralism of Eastern Europe, and whether it would operate on the principle of majority rule." He stated that Islam placed many restrictions on democratic action and that Islam did not allow "total submission to the majority" on all questions since many matters had already been decided by the Qur'ān and were not open to debate. He noted the same vagueness in the first *sila*, "Belief in God," and suggested that this *sila* was not the same "belief in God" confessed by Muslims. The belief in God mentioned in the Pantja Sila, he stated, was not concerned with undertaking good and shunning evil, establishing the *Sharī'ah*, "establishing *tawhīd*" and "destroying *shirk*," nor could it be used as a measure by which to resolve all matters and settle all disputes.⁵² Isa Anshary's

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51. Moehammad Natsir, "Pidato Komisi II Konstituante," *Tentang Dasar Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante*, p. 129. See also Moehammad Natsir, "Bertentangankah Pantja Sila dengan Al-Quran?" *Hikmah*, VII, Nos. 21-22 (May 29, 1954), pp. 6-7, 37. This essay also appears in *Capita Selecta*, II, pp. 144-154.
 52. Moehammad Isa Anshary, *Ummat Islam menghadapi Pemilihan Umum* (Surabaya: Hasan Aidid, 1953), pp. 7-8, 18-19. He stated elsewhere: "We hear people sloganize Belief in God

remarks illustrate the great gulf that existed after 1953 between the two leading factions in Indonesian politics and explain in part the inability of these groups to cooperate for the solution of the urgent national problems then facing the nation.

Attitudes Toward Communism

The bitter feelings that reemerged during the parliamentary period between Muslim and secular nationalists were excelled only by the total distrust of the Muslims for the Communists. The Communist Party, driven underground in the 1920's, had become a part of the nationalist movement during the early revolutionary years, but, in 1948, the Communist Party suffered another setback when it directly challenged the republican government and was defeated by the republican army at Madiun in East Java. Under the leadership of D. N. Aidit, the Communist Party adopted a policy of creating a national unity front with other "progressive groups" and, by 1952, had again begun to play an active role in Indonesian politics.⁵³ The Communists were able to cooperate with elements of the Nationalist Party partly because parallel interests existed and partly because several Nationalist Party leaders were willing to use Communist support to improve their own political position. President Sukarno as well was favorably disposed toward a Communist Party that would be loyal to the government and participate openly in the Indonesian political system. Muslim groups were generally outspoken against Communism, but the intensity of the opposition varied toward a Communist Party seeking accommodation and offering support for the programs of some Muslim parties. Several Perti leaders, for example, were sympathetic toward many goals espoused by the Indonesian Communists in the 1950's, and Perti leader Hadji Siradjuddin Abbas was active in the Communist-dominated international peace movement of that period. The Nahdlatul Ulama's membership remained generally anti-Communist, but its leaders found Communist Party

. . . whose actions are contrary to the laws of God; people who propagandize humanity but whose actions show bestiality; people who sloganize social justice but work only for their own comfort and satisfaction; people who sloganize democracy, but who promote only the interests of their own parties. Pantja Sila is used only as a slogan, for agitation and demagoguery, a gadfly of the people. Pantja Sila . . . has become *tanpa sila* [without principle]." Isa Anshary, Revolusi Islam, pp. 13-14.

53. Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 46-59.

support for some of its parliamentary programs advantageous and frequently downplayed its own anti-Communist orientation, for example, in 1957, when NU leadership avoided confronting Sukarno on his plan to allow PKI participation in the government. Masjumi, however, was openly anti-Communist and saw no room for compromise or cooperation with the Indonesian Communist Party. The Persatuan Islam was equally adamant in its complete rejection of Communism, and its members issued a large number of books, manifestos and *fatwās* that spelled out the basis for that rejection.

The March 1957 manifesto of the Persatuan Islam stated that the "theory and practice of Communism is not only opposed to all religions but has only enmity and opposition toward inner faith as taught by all religions."⁵⁴ On the same line of thought, Isa Anshary remarked that the Communists rejected God, revelation and prophets and that Communists saw religion as a "superstition shackling man's reason."⁵⁵ Isa Anshary noted that the Communist rejection of religious belief and absolute values revealed itself in a lack of morality which permitted Communism to use terror as a fundamental instrument of control. "The practice of Communist governments in lands they control," stated a Persis document, "is cruelly to exterminate religious life, tear down the places of worship, and terrorize religious leaders and (*ulamā*) inhumanely, as was done in Turkestan, Caucasia and Hungary." The document concluded that the Communists of Indonesia were no different than Communist parties in other lands and were also guilty of resorting to terror as was apparent "by the slaughter of Muslim leaders" at Madiun in 1948 "when the Communist Party was in open revolt against the Republic of Indonesia."⁵⁶

54. Persatuan Islam, "Persatuan Islam menolak Konsepsi Bung Karno" in Suara Masjumi, March 15, 1957, p. 8.

55. Isa Anshary, Jusuf Wibisono and Sjarief Usman, Bahaya Merah di Indonesia, p. 11. See also, Isa Anshary, "Kami menudju Republik Indonesia berdasarkan Islam" in Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante, II, pp. 227-228, 229-231.

56. "Persatuan Islam menolak Konsepsi Bung Karno," Suara Masjumi, March 15, 1957, p. 8. In 1948, the Indonesian Army ordered the Communist and Socialist youth fronts who served as paramilitary units against the Dutch in the Madiun area to lay down their arms. The youth fronts refused and attempted an insurrection in which the Communist Party leader Musso joined. In the Communist takeover of Madiun, Masjumi leaders were the particular targets of the insurrectionists. The revolt was completely crushed by the Indonesian Army within a matter of weeks. Hindley, The Indonesian Communist Party, p. 21.

Isa Anshary stated that the Communists were internationalist in orientation and received aid and orders from the Kremlin to further Communist efforts. He maintained that Communism's real aim was the introduction of a new kind of colonialism which would replace the imperialism of the West, and it was only in order to achieve this goal that the Communists masqueraded as a staunchly nationalistic group.⁵⁷ The 1957 Persis manifesto expounded this argument and stated that Indonesian Communist strength in the 1955 elections had been attained through deception and deceit and warned that "promises from the mouths of Communists to the Indonesian masses have no validity and no meaning in Communist ideology."⁵⁸

Persatuan Islam manifestos issued in 1953, 1954, 1957, 1958 and 1960, all devoted considerable space to a condemnation of Communism. The 1954 declaration, for example, stated that any Muslim who, having heard the evidence against Communism and secular nationalism, still adhered to either of them politically, would "be considered an apostate" (*murtadd*) and would not "receive Muslim prayers or a Muslim burial after death."⁵⁹ The 1957 manifesto gave a brief resume of Qur'ānic references on which Muslims could base their opposition to Communism.

Āl-Imrān 117 recalls that *kāfirs*--anti-religious and anti-God--are always causing and undertaking destruction of every *ummah* that believes properly and follows religion; *al-Mujādilah* 22 contains the explanation that the Islamic *ummah* may not cooperate with groups opposed to Allāh and His Prophet; *al-Nisā'* 140 clearly forbids Muslims to remain together with people who reject religious teachings; *al-Mā'idah* 2 commands Muslims to work together

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57. Isa Anshary, Jusuf Wibisono and Sjarief Usman, Bahaja Merah di Indonesia, pp. 25, 27; also, Isa Anshary, "Kami menudju Republik Indonesia Berdasarkan Islam" in Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante, II, p. 234.
 58. "Persatuan Islam menolak Konsepsi Bung Karno," Suara Masjumi, March 15, 1957, p. 8.
 59. "Fatwa ulama 'Persatuan Islam'" [adopted by the Conference of the Persatuan Islam at Bandung on November 9, 1954] in Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante, II, p. 288. A partial English translation of the *fatwā* appears in Compton, "Muslim Radicalism" The Anti-Communist Front," p. 8. Compton mistakenly translates the term *murtadd* as excommunicated, which has a papal connotation and is not known in *Sunnī* Islam.

for accomplishment of *taqwā* and forbids cooperation for the purpose of committing sin and injustice.⁶⁰

Fatwās issued by individual Persis (*ulamā*) presented similar arguments and accurately reflected the arguments and attitudes toward Communism of a large segment of Indonesian Muslims. One particular *fatwā*, appearing in *Al-Muslimun* in 1955, declared that marriage between a Muslim woman and a Communist could not be valid.⁶¹ A *fatwā* by Ahmad Hassan condemned the Communist united front policy and stated that Muslim cooperation with Communists was not permissible since such cooperation would lead only to destruction of religion.⁶²

In 1957, the Persatuan Islam issued a rebuke to President Sukarno in a joint resolution of all Persis (*ulamā*) entitled "The Persatuan Islam rejects Sukarno's 'concept'" (Persatuan Islam menolak konsepsi Bung Karno). The Persis resolution rejected Sukarno's plan, called upon the President to reconsider and called upon all non-Communists to close ranks and combat the "anti-God and anti-religious basis which is Communism and atheism."⁶³ Again in 1960, the Persatuan Islam, at its annual congress, called upon Sukarno to abolish the Communist Party which "openly chooses sides with the Communist Bloc . . . and assumes the position of a fifth column for the Soviet Union and Red China." This 1960 statement demanded that the army take action against the "subversive Communist Party" which "like the rebels" in the Outer Islands "endangers the safety of the country."⁶⁴

In the period from 1953 through 1958, Isa Anshary conducted a vigorous crusade against the Indonesian Communist Party, as was exemplified in his periodical entitled *Anti-Komunis* (Anti-Communist). All of his writings during this period had a strong

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60. "Persatuan Islam menolak Konsepsi Bung Karno," Suara Masjumi, March 15, 1957, p. 8.
 61. Abdulkadir Hassan, "Kawin dengan orang komunis," Al-Muslimun, I, No. 12 (March 1955), pp. 7-8.
 62. Ahmad Hassan, "Kerdjasama dengan qaum-qaum jang berfaham sosialis," Pembela Islam (New Series), I, No. 2 (April 1956), p. 32.
 63. "Persatuan Islam menolak konsepsi Bung Karno," Suara Masjumi, March 15, 1957, p. 8. The 1957 statement was issued when Sukarno, seeking to build a united front of his own in Djakarta with which to oppose the disaffected Outer Regions threatening his position, raised the possibility of placing Communists in the cabinet.
 64. "Persatuan Islam menuntut Penghantjuran Partai Komunis Indonesia," Harian Abadi, September 7, 1960, p. 1.

warning to Muslims against ideologies not compatible with Islam; in *Bahaya Merah di Indonesia* (The Red Menace in Indonesia) and again in his speech before the Constituent Assembly, he outlined his specific objections to Communism and rejected it as incompatible with Islam and with Indonesian nationalism. In 1954, along with Muslim leaders Wibisono and Sjarif Usman, he formed the Front Anti-Komunis (The Anti-Communist Front) which was intended to become a national political pressure group, organized on lines similar to the Communist cell system, that was to combat Communism on all levels of society.⁶⁵ It was intended to cross party lines but depended heavily on local Masjumi groups and, consequently, was regarded by other political groups as a Masjumi front organization. While it gathered considerable strength in some areas such as Djakarta and Surabaya, it never really caught on nationally, and was finally banned sometime after 1958.⁶⁶

Political Attitudes Toward Christians

Another important political problem faced by the Muslim political groups in the pre-election period was the relationship between Christians and Muslims on the political plane. The four million Christians in Indonesia, like Christian minorities in other predominantly Muslim lands, generally believed that Muslim political aspirations would directly discriminate against Christianity and make Christians second class citizens. Christian political leaders from the Protestant Party (Partai Kristen Indonesia--Parkindo) and the Catholic Party (Partai Katolik Indonesia) stressed that Christians had fought for independence from colonial rule and, like Muslims, had spilled considerable blood to achieve that goal. They argued that the secular basis for the state was more equitable for all Indonesians and that Pantja Sila with its guaranty of religious belief was sufficient to allow both Muslims and Christians to undertake their religious obligations without discriminating against Christianity. The Christian leaders stressed that Islam as the

65. There are only a few readily available materials on the Anti-Communist Front. Boyd R. Compton, "Muslim Radicalism: The Anticommunist Front," American Universities Field Staff Report, March 5, 1953; "Front Anti Komunis menudju Djalān Djiḥād," Suara Masjumi, December 10, 1954, p. 3; "Statemen Front Anti-Komunis, Djakarta," Suara Masjumi, September 1, 1956, p. 8. In late 1957, the Anti-Communist Front changed its name to Liga Anti-Komunis Rakjat Indonesia (The Indonesian Peoples Anti-Communist League--LIKRA).

66. See below p. 185.

guiding force of the state would have an adverse impact on the Christian population, and some Christian leaders even threatened that predominantly Christian areas such as the Celebes and the South Moluccas would not accept such Muslim domination.⁶⁷

The Persatuan Islam followed the general lead of Masjumi on the Christian issue, and the 1958 Persis manifesto mentioned that in an Islamic state, Christians would be protected and that Muslims would be tolerant of Christian teachings.⁶⁸ Two different approaches to the matter were apparent, however, in the writings of Persis leaders. Isa Anshary, reflecting his "revolutionary-radical" approach, stated in *Islam dan Nasionalisme* that Muslims and Christians were alike in that they both worshipped God, and if each followed the lessons of their respective religions, there was no reason why the followers of the two religions should not live in friendship and without friction. Freedom of religion, he pointed out, was clearly observed in Islamic history and was "more guaranteed and of much wider scope than the 'freedom of religion' observed in several of the great states of Europe."⁶⁹ Like many Muslim writers dealing with Muslim relations with Christians, Isa Anshary implied that the "religious freedom" that was to be guaranteed religious minorities was to be determined by Muslim standards and interpretation and that the Christian interpretation would be accepted only if it did not conflict with the Muslim viewpoint in the matter.

Moehammad Natsir's approach accepted Isa Anshary's formulation but made an additional effort to overcome Christian fears of Muslim political power. In "Keragaman hidup Antara-Agama" (Religious tolerance among religions), Natsir maintained that Muslims were commanded to spread the true faith, but in performing this religious obligation, Muslims were "to give summons in a manner free of all force" and under no circumstance were they to attempt to solve the problem of religious difference by resorting to the dictates of passion. Muslims, Natsir argued, were not to be passive in following a policy of religious tolerance, but were to constantly undertake to remove irritations among religious groups, and to come to the aid of other religions whenever there was a threat to those religions. "Whenever freedom of religion is threatened and suppressed, even if Muslim religious rights are not involved, Muslims are obliged to aid the 'people of the book' [and allow them] to worship God accord-

67. J. B. Kawet, "Speech in Committee II of the Constituent Assembly," in Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante, II, pp. 12-13.

68. Manifes Perdjuangan Persatuan Islam, 1956, p. 55.

69. Isa Anshary, Islam dan Nasionalisme, pp. 61-62.

ing to their various religions, even by pledging their own lives if necessary."⁷⁰

Despite assurances by Natsir and other responsible Indonesian Muslim leaders, Christians saw their religious obligations as best served by a secular state and, consequently, developed both political and religious arguments to support their choice. During the Constituent Assembly debates on the nature of the Indonesian state, the Christian political parties supported Pantja Sila as a state ideology. The radical approach of Isa Anshary, his intolerance of *munāfiq* Muslims, and the anti-Christian activities of the outlawed Muslim rebel groups in West Java and the South Celebes made rapport between Muslims and Christians difficult regardless of Muslim assurances of friendship and tolerance. Muslim efforts to join forces with the Christians, however, continued even after the general elections and, occasionally, the Persatuan Islam made unsuccessful appeals for Christians to join with Muslims and form an anti-Communist front.⁷¹

The Importance of the (*Ulamā*)

In the Persatuan Islam, there was general recognition that the (*ulamā*) had a major role in political affairs. The (*ulamā*) of the organization--Ahmad Hassan, Isa Anshary, Ahmad Abdullah and Abdulkadir Hassan--all formulated many *fatwās* on political subjects intended to determine the direction of Muslim political activity. These *fatwās*, without exception, urged Muslim political unity and passed judgment against Muslim aid to the secularists and communist parties because such parties wanted a state not based on Islamic principles.

Persis writers made occasional references in their books and articles concerning the role they considered appropriate for the (*ulamā*) to play in society and in national affairs. In an article entitled *Fungsi Ulama dalam Masyarakat dan Negara* (The (*Ulamā*)'s Function in Society and the Nation), Moenawar Chalil explained that the (*ālim*) was the transmitter of the word of God to subsequent generations following the Prophet. Through their role as transmitters of the message and as guardians of its pristine truth, Moenawar Chalil stated, the (*ulamā*) have built up considerable respect among lay Muslims. He maintained

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70. Moehammad Natsir, "Keragaman hidup Antar-Agama," *Hikmah*, VII, No. 6 (February 6, 1954), p. 6; also in *Capita Selecta*, II, pp. 225-230.
 71. See for example, "Persatuan Islam menuntut penghantjuran Partai Komunis Indonesia," *Harian Abadi*, September 7, 1960, p. 1.

that lay Muslims would often respond to the words of the '*ulamā*' when they would not respond to similar orders from state officials. He concluded that since '*ulamā*' had such considerable influence over the faith and morals of the Muslim population and were listened to on political and social matters as well, the '*ulamā*' had a great responsibility to act with prudence and wisdom.⁷²

Isa Anshary developed a similar line of reasoning, perhaps to explain his own considerable participation in political activity. He recognized that the well-being of Muslims, whether political, religious, social or economic, depended on the individual, and that it was ultimately "auto-activity" (*auto-aktivitat*) that determined the success or failure of Muslim efforts. He stated that it was the duty of the '*ulamā*' and other Muslim leaders to educate ordinary Muslims in the "lessons of religion, laws of God" so that they would follow a course of action that would bring reward to the Muslims in this world and in the Hereafter.⁷³ Isa Anshary's own political activity was guided by such considerations, and he apparently believed that his own activity would have considerable impact on lay Muslims and determine the direction of their political activity. Moehammad Natsir also believed that the '*ulamā*' had a significant role to play in political affairs, and in a number of speeches, he called on '*ulamā*' to give guidance to lay Muslims on political as well as religious affairs.

This stress on '*ulamā*' was made by many other Muslim groups as well. Deliar Noer has stated in his thesis on the Masjumi Party that the '*ulamā*' in Indonesia could not be ignored as a political factor and that whoever gained their approval would consequently gain a large following, particularly in the rural areas.⁷⁴ It was generally recognized among Masjumi activists that the '*ulamā*' did wield considerable political as well as religious influence among much of the rural population. The Nahdlatul Ulama, for example, was particularly strong in East Java and on Kalimantan where the local '*ulamā*' tended to follow traditionalist Islamic patterns. Masjumi itself was organized so that the '*ulamā*' were on all levels of the party structure, and at least one '*ālim*' was on the control board at each level of the organization. Even though the Nahdlatul Ulama quit Masjumi on the charge that the '*ulamā*' in the Madjelis Sjuro were denied leadership responsibilities, the charge was that the Nahdlatul Ulama's leaders felt slighted that its own '*ulamā*'

72. Moenawar Chalil, Fungsi Ulama dalam Masyarakat dan Negara, pp. 27-28.

73. Isa Anshary, Ummat Islam menghadapi Pemilihan Umum, p. 69.

74. Deliar Noer, "Masjumi," p. 50.

did not dominate the Central Leadership Council. Several members of the Central Leadership Council were in fact '*ulamā*' by recognized *Sunnī* Muslim standards, and the NU implication that '*ulamā*' had no voice in Masjumi was misleading. Like the Nahdlatul Ulama and Masjumi, Persis' emphasis on the '*ulamā*' reflected the general view that '*ulamā*' were to be active in political affairs and serve as leaders and guides for the Muslim population. Moreover, the political activity of Isa Anshary and the political statements of Ahmad Hassan and Moenawar Chalil appears to have been an expression of that ideal.

The End of Persis Political Activity

The Indonesian political situation went badly throughout the parliamentary period when governments resting on weak parliamentary coalitions were unable to form stable governments or to resolve basic economic and political problems facing the nation. The failure of a single party to win a majority in the 1955 elections and the consequent deadlock in both parliament and the Constituent Assembly offered only the prospect of further political immobilization and deterioration. Sukarno's decision in 1957 to resolve the stalemate by instituting presidential rule consequently had considerable support throughout Indonesia and, most importantly, was favored by the military leadership. Sukarno's move was adamantly opposed by Masjumi and by several other political parties.

Although several regionalist movements had actively opposed the central government since 1950, by 1957, disillusionment with the Djakarta government was widespread in several of the outer areas, and local army commanders established local governing councils and refused to recognize the authority of the central government. In 1958, a group of dissident political leaders, mostly from the Masjumi Party, formed a Revolutionary Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) and attempted to bring together all dissident units in a move to win basic political concessions from the Djakarta government. The Revolutionary Republic demanded more autonomy for the Outer Areas, insisted that a greater portion of the finances that the Outer Areas' exports earned abroad be returned to the Outer Areas, and demanded the removal of several leftists widely believed to be crypto-communists from cabinet and sub-cabinet posts. The economic strength of the areas under rebel control--Sumatra, parts of Kalimantan and the Celebes--the support of the armed forces stationed in those areas, and a responsible and well-known leadership appeared at first to give the Revolutionary Republic a good chance of attaining its goals. The rebellion was easily defeated, however, when, contrary to expectations, the Indonesian army conducted a quick and effective campaign against the rebel heartland in central Sumatra. Rebel units held several areas on Sumatra, Kalimantan and the Celebes until 1961, when army leaders offered

a general amnesty and convinced most military units and many civilian leaders in the rebel cause to surrender.⁷⁵

There was considerable hesitation by Moehammad Natsir before he joined the rebels in 1958 even though several other leading Masjumi personalities had already done so. Ultimately he gave way, apparently because he believed that insurrection was the only way left to correct the slide to the left and steady deterioration of politics which had marked Indonesia's parliamentary period. In the several weeks prior to his defection, he was threatened with physical violence by Communist youth groups seeking to discredit him as loyal to the Outer Areas cause,⁷⁶ and it must have been apparent to him that Masjumi was widely regarded as responsible for the rebellion. In August 1958, he was given the position as vice president in the rebel government⁷⁷ and for the following three years attempted to revive the dissident forces which the government forces had been unable to crush after their initial campaign had outstripped their logistical capacity. Finally, in 1961, Natsir surrendered to central government forces under terms of the general amnesty offered that year.

The Masjumi organization Natsir left behind continued to exist until 1961 when Sukarno banned it by decree, but the institution of presidential rule and a number of state of emergency

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75. Leslie H. Palmier, Indonesia (New York: Walkers and Co., 1965), pp. 185-198, succinctly describes the main events of this period. See also Willard Hanna, "The Rebel Cause," American Universities Field Staff Reports, October 9, 1959. The central government viewpoint is given in Lt. Col. Rudy Pirngadi, Peristiwa PRRI: ditindjau dar Sudut Sedjarah TNI (Djakarta: N. V. Endang, 1958). Translated into English with the title The PRRI Affair (as seen in the light of the history of the Indonesian Armed Forces) (Djakarta: Nusantara, 1958). The rebel viewpoint appears in The Birth of New Indonesia (Six months PRRI) (Frankfurt a/Main: PRRI Mission in Europe, 1958), and in RPI Monthly Review, No. 1 (March 1960).
 76. Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy" in Ruth McVey, ed., Indonesia, p. 321.
 77. This essay will not include a study of Natsir's role in the PRRI because it is removed from our real subject, the Persatuan Islam. Natsir's views during this period are recorded in "Moehammad Natsir's views on Sukarno," Bulletin PRRI: Voice of New Indonesia, No. 8 (February 1959), p. 4, and "Excerpts of Natzir's speech" [broadcast over Radio PRRI from Central Sumatra], PRRI Bulletin: Voice of New Indonesia, No. 2 (November 1958), p. 2.

decrees had put an end to Masjumi activity as early as 1959. Anticipating its demise, the extraordinary members of Masjumi, including the Persatuan Islam, all dissociated themselves from Masjumi in October 1958.⁷⁸ Some of these member organizations continued to perform a political role, but many, like the Muhammadiyah and the Persatuan Islam, backed away from political life and concentrated on the educational and social welfare aspects of their programs.

Isa Anshary, although from Sumatra, did not join the rebels but continued to play an active political role on Java. By 1961, however, his Front Anti-Komunis had taken on a more clandestine appearance and was rumored to be anti-Sukarno as well. Shortly thereafter, Isa Anshary was placed under detention.⁷⁹ His arrest and the banning of Masjumi marked an end to political activity by Persis members, although some Persatuan Islam leaders, such as Ali Alhamidy, continued to stress that Muslims must play an active role in the political affairs of the nation, are obliged to combat Communism, and are commanded by Islam to make Islamic principles operative in nation and society.⁸⁰

78. Harian Abadi, October 14, 1958, p. 1.

79. Interview with Abdurrahman and Junus Anis on July 21, 1963.

80. Lecture by Ali Alhamidy at the Universitas Pesantren Persatuan Islam on July 13, 1963.

CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSIONS

The Persatuan Islam was significant because it attempted to define for Indonesian society what constituted Islam, what were basic Islamic principles, and what constituted proper religious behavior for Muslims. The Persis attempt to define Islam came at a crucial point in history, at a time when new ideas from the West and from other Muslim areas clashed with each other and with cultural and religious traditions already esteemed in Indonesia. The importance of the Persatuan Islam lay in an examination, critical in its time and context, of the problems created by the interaction of these diverse influences and in attempts to judge what was religiously permissible and what was not.

The Persatuan Islam presented a religious ideal that prescribed worship and the other obligations of the *Sharī'ah* as the focal point of life, and it insisted that Muslims excise all beliefs and practices that it regarded as contrary to Islamic teachings. This attempt to make Islam the most important influence in the lives of Indonesians was not new in Islamic history, for Islam has always demanded such commitment. The Persis message was significant precisely because it was a reiteration of the historical Islamic ideal within a nation which had been converted to Islam for only a relatively short time, and where indigenous religious institutions had not developed to a point where they could facilitate such an ideal. The message of the Persatuan Islam intended to hasten the development of new and needed "Islamic" institutions, to deepen and broaden faith and practice in Indonesia and thereby make Islam the dominating influence on Indonesians and on Indonesian national life.

Exposition of Basic Beliefs

Perhaps the most important Persis contribution to the development of Indonesian Islam was its description of the fundamentals of religion. Persis (*ulamā'*) defined *Sunnī* Muslim beliefs that they regarded as basic. They avoided controversy on matters of belief that have long been issues of debate among Muslims, such as God's eternal existence, and determinism (*qadar*), and noted that man was not to spend his time on earth

idly speculating on matters beyond his ability to understand. The reduction of *Sunnī* Muslim doctrine to simple, readily understandable forms set a mark for other religious educators in Indonesia and redounds to Persis' credit, while the Persis ability to express those beliefs in a context meaningful with the contemporary world was equally laudable.

This exposition of *Sunnī* doctrine led directly to the publication of textbooks easily understood by students and interested lay Muslims. *Pengadjaran Shalat*, *At-Tauhiid* and *Al-Furqan* among others, were a considerable contribution to the Indonesian Muslim community since they presented an exposition of Muslim beliefs and practices written in Bahasa Indonesia, and included the appropriate religious texts in Arabic with an Indonesian translation. Such texts marked an obvious advance over the Arabic texts in use in Indonesian religious schools at the turn of the century. These books outlining basic *Sunnī* Muslim beliefs were well received when first published, have retained their popularity as religious texts to the present, and compare very favorably with more ambitious texts written in recent years.

The Persatuan Islam's exposition of the obligations placed on every Muslim was well made and showed considerable insight into the problems confronting Indonesian Muslims when their loyalty is conflictingly demanded by religious law, by secular law and by custom. Ahmad Hassan's exposition of the various systems of law and their relationship one to another helped Muslims to better understand their religious obligations. Persatuan Islam insistence that the *Sharī'ah* take precedence over *ādāt* and secular law, and its refusal to seek accommodation with these systems except on its own terms did little, however, to reconcile these three diverse trends in Indonesian social and political life or to give Muslims a genuine understanding of the problems facing adherents of other systems.

Presentation of Modernist Muslim Principles

With its exposition of indispensable *Sunnī* doctrine, the Persatuan Islam presented cogent arguments for modern fundamentalist Muslim principles and for the reforms which such principles would entail. While the principles of modern Muslim fundamentalism were not original to Indonesia--having originated with the Salafīyah movements of the Middle East--the Persis presentation was valuable since it placed both principles and reform in an Indonesian context. The introduction of modernist principles was made easier by the changes in the character of Indonesian Islamic life after the beginning of the twentieth century. While the older syncretic patterns were still predominant, a minority of Muslims adhering to *sharī'ī* patterns existed, and modernist Muslim principles assisted many from this

group to make explicit their religious ideals. On the one hand, modernist Islam allowed a reinterpretation of religion in order to bring it into harmony with contemporary conditions, and on the other hand, it urged the removal of syncretism from Indonesian Muslim practices, which the *sharī'ī* group favored and which traditionalist Muslims were reluctant to undertake. As it happened, modernist Islamic thought also made a considerable contribution to the development of the Indonesian nationalist movement by providing religious justification for political action. In addition, leaders in several of the early governments of independent Indonesia had been associated with modernist Islamic movements.

On the negative side, the adoption of modernist principles led to a greater cleavage between the *santri* and *abangan* segments of Indonesian society. Muslim traditionalists had always helped minimize this split in the population by their considerable contact with the *abangan* population. Unlike the traditionalists, modernist Muslims (and particularly the Persatuan Islam) were hostile to and removed from the *abangan* population because of *abangan* concern with beliefs and practices that were unacceptable for the modernist position. This hostility and drawing apart, which modernist Muslims intensified, perpetuated a dichotomy marking Indonesian society that is perhaps most evident in Indonesian political life.

The depth and breadth of Persis' exposition of *taqlīd* and *ijtihād*, the two central concepts involved in the traditionalist-modernist dispute, illustrated the Persatuan Islam's ability to justify its program within the terms of *Sunnī* Muslim doctrine. Its attacks on *taqlīd* and its defense of *ijtihād* were vigorously argued and backed by apposite religious texts, and the opponents' counterarguments were well answered. While traditionalist Muslims charged that modernist Muslim thinking emasculated religion by ignoring tradition to replace it with unbridled reason, Persis '*ulamā*' appear to have arrived at their conclusions through a scrupulous application of the principles of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, a religious science recognized as valid (if not always used by *Sunnī* Muslim '*ulamā*' since the third century). The Persatuan Islam appears to have been within the Ash'arite tradition in its use of reason, for it used reason to apply religious principle to specific problems, but there was certainly no instance in which Persis '*ulamā*' reached conclusions on the basis of reason alone, because their method involved a fundamentalist return to primary texts.

The Persatuan Islam's unique contribution to Islam in Indonesia was the role it assigned to lay Muslims in determining their own religious behavior. Both traditionalist and modernist Muslims placed heavy emphasis on the religious scholar, generally leaving little for the lay Muslim to do but make his own religious belief and practice conform to the views of the '*ālim* he listened to. While reserving primary research on religious

matters for the ('ulamā'), the Persatuan Islam still gave lay Muslims a limited role through *ittibā'*, by which they were to choose between the decisions of various ('ulamā') on matters affecting their religious behavior and belief. Persis' critics were correct in stating that *ittibā'* did not allow great freedom in religious research, but certainly it did encourage lay Muslims to examine religious texts and use some discretion in choosing the religious decision that would affect their own religious behavior. This would appear to be a genuine contribution to Muslim religious practice and a suitable solution to the age old problem of assigning to the rank and file some responsibility in religious matters while retaining for the ('ulamā') a control over the direction and scope of such effort.

Persatuan Islam Reforms

Persis' reform of certain practices in worship appear to have contributed to the strengthening of *Sunnī* Muslim thought and behavior in Indonesia. Recitation of the *khutbah* in the vernacular was intended to deepen Muslim knowledge of religion, a goal traditionally favored among ('ulamā'). Reform of burial practices aimed at separating basic Islamic belief and practice from the folk custom and superstition that have been a fecund source of contention among ('ulamā') for centuries. The demand that the recitation of *nīyah* be removed from worship was aimed at removing from ritual worship a practice not actually commanded in Qur'ān and *Sunnah*, and this was a stand that *Sunnī* ('ulamā') have always regarded as theoretically correct, even when they have not adhered to the principle. Insistence on the abolition of *taqbiḥ* and other acts of deference paid to certain Arab ('ulamā') was in accordance with the commonly-held Islamic principle of the equality of believers. Whether the reforms were popular or not, and whether the traditionalist ('ulamā') agreed or not, is not really germane; the reforms do seem to have been justified within the *Sunnī* Muslim tradition.

The Persatuan Islam maintained that, as a general rule, all things outside the area of *'ibādāt* were permitted by Islam unless specifically prohibited and that change was permissible so long as certain broad limitations established by Islam were not transgressed. In some areas, such as economics, modern medical practice and scientific advancement, Persis ('ulamā') interpreted this principle in a wide sense and showed considerable ability in relating Muslim principles to new developments. This broad interpretation was apparent, for example, in Ahmad Hassan's discussion of *ribā*, which he defined as excessive interest, and in his explanation that Muslims were permitted to use banks and cooperatives because these institutions charged and paid normal rates of interest. The same liberal attitude was also present in Persis' decisions permitting blood transfusions and birth control measures which illustrate the Persatuan

Islam's attitude of attempting to relate religion to the thought, goals and developments of the twentieth century.

In some matters not related to worship, the Persatuan Islam opposed pressures for change and moved contrary to the direction of developments in the contemporary world. Persis ('*ulamā*') opposed basic changes in the traditional status of Muslim women and chose a rigid interpretation of scripture to oppose what they saw as radical, unwarranted change. Persis insistence on traditional dress and limitation of women's movement in society preserved what Persis regarded as positive Muslim social values. At the same time, Persis ('*ulamā*') sought to overcome critics' charges that women held a subservient position in Islam rather than an equal but separate position, as Muslim apologues maintained, by granting greater educational opportunities for women and allowing considerable freedom for women to contact other women for social, educational, political and religious purposes. These limited concessions show an effort to correct apparent inequities without opening the way to what the Persatuan Islam regarded as destructive tendencies inherent in the radical changes advocated by the secularists and other groups favoring emancipation for women.

It was not inconsistent for the Persatuan Islam to approve some contemporary developments while rejecting others. Scripture was the final authority on what could and what could not be accepted, and in the case of women's role in life, the Persatuan Islam believed that the progressive emancipation of women of the past century is not condoned by scripture. The Persatuan Islam was apparently satisfied that the limited liberalization of women's role in society it advocated achieved the proper adjustment of religious principle and contemporary development. In this matter, the Persatuan Islam appears to have been guided by prejudgment since it was not consistent with its own principles. Thus Persis ('*ulamā*') stated that in the problem of women's status, the matter was limited to what was permitted in Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*, but this stand contradicted the Persatuan Islam's stated position: that change is permissible in matters not related to worship. This was one of the few contradictions by Persis ('*ulamā*') of the theoretical principles they themselves defined. Defense of the established system regarding women is obviously not wrong in itself, but the conservative arguments used in defense of their position on womanhood indicate that Persis ('*ulamā*') had not made the deep, careful examination of the role of women in society that they claimed to have made.

Its condemnation of secularism again showed Persis' refusal to accept a contemporary trend it believed was not permitted by Islam, even though the nation-state based on non-religious factors and relegating religion to a lesser role in national affairs has been the trend over the past sixty years. Persatuan Islam's resistance to this trend was not unusual considering that historically most Muslims have insisted that Islam must

dictate the policies of the government of any Muslim area, even though one can find few Muslim governments in history where this was wholly true.

The Persatuan Islam formulated many of the arguments against secularism that were taken up by other Muslims to defend their convictions against the attacks of the secularists. Persis political statements were a clear argument that Muslims must not abandon their faith as a means of achieving independence and that the retention--indeed the intensification--of religious values was essential to give national independence real meaning. Persatuan Islam writers clouded their arguments somewhat with their stress on pan-Islamic beliefs and their rejection of national boundaries. Their objections to the flag and the other trappings of a national state were too cautionary. Their arguments for the inclusion of Muslim values in the operation of an independent Indonesia were justifiable--both by Muslim tradition and because many secular states are guided by religious principles. In fact, religiously-based morality does appear to be called for in the operation of a state, as Isa Anshary pointed out, to maintain proper governmental behavior and to avoid the use of terror and immorality as deliberate state policy.

It does appear that the Persatuan Islam was over-intransigent in its insistence that Indonesia must have an Islamic state governed according to Islamic law. Not only was "Islamic state" a vague term, but also in Indonesia during the 1930's and the 1950's, it created disagreeable reactions in the minds of many, Muslim and non-Muslim. It was generally believed among non-Muslims that Islamic law would be harsh and onerous; Persis' insistence on the stern laws of punishment (*hudūd*) did little to dispel this apprehension. Seeing that Persis realized that there was as yet no law code that could be characterized as Islamic and implemented immediately, and that there was even a great measure of disagreement on basic principles, Persis' efforts might have been better directed toward a fuller explanation of its view concerning the content of "Islamic law" and the nature of an "Islamic state." Of the leading Persis writers, only Moehammad Natsir attempted such an explanation, while most Persatuan Islam effort was expended on insisting that "Islamic law" was required by religion and condemning as apostates those who did not agree.

Shortcomings in the Persis Argument

There were several shortcomings in the Persatuan Islam's efforts to define Islam and its proper mode of operating in twentieth century Indonesia. Most outstanding was an attitude of non-compromise that marked the statements of Persis leaders and hindered the establishment of the unity which the Indonesian nation so badly needed. Persis arguments were almost without

exception directed against concepts and generalized actions of its opponents and only rarely against individuals and their specific actions. Ahmad Hassan's use of etymology to refute the concept of Christ's divinity in *Jesoes menurut Bijbel*, Abdurrahman's presentation of Islamic history to challenge the viewpoint of traditionalist Islam in "Ahliis Sunnah wal Djama'ah" and Moehammad Natsir's reconciliation of Islamic and Indonesian values as a basis for an Indonesian Islamic state in his Constituent Assembly speech are polemic at its best, containing well-reasoned, pertinent arguments, worthy of an answer. These works reflect the trait usually found in Persis writings of keeping arguments centered on the issue at hand and hitting hard against what the organization regarded as objectionable and unacceptable. Since Persis arguments were sharp and to the point, this characteristic--not common in much of Indonesian argumentation and writing--clearly alienated many persons, both non-Muslim opponents and people associated with the Indonesian Muslim movement. Persis writing, moreover, offered no quarter and accepted no compromise, but demanded complete submission to its viewpoint by both Muslims and non-Muslims. The demand for submission encompassed all matters on which the Persatuan Islam chose to pronounce judgment, whether in matters of worship, in matters of social behavior, or problems of political action. Deliar Noer, speaking of Ahmad Hassan's approach prior to World War II, offers an analysis that holds generally true of all the leading writers of the Persatuan Islam either before or after the war.

Persis seemed to create antagonism, if not enemies, everywhere, first among the traditionalists, then the "emancipated" nationalists and even within the Muslim reform group. . . . It would be difficult to state with precision who started this hostility first . . . but Hassan was hard in his judgments, and his writing style might upset his opponents, although he remained in general objective and avoided personal criticisms, he considered the application of his *fatwa*, whether on *furu'* or questions of principles, as something not to be compromised with.¹

A genuine Islamic sense of catholicity, of acceptance of disagreement, was lacking among Persis (*ulamā'*), nor could they envisage a society where the opposition would have the right to disagree for all time. There was, at best, tolerance for only a limited period, since Persis members were convinced that finally all other viewpoints would inevitably conform with their own. This was Islam as ideology rather than religion. Persis maintained for example that Christianity was tolerated, but, on closer examination, it appears that what was to be tolerated was Christian action conforming to the Persis interpretation of what it believed Christian action and behavior

1. Noer, "The Modernist Muslim Movement," p. 149.

should be. Little wonder then that Christians were suspicious of Muslim intentions and preferred a secular to an Islamic state. Toward the secularists there was even less tolerance as illustrated by the brands of *fāsiq*, *zālīm*, *kāfir* and *munāfiq* applied by Ahmad Hassan and Isa Anshary to persons in the secularist movement. This attitude, which suggested that the Muslim dispute with the secularists could only be resolved by a complete Muslim victory and implied further that secularist beliefs had to be eradicated as evil, certainly contributed to the failure of Indonesian political leaders to find a common *modus operandi* for Muslim and secularist political factions. Since Indonesian democracy failed in great part because these two factions could not cooperate politically, Persis as an opponent of accommodation shares in the blame for the failure of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia.

Even toward fellow *santris*, Persis remained uncompromising on matters of difference, demanding that its own viewpoint be accepted without change as the basis of reconciliation. This attitude made it difficult to build the strong *ummah* the Persatuan Islam wanted, since differences between traditionalists and modernists were considerable and an attitude of intolerance worked counter to an accommodation. One cannot consider it wrong for the Persatuan Islam to have defined its own religious principles or for Persis to refuse to surrender on matters of principle. It was unfortunate, however, that the Persatuan Islam decided only to expound its viewpoint without seeking to understand the views of the opposing faction and look for an accommodation on those matters that could be acceptable to both sides.

In its effort to clearly define Islam, the Persatuan Islam made little use of history, either Muslim or Indonesian, to amplify and explain its arguments. Its statements usually made references only to the "glorious past" of Islam. All the same, Abdurrahman's discussion of the term *ahl al-sunnah wa al-djamā'ah*, Ahmad Hassan's formulation of the history of Muslim jurisprudence and Moehammad Natsir's succinct presentation of Indonesian history to explain Islam's place in Indonesian politics, were notable exceptions and show how historical perspective might have been effective in other arguments as well. While several other Persis works have had some discussion of the Muslim past, particularly events during the lifetime of the Prophet, these were always presented as part of belief, or as raw material to be utilized in *fiqh*, but seldom viewed as history itself, or even given historical perspective. It was this point that prompted Moehammad Rasjidi, in his dissertation for the Sorbonne, to conclude that the Persatuan Islam was not sufficiently aware of "historical evolution and development" and was unable to find answers to fundamental problems facing Indonesian Muslims

in the modern world.²

A better understanding of history might have enabled Persis writers to use religious sources with even greater understanding than they did. This could have had considerable impact, for example, on their attempts to extract religious principles from *ḥadīth*, where they too often were literalists and often did not separate the religious message from its historical setting. The interpretation of woman's role in society, for example, is the product of a literalist interpretation of religious sources that historical perspective might have changed considerably. The Persis practice of reviewing decisions of earlier '*ulamā*' on particular religious problems would also have been considerably enhanced by an awareness of history and might have enabled Persis '*ulamā*' to see how contemporary factors could influence decisions in the age in which they were made. Finally, a study of history would have made the Persatuan Islam more aware of the processes of time and change themselves and how man's thinking and actions are affected by them. This awareness could perhaps have enabled its members to better cope with the changes that were taking place in twentieth century Indonesia, and aided the analysis of the problems confronting them.

A third shortcoming of the Persatuan Islam's formulation of its religious program was its failure to take sufficient cognizance of Western advances and culture that have made such a great impact on the non-Western areas. Not unlike Muslims throughout other parts of Asia, Persis '*ulamā*' believed that many aspects of the culture generally referred to as the "West" were inimical to Islam and destructive of Islam's moral and ethical principles. Persis writing contained a strong distrust of the West and condemned those Indonesians who appeared to be exponents of Western ideas, such as the secularists. On occasion, Persis writers examined individual ideas, institutions and processes developed by the West, but never undertook a deep and penetrating study of the West in an attempt to analyze the true values of the West or to find the source of the West's vitality.

Two of the Persatuan Islam's most capable writers--Ahmad Hassan and Moehammad Natsir--were capable of providing greater explanation of the West to Indonesian Muslims. Ahmad Hassan, with his considerable ability in stripping a problem to its rudiments and analyzing it according to religious text and principles, showed in the several instances where he examined practices developed by the West--modern medical practice and interest-granting financial institutions--that he could sanction some as acceptable with Islam. Moehammad Natsir, with his own

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2. Mohamad Rasjidi, "L'Evolution de l'Islam en Indonesie (Java) ou Consideration Critique du Livre Tjentini" (Paris: University of Paris dissertation, 1956), p. 167.

secularist education, should have been able to act as a bridge and better explain the West to Indonesian Muslims.

More attention to the West was needed, because the West has had an undeniable impact on Islam and Indonesia. This is not to suggest that all Persis arguments on women and nationalism would necessarily have been different had Persis '*ulamā*' been better informed about the West, but the Persis position on many matters would have reflected greater understanding of the concepts it opposed, and possibly different solutions would have emerged as a result.

The Educational Effort

Connected with the attempt to define Islam has been the Persatuan Islam's emphasis on education. Since its establishment in 1923, Persis maintained that only an educated *ummah* could really understand fundamentalism and practice *ittibā'*, and only a highly trained '*ulamā*' could be capable of correctly consulting religious sources and practicing *ijtihād*. Persatuan Islam insistence that education be based on religion is a principle with considerable support in both East and West, and it would seem that there is considerable merit in an educational system that aims at producing a body of educated lay Muslims with a solid understanding of Islam. While emphasis was on religious subjects in Persis elementary and secondary schools, general subjects were not neglected and the quality of the education appears consistent with that of other Indonesian Muslim schools and the Indonesian national education system.

The training offered at the Persatuan Islam's teacher courses and seminaries reflected the organization's emphasis on Islamic law. It is difficult to criticize an educational course intended to train religious officials for placing too much stress on religion. Yet given the Persis statements of intent to equate religion with every aspect of life, it is apparent that in addition to their detailed knowledge of Islamic sciences, these future '*ulamā*' needed a broader understanding of people, society, traditions, history, and developments, whether indigenous, Western or Muslim. Some graduates of the Pesantren Persatuan Islam went to Al-Azhar in Cairo for further training, and this perhaps broadened their knowledge and experience. There were also other universities that specialize in religious studies in both Asia and the West attendance at which would have helped the participants, and the Persatuan Islam, develop a broader viewpoint, and perhaps greater perception in their own concerns. This is not to suggest that Persis '*ulamā*' had to lose their identity as Indonesian Muslims, but only that the Persatuan Islam needed among its members those who were knowledgeable about other parts of the Muslim world, the West, and other Asian areas as well.

The Persatuan Islam led in giving young men and women interested in religious careers the necessary training during an era when adequate training in the religious field was difficult to attain. When it is realized that the *pesantren* operated on modern lines had only a twenty year history when Persis began its work, and that the first university offering full-time studies in Islamics appeared in Indonesia only in 1956, Persis' educational efforts in the religious field take on more significance. The Persatuan Islam helped develop the new educational system and its Pesantren Persatuan Islam was a leading center for religious training in the pre-World War II era. With the rise of state-financed institutions to train '*ulamā*', the Persatuan Islam had also to compete with these new institutions.

Epilogue

During the period of Guided Democracy (1958 to 1966), the Persatuan Islam concentrated on its own organizational structure and on developing its educational system. Its political activities became muted because its past association with the discredited Masjumi party made its message suspect to Indonesian society, which came increasingly under the dominance and control of the political left. Persis did not completely abandon its political role, but it did speak and act in the context of political acceptability for that period and did not pursue the highly independent line it had followed in the previous decade. Its periodical, *Risalah*, and other pronouncements of the movement made reference to the paramount importance of Sukarno in Indonesian national life, and its calls for action were argued within the context of the dominant thought of that period. The leaders of the Persatuan Islam did not favor the mounting influence of the left in Indonesian political life, but they did support and assist in the convening of an Afro-Asian Islamic Conference in 1965 to aid Sukarno's efforts to make Indonesia a capital of the Afro-Asian world.³ *Risalah* lamented the growing emphasis in Indonesian society of anti-religious propaganda, but at the same time, it lauded Sukarno's speeches and avoided comment on those parts that implied cooperation with the communists as a principle of national political unity.⁴ By early

3. "Dengan K.I.A.A.: Kita Amalkan Adjaran Islan," *Risalah*, III, No. 20 (April 3, 1965), pp. 3-4.
4. The issues of *Risalah* that appeared between January and October 1965 have several reprinted speeches of Sukarno and several articles about him. Like other Muslim periodicals, *Risalah* apparently screened the speeches and used only those that emphasized Muslim values while avoiding those that lauded communism and Marxism. Almost no editorial comment is made about Sukarno in *Risalah* during this period, and certainly there is no criticism of him or of his views.

1965 then, the Persatuan Islam had become politically docile, even as it had been during the period of the Japanese occupation twenty years earlier.

The events of early October 1965 that ended Sukarno's dominance of Indonesian political life had a reviving effect on the members of the Persatuan Islam as they did on many other Muslim groups opposed to leftist dominance. Younger members of the organization participated in street demonstrations and gave support to the pogroms carried out against the leftists in the latter part of 1965 and early 1966. Again they were active in the numerous street rallies during 1966 and early 1967 that were mounted by the military to remove Sukarno entirely from the government.⁵ The Persatuan Islam identified itself with the New Order (*Orde Baru*) and castigated the Old Order (*Orde Lama*), that is, those who had been identified with the Sukarnoist government. Articles in *Risalah* implied that the traditionalist Muslims and the secularists that had cooperated with Sukarno had been misled into cooperating with the communists because their concepts of religion had been wrong, even as the Persatuan Islam had warned them previously in the 1950's.⁶

While the Persatuan Islam has identified itself with the Suharto government and the New Order, it has been cautious in reentering politics via a formal political organization. Since 1966, its leaders have stressed that the Persatuan Islam is not a political organization. They have also insisted that members refrain from joining any political organization lest the public interpret such membership as a Persatuan Islam identification with a particular political viewpoint.⁷ This is, of course, a reversal of earlier practice, for, in the 1920's and 1930's, Persis members were active in the Sarekat Islam and, in the 1950's, they were active in Masjumi. This refusal to reenter political life may be due in part to a reluctance by the leaders to associate Persis with a new political group which has been less than enthusiastically received by the Suharto government. It may, however, indicate a commitment on the part of the leaders to devote the energies of the movement to educational pursuits, since that activity has become its primary focus in the past few years and is not at all controversial.

5. Personal interviews with members of the Pemuda Persatuan Islam, February 1967.
6. "Vested Interest," *Risalah*, VI, Nos. 53-54 (December 1967-January 1968), pp. 10-11; E. Nashrullah and Junus Anis, "Mulailah dari Ana bukan si Anu!" *Risalah*, V, No. 42 (January 1967), pp. 3-10.
7. E. Nashrullah, "Peliharalah sangka baik orang," *Risalah*, VI, Nos. 45-46-47 (April, May and June 1967), pp. 40-42; *Risalah*, VI, No. 51-52 (October and November 1967), p. 35.

The Persatuan Islam is no longer the small, elite group of Muslim crusaders that it was in the 1930's and 1950's. The older activists no longer seem as militant or as eager, and the message they once pursued with such vigor is not directly applicable to the contemporary Indonesian environment. The younger members have involved themselves in direct political action, but they are followers of programs initiated outside the movement. They have not yet developed a distinctive political and social viewpoint, relevant to current conditions, that can provide the movement with a common social purpose, as it had had when Ahmad Hassan and Isa Anshary dominated the movement. But whether this new viewpoint emerges or not, the Persatuan Islam seems certain to continue as an educational system, providing a religiously-based education for those Muslims who believe that fundamentalist religious values remain the touchstone of life.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

This glossary of terms is intended only to briefly identify foreign words and terms appearing in the text of this essay. More detailed definitions can be found in basic works on Islam and in books on Indonesia. The definitions given below are taken chiefly from the Encyclopedia of Islam, the Encyclopaedië van Nederlandsch Oost-Indië, and T. P. Hughes, A Dictionary of Islam.

- abangan* (Javanese) The general term applied to Javanese who are nominally Muslims but who do not follow strict religious practices; they often are syncretic toward religion, incorporating Islam into surviving Javanese, Hindu and Buddhist beliefs and practices.
- adat* (Indonesian from Arabic (*āda*) In Islamic law, a legal term designating a custom which is recognized by Muslim jurists as valid in some instances. The word has been taken into Malay and other languages of the Indonesian Archipelago to mean all things Indonesian that are custom, usage or practice.
- adhān* (Arabic) The call to prayer given for the five daily prayers and for the Friday community worship.
- ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamā'ah* (Arabic) An epithet used by *Sunnī* Muslims to describe themselves, usually in apposition to the *Shī'ah* and other sects regarded as heretics by the *Sunnī* Muslims. Generally speaking the criteria for being able to use this epithet is to adhere to the religious teachings of al-Ash'arī and/or al-Mātūrīdī, and the legal teachings of one of the recognized legal schools (*madhabs*).
- ʿālim*, pl. *ʿulamā'* (Arabic) Those Muslims who are considered knowledgeable in religious learning, particularly in jurisprudence and theological matters. The Indonesian equivalent is *kijai*, which, often along with the term *hadji*, is included as an honorific before an *ʿālim*'s name.
- ʿaqīdah* (Arabic) A statement of doctrine, or an article of faith. In Islam, the theory of revelation has precluded the composition of a creed with divine aid, but many have been written as statements of Islamic faith and have been useful for purposes of teaching.

asrama (Sanskrit) Dormitory.

āyah (Arabic) A verse of the Qur'ān.

barzandji (Indonesian from Persian) A special prayer usually recited on the occasion of the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet (*Mawlūd*).

bedoeg (Javanese) A great drum that is played in the *gamelan* orchestra. It is also used at some mosques for the call to worship.

bid'ah (Arabic) Innovation; a view, thing or mode of action that has formerly not existed or been practiced. The term has come to suggest change in religious belief or action that leads to heresy, but not necessarily to disbelief.

dhikr (Arabic) A Muslim practice, commonly associated with *sūfism* in which a formula is incessantly repeated as a means of removing extraneous thoughts from the worshipper's mind, and to prepare it for religious contemplation. A common form of *dhikr* is the repetition of the ninety-nine names of God. The name is also applied to the performance of litanies by groups of *sūfīs*. *Dhikr* is widely believed among Muslims to give religious merit to the performer.

dirham (Arabic) A unit of silver coinage in the Arab monetary system.

djawi (Malay) Malay written in an Arabic script adapted to accommodate Malay letters and sounds. It is still in use in Malaysia, but was dropped for a Romanized script in Indonesia in the early twentieth century.

du'ā' (Arabic) In Indonesian *doa*. The prayer of petition or aspiration, which may be made at any place or time, as distinct from *ṣalāt*, the ordained ritual prayers.

dukun (Javanese) A practitioner of magic who claims to possess secret powers which he employs in a variety of functions. The *dukun*'s chief employment is the treatment of illness with herbs and native medicines. Some classes of *dukuns* foretell the future, others cast spells to create good or bad fortunes, and some are practitioners in black magic.

farḍ (Arabic) In Islamic law that which is strictly prescribed and obligatory, the omission of which will be punished, while the execution will be rewarded. Muslim law distinguishes *farḍ al-ʿain*, to which everyone is bound, and *farḍ al-kifāyah* in which it is only demanded that a sufficient number of Muslims should fulfill the religious duties concerned (holy war, performance of common prayer).

farḍ al-ʿain See *farḍ*.

farḍ al-kifāyah See *farḍ*.

fāsiq (Arabic) A transgressor; in Muslim law a term applied to a person who behaves contrary to practice established by the *sharīʿah*.

fātiḥah (Arabic) The first and most popular *sūrah* in the Qurʾān, very often recited as a short prayer.

fatwā (Arabic) A decision of sacred law made by a religious scholar (*ʿālim*), or a legal scholar (*muftī*) or a judge (*qāḍī*). The decision is intended to aid individual Muslims, and religious courts, in determining just what constitutes proper religious behavior. The *fatwā* itself is not legally binding on any believer, but is considered only to be an advisory opinion.

furūʿ See *khilāfīyah*.

gamelan (Javanese) An ensemble of stringed and percussion instruments which provides accompaniment for the *wayang* (shadow) plays, and for other occasions.

garuda (Sanskrit) A mythical bird which carried the God Vishnu. The *garuda* as an eagle is the official seal of the Republic of Indonesia.

guru (Indonesian from Sanskrit) Teacher; this term is used in the general sense as a teacher in any school. It is also the equivalent of guide (*pīr*) in the mystical (*ṣūfī*) orders in Indonesia.

ḥadīth (Arabic) A narrative concerning the Prophet Muḥammad as passed on orally from one generation of Muslims to another until recorded in the second century A.H., by the great collectors of *ḥadīth*. These collectors attempted to check the authenticity of the *ḥadīths*, and label those clearly spurious, by recording the chain of relators of the *ḥadīth*. The term *ḥadīth* is sometimes used in writings on Islām as synonymous with *sunnah*.

Ṣaḥīḥ ḥadīth are those that pass all the criteria laid down by the collectors and are regarded as particularly fit for legal purposes. *Muṣṭalaḥ ḥadīth* is the science of examining and using *ḥadīth* for legal and religious purposes as established in *Sunnī* Muslim jurisprudence.

ḥadji (Indonesian, from Arabic *ḥājj*) Honorific often included as part of the title of address for those Indonesian Muslims who have undertaken the pilgrimage to Makkah.

Hari Raja See 'Īd al-*fiṭr*.

'*ibādāt* (Arabic) The ordinances of divine worship in Islam. In books on Islamic law '*ibādāt* comprises the first subject matter and includes *tahīrah* (ritual purification), *ṣalāt* (ritual prayer), *ṣawm* (fasting), *ḥajj* (pilgrimage), *zakāt* (almsgiving), and sometimes *jihād* (holy war).

'Īd al-*fiṭr* (Arabic) The feast marking the end of the fasting month, and one of the chief feastdays of Islam; it includes a special ritual service. 'Īd al-*fiṭr* is known as *Hari Raja* in Indonesia.

ijmā' (Arabic) One of the four sources from which Muslim law is derived. It is frequently defined as the agreement of the *mujtahids* of the people (i.e., those who have a right, in virtue of knowledge, to form a judgment of their own), in any age, on any matter of faith. It is also defined by some as "agreement of the Muslim community."

ijtihād (Arabic) A term used in Muslim jurisprudence to designate the process of arriving at new judgments in a rule of law in a particular case by drawing conclusions from basic sources of Islam (i.e., the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*), as opposed to acceptance of tradition. In Indonesia the adherents of *ijtihād* have been referred to as the *kaum muda*.

ikhḷās (Arabic) A term, used in all modes of Islamic religious practice, to define "absolute devotion to God." *Ikhḷās* is often used as a contrast to *shirk* (disbelief).

ilhām (Arabic) Revelation in an individual sense as opposed to revelation to men in general. In *Sunnī* Islam, many saints have been said to have been recipients of *ilhām*. It differs from intellectual knowledge in that it cannot be gained by meditation and rational deduction.

'*ilm* (Arabic) A broad term for knowledge; in Muslim history it has come to mean sciences and particularly the religious sciences--knowledge of definite things in contrast to innate knowledge or perception (*ma'rīfah*).

imām (Arabic) Either the leader of Muslim ritual prayer; or the title given to the spiritual and secular head of a Muslim political unit, also called *khalīfah*.

īmān (Arabic) A theological term denoting proper religious belief and faith, generally described as "belief of the heart and confession of the lips to the truth of Islam."

Injīl A variation of the Greek word for gospel (εὐαγγέλιον). Islam holds that the *Injīl* was, like the Qur'ān, originally a holy book containing divine law, revealed to a prophet (here, 'Īsā) for the guidance of mankind.

iqāmah (Arabic) The second call to ritual prayer (*ṣalāt*) pronounced by the *mu'adhdhin* in the mosque before each of the prescribed prayers.

Ismā'ilīyah (Arabic) A sect of *Shī'ah* Islam, which itself is divided into differing subsects. The *Ismā'ilīs* believe that its leaders (*imāms*) receive divine guidance, and that religion has inner mysteries which are revealed only to those believers with sufficient intelligence and proper indoctrination.

istighfār (Arabic) Begging for divine pardon.

ittibā' (Arabic) Literally "following"; the Persatuan Islam maintained that those Muslims not trained to undertake *ijtihād* might make a decision on religious behavior by deciding between the *fatwās* of several *mujtahids*.

Jāhilīyah (Arabic) The age of ignorance; it refers to the state of things in Arabia before the arrival of Islam.

Jamā'ah prayer (Arabic) The obligatory Friday community prayer.

jihād (Arabic) Holy struggle. Exerting oneself for Islam, and defense of it by arms is a religious duty for Muslims in general.

jināzah (Arabic) The funeral rites in Muslim law, which includes detailed prescription for the preparation of the body and prayers for the deceased.

Ka'abah The "House of God" and center of Islam, constructed of layers of gray stone situated almost in the center of the great mosque at Makkah. Muslims pray toward the *Ka'abah*, and circumambulation of the *Ka'abah* is part of prescribed ritual for the pilgrimage (*ḥajj*).

kāfir (Arabic) Literally "rejecter"; used in Muslim theology and law to define the unbeliever.

kalimah (Arabic) Actually *kalimat al-shahādah*--the expression "There is no god but Allāh and Muḥammad is the apostle of God." This is the first tenet of practical religious practice and is generally recognized by Muslim theologians and jurists as separating believers from unbelievers.

kaum muda (Indonesian) "The young group." A term applied to those Muslims in Indonesia in the twentieth century who advocated changes in religious ritual, belief and practice, on the basis that such change purifies Islam of accretions taken on over the centuries. The Persatuan Islam, the Muhammadiyah and Al-Irsjad were the major *kaum muda* groups.

kaum tua (Indonesian) "The old group." The term applied to those Muslims in Indonesia during the twentieth century who defend traditionalist Islam against reforms by the modernists. The *kaum tua* hold that the *madhhabs* are the proper interpreters of religious behavior. The Nahdlatul Ulama, Perti and several Bā 'Alawī groups have been major *kaum tua* organizations.

keirei (Japanese) Slight bowing in use among the Japanese as a form of greeting. During the Japanese occupation of Indonesia the *keirei* was required of all inhabitants, free or jailed, vis-a-vis any Japanese. Not to be confused with *sai keirei*, which had ceremonial aspects.

kenduri (Persian) A communal feast noted in *Shāfi'ī* law books in Indonesia, that became confused with a local animistic feast meal. See also *slametan*.

khalīfah (Arabic) Literally "successor." Title of the supreme head of the Muslim community, usually regarded as successor of the Prophet Muḥammad.

khilāfīyah (Arabic) Differences in the Muslim community in matters of doctrinal importance. In Indonesia the dispute concerning the correct use of *taqlīd* and *ijtihād* was considered to be a *khilāfīyah* dispute, while other differences such as pronouncing the *khutbah* in the vernacular or in Arabic, which was dependent on the *taqlīd-ijtihād* debate, was considered an associated dispute (*furū'*).

khutbah (Arabic) The sermon delivered on Fridays at the time of the *zuhr* or meridian prayer. The *khutbah* is also given in the morning after sunrise at the 'Īd al-Fiṭr and 'Īd al-Adḥa festivals.

kijai or *kiai* (Indonesian from Persian) A title of respect given 'ulamā' in Indonesia. See 'ālim.

kufṛ (Arabic) A legal and theological term denoting rejection of any of the tenets of Islam, and connoting disbelief in Islam itself as the religion of God.

madhhab (Arabic) A jurisprudential school among *Sunnī* Muslims. At the present time, there are four major *madhhabs* in the Muslim world--*Shāfi'ī*, *Mālikī*, *Ḥanafī* and *Ḥanbalī*--although a number of others were of considerable importance in the past. The formulations of each *madhhab* are intended to regulate in considerable detail the religious acts of its followers. There are only relatively minor differences existing among the *madhhabs*.

madrasah See *pesantren*.

Mahayana Buddhism (Sanskrit) One of the two major divisions of Buddhism. The *Hinayana* school stresses an individualistic search for salvation while the *Mahayana* stresses the importance of universal salvation as integral to the good life.

maḥram (Arabic) A male with whom a woman could not marry because of their close family relationship. He may accompany her on journeys and be in her presence alone and when she is unveiled.

al-Masīh (Arabic from Aramaic) The messiah. Identified in the Qur'ān with 'Īsā b. Maryam.

mu'adhdhin (Arabic) One who gives the summons to worship. See *adhān*.

mu'allim (Arabic) A teacher, specifically a Muslim learned in the Muslim sciences of religion. Usually an *'ālim*.

muballigh (Arabic) A Muslim propagandist who, in Indonesia, has a function somewhat similar to that of a Christian missionary in spreading the religious message among non-Muslims or among Muslims of a different sect or outlook.

muftī (Arabic) A Muslim, learned in science and methodology of Muslim jurisprudence, who issues advisory opinions (*fatwās*) on matters of Muslim sacred law. Some countries in the Middle East have salaried *muftīs* as part of the judicial administration, but any qualified person may give *iftā'*.

muhaddithūn (Arabic) Collectors of *ḥadīth* in the second and third centuries A.H. who collected all traditions available concerning the Prophet and laid down procedures for judging their authenticity. Al-Bukhārī, Muslim, Abū Dawūd, al-Nasā'ī, al-Tirmidhī and Ibn Māja were the major collectors of *ḥadīth* in *Sunnī* Islam.

mukhāṭarah contract (Arabic) A double contract whereby more money or goods is repaid than originally borrowed in order to avoid formally violating the Islamic prohibition on usury (*ribā*).

MULO (*Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs*--More Extended Lower Instruction) (Dutch) Lower secondary school system (three years) established by the Dutch for Indonesians in 1903. MULO schools gave instruction in Dutch, English, German, history, science, mathematics and drawing, and graduates were eligible to attend a higher course in mathematics or literature. Private groups could found MULO schools and were eligible for subsidy from the Colonial Administration so long as they maintained minimum standards.

munāfiq (Arabic) Hypocrite; the term has been used in Islam, especially during the time of the Prophet, to designate those persons who, while outwardly professing to accept Islam, have secretly denied the faith.

Munkar (Arabic) According to popular Muslim belief, one of two angels who asks pertinent questions of the recently deceased to determine whether he is truly a Muslim. If the deceased fails to answer the questions satisfactorily, Munkar and his associate Nakīr inflict painful punishment.

murtadd (Arabic) An apostate to Islam. Apostasy may either be verbal by denying a principle of belief or by action in treating things religious with disrespect.

muṣṭalah ḥadīth See *ḥadīth*.

nabī (Arabic from Hebrew) Prophet. In Islam a prophet is a messenger sent to a particular people--or in Muḥammad's case to all mankind--with a revealed message to indicate what is right and wrong, and to serve as a guide for human behavior. *Sunnī* Muslims hold that Muḥammad was the final or seal (*khatam*) of the prophets.

Nakīr (Arabic) An angel; see Munkar.

negara Islam (Indonesian) A general term in use in Indonesia by Muslims since the early part of the century to express their ideal of an independent Indonesian state based on the principles of the Islamic religion. The defining of these principles by various groups led to several distinct views of just what should constitute an Islamic state, such as the liberal-democracy advocated by Zainal Abidin Ahmad and the totalitarian *Darul Islam* of S. M. Kartosuwirjo.

nīyah (Arabic) A short declaration of intention pronounced audibly or mentally, immediately prior to prescribed religious ritual in which the performer states his intent to perform the act.

Padri (Minangkabau) A religious sect in the Minangkabau area of Sumatra at the beginning of the nineteenth century which sought to replace local custom (*ādāt*) with a severe form of religious law (*sharī'ah*). The Padri wars, during which Dutch control was extended over the west coast of Sumatra, lasted from 1795 to 1838.

Pantja Sila (Indonesian from Sanskrit) A formulation of five principles put forward by Sukarno in 1945 as the philosophic basis for an Indonesian state. The principles were Belief in God, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy, and social justice.

perdjamaian (Indonesian) Ritual meal; see *slametan*.

pesantren (Javanese) A seminary for students of theology. The *pondok* (Sundanese) is usually the lodging place of the students at a religious school. The *pesantren* is known as a *surau* in Minangkabau and *panjantren* in Madurese. The *madrasah* is a school combining religious and general courses in its curriculum.

pesta (Javanese) Ritual meal; see *slametan*.

pitrah (Indonesian from Arabic *fiṭrah*) The tax on rice according to the laws of *zakāt*, which is traditionally divided among the poor in time for the *Hari Raja* ('*Īd al-Fiṭr*) celebrations at the end of the fasting month.

pondok (Javanese) A lodging place for students; see *pesantren*.

prijaji (Javanese; variant *prijayi*) A set of cultural values among the aristocratic elements of Javanese society that emphasizes refinement and polite form. Clifford Geertz describes the *abangan* as Java's peasantry and the *prijajis* as its gentry.

qiblah (Arabic) The direction toward Makkah. The Qur'ān commands Muslims to face toward Makkah while performing ritual prayer.

qiyās (Arabic) Analogy; one of the four sources of *Sunnī* Muslim jurisprudence. See *uṣūl al-fiqh*.

Qur'ān (Arabic) In Islam, the word of God revealed to the Prophet Muḥammad, containing a guide for proper religious action.

Quraysh (Arabic) A tribal grouping in Arabia at Makkah into which the Prophet Muḥammad was born. Many Muslims consider the *Quraysh* to form an aristocracy among Muslims.

rak'ah (Arabic) In Islamic prayer the act of prostration by the worshipper.

Ramaḍān (Arabic) The holy month in which the Qur'ān was revealed. It is the fasting month in which Muslims may not eat, drink or have sexual relations during the daylight hours.

rasūl (Arabic) Messenger or apostle from God to mankind, originally distinct in meaning from a prophet (*nabī*) who brings a message. Historically, *rasūl* has been confused and identified with the term for prophet (*nabī*).

ribā (Arabic) Usury; in general any unjustified increase of capital for which no compensation is given.

sadakah (Indonesian from the Arabic *ṣadaqah*) Generally the giving of alms. In the Indonesian context, *sadakah* retains its association with alms at ritual meals where the food given to the poor, invited for this purpose, is considered to be alms which redound to the religious merit of the giver of the meal.

ṣaḥiḥ (Arabic) See *ḥadīth*.

sai keirei (Japanese) The deep bow toward Tokyo as a token of obeisance to the emperor that marked the commencement of every official Japanese function prior to the end of World War II. In Indonesia, this was part of a daily brief morning ceremony in all government offices during the Japanese Occupation. The *sai keirei* was similar in form to the prostration (*rukū'*) of Muslim ritual prayer and several '*ulamā*' objected to the *sai keirei* on that basis. The Japanese maintained that the two prostrations were entirely different in purpose.

salam (Arabic) A litany, which is pronounced from the minarets every Friday about half an hour before the *adhān* of the community prayer (*jamā'ah*). This part of the liturgy is repeated inside the mosque before the beginning of the regular ceremonies by several people with good voices.

samā' (Arabic) Heaven, or the heavens.

santri (Javanese) Those Indonesian Muslims who strive to fulfill their religious obligations, as opposed to the *abangan* element that is only nominally Muslim.

sayyid (Arabic) A title commonly taken by persons claiming descent from the Prophet Muḥammad, particularly through his grandson Husayn. At the turn of the twentieth century the term *sayyid* came into use in some parts of the Arab world as a title of address equivalent to the English "mister."

shahādah (Arabic) Literally "witnessing"; in the religious use of the word it is the profession of faith--"There is no god but God; Muḥammad is the Prophet of God."

Shaivism (Sanskrit) One of the three chief sects of Hinduism, centering on the worship of Shiva. *Shaivism* has two main systems which are theistic in that they admit to a personal God, but are monistic in that they hold Shiva to be the ultimate Reality, with other realities in some sense identical with him or his creative power.

sharī'ah (Arabic) The sacred law of Islam. An amorphous term since it has a different meaning to various groups of Muslims. Traditionalist Muslims view the *sharī'ah* as the legal systems defined by the various *madhhabs*, while modernists speak of the principles and clear commands from Qur'ān and *Sunnah* as constituting the *sharī'ah*.

sharīfah (Arabic) Feminine form of a title commonly taken by persons claiming descent from the Prophet Muḥammad, particularly through his grandson Hasan. According to some Arabic writers of the *Shāfi'ī madhhab* in Indonesia, a *sharīfah* might only marry a Muslim who was likewise descended from the Prophet, in order to perpetuate the purity of the line.

shayṭān (Arabic) Generally an evil spirit, including bad *djinns* (spirits) and Lucifer (*Iblīs*).

Shī'ah (Arabic) The general name for a group of different Muslim sects, the starting point of all of which is the recognition of 'Alī as the legitimate *khalīfah* after the death of the Prophet Muḥammad. It constitutes a second orthodox community in Islam, separate from the *Sunnī* Muslim tradition.

shirk (Arabic) "Associating" something or someone with God; worshipping someone other than God; hence polytheism.

slametan (Javanese from Arabic) A communal feast, popular among the nominal-Muslim (*abangan*) population on Java, given to commemorate important events in an individual's life. The ceremony attached to the meal has an animistic, and shamanistic flavor.

sual-djawab (Indonesian from Arabic *su'āl* and *jawāb*) Literally "question and answer." A device used by Ahmad Hassan to expound his viewpoint. A question was posed and then an answer given. This was the general format of most of Ahmad Hassan's works, and is a recognized method employed in all *fatwās* issued by the Persatuan Islam. Muhammad Rasjidi believes that this is Ahmad Hassan's attempt to apply the Socratic method to Indonesian Muslim problems.

ṣūfī (Arabic) A Muslim mystic; see *taṣawwuf*.

sunnah (Arabic) Used in Muslim theology and jurisprudence to refer to the "acts, words and pattern of life" of the first three generations of Muslims, which have relevance in explaining the Prophet Muḥammad's actions and behavior. *Sunnah*, applied to the Prophet, is the words, behavior and pattern of life of Muḥammad, which are considered to be divinely inspired and augmenting the Qur'ān as a pattern of conduct for Muslims. In this respect often synonymous with *ḥadīth*.

surāh (Arabic) The name given to the chapters of the Qur'ān.

tābi'ūn (Arabic) That generation that come after the Companions (*aṣḥāb*). The *tābi'ūn* also include those of the generation of the Prophet who did not know him personally but knew one of his Companions.

tābi'ul tābi'in (Arabic) Followers of the followers. In Muslim jurisprudence the third generation after Muḥammad who related traditions about the actions and deeds of the Prophet. Traditions related by them have been historically accepted by *Sunnī* Muslim jurists in the formulation of jurisprudence, but are of less authority than those related by persons who have actually known the Prophet.

tadjhizijjah (Indonesian from Arabic *tajhīzī*) In Indonesian Muslim education, a preparatory course for a specialized subject, such as for teachers or for religious propagandists.

tahlīl (Arabic) The act of repeating the ejaculation *lā ilāha illā llāh!*, i.e., "There is no god but Allāh!" It is believed by many Muslims that repetition of the *tahlīl* will cleanse a person's sins and gain him religious merit.

takbīr (Arabic) The act of pronouncing the formula *Allāh akhbār*, i.e., "God is great!"

taḥfīq (Arabic) Following the regulations of a *madhhab* other than that one usually followed. Traditionalist Muslims in Indonesia maintained that a Muslim might not perform *taḥfīq* but might only follow consistently the regulations of a single *madhhab*.

taḥqīn (Arabic) A term used to denote an instruction given by a religious teacher, and generally denoting instruction given to the deceased at graveside at the close of the burial service.

taqbīl (Arabic) A practice whereby a Muslim not descended from the Prophet Muḥammad kneels and kisses the hand of the *sayyid* or *sharīf*, i.e., those descended from the Prophet. In considerable use in the Malay-Indonesian world earlier, the practice was originally intended to show respect for the Prophet, but came to be the mark of Arabic superiority over non-Arab Muslims.

taqdīr (Arabic) The Islamic doctrine of fate or predestination.

taqlīd (Arabic) A term used in Muslim jurisprudence for uncritically accepting legal and theological decisions of a teacher or teachers. In Indonesia the adherents of *taqlīd* were referred to as the *kaum tua*.

taqwā (Arabic) Fear of God in the sense of reverence, and shame of man's shortcomings in the presence of God.

taṣawwuf (Arabic) The act of devoting oneself to the mystic life. A great number of mystical brotherhoods have appeared in Islam. In Indonesia, the most important of these "paths" have been the Naqshabandīyah, the Qādirīyah and the Shaṭṭarīyah.

tasbīḥ (Arabic) The act of repeating the formula *subḥān Allāh*, i.e., "praise God!"

tawhīd (Arabic) A theological term used to express the unity of the Godhead. It is a fundamental tenet of Islam, and is generally believed by Muslim theologians to contradict the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

Tawrāh (Arabic from the Hebrew *Tōrā*) In Islam the name of the holy scripture revealed after the time of Ibrāhīm and Isrā'il and afterward confirmed by 'Īsā which contains the "laws of God" (*ḥukum Allāh*).

'*ulamā*' (Arabic) Religious scholars; see '*ālim*.

ummah (Arabic) "Community," hence also nation and sect. The term is primarily used to denote the community of believers among Muslims.

ushalli See *nīyah*

uṣūl al-fiqh (Arabic) The science of the methodology of Muslim jurisprudence. It concentrates on extraction of principles and data for the formulation of religious law. In *Sunnī* Islam the traditional sources (*uṣūl*) are Qur'ān, *sunnah qiyās* (analogy) and *ijmā'* (consensus).

Volksraad (Dutch) The legislative council established by the Dutch Colonial Administration in Indonesia in 1917. It consisted of both appointed officials and members chosen by indirect suffrage. Since it had no power to legislate, but only advised the Governor-General Indonesian nationalist groups used it alternately as a sounding board or boycotted it. It was abolished at the beginning of the Japanese Occupation in 1942.

wahy (Arabic) Revelation, by which a message is given to mankind through a Prophet. The *Tawrāh*, *Injīl*, *Zabūr* and Qur'ān are considered by Muslims to have been revealed for man's general guidance. *Wahy* differs from *ilhām* which is inspiration given to an individual rather than to mankind in general.

walī (Arabic) Literally "near one," or "friend." Especially a friend of God, a title generally involving mystical practices and forms. In Javanese folklore nine *walīs*, or saints, supposedly introduced and propagated Islam in Java.

waqf (Arabic) Pious endowment.

wayang (Javanese) A play or performance depicting legendary stories, both of Javanese origin and from the Hindu *Ramayana*. The *wayang kulit* is a shadow play whose dialogue and action highlights moral and ethical lessons, given usually to celebrate important events in the village, city or person's life. The *wayang orang* is performed by human actors. Specialized forms exist as well.

Zabūr (Arabic) The Psalms of David, which the Qur'ān defines as a scripture to the Jews containing a religious law like that contained in the Qur'ān.

zakāt (Arabic) A religious duty imposed on all Muslims to give a portion of their wealth, as prescribed by religious law, in alms to the poor. It is one of the five commands of practical religious behavior. In Indonesia its most important application is the *pitrah*, commonly referred to as the rice tax, used by the poor to celebrate the festival of *Hari Raja* ('Īd al-Fiṭr).

zinā (Arabic) Fornication, or any sexual intercourse between persons who are not in a state of legal matrimony or concubinage.

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