


West Papua: The Obliteration of a People



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Carmel Budiardjo

Liem Soei Liong

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
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WEST PAPUA



Names and terms

Some names and terms crucial to the subject of this book have been changed or distorted as a result of Indonesia's annexation of West Papua. An explanation of the expressions used in the text is therefore necessary.

West Papua for the country itself, is the name used by those who support the right of the people of West Papua to self-determination. During the period of Dutch colonialism, the country was known as West New Guinea or Dutch (West) New Guinea. At the time of the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands, it was known in Indonesia as West Irian. Since 1969, it has been called *the province of Irian Jaya*.

TAPOL always refers to the country as West Papua. In some places in the text, however, when referring specifically to Indonesian "provincial" structures or personnel, the name *Irian Jaya* is used.

Indonesia refuses to acknowledge the people of West Papua as *Papuans* or *Melanesians*, even though terms like Javanese, Sundanese, Moluccan, Acehnese and other ethnic designations are not proscribed. Instead, West Papuans may only be called *Irianese* or *anak daerah*, the literal meaning of which is "son (child) of the region". *Anak daerah* could also be rendered as "native".

Jayapura is the name given by Indonesia to the capital of its "province". During Dutch times, it was called Hollandia. After the Indonesian takeover, it was renamed Kota Baru, then Sukarnopura. After Sukarno was deposed as President, the name was again changed to *Jayapura*. This name is now generally accepted and is used in the text.

The Indonesian authorities have banned the use of the name *Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, or Free Papua Movement. Instead, the OPM may only be referred to in Indonesia as the "GPL", an abbreviation for "gerombolan pengacau liar", meaning "wild terrorist gangs".

The Indonesian authorities call the fraudulent exercise of self-determination in 1969, *Pepera*, or *Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat*, which means Determination of the People's Opinion. The widely-used English term is the *Act of Free Choice*. In this text, it is referred to throughout as the *Act of 'Free' Choice*.

Preface

The people of West Papua have been waging a struggle for independence from Indonesian rule for more than a quarter of a century. Their struggle is also a struggle for survival. Yet at a time when similar struggles in other countries draw considerable attention, with pressures now growing for the resolution of regional conflicts, the West Papuan struggle is widely neglected. Few people are even aware of its existence.

Occasional reports about massacres, about the flight of thousands of refugees into neighbouring Papua New Guinea and about the large-scale resettlement of Javanese on land that belongs to West Papuans, are greeted in some circles with disbelief. Indonesia's military government systematically suppresses all news of opposition and armed resistance in its 'province of Irian Jaya'. The Indonesian Government stands by the fiction that the armed resistance movement, *Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, the Free Papua Movement, does not exist; there are only a handful of 'trouble-makers', contemptuously referred to as 'wild terrorist gangs'. Access to the country by journalists is closely controlled and many areas are strictly out of bounds. As in East Timor, Indonesia's other colonial territory, real conditions in West Papua are hidden behind a thick veil of secrecy and disinformation.

West Papua lives today under virtual military occupation. Following a thirteen-year dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over whether West Papua should become a Dutch-sponsored independent state or an Indonesian province, the issue was resolved in 1962 by a series of diplomatic manoeuvres master-minded by Washington. The Hague abandoned its claim and surrendered the people of West Papua to colonial domination by Jakarta. Papuan demands, initially encouraged by the Dutch, that an act of self-determination should precede any decision about their country's fate, were ignored. At no point during the negotiations that led to the New York Agreement which was concluded in August 1962 and ratified soon afterwards by the UN General Assembly, were the the West Papuan people ever consulted.

After Indonesia's formal assumption of administrative control in May 1963, conditions in West Papua steadily deteriorated. Attempts by the people for an internationally-supervised exercise of self-determination were violently suppressed by Indonesian troops. The Act of 'Free' Choice held in 1969 sealed the country's fate as part of Indonesia on the basis of the unanimous vote of 1,025 hand-picked members of specially appointed 'referendum' councils. This Act, which took place amid widespread political unrest and armed resistance, was

formally acknowledged by the UN General Assembly, and West Papua henceforth ceased to occupy the attention of the world community.

Yet nearly a decade earlier, in 1960, the General Assembly had adopted a Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which upheld "the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples". This Declaration, which was adopted as Resolution 1514 of the XVth Session of the General Assembly, was manifestly violated by what happened in West Papua in August 1969. Principle IX of Resolution 1541 (XV), the Resolution which enunciated the principles for implementing Resolution 1514 (XV), defined the conditions under which integration with another country should take place:

(a) The integrating territory should have attained an advanced stage of self-government with free political institutions, so that its peoples would have the capacity to make a responsible choice through informed and democratic processes. (b) The integration should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the Territory's peoples acting with full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes having been expressed through informed and democratic processes impartially conducted and based on universal suffrage. The United Nations could, when deemed necessary, supervise these processes.

These principles were profoundly breached by what happened in West Papua from the moment Indonesia took over the country's administration.

The causes of political and social unrest in West Papua extend far beyond the issue of self-determination. There has been forced resettlement of whole populations to make way for mineral exploitation and safeguard the interests of foreign investors. Heavy-handed attempts have been made to force West Papuans to abandon their culture and life-styles. Forest communities have been subjected to forced labour schemes, inflicted on them by government officials acting as brokers for timber companies. In urban areas, West Papuans face racial discrimination in government offices and in private enterprise; they are being driven from the towns as migrants from the west arrive in droves to run the administration and take over commercial activity. Many people predict that the West Papuans will soon be a minority in their own country, squatters in their own land, marginalised like the indigenous people of North America, the Aborigines of Australia and the Maoris of Aotearoa (New Zealand).

There is no firm basis on which any reliable estimate can be made of the death toll among West Papuans in the more than twenty-five years of Indonesian rule. Accounts of military operations show that at certain times, thousands of people were killed by bombing and strafing, and that thousands have died as the result of neglect, famine and maltreatment. Estimates of the death toll range from 100,000 to 150,000. We would prefer not to support any particular figure, only to state the conviction that the loss of life suffered by the West Papuan people at the

hands of their Indonesian colonisers has been on such a scale as to threaten their very survival as a people.

Almost since its inception in 1973, TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign, has reported human rights violations in West Papua in its journal, *TAPOL Bulletin*, one of the few English-language publications to do so. As the situation worsened and more evidence piled up, we recognised the need to publish a book analysing these violations in their historical context, against the background of the political, social and economic situation in West Papua. The first edition of *West Papua: The Obliteration of a People*, published in 1983, was sold out in less than a year. A re-print was published in 1984, with the addition of a chapter to record the momentous events of 1984. The re-print was sold out by 1987 but demand for the book has continued to be strong. Hence, the decision to publish this third edition.

With the passage of time, much that was written in the early 1980s needed updating and revision so, with the exception of Chapter One, all the chapters have been substantially re-written.

The book has been kept short enough to reach a wide audience but comprehensive enough to explain why West Papuans are rebelling, why the mass murders, the cultural annihilation and other forms of abuse have failed to quell Papuan resistance. The first two chapters give an overview of the country's history up to the 1962 New York Agreement which handed the territory over to Indonesia, and then up to the fraudulent Act of 'Free' Choice in 1969. Chapter Three describes how village communities have been sacrificed to the economic interests of the transnationals and to rapacious government officials. Chapter Four draws together the available information on Indonesia's plans to resettle the territory with hundreds of thousands of people from Java and to destroy Papuan cultural traditions. Chapter Five gives an account of the armed resistance to Indonesian rule since 1969, continuing the account of armed resistance from 1964 to 1969 given in Chapter Two. Chapter Six deals with human rights violations. An appendix at the end of the book documents the events that led to the murder of the West Papuan anthropologist, Arnold Ap. Chapter Seven deals with the refugee problem and the closely related question of Indonesia's relations with Papua New Guinea. Chapter Eight summarises overseas support for Indonesia, concentrating on economic support and the supply of military hardware.

Few people in Indonesia will accept that West Papuans have a right to self-determination. Hardly anyone in Indonesia has access to information about West Papuan attitudes, about why there is so much opposition to the Indonesian takeover, and about what is now happening in Indonesia's '26th province'. Outside Indonesia, information is scant and few people are well enough informed to express concern about the issue.

It is our hope that this publication will help publicise a much neglected case of human rights abuse and will provide the people of West Papua with urgently needed sympathy and support.

Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong
London, September 1988

Chapter One:

Foreign Intrusions and Papuan Resistance

The people of West Papua are Melanesians, of the same ethnic origin as the people who inhabit the eastern half of the island of New Guinea and the Pacific islands to the east. Their country is a land of high mountain ranges reaching up beyond the snowline, of mangrove swamps and jungles. It is dominated by a great cordillera running from east to west. South of the mountain range is a coastal plain, widest in the east at the border with Papua New Guinea, which consists of sago swamps and low-lying alluvial plains. The northern coastline is narrower and less swampy. Heavy rains produce a hot and humid climate in the coastal plains for most of the year. The steep mountain slopes and heavy rainfalls have limited the formation of topsoil, with the result that fertility is fairly low everywhere, except in regions affected by volcanic activity.

In the days before foreign penetration occurred, the vast majority of Papuans lived in widely scattered hamlets, having virtually no contact with each other or with the outside world. In the words of a Papuan writer:

In the period before the Papuans were brought under non-Papuan domination, the tribes in West Papua were in fact sovereign small tribal states within which the group, which was an economic, political and military entity, was kept up by the mutual link springing from the fact of having common ancestors. Anyone who did not by virtue of this mutual link belong to the group . . . was a foreigner who, if he entered the territory of the tribal state without reasons acceptable to that society, would be considered as an evil intruder and therefore liquidated if need be.¹

Due to the differences in terrain and climate and the age-long separateness of the tribal communities, food production differs from place to place. One of the most extensively and intensively cultivated

regions is the Paniai region, known as the Central Highlands. This, together with the Baliem Valley to the east, is quite densely populated. In the Baliem Valley, a complex system of garden cultivation has developed, with sophisticated drainage and irrigation techniques. In both regions, pigs are reared for food and as an mark of wealth and status.

In other places, shifting agriculture is practised. Land is cultivated for several years, then left to lie fallow to allow regeneration of the topsoil. Trees are crucial to this mode of production, providing protection from the fierce sun and fertilising the soil with their leaves. By all accounts, the Papuans have developed a well-balanced, if precarious, system of food production in most places, depending for its success on a viable balance between population density and land.

Foreign intrusions occurred long before the arrival of the European colonisers. There are records to show that the Java-based Mojopahit Empire, spanning the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, made contact with the western part of New Guinea to capture slaves and hunt birds of paradise. Later, the Tidore sultans are known to have made frequent forays into the territory, demanding tribute and plundering its wealth. However, neither the Mojopahit adventurers nor the Tidore missions established control. Rather, they were the precursors of later foreign predators who profited from brief incursions but shied away from lasting penetration because of the inhospitable nature of the country.

It was not until western explorers arrived that the island began to take shape, as it were, in western eyes. It was only after Cook's voyages in the area that the distinctive, bird-like shape of New Guinea, the world's second largest island, began to appear on maps. It is perched between the equator and 'terra australis', its head at 130 degrees, close to the archipelago which is now Indonesia to the east, and stretching east beyond the 150th meridian.

Early western explorers included the Spaniards who gave the island its name in 1546 because of physiological similarities between the inhabitants and the people of African Guinea. The Portuguese made only fleeting visits and were the first to notice the equatorial glaciers visible from the southern shores in the western half of the island. The French and British made landings, but it was the Dutch who first set up outposts. The first was Fort du Bus, established in 1828 and dismantled less than a decade later. Holland's chief interest in staking a claim to the territory was to protect its lucrative assets in the Dutch East Indies. By the 1820s, the Dutch colonisers were firmly established in Java and were waging wars to gain supremacy in other islands of what is now Indonesia. The Moluccas, just west of West Papua, had for centuries provided huge profits for the Dutch because of the forced cultivation of spices. In Java, the notorious Culture System of compulsory sugar cultivation was about to be launched. It was an empire in need of protection from other European colonisers.

Thus it was that for over a century, West New Guinea or West Papua,

too difficult to colonise or exploit, was used as a buffer against other colonial powers. The Dutch did not administer the territory as part of the Dutch East Indies but held on to it by proxy, through a treaty with its vassal state of Tidore and based on the "sovereignty of the Sultan of Tidore over the Papuan islands in general". Historians agree that Tidore sovereignty was a fiction, but it spared the Dutch the need to colonise and administer a territory that appeared in those days to be of little economic value.

The 141st meridian was established as the border between the western and eastern halves of the island in an agreement signed in 1848 between Holland and Britain. The eastern half was colonised by Britain and Germany. Later, after the first world war, it passed to Australia as a mandated territory. In the western half, it was well into the twentieth century before the Dutch went ahead with more than token settlement. Until then, the only visible signs of Dutch presence were the wooden sign-posts declaring sites to be part of the Netherlands Indies, at various points along the coast where sea voyagers sought shelter or collected fresh water. The earliest Dutch settlements were on Vogelkop or Bird's Head in the west, and in Merauke, in the south-eastern corner.

The struggle for natural resources

Geological exploration began in 1907 when Dutch military personnel surveyed the northern region and examined its natural resources. A large seepage of oil was discovered near the River Teer, leading to the discover of sources of energy and minerals that have dramatically determined the country's recent history. It was in 1907 too that Dutch and British petroleum interests merged to form the Royal Dutch Shell company, with the Dutch holding sixty per cent of the shares. This move was in opposition to the aggressive tactics of Standard Oil, the giant US company which was already trying to dominate the oil resources of the Indies. This would have given Standard Oil proximity to the large and growing market in China and Japan.

Rapid expansion by US and Japanese interests in the western Pacific, rich in natural resources and market potential, was resisted by the European colonial powers. Limited concessions were granted by the Dutch colonial administration but entry into the vast, untapped region of West New Guinea, where fifteen oil seepages had been recorded by 1935, was refused for many years. Agricultural concessions granted to the Japanese were later shown to have been used for oil exploration. Then, shortly after these covert Japanese operations were discovered, the Dutch allowed Standard Oil to begin drilling in West New Guinea. A joint company was formed, with US interests holding sixty per cent of the shares. Oil was found soon after, in 1936.

It was in the longterm interests of Standard Oil and US transnationals in general that Dutch colonial rule in South-east Asia be terminated. But it was Japan that succeeded in driving the Dutch out of

the Indies in 1942, after occupying Malaysia and Singapore. With the exception of West New Guinea which was re-occupied by Allied forces in April 1944, the Dutch East Indies remained under Japanese occupation for three-and-a-half years.

At the time of the Japanese invasion, there were only fifteen Dutch administrative posts in West New Guinea, besides a number of Christian missionary sites, Protestant in the north and Catholic in the southeast. One Dutch historian has remarked that by 1937, the Dutch presence amounted to only a "slender control over about 200,000 people". Another Dutch writer has referred to the exile of a thousand or so Indonesian communists and nationalists to Boven-Digul in Merauke in 1926 as being "the first time the Netherlands had a use for its colonial power over half that huge island".

For an account of the impact of Asians on Papuan society during the period of European domination, a Papuan writer explains that most Asians initially came to West Papua as traders. Later, however, they came

as employees of the Europeans, especially in the period after the Netherlands . . . had made the entire region of what was called the Netherlands Indies their colonial territory. The most direct and intensive contact of the Papuan tribes with Indonesians and other Asians had been in the form whereby the latter . . . performed a bridging function between the European colonisers and the masses of Papuans to be colonised. Indonesians as well as Chinese and other Asians were employed by the Dutch and other European colonisers as civil servants, policemen, teachers, evangelists, military personnel and traders. That was why the most immediate resistance of most of the individual Papuan tribes which ensued has been directed in the first place against these helpers of the European colonisers. This resistance was of course inexorably beaten down by the intermediary group in the service of their colonising masters.²

The writer maintains that the Papuans did not come into face-to-face contact with the Dutch as colonisers until after 1949, when direct and massive Dutch interference with the Papuans began to occur.

Papuan resistance before the Pacific War

Little has been written about Papuan resistance to the European colonisers. To ignore this is to fail to understand the roots of contemporary Papuan history. The main centres of resistance developed in Biak and the other islands of the Geelvink (now Cendrawasih) Bay, and in the Lake Sentani region near the capital of Hollandia (now Jayapura). It took on millenarian forms, movements proclaiming the coming of a Golden Age of Perfect Society, when the Dutch would be thrown out, heralding the end of forced labour and compulsory taxation. They were known as *Mansren* movements.

the extension of an ancient myth which came to express a response to the events of colonial domination. From the year 1867, the search for liberation was expressed many times in the recurrence of the movement which was increasingly accompanied by acts of revolt . . . (T)he Mansren movement was one of many hundreds of millenarian movements which occurred under conditions of colonialism: their common aspect may be found in the belief that the salvation of a people from oppression would come through the intervention of supernatural forces. Movements of colonial millenarianism such as these have been called the 'religions of the oppressed'.³

Peter Worsley, a leading writer on millenarianism, has stressed the social and revolutionary aspect of these movements in West Papua. Many of their prophets, who were known as 'konor', became immensely popular. The social unrest they caused in Dutch times often led colonial officials to mistrust them even before they began to challenge any aspects of colonial rule. Worsley refers to several non-millenarian and secular uprisings in the Geelvink Bay region, the uprisings in Makukar and Arwan in 1906 that were prompted by the imposition of forced labour for road-building, and the Aweho and Aduweri uprisings in 1921 and 1926. Millenarian political protest remained common throughout the period of Dutch colonial administration prior to the Pacific War, largely because open, secular protest was more dangerous and liable to be suppressed.⁴

In 1938, a powerful millenarian movement took root in Biak, culminating in what Papuans refer to as their 1942 proclamation of independence. This movement, which came to a tragic and bloody end, centred round a woman named Angganita. After being struck down by leprosy, she lived as a hermit until a miraculous cure made it possible for her to return to her village. She was then regarded as having magical powers and became widely revered. These developments were followed by Dutch officials with great suspicion. When she started preaching resistance, her arrest threw the region into turmoil. Protest was widespread and people started refusing to pay colonial taxes. De Bruijn, a Dutch colonial administrator in the area, referred to the movement as being "far less a religion than a self-conscious Papuan cultural nationalism"⁵. Others to emerge as leaders were the Simiopiaref brothers who had previously been imprisoned by the Dutch, and Stephanus Dawan.

The anti-foreign thrust of this movement was also directed against middle-ranking officials whom the Dutch brought in from the west to work as policemen, clerks, teachers and the like. Indonesians were also employed by the Christian missions while others became involved in commerce. In many cases, they assumed an air of racial superiority and were often the more visible face of colonial power. Such was the feeling of animosity they inspired that they became known as *amberi*, an uncomplimentary Biaki word which one Papuan has described as meaning "foreigners who talk sweet but have evil intentions". From their position of privilege, they looked upon Papuans as 'primitive' and

referred to them as *bodoh* or ignorant, an attitude which still predominates among Indonesians now in control of West Papua.

During the Japanese occupation, Biak became a major air base with roads, airstrips and defence fortifications. Illusions that the Japanese had come as liberators were quickly dispelled and "the doctrine of freedom from all foreign control was soon in the air".⁶ Like the Dutch, the Japanese saw the Angganita movement as a threat and suppressed it. A number of violent clashes occurred in July 1942. All the leading figures were captured and killed, and whole villages were wiped out. Worsley records that the Japanese "ruthlessly deported whole villages, beheaded and tortured many people and laid heavy burdens of forced labour upon men, women and children".

At its peak, the Angganita movement called for the removal of all non-Papuans, including Indonesians, from Papuan soil and insisted that the whole of West Papua, from Sorong in the west to Hollandia and Merauke in the east, be liberated from the foreign yoke. Before the movement was finally crushed, it had called upon Papuans everywhere to support its proclamation of a Papuan kingdom with its own flag, the inverted Dutch tricolour to symbolise the reverse roles of Papuans and white people. Villages had their own rajas with their own staff, military organisation and civil servants. The Angganita movement was typical of Papuan millenarian resistance. It was by no means the only one but has been most thoroughly documented by western anthropologists.

West Papua and Indonesian independence

West New Guinea was occupied by the Allies under the command of General MacArthur on 23 April 1944. A huge force of American and Australian troops occupied Hollandia and Biak and destroyed Japanese naval power in the region. Dutch officials returned and had ample time to restore control there well before the Indonesian Republic was proclaimed in August 1945.

The end of Japanese rule took a very different course in Indonesia. The Indonesian Republic was proclaimed two days after the defeat of Japan but before the Japanese forces of occupation had formally surrendered to the Allied forces. Although the proclamation came as the culmination of a long struggle for independence, it was at the same time supported and encouraged by the Japanese fascist authorities who had, throughout the occupation, enjoyed the collaboration of some leading Indonesian nationalists, including Sukarno, the man who became the Republic's first president. The proclamation and the colonial wars that occurred in the years that followed were concentrated primarily on Java. Support for Indonesia in West Papua was largely limited to outsiders who had come from the west, including Indonesian political exiles who remained in the territory after the Dutch were driven out by the Japanese in 1942.

The first Allied troops landed in Indonesia in September 1945, under British command. Soon afterwards, Dutch troops and administrators

returned. Their efforts to restore colonial rule led to a series of colonial wars, alternating with negotiations. Although the Dutch were gaining the upper hand by 1948, they were eventually forced to negotiate the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia mainly because they lost Washington's support. The US, hoisting the anti-colonial banner, used the threat of withdrawal of Marshall Aid to force the Dutch to hand over power. Negotiations on the transfer took place at the Round Table Conference in 1949 and the transfer took place in December that year. But West New Guinea was excluded from the transfer accord. To trace the background of this decision, it is necessary to go back to the period of the Japanese occupation when Indonesian nationalist leaders first discussed the territorial limits of their new Republic.

The discussions took place at the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia's Independence, a body set up by the Japanese military administration and including more than sixty nationalists. The dominant view was advocated by Mohammad Yamin, a politician who later played an important role in republican political affairs. He argued, with strong support from Sukarno, that the Republic of Indonesia should include not only the Dutch East Indies but other Dutch-administered territories, including West Papua. It should also include the whole of Timor, the eastern half of which was a Portuguese colony, North Borneo, then a British colony and now Eastern Malaysia, and the whole of the Malay Peninsula. Mohammed Hatta, who later became Indonesia's first vice-president, strongly disagreed, warning that such views could be regarded as "expansionist and imperialistic". Concentrating mainly on the claim to West Papua, he rejected Yamin's assertion that Papuans were Indonesians. "They are Melanesians," he said.

If we proceed with the demand for Papua, it is possible that we shall not be satisfied with Papua only and that we may want to include the Solomons and so on as far as the middle of the Pacific Ocean . . . I am inclined to say that . . . it should be left to the Papuan people themselves. I recognise that the Papuans have the right to be an independent nation.⁷

Hatta's views are relevant to subsequent developments in the dispute over West Papua, as it was he who in 1949 led the Indonesian delegation to the Round Table Conference which culminated in the transfer of sovereignty. The Dutch delegation insisted on a provision excluding West Papua from the final agreement. However, the issue was left unresolved as the result of a compromise which stipulated that the disputed territory would be the subject of negotiations to be held within a year. Hatta is known to have privately expressed the view at the time that he did not agree to Papua's incorporation into the Republic but could not return home empty-handed on the issue. The negotiations provided for in the transfer accord never took place.

Later, during the 1950s and early 1960s, when the dispute over West Papua came to dominate the Indonesian political scene, Hatta's views

regarding West Papuan self-determination found no echo among Indonesian politicians or political parties.

Minerals, the unmentionable undercurrent

The manoeuvres and shifting diplomatic stances towards the dispute over West Papua during the years after 1949 can only be understood if it is realised that the natural resources in the territory were far better known to the transnationals than was revealed in the public debate. Important oil and copper discoveries had already been made in the 1920s and 1930s.

When Allied troops landed in the territory in April 1944 under the command of General MacArthur, they were accompanied by geological teams brought in to evaluate pre-war discoveries as well as conduct their own explorations. The conclusions, now available though never adequately publicised before the Dutch were ousted, were startling. Nickel and cobalt ore together with chromite were found in large deposits in the Cyclops Mountains, close to the capital city. In Bird's Head at the other end of the territory, Gag Island was estimated to hold ten per cent of the world's known nickel. In the southern reaches of the central Cartensz Range, there was a known deposit of copper that has since been described as the world's largest outcrop, with a surprisingly high concentration of gold. The petroleum in Bird's Head, which later recorded the highest-flowing well in Indonesian history, was described by Shell's former chief geologist in West New Guinea as "almost pure distillate"; its sulphur-free quality and profusion was to contribute to the post-war resurgence of the Japanese economy whose vital oil imports were all channelled at the time through US-controlled supply lines. Had West Papuan aspirations for self-determination been acknowledged, the West Papuans would have had the final say in the exploitation of these resources.

Having secured a breathing-space over West Papua's future, as a result of the compromise at the Round Table Conference, the Dutch capitalised on these aspirations and threw their efforts into a plan for eventual self-government and the creation of a Papuan state by 1970. But Indonesia vigorously pursued its claim to the territory. For years, the issue was debated at the UN but the necessary two-thirds support eluded Indonesia. The debate had at its core the future of the Papuan population. Holland argued that continued Dutch sovereignty would ensure proper implementation of the principle of self-determination in accordance with the UN Charter. It was a position strongly supported in the Netherlands by a lobby described by a Dutch historian as "extreme nationalist, militarist, anti-communist and anti-Indonesian".⁸

Vigorous opposition to the demand came from the Dutch leftwing which strongly supported Sukarno's Indonesia. It was also opposed by some leading Dutch transnationals who feared the effects the dispute was having on the future of their own investments in the Indonesian Republic. But these interests kept their views to themselves, though they

are known to have been lobbying quietly for a settlement favouring Indonesia.

Indonesia's case was that the territory had been part of the former Dutch East Indies. In other words, it was a territorial claim. They argued that Holland's belated concern for Papuan self-determination was a colonial ploy to encircle Indonesia. The right of the Papuans to determine their own future was never conceded by Indonesia. The campaign had no vocal critics in Indonesia and it was at all times assumed that Indonesia was speaking on behalf of the Papuans. Papuans who upheld their right to self-determination were dismissed as Dutch puppets.

The late 1950s saw an escalation in Indonesia's anti-Dutch campaign which led to the takeover by trade unions of most Dutch companies in the country. Whatever the political motivations prompting trade unions to do this, encouraged by President Sukarno, it was the army which benefited by taking control of the companies. The takeovers did not, however, force the Dutch to compromise. By early 1960, political parties and mass organisations in Indonesia were being mobilised for a campaign 'to liberate West Irian' and the armed forces began to use military means by dropping paracommandos in various parts of West Papua.

Indonesian-US relations had been deteriorating during the 1950s because of US support for regional rebellions in Sumatra and North Sulawesi. It was during this time that Indonesia concluded several arms deals with East European countries and began to negotiate with the Soviet Union for weapons. An important arms deal was concluded with Moscow in 1961, at a time when the prospect of military confrontation over West Papua was increasing.

After John Kennedy became President in 1961, the US launched a diplomatic offensive aimed at mending fences with an increasingly recalcitrant Indonesian President and at steering the Dutch-Indonesian dispute away from armed confrontation. Robert Kennedy, the Attorney-General, visited Indonesia and Holland, urging that negotiations be held. Washington was now shifting in favour of Indonesia's position, regardless of any promises it may previously have made to stand by its NATO ally.

After months of pressure, Washington's special ambassador, Elsworth Bunker, brought the two sides together in negotiations that began in March 1962. They concluded five months later with an agreement that became known as the New York Agreement. Formally speaking, Bunker was mediating in the talks on behalf of U Thant, the UN Secretary General, but U Thant attended sessions only on the last two days of the five-months-long negotiations. The New York Agreement, based on the Bunker Plan, was the culmination of Washington's efforts to bring about a solution in Indonesia's favour. For the second time, the US had withdrawn support from the Dutch and had come down decisively on the side of the Republic.

The negotiations were remarkable for the absence of a Papuan voice.

The Dutch government posed as their protectors but in the end betrayed them completely by agreeing that self-determination, enacted in a so-called act of free choice, would be exercised six years after Indonesia took administrative control. The 1962 New York Agreement was immediately ratified by the UN General Assembly and put into motion within six months. It contained no guarantees that the Papuan people's right to self-determination would be safeguarded in any meaningful way. As the Council of Foreign Relations, an influential US body with powerful connections in Washington and in the oil industry, remarked in its 1962 report:

No-one regarded the stipulations for 'free choice' by the Papuans as more than a formality. Outsiders could only hope that their progress under Indonesian rule would not fall far behind what it might have been if the Dutch had remained.⁹

Footnotes

1. Saul Hindom, "Resistance in West Papua: From Tribal States to Nation State", published in mimeograph by Foundation Workgroup New Guinea (no date), page 4. Also published in *West Papuan Observer*, Volume 4:5 January/February, and Volume 4:6, March/April 1980.
2. *ibid.*, page 4-5.
3. Nonie Sharp, *The Rule of the Sword: The Story of West Irian*, Kibble Books in association with *Arena*, Victoria, 1977, page 12.
4. Peter Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of Cargo Cults in Melanesia*, Schocken Books, New York, 1968, page 135.
5. *ibid.*, page 138.
6. *ibid.*, page 141.
7. See *Background to Indonesia's Policy Towards Malaysia*, published by the Federal Department of Information, Kuala Lumpur, 1964, page 18.
8. Arend Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonisation: The Dutch and West New Guinea*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966, page 144.
9. Council of Foreign Relations, *The United States and World Affairs*, 1962, page 209.

Chapter Two:

The New York Agreement and its aftermath

After the UN General Assembly ratified the New York Agreement, preparations began immediately for the transfer of Dutch New Guinea to Indonesia. The first stage consisted of a seven-month period of UN administration which commenced on 1 October 1962. On 1 May 1963, the administration was handed over to Indonesia. According to the Agreement, the Papuan people would be consulted about their country's future no later than 1969.

The decolonisation process in West Papua which had been fostered by the Dutch since the early 1950s came to an abrupt halt in August 1962. Up till then, a number of local assemblies had been formed, most of them elected by universal suffrage. A New Guinea Council had been set up on the basis of elections in February 1961. Papuans held twenty-two out of twenty-eight seats. This Council had little more than an advisory function, not unlike the Volksraad or Council of the Indies set up by the Dutch in the Dutch East Indies in 1918.

A number of political parties as well as a trade union organisation had been set up. The parties represented a range of policies; some were strongly pro-Dutch, others were nationalist and pro-independence. There was organised pro-Indonesian opinion too, though some pro-Indonesia politicians had left for Indonesia. The main trade union had been set up by a Dutch Christian union. It catered initially for Dutch employees but as more Papuans joined the urban work force, it became more Papuan-oriented, organising strikes against foreign companies and making political demands against the Dutch.

A Dutch crash programme for self-determination, scheduled to take place in 1970, was the framework within which these organisations campaigned. The Dutch colonialists who had been so unwilling to relinquish their colonial possessions in Indonesia, had been forced by circumstances to perform a different role in West New Guinea, that of encouraging a move towards self-rule. Whatever the Dutch motives,

however, it introduced a period of political growth among urban-based, western-educated Papuans.

When Holland was forced to the negotiating table in 1962, after the withdrawal of US support and an escalation in Indonesian hostility, the Dutch Government tried to insist that Papuan self-determination should be the primary concern. It was, but not in the way the Dutch had intended. During the five months of talks conducted under the guidance of US negotiator, Elsworth Bunker, Indonesia's chief delegate, Adam Malik (a leading politician during the Sukarno era who became Foreign Minister and then Vice President under General Suharto) concentrated on reducing the likelihood of a meaningful act of self-determination. His task was greatly facilitated by the fact that the New York Agreement as construed by Bunker was designed to ensure that Dutch patronage of Papuan self-determination would come to nought.

While paying lip-service to the principle of self-determination, the Agreement contained formulations that facilitated the betrayal of this principle. Self-determination, it affirmed, would be carried out "in accordance with international practice" [*Article XVIII of the New York Agreement*], without saying what that means, and "under arrangements made by Indonesia" [*Paragraph 5 of the Explanatory Memorandum*]. The role of the UN was limited to "advice, assistance and participation" [*Memorandum, Paragraph 5 and Agreement, Article XVIII*]. In other words, the UN did not have a supervisory role. Moreover, the Act of Free Choice, as this exercise was called, could be held at any time up to the end of 1969, giving Indonesia six years of direct control.

The UNTEA period

From the time of the Dutch withdrawal and the departure of most Dutch officials on 1 October 1962, up to the installation of the Indonesian administration on 1 May 1963, a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) held power of state. According to the 1962 Agreement, the UN would provide "such security forces as the UN administrator deems necessary" [*Article VII*] for the maintenance of law and order. They were intended primarily to supplement the Papuan Police and the *Papua Vrijwilligers Korps* or PVK (Papua Volunteer Corps). However, the UN Administrator was also empowered "at his discretion, (to) use Indonesian armed forces". Moreover, for the purposes of general administration, he would "have the authority to employ personnel provided by Indonesia" [*Article IX*].

Armed Indonesian troops were immediately on hand because the para-commandos who had been dropped into West Papua during the military operations that had preceded the New York Agreement were reconstituted as the *Kontingen Indonesia Irian Barat* or Kontindo (Indonesia's West Irian Contingent). With the permission of the commander of the UN Special Force (UNSF), Kontindo had a general staff of one hundred officers and mustered a force of several thousand

men from the army, the navy, the air force and the police mobile brigade (Brimob). According to Indonesian army historians, Kontindo was tactically under the UNSF command but organically it was part of the Indonesian armed forces, under the Mandala Command which had been created in 1961 to supervise military operations against the Dutch in West Papua. Its commander was Major-General Suharto, the general who seized power in Indonesia in 1965. As the history of the regional military command in Irian Jaya explains:

Formally speaking, Kontindo was there to meet the requirements of the UNSF, but informally speaking, it had national tasks to perform, to protect the authority of the Republic of Indonesia (and) to safeguard against being manipulated (*dipermainkan*) by UNTEA . . . Kontindo attached greater importance to its informal tasks than to its formal tasks.¹

The commander of Kontindo was Lieutenant-Colonel Sudarto, and Major Ali Murtopo was its assistant for intelligence. Murtopo had been Suharto's intelligence officer for many years and would continue to serve him in this capacity for many more years after he took power in 1965. Dr Subandrio, who was then Indonesia's Deputy Prime Minister, was making no idle threat when he said that Indonesia had ample experience to "guarantee against any possible disturbance by the indigenous people of West Irian".² Under the terms of the 1962 Agreement, it was well within Indonesia's power to make good this threat, even during the UNTEA period.

The security forces brought in by the UN consisted of 1,537 troops from Pakistan. The UN peace-keeping force should have been multinational and multi-denominational, in order to safeguard the rights of Papuans, most of whom are either Christian or have no western religious belief, but the New York Agreement was not specific on this point. The circumstances that made it possible for UThant to send only Pakistani troops remain a mystery as no documents regarding this decision have been made public. There were, in addition, fifty-nine US military observers, but they could hardly have been expected to check Indonesian excesses. Although the stated function of the UNSF, including the Indonesian troops, was "to supplement the existing Papuan Police in the task of maintaining law and order" [*Article VII*], the Indonesian paratroopers took it upon themselves to confront the Papuan troops, for whom they had nothing but suspicion and contempt.

Clashes between West Papuan and Indonesian troops occurred almost at once. The first Papuan policeman was killed on 15 November 1962, exactly a month after the last Dutch troopship set sail for Europe. Indonesian army historians report that the incidents were provoked by Papuan troops "but Kontindo troops dealt with them resolutely and boldly so that most of them came to their senses and changed their attitude except for a few fanatics who persisted with their subversive (*sic*) activities. Members of PVK were disarmed, confined to barracks

and given the necessary explanations.”³ The UNSF apparently did nothing to halt such outrageous actions.

In November, when Papuans were preparing to hold a demonstration in the capital scheduled for 1 December, the UNTEA administration suddenly withdrew permission, after first having granted approval. The date for the demonstration was itself symbolic, the anniversary of a decision taken several years earlier to adopt a flag for a future Papuan state. The thrust of the slogans was explicit: “UNTEA! Stay, in order to protect Papuan rights!” and “We Papuans continue to uphold a plebiscite in 1969!” As one writer has pointed out, “none of these could be considered anti-Indonesian within the context of the Agreement”.⁴ UNTEA’s refusal to permit the demonstration was a clear indication of the extent to which Indonesian pressure on UN officials was bearing fruit. Yet, the Agreement stipulated that UNTEA was required “to widely publicise and explain the terms of the present Agreement and . . . inform the population concerning the transfer of administration to Indonesia and the provisions for an act of self-determination” [*Article X*] and “to guarantee fully the rights, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and of assembly, of the inhabitants of the area” [*Article XXII*].

On 23 December 1962, the Biak-Numfor Regional Council, a local assembly that had been elected by universal suffrage in 1959, made a call to the UN and UNTEA for a free plebiscite to be conducted under UN auspices in 1964. It bitterly resented the suppression of various rights “even under the UNTEA administration” and complained that the UN had handed over the Papuan people from western colonialism to “an even more ruthless power”. The adoption of this statement was quickly followed by a series of extraordinary moves by Indonesian officials employed by UNTEA, to have the statement amended. When the Council failed to adopt amendments acceptable to the Indonesians, the members were compelled to withdraw it altogether and sign a statement of loyalty to Indonesia. The incident is related in detail by Paul van der Veur, who describes how Council members were in touch throughout with a senior non-Indonesian UNTEA official. He told them that UNTEA was powerless to protect their right to preserve the statement intact “because its task ended on 1 May 1963”. One UNTEA official is quoted as saying: “The astonishing aspect is that they (the Indonesians) are doing this right under our noses. They don’t even wait until the first of May.”⁵

Zacharias Sawor, a Papuan official at the department of agriculture who travelled widely in connection with his work, provides numerous details of arrests, intimidation and torture inflicted on Papuans during the UNTEA period by Indonesian soldiers and military police.⁶ Already at that time, the Indonesians were making use of underwater cells in Ifargunung prison in Lake Sentani district which later became notorious as a centre for atrocities against Papuan dissidents.

The head-teacher of a church primary school in West Papua has described, in testimony at the Tribunal on Human Rights in West

Papua held in Port Moresby in May 1981, how his school was raided and searched for symbols of Papuan nationalism by tank-borne Indonesian troops in April 1963. Anything connected with Papuan culture, flags, books, charts, was removed. The head-teacher, Adolf Henesby was then taken to army barracks where he was questioned about West Papuans who "were hampering the Indonesians in their plans and programmes. I was transferred from there to a military police unit and held there for three days".⁷

On 27 April 1963, a few days before the UNTEA period came to an end, the chief UNTEA administrator, Dr Abdoh, an Iranian diplomat, attended a roofing ceremony for the Court of Justice building overlooking the harbour of the capital, then named Kota Baru. A UN publication describes the proceedings:

In his speech, Dr Abdoh expressed confidence that fundamental freedoms, rights and liberties would be upheld by the court because the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter of the United Nations have this purpose in view and the United Nations has been directly concerned with this Seat of Justice which will be the very means of enforcing these very objectives.

Adolf Henesby did not tell the Tribunal whether he heard the speech. It is unlikely that he did for he was at the time a detainee in an Indonesian army cell. Another Papuan is quoted elsewhere as saying:

A chasm yawned between us and the UNTEA. They had no contact with the people whatsoever. As far as I am concerned, they may just as well not have been there.⁸

Indonesia takes charge

The formal transfer of power from UNTEA to Indonesia took place on 1 May 1963. With their troops already firmly in control of security, the Indonesians set about formalising the suppression of Papuan cultural expression and the elimination of Papuan political activity.

The day after the transfer, there was a huge bonfire in the main square of the capital, presided over by Rusiah Sardjono, Indonesia's Minister of Culture. Artifacts connected with Papuan life-styles, as well as school textbooks and Papuan flags went up in flames. About ten thousand Papuans had been gathered to witness this ceremonial act to extinguish Papuan culture, described by Mrs Sardjono as their "colonial identity".⁹

The next day, the New Guinea Council was disbanded and replaced by an Indonesian-appointed regional assembly which included none of the Papuans who had been elected to the Council. Membership was based on the Guided Democracy system in operation in Indonesia since 1959, and consisted of appointed representatives of functional

groups as well as Indonesian department heads, military officers and religious figures.¹⁰ In the same month, Presidential Decree No 8 1963 was promulgated, placing West Papua under political quarantine and specifying that

... it is prohibited for the time being to set up new political parties or party branches in West Irian. [Article 1, Paragraph 3]

In the region of West Irian, it shall for the time being be prohibited to undertake political activity in the form of rallies, meetings, demonstrations or the printing, publication, announcement, issuance, dissemination, trading or public display of articles, pictures or photographs without permission of the governor or an official appointed by him. [Article 2]

Regarding political parties which existed in West Irian before 1 May 1963, they shall be recognised as parties only if they comply with the provisions of Presidential Decree No 7, 1963 on the conditions and simplification of parties, and Presidential Regulation No 13, 1963 on the recognition, supervision and dissolution of parties. [Article 3, Paragraph 2]

President Decree No 7, 1963 recognised only ten Indonesian-based parties, none of which existed in West Papua. As Sawor says, this Decree outlawed Papuan parties and the Papuan independence movement.

A few weeks later, an even more repressive decree was enacted in Jakarta, the Anti-Subversion Decree, Presidential Decree No 11, 1963. "The formulation of 'subversion' in the Decree embraces almost any attitude or behaviour, however passive, which is considered to undermine the ill-defined 'aims' of the Revolution."¹¹ This Decree which was introduced in Indonesia to reinforce the repressive aspects of Guided Democracy, also gave the authorities in West Papua powers to make anti-subversion charges against anyone campaigning for Papuan rights, under threat of the death sentence.

After the military came to power in Indonesia in 1965, the Anti-Subversion Decree, along with powers vested in the army's special security command, *Komando Operasi untuk Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban* or Kopkamtib (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), was widely used in Indonesia to annihilate the leftwing movement, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and all organisations associated with it. These organisations, like other Indonesian parties, had no roots or following in West Papua. Hence, the catch-phrase, 'PKI involvement' used for mass arrests in Indonesia was never used in West Papua. Instead, the authorities soon created another catch-phrase, branding political suspects as people connected with the armed struggle that began in the late 1960s. The catch-phrase was *gerakan pengacau liar*, or GPL, which means 'movement of wild trouble-makers'.

The first governor of West Irian to be appointed by Indonesia was Eliezer Bonay, the acting-chairman of *Partai Nasional*, one of the dissolved Papuan parties. In an interview with TAPOL in 1981,

conducted in Sweden where he was then living as a refugee. Bonay described the hopes and realities in those first days of Indonesian rule.

At first, I believed that the Papuan people would have the right to decide their fate in 1969 in accordance with the New York Agreement. But as soon as the Indonesians arrived in our country, totally unexpected things began to happen. There were numerous brutalities, thefts, torture, maltreatment, many things that had not happened before. In many different places, people were arrested; the prisons everywhere were full.

When the Indonesians came, they took literally everything . . . even air-conditioners firmly installed in walls. All of them, officials and soldiers, behaved in the same way. Our people looked on and laughed to themselves, thinking: "Is this how they are going to run things here, taking down mirrors, wall fixtures, dismantling everything and taking them away?"¹²

By late 1964, Bonay had been removed from office and was sent to Jakarta. After returning to West Papua in 1965, he was arrested for disseminating 'subversive', pro-independence literature. He was held without trial, together with a group of about sixty others, for twenty-two months.

The government in Jakarta tried to minimise the impact in West Papua of the economic decline which set in in Indonesia during the years of confrontation with Malaysia (1964-65). In October 1962, West Papua was designated a separate monetary zone with its own currency. The West Irian rupiah was held at par with the Dutch guilder and made freely convertible into Indonesian rupiahs. The aim was to isolate the territory from Indonesia's spiralling inflation which might have caused a sudden fall in living standards and accompanying disillusionment with Indonesian rule. But the protected monetary system provided the basis for unbridled corruption and plunder by Indonesian officials and brought about the very fall in living standards which it had been designed to prevent. Taking advantage of the heavily over-valued Indonesian rupiah, Indonesians made huge profits by using their earnings to buy up commodities in West Papua and export them to Indonesia for their own use or for sale on the black market.¹³

With UNTEA's help, Indonesian officials had secured positions of dominance in the administration, following the exodus of Dutch officials in October 1962. Many Papuans in senior positions were demoted or sacked, as were Papuans in intermediate positions. On the other hand, some Papuans were elevated to high public office but were shadowed by Indonesian officials occupying seemingly subordinate positions but with the real power in their hands. Eliezer Bonay found himself in precisely this position. Although formally speaking he was provincial governor, he insists that he was nothing more than a puppet.¹⁴

Resistance to Indonesian control

Among urban-based Papuans, the political response to the Indonesian takeover took a variety of forms. Some like Nicholas Jouwe, Marcus Kaisiepo and Herman Womsiwor left West Papua with the Dutch, hoping to use the international forum to campaign for self-determination. Others like Eliezer Bonay initially accepted collaboration, hoping that this would serve Papuan interests best. Others, clinging to the provisions contained in the New York Agreement and hopes of UN concern for their fate, tried to campaign for a properly-conducted referendum, in the conviction that this would result in independence. These efforts were brutally crushed by the Indonesian security forces.

Others turned to armed struggle which has characterised Papuan opposition to Indonesian rule ever since the mid 1960s. A fuller account of this resistance is given elsewhere, but in order to understand the atmosphere which prevailed before and during the 1969 Act of 'Free' Choice, it is necessary to examine the uprisings that shook Manokwari and other parts of West Papua from the mid 1960s up to August 1969 when the Act took place.

The official history for the period from 1962 to 1970 of the XVIIth/Cendrawasih Regional Military Command, the command in control of West Papua, gives a detailed account of the military situation and the strength of armed resistance up to August 1969. The deployment in Manokwari of Infantry Battalion 641 and Battalion 642 of the Cendrawasih Division in late 1964, it states, led to "disturbances, demonstrations and the display of posters in Manokwari, Sorong, Ayamaru, Teminabuan, Bintuni, Fak-Fak, Kaimana, Kokonao and several other places. This was followed by an attempt by separatists (sic) on 16 December 1964 to steal weapons from the local police".¹⁵

The history goes on to record a number of rebellious incidents from mid-1965, involving hundreds and in some instances thousands of Papuans, infuriated by Indonesia's decision to quit the UN and by Sukarno's announcement that Indonesia no longer felt obliged to conduct a referendum because "the whole people of West Irian are in favour of the Indonesian Republic". Clearly, Sukarno feared the results of a properly conducted Act.

The first incident was the "Kebar Incident" when Papuan forestry and agriculture department employees attacked and killed Indonesian troops during a flag-raising ceremony on 26 July 1965, then fled into the bush after seizing a number of weapons. Two days later, the legendary Ferry Awom, along with four hundred men, attacked the barracks of Infantry Battalion 641 in Arfai, Manokwari. These uprisings prompted the Indonesian army to launch its first counter-insurgency operation in West Papua on 4 August 1965, the so-called *Operasi Sadar* or Operation Consciousness in order "to destroy gangs that are active in Manokwari, Warmare and Kebar".¹⁶ A week later, the Operation was broadened to cover the whole of West Papua, with operational headquarters in

Manokwari, Merauke, Jayapura and Jayawijaya.

In 1966, armed insurgents won more support "among local people (*putera-putera daerah*) within units of the Indonesian armed forces, in the police force and among civil servants". They went onto the offensive, attacking many military posts and seizing weapons.¹⁷ The Cendrawasih history records that things continued to worsen for Indonesia throughout 1967 with a rebellion in Merauke in January, and soon afterwards, an uprising of 14,000 West Papuans of the Arfak tribe in Manokwari. In March 1967, the *Operasi Sadar* command brought in troop reinforcements and launched a special operation called *Operasi Bratayudha* "to smash the gang of 14,000 men with about one thousand firearms, under Ferry Awom, and to gain control of the entire (Birds Head) region".¹⁸ Although the army inflicted many casualties on the armed resistance, Ferry Awom was not captured and the guerrillas were able to intensify their actions. The Cendrawasih history depicts the army as being extremely hard-pressed throughout 1967:

The basic force of the enemy was not paralysed at all. Many remnants roamed the forests, attacked our posts and patrols, then vanished into the forests. Their actions intensified even further at the start of 1968 and they were able to employ the principles and tactics of guerrilla warfare to great effect: the tactics of appearing-and-vanishing, of laying home-made mines ... of having their agents close to our own positions and waging psychological warfare so as to fuel tension.¹⁹

The Cendrawasih history is silent on the atrocities perpetrated by Indonesian troops, but reports of the repression and killings by Indonesian troops were so persistent that on 5 April 1967, Lord Ogmore made a call in the House of Lords for a UN investigation. Early in 1967, the Arfak leaders, the Mandatjan brothers, Lodewijk and Barend, and Ferry Awom declared Manokwari a "Free Papua State". Indonesian troops responded by strafing the area, and in March, Silas Papare, a pro-Indonesia member of the MPRS, Indonesia's upper legislative chamber, from West Papua, protested that the Indonesian air force had killed a thousand people in Manokwari during strafing raids and rocket attacks.²⁰ By the end of 1967, it was reported that whole villages had been razed to the ground and that 3,500 villagers had been killed.

The Cendrawasih history records a number of occasions when Indonesia used B-26 aircraft to strafe whole regions in an attempt to defeat the guerrillas. In January 1968, Indonesian troops trying to relieve an army post in Makbon which had been raided by guerrillas, discovered that the district of Sausapor was under guerrilla control and the Sausapor army post was isolated. Guerrillas gained control of the post in an attack on 2 February, but four days later, the army strafed the region with B-26 aircraft and regained control of the post. Nothing is said about the death toll from this aerial attack.²¹ According to another source, the death of fourteen soldiers in an OPM ambush near Sorong was

followed by shelling from the sea. The villages of Sausapor and Makbon suffered heavy casualties after which marines were put ashore.²²

More strafing was reported in March to regain control of an army post in Irai/Anggi. AFP correspondent Brian May, who was in West Papua to cover the Act of 'Free' Choice, reports that, at its height, the movement in Manokwari was supported by more than ten thousand Arfak people. "The Indonesians gradually wore them down, bombing them, cutting them into isolated groups and starving them from their hiding places."²³

The situation was clearly getting desperate for the Indonesian army. After Suharto seized power in October 1965, Indonesia rejoined the UN and reversed Sukarno's decision not to hold a referendum. The deadline for the referendum was fast approaching, yet armed resistance was spreading. The army command was forced to revise its strategy. Six thousand reinforcements were brought in and *Operasi Sadar* now devoted more attention to destroying the sources of food supply for the guerrillas, a sure sign that villagers would become a prime target of operations.

In June 1968, Brigadier-General Sarwo Edhie was appointed commander of the Cendrawasih Division. Sarwo Edhie had achieved notoriety as commander of the RPKAD special commandos in the massacre of hundreds of thousands of leftwing suspects when Suharto came to power in 1965. His task now was to quell the unrest in West Papua in time for the 1969 Act of 'Free' Choice. On 1 January 1969, Sarwo Edhie announced the surrender of the Mandatjan brothers, his 'New Year's present' to the Indonesian government. Both men were later killed by their captors.

But the battle was far from over for Indonesia because Ferry Awom continued to resist, with followers in many parts of Bird's Head. On 22 February 1969, Sarwo Edhie launched a new operation, *Operasi Wibawa* (Operation Authority) with three objectives, to annihilate the resistance under Awom's leadership, to enforce security in time for the Act of 'Free' Choice in six months' time and to consolidate Indonesian administrative authority throughout the territory. The district and sub-district commands throughout West Papua were reinforced with combat troops, the civil administration was cleansed of suspect elements, while intelligence operations were strengthened.²⁴

The planning and implementation of *Operasi Wibawa* was a clear sign that the Suharto regime realised that a massive military operation was essential if the Act of 'Free' Choice was to be steered to a "successful" conclusion. *Operasi Wibawa* was divided into four three-month stages with the following objectives:

First quarter: To continue with operations to smash the Ferry Awom gangs in the Majembo-Anggi-Afui area and then reinforce territorial forces with personnel that can be totally relied on . . .

Second quarter: To consolidate Bird's Head region so that the region and its

population can be properly prepared to participate in the Act, free from pressure and influence by the armed gangs or such separatist elements as still exist. To intensify efforts to raise the level of national consciousness by utilising all the forces of the armed forces and the civilian government . . . directed primarily towards winning the Act . . .

Third quarter: (1) To conduct the Act of Free Choice. (2) To safeguard physically the conduct of the Act.

Fourth quarter: To safeguard the victory achieved . . . and to prevent negative excesses that may occur in whatever form, and if such excesses do occur, to take measures for their suppression and annihilation.²⁵

During the first phase, Cendrawasih reported that the guerrilla bases were brought under control and "thousands of gang members surrendered, were captured or killed".

As the Act drew closer, however, security disturbances spread to other parts of the country. In April 1969, two-thirds of the population of the Erambo/Kalimaro region, north-east of Merauke, near the border with Papua New Guinea, were found to have fled across the border to Papua New Guinea, still then an Australian protectorate. The reasons for the flight are not explained but army officers involved in 'clean-up operations' were attacked and killed.

In May, the army discovered that Papuan youngsters were being given military training in Dubu/Ubrub region, up in the north. Troops sent to capture the organiser were trapped and killed. When an army unit returned to the area to take revenge, they found that the villages were deserted.

The most serious incident of all outside Manokwari occurred in Enarotoli in the populous Wissel Lakes/Paniai region. According to the official account of this six-month long uprising, as related in the Cendrawasih history,²⁶ the trouble started in February 1969 with the rejection of the appointment of an Indonesian as district head of Paniai. This quickly spread to a movement rejecting all Indonesian personnel in the area working as teachers, officials and soldiers. Anti-Indonesian sentiment ran so high that all Indonesians and their families fled and Jakarta lost control of a huge area including Wagete, Muanemani and Enarotoli. Wooden stakes were implanted, making all the airstrips in the region unusable. When Sarwo Edhie attempted to land a plane in Enarotoli on 30 April and re-establish control, his aircraft was fired on and had to return to base. An aerial attack was then launched to regain control, forcing the inhabitants to flee into the forest. The army gradually re-occupied Wagete, Enarotoli and other sub-district centres. The Indonesian version of the campaign is silent on casualties but hundreds if not thousands of people may well have been killed.

The army's attempt to regain control of Muanemani encountered stiff resistance from "large numbers of people".²⁷ More troops were drafted into the area and for a few weeks, it seemed that the army had re-established its authority, but in June, army units were again attacked

by "thousands of people". The most serious attack, according to the Indonesian account, took place in Pasir Putih Kumopa when eleven soldiers were killed, dozens more wounded, many weapons captured, and surviving troops were forced to retreat. Troops tried to re-enter the area on foot, supported by an airlift of troops from Biak, starting on 9 July. Bitter fighting broke out, again involving many thousands of people. Five days later, the army reports, eight hundred people attacked Wagete from three directions:

Repeated attacks were launched against our troops every day from 14 July 1969 and the numbers involved grew, reaching many thousands of people. It was not until 18 July, when their food had run out and they had suffered numerous casualties that the spirit to resist began to flag. People who had taken the side of the enemy abandoned their areas of concentration in Aporo valley and returned to their villages.²⁸

To re-establish control, the army divided the *Operasi Wibawa* command into two commands, a military command to smash the resistance and a territorial command to pacify those who surrendered. The army also sought the help of missionaries to make contact with those still fighting and to help pacify the area.²⁹

It was not until 30 August that the army succeeded in pacifying the area with the surrender of many of the rebel leaders. The army says that it was only by means of "heavy strikes followed by correct territorial operations that the Enarotoli incident was prevented from influencing the preparations and conduct of the Act of Free Choice, enabling it to proceed smoothly".³⁰ Such was the military force needed to crush opposition to Indonesian rule.

A few months later, the United Nations had no hesitation in accepting the Act of 'Free' Choice as a valid test of opinion even though the events in Enarotoli were mentioned in the official report of the UN Secretary-General to the General Assembly. (See below)

The final solution

After General Suharto seized power, Indonesia re-joined the UN and rescinded Sukarno's decision not to hold a referendum. His military regime has always taken care to give the appearance of legitimacy to every act of violence perpetrated in Indonesia, in West Papua and in East Timor, when the regime annexed this former Portuguese territory in 1975.

In 1967, he announced that the Act of 'Free' Choice would take place in 1969 and that the government would do everything in its power to "*mensukseskan*" or "make a success of" the event. Those who favoured West Irian's separation from Indonesia, he warned, would be treated as traitors.

In compliance with the terms of the New York Agreement, the UN Secretary General appointed Ortiz Sanz, a Bolivian diplomat, to

observe the Act. The events surrounding his mission, the obstructions and deceptions to which he was subjected, have been graphically described by AFP correspondent, Brian May.³¹ They are also reflected in the Sanz report, submitted to the UN General Assembly by the Secretary General in 1969, which nevertheless became the basis for formal UN acknowledgement of the 'unanimous' decision to opt for Indonesia.³²

Of all people, Ortiz Sanz knew about the tricks and subterfuge used by the Indonesian authorities to prevent his team of observers from properly implementing his brief. Although his report contained much information that should have led the UN to reject the decision, there was no challenge to the fraud enacted under his very eyes. A whole section is devoted to detailing the disturbances that occurred in Paniai in April 1969. It said: "The leaders of the insurgents requested the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from the Paniai with the explanation that the people wanted to exercise the right of free choice without pressure." [Paragraph 160]

After reporting that Indonesian troops were brought in and encountered resistance, Sanz went on to say that the besieged Papuans repeated their appeal for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops and asked the UN envoy to arrange for the Indonesian troops to be replaced by UN troops. "The answer given by the Military Commander was that the withdrawal of troops was a matter for the army to decide and that the UN Representative had nothing to do with it." [Paragraph 162] Sanz also made it clear that Indonesian explanations about the uprising were not reliable:

According to the official explanation, the main reason for the uprising was the discontent of the people with the functioning of the local administration. There is no doubt however that this uprising was instigated by people with political motivations. [Paragraph 164]

Yet in the very next paragraph, Sanz expressed satisfaction that his request to the Indonesian army chief-of-staff for the West Irian military commander to be instructed "to deal with the population with consideration and restraint" had been met. Brian May viewed the affair in a very different light:

The picture that emerged from my enquiries in West Irian made nonsense of the soothing utterances of the UN office. Indonesian troops and officials were waging a widespread campaign of intimidation to force the Act of Free Choice in favour of the Republic. They were gaoing the educated and terrorising the primitive, pursuing them even into Australian territory, where they caught up with some and shot them.³³

Under the system devised by the Indonesian authorities, the Act of 'Free' Choice was exercised by eight regional councils made up of 1,025 local 'representatives'. These Indonesian appointees 'consulted'

together in accordance with the Indonesian method of *musyawarah* or 'reaching consensus', a method which, by its very nature, should be unacceptable as a way of testing public opinion. A referendum is not meant to produce a consensus. Its purpose is to discover the relative strength of those in favour and those against a proposition.

Sanz reported that he made several attempts to have the Act conducted by universal suffrage: "I could suggest no other method for this delicate political exercise than the democratic, orthodox and universally acceptable method of 'one man, one vote' ". [Paragraph 82] The idea was rejected by the Indonesians who also refused to consider another proposal from Sanz for a mixed system to be used, the one-man-one-vote principle in urban districts "complemented by collective consultations in the less accessible and less advanced areas of the interior". Sanz reported that this idea was also unacceptable to the Indonesians, leaving the UN envoy to say that "he had no authority to object to, even less to reject" the Indonesian government's decision. [Paragraph 86] Such was the impotence and ineffectiveness of the UN in influencing the conduct of the 1969 Act of 'Free' Choice.

The Indonesians claimed that the Papuans were 'too primitive' or 'too simple' for universal suffrage. Yet, a number of elections had been conducted during the Dutch administration using this method. Two years later, in 1971, the Indonesian authorities would be cajoling Papuans to participate in general elections based on universal suffrage.

The New York Agreement had defined the UN role during the Act as being "to advise, assist and participate". Journalist Brian May, who monitored the proceedings closely, during the appointment of the regional councils (which should have been observed by the UN mission, but were not) and during the final decision-taking process, documented numerous occasions where members of the UN mission were deliberately excluded from events they should have attended. Moreover, the mission was prevented from arriving in West Irian in time to participate effectively. The size of the mission was cut from fifty to twenty-five persons then cut again to sixteen, including administrative personnel, "in view of the request of the parties to the Agreement that the budget should be kept to a minimum - a request reiterated by the Indonesian Government - and the physical impossibility for the government to provide us with more housing in Jayapura". [Paragraph 42]

Whereas the UN experienced obstruction and delay, officials of the copper-mining transnational, Freeport, were in Jakarta so soon after the 1965 military takeover that their top geologist, Forbes Wilson, described in his book, *The Conquest of Copper Mountain*, the eerie sound of tanks rolling down the streets after the curfew. Freeport officials had no difficulty visiting the mist-covered Ertsberg copper mountain, years before the UN was able to muster a token presence in West Papua to observe an event affecting the future of its people.

Even though the UN mission was prevented from witnessing the

procedures by which the so-called 'representatives' had been selected, there was enough evidence from documents produced by the Indonesians alone to prove that the Act was nothing more than a charade. For example, when Sanz expressed concern that all sections of the community should be adequately represented on the local assemblies, he was told by the Indonesian Government on 10 May 1969 that only those political groups that existed legally would be represented:

In the same letter, the government explained that "those few people - possibly existing - not in favour of retaining ties with the Republic of Indonesia are not organised in legally existing political groups or parties in West Irian." [Paragraph 126]

The UN mission could have taken note of a news item in an officially-sponsored Jayapura newspaper, reporting that Major Soewondo of the Indonesian army had rounded up village representatives in the Lake Sentani district and told them: "I am drawing the line frankly and clearly. I say I will protect and guarantee the safety of everyone who is for Indonesia. I will shoot dead anyone who is against us - and all his followers."³⁴

On 2 August 1969, the 1,025 council members met in Jayapura and duly decided, without a dissenting vote, to "remain with Indonesia". Two weeks later, a correspondent of the Dutch news agency, *Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau*, who had been in West Papua during these events, quoted a Papuan clergyman who was one of the 1,025 council members:

The man who totally destroyed my self-respect was Brigadier-General Ali Murtopo, publicly acknowledged as being the chief brain-washer. For two hours, this special envoy of President Suharto spoke to us. He destroyed any will we may have had to vote against integrating with Indonesia.

He began by pointing out that Indonesia, as the strongest military power in South-east Asia, is able to strike fear into any country. Jakarta was not interested in us as Papuans but in West Irian as a territory. If we want to be independent, he said, laughing scornfully, we had better ask God if He could find us an island in the Pacific where we could emigrate. We could also write to the Americans. They had already set foot on the moon and perhaps they would be good enough to find us a place there.

This was not all. General Murtopo impressed upon us that 115 million Indonesians had fought for West Irian for years. They had made many sacrifices in this struggle, and they would not therefore allow their national aspirations to be crossed by a handful of Papuans. Short shrift would be made of those who voted against Indonesia. Their accursed tongues would be torn out, their full mouths would be wrenched open. Upon them would fall the vengeance of the Indonesian people, among them General Murtopo, who would himself shoot the people on the spot.³⁵

The UN General Assembly "takes note"

On 19 November 1969, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution "taking note" of the UN Secretary-General's Report containing the report by Ortiz Sanz on the conduct of the Act of 'Free' Choice. Fifteen African countries voted against the decision, including the Ghanaian delegation which described the Act as "a travesty of democracy and justice". By its decision, the General Assembly endorsed the results of the Act during which, it was claimed, all the councils had, "without dissent . . . pronounced themselves in favour of the territory remaining with Indonesia".³⁶ This must surely rank as the most damning betrayal by the UN of its very own principles.

Quite apart from the damaging evidence contained in the body of Ortiz Sanz' report, several of the concluding paragraphs should have alerted General Assembly delegates to the fraud which Indonesia had perpetrated:

The petitions opposing annexation to Indonesia, the cases of unrest in Manokwari, Enarotoli and Waghte (Wagete), the flight of a number of people to the part of the island that is administered by Australia, and the existence of political detainees, more than three hundred of whom were released at my request, show that without doubt certain elements of the population of West Irian held firm convictions in favour of independence. [Paragraph 250]

I regret to have to express my reservation regarding the implementation of Article XXII of the Agreement, relating to "the rights, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and of assembly of the inhabitants of the area". In spite of my constant efforts, this important provision was not fully implemented and the (Indonesian) Administration exercised at all times a tight political control over the population. [Paragraph 251]

The UN General Assembly chose to ignore this grave indictment and closed the books on the issue of West Papua, leaving the Papuan people to the mercies of a ruthless colonial power which had already taken important strides towards exploiting and plundering their abundant natural resources.

Footnotes

1. *Praja Ghupta Vira. Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa*, (Praja Gupta Vira: West Irian, From Era to Era) published by Sedjarah Militer Kodam XVII/ Cendrawasih, the Military History of the XVIIth/ Cendrawasih Regional Military Command, 1971, (hereinafter, *Cendrawasih Military History*) page 97-98. This publication only came to our attention recently. It is an important source of information about the strength of opposition to Indonesian rule in West Papua up to 1970.
2. *Asian Recorder*, 23 April 1962.
3. *Cendrawasih Military History*, page 99-100.

4. Paul W. Van der Veur, "The United Nations in West Irian: A Critique", in *International Organisation*, Volume 18, No. 1, 1964, page 71.
5. *ibid.*
6. Zacharias Sawor, *Ik Ben Ein Papoea*. (I am a Papuan), de Vuurbank, Groningen, 1969.
7. See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No. 53, September 1982 for a transcript of parts of the Tribunal on Human Rights in West Papua, held in Port Moresby in May 1981.
8. Van der Veur, "The UN in West Irian: A Critique", page 59.
9. Testimony given to the Tribunal on Human Rights in West Papua, May 1981.
10. Van der Veur, "The UN in West Irian: A Critique", page 70.
11. Julie Southwood and Patrick Flanagan, *Indonesia: Law, Propaganda and Terror*, ZED Books, London, 1983, page 144.
12. *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 48, January 1982.
13. Peter Hastings, *New Guinea: Problems and Prospects*, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1969, page 212.
14. *TAPOL Bulletin*, No. 48, January 1982.
15. *Cendrawasih Military History*, page 121.
16. *ibid.*, page 128.
17. *ibid.*, page 139.
18. *ibid.*, page 141.
19. *ibid.*, page 145-6.
20. Nonie Sharp, *The Rule of the Sword: The Story of West Irian*, Kibble Books on association with *Arena*, Victoria, 1977, page 19-21.
21. *Cendrawasih Military History*, page 149.
22. Robin Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War: The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, London, Boston, 1985, page 37.
23. Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, Henley and Boston, 1978, page 172.
24. *Cendrawasih Military History*, pages 166 and 168.
25. *ibid.*, page 170.
26. *ibid.*, from pages 178 to 189.
27. *ibid.*, page 182.
28. *ibid.*, page 186.
29. *ibid.*, page 187.
30. *ibid.*, page 189.
31. See Chapter 5, "The United Nations Fiasco" in Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy*.
32. *Report of the Secretary-General regarding the Act of Self-determination in West Irian*, UN Document A/7723, UN General Assembly 1969.
33. Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy*, page 178.
34. *Tjendrawasih*, 24 May 1969, quoted in Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy*, page 179.
35. *De Tijd*, The Hague, 14 August 1969.
36. Paragraph 6 of the UN Secretary-General's Introductory Report to Document A/7723, UN General Assembly, 1969.

Chapter Three:

The Plunder of Resources

The huge land mass of West Papua, located on the border of the Wallace Line, not surprisingly has large deposits of minerals and other natural resources. But the rough terrain, the formidable barriers of nature and the rudimentary infrastructure have discouraged foreign and Indonesian companies from rushing in to exploit these resources. Indeed, it was not until well into the eighties, when world oil prices had fallen dramatically, that the Indonesian government started constructing the necessary infrastructure to support its transmigration programme and facilitate the exploitation of West Papua's riches. Some foreign investors got in much earlier, however.

Any comprehensive survey of foreign investment and its impact on the native population must take account of four leading capital interests currently exploiting West Papua's resources: Indonesian, US, Japanese and South African. The resources fall into five main categories: petroleum, minerals, timber, cash crops and fisheries. Exploitation of these resources, however, has not only failed to benefit the local people; it has played havoc with their lives and customs, caused widespread suffering and has been a major factor in promoting a style of development that is taking a relentless toll in Papuan lives. All investors, Indonesian and foreign alike, regard Papuans as being too unskilled and undisciplined to be of any relevance to their enterprises.

Geologists who conducted surveys in the 1930s found traces of many valuable minerals, nickel, cobalt, gold, silver, copper, chromium, marble, limestone and asbestos. The fact that estimates of deposits have not been made public can mean either that the surveys were not extensive enough or, more likely, that they are being kept secret to withhold information from competitors. Even official figures from Freeport Indonesia Incorporated (FII), which runs the huge copper-mine in West Papua, are unlikely to give a true picture of either

estimates or actual production. Contradictory statements about the gold vein content in the copper ore continue to be one of the big mysteries of the Indonesian economy. Official Indonesian figures now show that for a number of years, the FII copper-mine has been Indonesia's largest gold-mine as well.

From 1974 till the early 1980s, over seventy per cent of Indonesia's foreign exchange earnings were from petroleum, but when oil prices plummeted, Indonesia's planners had to find ways to compensate for the heavy losses caused by the collapse in oil prices. It is now a matter of urgency for Indonesia to push non-oil exports, such as cash crops from plantations, in particular by promoting the expansion of the estates sector.

In the 1930s, the Dutch started sending colonists to West Papua as part of a plan to develop a cash crop economy along the lines of the plantation economy they had developed in Sumatra and Java, but the lack of an infrastructure, the prevalence of tropical diseases and the absence of city life made the territory much too uninviting for Dutch settlers. It was not until General Suharto took power that new conditions were created, making the territory more attractive to foreign capital.

It is now impossible to obtain official figures about Irian Jaya's exports and imports. The *Pacific Islands Yearbook* published the figures for many years but announced in its 1985 edition that the statistics had ceased to become available since 1984.¹

Petroleum

Although Dutch oil companies started producing oil more than fifty years ago, the quantities remained modest up to the end of Dutch rule. It was not until the 1970s that output from the Salawati basin area, south of Sorong, reached a peak of 130,000 barrels per day. In 1972, Petromer Trend, which is controlled by the South African tycoon, Harry Oppenheimer, was licensed to resume drilling on a site that Standard Oil had been "sitting on" since 1941 when extraordinarily rich oil deposits were discovered in Bird's Head. By the 1950s, the oil-wells had dried up and, in the sixties, the territory was described in the Netherlands as being not worth fighting for. Yet in the following decade, oil and minerals were said to be in such abundance that the territory was spoken of as a 'new bonanza'. Rich oil deposits had been discovered, sulphur-free and of light quality, minimising refinery costs for petro-chemical production. Shortly after Petromer Trend struck the highest-producing oil-well in Indonesian oil history, with a capacity of 26,000 barrels per day, a US weekly wrote that, "if there is one thing worse than having no natural resources," one Indonesian official sighed to me, "it's having resources that everyone wants."²

Within a year, Petromer Trend was said to be producing well over 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) from its Sorong oil-field, a field with the added advantage of being only a few miles from a natural deep-water

port. Production costs at the Salawati wells are well below average, at \$3.72 a barrel, whilst production losses caused by a variety of factors are estimated at a mere three per cent, which is low by any standards. However, in 1985, the Sorong oil-field was down to producing 33,000 bpd and fell further to 26,000 in early 1988. A Petromer Trend official, Surono, insisted that despite the decline in output, the region still contains major deposits of oil waiting to be explored. Up to 1987, he said, the Petromer Group had produced no less than 250 million barrels from the Salawati field alone.³ Other companies with concessions for oil exploration have located many geological structures that could contain sizable oil reserves.

In 1983 and 1984, exploratory drilling by Shell took place in Sarmi region, along the north coast, west of Jayapura, and subsequently moved eastwards. In 1986, Shell was forced to abandon these activities because of a series of attacks by the OPM. Shell appears not to have resumed exploration, either for fear of more OPM attacks or because the initial findings were not encouraging. On the south coast and in the Asmat region, intensive surveys have been under way but no-one seems ready to say whether these activities have led to anything spectacular. With oil prices currently so low, oil companies are reluctant to make new investments. Although oil production in West Papua is only a fraction of Indonesia's total output, things could change if oil prices start rising again.

Needless to say, even exploratory activities inflict damage on the environment; depending on the area, trees, gardens or sago groves have been destroyed with serious results for food supplies. Disregard for local needs by contractors has often led to disputes with local people. A conflict erupted when contractors, working in Inanwatan sub-district, south of Sorong, for Conoco-Pertamina, a joint venture between Indonesia's state-run oil company and US capital, began cutting lines, corridors and drilling sites in early 1983. Neither Conoco nor Pertamina heeded demands from the local people for compensation or requests for alternative food supplies. After violence broke out, a local guide was killed and a French oilman was seriously wounded, the company responded by promising to pay compensation. There was further unrest when people realised that the company's rate was only a fraction of the standard rate set in provincial regulations.⁴ Up to 1985, Conoco-Pertamina were still claiming that their exploration had not yet resulted in finding any productive wells.

In June 1988, villagers from twelve villages in Inanwatan initiated proceedings in court to sue the two companies for Rp 14,703 billion compensation for the loss of 931,944 sago trees, having received nothing from the companies after all that time.⁵

Nor do the oil ventures result in jobs for West Papuans. The number of local people employed by the oil industry has dropped to almost nil. This was emphasised by a former oil-worker, Mecky Salossa who testified at the Tribunal on Human Rights Violations in West Papua, held in Port Moresby in May 1981. He worked for a joint

US-Indonesian oil company in Ayamura, Sorong from 1973 till 1978 when he left the country to seek political asylum in Papua New Guinea:

About eighty per cent of the workforce were native Papuans initially, but then it was reduced to twenty per cent. Some were dismissed because it was said that their contracts had expired, and others because, for example, they failed to turn up to work for a day or two. None of the supervisory employees was native. There had been an instruction for native employees to be dismissed and replaced by Indonesians. In 1975, the Papuan workers at the company rebelled. They organised an attack on the Indonesian and western managers at eight in the morning, beating and attacking them.⁶

In the 1950s, Papuans still had a reasonably good chance of being employed in the oil industry, at least in lower-ranking jobs, but things changed under Indonesian rule, and precisely at a time when the industry was booming. In the eighties, things have deteriorated even further as the industry has gone into decline. Dismissal, however, has not been the only problem. According to the US journal already quoted, local employees were subjected to intimidation by the Indonesian authorities and more than two-thirds of the pay earned by Papuan workers was seized by the military.⁷ Observations by an American professor who visited West Papua in 1981 focussed on the planned influx of Indonesian labour into the oilfields

to provide a secure labour force in key sectors of the economy. For instance, for 1981/82, 1,050 families or 5,000 persons are planned to be 'dropped' near the oilfields of Manokwari and another thousand families will be 'dropped' near the oilfields of Sorong. This guarantees a safe labour force, and ties in with Pertamina's (the national oil company) policy of non-employment of Melanesians in the oil industry. That began in 1969 and the Papuan labour force was soon afterwards retired from the industry.⁸

Minerals

Some idea of the mineral wealth of West Papua has already been given in Chapter One. In this sector too, the share-out between foreign companies has been massive, with some of the most renowned US multinationals taking the lead. As with the oil companies, some mining regions have not been exploited because of unattractive world commodity prices. In the early 1980s, the nickel deposits in Gag Island were abandoned by Pacific Nickel, a subsidiary of two steel giants, US Steel and the Dutch company, Hoogeveens, even though preparations for exploitation were practically completed, an airstrip constructed and strip-mining equipment brought in. Similarly, the nickel deposits in the Cyclops Mountains have not been developed. The state company, P.N. Aneka Tambang, has taken control of most of the mining sites, but all activity in preparation for exploitation has been halted.

The only mineral resource to have proved an eldorado has been the copper discovered in Ertzberg Mountain. Although Dutch geologists discovered the deposit with its high gold content, it was the huge US corporation, Freeport Sulphur, that succeeded in making a deal soon after General Suharto's military government came to power. Freeport was the first foreign company to invest in Indonesia after the army takeover. The deposed Sukarno government had been virulently anti-western and had introduced foreign investment laws that were extremely restrictive. These were scrapped by Suharto and, with nothing to take their place for two years, Freeport was literally able to write its own contract. Construction of a 110-kilometre pipeline from the mountain to the harbour and a new town called Tembagapura was commenced in 1970. Although much was known about the quantity and quality of the copper ore, its gold and silver content was a closely-guarded secret.

An official of Freeport Indonesia Incorporated was probably making a gross understatement when he said that "Freeport can cover its wage bill by the value of the gold and silver alone".⁹ Later, a second, even larger, ore mass was discovered directly below the first layer, bringing the total ore deposit to 85 million tons of rich copper ore, far and away the richest copper deposit in the world. When Admiral Sudomo, still the Labour Minister, visited the site in December 1987, the Indonesia press filed reports on the present state of the enterprise. Figures published at the time showed a steady rise in gold production:

Year	FIH gold output in kg
1982	2,018
1983	2,194
1984	2,209
1985	2,370
1986	2,738

Source: Department of Mining and Energy

At current prices, the 1986 output would yield receipts of over \$40 million, confirming the views of analysts that Tembagapura is indeed a gold-mine for the mother company in the US. For the Indonesian government, determined to make gold an important source of foreign exchange earnings, the importance of Freeport cannot be underestimated.

At Freeport's opening ceremony in 1973, President Suharto not only named the newly constructed mining town, Tembagapura; he re-named West Papua, known until then in Indonesia as Irian Barat (West Irian), as Irian Jaya or 'Victorious Irian', a measure of the tie between copper prosperity and the successful acquisition of West Papua. High up in the mountains of West Papua, Tembagapura has been transformed into Indonesia's most advanced township. Its telephones

are linked to Jakarta's telephone exchange and the inhabitants enjoy telex and facsimile facilities.¹⁰ Fresh fruit, vegetables and meat are flown in from Australia, while the supermarkets are stocked with the same variety of goods one would expect to find in the most luxurious supermarkets of the west. A Dutch KRO television team, on a visit to Tembagapura in 1981, described it as a "small piece of western comfort and ingenuity. An air-conditioned town with a supermarket where you can buy everything that can be bought in Holland . . . Where there is money everything is possible. A harbour, an aerial cable-way, an airstrip, a hospital, a huge depot for machinery. And everything, but everything, is brought in by helicopter."¹¹

The population of Tembagapura is at present about 5,000, a mixture of ex-patriates and Indonesians who are segregated from the local people in a way reminiscent of South Africa's apartheid system. As far as jobs for local people are concerned, an Australian pilot who plied the supply route from Cairns in Queensland to Tembagapura some years ago, said that they "didn't get much of a look-in at all". He blamed this on the Indonesian authorities who dictated the company's staffing policy, requiring Freeport to employ people from other parts of Indonesia for virtually all 'local' staff positions. "Anyway, life was made so unpleasant for them (the Papuans) that they couldn't have enjoyed working there. As far as I could see, the Melanesians resented everything that was going on and wished that it would have disappeared."¹²

According to an Indonesian source in 1982, Freeport employed 452 ex-patriates, mainly Americans and Australians, 1,850 Indonesians while only two hundred Papuans were employed as labourers for unskilled jobs like road maintenance and ship loading.¹³ Even the Indonesian workers had grievances because of their second-class housing and wages. The Papuans were at the bottom of the pile, in a racially stratified system, forced to live outside the perimeters of the site in 'illegal' squats. A photograph of these squats appeared in *Berita Oikoumene*, the journal of the Indonesian Council of Churches.¹⁴

Nor have the huge revenues brought any benefit to the local population. On the contrary, Freeport mining operations have, from the start, been the most blatant example of economic greed and military oppression working hand in hand to destroy the livelihoods of the local population. Part of the mining complex is located on the traditional hunting ground of the Amungme people who live from gardening and hunting. In 1977, protests by Papuans attracted worldwide attention when the company's pipeline was cut by angry villagers. Earlier that year, Amnesty International reported that the army was using steel containers from the mining site as prison cells. Thirty men were reported to have been incarcerated in total darkness for three months in the middle of the mining site, not far below the equatorial glacier where night temperatures approach freezing-point. In May that year, OV-10 Broncos dropped "anti-personnel 'Daisy Cluster' bombs which scattered shrapnel at body height near the village of Ilaga on the other

side of the mountain chain from Freeport's mine".¹⁵

The background to the revolt which erupted in 1977 was reported at length in the monthly journal of the Indonesian Council of Churches:

The local inhabitants feel disadvantaged by the presence of a foreign mining company whilst their complaints do not receive proper response either from the company or from government authorities supporting the company.

In the Akimuga sub-district of Fakfak, the underground movement against the American mining company burst into the open at 6 am on 18 June 1977.¹⁶ They began to attack a police post in Akimuga Kampung, then blocked the Ilaga airstrip near Tembagapura with tree stakes. When the army launched a counter-attack, they withdrew to the forest. Nevertheless, in July 1977, a very impressive act of sabotage occurred. The pipe transporting copper slurry mixed with gold from the mine at a height of 11.5 thousand feet, down to the Timika harbour on the Arafura Sea coast, was blown up by the guerrilla forces. A bridge was also blown up and some Freeport oil storage tanks were destroyed by fire. Over a period of several months, Freeport Indonesia sustained losses of several million dollars a day.

As a consequence of these guerrilla attacks, the Amungme tribespeople in the Akumuga region were to suffer greatly because of indiscriminate counter-attacks. At the end of August, two OV-10 Bronco bombers showered the region of Akimuga with bullets. Those who survived fled into the forests and some even fled into the mountains. These anti-guerrilla attacks were not confined to air attacks; ground attacks went on for several months, as well as arrests and detentions . . .

. . . a teacher from Aramsoliki valley, Akimuga . . . said that twenty-five per cent of the Amungme tribe took part in the 18 June 1977 movement. ¹⁷ The reasons lie in the distress felt by the Amungme people because their traditional hunting lands have been taken over by the mining corporation which has been granted a concession area of one hundred kilometres. To cope with their distress, an accord was concluded between the Irian Jaya provincial government, Amungme tribal chiefs and Freeport Indonesia . . . On the basis of this accord, Freeport built a school, a polyclinic, a church and a government office in the kampungs of Waa Lama, Tsinga and Kwamki. Following the 1977 upheavals, all these buildings were abandoned by local inhabitants; the teachers fled to Fakfak and the buildings which had been contributed by Freeport were turned into army posts.

With the safety of its own company interests in mind, Freeport made a new offer at the beginning of 1978 to resettle 350 Amungme families living in the vicinity of the mine to a location 65 kilometres from Tembagapura . . . Unfortunately, after resettling the first fifty families up to the end of November 1979, no further action appears to have been taken. Freeport apparently felt resentful about using its heavy equipment for a project that brought no profits.¹⁸

The conditions of the Amungme people who were compulsorily resettled brought yet more misery. The climatic conditions and terrain

were very different near the coast, hot and malaria-infested as compared with the cool, moist atmosphere of their natural habitat which had been described by early Freeport workers as one of natural grandeur with a permanently detectable smell of copper and iron ore. A Jakarta weekly described the resentment of the Amungme people at being forcibly resettled:

Efforts to bring the inhabitants from around Tembagapura down to Timika encountered difficulties. "On the first day when fifty families were brought down, they couldn't stand it," said Darmawan, an official of the Agency for Investigation and Development of Technology. The climate is hot whereas Tembagapura is cool. After being there for only a day, they returned home and had to be fetched again with jeeps. This happened several times. "Now thirty-six families are willing to stay in Timika," said Darmawan.

It is predictable for these mountain people not to feel at home. Besides the climate, the houses built for them are unsuitable. They are very basic, bare huts with roofs and earthen floors. In their native villages, they live in houses with wooden floors. "We feel ill. We can't sleep," said a woman in one of these huts, pointing to the earthen floor where they have to sleep. "Please tell them," she said.¹⁹

Driven from their ancestral homes, their conditions rapidly worsened. In June 1980, according to a Jayapura newspaper, an epidemic swept through the resettlement, killing 216 children, more than twenty per cent of the infant population. A doctor complained of lack of medicine to fight the epidemic, yet a stone's throw from the ravaged kampungs, Freeport staff were living in luxury with all the medical facilities one could possibly hope for. Moreover, the company was exporting copper and gold by then worth at least \$150 million a year. The same report said that the high death toll was due to the fact that people who had been "resettled for reasons of security after the Akimuga uprising" had become severely under-nourished. They are garden cultivators by tradition, but were now living in a location where they had to rely on scarce supplies of sago and poor fishing grounds.²⁰

Many petitions from the dispossessed Papuans were sent to the authorities. One petition from Akimuga dated 25 May 1980 was published by TAPOL. Addressed to the governor, it contained a litany of complaints:

Papuans are treated like dogs who must scavenge from garbage bins in order to survive.

No services are provided for them either by the government or by the company.

They have a strong desire to make progress but do not get the opportunity either to work or go to school.

In Tembagapura, local inhabitants are not permitted to buy anything in the shops, even the most basic commodities.

They are treated like foreigners in their own land. Although Indonesian law recognises private ownership rights and traditional community land rights, these rights are being totally ignored in this region.

The land used by Freeport is the property of the people of Tembapapura-Akimuga, handed down to them over the generations by their ancestors.

The petition demanded work, clinics, schools and shopping facilities for the people and asked for a new contract to be negotiated between the government, Freeport and the local community.²¹

Forestry

West Papua is one of the few remaining parts of the world still covered with primary forest. Indonesia's forests are second only in extent to Brazil and constitute nearly ten per cent of the world's remaining rainforests.²²

Predictably, the Indonesian authorities have been anxious to use this wealth for economic gain. Just like the Dutch before them, more attention has been paid to exploiting the more easily accessible tropical forests of Sumatra and Kalimantan. One particular difficulty in West Papua is the lack of wide, navigable rivers, especially in the north, where the better stands of timber are located. Timber companies have selectively stripped the forests in regions where the logs could be skidded or trucked to coastal landing points. Islands off the north coast and to the west, like the Raja Ampat islands of Biak-Supiori and Numfor, and the Schouten islands, have been virtually denuded of the more commercially-useful types of trees.

During the 1970s, Suharto made a habit of awarding members of the ruling elite or their kith and kin forest concession holdings (HPH) in all parts of Indonesia. Once a concession was granted, the concessionaire had a free hand to plunder Indonesia's rainforest. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimated an annual loss of 550,000 hectares between 1976 and 1980; estimates of deforestation in the early eighties vary from 0.6 to 1.5 million hectares a year. By the turn of the decade, the situation had become untenable. The government was forced to impose stricter controls, issuing concessions in stages - first for survey, then for trial cutting and finally for approved logging plans. While the restrictions appear to be aimed at protecting the forests from unbridled exploitation, they in fact camouflage a system which benefits companies close to Suharto which are able to buy up concessions from smaller companies that lack the resources to comply with the terms demanded by the government.

During the late 1970s, the government also imposed restrictions on the export of logs in order to encourage the development of a timber-processing industry. In 1980, the export of all unprocessed logs was finally banned, except in West Papua. This is apparently because neither foreign nor western concessionaires have been willing to invest capital there to construct processing facilities. According to one source, the result has been "a generally exploitative system of logging at the

expense of the local people who lose their forests, often with little or no compensation, since forests are considered to be a 'national' asset under the basic forest law of 24 May 1967".²³

A South Korean company, PT You Lim Seri, acting on behalf of the Indonesian concessionaire, PT Kebun Sari, started preparing for forestry exploitation south of Demta, seventy kilometres west of Jayapura. They paid compensation of the equivalent of \$0.50 a hectare for 400,000 hectares to the local people, for forests from which they would be able to earn an estimated \$45.00 a hectare. Three years after moving in, and after having apparently exported about 24,000 cubic metres of unprocessed logs without proper permits, the company suspended operations, saying that they would resume in three years time. However, immense damage had already been done. Land clearance and road construction have caused soil erosion and landslides, polluting the water supply of the villages of Ambora and Muris and damaging coastal fishing.²⁴

In West Papua, the Department of Forestry has designated 13.2 million hectares of land for logging concessions. During 1986/87, ten HPH concessions were granted, covering an area of 2,831,000 hectares and in the following year, three more concessions were granted.²⁵ But, although the government has tried to regulate the industry, it would be a mistake to imagine that logging goes on with due regard for regulations aimed at preventing over-stripping and ensuring reforestation. Local control is weak and companies with concessions for trial cutting only can easily get away with full-scale logging without too much interference from officials easily tempted by bribes. Compensation to local people for the loss of their forest-lands is outrageously low while promises to build infrastructure, houses, schools and clinics as part of the compensation, usually come to nothing.

The most detailed exposure of the scandalous exploitation of local people for the benefit of logging companies came to light in 1982. The racket was located in Asmat, near the south coast, on the estuary of the Siretz River which flows into the Arafura Sea. The 70,000 Asmat people have a territory of some 27,000 square kilometres, of which 20,000 square kilometres is (or was) covered with forest. The Asmat live in villages of three to six hundred people on a vast coastal swamp. Trees are central to the culture of the people. The ornate carvings which they produce, along with the distinctive Asmat music, have led to many studies of this remarkable tribe. Back in the 1950s, when mission-sponsored sawmills began to provide cash wages to the Asmat people, traditional concepts began to change.

In the 1970s, timber became big business for the Indonesian military. A variety of species, from ironwood to mahogany, was felled by forced labour. The scandal became public with the publication of three articles in a leading Jakarta daily describing the exploitation and oppression of Asmat who were being forced to fell timber for next to nothing, for weeks at a stretch. The system undermined their social and

cultural traditions, disrupted village life and caused numerous human rights violations.²⁶

The articles revealed that Jakarta-based timber companies used local military, police and civilian officials, the so-called *tripida* (triple regional leadership) to force villagers to go into the forests, their very own forests, to cut down trees, and float them down to waiting ships. Although the rate had been fixed at Rp. 3,500 per cubic metre, villagers often received that amount for a whole trunk, and in any case, the pay was frequently withheld for months. All local officials were involved in the racket and were handsomely rewarded by the companies in the form of hefty commissions. For the company, it was a no-risk venture, involving no capital investment; even the cost of tools supplied to the villagers was deducted from their wages. The local government officials used the weight of their authority to browbeat the villagers into accepting logging jobs, warning that those who refused or who protested against the onerous conditions, could face charges of subversion or of 'undermining government development plans'.

The compulsory log-felling scheme exploited forests that were the property of the tribespeople. It threatened their sago supplies, the staple food of the Asmat people. "Large-scale logging can be catastrophic," said the Catholic Bishop of Agats, an anthropologist working in the region for twenty years. "The result could be the total annihilation of the Asmat people." It disrupted village life, forcing villagers to stay in the forest for as long as six weeks. The women accompanied the men to prepare food and had no option but to take their children as well, as no adults were left in the villages. "Traditional village life no longer functions," commented the newspaper. "For a measly Rp. 10,000 for each logging period, the tribespeople spend many days, fraught with risks to their own safety, endangering the very future of their people."

In the wake of these revelations, an Indonesian environmentalist group warned that the Asmat people were "on the brink of cultural starvation after a decade of enforced ironwood logging." The group warned that

ironwood has become a curse for the indigenous forest communities . . . Supported by local authorities, the timber companies operating in the Asmat region have turned these proud, feared and artistic people into underpaid timber workers . . .

Asmat artwork, especially their wood-carving for which they are well-known, has declined rapidly. The production of drums has been forbidden by the local *camat* (sub-district chief) since he assumed that drumming would limit ironwood. The production of their famous long dugout canoes has also been hampered due to the depletion of the *ketapang* (*terminalia*) trees, also for export. [Original, English] ²⁷

According to the environmentalists, these operations were made possible because special permits had been issued, exempting the

timber companies from conditions normally attached to forestry concessions for the protection of the forest. In order to facilitate the exploitation of local labour, the authorities "had relocated the Asmat communities from the interior to the river mouth, closer to prospective ironwood loading places and closer to government supervision." As a result of the activities of companies operating with these special permits, timber exports from Merauke rose sharply during the 1970s. By 1979, these companies were exporting 280,000 cubic metres of timber a year, a tenfold increase in only three years. "Based on these figures, the government of Irian Jaya demanded in 1980 an extension of the special permits, extending the scandalous forced labour in Indonesia's most remote jungles."

Not satisfied with the proceeds of the timber racket, the *tripida* officials exacted other forms of forced labour, for road building and office construction, whenever villagers were not in the forests felling timber. "It is called *kerja bakti* or 'voluntary labour'," said a missionary. "Villagers are forced to work without pay on development projects . . . The *tripida* arrest people on petty charges and keep them in detention to do *kerja bakti*."

One of the Indonesian companies operating in Asmat is PT Artika Optima Inti which is part of the Djajanti Group, the largest timber corporation in Indonesia. Djajanti is controlled by Bob Hasan whose close business links with President Suharto date back to the 1950s when Suharto was commander of the Diponegoro Division in Central Java. The Djajanti Group has extensive concessions in Kalimantan where forest destruction has proceeded at frightening speed, and in the islands of Seram and Buru. Hasan's pivotal role in the rape of Indonesia's forests is reinforced by the control he exerts as chairman of all the federations of companies involved in logging, log-processing and other forest-related commercial activity in Indonesia.²⁸

PT Artika Optima Inti has a concession of 600,000 hectares in Asmat, and more recently is reported to have obtained another concession in Pulau Adi, near Kaimana. Hasan has built a plywood factory at Waisarisa on Seram and his huge concession in Asmat seems "destined to supply raw material at minimal financial cost to the Seram processing facility, but at high environmental and social cost to the inhabitants of the logged areas."²⁹

The October 1982 press reports about the rape of Asmat prompted the editor of a Jayapura newspaper to make a few comments of his own:

The timber racket in Asmat is in fact nothing new. I went to Asmat in 1978 and investigated conditions throughout most of the areas where the timber companies operate . . . The things that go on behind these operations makes one's hair stand on end. The people are whipped with stingray fish-tails, soldiers use firearms against men and women, young and old. People are forced to stand out in the blazing sun, teachers are slapped in the face by members of the armed forces. People are forced to do *kerja bakti*, children are left to go

hungry in the barracks, missionaries who come to the defence of people's rights are threatened with physical violence.

Human exploitation of the weak and ignorant occurs not only in Asmat but in many places throughout Irian Jaya, including the towns and the provincial capital . . .

"I can understand why frustrated Irianese flee into the bush to seek freedom according to their own vision. Their rights are violated, their traditional forests are grabbed, their birds-of-paradise, part of the magic of Asmati culture, are shot down . . ." one teacher in Paniai told me.³⁰

In July 1988, new warnings about the rape of the Asmat people surfaced. The chief of the Directorate for Guidance of Alien Societies of the Department of Social Affairs warned that concessionaires who have been clearcutting the forests inhabited by the Asmat people since 1986 "have very clearly damaged the forests and environment of the Asmat". Cliff Marlessy, a West Papuan member of the Indonesian Environmental Forum's (Walhi) presidium, said the "area of the Asmat's forest has already been allotted to concessionaires. What is left for the Asmat?" The felling is getting further and further from the rivers. He explained that the sloping territory of the Asmat was formed from mud sediments centuries ago. The brackish swamp land has no stones and uncontrolled felling is speeding up the process of land erosion. Reporting these alarming developments, a Jakarta weekly said:

The Asmat area can again become sea. There is concern that several large rivers from the Jayawijaya mountain range like the Frinskap, Berasa and Tor, will submerge the Asmat.³¹

Fisheries

The seas surrounding West Papua are teeming with marine life. The Arafura Sea to the south is regarded as one of the most fertile prawning grounds in the world, while the deep Banda Sea to the west contains a rich variety and quantity of fish like tuna, yellow fin and skipjack. Similarly there are many varieties in the northern waters, from Sorong in the west to Jayapura in the east.

During the 1970s, Japanese and South Korean trawlers began operating extensively in the seas around West Papua, and Japanese capital was invested in the West Irian Fishing Industries (WIFI) which mainly handled the catch of prawns and the shipment of frozen prawns to Japan. As with other capital ventures, the local people were hardly employed at all; refrigeration ships were used, with only Japanese personnel on board. In the face of strong competition, during the early eighties, from other prawn-producing regions, WIFI operations were not expanded.

In 1982, Transpeche, a French company based on the island of Biak, began constructing the region's first fishing business with an onstream canning facility. The fishing plant came into operation in June 1987

and is able to process 25,000 tonnes of fish annually, with a an initial turnover of \$15 million. The ultra-modern equipment used by Transpeche is already destroying the livelihoods of local fishermen. While indigenous people still rely on the traditional pole and line, Transpeche uses nets "as deep as the Eiffel Tower". Bernard Forey, the general manager of Transpeche, has been quoted as saying that Biak offers many advantages to the foreign investor, not least, "a ready supply of cheap labour". However, he said that his company preferred to employ Japanese crews on their ships as the local people "do not have the necessary skills". The collapse in the price of fish did not worry Mr Forey too much as the rich fishing grounds near his plant kept production costs low. "The logic is simple," he said. "With prices as low as they are, only those fleets with their cannery close to the fishing grounds can hope to survive."³² Local fishermen have no chance of survival against such cut-throat competition.

The new trend, developing a plantation economy

In the last few years, there has been a major shift in focus of Indonesia's transmigration programme to resettle the landless poor from Java in so-called land-rich areas. With the mounting failure of food-crop transmigration sites and Indonesia's need to boost non-oil exports, transmigration is now being transformed into a programme to supply cheap labour for the plantation economy. Transmigrants are no longer expected to grow their own food but to resettle on state-run or privately-owned *perkebunan inti rakyat* or PIR (nucleus and smallholder estate) projects.

The core or nucleus of the estate is held by the company, cultivating twenty per cent of the land, while the remainder is known as the 'plasma', cultivated by peasants who are required to plant and care for the crop. When the trees begin to yield a harvest, they must sell the output to the company. The 'plasma peasants' are housed in compounds which may be located many kilometres from the land that has been allocated to them. The peasants are promised eventual ownership of 1.5 hectares in the plasma region, plus 0.5 hectares for a house and garden. In due course, when the trees become productive, they will be required to pay for the land by paying a share of the bank credit that was used for the initial investment by the company. In the case of tree crops such as palm oil, this is likely to be six to eight years after planting. Some PIR projects in Java and Kalimantan have turned out to be disastrous because of mismanagement and outright corruption on the part of the company. The settlers become cheap plantation labour, just as in Dutch colonial times.

Since 1986, special attention has been given in Irian Jaya to the availability of land for plantations. Ibrahim Junaedi, chief of the provincial plantation department has been quoted as saying that two million hectares of land, spread throughout nine districts, has been set aside for plantation use. So far, only 44,125 hectares had been put to use, a mere two per cent of the target.³³ Plantations already in existence

produce nutmeg, cocoa and rubber, but the intention is to increase the diversity by planting vanilla, pepper and copal as well.³⁴

The government is determined to press ahead with the scheme throughout the eastern regions of the archipelago, notably in the Moluccas and West Papua, in accordance with plans initiated by the Dutch colonial authorities in the 1950s. At the time of the state budget of 1987, when the government introduced wide-ranging austerity measures because of the sharp fall in the price of oil, an exception to the cutbacks was expenditure for the eastern provinces. Irian Jaya in particular was treated as a priority, the only province where the Department of Public Works was still allocated funds to build roads and bridges. In order to promote PIR-type ventures, the government took steps in December 1987 to make foreign investment more attractive, not only by offering more tax holidays and other facilities but also by allowing foreign investors to own land, which had previously been impossible.

So far, there are no signs that foreign capital is interested in investing in West Papua. Maybe, they are still waiting for better road communications or for an improvement in the security situation. In any case, investment in plantations depends on long-term assessments of market possibilities, which are not particularly bright at present. The only foreign plantation company operating in West Papua is P.T. Coklat Ransiki, near Manokwari, whose major share-holder is the Commonwealth Development Corporation. The land being used by the company was designated for the purpose by the Dutch many years ago. After initial difficulties, the project now appears to be expanding; production rose from 92 tons of dried cocoa beans in 1985 to 318 tons in 1986. But, as these figures suggest, even after years of trying, the CDC's project is still at the developmental stage.

As with many other sectors, investment in the plantation economy has now become a focus for the Suharto Family, with the President urging his sons and daughters, and close business associates to put their money into agribusiness. Whether or not the plantation sector in West Papua becomes viable, moves to set aside land for the purpose will mean yet more pressure on Papuan tribes to relinquish their land and increase West Papua's contribution to the economic well-being of the Suharto military regime.

Note:

For additional information please turn to Appendix III

Footnotes

1. Export and import figures were given in the first and second editions of *West Papua: The Obliteration of a People*, page 34. They are not repeated here as they are now too out-of-date.

2. *Newsweek*, 18 February 1974.
3. *Kompas*, 11 June 1988.
4. From research undertaken for the Anti-Slavery Society in 1988, quoting an article by Adicondro and Mambraser, 1984.
5. *Merdeka*, 23 June 1988.
6. TAPOL Bulletin, No 53, September 1982.
7. *Newsweek*, 18 February 1974.
8. *The Times of Papua New Guinea*, 22 May 1981.
9. *Prisma*, August 1982.
10. *Kompas*, 9 December 1987.
11. From the transcript of a KRO film shown on Dutch television in February 1982.
12. The pilot, Terry Doyle, was interviewed in 1984 by Robin Osborne. See Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War: The Guerrilla Struggle in Irian Jaya*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1985, page 120.
13. George Adicondro in *Prisma*, August 1982.
14. *Berita Oikoumene*, May 1981.
15. Denis Reinhardt in *Nation Review*, 15-21 September 1977.
16. *Tifa Irian*, 20 April 1978.
17. *ibid.*
18. *Berita Oikoumene*, April 1980.
19. *Tempo*, 13 September 1980.
20. *Tifa Irian*, June 1980 (no date).
21. TAPOL Bulletin, No 45, May 1981.
22. Charles Secrett, "The Environmental Impact of Transmigration", in *The Ecologist*, Volume 16, No. 2/3, 1986, page 78.
23. From research undertaken for the Anti-Slavery Society, 1988.
24. *ibid.*
25. *Jakarta Post*, 26 April 1988.
26. *Kompas*, 4, 6 and 7 October 1982.
27. From a statement by Kampanye Pelestarian Hutan Indonesia (known in English as the Movement of Indonesian NGOs against Foreign Destruction), dated October 1982, and made public during a National Parks Conference in Bali.
28. *Jakarta Post*, 16 June 1988.
29. From research undertaken for the Anti-Slavery Society, 1988.
30. Bill Rettob in *Tifa Irian*, 16 October 1982.
31. *Editor*, 2 July 1988, as reported in *Indonesia News Service* No 120, 25 July 1988.
32. *Financial Times*, 8 April 1987.
33. *Pedoman Rakyat*, 16 July 1987.
34. See Chapter Four, for more about state-run PIR projects in operation.

Chapter Four:

Squatters in Their Own Land

The New York Agreement was worded and implemented with such disregard for the original inhabitants of West Papua that they are now confronted with the dispossession of their homeland. The result has been nothing less than a death warrant for Melanesian culture west of the 141 meridian. To those who are major participants in the lucrative exercise of eliminating the legitimate landowners and occupants and who rationalise ethnocide in terms of the 'inevitable decline of primitive people' or of 'regional security', it has come as a surprise that the people of West Papua are providing formidable opposition.

The dispossession of land is systematic and involves the resettlement of illegally seized land by migrants from Indonesia. A policy of transmigration is being carried out which involves shifting large numbers of people from overcrowded areas such as Java, Madura and Bali to Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Irian Jaya. The transmigration programme originated in Dutch colonial times; it was resumed on a massive scale by the New Order regime in 1969. At first, it was said to be aimed at reducing population in Java, the most heavily populated region in the world. Later, other objectives were added, such as regional development and promoting the cash-crop economy. Transmigration, however, has always had a key political and strategic function. As Peter Hastings wrote several years ago:

The 'transmigrasi' policy . . . is aimed primarily at creating a cordon sanitaire where the Indonesian government is uncertain of local loyalties and wishes to dampen the activities of local dissidents like the OPM in Irian Jaya and Papua New Guinea sympathisers . . . Resettlement is accompanied by establishment of fairly substantial services such as roads, new villages, land clearance and crop cultivation. Future plans include driving a road the length of the PNG border through the Star Mountains to the Bensback River in the south.¹

Roch Basoeeki Mangoenprojo, a close observer of the transmigration programme, admitted recently that officially stated objectives such as reducing population density, promoting regional development and improving living standards have all proven untenable:

There is only one issue that is difficult to reject, that it is aimed at strengthening national defence and security. In view of the vast Indonesian territory that has to be safeguarded one is inclined to agree to this. It is assumed that with transmigration, vacant areas are populated and, with territorial development, the defence and security in the regions can be accounted for. [Original: English] ²

The trouble with this statement is that most land resettled by Javanese families is not vacant at all, but belongs to people who have occupied it and lived from its products for hundreds, if not thousands, of years. The fact that transmigration has become part of a longer-term political strategy in the homeland of the Papuans casts a more sinister shadow over the programme in West Papua than in other parts of the archipelago. Not only will Javanisation be a force acting to diminish OPM activity, partly because the Indonesian population will eventually become the majority in the territory; it will also create pressure on neighbouring Papua New Guinea. Indeed, in the longer term, Papuans as a percentage of the population of the whole island of New Guinea could well be reduced to a minority.

Spontaneous migration

Before examining the transmigration programme in greater detail, it is necessary to look at the equally damaging influx of migrants from the west who have moved into the urban districts of West Papua and have taken over large segments of business as well as many jobs in the administration. Taken together, these immigrants plus the transmigrants are currently thought to amount to between three and four hundred thousand people. In the early eighties, Professor Jim Griffin, Director of Extension Services at the University of Papua New Guinea, estimated that there were 300,000 non-Melanesians living in Irian Jaya and predicted that by 1990, they would out-number the Melanesians.³ According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, "Indonesians from outside" accounted for about a quarter of the population of West Papua in the mid-eighties.⁴ They include tens of thousands of civil servants and military personnel and their families. The administration has been run largely by non-Melanesians ever since the UN handed the territory over to Indonesia in 1963.

The vast majority of these urban-based migrants are Buginese, Butonese and Macassarese from South and Southeast Sulawesi who began to flood into the territory in the nineteen-sixties. Many are engaged in unskilled wage labour, trade, transport, market-gardening, fishing and logging. According to George Adicondro, they have been

coming in at a rate of three to four thousand a year since 1970. "I have come across Buginese and Javanese running shops even in the most remote places," said the wife of Brigadier-General Sugiyono, then deputy governor of Irian Jaya.⁵ Adicondro has graphically described their rags-to-riches transformation. They "arrive by ship, sleep rough in market-places, relieve themselves on river banks, then return home by air".⁶

Visitors to Jayapura all agree that the city has become "a fully-fledged Indonesian town. You rarely see a native Papuan in the streets".⁷ The overwhelming preponderance of non-Melanesians has marginalised the Papuans. A Dutch missionary told Dutch television journalist, Aad van den Heuvel, that "these people come here and make their own way. The majority of them are very dynamic people . . . so, eventually they manage to occupy certain positions which the local people . . . also want. Hence, opportunities for the indigenous population eventually disappear".⁸ According to Adicondro, the newcomers have had a very negative effect because of their unfair trading practices and their competitive advantages over the native Papuans in the exploitation of land and sea resources, and in the many land disputes.

To call the migrants 'dynamic' makes the Papuans sound inferior, a lesser breed. The problem is that the style of development and commercialisation places Papuans at a serious disadvantage. One recent visitor wrote that Papuans "are being forced to make a gigantic leap from their own indigenous culture and life-styles to twentieth century modernisation. It overwhelms them. They are not given the chance to adjust at their own speed. They cannot possibly compete with the newcomers who have for so much longer been accustomed to twentieth century culture, to the money economy, the profit motive, regular salaried employment, materialistic habits, speed in everything, bureaucracy and so on."⁹)

A Melanesian cultural wasteland

The original dwellers in the towns have become the fringe-dwellers on a foreign culture, and this second-class classification includes Papuans who hold governmental positions which are mostly of figurehead significance only. Whilst the migrants are the visible evidence of the change in cultural orientation that is occurring in West Papuan towns, it is the military who are the essential agent of change.

The towns are few in number but with a total urban population of some 200,000, they have become areas of marginal Papuan influence. In substance, the urban centres are the bastions of the colonial presence today just as they were in the days of the Dutch. The striking impression of West Papua as a Melanesian cultural wasteland was described at some length by a visitor from the US:

Cultural destruction takes many forms. For instance, the one TV station which operates in the evening hours features Jakarta-originated programming. Except

for foreign shows, all the programmes feature only casts, stories, announcers and reporters who are Indonesian. Only one programme every three or four weeks features Melanesian actors and actresses.

Of the array of 10 to 15 magazines that get respectively displayed by news-vendors on the sidewalks of Jayapura, none that I saw featured any Melanesian faces on their covers or carried articles specifically addressed to a Melanesian audience . . .

From the military recruitment posters to those for health and nutrition, and to those for the scout jamboree, from every government piece of propaganda, it is clear that Melanesians just do not exist.¹⁰

Propaganda posters are on display conveying the message that Papuans must learn to adopt the superior Indonesian way of life. Papuan ways, shown on the left-hand side, are shown as being crude, inefficient, wasteful and primitive; while on the right is the way forward - productive, harmonious, clean and efficient, with all the figures neatly-clothed and predominately Javanese. The posters are sponsored by the Project for the Guidance of Alien Societies, of the Directorate-General for Social Guidance (*Projekt Pembinaan Kemasyarakatan Suku-Suku Terasing*). Who, one may ask, are the aliens?

The official Indonesian view of West Papuans as primitive, barbaric and unproductive is evident from the way they were presented in the officially-approved schoolbooks that were in use throughout Indonesia in the early 1980s. Hardly any of the books even referred to Indonesia's most easterly 'province' and the term Papuan was altogether absent. It was only in the geography book, *Ilmu Bumi, Bagian II* (Geography, Part II) by M.D. Adiwikarta, a textbook for Class V of primary school, that Irian Jaya was dealt with at all, where it was lumped together with Maluku. There was no reference to Papuan forms of communications, methods of food production and life-styles. Indeed, as the following quotations show, the Papuan inhabitants of the country might just as well not exist:

Land communications in Irian Jaya are virtually non-existent. The navigable wide rivers are a great help for communications with the interior. Because of the appalling state of communications, many jungles and swamp areas are inaccessible to outsiders. All the more praiseworthy therefore are the feats of Indonesian and Japanese mountaineers, who have succeeded in scaling the Jayapura Peak!

The inhabitants of Maluku and Irian both come from the same ethnic stock: Irianese. This is evident from their physical similarities, tall, black, with curly hair.

...the countryside of Irian has not yet been cultivated because of the lack of people. Even their staple food, sago, just grows wild in the jungle. Jungle products and minerals (gold and petroleum) have not yet been exploited commercially, except in Sorong where oil drilling has now started.

The most advanced and prominent ethnic group are the Ambonese, many of whom earn their living as civil servants or members of the armed forces.

Civilisation is uneven. Some of the people are advanced (in Ternate and Ambon); some are a little advanced (in Halmahera, Seram, Aru and on the coasts of Irian). It is clear that the level of civilisation depends on the degree of intercourse with other, advanced ethnic groups or nations.

An ethnographer at the Horniman Museum in London has analysed photographs of Papuans used in a series of booklets published by P.T. Karya Nusantara dealing with topics like dance, costume and ceremonial weaponry of the diverse ethnic groups in Indonesia. He compares the treatment of the Papuans with early European attempts to depict natives in far-off places "in the contradictory roles of stupid or harmless savages on the one hand and bloodthirsty barbarians on the other".

Remarking on "the exceptional treatment of the Irian Jayans", he writes that, unlike the texts accompanying photos of other ethnic groups, "no ethnic groups are mentioned in the text that accompanies the photographs of Irian Jayans in the booklet on traditional dance. The text is equally vague about the kinds of dances that are popular in the province and this contrasts with the rather more precise coverage that the other provinces receive". He also believes that the photos of 'Irianese' show not original dress but factory-made clothes. The most curious photos of all are those of "an allegedly newly-married couple . . . The couple are wearing belted tunics and the woman also wears a skirt and the man a pair of breeches, all decorated with what appear to be factory-made braids and gringes. Especially interesting to note is that the same beads which the Irian Jayan man and woman wear can also be seen adorning the regional costumes of ladies elsewhere in the book from Central Kalimantan and East Timor."¹¹

Indonesia's third Five-Year Plan which ended in 1984 spoke of "promoting the social and economic life of the people in order to establish the solid foundation of social and economic development, so that within a relatively short period, Irian Jaya will arrive at a relatively similar level of development to the other regions of Indonesia".¹² Within the rhetoric, there is again the inference that the 'backward people' in Indonesia's most easterly region can only benefit from the presence of Jakarta's administrative power, when in reality, the original inhabitants are far from being included in any 'plans for development'. A large share of development revenues, about sixty per cent in the early 1970s and forty per cent a decade later - have gone into shipping and air services within the territory and with Indonesia. Regular liner services from Java and Sulawesi have reduced the dependence on high-cost imports in the towns whilst at the same time encouraging a rapid inflow of migrants.¹³

Education has taken a third of the development budget since the early 1980s but has contributed little to Papuan welfare. "At upper-secondary and tertiary levels in particular, a high proportion of positions have been filled by children born to immigrant families, and at the tertiary level, by applicants from higher-quality high schools in

Java and elsewhere."¹⁴ As for the administration,

key officers in central government departments and lower-level officials are still mainly recruited from outside the province (while) the major share of benefits from the larger government presence has gone to newcomers . . . the Bugis, Butonese and Macassarrese ethnic groups from Sulawesi which have dominated new employment opportunities in trade, transport and construction - and even in market gardening.¹⁵

Transmigration

The land allotted by the government to Javanese who settle on transmigration sites has been taken from the Papuans. In the words of Peter Hastings: "Transmigration schemes offer Javanese landless peasants a once-in-a-lifetime chance to own their own land even if, not to put too fine a point on it, it belongs to someone else, a fact which is discreetly ignored."¹⁶

The idea that West Papua consists of vast tracks of unclaimed land available for settlers is quite false.¹⁷ Because of the poor soil in much of West Papua, most tribal groups engage in extensive agriculture known as swidden or shifting agriculture, along with foraging and the cultivation of sago palms, often supplemented by the breeding of pigs. Only in the highlands, where the temperate climate has allowed richer soils to develop, is intensive agriculture possible and indeed well developed.

The relationship between Melanesian tribal people and their land is fundamental to the entire structure of their societies. The land is held in trust by the tribe and "belongs to the ancestors of the group and to the group's descendants whom the Asmat call 'our children who are still in the soil'".¹⁸ Although Indonesian law concerning land tenure recognises traditional land rights, this is only insofar as they are "not adversary to the interests of the nation and the State," to quote Law No 5, the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law. The elucidation to Article 2 of the Law goes so far as to say:

It is not possible for a community, basing itself on these traditional rights, to obstruct the granting of a land-use right in cases where that right is truly needed for the broader interests. Likewise, it is not permissible, for example, for a community, based on its traditional rights,

to refuse to allow forest land to be cleared on a large and organised scale for the implementation of large-scale projects undertaken in the framework of plans to increase the production of foodstuffs and to shift the inhabitants.

As one writer points out, from a legal standpoint, "the Basic Agrarian Law is a masterpiece of legislation in that it appears to protect and preserve the traditional *adat* (customary) system of land tenure while being couched in sufficiently vague terminology enabling the

government to do as it pleases."¹⁹

Under the Agrarian Law, rights to land are in any case only recognised if the land is proven to have a *hasil* or yield. Swidden cultivators thus have rights only to plots currently under cultivation and not to land under fallow, even though such land is crucial to the agricultural cycle.

Tribal peoples whose land has been selected for transmigration are required to "consult" with local government officials who come under the authority of the Department of the Interior, the most heavily-militarised sector of the bureaucracy outside the Defence Ministry and the armed forces. With the law stacked so heavily against them, the chances of them having the option of refusing to relinquish their land are virtually nil.

Nor can they even negotiate to get proper compensation. During a discussion in Biak with the Dutch Minister for Overseas Cooperation in April 1986, a team of senior Indonesian officials, including the transmigration minister and the governor of Irian Jaya, declared that

the surrender of land for the needs of transmigration is not accompanied by compensation (*ganti-rugi*) but only by granting *recognisi*, namely a certificate of recognition of right *Recognisi* can take various forms, even the form of something with no economic value such as a holding of a traditional ceremony, the presentation of agricultural implements, a church or a mosque or other social facilities.²⁰

An Australian Liberal Party delegation which visited West Papua in early 1986 was told by officials that the provision of roads and schools was considered to be adequate compensation; the Indonesian authorities had no intention of paying heed to the Melanesian notion of inalienable land.²¹ Indeed, the official view is that the transmigration programme is beneficial to the native inhabitants because it enables them "to learn from the Javanese".²²

Transmigration into West Papua began to occur in significant numbers during Indonesia's third Five-Year Plan (1979-84), rising from 290 families in 1979/80 and 2,521 families in 1980/81, and then to 5,755 families in 1983/84. In the next two years, more than 10,000 families arrived. By mid-1986, 27,726 families had moved in (families consist on average of five persons), bringing the total of transmigrants since the end of the 1970s to nearly 140,000.²³

At the start of the fourth Five-Year Plan (1984-1989), it was announced that West Papua and Kalimantan would become the main target areas because the older transmigration regions in South Sumatra and Sulawesi were said to be "full up". Of the national target of 750,000 families to be re-settled (the equivalent of about 3,750,000 people) during the five years, 137,000 were scheduled to move to West Papua. By the end of 1984, twenty-four major transmigration sites had been established in West Papua, alienating a total of 700,000 hectares of land

from the traditional owners.

Plans to accelerate transmigration on such a scale was a major factor prompting thousands of West Papuans to flee across the border into Papua New Guinea during 1984. In the area between Mindiptana and Tanah Merah, a region where some villages became completely deserted during the 1984 exodus, the refugees later told a foreign journalist that a land survey was carried out in 1984 in preparation for transmigration.²⁴ A Jakarta-based lecturer, himself a Papuan, later warned in an unusually outspoken interview, that "dissatisfaction among native inhabitants in Irian Jaya about the transmigration programme often manifests itself in their crossing the border in the hope of a better life in Papua New Guinea".²⁵

The economic crisis which engulfed Indonesia in 1985 resulted in sharp cutbacks in the funding of transmigration. Nevertheless, the overall re-settlement target of 750,000 families during the fourth Five-Year Plan has been realised, due to the inclusion of a higher percentage of self-funded transmigrants. Figures published in a Jayapura-based newspaper in 1987 show that in the three-year period from 1986 to 1989 98,500 families or about 490,000 people were due to move to West Papua:

**Resettlement of transmigrant families in West Papua
1986 - 1989**

Region	1986-1987	1987-1988	1988-1989
Sorong	2,500	4,000	4,000
Manokwari	1,500	none	1,000
Paniai	1,000	2,000	3,000
Yapen-Waropen	1,000	1,500	1,500
Jayapura	7,500	11,500	13,500
Merauke	6,000	8,500	7,500
Fak-Fak	6,000	7,000	8,000

Tifa Irian, 31 May 1987

If these figures are achieved in the last three years of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, the programme will be not far short of the original target of 137,000 families. But even if fewer families arrive, many sites have been made ready, meaning that the process of land alienation has continued. Thus for instance, an area of land large enough to accommodate 23,500 families was ready for occupation in the southern district of Timika in 1986 even though only a few hundred families had actually arrived.²⁶

In transmigration policy, developmental infrastructure is essential to cater for the incoming families. Possibly the most vivid description of the process and its impact on the original inhabitants was given in an article published anonymously in Papua New Guinea:

Each family receives a free air or sea passage, two hectares of cleared land (on average four times the amount farmed per family in Java), a new house and enough supplies of grain and fertiliser, food, cooking oil and kerosene until it starts to become independent . . .

The Genyem transmigration settlement in Nimboran, just south of Jayapura, is stunning in size. It is a transplanted slice of Central Java set in one of the most fertile areas of Irian Jaya. Endless rows of neat wooden houses are set in the middle of fields of rice sown among the giant logs of felled timber . . . Do the Melanesian people share in the economic benefits of these new realities? No. The Melanesian villages are settled in new locations away from their land . . .

The usual justification of transmigration given by government officials is that the new settlers will bring skills that will help to educate and advance Melanesians, and create prosperity for everyone. I saw no evidence that this was happening in Irian Jaya. The undoubted skills of the Javanese farmers are practised without the co-operative participation of the Melanesians.²⁷

Transmigration and translocation

A detailed report on the impact of transmigration in Merauke, the south-east border region, was given by an observer who visited the area in late 1982. Merauke, the home of the Marind people, which is four times the size of Holland, has a Papuan population of 180,000 and is scheduled to receive 400,000 Javanese settlers. One of the main transmigration areas lies in between and to the east and west of the Kumbe and Bian rivers, very close to the Papua New Guinea border. The first group of one hundred transmigrant families arrived in 1967 at a time when, under the terms of the 1962 New York Agreement, West Papua was not yet formally recognised as part of Indonesia. There were no further arrivals until 1980 when 450 families settled in a transmigration site called Rawasari. A year later, five hundred more families arrived and a similar number came in the following year.

To make way for the Javanese settlers, the original inhabitants have been dispossessed of their land and are required to 'translocate', that is to say, to move into the transmigration compounds. The scheme serves the security objective of dispersing the Papuans by dispersing them in alien communities. The government has even stipulated that, within the compounds, the Papuans should be thinly spread, one Papuan family to nine Javanese families. The Papuans are thus turned into 'translocals', ensuring that they become a minority in each locality, swamped by Javanese migrants.

The Marind people have always been conscious of the traditional boundaries of the land used by each clan in a tribe, with each one respecting the territorial rights of the others. But much of their land was expropriated when village chiefs were summoned by transmigration officials, offered gifts and told to finger-print the receipts. In so doing, they had signed away their land; the villagers were unaware that they were dealing with government officials. The tribal people later discovered that they had been cut off from their hunting grounds and sago

gardens.

On one side, they have the sea or river, on the other, the Javanese. In this way, Jakarta has forced the local people to become translocals, robbing them of, or separating them from, their natural means of production and sources of livelihood. Under the Dutch, the Marind people had been 'domesticated', their man-houses abolished, their customs and ceremonies forbidden, and they were forced into a position of dependence (on government facilities). Now Sawor, for instance, a village situated to the north of Kurik, has been turned into rows of houses for transmigrants and the local people have been left without government facilities. And Jakarta says to the people: "If you join a transmigration project, you will get the facilities you need." Already ten per cent of Sawor villagers have become translocals in Chandra Jaya, not physically forced, but pushed into doing so.²⁸

Within a year, many Sawor people had left the project. "They are semi-nomadic, not land cultivators. They can't stand life among the Javanese who regard the locals as inferior," wrote the same observer.

The Nimbokrang transmigration sites not far west of Jayapura are treated as show-pieces to impress foreign visitors because rice production has prospered and the transmigrants are doing very well. However, Indonesian parliamentarians who visited Nimbokrang spoke of the need for improvements because "local people complain that they have been driven out". Journalists accompanying the group quoted Paulus, head of the Benyum Tribe, whose land had been expropriated, as saying that not a cent of the compensation promised by the government had been paid.²⁹

When a development aid administrator from Port Moresby visited Jakarta in 1984, he paid a visit to the Department of Transmigration where he was shown a propaganda film entitled *Follow Our Steps*. Scenes in the film portraying Indonesian policy towards Melanesians in West Papua were "mostly awkward and sometimes downright appalling". One scene showed an Indonesian official asking a Melanesian farmer in the field whether he liked his new life:

The facial expression of the official speaking is one of a benevolent, at times, stern, father talking down to a rather backward, distant member of the family. The farmer answers all the questions in the affirmative and is then advised in the same patronising manner to tell all his relatives about his beautiful new life and to ask them to come to the settlement too . . .

Probably the most depressing scene (was) a group of Melanesians celebrating their achievements as farmers in the transmigration camp with a singsong. But already it isn't a traditional Melanesian singsong; part of the dresses are Javanese, some of the musical instruments used are Javanese, the rhythm and the melody of the song are Javanised . . . What is left traditionally Melanesian in the depicted event looked like colourful folklore laid on for the entertainment of the spectator. Folklore, to put it bluntly, is what is left over after a culture dies.³⁰

Developing a plantation economy

Following the pattern established by the Dutch, the Indonesian government has started investing capital in West Papua for the development of a plantation industry. During the Dutch colonial era, contract labour was recruited from Java to work on the estates. Today, the plantations recruit transmigrants from Java in preference to local labour. The plantations are what are known as *perkebunan inti rakyat* or PIR (nucleus and smallholder estate) projects, already described in Chapter Three. The surrounding plasma area is farmed out to 'participants' who become bound by credit to the company and dependent on it for the provision of agricultural inputs and the sale of their products. The estates have the effect of transforming the local economy from self-supporting food-production into a region that relies on a single crop which can only be sold on the world market.

Detailed investigations of two plantations managed by a state-owned company, the PTP-2, in Manokwari and in Arso, east of Jayapura, revealed manifold injustices inflicted on the local inhabitants. In both cases, the land had been seized without compensation, leaving the people without sufficient land to practice their traditional shifting cultivation, the only way to grow enough food in the area. The creation of these estates is completely at odds with traditional Melanesian land ownership, causing confusion and distress among West Papuans and sowing the seeds of conflict with the transmigrants.

Since PIR projects are deemed to be "in the national interest", villagers have no right to demand compensation for their land. In the village of Nimbai, Manokwari, an agreement on compensation was nevertheless reached with PTP-2, but the owners of the land received nothing. In the village of Aimasi, Manokwari, PTP-2 seized 550 hectares of land but paid compensation only for a graveyard. Community leaders asked for their houses and garden plots to remain on traditional land, but instead were forced to live on land held by the Transmigration Department. In Prafi, Manokwari, the village head agreed to lease out 400 hectares to the Transmigration Department but a different and larger area than agreed was taken. PTP-2 refused to respond to complaints and local people were rounded up when visitors came, to prevent them from speaking about their grievances.

At the plantation in Warmare and Subsai, Manokwari, local people were prevented from tending cocoa trees that had been purchased with funds from the UN Joint Development Fund. They received compensation of Rp.500 for a tree capable of producing a harvest worth Rp. 50,000. When about a fifth of the villagers refused to work on the plantation, security forces were brought in to compel the whole community to join. Yet participation depended on successfully completing a trial period, with no provision being made for people who were not accepted as participants even though their land had already been seized for the project.³¹

Cultural coercion

There have been many attempts to impose western, that is to say, Indonesian, customs on the people of West Papua, in some cases accompanied by brutality. Some of these attempts were abandoned in the face of strong opposition. A major objective is to force villagers to "dress properly". Behind the rhetoric lies a determination to force Papuans to submit to an alien culture and, by extension, to alien control.

The most systematic of these attempts was the so-called *koteka* operation, conducted in the early 1970s against the Dani people, inhabitants of the Baliem Valley. The valley was first 'discovered' in 1938 by an expedition from the American Museum of Natural History under Richard Archibold. His account of this fertile valley described the intricate system of irrigation channels using the river water that was fed by the watershed of the snow-capped central cordillera. In 1972, another US visitor came to the valley, a Quaker photo-journalist, Wyn Sargent who stayed for three months and built a close relationship with villagers just north of Wamena, the district capital. In that brief period, she collected shocking evidence of brutalities inflicted on the people. She was eventually hounded out of the country after sensational and exaggerated reports of her 'marriage' to a Dani chief were splashed all over the Indonesian press.

Sargent was in West Papua just a year after the *koteka* operation had been launched and was told by Brigadier-General Acul Zainul, the military commander, that they wanted "to put clothes on the Dani and teach them to speak the Indonesian language"³². *Koteka* is the Indonesian word for 'tail', the word the army chose to ridicule the *holim* or penis sheath worn by all Dani males. The *holim* is the only item of apparel used by men, plus an assortment of decorative ornaments. In addition, the men cover their bodies with pig-fat to guard against the rigours of climate and environment. On occasion they even cross the high mountainous southern wall of their semi-alpine valley, running fast to keep themselves warm.

Racist contempt for the Dani manifested itself in the futile and damaging attempt to clothe the people and compel them to accept Indonesian ways.

The military were harsh in their attitude toward the Dani. They meant to change the way the Dani looked, as well as their habits. The military bound up their hands and cut off their hair. They dumped them into the river and forced them to wash off the grease they'd spent hours applying. Then they put pants on them. It hurt the Danis' feelings . . .

The police fought the Dani too. And they made fun of them. They criticised their behaviour, their morals, and the way they looked. They presented a picture of them as dirty, ignorant savages who would kill you if you didn't kill them first. Much of this was motivated by the fact that the government knew the Dani didn't want them there in the first place. When the Dani resisted the government's efforts to 'civilise' them, they were simply shot down and killed.³³

The offensively-named operation was even referred to as a 'humanitarian' project to introduce material benefits and new agricultural methods, as a way of establishing a link between abandoning traditional customs and entering the modern world.³⁴ The benefits were to consist of information, agricultural extension, land, fisheries, housing, home industries, and health and social welfare. With the military in charge, however, things worked out differently. In the first year, twenty-five fishponds (completing a Dutch project), a council house and a three-room school building were constructed. Religious centres and polyclinics followed, but the Dani were not interested in adopting the Muslim faith, nor could they pay for medical treatment because army officers control cash flows. Kits for primary-school children included clothing, writing materials, a photo of the Indonesian president and the Indonesian flag, the very things that mock Dani culture.

But this was trivial by comparison with the corruption and oppression that followed in the wake of the operation. A Papua New Guinea newspaper reported how the trouble started:

The people have now charged that goods, welfare supplies and agricultural equipment sent by the central government as part of the aid programme, have been taken away by the army and sold in the markets of Jayapura. They say the money went to families of army staff. Some of the smaller goods were allegedly used by the soldiers in exchange for food from villagers, and the report states that officers and soldiers forcibly removed villagers' property and goods, stole, looted and raped.

The welcome which the Baliem people gave to the scheme on its introduction has turned to violent antagonism and they have refused to cooperate with the *koteka* project in any way. Army authorities moved in and arrested the two main chiefs of the Ukomheri and Ikimaben tribes who had ordered their people to stop helping the government. The two leaders were taken to Jayapura and kept under military custody at Kodim 1701 detention centre. On 10 March 1973, one of them, the chief of Ikimaben, died. Reaction to his death has come in the revolt of the Baliem people . . .³⁵

At the height of this operation, Sargent witnessed the force and brutality of Indonesian rule. Shocked by what she saw, she tried on many occasions to protest or deliver petitions from the Dani people. The impositions they suffered included forcible abduction of children to attend Indonesian schools, putting school-children to work to build schools and erect fences, compelling Danis to build bridges they would never use and to construct prisons, cut down trees and transport the timber to Wamena. In addition, the tribes-people were beaten and the women raped.

Social and economic decline

The upheavals forced on the population of West Papua, as Indonesian-style development has encroached on their land and disrupted their

life-styles, have gravely threatened health standards. The influx of Indonesian administrators, soldiers, urban migrants and transmigrants have exposed the native inhabitants to new diseases against which they have no resistance. They have been subjected to pressure to change their eating habits without the provision of adequate medical attention to protect them from the disruption caused by alien life-styles developing in their midst. They have, moreover, been the victims of a deadly infection known as cysticercosis caused by pig tapeworm, following the introduction of parasitic infected pigs from Bali in 1971.

A searing indictment of the harmful effect of Indonesian intrusions on West Papuan life-styles came from an Indonesian doctor, speaking from twenty years experience in the interior. He complained of a high incidence of disease, precisely where contact with outsiders is greatest, along the coast. Traditional Papuan eating habits protect people against disease, he said, because they make good use of animal proteins from snakes, worms, lizards and small rats, all rich in calories.

... (I)t is only after children start going to school that you find vitamin deficiency because they learn not to want to eat the things they have eaten in the interior ... The people in the interior make excellent use of all kinds of foodstuffs without discrimination: they eat anything edible. It is only when people from the towns come and tell them not to eat this, that or the other - snakes, for instance, because it is *haram* - that the trouble begins.

Commenting on Indonesian pressures on villagers to wear clothes, the doctor said such matters should be left to the people themselves.

Sometimes they are forced to wear clothes to go into town to report to the office of the local sub-district officer. Because they don't have enough clothes of their own, they have to borrow from their friends. This spreads disease because the clothes are not clean and they have probably been worn by many other people.³⁶

A television crew from the Dutch TV company, KRO, was given a rare opportunity to make a film in late 1981 which included an interview with a Dutch doctor working in Wamena. He was the only doctor at Wamena Hospital, with twenty-four beds serving 60,000 inhabitants. The doctor described the health situation as "alarming": cholera in Asmat, whooping cough and venereal diseases in the Baliem Valley, and yaws and measles are all on the increase. He also spoke of small and large scale epidemics, causing many deaths including an appalling epidemic of sexually-transmitted diseases in Wamena which had seriously affected the fertility of the Dani people.

A Dutch missionary working in a mountain region told the visiting journalists that "ninety per cent of people here have goitre, infant mortality is more than sixty per cent, the average life expectancy is 30 or 31 years. Yes, and then there is yaws which has caused many deaths,

and respiratory diseases, and that sort of thing."

Pig tapeworm: a weapon of biological warfare

Since the 1970s, there have been numerous references to the prevalence of cysticercosis among the highland Ekari people who live in Paniai, in the Wissel Lakes area. This pathological infection "has been running rampant for over fifteen years in West Papua", according to a recent study. The disease originates from pig tapeworm (*taenia solium*). Although pigs have been an integral part of Melanesian life for thousands of years, cysticercosis has only occurred since the early 1970s, following the introduction of pigs from Bali which were given as a 'peace offering' from President Suharto after his troops had brutally suppressed an uprising in the Paniai region, just prior to the Act of 'Free' Choice in 1969 (see Chapter Two).

When cysts caused by the tapeworm lodge in the brain, they cause cerebral cysticercosis, triggering many pathological conditions, including psychosis and epilepsy. On numerous occasions, doctors have drawn attention to the unusually high number of severe burns among tribal people in the highlands, resulting from falls into fires during epileptic convulsions.

The disease is the subject of a paper by David C. Hyndman, an anthropologist at the University of Queensland, who undertook "a detective search through often obscure medical literature to bring out the story of how the Indonesian military purposefully introduced parasitic infected pigs from Bali to the Me (Ekari) people of the Paniai Lake highlands".³⁷ The Me or Ekari people number around 65,000 people who inhabit the most westerly of two densely-populated highland basins in West Papua, the other being the Baliem Valley.

By 1978, serological tests had confirmed that at least twenty-five per cent of adults and children among the Ekari were infected with cysticercosis. But since these tests rely on faecal specimens which only partially reveal the extent of the disease, Hyndman believes that the majority of the Ekari people are infected. Hyndman also discussed evidence from the work of researchers indicating that by the late 1970s, the disease had spread to the Western Dani people living in the Baliem Valley, and even farther east to Ok Sibil near the border with Papua New Guinea.

Three Indonesian physicians were among the earliest to identify the disease. When they first wrote about it in an obscure journal, the *Bulletin of Health Studies in Indonesia*, in 1976, they declared that transmission of the disease to the Me people was restricted to a single importation of one batch of infected pigs from Bali in 1971, but they changed their account in a report published two years later in a more prestigious, internationally-circulated journal, *Tropical and Geographical Medicine*, where they restricted themselves to saying that "the cause of the increasing number of taeniasis solium and cysticercosis in the area could not be established".³⁸

One researcher, Gajdusek, reports that it was the Me "who first noted the appearance in the pig flesh of strange cysts which they had never seen before . . . They themselves had associated this infection with the introduction of new pigs, a gift from the Indonesian government in Java, since they had first seen the cysts in the flesh of new pigs and such cysts had appeared later in their own pigs".³⁹ Another researcher, Desowitz was more explicit about the source when he wrote that

the Me were uncertain, to say the least, about the change in regime, and during the plebiscite (i.e. the Act of 'Free' Choice), or shortly thereafter, the Indonesians sent troops into Enarotoli. Some of the soldiers came from Bali. Indonesia's President Suharto softened the military action by sending a gift of pigs. The pigs too came from Bali, the area in which pig rearing is largely concentrated, since Bali is Hindu and the rest of Indonesia is mostly Muslim. Whatever the political and social advantages of the gift, the medical result was a tragedy.⁴⁰

Drawing conclusions from the medical evidence, Hyndman does not mince his words. "The conspiracy of official Indonesian silence surrounding the fact that they transferred the pigs from Bali is guilt by lack of admission or acceptance of responsibility for their actions . . . From the ferocity with which Indonesia pursues its Fourth World war in West Papua, there is little room for doubt that they are capable of using cysticercosis to their military advantage."⁴¹

The evidence against Indonesia is compounded by the fact that the health authorities in Jakarta have been unwilling to provide vitally necessary drugs. The Jakarta weekly, *Tempo* reported in 1983 that, when a Catholic priest, alarmed at the mounting occurrence of cysticercosis-related accidents, made attempts to obtain a drug believed to be the only cure, he discovered that the drug was not included on the list of medicines allowed for import into Indonesia. The Director-General for Public Health at the Department of Health told him there was nothing the health authorities could do to fight the disease "except advise people to change their habits and way of life . . . In terms of national priorities, tapeworm comes much lower down than other diseases like malaria, tuberculosis and so on".⁴²

Note:

For additional data regarding population growth, please turn to Appendix III

Footnotes

1. Peter Hastings, " 'Javanisation' of borders as defence tactic" in *Sydney Morning Herald*, 13 March 1982.
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3. *Post Courier*, 18 October 1982.
4. Chris Manning in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 30 April 1987.
5. *Berita Buana*, April 1986 (date of clipping unclear).
6. *Kabar dari Kampung*, No 20, Year IV, April 1986.

7. Aad van den Heuvel, in a television documentary shown by KRO, Hilversum, February 1982.
8. *ibid.*
9. Private communication.
10. Henk de Suvero in *Times of Papua New Guinea*, 22 and 29 May 1981.
11. Mike Hitchcock, "Images of an Ethnic Minority in Indonesia", in *Anthropology Today*, Volume I, No. 1, February 1985. Mike Hitchcock is Assistant Keeper of Ethnography at the Horniman Museum, London.
12. *Pacific Islands Yearbook 1981*, page 212.
13. Chris Manning in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 30 April 1987.
14. *ibid.*
15. *ibid.*
16. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 13 March 1982.
17. Marcus Colchester in "The Struggle for Land: Tribal Peoples in the Face of the Transmigration Programme" in *The Ecologist*, Volume 16, No 2/3, 1986.
18. *ibid.*
19. Joseph Weinstock, *Land Tenure Practices of the Swidden Culture of Borneo*, M.S. Thesis, Cornell University, quoted in Marcus Colchester, see note 17.
20. *Laporan pembicaraan tentang hak-hak tanah bertalian dengan transmigrasi*, (Report of discussions about land rights in relation to transmigration) on 5 April 1985. Mimeograph.
21. Private communication to TAPOL.
22. Marcus Colchester, see note 17.
23. World Bank, *Indonesia. Transmigration Sector Review*, October 1986, page 9 and page 11.
24. Hamish McDonald in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 March 1986.
25. John Djopari in *Sinar Harapan*, 25 May 1986.
26. *Pedoman Rakyat*, 9 April 1986.
27. *Times of Papua New Guinea*, 15 May 1981.
28. Report from a photographer-journalist who visited Merauke in 1982.
29. *Kompas*, 18 October 1985.
30. Alexander Papenberg, "The official view of transmigration", in *Times of Papua New Guinea*, 5 July 1984.
31. *Kabar dari Kampung*, Jayapura, No. 3/4, 1985.
32. Wyn Sargent, *People of the Valley*, Victor Gollantz, London, 1976, page 12.
33. *ibid.*, page 198.
34. *Post Courier*, 3 September 1973.
35. *ibid.*
36. Interview of Dr Suriadi Gunawan, published in *Higina*, in the early part of 1984. See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 63, May 1984 for translated extracts from the interview.
37. David C. Hyndman, "Transcultural Tapeworm Trafficking: The Indonesian Introduction of Biological Warfare into West Papua", in *Fourth World Journal*, Volume I, No 6, 1986. This quotation is from page 1 of the mimeographed copy of the article, given to TAPOL by the author.

38. See Gunawan, Subianto and Tumada in *Bulletin of Health Studies in Indonesia*, 1976, and Subianto, Tumada and Margono in *Tropical and Geographical Medicine*, 1978, page 278, quoted in Hyndman, "Transcultural Tapeworm Trafficking", page 7-8.

39. From Gadjusek, 1977, page 84, quoted in Hyndman, "Transcultural Tapeworm Trafficking", page 8.

40. From Desowitz, 1981, page 41, quoted in Hyndman, "Transcultural Tapeworm Trafficking", page 10.

41. Hyndman, "Transcultural Tapeworm Trafficking", page 11.

42. *Tempo*, 6 August 1983.

36. David Hyndman, "Transcultural Tapeworm Trafficking: The Indonesian Introduction of Biological Warfare into West Papua", 1986, mimeograph copy, page 2. This article later appeared in *Fourth World Journal*, Volume 1, No. 6, 1986.

37. *ibid*, page 3. 38.

Chapter Five:

Resistance

From the moment of West Papua's incorporation into Indonesia, Papuan opposition had no legal redress. Demands for a democratically conducted plebiscite were crushed and human rights violations became widespread. Attempts in urban areas to engage in political activity proved risky and costly in terms of personal freedom. In such circumstances, many forms of resistance developed, ranging from petty sabotage within the colonial administration to armed resistance and guerrilla warfare in the countryside.

With the Indonesian administration assuming, over the years, the characteristics of a colonial force of occupation, West Papuan resistance has developed distinct anti-colonial features. Resistance, whether active or passive, whether inside or outside the colonial system, has become a common feature among West Papuans. The brutal, racist behaviour of Indonesian officials, civilian as well as military, has only reinforced anti-Indonesian feelings among the indigenous people, and the call for *Papua Merdeka* or Free Papua has reverberated with increasing strength.

Armed Resistance

The standard bearer of the armed resistance is the *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* or OPM (Free Papua Movement). Nowadays, identification with the OPM does not necessarily mean being involved in the armed struggle. On the contrary, such identification is more often than not synonymous with a feeling of defiance towards Indonesia and a yearning for independence. "We are all OPM. OPM is in the hearts and minds of every Papuan" is the common response when foreign visitors ask Papuans, "Where is the OPM?"

The first organised armed resistance broke out in July 1965 when a major uprising occurred in Bird's Head and the first units of the OPM

were set up. Later, the armed struggle spread to other areas, notably the Central Highlands, reaching a climax in 1969, the year of the Act of 'Free' Choice. As the armed struggle progressed during the early 1970s, two leaders came to the fore, Seth Rumkorem, now an exile in Greece, who left the bush in 1982, and Jacob Prai, now an exile in Sweden, who was captured during a visit to Papua New Guinea in 1978 while seeking medical treatment.

Since the departure of Rumkorem and Prai, many local leaders have emerged. Fisor Yarisetouw, Bas Mekawa, Bonny Aniya, Lawrence Doga, James Nyaro, Bernanrd Mawen, Mecky Salosa, M. Prawar and others, giving the impression that the movement lacks continuity. It shows, however, that the OPM has no difficulty producing new cadres and leaders as others retire or flee in search of sanctuary across the border. Some leaders, like Melkianus Awom in West Biak, have been continuously active since the very beginning. In December 1987, special units of the Udayana Military Command, based in Bali, were sent to capture him dead or alive, a few months after special troops had been despatched to capture Xanana Gusmao, the leader of the armed resistance in East Timor.

The two best-known OPM leaders, Prai and Rumkorem, fought together for many years, but in 1977 a rift occurred, creating two factions. Eight years later, on 11 July 1985, the rift was healed when the two men met in Vanuatu and signed a unity declaration, under strong pressure from the movement inside the country and abroad. The declaration, which became known as the Vila Declaration¹, after Port Vila, the capital of Vanuatu, was preceded several months earlier by a unification accord signed inside West Papua by M. Prawar representing Markas Victoria, the Rumkorem headquarters, and Fisor Yarisetouw, for Markas Pemka, the Prai headquarters.

Seth Jafeth Rumkorem, a native of Biak, began his working life as a book-keeper for KLM airlines. Like many Biakis who were vehemently anti-Dutch, he welcomed the Indonesian takeover with enthusiasm. He joined the Indonesian army and was sent on a military course in Bandung, West Java. After graduating as a second-lieutenant, he was attached to the Central Java Diponegoro Division as an intelligence officer but soon started getting into trouble. His work in intelligence made him privy to abuses being committed by the army in his homeland. He was arrested briefly in late 1964 for trying to thwart a government-sponsored demonstration and remained under house arrest till November 1965. He later recalled how local people would come to tell his father about their ill-treatment. In March 1969 he was arrested again for criticising the fraudulent conduct of the Act of 'Free' Choice and remained in detention until after the Act. It was after he was posted to Jayapura in 1970 that he eventually confirmed the army's suspicions of his anti-Indonesian sentiments by deserting and going into the bush.² Thanks to his military training, Rumkorem soon occupied a position of leadership in the OPM.

On 1 July 1971, the OPM issued a proclamation announcing the

establishment of a Government of West Papua:

To all the Papuan people, from Numbay to Merauke, from Sorong to Baliem and from Biak to the island of Adi!

With God's help and blessing, we take this opportunity to announce to you all that, today, 1 July 1971, the land and people of Papua have been declared to be free and independent, *de facto* and *de jure*. May God be with us and let it be known to the world that the sincere wish of the Papuan people to be free and independent in their own country is hereby fulfilled.

The proclamation was signed by Seth Rumkorem, who was designated as President of the Government of West Papua.

Rumkorem remained in the bush until 1982 when, along with nine others, he left West Papua in a small boat, intending to sail to Vanuatu and from there, to publicise West Papua's struggle for independence. As they were nearing the Papua New Guinea island of Rabaul, they were apprehended by PNG patrols and forced to land. They were charged with illegal entry but a court found that they had no case to answer and they were all freed. However, their plans to go to Vanuatu had been thwarted. The PNG Government refused to allow Rumkorem to remain in the country and he, along with Luis Nussy and Fred Atamboe, was granted political asylum by the Greek Government.

Jacob Prai is a native of Ubrub, near the border with Papua New Guinea. He first became involved in political activities as a young student in December 1962 when he helped found the pro-independence Papuan Youth Movement, and later became its chairman. He went to Jakarta in 1965 with a group of students, returning to Jayapura days before the events of October 1965 that brought General Suharto to power. He continued his law studies at Cendrawasih University while keeping his links with the underground youth organisation. He was briefly arrested in April 1968 along with a close friend, Bob Kubia. Later, his underground activities intensified until he fell under suspicion and was arrested for a second time. This time, he managed to escape and fled into the bush to join Rumkorem.

While Rumkorem brought military expertise to the movement, Prai's special contribution was his close contacts with the underground movement. After the two men split up, they each had their own armed force. Rumkorem's wing was known as *Tentara Pembebasan Nasional* or TPN (National Liberation Army) whose headquarters, constantly on the move, is known as Markas Victoria. The Prai wing called their armed forces *Pasukan Pembebasan Nasional* or Papenal (National Liberation Forces) with headquarters called Pemka for *Pemulihan Keadilan* or Restoration of Justice.

The ideological foundation for the split between the two men has never been satisfactorily explained. Both are devout Christians and their political convictions are moderate. Coming from different parts of West Papua is likely to have played a role in the conflict, plus a contrast

in personalities and a sharp difference in their early political motivations. It is also likely that the bitter feud that raged among West Papuans in exile during the 1970s was partly to blame for the conflict back home. Robin Osborne who has written the most detailed history of the OPM has other explanations, including disputes between the two men over international links.³

The proclamation of independence became the catalyst for intensified guerrilla activity; armed skirmishes, local uprisings and consolidation of the OPM. Atrocities perpetrated by the Indonesian military also increased. In September 1973, the OPM announced that, over the previous decade, more than 30,000 men, women and children had been killed by Indonesian troops, while thousands more had fled from towns and villages, many of them to join the guerrillas in the bush.

The OPM has never published a detailed political programme, confining itself to making general statements about the anti-colonial nature of its struggle. However, in an interview with *TAPOL Bulletin*, Rumkorem spoke about the "village advancement programme" implemented in areas under OPM control, describing it as a precursor of OPM policy in post-colonial West Papua. The programme includes extensive literacy work, agricultural training, the formation of cooperatives and political education:

We are making the necessary preparations for the Papuan people to become involved later on in economic efforts. We do not pursue a policy of one hundred per cent free enterprise or one hundred per cent socialism . . . Instead we have chosen a mixed system. Take for example, timber logging. There is plenty of timber to be had. The government only needs to have agreements with countries interested in exploiting West Papuan timber, then local communities can work jointly with foreign companies.

Our revolution must, as far as possible, retain its Melanesian identity and many customs will serve as the basis for important social, political and economic institutions in the future. Our collective society places the emphasis on local, cooperative effort, and it is not divided between rich and poor. Hopefully we shall be able to avoid class conflicts which disturb so much of the world. Many countries searching for independence and modernisation have abandoned their identities . . . This is a vital issue to which we must give a great deal of thought, just how much and how quickly we can modernise our society.⁴

During the 1970s, there was a discernible intensification in the level of Indonesian pressure "to modernise the backward natives", which meant making an assault on many features of indigenous culture. People were removed from their traditional houses and villages, and placed in government-built compounds. They were told to adopt new agricultural techniques. The men were ordered to abandon their penis-sheaths and to wear trousers. The alienation of the population grew worse in the 1980s as Javanese transmigrants began to stream into West

Papua. All the best land in the towns and in the countryside passed into the hands of these aliens while the centres of commerce and business fell increasingly into the hands of newcomers from Sulawesi. As Robin Osborne says:

On balance, it would be hard to conclude that Irian Jaya has become anything but an internal colony; the population's resources are exploited without permission being sought or due compensation paid; their traditions derided; their land alienated in the 'national interest'; their political rights subsumed by the need for republic unity; their human rights abused in an organised manner.⁵

This only helped boost the popularity of the OPM, attracting Papuans who had previously worked for the Indonesian administration or studied at the state university in Jayapura. Many OPM guerrilla units today consist of Papuans who served in the Indonesian army, the military police, or within the civil administration.

The 1977 and 1978 uprisings and the military backlash

In May 1977, several factors converged to cause major uprisings in the border regions, in the Baliem Valley and in the Carstensz mountain range in the Central Highlands. Pressure was being exerted on Papuans to take part in the Indonesian general elections of that month. As it was, there was such wide reluctance to participate that the elections had to be postponed for several months, and in some places were abandoned altogether. Then there was growing dismay over Indonesia's drive to 'modernise' Papuans and stamp out their cultural and traditional customs. Problems associated with the Freeport copper-mine in Tembagapura, in particular the expropriation of land belonging to village communities, were also coming to a head.

The first signs of the uprising appeared in the Baliem Valley in April 1977 when OPM units attacked Indonesian military posts. Details of a series of armed encounters from April 1977 to April 1978 are contained in an internal Indonesian army document that was leaked to TAPOL; it is reproduced in full in Appendix I. According to that report, the first major encounter occurred on 13 April when "one of our patrols, on operation in the village of Pireme (direction of Makki) was attacked by a group of about two hundred people led by Boas Wawimbo . . . They demanded that the army should be prohibited from entering their region up to the time of the elections."

From then on, the document records numerous attacks on military and police posts, several occurring on the same day. For example, on 25 April: "Makki was taken by the GPL; airstrip damaged." Two more incidents occurred on the next day and on the morning of 27 April, an Indonesian post at Kombin "was attacked from two directions with a force of about three thousand people". The same afternoon, a police post in Wurik Lebur was attacked and the police post in Makki was

again attacked and surrounded, forcing the police to withdraw.

The document reports many more such attacks, incidents and counter-attacks following in quick succession up to the end of April and during May, June and July. Many of these incidents involved thousands of Papuans. Yet a year earlier, in February 1976, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, had declared that "there is no separatist movement in Irian Jaya".⁶ When asked about the disturbances in Jayawijaya in November 1977, Vice-Admiral Totok P.S., area commander for Maluku and Irian Jaya, was quoted in the Indonesian press as saying that "it was a small affair . . . tribal warfare exploited by a third party. This third party consists of a few GPL elements, only six or seven in number."⁷

For some idea of the number of victims that must have fallen as a result of strafing and bombing by Indonesian aircraft, the entry dated 29 July 1977 records that "192 people came down and surrendered to the army post in Kurulu sub-district. Many of them were slightly or severely wounded as a result of operations - mortar-fire and strafing by our troops". More than two months later, the report documents an attack launched by an estimated three thousand people. They were strafed by helicopters and a one-hour battle ensued, after which the enemy withdrew, leaving a number of casualties.

The Jakarta daily, *Kompas*, reported that, during the disturbances, there were "a very large number of victims. It is said that the Baliem River was so full of corpses that for a month and a half, many people could not bring themselves to eat fish."⁸

While this uprising was taking place in the Baliem Valley, a major attack was launched by OPM units against Freeport mining installations, in response to which the Indonesians used US-supplied OV-10 Broncos to strafe and bomb villagers. The use of Bronco counter-insurgency aircraft was also reported by the world press on a number of occasions a year later. A Papua New Guinea newspaper mentioned counter-insurgency operations by Indonesian military forces along the border in which the Indonesians "are using Strikemaster jets or Bronco counter-insurgency combat aircraft".⁹ The matter caused consternation in Port Moresby because Indonesian air force pilots were flying over and bombing village targets several kilometers inside the PNG border. A London newspaper reported that Indonesia had "stepped up bombing raids along the border, using American-built aircraft".¹⁰ A few days earlier, *The Times* had reported that "the Americans are understood to be concerned that their OV-10 counter-insurgency aircraft are being used to clean out a small nest of guerrillas."¹¹

At this time, Broncos were being widely used in East Timor to break the back of Fretilin resistance to the Indonesian occupation, forcing hundreds of thousands of villagers and mountain dwellers to come down to the coastal plains. Because far greater attention was paid internationally to the events in East Timor, a fuller picture of the destruction wrought there and the immense loss of life was eventually

made public. The destruction and loss of life in West Papua has been more successfully concealed from world attention.

According to Jacob Prai, the Indonesians began to use chemical weapons during the 1977 operations. He spoke in an interview of his experiences in May that year in the vicinity of the Mamberamo River:

I was inspecting kampungs which were to be made ready to receive evacuees from villages that had been attacked by the colonial army. Then, at about 9 in the morning, a plane and a helicopter flew past. I saw a yellow-coloured smoke or spray being emitted from the aircraft. A couple of days later, people started dying, children as well as adults. We quickly ordered the people still alive to abandon the area, and we burnt the kampung down.

We paid too little attention to this incident at the time and didn't collect specimens of water or plants. I received similar reports at the time from other places, and I feel convinced that Indonesia used chemical weapons against our country.¹²

The 1978 border operations which occurred more than a year after the Baliem Valley and Tembapapura uprisings followed a daring raid by the OPM in May that year to draw international attention to its demand for negotiations with the Indonesians. A unit of guerrillas ambushed a helicopter and kidnapped seven high-ranking officers and civilian officials aboard the aircraft. Among those kidnapped were Colonel Ismael, operations commander of the XVIIth Cendrawasih Division of Irian Jaya, and Lieutenant-Colonel Atang, chief of divisional intelligence, along with three other army colonels, Anang Suriono, Sudewo and Sutarno.¹³ The kidnap was followed by

bombing sorties by Indonesian counter-insurgency, US-supplied OV-10 Bronco aircraft, the burning of villages on both sides of the Irian Jaya-Papua New Guinea border, Irianese refugees fleeing to the sanctuary of PNG's West Sepik Province, and belatedly, expressions of Australian and US concern at Indonesia's tactics.¹⁴

The Indonesian officers were eventually released unharmed ("and well-fed", says Prai) in exchange for weapons and supplies. According to an Australian weekly, Indonesian military operations aimed at securing the release of the officers "led to the deaths of several hundred people and to at least another one thousand crossing the border into Papua New Guinea".¹⁵ A second kidnap took place in October 1978 when more junior officers were caught.

It was around this time that the Indonesian army, acutely aware of the damage that had been done to its image by its savaging of East Timor and the heightened tensions in its relations with PNG and Australia because of the border incidents earlier that year, launched a so-called conciliatory policy in West Papua officially proclaimed as "the smiling policy". General Jusuf who had become Minister of

Defence in March 1978 took the view that past campaigns, both in military affairs as well as in the field of culture, "would only lead to a confrontative attitude on the part of the local population". It was not necessary, he said, for Indonesian troops to pursue OPM rebels; they should confine themselves to reacting to acts of provocation. As many commentators pointed out at the time, the policy shift was a sign that the army had failed to quell the resistance in West Papua.

The search for a suitable strategy to cope with the specific circumstances in West Papua was spelt out in some detail by Major-General Meliala Sembiring who became military commander of the Irian Jaya XVIIth/Cendrawasih Division in June 1982. He described "the smiling policy implemented . . . before the middle of 1982" as "the first step in our efforts to detach the people from the influences of the GPK (the regime's term for the OPM is usually abbreviated as GPL) separatist idea . . . Territorial smiling reflects a territorial attitude guided by the eight duties of the armed forces." This was, he said, "the right approach" which involved "socio-anthropological, socio-religious and socio-psychological approaches". Sembiring also claimed, writing in 1984, that since he took over as military commander in mid-1982, 593 OPM fighters had surrendered or been captured, along with 5,886 supporters.¹⁶ Whether or not these figures are true, the claim discredits previous army claims, made in 1982, when Major-General Santoso stepped down as military commander, that the OPM was "a spent force".

It was during General Jusuf's term of office that a more conciliatory policy was also tried out in East Timor, culminating in the negotiations in March 1983 between Colonel Purwanto, the military commander, and Fretilin leader Gusmao Xanana. These policy shifts were doomed to failure in both countries however, as 'territorial smiling' was not acceptable as an alternative to independence. In any case, when Jusuf was replaced as Defence Minister and General Benny Murdani took over as armed forces commander-in-chief in March 1983, all attempts at appeasement were abandoned.

Armed resistance in the eighties

Since the early eighties, the struggle in West Papua has become even more grim and ferocious, and the death-toll of innocent indigenous Papuans has grown alarmingly. Every OPM operation has been countered by the use of aerial bombardments followed up with mopping-up operations by combat troops.

From 1979 to 1982, the military commander of Irian Jaya was Major-General C.I. Santoso, a para-commando, red-beret officer with experience in East Timor. During his term, several operations were launched. One was code-named *Operasi Sapu Bersih* or Operation Clean-Sweep. This appears to have been concentrated primarily in the border area, particularly in the northern sector, from Arso, west of Jayapura, to Waris, to the south-east. This area has since become the

location of several show-piece transmigration sites.

According to Papuans who later fled to Papua New Guinea, an estimated one thousand people were killed in operations to clear land that was later used to re-settle Javanese families.¹⁷ The other operations launched under Santoso were code-named *Operasi Galang I dan II* or Operation Reinforce I and II. Three years after leaving West Papua, Major-General Santoso became secretary-general of the Department of Transmigration, an appointment that can be seen as a natural progression from his military activities in West Papua.

While the Santoso-led operations pursued clear objectives of their own, they also were in retaliation for a series of OPM actions that occurred during 1981 and 1982. After a Dutch television team in West Papua in late 1981 filmed hundreds of OPM supporters shouting anti-Indonesian slogans in the Wissel Lake area, the area was heavily bombed. Estimates of the numbers killed varied from 2,500 to 13,000.

In October 1981, OPM forces launched an assault on Abepura Prison on the outskirts of Jayapura, in an attempt to free political prisoners. The attempt failed but later, the guerrillas unfurled the West Papuan flag on a hilltop overlooking Jayapura and sang their national anthem. In the same period, guerrillas attacked a logging camp near the Genyem transmigration site and captured no fewer than 58 hostages. It took many months before Indonesia could secure their release, but the incident drew international attention because one of the hostages was Malaysian, and also because some of the hostages were taken across the border to Papua New Guinea, causing renewed friction between Jakarta and Port Moresby. Many OPM suspects were murdered in retaliation and their heads were impaled as a warning. But a US professor who visited the area shortly after, said that he found anger and a vision of independence rather than despair.¹⁸

The abortive 1984 OPM attack on Jayapura

The events in Jayapura in February 1984 had devastating consequences for West Papuans, and caused many thousands of people to flee from their homes to seek sanctuary in Papua New Guinea. By all accounts, the OPM had been preparing to launch an attack on the capital for many months, intending to hit Sentani airport, the harbour, electricity plants, fuel dumps and army installations, and to release all Papuan political prisoners. For the first time, the two opposing OPM factions were working together again, with Otto Joweni of the Rumkorem faction, Jan Hembrin of the Prai faction and Joel Awom, a Papuan officer in the Mobile Brigade unit of the Indonesian army, in control.

As it turns out, Indonesian army intelligence had got wind of the plans well in advance. In an unpublished interview with TAPOL, Seth Rumkorem revealed that several events created serious complications for the attack. Firstly, a captured OPM activist was brutally tortured

under interrogation and disclosed information about the OPM network in Jayapura. In addition, military intelligence succeeded in infiltrating an OPM cell. Then rumours circulated that Arnold Ap, along with other political prisoners who had been arrested in late 1983, was going to the murdered, causing people to act hastily.

In the event, the attack lacked coordination. Some actions proceeded, such as the unfurling of the West Papuan flag in Jayapura on 13 February; the Papuan who took this action was shot dead. Other isolated actions took place but, in the words of Rumkorem, "the entire plan for February 1984 had been hasty and was a total failure".¹⁹ As a result, the identities of many Papuans linked to the OPM who were serving as soldiers in the army's Battalion 751, were disclosed, leaving them with no alternative but to desert; more than a hundred of them made their way across the border to Papua New Guinea.

Major Joel Awom later revealed that these soldiers broke into the arms depot of Battalion 751, capturing automatic rifles, submachine-guns and ammunition. A Papuan corporal also declared: "We, the Melanesians in the army, about a hundred of us, fled with shotguns, rifles and ammunition into the jungle."²⁰

The Indonesian army struck back with many reprisals. House-to-house searches were conducted, spreading fear among the population. Many Papuans in Jayapura, fearful of reprisals and harsh treatment from the Indonesians, left everything and headed for Papua New Guinea. By the first week of March, three hundred refugees had arrived in Vanimo, the capital of West Sepik, the north border province, while two thousand more were waiting to come across. During the following weeks, the number of Papuans crossing the border grew to at least ten thousand.

The abortive Jayapura revolt was a major setback for the OPM, an assessment that is shared by all OPM leaders inside and outside the country. The Jayapura region had been one of its major strongholds, both for guerrilla activity and underground networks inside the city. According to Robin Orborne, PNG intelligence at the time estimated that there were a thousand OPM guerrillas operating in the Jayapura district alone.²¹ OPM operations immediately following the debacle appeared to consist of isolated events, directed towards army units or patrol posts. The failure of the Jayapura plan seemed to confirm the view that the OPM was not able to mount a nationally-co-ordinated strategy. This is not so much a sign of weakness as a recognition of the huge size of the territory in which it operates, favouring local, decentralised actions. Indeed, Indonesia is probably also forced to accept that its strategy is bound to be based primarily on local factors.

As refugees were pouring across the border, raising international alarms for the first time in years about the situation inside West Papua, a new incident occurred with international repercussions. A group of OPM guerrillas ambushed a small Cessna aircraft in Yuruf, a post near the border, in March 1984. International moves were needed to secure

the release of the Swiss pilot, who spent twelve days in the bush with the guerrilla leader, James Nyaro. The two Indonesian passengers aboard the plane were less fortunate. They were both killed on the spot, and pictures were later published in Papua New Guinea and other countries, showing their bodies pierced with arrows and spears, and surrounded by triumphant OPM guerrillas.

The OPM's revival

The first spectacular assault made by the OPM following the Jayapura fiasco occurred in January 1986 when a large band of guerrillas, estimated to number about nine hundred, took control of Waris, an important border post not far from the capital. Waris had been a major military post since Dutch times. The OPM managed to hold on to the post for two weeks; the West Papuan flag was unfurled and bridges and roads into the area were destroyed, preventing Indonesian troops from entering the region to recapture the post.²² Bulldozers being used to build the Trans-Irian Highway were also blown up. Most of the guerrillas who took part in the operation came from Wamena, in the highlands to the south-west. After gaining control of Waris, one group of guerrillas moved south to Ubrub while another moved north-west in the direction of Arso, an important transmigration region, leaving a third contingent to keep hold of Waris. The Indonesians, as always, vehemently denied that such an attack had been mounted, but PNG intelligence sources in Vanimo and Port Moresby confirmed that the raid had taken place.

In April 1986, petroleum industry circles announced that six Indonesians had been killed during several incidents near Sarmi, a town 150 kilometres west of Jayapura, from 10 to 20 March.²³ The Anglo-Dutch Shell Company had been conducting seismic studies in the region for several years. Three of the victims were Indonesian soldiers and the other three were officials of the Indonesian petroleum company, Pertamina. The OPM attacked the Shell installation in Podena twice, on 11 and 12 March, capturing fifty workers and six policemen on the first day and ten policemen on the second day. The Sarmi attacks forced Shell to bring a halt to all exploratory activities in the region, while seeking better security guarantees from the authorities in Jakarta.

At about the same time, OPM units made several attacks on police posts in the district of Jayapura. The two targets were a police post in Arso and, a few weeks later, a police post in Abepura, about 15 kilometres from the centre of Jayapura.

The civilian resistance

One thing that the events in Jayapura in February 1984 proved was that the OPM enjoyed widespread sympathy and support among the population in the very heartland of the colonial regime. Many Papuan

civilians who were working in the Indonesian administration or at the Cendrawasih University proved to be active OPM supporters. They felt they could no longer remain, for fear of retribution from the Indonesians. Once safely across the border and in Blackwater Camp, near Vanimo, many declared themselves to have been part of OPM's underground network in the capital. The Blackwater Camp turned into a centre of OPM activism, with people like Constantinopol Ruhukail, a official at the department of agriculture in Jayapura, and Tom Ireeuw, a lecturer in English at Cendrawasih University, emerging as skilled and experienced leaders. From statements and interviews that began to appear, the strong yearning for self-determination among West Papuans became evident and was well reported in the international press.

Greg Mongi, a Papua New Guinea activist who had long been involved in assisting West Papuan refugees, visited the camps soon after people started arriving in 1984, and later gave his impressions in an interview with TAPOL:

This is a new thing that I have come across because it seems that the feeling of solidarity among the West Papuans themselves has grown to such an extent that not only the educated people feel themselves to be involved in the struggle; it's everyone, men, women, children, old people, young people, from the coastal area right up to the highlands. They all want independence for West Papua.

It seems that there has been a lot of work among them to develop this new feeling. I don't blame them for that because they are Melanesians and they feel totally different. With transmigration affecting their very existence and future, they are feeling more united in their approach. There is a growing feeling of unity, a deep patriotism for West Papua, and I think they will not stop there but will carry on, because independence to them is a must. And they are willing to fight to the last man.

So, it's strong. In the past, the organisation was primarily in the hands of academics but now it has gone right down to the grassroots.²⁴

Probably, the new thing that struck Mongi had been there for years but the events of 1984 and the acts of terror that preceded them made people far more articulate.

Whereas refugees who had come across in 1981 consisted primarily of students, now many of those arriving in search of sanctuary were villagers. Since 1984, the call for independence for West Papua has come from a wide variety of Papuans.

Shortly after the February events in 1984, four Papuans who were studying in Jakarta entered the premises of the Dutch embassy in Jakarta and demanded political asylum. They said they had received death threats from Indonesia's secret police. The four men came under suspicion following the arrest in late 1983 of Arnold Ap, on whose behalf they made a formal protest to the Indonesian Parliament. Following an international outcry in support of their demand to leave Indonesia, the Dutch government decided to give them the necessary protection and arranged for their departure to Holland. One of the four, John Rumbiak,

later explained why West Papuans are under constant pressure to conceal their innermost feelings:

Let me be clear. The OPM has the support of the entire population of West Papua. This can be easily proven. If the UN were to conduct a proper referendum, the results would show quite clear what Papuan people want. The Indonesians have always known that the Papuans want independence. That is why, instead of using the democratic, one-man-one-vote system, they used '*musyawarah*' (consultation), according to which, Papuans, through their 'representatives', chose to stay with Indonesia. By using this system, it was easy for the Indonesians to exert pressure.

Ask any Papuan whether he or she is in favour of independence. Most of them will take a good look at you before answering. Nowadays, most Papuans are two-faced. For instance, Papuans in Jakarta demonstrated against our flight into the Dutch embassy. They had been under pressure from the Indonesians to protest against us, but in reality they were fully in agreement. It is just the same back home in West Papua; student and youth organisations, Muslims and Protestants, all support the OPM. These organisations were forced to make statements against our action, but later they wrote to us privately telling us how badly they had been treated by the Indonesians, to force them to sign statements against us. But they told us that they backed us in full.²⁵

Faced with such widespread hostility, the armed forces resort to all possible means, "plain murder, public executions, political leaders dying under suspicious circumstances, disappearances of Melanesian leaders without trace, violation of women (gang rapes), imprisonment, torture and armed coercion".²⁶ Just as in Indonesia's other colony, East Timor, this only escalates the conflict and creates yet more hatred for the Indonesian oppressors.

Thomas Agaky Wanda, a West Papuan refugee who reached Australian shores aboard a canoe in 1985, along with two friends, fleeing from Indonesian persecution, is a typical example of a non-combatant or civilian OPM activist who managed for more than ten years to operate within the Indonesian administration. He had a job at the Provincial Road Traffic and Transportation Inspectorate in Merauke from 1968 right up to the time he fled in 1984 to Papua New Guinea. He began to get involved in the underground in 1970. He was arrested several times though managed to retain his legality until mid-1984. He said that the underground functions in "loose networks", committing virtually nothing to paper. Obviously there is always the threat of infiltration but Agaky asserts that "it was never easy for 'straight-haired people' (meaning, Indonesians) to spy on us because we hardly ever mingled socially with them, anyway. So even though we occupied official positions, OPM work could and did continue without interruption."²⁷

Arnold Ap, the anthropologist who became curator of the museum attached to Cendrawasih University, was clearly very close to the OPM leadership for many years before his arrest in November 1983. He was well known and highly respected among anthropologists in Indonesia

and abroad, which explains why his arrest and subsequent murder in April 1984 aroused such an international outcry. The details of his fate are given elsewhere, but his experiences typify the two-faced attitude of the Indonesian authorities towards West Papuans whose services they employ. On the one hand, they need to have West Papuans working in the administration, in order to legitimise their claim to enjoy the support of the local inhabitants. However, they mistrust most if not all of them as potential OPM supporters, an attitude which is in itself proof of the strength of the civilian opposition in West Papua.

Footnotes

1. *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 71, September 1985.
2. See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 63, May 1983, and Robin Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War: The Guerrilla Struggle in Irian Jaya*, Sydney, 1985, page 51.
3. *ibid*, page 64.
4. The complete interview of Seth Rumkorem from which this quotation is taken appeared in *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 62 and 63, March and May 1984.
5. Robin Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War*, page 115-116.
6. Nonie Sharp, *The Rule of the Sword: The Story of West Irian*, Kibble Books, 1977, page 18.
7. *Kompas*, 28 November 1977.
8. *ibid*.
9. *Post Courier*, 6 July 1978.
10. *The Sunday Times*, 30 July, 1978.
11. *The Times*, 27 July 1978.
12. Interview with Jacob Prai, in *Kora-Kora*, May 1982.
13. *ibid*.
14. *Pacific Islands Monthly*, September 1978.
15. *National Times*, 16 December 1978.
16. From an article by Brigadier-General Meliala Sembiring, in *Kompas*, 19 October 1984.
17. Robin Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War*, 1985, page 87.
18. *ibid*, pages 88 - 93.
19. Unpublished interview with Seth Rumkorem, in Athens, August 1986.
20. *Post Courier*, 20 February 1984.
21. *The Age*, 15 March 1984.
22. *Nuigini News*, 15 January 1986.
23. *Nuigini News*, 42 April 1986, quoting an AFP report from Jakarta.
24. An interview of Greg Mongi was published in *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 66, November 1984. The quotation used here was in a section of the interview that was not published.
25. *Tribaal*, No. 22, September 1985.
26. Malcolm Gault-Williams, "Organisasi Papua Merdeka: The Free Papua Movement lives", in *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol. 19, No 4, October-December 1987.
27. *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 82, August 1987.

Chapter Six:

Human Rights Violations

Since the establishment of Indonesian rule in West Papua in May 1963, the people have experienced every conceivable violation of their human rights. As already shown in Chapter Two, even during the seven-month UN administration, Indonesian troops were committing abuses of many kinds.

The violations are often the work of territorial troops or special troops sent to a locality to terrorise the population. In many cases, they act under special powers vested in army commands to arrest and detain anyone in the interests of 'national security'. For Indonesia as a whole, these powers date back to October 1965 with the establishment of the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, known by its acronym, Kopkamtib. Kopkamtib was created in 1965 by Suharto, then a major-general, to annihilate the leftwing movement and subsequently to suppress all other forms of political opposition. In West Papua, the army used the special powers it already wielded in the days of Guided Democracy before 1965, directing them at all manifestations of West Papuan nationalism and demands for self-determination. West Papua experienced the full force of military rule two years earlier than elsewhere.

In the first few years, the new 'province' was administered by a *Sektor Khusus Irian Barat* or Special Sector for West Irian, which was staffed largely by military personnel. Special regulations were introduced, placing West Papua in political quarantine. Political parties were dissolved immediately after the UN administration left. The degree of military control in those early years is described by Garnaut and Manning:

The threat of insurgency and the necessity for strict control for the Act of Free Choice have justified a large military presence and tight security, including curfews and strict control of movement within Irian Jaya. The dominance of the

army has been encouraged by the expansion of military power elsewhere in Indonesia in the years following Irian Jaya's admission to the Republic.¹

Kopkamtib operates through the army's command structure. Military commanders at all levels - provincial, district, sub-district and village - have powers to arrest, detain, interrogate and, if they so wish, dispose of, people suspected as security threats. Kopkamtib acts on instructions from the Kopkamtib commander. From 1983 to 1988, the Kopkamtib commander was General Benny Murdani, concurrently commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Legal safeguards in the criminal code and the procedural code are waived in the case of security matters, placing Kopkamtib outside judicial control.

Mass killings

Many mass killings are known to have taken place since the mid 1960s. The victims are mostly villagers victimised in the army's campaign to stamp out armed resistance. Incapable of penetrating the jungle and discovering guerrilla hideouts, the troops resort to reprisals in order to isolate the guerrillas from local support. A *Le Monde* correspondent who visited West Papua in 1978 summed it up as follows:

Each strike by the rebels is immediately followed by reprisals. The area is prohibited (to access) and it is impossible to know the number of victims on both sides. Rumours circulate, impossible to check, that for each soldier killed, a hundred Papuans will be shot and villages will be bombed.²

Eliezer Bonay, who spent nearly two years in detention after his dismissal as Indonesia's first governor of West Papua, gave testimony on the killings during the Tribunal on Human Rights in West Papua held in Port Moresby in May 1981. In an interview with TAPOL in September that year, he estimated that 30,000 West Papuans were murdered in the six years up to the Act of 'Free' Choice in August 1969.

(These killings occurred) particularly from the time of the people's rebellion in Manokwari in 1965. They kidnapped people one by one. Anyone under suspicion in the regions was killed. Many villages were bombed during a number of rebellions in Manokwari and Enarotali and in many other places.³

Bonay was told by an acquaintance working at the Department of the Interior in Jakarta that about three thousand people were killed during army reprisals after the OPM attacked the Freeport mining installations in 1977. His description of how killings often take place explains why the death toll during operations against relatively small, scattered communities is sometimes very high:

I should explain that in many parts, the people are not under government control at all, because the troops cannot reach them. They can only bomb, or attack with rockets from the sea. So they just bomb whole regions where there are villages, wherever there are people. Indonesian troops rarely kill guerrillas, sometimes one or two. It's the people who get killed.

These are the tactics that were used with devastating results against East Timorese mountain dwellers during the Indonesian offensive against Fretilin from 1977 to 1979. An internal army report that was leaked to TAPOL (see Appendix I) refers repeatedly to the strafing of villagers during military operations in 1977 and 1978. The death toll from such operations has never been investigated.

One of the earliest detailed accounts of an Indonesian massacre in West Papua was published in the Dutch press in 1974:

We publish only those stories that our reporter noted down from the lips of people who were personally involved, who saw it happening or who immediately afterwards happened to speak to the survivors, and moreover, only the stories of witnesses whose reliability was vouched for by representatives of Catholic and Protestant missions.

The mass murders are said to have taken place on the west coast of the island of Biak in June 1970. What the immediate cause was is not clear. Members of the *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* are said to have fired on Indonesian soldiers in the jungle on the west coast and ten soldiers are said to have been killed. An Indonesian patrol of fifty red-beret and green-beret soldiers then went on a punitive expedition.

The kampungs of Wusdori and Kridori which are built on piles along the shore were visited by the patrol. The villagers knew the patrol was coming so they fled, not because that had been involved in any way with the OPM but because they were, as is usually the case, afraid of the soldiers. It often happens even to this day that soldiers misbehave, raping women, killing pigs and demanding food and drink without paying.

When the patrol reached the two kampungs, all the huts were deserted . . . The patrol moved on without destroying anything. The next day, the villagers went back home . . .

The rule is that, when a patrol visits a Papuan kampung, all the villagers must report to the village square. Anyone failing to do so is regarded as a member of the OPM and therefore an enemy. The fact that the villagers had all gone when the patrol arrived turned them into enemies.

After the villagers had been back for two days, the soldiers returned and encircled the kampungs. All the inhabitants were forced out into an open space between the two kampungs. The men, twenty-five from Wusdori and thirty from Kridori, were forced to dig a large hole . . . That hole became their grave. They were all shot dead while the women and children were forced to watch . . .

The day after the mass killings, the soldiers returned with about thirty Papuans, presumably from neighbouring kampungs. The Wusdori and Kridori villagers did not know who they were. The soldiers seized the boats of the villagers whom they had killed the day before and forced the thirty Papuans into

the boats. Stones had been tied round their necks and not far from the shore, the Papuans were thrown overboard and drowned.⁵

Biak was the scene of another massacre in 1979 when twelve men, women and children were shot down by an Indonesian patrol while out gathering sago in a sago patch beyond their village boundary. The patrol was out looking for OPM guerrillas and shot the villagers on sight. Later, the soldiers were told that the villagers had permits to gather sago. (The fact that villagers need permits to go and collect sago is itself a gross infringement of their freedom of movement.) The source of this information refused to identify the village beyond saying that it was located in the northern part of Biak, for fear of reprisals.

In July 1980, Indonesians troops fired on unarmed villagers in Abepura, on the outskirts of Jayapura. Five people were shot dead, three were wounded and fifteen were arrested. This was in reprisal for an incident in Sentani when West Papuan nationalists unfurled the West Papuan flag. According to the Papua New Guinea newspaper that reported the incident, the Indonesian soldiers in Sentani were asleep at the time. When they woke up and realised what had happened, they grabbed their weapons and left immediately for Abepura where the killings occurred.⁶

Operation Clean Sweep

In the latter half of 1981, the Irian Jaya military command, under its commander, Brigadier-General C.I. Santoso, launched a series of operations called *Operasi Sapu Bersih I dan II*, (Operation Clean Sweep I and II), one of the aims of which was to undermine support for the resistance by persecuting the families of people who were fighting in the bush. The wives of guerrillas were raped and assaulted, often with fatal results, and their parents were arrested. Villages suspected of supporting the OPM were sacked, the inhabitants were chased from their homes, their livestock killed and property looted. According to OPM sources, several brutal atrocities occurred from June to August 1981 in the villages of Ampas-Waris and Batte-Arso, in Jayapura district. Whole families were bayoneted to death and their bodies left to rot in the open.

Celsius Wapai, a West Papuan refugee in Papua New Guinea, told TAPOL in an interview, that he believed that 2,500 people were slaughtered during these operations. "The people massacred were inhabitants in the interior regions of Kelila, Ok Sibil, Waghete, Enarotoli and Kota Perak . . ." In 1981, Celsius was in detention at the intelligence unit of the regional military command in Jayapura. He described how twenty human heads were buried over several days from 15 to 21 September 1981. "I myself saw these heads of OPM members. One of them, as I recollect, was the head of someone who was blind in one eye."⁷

According to other West Papuan sources, there were a series of massacres in various parts of Jayapura district during Operation Clean

Sweep: five hundred people were killed in Sre-Sre kampung, 346 were killed in Lereh kampung, near Jayapura, and in Genyem, Abeputa, Wari and Sentani, all in the vicinity of the capital, Jayapura, a total of 155 people were killed.

One of the army's slogans during Operation Clean Sweep was: "*Biar tikus lari ke hutan, asal ayam piara dikandung*" which means: "Let the rats run into the jungle, so that the chickens can breed in the coop." This suggests that, in addition to intimidating families suspected of supporting the guerrillas, the operation was aimed at removing Papuans from areas that would then be resettled by transmigrants from Java. Lands that were so brutally "swept clean" by Santoso's troops were soon converted into lush transmigration areas, which are now show-pieces where foreign visitors are taken to admire the Department of Transmigration's biggest success story in Irian Jaya.

Possibly the worst single massacre in this period occurred in the Paniai basin in the Central Highlands, one of the most densely-populated regions in West Papua, when at least 2,500 villagers in the vicinity of the village of Madi were killed in late 1981, soon after a Dutch television team had filmed hundreds of people brandishing cassowary spears and shouting anti-Indonesian slogans. Other estimates put the death toll as high as thirteen thousand. The maker of the film, Aad van den Heuvel, said in his commentary, when the film was shown on Dutch television in February 1982, that the village of Madi had been "bombed to the ground" by the Indonesian air force. He said that he had concrete evidence that two other villages were also bombed at around the same time.⁸

The Central Highlands was the scene of more atrocities in 1985. According to West Papuan nationalist sources, 517 villagers were killed in a number of villages in June and July 1985, following a serious clash between the OPM and Indonesian troops during which more than thirty Indonesian soldiers were killed. Forty villagers died when three villages were surrounded and burnt down in Kamopa (Komopa?) sub-district on 4 June. Seventeen people were killed when four more villages in the same sub-district were attacked on 12 June. On 20 June, the army murdered 120 people in Mayubai village and a hundred people in Beoga village in Ilaga sub-district. 115 were killed in the villages of Iwandoga and Kugapa, sub-district Sinak, and a hundred in the village of Agadide, Kamopa (Komopa?) sub-district. On 2 July, ten people were killed in Epomani village, Obamo sub-district, and four days later, fifteen people were killed in Ikebo village, Bomamani sub-district.

A report from OPM's Markas Victoria, dated 26 July 1985, confirmed that Indonesian troops had carried out reprisals against many villages, following a series of OPM operations in April that year.¹⁰ From a non-OPM source, TAPOL also learnt at the time of an Indonesian army attack in May 1985, when two hundred village houses in the Enarotali region were burnt down, in reprisal for an OPM operation during which two Menadonese workers were killed.¹¹ The proximity of these areas and the closely related dates suggest that all these reports were

about the same series of events.

Arrest and detention

Armed with their special Kopkamtib powers, army personnel are free to arrest anyone at will. The army, the police and other sections of the armed forces have their own prisons, detention centres and interrogation centres, some of which are particularly notorious. In addition, military command posts known as *koramil* in the sub-district capitals and *kodim* in the district capitals, invariably have a few cells where prisoners are held for shorter or longer periods.

In a detailed investigation into arrest and detention in West Papua, Amnesty International said:

Arrest and detention of suspected political activists tend to follow a pattern, the most striking aspect of which is the prevalence of relatively short-term detention without charge or trial of people with a history of previous arrests.

When an incident occurs involving the OPM, such as the raising of the West Papuan flag or an armed clash with the Indonesian military, a wave of arrests usually follow, where anyone previously arrested on suspicion of OPM involvement reportedly becomes liable to arrest and relatively brief periods of detention.¹²

Amnesty identified no fewer than fourteen detention centres and prisons in and around Jayapura. They are: the Abeputa Prison for people awaiting trial or serving sentences, Ifargunung, a particularly notorious prison near Sentani airport used primarily by the army and the military police, the kodam (regional military command), korem (resort military command) and kodim (district military command) headquarters which all have cells for political detainees. Hamadi naval headquarters also with cells for political detainees, three police stations, Kores Dok VIII, Kosek Dok VIII, and Kodak Dok II, all with several large cells for prisoners, the Military Police (Pomdam) headquarters at Kloofkamp Bawah containing five rooms which can each hold 50-60 prisoners and the Military Police Corps station at Aryoko, an army officers' mess-house (Mess Pati) Dok V, with several cells in the rear for prisoners arrested by the regional Kopkamtib officer (Laksus), and two centres used by Kopassus, the elite para-commando unit. The two Kopassus centres are: Panorama, a former hotel used for detention and interrogation where there are three large rooms that can hold up to fifty prisoners and two special interrogation rooms; and Pos Borowai, near Lake Sentani, which is thought to consist of underground, water-logged cells.

Amnesty also reported that both short-term and long-term detainees are frequently moved around from one detention place to the other, to give the different branches of the military a chance to interrogate. This also frustrates efforts by relatives to keep track of the prisoner. In any case, most detaining agencies do not inform a prisoner's relatives of his

or her whereabouts.¹³

With the possible exception of the police, all these arresting and detaining agencies arrest people without warrant, acting on special Kopkamtib powers. Only a very small percentage of prisoners are ever formally charged and tried. There are no limits to the period a person may be held, when arrested under Kopkamtib powers. It appears to be the general practice for tried prisoners who have been given sentences of four years or more to be sent to East Java to serve their sentences in Kalisosok Prison in Surabaya or in Malang Prison. This makes it virtually impossible for families to visit the prisoners or even to keep them supplied with basic essentials, so necessary to make life in prison bearable.

Torture and maltreatment are widely practised against political prisoners. These include electric shock torture by applying a live wire to the prisoner's fingers, toes, tongue or genitals, beating, pistol-whipping, kicking and placing the prisoner's toes under the legs of a chair or table on which soldiers then sit or jump up and down. Another torture practice is to deprive prisoners of toilet facilities causing the malfunctioning of the bowel and bladder. Water torture is known to be used in Ifargunung and Pos Bowari. A description of this type of treatment was given in *Free West Papua*. Prisoners are put, naked, into 4 x 4 x 4 metre underground concrete bunkers and the water level is then raised. In some cases, a prisoner is left there for 72 hours, or the bunker is completely filled, giving the prisoner no chance of survival. One prisoner was known to have survived by floating between the water's surface and the ceiling, a gap of about one foot, and treading water for several hours. Some survivors of water torture later died of exposure, after their entire skin had lifted off "like a ripe banana skin".¹⁴

A detailed account of treatment in detention was given by Thomas Agaky Wanda from Merauke, who fled to Australia in 1985 and now has political asylum there. He was arrested in June 1981 by the special-tasks intelligence unit of Laksus. During three nights of interrogation in July, he was badly beaten up and kicked. After transfer to the regional military command in Jayapura, he was placed in a cell and not allowed to go to the toilet for several days. His food consisted of one packet of rice and a banana leaf.

On the third day, the rice tasted odd and gave me a splitting head-ache. I examine it and found some powder which I took to be poison. I noticed that each packet for me was given a special marker, a piece of onion skin, tied to the outer leaf. This happened for several days, so, for several days, I ate and drank nothing and could not wash or relieve myself.¹⁵

The fear of being poisoned is widespread among West Papuans. There have been many claims that persons under detention died after being poisoned by their captors. It has never been possible to substantiate such claims.

Amnesty International has published details of the treatment of a

group of eight West Papuans in the sub-district of Mindiptanah who were arrested in early 1987. All had been refugees in Papua New Guinea; Six returned home some time before their arrest, while the other two returned afterwards to contact one of the men's father to arrange his forthcoming marriage. Apparently, when the two more recent returnees visited their six friends, this aroused suspicions among the military and they were all arrested. On their first night in custody, the six friends were beaten with wooden sticks, stones and rubber batons until they were near collapse. The eight were then taken to Company C, a military unit stationed in Mindiptanah and again severely beaten. Further beatings took place after which their heads were partially shaved. During one beating session, one of the men bled profusely and was ordered to wipe the blood from the floor. Another, already weak from the beating, was ordered to climb a tree and recite the five articles of the State ideology, Pancasila.¹⁶

John Etheridge, the Bishop of Vanimo, who became closely involved in caring for West Papuan refugees in the Blackwater refugee camp near Vanimo, heard a great deal about methods of torture used in West Papua:

I've heard stories about people being put in 44-gallon drums of water and just left there for eight hours, and after that, taken out and put in the sun for eight hours. I've heard lots of stories about people being cut to pieces. I've seen photographs, at least two photographs, a photograph of a hole in the ground, full of water, and you can just see two heads - two or three heads - just above the water ... I saw a photograph of a Melanesian in a room of some sort. It looked like a morgue slab and he was naked. It was obvious that he was dead and it looked to me that strips of skin had been taken off his legs and his feet.

So, I believe, very, very strongly that there are human rights abuses going on in West Irian and I believe very, very strongly that there is racial genocide going on there. The Indonesians are trying to wipe out, completely annihilate, the culture of the Melanesian people there.¹⁷

Extra-judicial killings

Numerous people have been killed in custody or have died mysteriously shortly after being allowed to return home from detention. Mecky Salossa, a West Papuan refugee, testifying at the Tribunal on Human Rights in West Papua held in Port Moresby in 1981, gave a detailed account of the summary executions of several dozen people in Ayamaru, a township in the western part of Sorong and an important oil centre, in February and March 1967. According to Salossa, who was himself an oil-worker in Sorong:

Nine leaders were taken out of the military prison and shot dead in front of a crowd of people on 3 February 1967. This happened in Tinubuan. The military took the men from prison, then took them to the outskirts of the town and shot them there ... Other killings took place at the time in several areas of Sorong. In

all thirty-three people were shot dead like this by the Indonesians.

Eli and Adam Tambuaya were shot in Ayamaru in March 1967. I saw it myself and had to remove the bodies . . . They were both killed with the first shot but the soldiers went on firing at the bodies for about two hours, so when we picked them up, flesh and pieces were scattered all over the place. We had to gather the pieces all together to put them in a bag for burial.

Yorems was shot in Lasut village, also in March 1967. The soldiers came and asked him whether he was in the OPM. As they interrogated him, they held a bren-gun to his head. Then, someone fired the gun.¹⁸

The execution of two Papuans in 1976 is described in detail in an army document leaked to TAPOL several years later. The document is the verbatim record of the interrogation of a low-ranking, retired soldier named Soeyoto. It is not clear from the document whether Soeyoto was being interrogated in connection with charges against him or anyone else. Soeyoto said that two prisoners named Pilomen Wenda and Oscar were executed on the order of the chief of intelligence of Korem 172, the resort military command in Abepura. The two men had been arrested in 1969 for allegedly murdering two Indonesian soldiers but were later released. They were re-arrested and executed in 1976.

Soeyoto was the driver of the army vehicle used to transport the men to their place of execution. Asked how the men were killed, Soeyoto said:

They were beaten with iron bars . . . I didn't see who actually did it as I was waiting about a hundred metres away. I only heard the sound of the men being beaten.¹⁹

Another victim of Indonesia's extra-judicial murderers was Mimi Fatahan who fled to Papua New Guinea in April 1976, together with his family. On arrival, he was held by the Papua New Guinea authorities, tried for illegal entry and forcibly returned to West Papua. He then spent about a year in army detention by the resort military command in Jayapura. He was released in May 1977 and was given a job at the command. A few days later he was taken to the jungle, along with a hunting party of officers from the regional military command. The party returned three days later but without Fatahan. Persistent enquiries by his wife to trace him were fruitless and she was never told what happened to him. According to one informant, Fatahan's body was later discovered, chopped to pieces, by villagers living near Lake Sentani. His remains had been placed in a drum which was found floating on the lake.²⁰

The mysterious death of Baldus Mofu in 1979 was given widespread publicity overseas. Mofu was an elected member of the New Guinea Council set up by the Dutch in 1961. Other West Papuans elected to the Council left West Papua with the Dutch in 1962, but Mofu decided to remain. He was closely watched by the Indonesians and often arrested, beaten up and tortured whenever the OPM went into action or unrest

broke out in the towns. In July 1979, after allegedly making a speech to commemorate the proclamation of West Papua independence on 1 July 1971, he was again arrested. In October, he was released, but several weeks later, while his wife was out, two unknown men came to the house and took him away. Early next morning, he was returned home, his body covered with swellings and bruises. Within hours, he was dead. A photograph of his badly beaten head and shoulders was later published in a West Papuan publication in Holland.²¹ Five years later, Baldus Mofu's son Eduard was also killed while in army custody, along with the well-known anthropologist, Arnold Ap. (See below)

At the end of 1983 and in early 1984, several people in military custody were reportedly shot dead in and around Jayapura. The arrests were made by members of the elite para-commando corps then known as *Kopassandha* (now called *Kopassus*, *Korps Pasukan Khusus*, or Special Forces). The para-commandos had been flown in to West Papua to spearhead an operation called *Operasi Tumpas*, or Operation Clean-up, creating an atmosphere of tension and fear in the period before the upheavals of February 1984. On 22 September a villager named Mebri, from Bring village in Jayapura district, was arrested and beaten up by troops, along with several members of his family. The same afternoon, people from Bring and from the neighbouring villages of Yansen and Idjagrang were gathered together and forced to watch the head of the Mebri family being shot dead. They were ordered to leave his body unburied as a warning to anyone sympathising with the OPM.²²

Asser Demotekai, 60, who had just retired as an official of the Village Development Directorate of the provincial government was arrested by para-commandos in November. He was reportedly shot dead by his captors soon afterwards. Shortly before his own arrest, his son, Martinus Demotekai died under suspicious circumstances; some friends claimed that he had been poisoned by the security forces.

The extra-judicial murder of Arnold Ap, 38, curator of the Cendrawasih University Museum since 1978, and his colleague and co-prisoner Eduard Mofu, by para-commando, red-beret troops was widely condemned and much publicised in the international press, and led to a call by the Foundation of Legal Aid Institutes (YLBHI) in Jakarta for an independent inquiry. Arnold Ap was well-known in professional circles at home and abroad. He was also a popular musician and leader of *Mambesak*, a group of singers and instrumentalists which promoted and popularised West Papuan music and song.²³ He also ran a cultural programme on a local radio programme for several years.

When he was arrested in November 1983, there were many protests and calls for his immediate trial or release. The YLBHI, which had not previously taken up political cases in West Papua, took the unusual step of announcing that it would handle his case and issued a statement expressing concern about the circumstances of his arrest. The Jakarta newspaper, *Sinar Harapan*, was severely reprimanded and threatened

with closure for reporting the statement.

When it was learnt that Arnold Ap and Eduard Mofu had been killed "while trying to escape" in April 1984, the campaign of protest abroad intensified. Government claims about an escape attempt were received with incredulity. The suspicions were only reinforced by the contradictory and highly unlikely explanations given by Indonesian officials.

Eduard Mofu's body was found washed up on shore at Base G, near Jayapura, while Arnold Ap died soon after arriving at Aryoko Military Hospital in Jayapura on 26 April 1984, with severe bullet wounds and deep gashes. Some reports say he was already dead on arrival at the hospital. Arnold Ap's funeral in Jayapura on 29 April was attended by many hundreds of people.

Because Ap was so well-known and loved by Papuans and non-Papuans alike in Jayapura, several reports about the circumstances of his death were smuggled out. Later, colleagues of his who had fled from West Papua and were living at the refugee camp in Vanimo, Papua New Guinea, were able to collect more information about how he and Mofu were murdered. It soon became clear that they were murdered by a unit of para-commandos, after being tricked into leaving their place of detention, along with several other detainees, in the belief that they would be taken by boat to Papua New Guinea. TAPOL has since undertaken an investigation of all the available evidence; the results of this inquiry are reproduced as Appendix II.

In January 1987, Amnesty International published information about five persons believed to have been killed by the security forces in 1986. Among the victims were Martin Sani and Sarinah Zoani, a married couple whose hastily-buried bodies were discovered by students in Padang Bylan, near Jayapura on 25 September. They had apparently been killed during a search by the military, following an incident in which two soldiers were killed. Efforts by the family to discover the cause of death were thwarted by the army. Two other victims were reportedly arrested and shot dead in Pantai Timur, near Sarmi, when army troops were conducting operations in the area.

Amnesty pointed out that information about extra-judicial killings "is often scanty and difficult to verify, given the limited access to Irian Jaya by independent observers and the restrictions on press freedom in Indonesia more generally". A request for a full and impartial inquiry by the Indonesian government was ignored.²⁴

Trials

Virtually all political detainees held in West Papua are arrested on suspicion of being supporters of, or activists in, the OPM. In most cases, people are held for relatively short periods, the purpose being to intimidate the population and create an atmosphere of uncertainty. Cory Ap, the widow of the murdered anthropologist, Arnold Ap, told TAPOL that political trials were never reported in the press.

Of course, we know that some people are tried, but nothing is ever reported about the trials, about what the defendants said or what the verdict was . . .

What amazes me is that when people are arrested in West Papua on political charges, they never seem to remain in prison for long, to serve a long prison sentence. We never know of anyone serving long sentences, getting life imprisonment or the death sentence. If that happened, our people would know where they stand. But things don't happen like that. Someone is held for several months or perhaps a year, then after being released, they are kidnapped, or they disappear or are killed. The government does what it likes, never conforming with the laws.²⁵

Even in Java, where monitoring by the world press is slightly better and a small, dedicated group of lawyers tries hard to assist people brought to court on political charges, the courts are heavily loaded against the defendants. The chances of a fair trial are far worse in West Papua. Unlike many cities in Java, there is no independent legal aid institute in Jayapura. Hence, the abuse of safeguards included in the Criminal Procedural Code, by the police, the army, the public prosecutors and the judiciary, is even more blatant. Following a visit to Jayapura in late 1983, Mulya Lubis, then chairman of the Foundation of Legal Aid Institutes (YLBHI), declared that Irian Jaya was the worst region in Indonesia for human rights abuse. "The new Criminal Procedural Code might just as well not exist," he said, "for it has no reverberations in Irian Jaya."²⁶

The following information about trials is far from exhaustive. It is offered simply to give some idea of the kind of political trials that have been conducted in West Papua since the early seventies.

Convicted man disappears

In 1972, five men who had been in detention for some time were brought to trial in Jayapura on charges of engaging in pro-OPM activities. They were all found guilty and given sentences of two or two-and-a-half years. One of the accused, Daniel Kafiar, later fled the country and was given political asylum in Sweden. In an interview with TAPOL, he said they had never been told they were entitled to have defence lawyers and no lawyers were provided. The five accused men defended themselves as best they could.

Shortly after sentence was passed, they were transferred from their prison cells to the Abepura military prison. Then, one of the convicted men, Martin Luther Waring, was taken away by an army colonel; he was '*di-bon*' or 'on loan', a term used when one authority temporarily takes away someone in the custody of another authority. Waring was never heard of again. All efforts by Kafiar and his friends to trace the man's whereabouts proved futile.²⁷

The Serui Statement case

The Serui Statement was a document drawn up in December 1974, calling for the re-unification of all Papuan people from Samaria on the east coast of Papua New Guinea, to Sorong, in the far west of the island. It also demanded complete independence for West Papua. In February 1975, six signatories of the Serui Statement were arrested but they were not brought for trial until some time in 1977. By the time of the trial, which took place in Jayapura, one of the accused, Y. Ch. Merino, had died.

The men were charged under the 1963 Anti-Subversion Law and were found guilty of rebellion and of attempting to undermine the state. They were all sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. Eliezer Bonay, who appeared as a witness, said the Anti-Subversion Law was used because the defendants could not have been convicted under the Criminal Code.²⁸ Reporting on the trial, an Australian journalist wrote that it was originally to have been held in public. However,

it closed shortly after commencement when crowds noisily supported comments Anton Tewa (one of the accused) made. Tewa was asked by the judge to state what made him act rebelliously, to which he replied, holding up the strands of his black curly hair: "Something you wouldn't understand."²⁹

The March 1981 Petition trial

In March 1981, a petition signed by fifty people was presented to the governor of Irian Jaya. The petition consisted of three points:

- (1) A protest against the 1969 Act of 'Free' Choice and the failure to conduct it in accordance with the one-person one-vote principle, even though this principle was later used in the 1971 and 1977 elections in Irian Jaya.

- (2) A declaration of support for the struggle for West Papuan independence.

- (3) An appeal to the Indonesian government to grant independence to the people of West Papua.

The signatories described themselves as "members of the 1945 generation". This possibly meant that they saw themselves as continuing in the spirit of Indonesia's own "1945 generation" which fought for independence, or it may have meant that, back in 1945, they were on Indonesia's side.

On trial for flag-raising

Flag-raising is a widely-practised form of political defiance in West Papua. There is a deep-rooted belief among many Papuans that, by unfurling their flag and keeping it aloft continuously for 24 hours, forces will be unleashed that will be capable of driving out the foreign intruder. This is why so many of these incidents have occurred, at very great risk to the persons involved.

The most celebrated case occurred in August 1980 and involved six women, all of whom were arrested on the spot, as they stood round the flag-pole in the forecourt of the provincial governor's office, their West Papuan flag proudly unfurled for all to see. They were all brutally treated and raped during detention and held for a long period without trial. Several years after their arrest, they were reportedly tried, but no details were ever received about their sentences.

On 3 July 1982, nine students of Cendrawasih University lowered the flag in front of the provincial assembly building in Jayapura, raised the West Papuan flag in its place and read out a proclamation of the state of West Papua. They were immediately arrested. In this case, the trial followed relatively soon, only six months after the arrests. It was open to the public and crowded with spectators, and even received some international coverage. It appears that, unlike other political detainees, the students were held, not by the army, under Kopkamtib's special powers, but by the police. They were also permitted to have lawyers from the legal aid institute of Cendrawasih University. These unusual circumstances may have been due to the attention being given at the time to the enactment of Indonesia's new Criminal Procedural Code which came into effect at the end of 1981, providing far better safeguards for defendants. The Code specifically excludes cases handled under the Anti-Subversion Act, but it may be that the nine students were not charged under that Act.

According to Amnesty International, sources who attended the trial reported that the judges "may not have been impartial" and the lawyers did not have full access to their clients.³⁰ All the nine defendants were found guilty and given harsh sentences. Four received ten-year sentences, three received seven-year sentences, while the remaining two, including a woman who was charged with sewing the flag, received four-year sentences. After being held for eighteen months in Abepura Prison, four of the convicted men were transferred to East Java, to serve the remainder of their sentences in Kalisosok Prison, Surabaya, making it impossible for relatives to visit them or keep them supplied with essential food and clothing.

Forcibly-repatriated refugees on trial

Seven of the twelve refugees who were forcibly deported back to Indonesia by the Papua New Guinea government in October 1985 (see Chapter Seven) were tried in Jayapura some time in 1986. Unlike the trial of the nine flag-raising students, these men were tried without any publicity at all. It appears that they were all sentenced, but little is known about the sentences that were passed.

All the twelve deportees were arrested and tortured as soon as they arrived back in Jayapura. In January 1986, they met a group of Australian parliamentarians from the Liberal Party who visited them at the prison. With some forty Indonesians present, including prison officials and security officers, it was impossible for them to speak freely.

The encounter was clearly stage-managed to counteract the widespread condemnation of the deportations which had delivered these men, all of them OPM supporters, into the hands of their persecutors.

Attempts to observe the trials by Amnesty International, by the well-known Papua New Guinea lawyer, Bernard Narokobi and other organisations were all unsuccessful.

Four six-year sentences in Sorong

An announcement in Jakarta in September 1987, that four West Papuans convicted for activities in support of an independent West Papuan state had taken their appeal to the Supreme Court, provided a rare glimpse of judicial procedures in the territory. Nothing had been heard previously of the case. The newspaper reported that two of the men had received six-year sentences while the other two were sentenced to three and five years. On appeal to the High Court, the six-year sentences were upheld while the other sentences were raised to six years.

One man was alleged to have been an OPM courier from Jayapura, bringing instructions to an OPM group in the west. When passing sentence, the judges said, in the men's favour, that they had all frankly admitted their involvement in OPM activities and had done nothing to impede court proceedings.³¹

* * * *

It is difficult to detect a pattern in the judicial procedures used against West Papuan opponents to Indonesian rule since so little comes into the public domain about trials. Court proceedings are not open to scrutiny, press reporting is scant, to say the least, and the single occasion when a trial did become public knowledge, it seems to have been the result of a short-lived move in favour of handling trials within the framework of the Criminal Procedural Code. The situation was very well summed up by Cory Ap when she said: "The government does what it likes."

Footnotes

1. Garnaut and Manning, *Irian Jaya, The Transformation of a Melanesian Economy*, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1974, page 24.
2. Tony Mellive, in *Le Monde*, 3 January 1978.
3. *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 48, November 1981.
4. *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 51, May 1982.
5. Henk de Mari, in *De Telegraf*, 11, 12 and 19 October 1974. Extracts from these articles were published in *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 8, January 1975.
6. *Wantok*, 23 August 1980.
7. *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 60, September 1983.

8. See commentary of KRO-Hilversum film on West Papua shown in February 1982.
9. *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 70, July 1985.
10. *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 71, September 1985.
11. *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 70, July 1985.
12. Amnesty International, "Irian Jaya: Patterns of Arrest and Detention", Document No. ASA 21/06/86, March 1986.
13. *ibid.*
14. *Free West Papua*, January 1982.
15. *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 81, June 1987.
16. Amnesty International, "Indonesia/East Timor: Allegations of Torture", Document No. ASDA 21/05/88, March 1988.
17. From an interview conducted by Jean MacLean, member of the Victoria State Parliament, and reproduced in *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 77, September 1986.
18. Transcript of the Tribunal on Human Rights in West Papua, Port Moresby 1981. A copy of the transcript is held at the TAPOL office.
19. See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 46, July 1981 for an unabridged translation of Soeyoto's interrogation.
20. *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 44, March 1981.
21. *West Papuan Observer*, January-February 1980. See also the interview of Cory Ap in *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 73, January 1984.
22. *Nederlands Dagblad*, 6 December 1983.
23. See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 72, November 1985, for an account of the activities of the Mambesak Group.
24. Amnesty International. "Indonesia: Update on Amnesty International's Concerns in Irian Jaya", ASA 21/01/87, January 1987.
25. *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 73, January 1986.
26. From reports that appeared in *Sinar Harapan*, 20 and 31 October 1983, as reported in *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 61, January 1984.
27. *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 48, November 1981.
28. *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 49, January 1982.
29. Denis Reinhardt in *Nation Review*, 7 September 1979.
30. Amnesty International, "Indonesia: Detention of Nine Students from Irian Jaya", ASA 21/05/86, March 1986.
31. *Merdeka*, 19 September 1987.

Chapter Seven:

Refugees

In February 1984, three hundred West Papuans arrived in Vanimo, capital of Papua New Guinea's West Sepik Province, 35 kilometres from the Indonesian border and 70 kilometres from Jayapura, capital of the 'province' of Irian Jaya. They had fled in the wake of the Indonesian army's crackdown in Jayapura, following the abortive OPM uprising. Among them were government officials and employees, university lecturers and students, as well as deserters from the Indonesian armed forces. Some arrived in canoes, others had walked across the border.

By the end of April, the influx of refugees had risen to six thousand, the majority of whom came from southern border regions, seeking sanctuary in Papua New Guinea's Western Province. By the end of June, there were no fewer than ten thousand West Papuan refugees. A string of hastily-erected camps came into being all along the border.

Since the establishment of Indonesian rule in West Papua in 1963, there had been waves of West Papuan refugees, but never before on such a scale. For the first time, the vast majority of the refugees refused to return, despite entreaties from the Papua New Guinea government and assurances from the Indonesian government. The 'refugee problem' in Papua New Guinea had come to stay, drawing worldwide attention for the first time to the horrors of Indonesian rule in West Papua. The refugee problem also threw into stark contrast the condition of two artificially-divided halves of the Papuan people, one half living in a parliamentary democracy, the other half living as the colonial subjects of a totalitarian state. The refugee problem also forced the two neighbouring states to resolve, one way or another, the relationship between them, dogged from the outset by a border that had been drawn more than a century ago by the Dutch and British colonial powers for their own convenience.

Papua New Guinea and the border problem

Papua New Guinea inherited the border problem and the closely related refugee problem from Australia which took over trusteeship of the eastern half of the island following the first world war. Throughout the 1950s, Australia supported the Dutch in their dispute with Indonesia over West Papua. There was even talk of an eventual reunification of the island. In 1961, however, under the government of Robert Menzies, Australia fell into line with US strategic interests in the region which switched, under President Kennedy, from supporting the Netherlands to supporting Indonesia. The new policy placed a heavy burden on a future, independent Papua New Guinea tied closely to Australia. Any sympathy for its colonised kinspeople over the border would have to take second place to the interests of regional security as perceived by Canberra and Washington.

Within a year of Indonesia's annexation of West Papua in 1963, Australia initiated steps towards independence for its trusteeship territory. A 64-member House of Assembly with limited powers was set up. In 1972, Michael Somare was appointed Chief Minister and three years later, in September 1975, Papua New Guinea became an independent state, with Australia retaining a grip over security, intelligence, government administration and the economy.

It was the change in West Papua's status that compelled Canberra to abandon its trusteeship. Had PNG remained a colony, resistance to Indonesian rule in the west would have inspired an anti-colonial struggle in the east. The tensions created by the influx of refugees, the first of which occurred in the 1960s, and Indonesian demands for joint border patrols to contain OPM activity on the PNG side of the border, would have been far more difficult to defuse, with Canberra still in charge.

By late 1968, about 1,200 refugees had crossed into PNG and over two hundred were granted permissive residence. In May 1969, in the spirit of Melanesian solidarity, a demonstration took place in Port Moresby. Students, church leaders and others protested against the Australian government's tacit support for Indonesia's plans to conduct a fraudulent Act of 'Free' Choice. But after 1972, it fell to Michael Somare's administration to contain such outbursts of solidarity which threatened to antagonise Canberra.

Two years before PNG became independent, Australia concluded a border agreement with Indonesia, regulating border security and providing for a joint border committee. It dealt also with border crossers and made a distinction between 'traditional' border crossers - people moving about in their own tribal territory which had been cut in two by the border - and others who crossed the border for 'non-traditional' purposes. The agreement made it a crime to flee from Indonesian terror by stipulating that "each government shall act in a spirit of friendship and good neighbourliness, bearing in mind . . . the importance of discouraging the use of border crossing for the purpose of evading justice" (*Article 6, Paragraph 1*). On security, the agreement

provided that "the governments on either side of the border agree to continue to cooperate with one another in order to prevent the use of their respective territories . . . for hostile activities against the other" (*Article 7, paragraph 1*).

The Agreement was signed in February 1973 by Michael Somare, on Canberra's behalf. In a statement to the House of Assembly on 19 June of that year, Somare gave the seal of approval to a policy of expediency when he said: "We have a population of only 2.5 million, while Indonesia has about one hundred million people. When we see such a big population in the country bordering ours, we must not create any disputes with Indonesia"¹

Since then, the 1973 border agreement has been renewed twice, in 1979 and 1984, incorporating various amendments, but on two crucial issues, Indonesia has not been able to get its way. There has been no agreement to conduct joint border patrols and to allow troops of either side to engage in hot pursuit across the border, an arrangement from which only Indonesia would stand to gain. Nor has Papua New Guinea been willing to have an extradition treaty with Indonesia. This has enabled Papua New Guinea to withstand demands for the return of prominent anti-Indonesian militants or guerrillas. Port Moresby has been very reluctant, however, to offer asylum to such people, for fear of offending its powerful neighbour, and has turned to the UN High Commission for Refugees to find places of asylum elsewhere. Hence, OPM leaders like Seth Rumkorem, Jacob Prai, Gerardus Thomy, James Nyaro and Rex Rumakiek are scattered around the globe, in Greece, Sweden, Ghana and Australia, with many of the older generation of West Papuan refugees living in the Netherlands.

Although the main jungle tracks which cross the border are signposted, the border remains in essence a 750-kilometre stretch of wilderness marked by some three dozen markers. The southern region consists of tracts of savannah and swampy rain forest. Huge chunks of the border sub-district of Merauke are now colonised by Javanese transmigrants. Transmigration sites have also been set up in the north, around Jayapura, with a cluster of West Papuan villages stretching some distance to the south. Areas settled by transmigrants, some of whom are ex-military personnel, are well protected by troops. Part of the central region, north of the bulge in the border formed by the Fly River, is dominated on the Papua New Guinea side by the giant Ok Tedi copper and gold mine, located only a few miles from a large Indonesian military encampment visible across a mountain pass. Otherwise, the border is a vast forest-land of impenetrable jungle, sparsely populated by shifting cultivators.

A key element in Indonesia's plans to establish a presence all along the border is the construction of the Trans-Irian Highway, a 2,000-kilometre road system that will eventually link Jayapura, Senggi and Wamena in the northeast, to Merauke, Bupul and Tanah Merah in the southeast, and Nabire, Ilaga and Enarotoli in the centre-west. Although progress in building the Highway has been slow, with only thirty per

cent completed since 1980, sections near the border from Merauke to Tanah Merah and from Jayapura to Wamena have been built², opening the way for a string of settlements inhabited by loyal Indonesians from Java and elsewhere.

Prior to 1984, Papua New Guinea's policy towards anyone crossing the border was as follows:

People crossing the border are required to report to one of the several patrol posts along the border and state their reason for crossing. If their purpose is "traditional" (the most common is sago-making), they are normally allowed to stay until they have finished what they came to do and are then expected to return across the border. If they apply for political asylum, they are held until a decision is taken and then either granted permissive residence or told to return. In all other cases, they are told to return. If they refuse, they are arrested and charged as illegal immigrants, after which they may be deported.

In practice however, the administration of this policy has varied considerably . . . On numerous occasions groups of people have been allowed to stay in temporary camps until the conditions which caused their move have abated; while in such camps, they have been given food and medical attention. On at least one occasion, in 1977, the Papua New Guinea government has sought Indonesia's assurances that those returning will not be harmed³

During the 1970s, there were four refugee camps, at Yako and Oksapmin in West Sepik Province, at Weam in Western Province and at Wabo in Gulf Province. Papua New Guinea was not then a signatory of the UN 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees, so the United Nations High Commission for Refugees played no role in running the camps or protecting the rights of the refugees, though funding from the UN was sometimes sought.

In 1981, all the camps were closed down. Some of the refugees still living there were offered permissive residence while others were sent into exile. According to a West Papuan refugee in Sweden in 1982, the decision to close the camps created problems "not only for the refugees who are now in PNG but for those who may come in the future. Where will they go? They would probably be sent to prison and that's very bad indeed. They [Papua New Guinea] seem to think that if the camps are closed down, the refugees will stop coming to PNG."⁴

That they did not stop coming became clear in 1983 when a Canberra-based Dutch journalist reported that more than a thousand West Papuans had fled across the border to Papua New Guinea. Most were underfed and in desperate need of medical treatment. The refugees found temporary shelter in border villages and the Papua New Guinea government sought funding and medical assistance from the UNHCR. But the journalist had been told that they would soon be returned to Indonesia."⁵

The upheavals of 1984

It soon became apparent, after hundreds and then thousands of West Papuans started flocking over the border in February 1984, that earlier policies pursued by Papua New Guinea simply would not work. In March, sticking by their earlier policy of regarding the refugees in Vanimo as illegal immigrants, the authorities arrested and tried more than a hundred men, all the male adults who had arrived in Vanimo. The Bishop of Vanimo, John Etheridge, was the first of many to express outrage, saying he found it "regrettable . . . that the very basic act of humanity, of extending refuge to people legitimately requesting it, has been seemingly traded for political cooperation with a neighbouring country".⁶ Although the men were found guilty, the magistrate refused to pass sentence before consulting with Port Moresby. Soon afterwards the verdicts were quashed on appeal.

As more and more refugees overwhelmed the limited resources of local villagers and church agencies, the Somare government became bogged down in a policy that proved unworkable. It maintained, in step with Jakarta's views, that there were no refugees, only 'border crossers'. They would all have to be repatriated. The matter would be handled solely by Papua New Guinea and Indonesia without resort to the UN or other external agencies. Since it was patently obvious, however, that Papua New Guinea did not have the means to force all these thousands of people to go home, steps would be taken to convince the refugees that conditions in West Papua had improved and they had nothing to fear.

Months were spent negotiating with the Indonesian authorities on how repatriation would take place. Port Moresby wanted to be allowed to monitor the homecoming of the 'border crossers', and it sought assurances from the Indonesians that the returnees would not be harmed. For its part, Indonesia showed little interest in meeting halfway a policy that was costing the Somare government so much in terms of support at home and credibility overseas. An attempt by Somare's Foreign Minister, Rabbie Namaliu, to involve the UNHCR in the repatriation programme was turned down flat by Jakarta. Papua New Guinea leaders were treated with arrogance, impossible demands were made about compiling lists of all the people in the camps. On several occasions, Indonesian officials failed to turn up for meetings that had been mutually agreed.

Meanwhile, more refugees continued to stream across the border, particularly in the central sector. More than six thousand had arrived at a mission station in Komopkin by June, far more than the station could cope with. Even the Indonesian media confirmed that a mass exodus had taken place in Mindiptanah district, where 3,290 villagers out of a population of 8,506 had fled their homes; 4,350 of the 6,094 inhabitants of Waropka district had also fled.⁷ Journalists, church-people and others were visiting the camps and testifying to a widespread fear among the refugees of the Indonesian authorities, in particular, the military. There is also strong evidence that the OPM in the region, under its commander Gerardus Thomi, encouraged panic-stricken villagers to flee across the border. A British journalist, George Monbiot, who visited Mindiptanah in

1988, writes in a forthcoming publication that the exodus from the region started as a voluntary protest movement to register displeasure at the army, but many also believed, as did the OPM, that flight into Papua New Guinea would get other countries to see what was going on, and so build up backing for the independence movement.

Faced with stalemate in its programme of repatriation, the Somare government "seems to have opted to take a harder line with the border-crossers, permitting conditions in the camps to deteriorate, in order to try to persuade their inhabitants to return home"⁸ In other words, the refugees were to be starved out. In July 1984, Bishop John Etheridge reported that the Green River camp was critically short of food.⁹ Warren Dutton, a member of the Papua New Guinea Parliament for Western Province, wrote to the government on 25 July, reporting widespread malnutrition and disease at Atkamba and Kiungim camps, but the report was ignored. In August, a minister of the Evangelical Church of Papua reported to local officials that dozens of people at these camps had died of starvation or disease, but again nothing was done. On 12 August, Warren Dutton went public, stating that he regarded the deaths as having been caused both by neglect and deliberate government policy. In his 25 July report to the government, he had said:

The government appears to be attempting to allow starvation to take the place of its meaningless and unenforceable "illegal immigrant" policy.¹⁰

By 20 August, the newspapers were reporting at least ninety deaths in the camps. It later became clear that the Somare government had received an internal report from the Border Liaison Branch of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade as early as 1 June, warning that funds to feed the refugees had run out. The UNHCR and the Red Cross had offered the government food and medicine before the crisis struck but the offers were refused. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade had even said that aid was not to be accepted because it "did not want to make things easier for the border-crossers".¹¹ The Somare government was so embarrassed by the disclosures that the day after Warren Dutton's public statement, it announced that the UNHCR would be asked to assist in caring for the refugees.

The catastrophe that befell the refugees in Atkamba and Kiungim also proved that many West Papuans crossing the border had been suffering from malnutrition long before they arrived. A group of nutritionists found, during three surveys, that fifty per cent of the children in the camps were suffering from long-term malnutrition.¹²

Although the policy of 'starving-them-out' was now abandoned, the policy of organising mass repatriations continued. The Papua New Guinea government insisted on involving the Indonesian authorities in the process, believing that the refugees would accept assurances of good faith from the very administration that had caused them to flee. In preparation for the repatriations, the Papua New Guinea and Indonesian governments decided to organise a series of visits to all the camps by a

'verification team' of senior Indonesian government officials, led by the deputy governor of Irian Jaya, Brigadier-General Soegiyono. The first camp visited by the team was deserted for the occasion, while at the second camp, the Indonesians were greeted by anti-Indonesian banners and a demonstration. At the third camp on the itinerary, Blackwater, near Vanimo, the Indonesians were met not only with banners and protests but with a hail of missiles that forced them to run for their lives. Even reports in the Indonesian media could not conceal the humiliating blow the refugees had struck at their former Indonesian tormentors.¹³

All the remaining visits were cancelled. Port Moresby obviously had no conception of the strength of feeling among West Papuans against Indonesia. Nothing could have been more provocative than to bring a team of Indonesian officials into the midst of people who were, for the first time, free to give expression to pent-up feelings. The Blackwater incident should have warned Port Moresby of the futility of trying to persuade the refugees to go home. But the policy did not change.

A month before the incident, the Australian section of the International Commission of Jurists succeeded in sending a mission to refugee camps, despite last-minute attempts by the government in Port Moresby to cancel a visit that it had already authorised. Already before the mission, the government had declared the camps to be 'off-limits' to journalists. Prime Minister Somare was even quoted as saying that he did not want the camps "to become a tourist attraction".

In their report, published in December 1984,¹⁴ the jurists, who visited all the camps, said that "a large number of the approximately 11,000 refugees now consider themselves to be indefinitely or permanently displaced from Irian Jaya". It made a strong plea against refoulement (enforced repatriation), stressing that the principle of non-refoulement was obligatory on all states, whether or not they were signatories of the UN Convention on Refugees. The 62-page report described the attitudes of the refugees and the circumstances that had caused them to leave their ancestral lands in search of refuge. Refugees in Kiungim had fled after an army operation in three villages, when troops fired indiscriminately into churches, schools and homes. In Komopkin, refugees also spoke about shoot-ups by troops in April. In Green River camp, most refugees were people who frequently came to Papua New Guinea as traditional border-crossers, only now, no-one wanted to go home, except to join the OPM. Some of the refugees in Green River had been driven off their land more than a decade earlier and had been living in the bush ever since. Refugees in Kamberatoro were terrified by the killing of local teachers. Some said they fled to PNG in 1978, then returned home; since then, they had lived in the bush because they were too afraid to return to their villages.

For the first time, it was possible for a team of independent observers to get a glimpse of the sufferings of remote villagers during two decades of Indonesian rule. Yet, repatriation continued to be the focus of government policy, a stance that was to be a major factor in the downfall of the Somare Government in November 1985. Somare's main partner in his coalition government was the Melanesian Alliance, whose chairman, Father John

Momis, was Deputy Prime Minister. The Alliance programme has always supported the demand for self-determination for West Papua and rejected the Indonesian takeover. A prominent Alliance member was Bernard Narokobi, a lawyer who went to great lengths to defend the refugees in numerous court actions and who, in May 1985, filed a lawsuit against the government for ignoring the constitutional rights of the refugees.

Shortly before the Somare Government fell, Father Momis drew up a programme for the re-location of refugees away from the border. His definition of how individuals should be classified as refugees fell far short of the conditions laid down in the UN Convention. Although his party was obviously embarrassed by Somare's efforts to get rid of the refugees, it did nothing to oppose the policy until the outrageous deportation of twelve refugees in October 1985.

Signs that the tide was moving against the refugees became increasingly apparent with the disclosure of a secret plan, drawn up in May 1985 by Indonesian and Papua New Guinea officials at a meeting of the Border Liaison Committee. 'Militant elements' in the camps would be neutralised by shifting them to remote camps; 'moderate elements' would be persuaded to go to Jayapura to hear about arrangements being made for refugees who agreed to go home, and then return and spread the word in the camps.¹⁵ Some of the more outspoken refugees were moved to Telefomin, located in a very remote part of the central highlands. Among them were men who had been charged in Vanimo as ring-leaders of the protest against the ill-fated verification team from Indonesia.

By late 1984, the UNHCR had been allowed a presence in Papua New Guinea, to help feed and care for the refugees; it had also persuaded the Papua New Guinea authorities to allow it to monitor repatriations. Nevertheless, in December 1984, ninety-nine refugees were secretly returned to Indonesia under cover of dark. The people had expressed a desire to return home to Workwana, not far from the border, but they wanted to walk back unescorted. Instead, they were taken to the wharf and put on board a ship. In Jayapura, they were given a ceremonial welcome by the governor and deputy governor of Irian Jaya and the military commander. The incident was condemned by the Bishop of Vanimo who complained that the West Papuans' trust in PNG officials had been betrayed.¹⁶

During the first half of 1985, several groups of refugees agreed to return home, but repatriation never became anything more than a trickle. In fact, new arrivals in Papua New Guinea during 1985 far outnumbered the returnees. The largest number arrived in June when 560 made their way to the border in the north, while another 1,500 crossed over near the Yapsie River, 250 kilometres to the south of Vanimo. In September that year, 350 people crossed the border and reached a camp in Bewani. Seventy-five per cent were said to be malnourished; they had left their village home in 1977 and had been roaming in the forest ever since.¹⁷ In September 1986, a group of 747 West Papuans arrived in the West Sepik border station of Yapsiei from Kiriwok across the border, complaining

bitterly of maltreatment by Indonesian troops; they told Papua New Guinea officials that six or seven hundred more people were waiting to cross.¹⁸

The other aspect of the Liaison Committee's secret plan was a programme of refoulement. A group of eight OPM guerrillas captured by the Papua New Guinea police had already been deported in December 1984, three of whom, according to information reaching TAPOL, were dead within a week of arriving in Jayapura. Four more OPM guerrillas were deported in July 1985 and placed in custody immediately on arrival in Jayapura.¹⁹ Amnesty International later succeeded in documenting what happened to them. But it was the deportation of twelve refugees on 12 October 1985 that brought the crisis surrounding the refugees to a head.

Early that morning, sixteen men were transferred from Telefomin to Vanimo. Sensing that this was the prelude to deportation, four managed to escape. On arrival in Vanimo, the others were put on board a plane. They attacked the crew in mid-flight, forcing the pilot to return to Vanimo. There, they were beaten up, handcuffed and forced onto the plane again. The security forces were waiting for them at Sentani airport. They were taken into custody, interrogated and beaten up. Later, in conditions of great secrecy, seven were tried on subversion charges, one of the other five later disappeared, and another, Aben Pagawak managed to flee back across the border, to tell the outside world what had happened to them.

The day before the deportation, the Bishop of Vanimo got wind of the scheme and asked Bernard Narokobi to try and stop it. The lawyer immediately applied for an injunction, but the judge refused, saying he was unable to obtain a copy of the deportation order from the acting foreign minister, who alleged that no such order existed. In fact, the order had been signed on 4 October by John Giheno, a former police officer who had taken over as foreign minister, just before leaving Port Moresby to attend the Commonwealth Conference in Barbados.

There was an international outcry as soon as the news broke. For the first time, the government in Port Moresby became the target of worldwide protest. Within a month, opposition leader Paias Wingti had pushed a no-confidence motion through parliament, forcing Somare to resign. Wingti was a former party colleague of Somare's who had walked out of his government earlier that year, creating a new party and setting himself up as leader of the opposition.

Relations between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia during the Somare administration could not be described as particularly cordial. Although Somare believed that the country's national interests could only be served by accepting Indonesia's annexation of West Papua, complying with Jakarta's wishes and ignoring the groundswell of opposition inside West Papua, his government found little comfort and help from the Suharto regime in pursuing a deeply unpopular policy. Rabbie Namaliu, his foreign minister for most of the period, was often offended by Indonesian arrogance. He managed to upset the Suharto government on arrival in Jakarta for talks in April 1984, by offering to

advise it on how to treat its Melanesians. Later, he infuriated Jakarta by making a blistering attack on its policy in West Papua at the UN General Assembly in October 1984.

As one Australian scholar, who has written extensively on the PNG-Indonesian border question, has remarked, it is quite wrong to regard the relationship between the two neighbouring countries as symmetrical.

Obviously it is not. Border crossing has been essentially one way, border violations have been entirely at Papua New Guinea's expense, Papua New Guinea does not have a domestic insurgency overflowing its border, it has been Papua New Guinea rather than Indonesia that has had to seek explanations for external disturbances, and responsibility for the frequent ineffectiveness of liaison machinery has been largely on the Indonesian side.²⁰

The pressure on Papua New Guinea to seek an accommodation with Indonesia over the refugee issue was further reinforced by Australia's stubborn refusal to help Port Moresby resolve the problem. Australia was facing its own 'refugee problem', with the arrival in October 1985 of three West Papuans on a tiny craft which had transported them from Papua New Guinea to Australia's Boigu island in the Torres Straits.²¹ They were followed soon afterwards by eight more refugees. Suddenly, stories began to proliferate in the Australian media warning that, if these men were given asylum, thousands more Papuans would invade Australia's north coast, throwing Australia's relations with Jakarta into turmoil.

Meanwhile, the October deportations had forced the hand of the Melanesian Alliance. While Prime Minister Somare was out of the country, his deputy, Father Momis pushed through cabinet a policy of relocating and resettling the refugees. He publicly insisted that Australia should help by taking in several hundred refugees in need of political asylum. This set alarm bells ringing in Canberra. Within a month of the deportations and the arrival of the first three West Papuans in Australia, Foreign Minister Bill Hayden was visiting Port Moresby, pushing for a hard line on the refugees.

What the Hawke Government feared more than anything was that Port Moresby's dilemma might spread to Canberra. Hence the extraordinary lengths to which the Hawke Government went to avoid accepting a single West Papuan although Australia gives political asylum to refugees from all over the world. Eventually, Canberra was compelled to grant refugee status to two of the men and allow the others to stay, after its own Committee for the Determination of Refugee Status pronounced that it had no other choice. The prospect of finding itself 'lumbered' with more refugees from camps in Papua New Guinea who were in desperate need of third-country asylum, caused the Australian government to insist that West Papuan refugees were a problem for Papua New Guinea and Indonesia alone.

More fundamental were issues involved as well. Canberra was

deeply troubled by what it saw as the spectre of "regional destabilisation". Australia's Foreign Minister Bill Hayden made it clear, both to the Somare administration and later to the Wingti administration, that Australia wanted to see the repatriation of the vast majority of the refugees. The one thing Australia did not want was for tens of thousands, perhaps even hundreds of thousands of West Papuans, to make their homes in Papua New Guinea and turn the country into a 'hotbed of opposition' to the military regime in Indonesia. Assessing the line pushed by Hayden during his visit to Port Moresby in November 1985, just days before Somare's government fell, an Australian columnist wrote:

The real issue is, what happens to the upwards of one million Melanesians in the province. Will they stay and co-exist with the (trans)migrants? Will they be reduced to a "West Bank" minority with many thousands crossing to PNG, or will the worst scenario occur and the bulk of the Melanesian population evacuate to PNG over the next few generations?²²

Based on the view that very few of the West Papuans in the refugee camps were 'genuine refugees', that they really wanted to go home but were being prevented from doing so by OPM agitators, Bill Hayden's advice to Port Moresby was "to adopt proper screening procedures, identify the real refugees, separate the OPM activists from the other border crossers and create the conditions for these people to go back to Indonesia".

A year later, when asked by the UNHCR to contribute funds towards the establishment of resettlement camps in Papua New Guinea located some distance from the border, Bill Hayden refused, arguing that these camps should not be set up "until all options for voluntary repatriation had been exhausted". Canberra wanted the UNHCR to press for international monitoring, inside Indonesia, of the returning West Papuans; it supported efforts to "secure Indonesia's agreement to an International Red Cross presence in Irian Jaya".²³ Unfortunately for Bill Hayden, this was something that Indonesia would not countenance, as it regarded this as "interference" in its internal affairs.

The refugee problem and PNG-Indonesian relations since 1986

When the government of Paias Wingti took office in November 1985, government policy regarding the refugees was in disarray. It immediately set about implementing a new policy in its relations with Indonesia. The key elements were: accession to the UN Convention and Protocol on Refugees, the conclusion of a friendship treaty, and the establishment of close military ties with Indonesia.

The decision to accede to the UN Convention was announced first, causing sceptics in Papua New Guinea to predict that this would be strongly opposed by Indonesia. Had Indonesia not insisted for years

that the West Papuans were border crossers, not refugees, meaning that they were a purely bilateral problem and not a matter for the UNHCR? But to everyone's surprise, when Foreign Minister Legu Vagi visited Jakarta in February 1986, the Indonesian government declared, in a joint communique, that it "respects Papua New Guinea's decision to assign a greater role to the UN High Commission for Refugees on its territory". At the time, it seemed that Jakarta had been won over by the lure of Vagi's offer of a friendship treaty. Vagi himself had served for more than three years in the PNG embassy in Jakarta; he was well known in government circles and apparently seen as a good friend.

The crucial factor for the military regime was not the Vagi visit, however, but the visit a month later of Brigadier-General Anthony Huai, commander of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF), as guest of General Benny Murdani, commander-in-chief of Indonesia's armed forces. It was during this visit that the groundwork was done to establish close military collaboration which would include training facilities for PNGDF officers in Indonesia, the supply of military equipment, at first only uniforms, the exchange of information (i.e. military intelligence) about developments along the border, and the exchange of military attaches between Port Moresby and Jakarta (attaches had been withdrawn in 1984 after a furious row over a border incursion by Indonesian troops).

Huai was given a busy schedule. Apart from having extensive talks with Murdani, he visited East Timor and went to a transmigration site in Lampung where he made the preposterous claim that he had always thought transmigration only happened in Irian Jaya (implying that Papua New Guineans were wrong to see the programme as a threat). He also met President Suharto, who assured him, for the benefit of any worried compatriots back home, that Indonesia had no military plans to invade Papua New Guinea. On his return to Port Moresby he shocked public opinion by calling the OPM a "bunch of terrorists" and declaring that he and Murdani had reached an understanding about their common objective "to eliminate the OPM".²⁴ Amid calls for Huai's resignation and complaints that, as a military officer, he had no right to speak out on policy matters, he replied that he had only been reiterating long-standing government policy, a statement that the Prime Minister did not deny.

Meanwhile, although the UN Convention could now be invoked as the guiding principle regarding the refugees, Wingti's ministers were in disagreement over whether the refugees should be permanently re-located away from the border or whether re-location was merely a preparation for screening and eventual repatriation. The most outspoken advocate for immediate and permanent re-location was Warren Dutton, the MP who had angrily exposed the starvation policy towards the camps in 1984 and who was now Minister of Justice in the Wingti Government. Since September 1984, Dutton, a man with considerable business interests, had been suggesting that the refugees should be resettled in East Awin where plans were being drawn up for

the purchase of land and the development of palm oil and rubber plantations. These plans could now be implemented in order to provide long-term security for the West Papuans, allowing them to become Papua New Guinea citizens after completing eight years obligatory residence. (A less generous way of describing the plan was that the refugees would become a captive labour force.)

For Foreign Minister Vagi, re-location should be a temporary measure until screening had determined who should go home. Indeed, in official parlance, the East Awin camp was called a holding and processing centre. In a statement on government policy, Wingti seemed fairly certain that only a few hundred West Papuans would be recognised as 'real refugees' while the remainder "would be returned to Irian Jaya . . . in accordance with previous guarantees by the Indonesian government that those returning would be safe". One Australian newspaper pointed out that the government did not explain "how any requirement for people to return would be enforced".²⁵ Later, Wingti claimed that 280 would be classified as 'real refugees'.²⁶ Since no screening had taken place, where that figure came from is a mystery.

There was prolonged delay before re-location began. Although the programme should have commenced in 1986, little happened until June 1987; by March 1988 only 2,000 refugees had actually been moved, less than a quarter of the total. A lot of time was wasted trying to persuade Jakarta to allow either the UNHCR or the International Red Cross (ICRC) to have a presence on Indonesia's side of the border in order to monitor homecomings; this was seen as an essential prerequisite for a voluntary repatriation programme. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees himself, Jean Pierre Hocke, personally intervened with the Indonesian foreign minister²⁷ but Jakarta was adamant. The only thing acceptable for the Indonesians was for local churches to help care for returning West Papuans, but this was no guarantee of independent monitoring and was unacceptable to the UNHCR.

Accession to the UN Convention did not bring any progress in finding third-country asylum for West Papuan refugees, though in the early stages, refugees in Blackwater had been invited to fill in applications for places, possibly in Australia. The only family to be given asylum in the Netherlands was Cory Ap and her four sons, on humanitarian grounds, to join relatives already there. In the case of OPM guerrilla leaders, Papua New Guinea has always insisted on their removal from its territory, compelling the UNHCR to find temporary asylum elsewhere. The only people to be accommodated since Seth Rumkorem was moved to Greece in 1982 were five guerrilla leaders who gave up the struggle: James Nyaro, Alex Derry, Gerardus Thomy, Ries Wyder and David Tiemka. They were all re-settled in Ghana in August 1986.

A Friendship Treaty and growing military ties

Meanwhile, negotiations between Jakarta and Port Moresby for the conclusion of a Friendship Treaty proceeded with considerable despatch. Although both sides kept on insisting that the Treaty would usher in a new era in a relationship which had hitherto focussed solely on border issues, it became clear that, for Indonesia, safeguards about border security was still crucial to the drafting of an acceptable treaty. A week before the main talks about the Treaty took place in Jakarta in May 1986, Murdani summoned Brigadier-General Huai to Jayapura for urgent negotiations.

In earlier attempts to reach agreement about border security, the stumbling-block had always been Papua New Guinea's refusal to agree to joint border patrols or to allow Indonesia the right of hot pursuit, both of which were constitutionally unacceptable. Now, it seemed, Indonesia was willing to forego these demands, for the time being at least, as long as careful joint arrangements were worked out regarding security in a wide area on the Papua New Guinea side of the border. (Of course, the Treaty deals with both sides of the border but, in reality, the concerns are not symmetrical.) As one media commentator put it, the 'hot pursuit' question was avoided as "Suharto and Murdani respect Port Moresby's position on this."²⁸ Details of the arrangements worked out by Murdani and Huai were not made public. All that was revealed was that the Jayapura talks were aimed at "ensuring security for the relocation programme".

The main aim in moving refugees away from the border, as far as Indonesia was concerned, was to "sanitise" the whole area, cleansing it of camps that were regarded as sanctuaries for the OPM. Murdani now needed cast-iron guarantees that this would happen. One can only assume that he got them. A key factor in these arrangements was the exchange of military attaches, which took place in September 1986. This would provide the channel for exchanging military intelligence, while Brigadier-General Huai had already publicly committed his Defence Force to working with the Indonesian armed forces for the elimination of the OPM. A demand for joint border patrols and hot pursuit had been thus supplanted by a coordinated strategy between the two armed forces.

The Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and Cooperation between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia was signed on 27 October 1986, even though two important issues remained unresolved. One was the terms of an extradition treaty which could be a veritable minefield for Papua New Guinea if it meant that any West Papuan regarded by Indonesia as a "criminal" could face extradition proceedings. The other was a demand by Indonesia for a Search-and-Rescue (SAR) agreement, giving Indonesian forces the right to carry out operations over the border. More than a year after the Treaty was concluded, neither of these problems had been resolved. The fact that Indonesia nonetheless signed the Treaty suggests that it saw the benefit in tying its South Pacific neighbour down to wide-ranging undertakings about "mutual

recognition of integrity" and "non-interference in internal affairs", and proceeding from there to wear Port Moresby down on other details of the relationship.

Throughout the negotiations, Suharto and Murdani were in control of developments. But they also used the visits of Papua New Guinea politicians to build personal relationships. The friends they assiduously cultivated were Brigadier-General Huai and his predecessor as commander of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, Brigadier-General Ted Diro. After quitting the Force, Diro had set up his own political party, the People's Action Party (as the name suggests, he is a great admirer of Lee Kwan Yew). He became Foreign Minister in early 1987. When in March 1987, the ceremonial exchange of the instruments of ratification of the Treaty took place in Jakarta, it was Ted Diro who headed the delegation from Port Moresby. During a meeting with Murdani, Diro asked for and was given a donation of \$139,400 towards his Party's election funds. The money was channeled into Diro's bank accounts by Indonesia's newly-appointed military attache, Colonel Pandji.

The payment came to light during an inquiry in November 1987 into Diro's alleged corrupt acquisition of funds during his term as Minister of Forestry. The matter could have been divulged at a private hearing of the inquiry, at the Prime Minister's request, but he chose not to exercise this privilege, with the result that the bribe became public knowledge. Diro was Minister without Portfolio at the time of the disclosure, and was forced to resign. At first, vigorous denials were made on Murdani's behalf by the armed forces spokesman in Jakarta. Indonesian press freedom being what it is, no-one dared to question it. During an official visit to Jakarta two months later, however, Wingti was informed by Suharto that Murdani had indeed paid over the money. Far from being angered, Wingti lavished praise on Suharto and Murdani

for their honesty and decency in revealing this information to me. It is a great indication of the respect Indonesia has for PNG and signals a new depth and maturity in the relationship that exists between the two countries.²⁹

A month after Diro's resignation, Brigadier-General Huai was dismissed as PNGDF commander for making unauthorised trips to Jakarta, for receiving gifts from Murdani and leaking to him information about the defence sections of a Joint Declaration of Principles to be signed between Papua New Guinea and Australia. A few weeks after Huai's dismissal, the PNG Defence Minister, James Pokasui, along with the new commander of the Defence Force, Brigadier-General Rocky Lokinap, went to Jakarta, no doubt to assure Murdani that undertakings given by Huai still stood. He also asked for

more military training facilities and was keen to examine the Indonesian army's civic action project.³⁰

The sinister growth in relations between Indonesia's military rulers and Papua New Guinea's militarists took place against the background of growing disenchantment in Papua New Guinea with Australia, which had long been its political and economic prop, and amid signs that a deterioration in relations between Indonesia and Australia had set in. In a wide-ranging interview with a leading Indonesian newspaper a few days after the exposure about his slush-funds from Murdani, Diro complained about Australia's economic interests in Papua New Guinea and claimed that Canberra was trying to block its relations with Indonesia. "In order to counteract such endeavours, we need to improve understanding between our two countries." One way of doing this was by sending senior army officers to Indonesia's Staff and Command School in Bandung.³¹ It is no coincidence that Murdani, the chief architect of Indonesia's deteriorating relations with Australia, has also spearheaded Indonesia's gradual penetration of Papua New Guinea political life which today represents the greatest threat to that country's independence.

The Treaty of Friendship, as most commentators agree, is hardly more than a pledge of adherence to principles laid down in the UN Charter and adds little to past accords concluded between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia. However, both countries look upon the new relationship as a 'bridge' to promote their own regional ambitions. For Papua New Guinea, which has been trying for years to become a member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the benefit is not likely to be wider trade outlets (most of its exports compete with ASEAN exports) but rather, the hope that by becoming member of another regional alliance, its stature within the South Pacific Forum will be enhanced. The benefits accruing to Indonesia are far more tangible and pressing. Indonesia sees Papua New Guinea as a stepping-stone into the South Pacific community of nations. Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja said that "ties with Papua New Guinea are needed in order to save Indonesia's image in the South Pacific".³² Indonesia desperately needs to win friends quickly in the South Pacific, to stem the tide of support for West Papua and East Timor. Papua New Guinea is not only a member of the South Pacific Forum; it is also a member of the Melanesian Spearhead Group set up in 1986, along with the Solomon Isles and Vanuatu, the one country that supports West Papua's right to self-determination. Basically, Indonesia seeks recognition as a Pacific power based on its annexation of two Pacific territories with Melanesian populations. The problem is that in both territories, wars of liberation are being waged, for which support in the Pacific is gathering momentum.

The fate of West Papuans who decide to return

Throughout the dispute over the refugees, Indonesia has insisted that they must all come home. But does Jakarta *really* want them back? General Ali Murtopo said bluntly back in 1969 (see Chapter Two) that the military regime was interested in the territory of West Papua, not its people. In 1985, Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja voiced the regime's contempt for Papuans when he told journalist Peter Hastings that the best thing Indonesia had done for its Melanesian people was "to get them off the habit of drinking beer". Had he been right, he was asked, not to exert too much pressure on Port Moresby to send the 'border crossers' back? Claiming that two thousand had already returned, he said: "The ones who stay in PNG do so because they don't have to work. We don't want people who won't work."³³ While he dismisses West Papuans as worthless primitives, however, the presence of tens of thousands of people in Papua New Guinea who have rejected Indonesian rule is not something Jakarta can accept with equanimity.

Throughout the saga, Jakarta has falsified the figures of the number of West Papuans who have returned home. When Mochtar claimed that two thousand had returned in 1985, the figure was in fact less than two hundred. In late 1987, when the UNHCR said that only 1,500 had been repatriated, Indonesian officials were claiming that 6,904 had returned.³⁴ These glaring discrepancies led an Indonesian observer of affairs in West Papua to examine how each side compiles its figures. After a rather unconvincing criticism of UNHCR's accounting methods, he turned to the numerous inaccuracies, double counting and phantom returnees that made up the Indonesian total. He argued that local Indonesian officials deliberately gave false figures "because any news of returnees sent to the provincial capital could . . . improve the district head's career".

The provincial government would also be glad to help the national government to improve Indonesia's image by boosting the number of returnees, since this could be regarded as an indicator of improving human rights conditions in Irian Jaya.³⁵

But many people recorded as "returnees" were villagers who had been roaming for years on Indonesian territory, along the border, "waiting for an opportune time to return to their home village". As the editor of *Indonesia Mirror* commented, "many returnees comprise an extensive pool of 'internal refugees' whose existence persists and whose conditions are often perilous in many respects".³⁶

What has happened to the West Papuan villagers who decided to return home? Those returning under the UNHCR voluntary

repatriation scheme are formally handed over to Indonesian officials. They are not allowed to return to their villages but are relocated to sites designated by the authorities. Following the return of 213 refugees from camps in the north to Jayapura, Governor Izaak Hindom said that they were given three choices: they could enter a nucleus estate project in Arso, settle in a transmigration site for 'locals' or go and live in a relocation site under the supervision of the Department of Social Affairs.³⁷ Two months earlier 452 returnees to Jayapura district were resettled in special locations in Arso. According to district head, Bas Jouwe, when he opened one of the sites, the aim was "to transform their mental outlook while raising their standard of living".³⁸

The authorities are also engaged in a campaign of pacification among returnees in the border regions, an "extension programme to boost their confidence in the Indonesian government" and counteract agitation by the OPM. The programme is run by the Irian Jaya military command with the help of the information services and the local administration. Reporting the results of a three-day campaign among villagers in Dobo Village, whose inhabitants had three times crossed over into Papua New Guinea and stayed at Blackwater camp, the army spokesman said, "The residents vowed not to leave their village upon the influence of any agitators." Village youth had been organised to prevent the villagers from leaving.³⁹

The regime is using many tactics to establish control over the inhabitants of the border region, including relocation, transmigration and pacification. Yet villagers continue to flee for their lives. Events since 1984 prove that efforts of the military to cow West Papuans into submission have failed to quell widespread opposition to Indonesian rule in their country. The large community of refugees in Papua New Guinea is a lasting reminder of that.

Footnotes

1. *House Assembly Debates III*(5), 19 June, 1973.
2. *Pedoman Rakyat*, 20 August 1986, and *Kompas*, 23 October 1986.
3. R.H. May (ed), *The Indonesia-Papua New Guinea Border: Irianese Nationalism and Small State Diplomacy*, Australian National University, Canberra, 1979, pages 98-99.
4. Daniel Kafiari, a West Papuan refugee in Sweden, in an interview with TAPOL. See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 51, May 1982.
5. Wio Joustra in *Volkskrant*, 17 February 1983.
6. *Niugini Nius*, 9 March 1984.
7. *Sinar Harapan*, 29 June 1984.

8. Stephen V. Harris and Colin Brown, *Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Australia: the Irian Jaya Problem of 1984*, Griffith University, Nathan, Australia, 1985, page 42.
9. *Niugini Nius*, 24 July 1984.
10. *The Times of Papua New Guinea*, 16 August 1984.
11. Harris and Brown, *Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Australia: the Irian Jaya Problem of 1984*, page 45.
12. *ibid.*, page 47.
13. See *Tempo*, 17 November, and *Sinar Harapan*, 5 November 1984. See also *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 66, November 1984.
14. Report of the Mission of the Australian Section of the International Commission of Jurists, Sydney, December 1984.
15. *The Australian*, 21 March 1985. See also *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 69, May 1985.
16. *The Times of Papua New Guinea*, 30 December 1984.
17. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 7 December 1985
18. *The Australian*, 5 September 1986
19. *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 70, July 1985.
20. R.J. May, "Mutual Respect, Friendship and Cooperation? The Indonesia-Papua New Guinea Border and its Effect on Relations between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia", in *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Volume 19, No. 4, 1987, page 45.
21. For an account of how three of these West Papuans made the journey, see the interview of Thomas Agaky Wanda in *TAPOL Bulletin*, Nos 80, 81 and 82, April, June and August 1987.
22. Paul Kelly, "Preaching a message of maturity to PNG", in *The Australian*, 12 November 1985.
23. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 15 September 1986.
24. *Niugini Nius*, 27 March 1986.
25. *The Australian*, 22 January 1986.
26. *Niugini Nius*, 28 April 1986.
27. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 9 October 1986
28. *Australian Financial Review*, 26 May 1986.
29. *Post Courier*, 27 January 1988.
30. *Post Courier*, 15 February 1988.
31. *Kompas*, 11 November 1987.
32. *Jakarta Post*, 4 February 1987.
33. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 August 1985.
34. *The Times of Papua New Guinea*, 20-26 August 1987, and *Jakarta Times*, 28 August 1987.
35. George J. Aditjondro, "The Irian Jaya Refugee and Returnee Problem: A State-of-the-Art Report and Options for the Future", reproduced in *Indonesia Mirror*, No 6, August 1987.
36. *ibid.*

37. *Kompas*, 11 March 1986.
38. *Suara Karya*, 4 January 1986.
39. *Jakarta Post*, 26 October 1987.

Chapter Eight:

External Support for Indonesia

During the whole tragic history of West Papua's enforced incorporation into Indonesia, western powers have displayed an almost total lack of concern about the fate of its people and the violation of their right to self-determination. The role played by the United Nations and its inexcusable acceptance of the results of the Act of 'Free' Choice meant that West Papua was removed from the agenda of the UN. The people of West Papua have, ever since, been denied this strategically-important international forum from which to press for the recognition of their rights and draw attention to their plight. By contrast, the question of self-determination for East Timor was the subject of resolutions adopted in 1975 and 1976 by the Security Council, and in the following years by the General Assembly. The UN still recognises Portugal as the administering power of East Timor, whose future continues to be on the agenda of the General Assembly.

As has been explained in Chapter Two, the betrayal of the West Papuan people was engineered by Washington, with the collusion of the Dutch and Australian governments. Until the 1980s, no country took up the cause of West Papua in the UN. In 1986, the newly-independent Vanuatu raised its voice for the first time at the General Assembly on West Papua's behalf. Since the mid-1980s, non-governmental organisations have spoken out about West Papua in various UN human rights bodies, and support for West Papuan independence has been growing in the countries of the South Pacific.

Western economic support

Indonesia has enjoyed very substantial economic support from western governments ever since the army crushed the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965 and deposed President Sukarno a year later. In 1967, the

Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), an international aid consortium, was set up, and has met every year in the Netherlands, under the general direction of the World Bank, to determine Indonesia's economic needs and provide aid accordingly. Seventeen countries now regularly attend IGGI meetings, including almost all the countries of western Europe, as well as the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. The World Bank has, until recently, contributed most of the aid, with the remainder coming from the IGGI member states in the form of bilateral aid.

There has been a steady increase in the IGGI's annual aid commitment to Indonesia. Even at the height of the oil boom in the 1970s when Indonesia reaped the benefit of soaring prices, IGGI aid continued to flow. In the early 1980s, when oil prices began to fall, IGGI aid was substantially increased and rose to above \$2,000 million a year. It reached \$2,519 million in 1986 and in 1987, after a further sharp fall in the world price of oil, it rose another 21 per cent, to \$3,160 million. The 1987 increase was the result, in particular, of a 60 per cent increase in bilateral aid, with the lion's share coming from six countries: Japan, the USA, France, Britain, the Netherlands and West Germany. As a result of IGGI handouts, Indonesia had become the world's sixth largest debtor state by 1986, with a total foreign debt of over £37 billion and a debt-service ratio (the percentage of export earnings needed to service the foreign debt) already in excess of 30 per cent. According to the World Bank's 1988 report on the Indonesian economy, Indonesia's foreign debt will reach \$50 billion by the end of 1988, with the debt-service ratio exceeding 40 per cent.

1988 has been something of a watershed in Indonesia's dependence on external economic and political forces, with a decisive shift in favour of Japan. Japanese commercial ties with Indonesia grew massively during the 1970s. Japan is now the main market for Indonesian oil and consumes almost all of its natural gas exports. Over the past five years, Japan has absorbed between 43 and 50 per cent of Indonesia's exports while nearly 30 per cent of Indonesia's imports come from Japan.¹ Japan has also been the primary source of foreign capital, with investments in sectors other than oil, gas and the financial sectors reaching \$5.7 billion since 1967. Other countries trail far behind, with Hongkong at \$2.01 billion, West Germany at \$1.81 billion, the US at \$1.24 billion and the Netherlands at \$1.13 billion. Its lead in the oil, gas and financial sectors is even more striking, with a total of \$9 billion, as compared with its closest rival, the US, at \$4 billion.² By 1987, more than a third of Indonesia's foreign debt was owed to Japan.

Several factors have given Japan the decisive role in controlling Indonesia's economic fate: the long-term decline in the position of the US as a super-power, and the combination, in the late 1980s, of a slump in world oil prices and a sharp appreciation in the value of the yen vis-a-vis the dollar. The fact that such a big portion of Indonesia's foreign debt is owed in Japanese currency, measured in a very weak dollar, has hugely inflated the size of the foreign debt, producing a grave crisis for

the Indonesian economy. The Suharto Government has been under strong international pressure not to reschedule its debt repayments to IGGI member-states. With this option closed to it, Indonesia decided to 'resolve' its debt crisis of the late 1980s by pleading for yet more aid from its main creditor, Japan.

After months of negotiations which included direct talks between Suharto and Japanese Prime Minister, Noboru Takeshita, Japan announced in June 1988 an aid commitment of £2.3 billion for the year, more than twice the amount committed in 1987 and more than two-thirds of IGGI aid for the year. Unlike previous Japanese credit which has been tied to specific projects, \$1.7 billion of the total has been made available in the form of untied credit, known as 'special assistance'. This is, in effect, a reserve of foreign currency, to be used up within a year, available to cover imports from anywhere in the world, with the rupiah proceeds going straight into the state coffers, to finance the budget deficit. Other IGGI countries have also provided 'special assistance' but nothing like the amount committed by Japan. 'Special assistance' has become the lifeline of the Indonesian economy. Although it is widely recognised that a central factor in Indonesia's debt crisis is its growing dependence on the rapidly strengthening yen, the 1988 aid commitment has only exacerbated the problem.

As Indonesia's leading creditor, Japan has won for itself a commanding position in Indonesia's resource-rich economy. These resources were the focus of Japan's dream of a Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which led to the Pacific War and the three-and-a-half years' occupation of the Indonesian archipelago. Japan's control of Indonesia's natural resources is now greater than it has ever been.

Military support

For many years, the Indonesian armed forces have relied heavily on the USA for military supplies and training, but the 1980s has seen a significant change in the composition of Indonesia's arms trade with foreign countries.

At the time of Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in 1975, more than ninety per cent of the equipment used by the Indonesian army had been supplied by the US under a variety of military aid programmes. They included helicopter gunships, armoured personnel carriers, M-16 rifles and a variety of small arms. In the late 1970s, the US supplied Indonesia with sixteen A-4E Skyhawks from 'surplus stocks' in Israel, as well as 16 OV-10 Bronco counter-insurgency planes.³ Broncos are low-flying, slow-moving aircraft which were used to spray bullets at helpless people on the ground in East Timor and West Papua during counter-insurgency campaigns in the late 1970s. As Admiral la Roque, a retired US defence expert, put it, when testifying about the war against East Timor in 1981, these deliveries "changed the entire nature of the war".⁴

The Broncos were also used to devastating effect in the army's counter-insurgency campaigns in West Papua to protect the Freeport copper-mine against attack in 1977, in the border operations of 1978 and in more recent aerial operations against OPM guerrillas. The Skyhawks have been used in many operations across the border into Papua New Guinea, leading to protests by the PNG government against violation of its airspace.

At around the same time, the US supplied Lockheed C-130 transport aircraft, Cadillac-Gage V-150 armoured cars as well as a large stock of rifles, machine-guns, mortars and cannons, and smoke and teargas launchers. In the late 1970s, more US military aircraft were supplied to Indonesia's armed forces, including another sixteen Skyhawks and 16 Bell UH-1H Huey helicopters. These helicopters were certainly used in strafing operations against West Papuans recorded elsewhere in this book. [See in particular Chapter Two and Appendix I.] In 1978, a year when Indonesian military operations in East Timor and West Papua were particularly ferocious, US military supplies to Indonesia amounted to a record £130 million, four times up on the previous year. During the ten-year period from 1974 to 1983, US military aid to Indonesia under a variety of US military programmes amounted to £504.5 million.

Since 1984, however, US military aid to Indonesia has been scaled down, partly as the result of budgetary cutbacks in Washington and partly because the Indonesian armed forces under General Benny Murdani, the armed forces commander-in-chief from 1983 to 1988, has been less enthusiastic about continuing the close ties with the US armed forces. The only major deal with the US in the past few years has been for the supply of twelve F-16 fighter-strike and four F-16 fighter-trainer aircraft, for delivery in 1988. US military aid to Indonesia has fallen from \$47.4 million in 1984 to \$22 million in 1988 and \$11.9 million (proposed) in 1989.⁵ As part of commercial purchases, Indonesia continues to import M-16 rifles, the standard rifle in the US army. During congressional hearings in Washington in May 1988, it was revealed that M-16 rifles had been exported to Indonesia from South Korea which produces the firearm under licence from the US.⁶

Increasingly, since the late 1970s, Indonesia has turned to arms dealers in other major weapons-exporting countries, in particular, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, as well as South Korea and Yugoslavia. From France, Indonesia has purchased Puma and Super-Puma helicopters, AMX tanks, infantry combat vehicles (MICV) and a large number of Exocet missiles and launchers, to arm the frigates supplied from elsewhere. From West Germany have come two submarines and from the Netherlands three frigates and more than a squadron of helicopters. Sweden has supplied 150 RBS-70 guided missiles.⁷

The most wide-ranging weapons supplies, however, have come from the UK. The upsurge in British military exports to Indonesia started

with a contract won in April 1978 by British Aerospace for the supply of eight Hawk ground-attack aircraft. This deal, which was licensed by the government of James Callaghan, was concluded at a time when Indonesia's war of aggression against East Timor had reached a climax. It led to widespread protest throughout the British labour movement. Since then, Britain has sold Indonesia twelve more Hawks, three refurbished naval frigates, Seacat launchers and more than seven hundred Rapier missiles supplied by British Aerospace. In 1988, BAe was handling contracts with Indonesia worth 220 million⁸, which also included a battery command-post computer software system. Another British company, Plessey, won a contract to supply a computer defence-command-and-control system, specially designed to give military commanders up-to-the-minute information about enemy forces in the air, at sea or on land. Computer software like this could well be put to use in Indonesia's counter-insurgency operations. Negotiations are also under way for the purchase from the UK of 600 Scorpion tanks, delayed only, it appears, by Indonesia's foreign currency difficulties.

In order to modernise the Indonesian armed forces and equip the crack infantry divisions created in 1985 by Kostrad, the army's strategic reserve, with advanced weapons systems, Indonesia has turned increasingly to British arms manufacturers. This expansion of Britain's arms trade with Indonesia has resulted also in a growing reliance on advanced technological training facilities in Britain. To cope with this rapid expansion, British Aerospace decided to set up its first overseas technical training college in East Java, which opened in 1988. All the students at the college will be members of the Indonesian armed forces.⁹

Indonesia is now also developing its own military-industrial complex, the centrepiece of which is the IPTN, Indonesia's aerospace company. Under its president-director, B.J. Habibie who received his technical and managerial training and experience with the West German aircraft manufacturer, Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohn, IPTN has concluded a number of joint-production ventures with overseas aircraft manufacturers. The first was with the Spanish aircraft company CASA, for the construction of CN-235 military aircraft, followed by contracts with aircraft manufacturers in France, West Germany and the USA for the production of helicopters. IPTN's hi-tech capability has been further enhanced by the inclusion of offset deals when purchasing foreign aircraft, giving it a share in the production of components for the overseas manufacturer. These days, overseas arms manufacturers are not only helping to equip, professionalise and modernise the Indonesian armed forces, they are also enhancing Indonesia's own capacity to develop as an arms manufacturer in its own right.

Both Holland and Sweden have laws prohibiting the export of weapons to countries engaged in armed conflict, yet they have refused to apply this prohibition to their trade in arms with Indonesia, despite indisputable evidence that Indonesian armed forces are waging war in

East Timor and West Papua. British governments, Labour and Conservative alike, have never refused to license any arms deal with Indonesia, hiding behind the claim, to quote many Foreign Office ministers over the years, that "we would not grant an export licence if we thought that the equipment was likely to be used for the purposes of repression". Equipping Indonesia's armed forces which are engaged at all times in repression and aggression is not considered to be a problem.

Like East Timor, West Papua has been living under Indonesian military occupation for years. Worldwide ignorance about the events that led to West Papua's colonisation by Indonesia, the nature of the continuing repression and the extent of resistance to Indonesian rule, has made it possible for Indonesia to proceed with its destruction of Papuan life, largely unhampered by international condemnation. Western governments have chosen to ignore the issue and give support to the Indonesian military regime in all possible ways. By their complicity and acquiescence, these countries have lent their support to the crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Indonesian military in West Papua, crimes that are leading to the obliteration of the West Papuan people. It is a situation that must not be allowed to continue.

Footnotes

1. *Tempo*, 23 July 1988.
2. *Jakarta Post*, 11 June 1988.
3. Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, *Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971-85*, SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 1987, Appendix I.
4. Testimony before a US House of Representatives Committee. See *Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1981 (Part 6)*, page 47.
5. From US Department of State, *Country Reports for 1986*, and recent figures supplied by the Department of State.
6. UPI and Scripps Howard News Service, quoted in *Indonesia News Service*, No 102, 23 May 1988, page 2.
7. Brzoska and Ohlson, *Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971-1985*.
8. *British Aerospace News*, August 1988.
9. *ibid.*

Appendix I:

Military report of incidents in the District of Jayawijaya in 1977

Translation

XVII Cendrawasih Military Regional Command. Intelligence Executive Agency

1. 7.IV.1977 at 15.00

GPL¹ troops, led by Matias Tabu, entered Pagai Kampung. They captured 1(one) GKI weapon. 2 (two) sacks of rice, 1 (one) Johnston. The people went into the jungle.

2. 13.IV.1977 at 14.00

One of our patrols on operation in the village of Pireme (direction of Makki) was attacked by a group of about 200 people, led by Boas Wawimbo. No incidents. They demanded that the army should be prohibited from entering their region up to the time of the election.²

3. 20.IV.1977 at 16.15

The army post in Kobakma was surrounded by the GPL and people.³ 1 (one) SSK (?) member, Corporal Rochim, was killed. 2 (two) SSK members were gravely wounded. The people went into the jungle with the GPL.

4. 21.IV.1977

Kelila police post surrounded. This was overcome with the help of army troops from Bokondini.

5. 25.IV.1977 at 06.30

Makki taken by the GPL. Airstrip closed.

6. 25.IV.1977 at 07.00

Piramid police post disarmed. Five members of the police, including the post commander (First Lieutenant Saprin) taken into the jungle, with six weapons: 4 Mausers, 1 Jungle, 1 Colt 38 pistol.

NB: One member of the police who escaped was arrested and is now in detention at 1702 Military Command. (No resistance.)

7. 25.IV.1977 at 16.00

Pitriver occupied by the GPL. Airstrip damaged.

8. 26.IV.1977 at 02.00

Suharto/Ilo or Abunawas Kampung attacked and burnt down by people from Piramid. The number of casualties and the number of *honai* (houses) burnt down not yet known.

9. 26.IV.1977 at 06.00

Keseloksak was murdered in Wasilima Kampung in Saudara (Brother) Pulus Lobo, former Wasilima village chief, who is now GPL commander in his region. Airstrip damaged.

10. 27.IV.1977 at 05.45

The GPL and people attacked Kombin post from two directions, with a force of about 3,000 people.

11. 27.IV.1977 at 06.30

Our troops, assisted by Lieutenant Colonel Alberth Dien, commander of 1702/Wamena command, launched a counter-attack and chase. Firing occurred by Merah River. The GPL started shooting.

12. 27.IV.1977 at 07.00

These troops tried to occupy Piramid. Further shooting took place with the GPL. (The GPL put up resistance.) The GPL fled into the jungle. Precise number of casualties not yet known. 3 (three) people with our troops were slightly injured.

13. 27.IV.1977 at 14.00

The GPL and people attacked and surrounded the Wurik Lebur Police post in the sub-district of Kelila, using firearms and traditional weapons. Our troops could only defend themselves while awaiting reinforcements. (Strafing from helicopters.) 2 (two) Brimob (Mobile Brigade) members wounded. Airstrip damaged. Number of casualties inflicted on the enemy not yet known.

14. 27.IV.1977 at 11.35

The GPL and people attacked and surrounded Makki police post. Police post (six Brimob troops) withdrew. *Camat* (sub-district head) and officials evacuated. HUB SSB (?) damaged.

NB: The six Brimob members withdrew to Wamena. Five arrived on 30.IV.1977. The sixth had to be left behind en route because he had a stomach disorder (his weapons were taken to safety). Nothing is yet known about his fate. He probably died.

15. 28.IV.1977 at 06.30

The GPL and people attacked and surrounded the Kabubaga police post. The post (two men) captured. Their weapons confiscated and the two policemen released. Airstrip damaged. An IAT (?) aircraft landed at the same time. The plane was damaged but the pilot was safe.

16. 28.IV.1977 at 11.30

The GPL and people, with a force of about 4,000 people, attacked and surrounded Tiom, using firearms and traditional weapons. Withdrew on 29.IV.1977, after strafing support from helis. No casualties on our side. The number of casualties on the enemy side not known.

17. 30.IV.1977 at 11.20

The GPL murdered four people in Usilimo Kampung, sub-district of Kurulu.

18. 30.IV.1977 at 13.00

2,000 (two thousand) people, consisting of children, old people and some young boys, surrendered to Tiom post.

19. 5.V.1977 at 12.15

The GPL and people attacked and surrounded a police post in Ilaga and held it until 7.V.1977, with a large force (thousands) of people. 2 (two) Mausers and 1 (one) SKS weapon fell into enemy hands. Airstrip damaged (severely). 1 (one) SSB MAF weapon captured. The number of casualties not known. The enemy withdrew after strafing by helicopters.

20. 8.5.1977 at 09.45

Our troops (joint army and police) on operations from Kelila to Bokondini were attacked by the GPL together with at estimated 3,000 people. At that time, our troops were supported by strafing from helis. A one-hour battle ensued. The enemy suffered many casualties. On our side, one casualty, an SSK member, shot in the left hand. The enemy withdrew, leaving many casualties.

21. 10.V.1977

In Piramid, a clergyman, Rev. Bosman, was holding a meeting with tribal chiefs and bible teachers when suddenly, about 20 GPL and thousands of people appeared, objecting to these discussions. One of the GPL, calling himself the deputy-commander, said:

"1. West Papua is now free.

2. Inform the army, the governor and the Indonesian President that West Papua is now free."

After he had spoken, he stood up, called on the people to clap hands loudly and say: "West Papua is free." He asked Rev. Bosmon to get them ammunition. He replied that he couldn't. The GPL then became very angry and the clergyman and his friends quickly left.

22. 11.V.1977

The GPL and people attacked Abusa Kampung from the direction of Usilimo, Ilugua, Wolo and Wagi. The Kampung was burnt to the ground. The number of casualties is not known. The GPL operations then continued in the kampungs of Ampena, Lima, Simona. These kampungs were burnt down and there were many casualties. The exact number is not yet known.

23. 20.V.1977 at 11.00

Our troops on operations to Logo Kampung, in the sub-district of Piramid, made fire contact with the enemy at 15.00 with the following results: One Mauser, ten GPL/people killed. 25 people wounded. *Our losses:* Engineer, First-Lieutenant Kiplan slightly wounded from a Longser shot, fired by himself. Explosion at the end of his rifle. Five of our people were wounded by spears, arrows and axes.

24. 23.V.1977 at 08.55

2 Zipur 9 Paras (sappers) killed, after being ambushed by the enemy/

people in Bokondini: 1. N. Nyambuh, First-Corporal, and 2. K. Rudito, First-Sergeant. The enemy used choppers, axes and arrows.

25. 24.V.1977 at 09.00

A Twin Otter plane carrying troops from Wamena to Bokondini was shot at as it was landing on Bokondini airstrip. One tank sprang a leak. The main tyre was deflated. The aircraft managed to land safely.

26. 30.V.1977 at 16.00

The Bokondini post (Zipur 9 Paras) on patrol in the Bokondini district was attacked by the GPL on its return home. First-Corporal I.N. Djahta was killed (hit by enemy fire).

27. 4.VI.1977 at 12.00

Our troops on operations from Muwak to Bokondini were ambushed by the GPL between Kelila and Bokondini. First-Corporal O. Soekarman from Infantry Brigade 752 was severely wounded by an arrow (taken to Wamena Hospital). Army First-Corporal Sakroni from Zipur 9 Paras was slightly wounded. Strafing support from the air.

28. 28.VI.1977 at 18.30

Troops under the command of First-Lieutenant Jalil Umbi made contact with the GPL. One man, Private Matus Maren, was killed by enemy fire with a Mauser, at the rise to Wolo Kampung, sub-district of of Wurigelebur. It is planned to transport his body by heli to Pyramid, then to Wamena.

29. 9.VI.1977 at 16.00

A GKI church in Anggruk, sub-district of Kurima, was burnt down by people whose identity is not known.

30. 4.VI.1977

People in Bokondini surrendered under the leadership of (1) Penakluh Penggo, head of the Bokondini tribe, (2) Argonik Pagawak, head of the Argonik tribe, (3) Murak Pagawak, *camat* official in Bokondini. Among them were teachers and shepherds.

31. 4.VII.1977

People of the sub-district of Kurulu, supported by Kur Mabel, tribal chief of Jiwika, ordered 323 people, adults as well as children . . . (sentence is not complete).

32. 7.VII.1977 at 11.00

Fire contact was made between the GPL and our troops in Bokondini post, Bokondini sub-district (Lama town). The following was re-captured: 19 SP bullets, 5 Mauser bullets, 1 Garang bullet. GPL leader Ruben Baminggen was killed.

33. 24.VII.1977 at 11.00

A patrol, under Czi Captain Tony David, Battalion 751, was ambushed by the GPL in the region of Umuga, Bokondini district. Private Muharto was severely wounded by an arrow in the stomach. No gains on our side. GPL fled.

34. 29.VII.1977

192 people came down and surrendered to the army post in Kurulu sub-district. Many of them were slightly or severely injured as a result of operations - mortar-fire and strafing by our troops on 27.VII.1977.

35. 27.VII.1977

A heli from the Surta⁴ Team on operations in Jayawijaya crashed in Kurulu sub-district; it was severely damaged. The five-man crew included four Australians and one Indonesian (First-Lieutenant Subandi). Their conditions: the Australian pilot died instantly and the four others were severely wounded, including First-Lieutenant Subandi. They were flown to Australia on 30.VII.1977 for treatment. The crash was caused by bad weather; the aircraft crashed into a tree.

36. 7.VIII.1977

A Cessna aircraft of the Surta Team was shot at in the Ilugua/Wolo district. The aircraft got a hole in the fuselage. It landed safely. It was hit by a bullet, possibly from a Mauser.

37. 4.VIII.1977 at 10.00

GPL member, Leby Tabuni, a native of Wame Kampung, surrendered. Twelve GPL members, four men and eight women, surrendered in Kurulu district.

38. 7.VIII.1977 at 16.00

Sixteen GPL members, twelve women and four men, surrendered in Kurulu district.

39. 9.VIII.1977 at 16.00

Eighteen GPL members, nine men and nine women, and twenty Hansip (civil defence) members, with the former head of the Kurulu and Lokon Legit tribes, surrendered in Kurulu district.

40. 15.VII.1977 at 17.30

Pulus Samino, member of the DPRD (regional assembly), using a report from Jayawijaya district chief, made derogatory remarks about the President of the Republic.

41. 9.V.1978

178 sympathiers of the GPL surrendered in Kobagma. They were then given guidance. In Iluga, a GPL member, Gognak ba Mingen, from Bilu Kampung, surrendered. He reported that the GPL commander of Bilu/Bok had been murdered by the people. North of Kobagma, nineteen GPL members were shot dead and 64 were arrested.

42. 22.III.1978 at 15.00

7 members of sub-team 5, plus 100 people, went on operations to Kelopak Kampung. On arrival at Pagai Kampung, between rivers Wanabur and Panaka, they shot dead sixteen GPL remnants. On 23.III.1977 at 09.00, they succeeded in capturing six GPL members including Debare, the GPL commander of Pagai Kampung.

43. 11.III.1987 at 07.30

A tribal war broke out in Ibele region. Kurulu sub-district, district of Jayawijaya, in which one man was killed. The fight was over a woman. A traditional peace-making ceremony was held, at which ten pigs were given in compensation.

44. 13.III.1978

A tribal war in Buton Kampung. Oksibil sub-district, district of

Jayawijaya. Eleven men and three women were killed.

45. 3.IV.1978 at 09.00

Fourteen people sent to represent the people of Paspale, who fled at the time of the disturbances, consisting of five tribal chiefs and four religious teachers, ran away to 1702 Koramil (sub-district military command), 08 Kurulu, Sector B.

46. 7.IV.1978 at 12.00

51 people, formerly of Kobagma, who had fled under the leadership of Dati Loga, surrendered in Kobagma, Jayawijaya district.

47. 17.IV.1978 at 12.00

The Kobagma post in Jayawijaya district accepted the surrendered of 850 GPL people, led by Nguarek Pagawar. The Pyramid post accepted the surrender of 138 people from Talang Kampung. The Kobagma post accepted the surrender of 6 GPL members, led by Yurur Endarba.

Footnotes

1. GPL, which stands for *gerombolan pengacau liar* or 'wild terrorist gangs', is the acronym used in Indonesian official circles, instead of referring to the OPM.
2. The Indonesian general election that took place in May 1977.
3. *Rakyat*, meaning 'people', is used throughout the document, apparently to denote ordinary people who accompany OPM guerrillas.
4. *Surta* team: border survey team.

Appendix II:

The Murder of Arnold Ap and Eduard Mofu

Arrest and detention

The known facts regarding the arrest and detention of Arnold Ap and Eduard Mofu are as follows:

30 November 1983

Arnold Ap was arrested by two red-beret para-commandos from Kopassandha (now called Kopassus), the elite corps, which had been carrying out special operations in West Papua for several months. Nearly thirty others were arrested at around the same time.

On 6 December, the Jakarta daily, *Sinar Harapan*, reported Arnold Ap's arrest saying that his family had no contact with him. On 16 December, the paper reported that the *Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia* or YLBHI (Indonesian Foundation of Legal Aid Institutes) in Jakarta had cabled the military commander of Irian Jaya protesting that it was illegal for a detainee not to be allowed to tell his family where he was, and stressing that, under the Criminal Procedural Code, a detainee should be charged and tried or released. The YLBHI made a determined effort to have Arnold Ap's case handled in accordance with the Criminal Procedural Code enacted at the end of 1981.

13 December 1983

After interrogation and maltreatment at Panorama, a former night club used as Kopassandha's interrogation centre, Arnold Ap was transferred to the provincial military command, Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih.

20 January 1984

Together with four other detainees, Gento Johanis Romainum, Agustinus Runtuboy, Alex Mebri and Octavianus Yanteo, Arnold Ap

was transferred again, to police force headquarters, Kodak XVII. There, they were under the direct supervision of Lieutenant-Colonel Soedjoko, head of section one (intelligence) at Kodak XVII. This was taken as meaning that the cases were now being handled in accordance with the Criminal Procedural Code which stipulates that only the police may make arrests and carry out preliminary investigations. From then on, up to the time of the 'escape attempt' and murders three months later, the five detainees were interrogated not by the army but by the police and "in a somewhat more humane fashion", according to Jayapura legal circles.

Prior to the transfer, Arnold Ap had been questioned about the *Sinar Harapan* report. Kopassandha interrogators promised to release him if he told them who had 'leaked' the information. Friends and acquaintances were also pressed by Kopassandha interrogators to reveal the source. According to legal sources in Jayapura, "efforts to discover who was the source of the report continued at a high level of intensity, right up to the middle of January".

The January 1984 issue of *Berita Oikoumene*, the monthly publication of the Indonesian Council of Churches, reported Arnold Ap's arrest.

21 January

The provincial chief of police, Soewarso, in a letter No. B/04/I/1984, informed Arnold Ap's employer, the Rector of Cendrawasih University, of Ap's arrest, in response to inquiries from the Rector about Ap's disappearance. The Rector suspended Ap from the end of March and 'temporarily' dismissed him as curator of the Cendrawasih University Museum of Anthropology although no formal charges had been made, still less a court verdict passed. His salary was reduced by twenty-five per cent. The Rector's letter of suspension, No. 137/UP/UC/84, was issued in view of the fact that Ap had been arrested on suspicion of subversion. Both the police and the Rector were in breach of the presumption of innocence recognised under Indonesian law.

11 February

An uprising in Jayapura was foiled and two West Papuans were killed trying to raise the West Papuan flag outside the governor's office. Many Papuan members of the armed forces deserted and fled to Papua New Guinea. Ap's wife, Cory, and three children, along with many others, including lecturers at Cendrawasih University and Papuans working for the provincial government, also fled to Papua New Guinea.

February (date unclear)

At a flag-raising ceremony, the military commander of Irian Jaya, Brigadier-General Sembiring Meliala, told the Irian Jaya branch of the youth organisation, KNPI, that Ap was in detention and was being questioned after confessing that his Mambesak songs were intended to

inspire "the OPM separatist struggle".

25 February

Arnold Ap's case was handed on to the public prosecutor, implying that formal charges might now be brought. He should have been transferred to Abepura Prison but Lieutenant-Colonel Soedjoko said that Abepura Prison was overcrowded and conditions there were unsatisfactory; he suggested that Ap and his friends should remain at Kodak XVII detention centre although interrogations were now to be undertaken by the Public Prosecutor's Office.

In Jakarta, four West Papuans complained to Parliament about the arrests in Jayapura, including that of their colleague, Arnold Ap. The four men then fell under surveillance. Fearing for their lives, with army death-squads operating in many parts of Java, they took refuge in the Dutch embassy on 29 February. They were granted permission to leave for the Netherlands under Dutch protection two weeks later.

9 March

Eduard Mofu, a member of Ap's Mambesak group, was arrested by Kopassandha forces and held for two weeks at Panorama interrogation centre.

13 March

Sinar Harapan was "sternly reprimanded" for reporting that the Procedural Code had been breached in Arnold Ap's case. The authorities insisted that "the detainee was being treated in conformity with the laws in force". The Department of Information, whose statement was published by the newspaper, alleged that the report had led to security disorders in Irian Jaya "jeopardising Indonesia's relations with a certain friendly foreign country".

24 March

Mofu was transferred to Kodak XVII to be with Ap and his colleagues. Octavianus Yanteo had been released, so there were now five detainees at Kodak XVII. Arnold Ap states in a taped message smuggled out of prison that Lieutenant-Colonel Soedjoko asked him whether he wanted Mofu to join them. This was typical of Soedjoko's many efforts to win Ap's confidence and trust.

March

Arnold Ap, presumably together with his co-detainees, acquired the assistance of lawyers of the Legal Aid Institute of Cendrawasih University (LBH-Uncen). He had been offered legal assistance by the YLBHI in Jakarta but opted for the Jayapura-based group. However, his defence team was unable to function properly because one member, Hengky Kafiari had fled to PNG, another, Adi Suwarno, had been dismissed for alleged financial irregularities, and a third, Fred Martin Kareth was seriously ill in hospital.

This was the first time Indonesian human rights lawyers had offered to take up a political case in Irian Jaya. The YLBHI was trying at the time to establish a branch in Jayapura. This, plus *Sinar Harapan's* interest in Ap's case, were a sign of a growing concern in Indonesia about human rights violations in Irian Jaya. Added to this, Arnold Ap was well-known and greatly admired in some intellectual circles in Java.

April

The April issue of *Berita Oikoumene* published a strongly-worded letter from two officials of GAMKI, a Christian-based organisation in Jayapura, and the head of the Christian Social Affairs Department of the Department of Religious Affairs in Irian Jaya, criticising the journal's January report of Ap's arrest. "In our opinion," they wrote, "it is not easy for the Military Commander of Irian Jaya, Brigadier-General Sembiring to arrest and detain someone unless the case is very clear or there is good reason to believe that the person has done something that could disturb the security and unity of the Indonesian people".

31 March and 10 April

Court hearings were held for three of the prisoners. Arnold Ap, Genthio Romainum and Eduard Mofu were to be indicted, but the hearings were adjourned without any charges being made because a witness (or witnesses) had not yet been traced. One witness whose absence may have caused this delay was Marthen L. Rumabar, from the Mambesak group, who had possibly fled with others to PNG.

Meanwhile, relatives of Ap and Romainum were informed by the public prosecutor's office that there was not sufficient evidence to charge them but the army would not allow them to be released. However, according to a taped message recorded by Arnold Ap early in April, the detainees had been told by Lieutenant-Colonel Soedjoko that they would be released on 10 April.

As far as is known, the charges against Ap were that he had arranged a meeting between an American professor and an OPM leader in 1981, that he had helped Professor Fred Hatabu [?] to escape from Irian Jaya and that his folk songs were an expression of support for the OPM.

14 April

Arnold Ap and his co-detainees were given a good meal and drinks by their interrogators, further strengthening their belief that release was imminent. Indeed, throughout their detention at Kodak XVII, they had been given generous facilities and treatment by Lieutenant-Colonel Soedjoko. They were allowed to have Arnold's radio and tape-recorder (which he used to tape a message to his wife and children). Daniel Mandowen, a Mambesak member not in detention, was often allowed to visit them, sometimes staying till late at night chatting, singing and making recordings.

Ap was allowed out of detention on several occasions, and was seen on campus in the company of Lieutenant-Colonel Soedjoko, apparently to collect his pay-cheque. Arnold said in his message that permission to have the tape-recorder had been given by Lieutenant-Colonel Soedjoko "to please me because he knows I'm an artist and like to play regional music. In fact, he will give me anything I want." The message was full of optimism, perhaps because it was addressed to his wife and children, and he wanted to boost their morale.

15 April

By now, Ap had been in prosecution detention for fifty days, without charge. According to Article 25, paragraph 4 of the Criminal Procedural Code, he should have been released. Despite the promise of release, nothing happened.

21 April, Easter Saturday

Reverend Bonay was allowed by the guards to celebrate Easter with Ap and his co-detainees. They met for an Easter gathering in their prison cell, with prison guards also present. Reverend Bonay left the prisoners at 9 pm, the night on which the 'escape attempt' took place.

The next morning, another minister came for an Easter Day service but was not allowed in. He was not told that the detainees were not there. Later that day, Lieutenant-Colonel Soedjoko told Mrs Romainum, Genthos's mother, that her son had escaped from prison together with his four co-detainees.

International interest in Arnold Ap's arrest

Ap's arrest had aroused protest abroad, particularly in Australia where he had a number of friends. His arrest was often referred to in the press, and some academics publicly drew attention to his case. There was a lot of interest in Holland as well.

4 April 1984

Senator Alan Missen of the Australian Liberal Party and chairman of the Parliamentary Amnesty International Group, wrote to the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs asking about the thirty people arrested in Irian Jaya in late 1983. He also asked the Australian Government to make inquiries about the safety of Arnold Ap and his co-detainees, and to make every effort to ensure that they received fair trials or were released immediately. This led to inquiries by the Australian ambassador in Jakarta.

However, the Department of Foreign Affairs did not reply to Senator Missen's letter until 9 May (more than two weeks after Arnold Ap's death) and even then, it did so only after renewed pressure from Senator Missen. (See *Australian Hansard*, 9 May 1984 Senate, column 1871.) The reply said, *inter alia*: "Firm information on the whereabouts of Mr Ap is

not available but we are continuing to pursue our inquiries. Enquiries were made about Mr Ap for example during the recent visit to Irian Jaya by our ambassador in Jakarta. We are aware of press reports that Mr Ap has been killed but these reports have yet to be confirmed."

Later, the Indonesian Foreign Minister was to refer to the Australian ambassador as his source for information about the alleged circumstances of Arnold Ap's death which the ambassador had obtained during a trip to Jayapura. Hence, the letter to Senator Missen was misleading as the ambassador was already well aware of the murder.

The 'escape attempt' of Arnold Ap and Eduard Mofu

The known facts about the 'escape attempt' of Arnold Ap and Eduard Mofu are as follows:

Late on Saturday evening, 21 April 1984, Corporal Pius Wanen, a Papuan police officer on duty at Kodak XVII, armed with an UZI-rifle, unlocked the cell doors of the five detainees and ordered them out. Two other guards on duty had allegedly been given sleeping pills by Agustinus Runtuboy according to a court judgement in January 1985. Wanen escorted them to the rear of the detention centre, through the barbed-wire fence, to the premises of the Cendrawasih Sports Building where a vehicle with a Kopassandha soldier at the wheel was waiting, with the engine running. All the detainees except Alex Mebri boarded the vehicle and were driven to Base G on the coast, south of Jayapura.

Alex Mebri, who later fled to PNG and was hence the only one able to talk freely about the incident, has testified that he was woken by someone calling his name. At first he thought he was dreaming, then thought the OPM had come to free them from detention. He left his cell and was about to leave with the others but returned to his cell to grab his trousers because he had put some important documents in the pockets. He reached the rear of the detention centre in time to hear the vehicle drive off. Finding himself alone, he quickly made his way out, crossed the city to a forest on the outskirts and reached Waena. The next day he went to his sister's home in Abe-Gunung and later crossed the border into Papua New Guinea.

Corporal John Kraar's version of the murder of Ap and Mofu

A detailed account of the 'escape attempt' was given by Corporal John Kraar, a member of the Mobile Brigade (Brimob), a unit of the police. Kraar had been seconded to Kodak XVII. Kraar later crossed the border to Papua New Guinea and stayed in the refugee camp at Vanimo for some time, though refugees did not regard him as a genuine refugee. Kraar's account was recorded by a refugee, Constantinopol Ruhukail, in July 1985:

According to Corporal Kraar, the Indonesian military authorities

regarded Arnold Ap as extremely dangerous because of the activities of his Mambesak players, and wanted him sentenced to death or given a life sentence. However, they could find no formal grounds for a charge in court. Lieutenant-Colonel Soedjoko, head of intelligence of Kodak XVII, was therefore instructed to look after Arnold Ap and his co-detainees and to trap Arnold Ap and Eduard Mofu. In collaboration with Satgas Kopassandha (Kopassandha Special Unit) and the intelligence unit of the regional military command, Soedjoko plotted a scheme that would be "legally defensible".

Soedjoko knew that Ap's family had fled after the 11 February 1984 events in Jayapura, and also that West Papuan members of the armed forces in contact with the underground had made an attempt to rescue Arnold Ap and Eduard Mofu. He recruited Corporal Pius Wanen of the police force, a heavy drinker, gave him half a million rupiahs with a promise of promotion and other perks. Wanen was instructed to open up the cell-doors to enable the detainees to escape. The two others recruited to implement the plot were Izaak Arobaya, a fisherman, and Bob Suwela, a student at Cendrawasih University.

Kraar's description of the departure of the detainees from the prison tallies with the account already given, above.

He went on to say that when the detainees (minus Mebri) reached Base G, they were told that a Johnson boat was ready. But it was some distance away because of rough seas, so they would have to swim out to it. Four (including, in Kraar's account, the already-released Yanteo) did so, but Eduard Mofu was struck on the back of the head with a hard object and stabbed in the neck. (Kraar does not say who committed this murder.) His hands and feet were tied up and his body was thrown into the sea. (According to information later conveyed to Cory Ap, Arnold's widow, Mofu was stabbed by Pius Wanen.)

The other detainees, unaware of what had happened to Eduard Mofu, clambered on board the boat where two Papuans, Izaak Arobaya and Bob Suwela, were waiting for them. Pius Wanen then swam out to join them. He asked them where Eduard Mofu was, though he must have known what happened on the beach. Ap and the others may have thought that Mofu had escaped into the woods so the boat departed without stopping to find out where he was. The detainees had by now lost two of their colleagues.

The boat took them a few kilometres west (instead of going east in the direction of Papua New Guinea) to Pasir 7 where everyone alighted. Arobaya told them the boat could not take them any further so he and Bob Suwela would return to Jayapura to find another boat and return to take them on to Papua New Guinea. Arnold Ap and his two colleagues, not suspecting anything, according to Kraar, because Pius Wanen remained with them, took shelter in a cave and waited for Izaak Arobaya and Bob Suwela.

Four days later, at about 7 am on 26 April, Arnold Ap went out of the cave to urinate. The hiding-place was surrounded by Kopassandha troops. He was shot down with an automatic weapon and hit three

times in the stomach. He screamed for help but the others fled as soon as they heard the shooting. One of the soldiers stabbed Ap in the chest and another slashed his wrists.

Just then, Izaak Arobaya and Bob Suwela returned. They showed surprise and were ordered by the troops to take the stricken Arnold by boat to Aryoko Army Hospital in Jayapura. He arrived there at about 2 pm on 26 April and soon died of his wounds. John Kraar claimed that he sang on his death-bed and told a nurse that, should he die, she should give his ring to his wife and children. Other sources say he was dead on arrival at the hospital.

Official explanations, after the deaths became public

The news of Arnold Ap's murder was first announced by the Australian Associated Press and reported in *Canberra Times* on 8 May. It immediately aroused widespread comment and protest in the Australian, Papua New Guinea and Dutch press. The matter was raised in the Australian Parliament by Senator Alan Missen on 9 May (see above).

Peter Hastings, foreign editor of the *Sydney Morning Herald*, published the first of three reports entitled, "The Murder of Arnold Ap" on 14 May. The killing was an act of "premeditated murder because he was an Irianese intellectual who personified Irianese culture which some powerful figures in Indonesia are not prepared to tolerate". This stinging criticism was a blow for Jakarta because Hastings is known to be very sympathetic to the regime.

On 15 May, the same paper published two letters from Australian academics, strongly protesting against Ap's murder. All the signatories were well-known Indonesianists. The letter from J.A. Mackie and Peter McCawley said: "Those of us who count ourselves Indonesia's staunch friends in Australia and who have long been endeavouring to present the Indonesian side of the story to the Australian public on controversial issues, find it impossible to defend or condone this kind of behaviour."

In addition, 125 Australian academics, among them, well-known Indonesian specialists, attending a meeting in Adelaide of the Asian Studies Association of Australia signed a petition protesting against Ap's murder.

The Indonesian authorities, angered by such reactions and unnerved by the shock waves reverberating among Papuans in Jayapura, started trying to disseminate their version of what had happened. On 16 May, two meetings took place in Jayapura at which explanations were offered about how Ap met his death. There are two reports of a meeting convened at Cendrawasih University which was attended by students and military personnel. According to one account, Agustinus Runtuboy was introduced as a witness to the events. He said that one prisoner, Alex Mebri, never reached Base G and two others (Ap and Mofu) never made it to the boat but were shot at Base G, while the

others, including himself, frightened by the gunshots, fled into the forest, lost contact with each other and made their way home separately. No questions were asked at the meeting. The names of all those present were recorded and photographs were taken.

According to the source that provided the above account, Brigadier-General Sembiring, military commander of Irian Jaya, also gave an account of the 'escape attempt' on the same day at a service held in his home for members of the Christian Students' Movement (GMKI). According to Sembiring, Arnold Ap and the prison guard (Pius Wanen) were at Pasir 6 (not Pasir 7) for five days. He said his men "were not fools" and they "knew where to look" so presumably waited to pounce on the 'escapees', for reasons best known to themselves. He claims that when the troops arrived to apprehend Ap, Pius started to shoot as he and Ap "ran across the coral". The two men were standing together when the soldiers shot at them from a distance of seven metres. Our source commented that, if shots were fired using the standard M-16 rifle of the Indonesian army, why was only Arnold hit, and why was he shot in the stomach and not in the legs, if the intention was only to stop him running away?

Refugee sources in PNG gave a different account of the 16 May meeting in Cendrawasih University. According to them, Gentho Rumanum explained that the killings would not have occurred if they had not escaped from detention on the orders of Pius Wanen. He explained that they were driven to Base G, swam out to the boat, were taken to Pasir 7 and were apprehended there on 26 April. According to this version, Ap and Mofu resisted an order to put their hands up and were shot dead. Refugee sources say that Runtuboy was also at the meeting but do not say whether he spoke.

In the first half of May, 1984, *Cendrawasih*, the government-owned newspaper in Jayapura, reported that five detainees under police detention had escaped from prison with the help of 'PW', a member of the police force. Security forces had searched for them throughout the district without success till indications led them to Base G. After hunting the men down for five days, their hiding place was discovered. "As they were being chased, the group of fugitives opened fire on the security patrol, and during the course of an exchange of fire, one of the fugitives, Arnold C. Ap, was hit. The others fled from the spot."

Mulya Lubis, Director of the Jakarta-based Legal Aid Institute, visited Jayapura in June 1984, in connection with plans to set up a branch in the city, and later reported that investigations into Ap's murder had led him to believe that Arnold Ap had been shot dead by the police at Pasir 6 three days after their 'escape' and that Mofu's body had been found at sea.

Lubis and another lawyer, Yap Thiam Hien, who visited Jayapura with Lubis, were deeply concerned that they failed to get a clear account from officials about the murders. They called for an independent commission of inquiry into the killing of Arnold Ap and Eduard Mofu. "There is a conspiracy of silence in Irian Jaya over this," said Yap.

(*Sydney Morning Herald*, 30 June, 1984)

The Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, was quoted in the *Sydney Morning Herald* (2 July) as saying that Ap had been killed in a shoot-out when the boat in which he was fleeing to PNG was tracked down by a patrol boat. On the same day, Peter Hastings published "The Murder of Arnold Ap (Part Two)", reporting that "the unresolved manner of the death of Arnold Ap . . . remains an extremely touchy issue here in Jakarta". Hastings reported Foreign Minister Mochtar as saying that the source of his account that Ap had been killed in a shoot-out was an "unnamed ambassador" (i.e. the Australian ambassador, Rawdon Dalrymple). Hastings went on: "In almost 40 years in journalism, this is the first time I can recall the Foreign Minister of an important country citing an 'unnamed ambassador' as the source for a ministerial statement."

On 27 August 1984, Hastings published yet another article entitled, "The Murder of Arnold Ap (Part Three)". He reported that a visitor returning to the US from Irian Jaya had given him a letter signed by five ex-patriates working in Irian Jaya confirming that Ap's 'escape' in April was "a put-up job by the Kopassanda or red berets . . . Some Kopassandha officers thought up a neat scheme whereby an alcoholic Irianese prison guard was offered a relatively huge sum to arrange for Ap's escape. From the time it occurred, his every move, down to the time he was captured and killed, was carefully monitored . . . Ap died four days after escaping. The first news about his death came from a nurse at the military hospital in Jayapura. She recognised him and informed his family and friends. He had been tortured and twice shot. The guard involved in the conspiracy was in prison."

Four men tried for organising the 'escape'

At the end of 1984, the Indonesian authorities staged a trial of four men who were accused of organising the 'escape' of Arnold Ap and his co-detainees. Only one document from the trial is available, the verdict of the court passed in January 1985. All four men were found guilty.

The four men were: *Pius Wanen*, who was accused of planning the escape, taking a weapon from the guard-room, freeing the detainees from their cells, and escorting them to Base G and then to their hiding place in Pasir 7; *Jonas Rejauw*, who was accused of being in contact with Arnold Ap and implementing his orders, arranging for a taxi to drive the men to Base G, raising money for the escape, supplying the escape vessel and organising the departure from Base G; *Bob Suwela*, who was accused of making contact with Izaak Arobaya, the owner of a boat, of providing funds for *Fajar Merdeka*, an illegal bulletin which Arnold Ap was alleged to have produced, of paying Izaak Arobaya for the hire of a boat, and passing on messages sent out by Arnold Ap via Jonas Rejauw; and *Izaak Arobaya*, who was accused of supplying the boat to transport the detainees to Papua New Guinea and selecting the hiding-place for the escapees.

The four were charged under the anti-subversion law and received sentences of between two-and-a-half and five-and-a-half years.

From West Papuan refugees and from Cory Ap, TAPOL learnt the following about these four men:

Pius Wanen was a corporal in Brimob. He had been seconded to the Irian Jaya police force. He was working under Lieutenant-Colonel Soedjoko, first assistant for intelligence of the police force, at the time.

Bob Suwela, a member of the government-sponsored Indonesian National Youth Committee (KNPI), was well known to West Papuan activists in Jayapura and had long been suspected as a spy working for Kopassandha intelligence. Constantinopel Ruhukail believes that Suwela was responsible for his own arrest by Kopassandha troops in 1982.

Izaak Arobaya was a fisherman who had, on many occasions, secretly transported West Papuans to Papua New Guinea by boat. It is not clear whether he did this out of a sense of commitment or simply to earn some ^{money} ~~some~~. He may not have been aware that, in this case, he had been recruited for an army operation. He could, however, certainly have provided a vessel for the trip to Papua New Guinea. Indeed the boat he supplied must have been suitable for the purpose. The court verdict said that he refused to transport them to their destination because he was not offered enough money.

Jonas Rejauw is a relative and close friend of the Ap family and was looking after the family home after Cory Ap and her children left Jayapura. The Aps supported him in many ways, and he visited Arnold Ap in detention. He was arrested by Kopassandha soon after the murders.

It is not unusual for the military to sacrifice their own agents by forcing them to take responsibility, in a court of law, for a conspiracy engineered by the security forces; hence, the imprisonment of Wanen and Suwela. Arobaya was probably an innocent participant in the plot. As for Rejauw, he was apparently dragged into the plot in order to cover up an important gap. At the trial he was named as being on the vehicle that took the prisoners to Base G, though he was not said to be the driver. The verdict referred to two others in the vehicle, a driver and a 'conductor' but did not identify them. According to Kraar, the vehicle was driven by a Kopassandha soldier but the Indonesians would certainly not have wanted to reveal Kopassandha's involvement. The charges against Jonas therefore took care of the matter of responsibility for arranging transport from Kodak XVII to Base G.

The role of police officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Soedjoko

It is evident from all accounts of the affair that Lieutenant-Colonel Soedjoko played a pivotal role in mounting the fake escape attempt. It may appear unusual for Kopassandha to use a police officer in a conspiracy of this nature but Soedjoko was well suited for the role.

According to Cory Ap, she and her husband had been on friendly terms with Soedjoko and his wife for some time before Ap's arrest. Cory did her midwifery training together with the woman who was then engaged to Soedjoko. Mrs Soedjoko later became Cory's superior. Arnold was also in contact with Soedjoko who sometimes asked him to perform at cultural events for visiting officials. Because of their friendship, Cory initially found it hard to believe that Soedjoko had been instrumental in laying a trap for her husband. Later, when she heard so many people at Vanimo camp in Papua New Guinea warn her of Soedjoko's duplicity, she became convinced herself, as she wrote later in a letter, "because Lieutenant-Colonel Soedjoko works for the intelligence and it is his task to appear to be guiding Papuans, whereas the way he goes about it only reinforces Papuan animosity towards uniting with Indonesia."

At some stage during Ap's detention, some officials tried to have the case handled in accordance with the Criminal Procedural Code. This is why Ap and his co-prisoners were transferred to the police detention centre at Kodak XVII. It was here that Soedjoko began to play a seemingly protective role, using his friendship with Ap to win his confidence. As Arnold stated in his taped message, Soedjoko went out of his way to be nice to him. Unfortunately, Soedjoko was merely creating the conditions for a plot that led to the premeditated murder of two West Papuan political detainees, one of whom had won respect as one of West Papua's finest intellectuals.

Appendix III:

Additional information regarding Chapters Three and Four

After completing the manuscript of this book, the authors obtained new documents containing important data about some issues discussed in the early chapters, particularly Chapter Three on "The plunder of resources" and Chapter Four on "Squatters in their own land". Some relevant quotations and tables are reproduced in this Appendix as it was too late to incorporate this material into the body of the book.

All the following excerpts, with the exception of Table 2 on exports and imports, are quotations from *Irian Jaya: Economic Change, Migrant Labour and Indigenous Welfare*, by Chris Manning and Michael Rumbiak, a paper prepared for Indonesian Region Surveys Workshop, Australian National University, Canberra, 1 - 6 February, 1987.

* * *

The changing structure of the economy

Observers of the regional economy in the early 1970s viewed investment in resource-based industries as a major potential stimulant to future economic development in the province. To some extent, these expectations were confirmed during the 1970s. Regional Gross Domestic Product (RGDP) at constant prices is estimated to have increased fourfold over the period 1970-1979, largely due to growth in oil and copper exports. Discovery of rich oil deposits near Sorong in the mid 1970s and exports from the Freeport mine at Tembagapura resulted in a substantial increase in minings' share of RGDP, contributing two-thirds of the total in 1980 (see Table 1).

From being a major drain on central government coffers, Irian Jaya became a significant net contributor to the central government budget

by 1980, with the value of total exports from the province exceeding \$500 million or 3 per cent of national export earnings. This was supported by a much smaller but significant expansion in log and fish exports which accounted for close to one third of the total estimated value of agricultural production in 1980. The ban on log exports from Indonesia implemented in 1985 in Irian, and both declining oil prices and a fall in the volume of oil exports as the wells in production began to dry up, saw a fall in total exports and in total RGDP by the mid 1980s. But mineral and fish exports continued to dominate total regional product, contributing over half of the total.

Table 1: Exports from Irian Jaya in selected years, from 1960 to 1985
(In thousands of \$)

Commodity	1960/1961	1971	1980	1984	1985 ¹
Village products					
Copra	747	317	-	-	-
Nutmeg	521	125	393	531	252
Mace	180	80	297	440	198
Cocoa	-	-	29	152	130
Crocodile skins	527	392	52	n.a.	73
Sub total	1,975	914	771	1,083	653
Oil	2,780	1,184	540,910	430,600	286,620
Copper	-	-	114,010	123,870	103,400
Prawns (frozen)	-	704	19,770	16,470	15,480
Tuna	-	-	5,180 ²	2,660	4,280
Logs	286	58	29,630	8,400	120
Other	221	26	1,280	2,540	420
Total	5,262	2,860	708,240	585,663	410,973

¹ To November.

² 1981

[Manning and Rumbiak, pages 7 - 9]

* * *

Manufacturing on the other hand has not increased its share of regional produce over the past 15 years. After declining in real terms in the 1970s, this sector recorded some growth in the 1980s linked to the growth of timber-based activities to meet construction and urban consumer demand and the processing of some foodstuffs - *tahu*, *tempe*, bread and coconut oil - for town consumption. Other consumer goods

industries, most notably soft drink manufacture, previously enjoying protection as a consequence of Irian Jaya's isolation from international and Indonesian markets, now found it increasingly difficult to compete with cheaper imports from elsewhere in Indonesia. The manufacturing sector's share of non-oil RGDP was only one per cent in 1980 and 1985, very much lower than most other outer island provinces, with the exception of Maluku, Southeast Sulawesi, East Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara and Bengkulu in 1980, and the share of total employment in manufacturing only higher than in Maluku and Bengkulu in 1980. [Manning and Rumbiak, page 10]

* * *

New economic activities in the province were concentrated in the north coast districts, particularly Jayapura and Sorong which accounted for a large share of the urban population but only about 40 per cent of the total population of the province. Over half of the provincial value of manufacturing, construction, transport and trade was recorded in Jayapura and Sorong, and around 70 per cent of these sectors and government administration in the north coast districts. [Manning and Rumbiak, page 10]

* * *

In the 1980s, Irian Jaya continues to remain one of the poorest provinces in Indonesia. At current prices, annual non-mining RGDP per capita in 1980 (Rp. 208,000) was only slightly above South Sulawesi (Rp. 190,000) and Java, and considerably lower than most other outer island provinces including Maluku (Rp. 260,000) with the exception of Central and Southeast Sulawesi and the two Nusa Tenggara provinces. The incidence of recorded urban poverty was relatively low by Indonesian standards, indeed lower than all other provinces with the exception of North Sumatra, but rural poverty was recorded as higher than almost all other outer island provinces with the exception of South Sulawesi and again the Nusa Tenggara provinces. [Manning and Rumbiak, pages 11 and 13]

* * *

Irian Jaya was certainly a net contributor to Central Government revenues from the late 1970s, with income derived from mining and oil operations contributing about Rp. 200 - 300 billion to Jakarta's budget in the mid 1980s. Income from these sources and forestry royalties have declined substantially however in recent years, following the ban on timber exports and falling oil production and prices. [Manning and Rumbiak, page 17]

* * *

Table 2: Exports and imports, West Papua, 1976 - 1984
(In millions of \$)

	Exports	Imports
1976	434.9	5.3
1977	482.1	5.3
1978	609.8	1.7
1979	502.6	11.4
1980	708.2	19.6
1981	5.8	3.0 ¹
1982	2.6	8.1 ¹
1983	539.1	33.9
1984	585.8	22.5

¹ In the original table, these figures are given, along with a footnote, 'Error in data'.

Source: Bappeda, Tingkat I (First-Level Regional Planning Board), *Kondisi Strategis Pembangunan dan Konsep Area Development*, Jayapura, February 1986.

This table is reproduced as Table 3,27 in Lavalin International Inc., *Economic Development of Irian Jaya, Supporting Report, December 1986*.

* * *

Table 3: Annual growth rate of the population of Irian Jaya, 1971 -1990

	Actual 1971-1980	Projected 1980-1990
1. Urban population		
Irian born	3.7	3.3
Non-Irian born		
Java	3.3	8.0
Sulawesi	13.9	12.0
Maluku	9.9	8.0
Other	5.3	5.0
Sub-total	8.7	9.9
All urban	5.0	5.9
2. Rural population		
Irian born	1.9	2.2
Non-Irian born		
Transmigrant	26.0	24.0
Others	15.0	10.0
Sub total	23.0	21.0
All rural	2.1	3.3
All Irian Jaya	2.7	3.9

[Manning and Rumbiak, page 109]

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
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


A Dani village.



A parade of West Papuan freedom fighters, members of the OPM. [Photo: A. Kentie]

The West Papuan anthropologist, Arnold Ap (left), who was murdered in April 1984, seen here receiving a stone axe from Soleman Nari, chief of the Ormu tribe.






West Papuan refugees arriving in Vanimo, Papua New Guinea, from Jayapura, in 1984.

West Papuan refugees in Blackwater Camp, near Vanimo, protesting at the visit of a journalist from the Indonesian weekly, *Tempo*.



MARI BELAJAR




Republik Indonesia
 Departemen Urusan Sosial
 Direktorat Pendidikan Masyarakat
 Jakarta, 1960


A propaganda poster from the Indonesian Department for Social Affairs, exhorting West Papuans to learn Indonesian lifestyles. The title: "Let's learn". [Photo: Roel Burgler]



West Papuans outside the airstrip in Wamena. [Photo: *Adrian Arbib*]

Indonesian police exercising in Wamena, as a West Papuan looks on. [Photo: *Adrian Arbib*]





Timber which has been felled by Asmat tribesmen, being loaded onto a ship in Ats, for export. [Photo: *Adrian Arbib*]

Indonesian tourists watching a Papuan marriage ceremony in Wamena. [Photo: *Adrian Arbib*]






An Indonesian shop in Wamena, where almost all commercial activity is in Indonesian hands. [Photo: Adrian Arbib]

Indonesian transmigrants in Erom, Merauke, ankle-deep in flood-water. At the height of the rainy season, the flood-water reaches up to the walls of the house. [Photo: Adrian Arbib]



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Errata

Page 6, line 6: Footnote number is 6, not 7.

Page 62: Ignore footnotes 36 and 37.

Page 81, 8th line from bottom: "1981" should read "1985".

Page 135, line 18: "some some" should read "some money".

West Papua, formerly the Dutch colony of West New Guinea, was annexed by Indonesia in 1963. Six years later, a fraudulent Act of 'Free' Choice took place amid severe repression, yet the Act was endorsed by the United Nations, giving the seal of approval to Indonesia's illegal annexation.

Since the 1960s, the people of West Papua have suffered numerous violations of their basic human rights: expropriation of their land, racial discrimination, arrest and detention, torture, disappearances and massacres. A liberation movement which fights for the right of self-determination has been active since the mid 1960s.

In order to swamp the West Papuan people and dilute their struggle, Indonesia is re-settling poor peasants from Java and other parts of Indonesia as part of its transmigration programme, acknowledged to be the largest resettlement programme in the world. West Papua is also important to Indonesia because it contains the world's richest copper deposit, several major oil fields, and extensive rainforests. Exploitation of these resources is wreaking havoc upon the lives of the people, while the transnationals which exploit these resources enjoy the protection of those who repress and persecute the people.

Obliteration threatens the people of West Papua, physical and cultural obliteration as well as the obliteration of their cause through neglect by the world community. This neglect is the result of a lack of information, which is why this book was first published in 1984. This third edition is a much revised and updated version of TAPOL's most successful publication.