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OUR STRUGGLE

SUTAN SJAHRIR

(Translated with an Introduction

by Benedict R. O'G. Anderson)

TRANSLATION SERIES

Modern Indonesia Project

Southeast Asia Program

Cornell University

Ithaca, New York

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PREFACE

A continuing concern of the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project has been to help provide a wider understanding of Indonesian politics and society by publishing translations of important writings of leading Indonesian political thinkers and academicians. The Project's Translation Series has already made available translations of the writing of such eminent Indonesians as former President Sukarno, former Vice-President Hatta, Mohammad Natsir, Soedjatmoko, Wilopo, and Professors Koentjaraningrat, Widjojo Nitisastro, A. K. Pringgodigdo, Selo Soemardjan and Soepomo.

Few Indonesians have done as much thoughtful writing about Indonesia and her problems as the late Sutan Sjahrir, Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia from November 1945 to July 1947, and Chairman of Indonesia's Socialist Party until it was banned by Sukarno in 1960. To a degree unusual among practicing politicians, Sjahrir devoted himself to reflective analytical study of his country's affairs from a very early age. Charles Wolf's excellent translation of Sjahrir's Indonesische Overpeinzingen, which appeared under the title Out of Exile, has already given Western readers a superb picture of Sjahrir's intellectual maturation as a nationalist intellectual-politician during his years of exile in West Irian and Banda, and during the period of the Japanese Occupation. But nothing has so far appeared to illumine his role as leader of the independent nation of Indonesia in the turmoil of the nationalist struggle against the Japanese, British and Dutch in the post-war years.

It is therefore with particular pleasure that the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project now makes available for the first time a translation of Perjuangan Kita (Our Struggle). Written in the first months of the nationalist revolution, it is probably not only Sjahrir's most important political writing, but it is a document essential for understanding the course of that revolution's subsequent development. It represents as well one of the most forceful statements by an Indonesian intellectual-politician of the problems of making the liberal-socialist parliamentary tradition of Europe relevant and meaningful to the aspirations, the concerns, and the hostilities felt by Indonesian society as it emerged from the colonial experience and sought to find a satisfying direction for its nationalism in an independent state.

Both during and after the Indonesian revolution I was fortunate in having many good talks with Sutan Sjahrir. I shall always admire the combination of keen intellectual power and deep humanitarian concern that so marked his personality. There was nothing doctrinaire in Sjahrir's political approach; all political theories, Marxian or otherwise, he saw with a fresh eye, subjecting each of them to the same cold, deep-cutting scalpel of dispassionate analysis. But, coupled with this incisive analytical ability was a warm, deep and very genuine sympathy for his fellowman and a powerful desire to improve their condition.

I was always forcibly struck by the strength of Sjahrir's anti-totalitarian feelings. He had an abiding fear that what he called the "feudal heritage" of so much of Indonesia, Java in particular, inclined its population towards an unquestioning submission to authority which he felt could easily lead to an authoritarian political order. Certainly this concern is manifested in Perjuangan Kita.

Often when I think of Sjahrir, I remember a long discussion we had together in Jogjakarta in late November 1948, just after the government of Sukarno and Hatta had overcome the Communists' Madiun Rebellion. Sjahrir had come from a meeting of his party where the discussion had centered about the failure of the Communists and the future of his own party, the PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia). He said:

The important work now for our party members is to build cadres of convinced socialists, who understand the meaning of socialism, particularly its emphasis upon the individual and his welfare rather than upon the state. Mass parties with uneducated followings led by leaders who themselves decide all party policy are an imminent and great danger and may well lead to fascism or some other type of totalitarian organization. The feudalistic heritage is still very strong amongst Indonesians. It means they are accustomed to receive political directives from above, that they are accustomed to look up to leaders for orders and that they are accustomed to follow such leaders without themselves taking initiative. The Communists were able to exploit this feudalistic heritage of the people by building a powerful party organized along totalitarian lines. The Communist Party's elimination does not eliminate the threat of totalitarianism. Indonesians, because of the yet strong impress of their feudalistic heritage, are particularly susceptible to the danger of becoming organized along totalitarian lines. Indeed the danger of becoming politically organized along totalitarian lines is the greatest of all threats to the Indonesian community. The problem

of gaining independence from the Dutch is transitory and short-run. The great, abiding, long-term problem is this danger of totalitarianism. If the Socialists accomplish only the negative objective of preventing totalitarianism they will have won the greatest of victories. This takes precedence over everything else.

In the decade after the revolution Sjahrir and his followers maintained an intellectual and political influence much greater than their party's relatively small membership, but they failed in their effort to train sufficient cadres to establish any really substantial base in the masses.

The personal tragedy of Sjahrir's last years, his growing political isolation, his four year imprisonment by Sukarno commencing in 1962, and his death alone in a hospital abroad in 1966, have perhaps tended to obscure his intellectual and political services to his country. Although towards the end of his life he no longer was in the mainstream of Indonesia's history, that is no reason for historians, Indonesian and foreign alike, to ignore Sjahrir's important contribution to his country's political development. Not only was he one of Indonesia's outstanding leaders during its revolutionary struggle and among the foremost representatives of an important and enduring part of the modern Indonesian political tradition, but a study of his writing can do much to illumine our understanding of the deeper problems and ambiguities that this tradition has faced and continues to face today.

I feel sure that many will share my gratitude to Professor Anderson for his sensitive translation of this historically important piece of Sutan Sjahrir's writings and for his valuable and illuminating introduction.

George McT. Kahin
Director

Ithaca, New York
July 13, 1968

INTRODUCTION

Sutan Sjahrir was born on March 5, 1909 in Padang-pandjang, West Sumatra, the son of a well-to-do public prosecutor, who was later advisor to the Sultan of Deli. He was among the lucky few who received an excellent colonial Dutch education both in Medan and later in the cosmopolitan city of Bandung. At the age of twenty he joined the even smaller group of Indonesians who were able to continue their education in the Netherlands. For a time he was enrolled in the Law Faculty at the University of Leiden, but never completed his degree. While in Holland, however, he became strongly attracted to Marxist ideas and the men of the left, who seemed the only considerable group of Dutchmen sympathetic to Indonesian nationalist aspirations. He became a member of the Socialistische Studentenclub in Amsterdam, and helped pay for his studies by working for the Metal Workers' Union and the International Federation of Transport Workers. Though not yet 22 years of age, he also became the secretary of the Perhimpoean Indonesia, the Indonesian student association which produced so many of Indonesia's later political leaders. In 1931 he returned to Indonesia and there helped to set up the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, a "non-cooperative" nationalist organization of young Indonesian intellectuals. Though he relinquished the chairmanship of this organization to the older Hatta on the latter's return to Indonesia in 1932, Sjahrir remained an important intellectual influence within it.

The Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia rapidly came into conflict with another important non-cooperative nationalist organization, the Partindo, which had been formed by Mr. Sartono from the remnants of Sukarno's Partai Nasional Indonesia following the latter's arrest by the Dutch authorities in 1929. When Sukarno was released from prison at the end of 1931, he attempted for a while to bring the two organizations together, but without success. While the reasons for the conflict were many and various, not the least of them being personal antagonisms, on the political and ideological level the main issue between the two organizations lay in their view of the tasks facing the nationalist movement. In very general terms, the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia believed that the Dutch would remain in control for the indefinite future, and that in

any case, Indonesians were by no means prepared, intellectually and organizationally, for the assumption of power. The most urgent task facing the nationalists was therefore to develop a disciplined, highly educated, and ideologically coherent leadership cadre, prepared, if necessary, to work underground. If nationalist sentiment was not effectively moulded and organized, it would remain diffuse, chaotic and vulnerable to Dutch repression. Heavily influenced by Marxist ideas, the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia strongly criticized the Partindo's call for a national united front of all classes against Dutch rule. Hatta denounced this idea as a sociological monstrosity. In a famous phrase he said it would lead, not to persatuan (unity), but to persatean (a hodge-podge). There was no real social basis for common action by feudal aristocrats, industrial workers, villagers, and the urban bourgeoisie. Moreover too much emphasis on unity would stultify democratic freedom of expression and retard the development of critical political thinking among the population.

By contrast, the Partindo (Sukarno) believed that while the process of cadre-formation was important, the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia's conception suffered from two severe disadvantages. First, there was the danger that the elitism of its ideas might tempt the party into becoming a self-enclosed urban clique without contact with or understanding of the Indonesian masses, whose support was essential to any meaningful struggle against the Dutch. Moreover, a small cadre, the Partindo felt, would be easily broken up by the Dutch political police, without leaving any significant residues behind. Secondly, the Partindo was convinced that there was a basis for the cooperation of all classes against the Dutch--the struggle for national independence--and that the organizational and military weakness of the Indonesians vis-à-vis the colonial government made such a coalition mandatory. Slogans about class conflict could and would be effectively used by the Dutch to play their traditional game of divide and rule. In the Partindo perspective, the proper task of a nationalist organization was mass agitation among all sectors of the population, to awaken a broad political consciousness of the common humiliation and subjugation of all Indonesians under colonial rule.

Conflicts between the two organizations, however, did not last long, since the Dutch moved rapidly to suppress both cadre-formers and agitators alike. Late in 1933 Sukarno was imprisoned and exiled to Flores (later to Bengkulu). Sjahrir and Hatta suffered the same fate in

early 1934, being sent first to the concentration camp at Boven Digul in West Irian, and later, in 1936, to the remote island of Banda. From then on all three men remained "quarantined" from Indonesian politics until 1942, when the Japanese arrived in Indonesia. At the time of the Japanese landings Sjahrir was just celebrating his 33rd birthday, after seven and a half years in exile.*

The coming of the Japanese presented the whole Indonesian nationalist intelligentsia with a grave dilemma. The question of what attitude should be taken toward the invaders was hotly argued. The majority were inclined to take the Japanese promises of early independence seriously, and therefore offered their cooperation to the military authorities. Many of them had earlier been profoundly impressed by the rapid development of Japan's economy and her war-making powers. Others, particularly those with a deep sense of Java's cultural traditions, found Japan's stress on the spiritual superiority of the East, and her success in combining traditional values with modern technology and organization a more appealing political model than the bourgeois rationalism of the Dutch.

It was a relatively small minority which did not cooperate with the Japanese; and this "opposition" came almost exclusively from those Indonesians who saw themselves as "men of the left," in the Western tradition. The most significant group consisted mainly of remnants of the Indonesian Communist Party under the leadership of the young Christian Batak leader, Amir Sjarifuddin, who attempted with extremely limited success to organize a resistance movement. While not himself taking any very active role, Sjahrir was also among the small minority who

* A collection of Sjahrir's letters to his Dutch wife from his various places of exile has appeared as Out of Exile, translated by Charles Wolf, Jr. (John Day, 1949). These letters give a vivid picture of Sjahrir as a young nationalist full of intellectual curiosity, unembittered by his imprisonment, determined to use his enforced leisure for sustained reflection on trends in world politics and Indonesia's relationship to them. One is also struck by Sjahrir's virtually complete alienation from Indonesia's past and the urgency he felt about liberating his fellow-Indonesians from the "dead-weight" of tradition.

refused to work with the Japanese, retiring into semi-obscurity during the war years. Both men, deeply influenced by Western radical thought, perceived what was happening in essentially Western terms. For them the Japanese, while certainly overthrowing Dutch colonial rule, represented reactionary imperialism and militarism, which would certainly exploit the population more ruthlessly than the Dutch. Nothing good was to be expected from the "feudal" Japanese military and the "fascist" ideas that they spread.

While Amir Sjarifuddin was eventually arrested and sentenced to death for subversion (his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment only because of the intervention of Sukarno and Hatta), Sjahrir was left in undisturbed retirement, partly because of his passivity, partly because of his relatively low conspicuousness. The same possibilities were not open to Sukarno and Hatta, who were widely known as the two most prominent Indonesian nationalist leaders. Their at least formal cooperation was demanded by the Japanese--and obtained.

Paradoxically, the Japanese occupation justified the expectations of both segments of Indonesian nationalist opinion. The "agitators" of the Partindo and of other more conservative nationalist groupings found under the Japanese an unparalleled opportunity for developing their talents and gaining political experience. For purposes of mobilizing the population of Java for the war effort, the Japanese formed an impressive array of mass organizations, which while ultimately under their organizational control, nonetheless were fully staffed by Indonesians, and penetrated in unprecedented fashion down to the urban and rural masses. Whereas Dutch policy had been as far as possible to isolate the nationalists from the population the Japanese encouraged their coming together, on the theory that the mass nationalism thus aroused could be directed against the oncoming Allies, provided that its leaders remained under their control. Many Indonesians gained considerable experience in the basic techniques of mass propaganda action in the Sendenbu (Office of Propaganda), the Hōkōkai (People's Service Association), the Barisan Pelopor (Pioneer Corps), etc.

Furthermore, largely against their will, the Japanese were in the end induced by their military defeats to begin really granting Indonesians that independence which had been somewhat cynically dangled before them in 1942. Many

Indonesian officials were promoted to fill the places of their now absent Dutch superiors. The beginnings of an Indonesian national army appeared in the Fatherland Defence Force (PETA), created along Japanese military lines in 1943. Finally, the Japanese devoted a great deal of their time and attention to the Indonesian youth, in the belief that they would prove more adaptable to the ideals of Dai Nippon than their Dutch-corrupted elders. A large complex of official and semi-official bodies for the first time absorbed huge numbers of Java's youth in modern organizational structures, at the same time awakening or deepening their nationalist consciousness and giving them elementary military and organizational skills. Thus, by August 1945, and perhaps contrary to much of their original intent, the Japanese had gone very far towards fulfilling the promises of 1942. For those nationalists who had taken these promises seriously and who admired much of Japanese civilization and technological development, the war years represented enormous progress over the pre-war era. Though the social and economic hardships of the occupation far exceeded those of the earlier colonial period, rapid political advances more than compensated for this.

For the members of the "opposition"--both passive and active--the experience of the Japanese occupation was inevitably very different. They took no part in the mass organizations, learned no new skills in the Sendenbu, experienced no rise in rank, were not among those who emerged from a static rural environment into the exciting new world of political activity. What they did experience were the cruelties of the Kempeitai, with its extensive entourage of Indonesian informers, spies and torturers. Some were executed, others lived in fear of their lives. Moreover, not sharing in the political advances of the period, they were able to see more clearly, if with jaundiced eyes, the real ravages which the Japanese occupation inflicted on the mass of the population.

To supply their armies and their military administration, the Japanese had instituted forced deliveries of rice, which created severe food-shortages for an already chronically undernourished population. The rōmusha program of labor mobilization for defence projects in Java, Sumatra and parts of mainland Southeast Asia transformed the traditional corvée by permanently uprooting the mobilized peasants from their village environments. The closing-down of the pre-war plantation system, caused by the Allied naval blockade of Japan, and the isolation of Java from its traditional export markets put many thousands of rural

laborers out of work. Lavish spending by the military government destroyed the value of the Rupiah, which stood, in August, 1945, at 1/60th of its value in March, 1942. This hyper-inflation in turn undermined first the incomes, and then, of necessity, the probity of the civil service. Corruption, hoarding, and abuse of power for economic profit developed very rapidly. Health measures and pest control did not figure among the authorities' major preoccupations, with the result that there were widespread epidemics. The combination of a declining economy, administrative inefficiency and demoralization, and the spread of hunger and disease certainly contributed to making the "opposition's" picture of the war years a very dark one indeed. Moreover, even those political advances which others saw as compensating for the privations of the occupation, appeared to Sjahrir and those like him as fraught with ambiguity and danger. In their view, the older nationalist leaders were betraying the population for their own advantage; they were being corrupted by the new positions offered them by the Japanese in return for their cooperation in dealing with the population. The youth was being indoctrinated with Fascist and militarist ideas. Anti-white racism was being cynically exploited by the Japanese. Promises of independence and freedom were, the "opposition" felt, hollow and meaningless so long as the military presence of Dai Nippon on Java remained pervasive.

For both groups, in any case, the suddenness of Japan's surrender came as a complete surprise. So did the very extensive delay before the Allied Forces landed in Indonesia in militarily significant numbers. The nationalists and senior civil servants who held the highest positions under the occupation attempted to carry forward the perspectives and instrumentalities of the Japanese period. After the proclamation of Indonesia's independence on August 17, largely under the pressure of militant youth elements in the capital city, a Cabinet was formed under Sukarno, consisting almost exclusively of the immediate subordinates of the previous Japanese heads of departments in the military administration. This Cabinet received for a while the cooperation and assistance of the Japanese, acting on a mixture of motives ranging from anxiety to maintain law and order, through a sense of moral obligation incurred by previous promises, to a scarcely disguised schadenfreude vis-à-vis the victorious Allies.

But the difficulties of maintaining the forms, institutions and authority of the Japanese government without the assistance of the efficient Japanese army, proved increasingly insurmountable. The indigenous Indonesian police was compromised by its association with the more repressive aspects of Japanese policy and found it hard to adapt to conditions of independent statehood. The PETA, which might have provided some disciplined support for the government, had been discreetly disbanded by the military authorities a few days after the Declaration of Independence. Since it had never been provided with a central staff or an officer corps above the level of battalion commander, it proved almost impossible to reassemble in the heady atmosphere of liberation. The new Cabinet was thus forced to rely for its authority on the well-trained but scarcely dynamic Indonesian sector of the colonial bureaucracy, which was in any case demoralized by the experience of the war years.

As a result, the Cabinet of Sukarno was extremely weak from the start, while the role its members had played under the Japanese did not allow for any optimism about friendly relations with the arriving Allies.

The situation was further complicated by the dissolution of the elaborate network of Japanese-sponsored youth organizations, which unleashed on Java hundreds of thousands of passionately nationalist young men and boys, without encadrement, leadership or control. In the months of September to November, 1945, Java was swept by these youthful militants who, ignoring the government, wrested weapons and stores from the Japanese and began attacking Allies, Japanese and "collaborators" alike in the name of Merdeka. In this process countless acts of cruelty and bravery were performed, both massacres of Chinese, Dutchmen, Eurasians, Ambonese and Menadonese, and heroic resistance to Allied penetration and Japanese repression. The traditional gap between older and younger generations (40-year olds and 20-year olds) had been widened by the experience of the Japanese occupation into a psychological and cultural abyss. For the older men, the long-awaited independence essentially meant succession to the position once held by the Dutch and Japanese, the take-over of the instruments of state power, and the securing of recognition of the new nation by the international community. For the politicized youths of 1945, Merdeka had little to do with the outside world, and even less with the accession to power. It was essentially a liberation from the physical and psychological bonds of the war society, a soaring

leap out of the routines and norms of everyday existence, a pure consciousness of unfettered will in action. In many ways, their perspectives were less the political ideas of nationhood emerging from colonial subjugation, than traditional messianic conceptions of a golden age emerging from a "mad era" of cruelty, oppression and disaster.

Observing the violence, exaltation and chaos around him, the impotence of the governmental apparatus, the dubious international standing of the Cabinet and the growing threat of the Allied armies, Sjahrir tried, while still in the position of uncommitted observer, to think through the problems which faced the new nation, and to provide some clarity and order to the revolutionary activity swirling around him. In the historic pamphlet called Perjuangan Kita (Our Struggle), whose publication was officially announced on November 10, 1945, he attempted to provide a thoroughgoing analysis of the situation, a critique of the government's policies and personnel, and a rational program for the future course of the nationalist struggle. It was the most clearly articulated diagnosis of Indonesia's contemporary problems and the only coherent program for the development of the nationalist struggle during the years of physical conflict with the Dutch. (The only comparable piece was Tan Malaka's program for the Persatuan Perjuangan. Sukarno himself did not provide any extended public statements of his own perspectives for this phase of the national struggle--a silence in striking contrast with his enormous articulateness as an ideologue in the periods before and after this one.)

The impact of Sjahrir's pamphlet was immediate. The militant youth of the capital city, while paying little attention to the subtleties of Sjahrir's long-term prognostications, were stirred by his bitter and caustic attacks on the older nationalists and civil servants as "running-dogs of the Japanese." And it was to an important extent because of their support that Sjahrir came to power in the "silent coup" of November, 1945. While Sukarno was retained as President of the state, the terms of the presidential constitution were reinterpreted to shift all executive power into the hands of a Prime Minister directly responsible to a provisional legislature. And it was Sjahrir who was the first to occupy this new position. The Cabinet he formed represented a complete break with its predecessor, and the coming to power of the "opposition" of the Japanese period. Its key figures were Sjahrir himself and the

recently released Amir Sjarifuddin. The fact that the author of so anti-Japanese a manifesto was now at the head of the Indonesian government made nonsense of Dutch claims that the new state was a Japanese creation and thus considerably improved the diplomatic standing of the young Republic with the Allied commanders and the outside world. But the strongly anti-Japanese and anti-"collaborationist" tone of Our Struggle, while ingratiating Sjahrir with the militant youth and with the Allies, who still tended to regard Sukarno as a collaborationist on the basis of his wartime speeches, earned Sjahrir the implacable hostility of many of his older nationalist colleagues. This hostility was to haunt the rest of his political life. The biting, and scarcely concealed references to Sukarno were of lasting importance in estranging the two men from each other.

But Our Struggle was not only an effective piece of political writing in support of Sjahrir's big for power. Nor was it merely a polemic against political rivals. It provided a clear statement of the strategy and tactics which the Sjahrir governments subsequently adopted, and which indeed were followed without serious disagreement by their successors. (There is no reason to suppose that Sukarno himself disagreed in any fundamental way with these aspects of Our Struggle.) It is this that makes Our Struggle essential reading for an understanding of Indonesian policy during the revolutionary years.

The heart of Our Struggle's argument lies in the enormous disparity that Sjahrir, like so many of his generation, both "collaborationists" and "underground," saw between the weakness of the new state of Indonesia and the overwhelming strength of the great powers, especially the West. In the opening pages of the pamphlet, Sjahrir paints a dark, vivid, but essentially "oppositionist" view of Indonesian society at the end of the Japanese occupation. Uprooted peasants, corrupted and demoralized officials, vacillating intellectuals and fascist-indoctrinated youths pass grimly before the reader's eye. One senses the difficulty which Sjahrir faces as he tries to come to terms with a situation which his whole pre-war political education had predisposed him to fear and to mistrust: an enormous expansion of "mass" nationalism through agitational politics, without the formative and controlling elite cadres to guide and channel this energy in a positive

direction. Hence the highly ambiguous attitude revealed throughout Our Struggle towards the phenomenon of the radical youth:

The present psychological condition of our youth is deeply tragic. In spite of their burning enthusiasm, they are full of confusion and indecision, because they have no understanding of the potentialities and perspectives of the struggle they are waging.

As Sjahrir saw it, the combination of the structural weaknesses of Indonesia's political organization and the uncontrolled, unpredictable revolutionary energy of the youth, was all the more dangerous in the light of Indonesia's international position.

Sjahrir's analysis of the world context of Indonesia's struggle reveals the deep impact of Marxist categories on his thinking, categories which indeed imprinted themselves on virtually all the Western-educated intellectuals of the pre-war period, Sukarno and Hatta no less than Sjahrir himself. With impeccable orthodoxy, Sjahrir describes the polarization of power between the Soviet Union and the United States in the wake of the Second World War, making, however, a clear distinction between the introspective, autarchic socialism of the former and the extrovert, expansionist capitalist economy of the latter. Noting that "it can safely be said that the whole world is in debt to Wall Street," and warning of "the political ambitions of that Giant of the Pacific, the United States," he declares that:

Those who . . . still cling to the old order are looking in every direction for ways of strengthening their position in order to restore the capitalist and imperialist system. And so we are faced with a new kind of imperialism. We are living in a period which will decide once and for all which system is destined to spread and ultimately determine the fate of all mankind--neo-capitalism or socialism.

A classical Marxist perspective perhaps, yet one notes the typically Sjahririan undercurrent of detachment and skepticism. There is no determined outcome to the struggle between neo-capitalism and socialism. The future is uncertain and open.

But of still greater importance is the fact that

Indonesia is geographically situated within the sphere of influence of Anglo-Saxon capitalism and imperialism. Accordingly, Indonesia's fate ultimately depends on the fate of Anglo-Saxon capitalism and imperialism. . . . In spite of our best efforts, we shall not, in ourselves, be strong enough to destroy [the Anglo-Saxon] ambience and thereby win for ourselves the fullest kind of independence.*

From this analysis, Sjahrir draws the decisive conclusion that "so long as the world we live in is dominated by capital, we are forced to make sure that we do not earn the enmity of capitalism."* From this conclusion, it follows logically and inexorably, that the most subtle diplomacy will be required to prevent the enormous power of American capital being mobilized behind the Dutch effort to reconquer the Indies, and to enlist American sympathy for Indonesian nationalist aspirations. This in turn demands a flexible attitude towards American capital in Indonesia, an end to violence by militant youths, particularly against white foreigners, political forms and institutions acceptable to the West, and a nationalist rhetoric without immediate radical components.

In the final section of Our Struggle, Sjahrir turns to the program which, under the circumstances, should guide the immediate future of the nationalist struggle. Speaking again with the voice of European evolutionary socialism, but with a vivid consciousness of what he and other "oppositionists" felt to be a Japanese exploitation and perversion of nationalism, he warns against the prosecution of a national revolution without a social revolution. For

the danger is that, not realizing that feudalism too is one of our enemies, we shall ally with the still living spirit of this feudalism, which is quite compatible with a certain kind of nationalism, and so create a nationalism built on a hierarchical, feudalistic solidarism: in fact on Fascism, the greatest enemy of world progress and of our people. The present ideological confusion often manifests itself as a kind of nationalism or national communism à la

* My italics--B.R.A.

Hitler or Mussolini . . . such methods can work for a while (see, for example, the successes of Mussolini, Hitler, Franco, Chiang Kai-shek, etc.), but in relation to the advancement of their societies they are always reactionary and conflict with progress and the social struggle the world over. The men who urge such a course are always enemies of the people, even though they may, momentarily, be deified by the people, like Hitler and Mussolini.

Opposed to a purely national revolution (which would naturally see its antagonist abroad), Sjahrir urges the development of a democratic revolution, a social revolution, led by "revolutionary democrats, not by nationalist groups who have kowtowed to fascists, whether Dutch colonial or Japanese military fascists."

What is to be the character of this "social revolution"? Sjahrir calls for a massive purge of the state machinery of those he terms "running gods and henchmen" of the Japanese, the proclamation of a democratic constitution guaranteeing the broadest possible democratic rights, resolute democratization of governmental institutions down to the village level, and the creation of a democratically oriented party to guide the revolutionary struggle. Significantly he adds that the party's "membership need not be large, provided that it forms a tightly disciplined army, efficient and modern in organization, and armed with a powerful, developed ideology and wide general knowledge." Here one finds again the old elitism of the *Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia*.

The most striking aspect of the Sjahrir program is the extent to which it fits his political assessment of the situation. For attacks on authoritarian ideas in the name of democracy, and demands for a liberal constitution, human rights and the democratization of governmental institutions, while fulfilling the requirements of a "democratic revolution," were also fully in harmony with the liberal rhetoric of the West, and thus least likely to arouse the formidable "enmity of capitalism." Thus the thrust of Sjahrir's ideas was at once to placate, or attract the sympathy of the Western powers and to begin the process of liberalizing Indonesian society from the institutional and psychological bondage of colonialism and "tradition."

The logic of Sjahrir's formulations was compelling enough to the majority of the older nationalist intellectuals, that all Indonesian governments thereafter, at least

until the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, more or less followed his guidelines, and accepted the premises and assumptions on which these guidelines were based. It was, in fact, only Tan Malaka who seriously challenged them. It is not possible here to do justice to Tan Malaka's ideas; suffice it to say that he accepted neither the inherent strength of the West in Southeast Asia, nor the weakness of Indonesian nationalism, as Sjahrir viewed them. He believed that the mass nationalism developed under the Japanese occupation was an enormously powerful and ultimately invincible social force, which could only be deepened and strengthened by direct conflict with Western capitalism. Arguing from this reversal of Sjahrir's premises he called for a massive mobilization of popular nationalism, the incorporation of the masses in a national front, the seizure of foreign-held economic installations, and a clear confrontation with the West. Sjahrir's arrest of the elderly revolutionary and many of his followers, however, meant the temporary eclipse of his ideas and program, and his murder by military officers in 1949 removed him finally from the political stage. The main stream of the Indonesian nationalist struggle during the Revolution continued to move along the paths outlined for it in Our Struggle.

It is perhaps too easy today to criticize Sjahrir's ideas from the comfortable armchair of historical hindsight. One could ask whether the guarantee of the fullest democratic freedoms and the radical democratization of governmental institutions is really compatible with the building of a single, revolutionary party. The belief that parliamentary institutions automatically undermine "traditional" structures may now seem a little over-simplified. We have seen the enormous staying power of these structures, and are now more inclined to suspect that challenging of "traditional" institutions in the name of democracy without an accompanying mobilization of the social forces thus released may prove self-defeating. Many would now hold that giving top priority to conciliating the West is likely in the long run to have fossilizing influences on dynamic change. One can also point to a certain partiality in Sjahrir's thought, which he shared with Sukarno: an engrossing interest in the psychological and institutional, rather than the sociological and organizational aspects of politics. From this perspective, it is not altogether surprising that neither man ever succeeded

in building an effective organization, or developing a sociological analysis of Indonesian society on which such an organization might be based. But in the light of a similar failure on the part of their contemporaries, it is probable that this was an inevitable consequence of the educational and social milieu in which their generation grew to maturity.

It has also become clear with time that Sjahrir was closer, generationally speaking, to what might be called the "Pudjangga Baru" (New Writers) group of nationalist leaders, men whose political ideas were formed in the generally placid environment of late colonial Netherlands India. The young men who gained their first real political experience under the Japanese occupation, in the disturbances, uncertainties, violence and melodrama of the war years, developed a decidedly anti-"pragmatic" point of view, romantic, expressive and at times self-consciously heroic. This "Angkatan '45", of the political world was, in 1945 and afterwards, fundamentally hostile to many of the values and assumptions which guided the "Pudjangga Baru"--above all to its rationalist meliorism and cautiously optimistic utilitarian humanism. While Sjahrir was brought to power by this "Angkatan '45" he was by temperament and generation unsympathetic to it. In the passages of Our Struggle dealing with the youth, one misses any sense of the sheer excitement, elan and nervous exhilaration which many members of that younger generation, now middle-aged, still so wistfully recall.

Yet once these things have been said, one can also not fail to be impressed, I think, by the coherence of Sjahrir's thinking as expressed in Our Struggle--the sense that Sjahrir was very much "all of one piece"--the moral strength of his impassioned pleas for humane treatment of the Chinese, Eurasians and other minority groups, and his sensitive awareness of the degradation of many sectors of traditional society. Perhaps no less impressive are Sjahrir's intuitions of the dangers his country would face in the future. To give only two examples:

The nationalist struggle rarely escapes completely the danger of being too influenced by names and forms. It frequently turns out that a so-called national victory is, in practice, without meaning for the masses of the people. . . . This nationalist frenzy may at first represent a certain strength, but in the end it must reach an impasse and finally choke itself to death in a spirit of djibaku.

These last years we have felt only too deeply the impact of military rule. This . . . has encouraged the false idea that our struggle is primarily a military one which should therefore be led by military men. Only a thorough understanding of the social basis of our present struggle can help us avoid this illusion. . . . In time our youth will learn from experience that it is not the soldier who will make our revolution triumph, but the masses of the people, the workers and the peasants, together with the intellectuals and the younger generation.

During his tenure as Prime Minister Sjahrir negotiated the important Linggadjati agreement whereby the Dutch recognized the Republic's de facto authority in Java and Sumatra. But in spite of this and other diplomatic successes, opposition to his conciliatory policies grew and he was forced to resign from office on June 27, 1947. Thereafter he was Indonesia's chief advocate at the United Nations. In 1948 growing personal and ideological differences with Amir Sjarifuddin led to a split in the Socialist Party which they had led together, and Sjahrir formed the Partai Sosialis Indonesia or P.S.I. (Indonesian Socialist Party) as a break-away group from the main body, which followed Amir's increasingly pro-Communist course. During the Madiun affair he gave strong support to the Hatta government's suppression of the old Socialist Party, which had in the meantime joined with the Indonesian Communist Party and other leftist political organizations in the People's Democratic Front. After the transfer of sovereignty, Sjahrir played no direct role in the government but was perhaps the major influence in creating the intellectual framework within which the governments of the early 1950's approached Indonesia's problems. But when national elections were held in 1955, the PSI managed to win only 5 seats in the 257-man Parliament, while the Communists, apparently crushed in 1948, recovered remarkably to win no less than 39 seats, and emerge as one of Indonesia's "Big Four" parties. This electoral rejection virtually ended Sjahrir's chances of a political come-back. He was, however, active in the opposition to Sukarno's growing political ascendancy and the expanding power of the Communists. With the onset of Guided Democracy he went into eclipse, and in August, 1960 the PSI was banned by Sukarno for failing to give pledges of support to the ideological principles of the new regime. On January 17, 1962 Sjahrir

was arrested, together with a number of friends and political allies, on trumped-up charges of conspiracy against the state. He was never brought to trial. Early in 1965, while still in prison, he suffered a massive stroke. By May, 1965 his condition was so serious that Sukarno gave permission for him to undergo medical treatment in Switzerland. Sjahrir never saw his country again. He died in exile on April 9, 1966.

It is now more than two decades since Sjahrir fell from power. His party has been dissolved for seven years. Yet in many ways his influence is still felt, not least through former friends and party colleagues now in influential positions in government and the universities. In the post-Sukarno period, the demands for "modernisasi" reflect many of the values central to Sjahrir's thinking: practical rationality, respect for individualism, contempt for "outworn traditions," distrust of nationalist utopianism, and concern for order and efficiency. In the historical perspective he therefore takes his place as a major representative of that important stream in Indonesian political thinking which draws its models from Western constitutional democracy. Our Struggle, in this perspective, is not only the best expression of Sjahrir's thinking at the peak of his career. It is not only an important document for the study of the Indonesian revolution and of the intellectual milieu of its leaders. It is also a humane, intelligent exploration of Indonesia's continuing problems, still relevant to our own times.

Benedict Anderson
Ithaca, 1968.

OUR STRUGGLE

The basic situation two months after the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia can be described as follows.

The hope and desire of joining in the defense of our independence is now general at all levels of our society. Never in years gone by did the freedom movement reach the heights of urgency that it has today. Above all, our youth stand out for their whole-hearted devotion to the struggle for our independence. Yet in the long run it is the ordinary people in the villages and towns who are intensifying and heightening our struggle. The masses of the poor have been stirred to join the independence movement by the profound unrest resulting from their present social environment. For the masses of the poor it is clear that the slogan "Freedom" does not simply mean a sovereign Indonesia; nor is the Red and White Flag merely a symbol of national unity and aspirations. For them "Freedom" means above all their liberation from arbitrary rule, from starvation and from misery; the Red and White Flag is above all a symbol of their struggle, the struggle of the people themselves. Expressions of mass unrest, which often take the form of cruelties and violent assaults on property, can readily be understood if we look for their deeper causes. During the three and a half years of the Japanese occupation the foundations of village society were disrupted and overthrown by forced labor, by the impressment of villagers to serve as rōmusha,¹ far from home, or as soldiers, by the compulsory delivery of some crops and the forced planting of others, and by an unlimited arbitrary despotism. In the towns, too, the uncertainty of their position stirred deep unrest among the masses. Thousands who earned their living as workers before the arrival of the Japanese have lost their livelihood. Tens of thousands of peasants fled

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1. Rōmusha. A system of hiring ostensibly volunteer labor for work on construction projects in Indonesia and in mainland Southeast Asia. In practice, working conditions verged on slave-labor and many rōmusha died of disease, starvation and ill-treatment.

to the cities to escape tyranny and famine in the villages. Tens of thousands more, fugitives from the rōmusha, Heihō² or other forms of forced labor, were added to the throngs in our cities who had no sure means of earning a living. All this caused a steadily rising tension in our society. The danger of this exploding in an uprising and in wide-spread disorders increasingly threatened the Japanese.

When Japan collapsed, and the Japanese prepared for surrender, their government's authority became extremely weak, and the danger of a massive explosion of the accumulated tensions in our society grew still more grave. To escape this threat, the Japanese resorted to all kinds of stratagems, including attempts to divert popular unrest against other groups.

By propaganda and agitation they tried to deflect the deep and growing hatred they aroused against the whites, against the Chinese and against the pangrèhpradja.³ It cannot be denied that this propaganda campaign was very influential and benefitted the Japanese considerably. For three and a half years Indonesia was completely sealed off from the outside world, so that we knew nothing of developments abroad, and the Japanese had no difficulty in selling the lies which formed the basis of their propaganda. When the hatred of our people for the Japanese had become universal and had in some places even caused disorders, they manipulated our nationalist feelings to "cool down" our burning hatred for them.

They formed a Younger Generation to heighten nationalist agitation and so to avert the internal social dangers which threatened them. And certainly this nationalist agitation gave deep satisfaction to our youth and intellectuals, who were in a general state of unrest and irresolution. Japanese secret societies, like the Black Dragon, the Black Fan and other creatures of the Japanese fifth

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2. Heihō. A corps of Indonesians serving as auxiliary troops in the Japanese army. In practice they were mainly used as a brutalized workforce for military construction projects.
 3. Pangrèhpradja. The semi-aristocratic Indonesian sector of the Dutch and Japanese colonial bureaucracies, through whom Dutch and Japanese policies were perpetrated on the populace.

column, the Kempeitai⁴ and the Kaigun⁵, directed most of their energies towards our youth--not without success. Although on the surface our youth generally loathed the Japanese, many were unconsciously influenced by Japanese propaganda, so that their behavior and way of thinking often followed the Japanese model. This psychological influence was manifested most clearly in hatred of foreigners, particularly those whom the Japanese denounced as our enemies: the Allies, the Dutch, the Eurasians (our own countrymen), the Ambonese, the Menadonese (these too our fellow-countrymen), the Chinese and the pangrèhpradja. In other words our youth were permitted to hate the whole world, so long as they did not direct their hate towards the Japanese.

Such was the situation before the declaration of Indonesian Independence, and such, accordingly, were the materials at hand for building the dwelling-place of Indonesian Freedom. When the Free State of Indonesia was set up, most of the men who controlled it were former employees and assistants of the Japanese. This has proved an obstacle to purging our society of the Japanese "disease" so dangerous for the moral health of our youth. Political education, which even in Dutch colonial times was superficial enough, virtually ceased to exist in the Japanese period. Our youth were psychologically conditioned simply to take orders, to bow down to and to deify their superiors, just as the Japanese themselves bowed down to and deified their Emperor. Thus our young people learnt merely to bow down to and deify their leaders; they were never taught--and so did not develop the ability--to act with a sense of individual responsibility. Real revolutionary consciousness, which must be based on a solid understanding of society, was naturally very rare. Accordingly, the ability to organize and make use of the potentialities existing in our society was scarcely developed at all. Thus the weapons and instruments of our struggle--which could and

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4. Kempeitai. The dreaded Japanese Military Police.
 5. Kaigun. The reference is to the liaison office maintained in Djakarta by the Naval Authorities who administered the whole of Eastern Indonesia. The function of the office was to maintain smooth relations with, and secure the economic cooperation of the Japanese 16th Army, which administered Java. Under Admiral Maeda the Kaigun instituted, late in 1944, a school for the political education of certain elite youth groups.

should have been forged from the social force inherent in hatred for Japanese oppression and exploitation--remained unforged. The pervasive unrest in our society was channelled by our youth into hatred for the foreigners living in our midst. Marching about with bamboo spears spread, and has now turned into robbery, murder and other acts which either have no meaning for our democratic struggle or are reactionary--as indeed all fascistic acts are ipso facto irremediably reactionary.

The delayed arrival of the Allies to replace the Japanese Army, which had lost the will to rule, actually offered the government of the Indonesian Republic an excellent opportunity to gather its strength. But this has never been adequately accomplished.

In the first place, this is because the people in control of the Republican government are men without real character. Most of them are far too accustomed to kowtow to and run errands for the Dutch and Japanese. Psychologically they are irresolute and have proved quite incapable of acting decisively and assuming responsibility.

Secondly, many of them still feel morally obliged to the Japanese, who "bestowed" on them an opportunity to "prepare" Indonesian Independence.⁶ In their own eyes, they have become the government because they worked together with the Japanese.

It was for these reasons that when the power of the Japanese weakened and finally collapsed--and yet had still not been replaced by Allied military power--the Republic of Indonesia was unable to build up our nation's strength. The result was that we were a state and a nation without a government. The masses in their uncertainty were given no education or clear understanding of how to solve the problems of government administration. Thus was born the

6. This refers to the fact that the Japanese had instituted a Committee for the Study of Indonesian Independence, which met for the first time at the end of May, 1945. Most of the nationalist leaders who were not "underground" participated in this committee. In August, 1945 this Committee was superseded by a smaller Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence, headed by Sukarno and Hatta. It was to this Committee that power was to be transferred according to Japanese plans, when Indonesian Independence would be granted.

chaos which is now spreading contagiously everywhere. In this atmosphere nationalist agitation has had consequences which the nationalist agitators themselves neither wished for nor could control. Looting and murders of foreigners, while quite understandable from the standpoint of the situation of the masses, nonetheless exposed the naked weakness of the Government of the Republic, which felt itself to be neither regarded nor respected by the people.

Our youth, who were trying to make use of popular unrest, also completely lacked the necessary qualifications for leading the people's struggle in the proper way. Generally speaking, their skills were simply those of the common soldier: marching, obeying orders, conducting field offensives and suicide assaults. They had never been taught to lead.

Inevitably therefore--since they knew no better--their methods of agitation and propaganda among the masses were those they had seen and learnt from the Japanese--in other words the methods of fascism. The present psychological condition of our youth is deeply tragic. In spite of their burning enthusiasm, they are full of confusion and indecision because they have no understanding of the potentialities and perspectives of the struggle they are waging. Thus their vision is necessarily very limited. Many of them simply cling to the slogan Freedom or Death. Whenever they sense that Freedom is still far from certain, and yet they themselves have not faced death, they are seized with doubt and hesitation.

The remedy for these doubts is generally sought in constant uninterrupted action. Action thus becomes a psychological opiate. For our nation, our youth's intoxication with action is actually an inestimable advantage: their activism has been a powerful stimulus to our struggle at its beginning. Nevertheless, through lack of understanding, many of their actions have missed the mark, and have undermined and damaged our cause. For example, agitation and violence against foreigners have seriously weakened the moral standing of our struggle in the eyes of the outside world.

The outside world was initially quite sympathetic to our hope of building a nation of our own. In fact it can be said that at first world opinion was generally on our side, especially the world labor movement. But with the growing number of incidents, such as looting and murder,

which indicate the spread of anarchy among our people, and which can scarcely be regarded as legitimate expressions of our struggle for freedom, international sentiment towards our cause has begun to change, as the events of the last few weeks have showed.

In general every sign of anarchy in our country disappoints, not only the capitalists, but also the workers of the world. The capitalists are disappointed in their hopes of profitable capital investment once security is established in our country. The workers are disappointed at evidences of fascist cruelty, which is now so notorious throughout the world. It is hard for them to swallow murders of foreigners, let alone murders of Eurasians, Menadonese and Ambonese, who are our fellow-countrymen. They will interpret these cruelties as signs of the immaturity of our nationalist feelings, which should properly contain a solid core of nationalist political consciousness.

Hatred for Eurasians, Ambonese and Menadonese can only be understood by the outside world as proof that a genuine national consciousness among the masses of our people is either still very superficial, or simply does not exist at all. So long as the people from one region can be played off against people from other regions, it will be very difficult for the world to accept the reality of an Indonesian national consciousness among our people, and our present struggle will also be completely misunderstood.

The capitalists judge our struggle by one simple standard--their calculation of profit and loss. If it costs them nothing, they will be neutral. If they stand to gain, they will be pro. If they expect to lose, they will be anti. If they believe that our struggle is going to damage them seriously, they will bend every effort to oppose us, and will not hesitate to instigate military intervention to protect their financial interests. Therefore, if the Indonesian republican government does not succeed in preventing disorders which threaten the plans and prospects of foreign capital, it will undoubtedly bring upon itself the hostility of foreign capital and therefore of those countries where capital is dominant. Either because they do not understand this truth, or because they choose to ignore it, many of our people are acting and behaving as though they were inviting foreign intervention. Such actions are in complete contradiction with the most basic rules of combat, which require that one's enemy be kept as weak as possible, his friends and allies reduced to a minimum. Of course such actions are understandable

enough, if we bear in mind the "djibaku"⁷ spirit. But we must be constantly on guard against the danger of continuing to fall victim to Japanese indoctrination and propaganda.

Now that we have explored and stated frankly what we regard as the shortcomings and weaknesses of our freedom struggle at the present stage, we may draw the conclusion that much of the present anarchy and confusion cannot be avoided. But we can also say with certainty that if the direction of our struggle can be carried on with a real understanding and careful calculation of the political realities and potentialities both at home and abroad, we shall make much better progress and the existing confusion and irresolution will be appreciably diminished. To help clarify some of these ideas and perspectives, we shall turn in the following sections to certain political facts which must be made the basis of our calculations, so that we can determine the course and direction of our struggle, internationally and here at home.

I. The Situation After the End of The Second World War

The end of the Second World War has left in existence three military and economic powers which dominate everything else: the United States, England and Soviet Russia. The present international structure, in which almost all nations are included, is wholly directed and controlled by them. As a result of the latest changes in the world balance of power, all other nations have lost what little genuine sovereignty they may have had before.

The political system of the Soviet Union is solidly based on a socialist economy which has successfully survived the appalling ordeal of the last few years, and which does not depend to any significant degree on the general political and economic situation outside Soviet Russia herself.

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7. Djibaku. This refers to the so-called "suicide" squads organized by the Japanese to resist Allied landings on Java. Special psychological training and indoctrination was given to the youths in these squads.

The United States and England, on the other hand, require the entire world as lebensraum for their capitalist and imperialist economies. The Second World War, which caused the destruction of billions of rupiahs' worth of property, has impoverished the entire globe--with the exception of the United States. The means of production, indeed often production-sites themselves, have been irretrievably ruined, and cannot again be put to use. Vast human losses, too, have seriously diminished the workforce, and the strength of the survivors has been sapped by hunger and disease.

All of this has weakened the capitalist world, and it is by no means clear how capitalism can muster the strength to continue a healthy existence.

Economic collapse in most parts of the world is being manifested in social disorder and acute political conflict. Pressure from the workers to transform the basis of capitalist society into a socialist community is becoming increasingly urgent. On the other hand, those who, in spite of this pressure, still cling to the old order, are looking in every direction for ways of strengthening their position in order to restore the capitalist and imperialist system. And so we are faced with a new kind of imperialism. We are living in a period which will decide once and for all which system is destined to spread and ultimately determine the fate of all mankind--neo-capitalism or socialism. The competition and struggle between these two ideologies and power-systems will continue to form the fundamental conflict in world politics. We are about to experience a permanent political crisis, possible in the form of a further economic depression exacerbated by power rivalries, and perhaps even by new wars.

II. Indonesia's Position in the World Today

Indonesia is geographically situated within the sphere of influence of Anglo-Saxon capitalism and imperialism. Accordingly Indonesia's fate ultimately depends on the fate of Anglo-Saxon capitalism and imperialism.

For more than a hundred years now Dutch power over our country and our people has been a by-product of the calculations and decisions of British foreign policy. We know that since Britain seized Indonesia from the Dutch at the beginning of the nineteenth century (and then later

handed it back), the Dutch have remained in our country not on the basis of their own strength, but by favor of the English, on whose policies they have been wholly dependent. Yet though British policy towards the Far East has been sustained successfully for more than a century, in spite of the emergence of new powers and new conditions--e.g., Russia, Japan, the United States and the Chinese Revolution--England's power position has clearly been changing, particularly in China. The most significant change that has taken place with regard to our own country has been the expulsion of Dutch power from Indonesia by the Japanese military. However, Japan's subsequent defeat has meant that for the time being she has been eliminated from Southeast Asian politics, and her entire pre-war position has been assumed by the United States, which is now far and away the greatest power in the Pacific. Vis-à-vis Britain's century-old politique in the Far East, the Americans feel themselves everywhere (also of course in Indonesia) as reformers and innovators. If the British cannot adapt themselves to this American politique, dominated as it is by the laws of capitalist development, it is clear that they will eventually be overwhelmed by the superior force at the United States' disposal. It is also clear that till now Dutch power has simply been a pawn in the political chessgame that the British have been playing. But we must also recognize that Dutch power here has by no means the same significance for American as it does for British foreign policy. In this fact lie possibilities for us to win a new position for ourselves, in harmony with the political ambitions of that Giant of the Pacific, the United States. But the same basic factor limits the potentialities of our future. So long as the world order remains capitalist and imperialist, as it does now, we shall have to live within, and be surrounded by the Anglo-Saxon capitalist and imperialist ambience. In spite of our best efforts we shall not, in ourselves, be strong enough to destroy that ambience and thereby win for ourselves the fullest kind of independence. Therefore the fate of Indonesia, more than that of other nations, is bound up with the international situation and world history. Therefore, too, we need, more than other nations, a radical transformation of the bases of human intercourse, so as to eliminate imperialism and capitalism from the world.

So long as this condition is unfulfilled, our national struggle will not be fully satisfactory, and our independence, even should we succeed in wresting it wholly from the Dutch, will remain the nominal independence that we observe in many other small states, dominated by the influence of the great capitalist powers.

III. The Democratic Revolution

Looked at from the outside our revolution is a national revolution. But seen from within it is a democratic revolution. Although we have been deeply involved in the modern world-wide communications-system for decades, and our society has been deeply influenced and transformed by this experience, our people, especially in the villages, still live and think in a feudal manner. Dutch colonialism clung to every vestige of this feudalism in order to arrest the historical progress of our nation. For example, our pangrehpradja is nothing more nor less than an instrument fashioned by Dutch colonialism from the feudal heritage of our society. All the various ordinances applied to the peasants in our villages were simply more orderly and systematic extensions of feudal practices. The peasant was--and is--despised as little better than a bond-slave, not only by our own "aristocrats", but also by the Dutch colonialists themselves.

Dutch colonialism sought its strength in a marriage of modern rationalism with Indonesian feudalism--and as such it became the earliest example of modern fascism. Colonial fascism long anticipated the fascism of Hitler or Mussolini. Years before Hitler set up his concentration-camps at Buchenwald or Belsen, Boven Digul was already in existence.⁸ Accordingly, in their struggle against foreign domination, our people have from the beginning really been fighting against the bureaucratic feudalism, and ultimately the fascism and autocracy of Dutch colonialism. This is why the struggle has been a profoundly popular struggle. The demand for people's sovereignty in our national movement clearly illustrates the realities of our conflict with autocratic and fascist colonialism. In their struggle for nationhood our people are demanding their basic human rights as guarantees that they will never again be treated like slaves. That is the reason why, in our view, the present revolution is both a national and a democratic revolution in relation to the feudal structures of our society, especially in the villages. Nevertheless, we obviously cannot equate this revolution of ours with, for example, the French Revolution. We are living in a world which has already learnt to make use of atomic power, and

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8. Boven Digul was a concentration-camp for political prisoners set up by the Dutch colonial government in the remote jungles of Southwest New Guinea.

whose technical, organizational and intellectual capacities make it totally dissimilar to the world of the French Revolution. Our own society has long been familiar with trusts and cartels, the telegraph, radio, factories, giant corporations (such as the oil companies), and so forth. All this tells us that though we are determined that our revolution shall be a democratic revolution, we must never make the mistake of seeing it as comparable to the French Revolution, either in its basic conditions or in its potentialities. When the French Revolution broke out, world capitalism and world imperialism, as described above, did not exist. Nor was the world inseparably one as it has since become through modern economic relationships. Finally, the whole situation in France and the composition of French society were utterly different from the situation in Indonesia and the Indonesian social structure today.

France and the French Revolution were the pioneers who cleared the way for the world of capitalism and imperialism, whereas our revolution must be regarded as one of the revolutions contributing to its termination. The social struggle taking place in the world today as a result of the capitalist-imperialist system--manifested in the struggle of the workers, the struggle of socialists everywhere, the advances and the victories they are gaining in the contemporary world--sharply differentiates the conditions of our revolution from the merely bourgeois-democratic French Revolution.

So our revolution must inevitably be social in character. In our revolution the workers will have a position fundamentally different from that of the working class in France during the French Revolution, even though there are similarities in their outlook--a general immaturity and lack of class consciousness.

The social character of our revolution also reveals the social possibilities inherent in our revolution, since all these factors involved are dynamic. Yet for our country, as has been explained above, everything still turns on the international situation and its potentialities. Subjectively, of course, the social character of our revolution should grow steadily deeper and clearer, but objectively the potentiality for development in this direction will depend on changes in the international order. The limits thereby imposed I have already sketched out above.

IV. The National Revolution

Externally our revolution is a national revolution; internally it develops according to the laws of a democratic society and bears a social character. If we do not fully comprehend this truth, and so, internally, do no more than promote a national revolution--whether through ignorance or insufficient understanding of the crucial role of democracy in the transformation of our society, we shall be in grave danger. The danger is that not realizing that feudalism too is one of our enemies, we shall ally with the still living spirit of this feudalism, which is quite compatible with a certain kind of nationalism, and so create a nationalism built on a hierarchical, feudalistic solidarism: in fact on Fascism, the greatest enemy of world progress and of our people. The present ideological confusion often manifests itself as a kind of nationalism or national communism à la Hitler or Mussolini. Therefore in marshalling our society's force for the revolution, we must never for a moment forget that we are creating a democratic revolution. Our national revolution is simply the "tail-end" of our democratic revolution. Top priority must be given, not to nationalism, but to democracy, even though it may seem easier to arouse the masses by encouraging their xenophobia. It is true, of course, that such methods can work for a while (see, for example, the successes of Mussolini, Hitler, Franco, Chiang Kai-shek, etc.), but in relation to the advancement of their societies, they are always reactionary and conflict with progress and the social struggle the world over. The men who urge such a course are always enemies of the people, even though they may, momentarily, be deified by the people, like Hitler and Mussolini.

V. Revolution and Purge

If our struggle is to be carried on in the environment just described, it is clear that our revolution must be led by revolutionary democrats, not by nationalist groups who have kowtowed to the fascists, whether Dutch colonial or Japanese military fascists.

This democratic revolutionary struggle must begin by purging itself of the stains of Japanese fascism, and curbing the views of those whose minds are still under the influence of Japanese propaganda and indoctrination. Those

who have sold their souls and their honor to the Japanese fascists must be eliminated from the leadership of our revolution--those who have worked in the Japanese propaganda organizations, the secret police, and the Japanese fifth column in general. These men must be regarded as traitors to our struggle and must be sharply distinguished from ordinary people who worked for the Japanese simply to earn their daily bread. Thus all such political collaborators with the Japanese fascists must be regarded as fascists themselves, or as the running-dogs and henchmen of the Japanese fascists, who, it goes without saying, are guilty of betraying the people's struggle and the people's revolution.

The Indonesian Republican State, which we have made the instrument of our people's revolution, must also be made the instrument of our democratic struggle, purged of all traces of Japanese fascism. The present constitution, which is still far from fully democratic, must be replaced by a wholly democratic constitution which will imprint on every organ of state administration the fundamental rights of the people: freedom of thought, speech and religion, freedom to write, to earn a living, to have an education, and to share in determining the organization and the business of the state through the right to elect and be elected to all bodies which participate in governing the country.

VI. Revolution and Party

To be able to harness all energies for carrying on the revolution in a purposeful and orderly manner, our leadership must be like an army, fortified by ideology and scientific knowledge, and tightly organized in a revolutionary party.

A revolutionary party with a fully developed, coherent ideology and theory, organized in a modern and efficient way, is essential for leading the revolution, for mobilizing all the forces in our society which can be brought into the struggle, for establishing tactics and strategy, and for shaping and utilizing all the instruments and weapons of that struggle.

This party must be a democratic and revolutionary party, preferably led by men with a broad knowledge of modern revolutionary methods, men with a wide understanding and experience of the revolutionary struggles of the

contemporary world, who can keep the course of our struggle in line with over-all changes in the world outside. Its membership need not be large, provided that it forms a tightly disciplined army, efficient and modern in organization and armed with a powerful and developed ideology and wide general knowledge.

VII. Revolution and Government

In the present circumstances the first step to be taken to improve and transform our situation, aside from the mobilization of all conscious revolutionary forces into a disciplined party structure, is the most rapid possible restoration of the authority of the Indonesian State and the systematic prevention of disorder among our people.

The whole governmental apparatus must be democratized as swiftly as possible, so that the masses of the people can be integrated into the structure of government. This can easily be accomplished by revitalizing, and, where necessary, by setting up popular representative councils from the villages right up to the highest levels of government. Governmental agencies must also be democratized as far as possible, to lessen the gulf of antagonism between them and the masses. For the time being the old pangreh-pradja can be given positions as advisors and inspectors of all the governmental changes being carried out in their respective regions--or they may be withdrawn to various departmental offices, to the police, to the agricultural extension services and so forth. With the formation of these new administrative organs the present anarchy will automatically be checked at its very source (i.e., in the village itself). The government will be provided with an instrument which can be utilized to promote a democratic revolution in the rural economy and social structure. And our society will acquire the means for a radical transformation of its foundation--the village. Thereby all our ideals for the renewal of our society can begin to be put into practice.

Inevitably, under these conditions, cruelty and inhumanity towards foreigners or towards groups of our own people who are not yet politically aware, will decline and eventually vanish altogether. Fascist attitudes will automatically disappear with the flowering of the spirit of democracy and humanity.

Inevitably, too, our position vis-à-vis the outside world will be greatly strengthened. Concentrated and continuous efforts to strengthen that position further mean building up the organization of our government in a democratic manner, and increasing world confidence that we are capable of a disciplined ordering of our state and nation, without undermining our economic, political and cultural relations with the world outside. So long as the world we live in is dominated by capital, we are forced to make sure that we do not earn the enmity of capitalism. This involves opening up our country to foreign economic activity as far as possible--always on condition that no damage is done to the welfare of our people. The same is true of the entry of foreigners into our country. In a strong and healthy democracy all this can easily be borne without arousing--as at present--racial hatred on the basis of nationalist sentiment. All laws and other matters relating to foreign residents must be regulated democratically in a spirit of humanity and social justice.

VIII. Struggling for the Content of Freedom

The Indonesian republican state which we are struggling to make an instrument of our democratic revolution, will only achieve its fullest value if we imbue it with a genuinely democratic character. For us, only a victory of this kind would be a victory with real meaning and content, not simply a victory of reputation and honor. It is this real content of freedom that must now guide our political struggle. For the nationalist struggle rarely escapes completely the danger of being too influenced by names and forms. It frequently turns out that a so-called national victory is, in practice, without meaning for the masses of the people. If we determine the value of Indonesia's freedom by its genuinely democratic quality, then in our political struggle vis-à-vis the outside world, it is for this inner content that we must strive. "The State of the Republic of Indonesia" is only a name we give to whatever content we intend and hope to provide.

IX. Hatred of Foreigners

One of the most important aspects of our struggle is our attitude and policy towards various groups who are more or less isolated from the rest of our citizens: foreigners,

Europeans and Asians of mixed descent, Christians, Ambo-nese, Menadonese, and so forth. As of now we still do not have a satisfactory attitude and policy towards all these groups. Recently, indeed many acts have been performed which are clearly wrong and do grave harm to our democratic struggle. Hatred for alien groups and peoples is a hidden facet of every nationalist movement, especially when these aliens occupy a visibly privileged position. But every nationalist movement which intoxicates itself with xenophobia in order to compound its own strength, will undoubtedly in the long run be confronted by the whole world and all mankind. This kind of nationalist frenzy may at first represent a certain strength, but in the end it must reach an impasse and finally choke itself to death in a spirit of djibaku. The strength that we must seek lies in a spirit of sacrifice, and a feeling for justice and humanity. For only a nationalist spirit sustained by a feeling for justice and humanity can lead us forward within the context of world history.

Ultimately all nationalities will inevitably come to an end in a human fellowship which will envelop the whole world and form it into a single nation of mankind, whose relationships will be based on justice and truth, no longer limited by narrow sentiments which cut man off from man, through difference of skin color or ancestral descent. Only when these narrow sentiments cease to be the main impulse behind our actions and behavior will the bands fall off which have blinded us to the barbarousness of our history. Only then shall we be able to understand clearly the difference between love of our country and hatred for foreigners or hatred for groups of our own countrymen, who, through accidents of history, have either been isolated or have isolated themselves from the rest because of differences of blood--stupid and barbarous as this idea of "blood" is. Our attitude towards this question must be based on a profoundly social perspective, honest analysis and rational calculation, in the service of the cause of humanity and social justice.

X. The Workers

At the present stage of capitalist development, in which world capital is undergoing ever greater concentration, especially in New York and London, the totality of production in the capitalist world is more than ever controlled by one or two financial centers, particularly Wall

Street. As a result of the War, it can safely be said that the whole world is in debt to Wall Street. This has made the position and power of the capitalist world truly international. Accordingly the resistance and struggle of the workers against this concentration of power will only bear fruit if they are organized in a way which takes this fact into account. Thus the organization and the struggle of the workers must also be internationally based.

Our workers are now directing their struggle towards the defense of the Free State of Indonesia. This of course is as it should be. Nevertheless we must re-emphasize the truth stated above, since for the further development of their struggle our workers must be able to transcend their nationalist solidarity and develop an international solidarity and organization on a plane with the struggle of the workers of the entire world. In fact a fiery nationalist zeal may even prove a hindrance to our workers, preventing them from understanding their struggle in the international context, and from becoming conscious of and evaluating their position in a capitalist society. And this in turn may lead them astray, and undermine and weaken their position. To avoid the danger of forgetting or abandoning the basis of their own struggle within the over-all nationalist struggle, and thus of falling prey to manipulation and exploitation by other social groups, our workers must know how to struggle for their own position as Indonesians within the framework of the nationalist movement: in other words through workers' organizations and with the weapons of the workers' struggle. The spirit needed to carry on this struggle is a spirit of class consciousness and class solidarity which cannot be weakened by nationalist sentiment. The essential condition for clarifying their position is for the workers to demand the fullest possible array of democratic rights, even from the Free State of Indonesia itself--the right to speak, to write, to assemble, to meet, to strike, the right to a guaranteed livelihood, health, education for their children, minimum wages, and so forth. Class consciousness and class understanding must be continuously deepened and strengthened, so that in the shortest possible span of time they can develop into an international class consciousness and feeling, thus facilitating the eventual linking of our workers' struggle with the international workers' fraternity. Our labor unions must be organized along modern lines, i.e., on an industrial basis. Workers' education must be adapted to the requirements of the working class struggle, i.e., on the level of an awareness and understanding of the international struggle to build a socialist world. In their struggle for Indonesia's freedom our

workers must also struggle for the strongest possible position for themselves, so that they can become the vanguard of the struggle against imperialism in Indonesia, and strengthen the struggle of the international working class against world capitalism.

XI. The Peasants

For the peasant our struggle for independence will only be meaningful if he feels it to be genuinely democratic. If the Indonesian national revolution now in full course is to be felt as a democratic revolution by the peasant, he must be liberated from arbitrary treatment by his government, so that he can fully enjoy the fruits of his labor, and is no longer harassed by countless regulations basically designed to make life pleasant for his rulers. Our revolution must combat rural feudalism in the form of landlordism, feudal bureaucratic regulations, and feudal levies of peasant labor and produce, such as were formerly maintained by Dutch colonialism. The population of our villages is already extremely dense; although agricultural land in Java is being worked to the utmost to provide food for her population, there is still not enough produced to raise the general level of our people's standard of living. Every day this problem becomes more urgent. We must therefore not only make every effort to spread the population more evenly across the Indonesian archipelago by transmigration, but also, in the light of Java's position and present circumstances, we cannot avoid stating that the most direct answer to the problems of population and production there is industrialization. If we can diminish the surplus population of the villages to a point where the village communities have a chance to raise their own living standards by means of cooperatives, then a planned program of industrialization under government direction should ensure that the great majority of that surplus can look forward to earning their livelihood as factory workers. Their standards of living should then steadily rise as Indonesia grows more wealthy, especially on a solid basis of peasant prosperity. Village government must also be restored to health by the institution of genuine democracy through the utilization of traditional customs--elections and village meetings--which will be given the fullest possible authority. The quality of this government must be improved by raising the level of village education and instruction, developing leadership in all village affairs, renovating the basis of our society, and promoting rationalization and efficiency. By these methods

we shall break the grip of rural tradition, so that without having to undergo the experience of town and factory life, the village can be modernized, and electricity and machinery introduced to help its inhabitants raise their own standards of living. Peasant associations must be set up to lead and guide the struggle to attune the spirit of peasant life to the pace of change we want to develop. Peasant associations will not only help promote this effort on a massive and disciplined scale, but will also facilitate the development of peasant unity and a close relationship with the workers' movement.

XII. Our Youth

One of the problems which looms largest at this moment is the problem of our youth. It cannot be denied that the remarkable surge of national consciousness that we are now experiencing appears to have been stimulated by the younger generation. It is as though it were they who determined the very rhythm of our struggle. It is as though the revolution we are now undergoing originated in the enthusiasm and stout-heartedness of our youth, in other words, that it has been driven forward by pure idealism alone. But only at first glance can this view be accepted. It is clear from the foregoing analysis that the very possibility of the present flare-up of our young people's enthusiasm and the possibility of a wide popular response to it, is rooted deeply in the condition of our society itself. That condition has already been briefly sketched above. But it is very plain that the younger generation, especially the students, who are now burning with patriotic ardor, will not be able to perform their pioneering tasks if this nationalist spirit is not suffused with a real feeling of democracy and social responsibility. Without this, it will find itself in the impasse which ultimately confronts all nationalisms. The time will come when the people will no longer follow, and may even resist.

In time our youth will learn from experience that it is not the soldier who will make our revolution triumph, but the masses of the people, the workers and the peasants, together with the intellectuals and the younger generation. The moment has come for our young people to broaden their vision of the foundations of our society. They must now realize that the real strength of our struggle lies not with them, but with the masses, especially the organized workers, who have a keen awareness and understanding of

the world-wide struggle of the working class. If our young men and women fully realize this, they will see that their real role is that of champions of the workers and peasants.

It should now be clear that the view that the younger generation must assume the leadership of our struggle for freedom, is a misconception which can do our struggle serious harm.

The leadership of our revolution belongs to the core of its political strength, in the form of a democratic revolutionary party. Given the full support of a revolutionary workers' party, our youth can still at the most become the advance guard of the party which leads the struggle. Equally misconceived is the view that leadership of our revolution should devolve onto those youths who have been organized in military formations, whether as ordinary troops or officers. This error is readily understandable. These last years we have felt only too deeply the impact of military rule. This and the military training given to our youth and to our people in general, has encouraged the false idea that our struggle is primarily a military one which should therefore be led by military men. Only a thorough understanding of the social basis of our present struggle can help us avoid this illusion. By nature our youth is neither fascist nor feudal-militaristic. Yet fundamentally incorrect ideas on this question still remain to be combatted. While our youth are engaged in the present struggle, their understanding must be given content, and their attitudes changed so that they do not lower themselves to the level of wild beasts, but can develop into a revolutionary youth looking forward to a new world, an idealistic youth with a deep consciousness and unsullied awareness of their struggle on behalf of our people and of mankind in general.

XIII. The Army

In spite of this, however, the present world situation demands that we heighten our ability to defend our country and our people as systematically as we can. We need an organized defense force. We need a disciplined army structured along modern lines. Our youth as a whole must be given training to fill this need. We therefore not only require a well-organized, modern army with up-to-date weapons, but also military training for our whole people,

especially our youth. We must institute a mass militia as soon as possible, in which all young people, beginning at a certain age, will have to undergo military training for a specified period. Since the basic materiel and equipment are still largely lacking, we must make do with what we have, meanwhile endeavoring to make good these deficiencies. Of course the most essential of these requirements is education: this can be developed through an Army and a Naval Academy. In this regard local deficiencies can be supplemented with help from abroad in the form of teachers and instructors. To equip ourselves with an adequate supply of armaments it is only proper that in the present situation we sacrifice less pressing needs. In the present crisis the manufacture and purchase of weapons must therefore be given the highest priority. Nevertheless, acknowledging the importance of military expertise and techniques does not for a moment permit us to forget the real nature of our struggle as described above, nor to overestimate the real place of military affairs in our revolution. Since our struggle is expressed in the form of the Indonesian State, and so must utilize the power-instruments of the state, we are compelled to build up the main instrument of state struggle--in other words, the Army. But this certainly ought not to be taken to mean that we should become the slaves of the state or the military--i.e., fascists and militarists.

We must draw a clear and sharp line between these objective requirements and the spirit of our democratic revolution, so that we never destroy our revolution and its spirit by straying into militarism and fascism.

