

AMERICAN REACTIONS TO INDONESIA'S ROLE
IN THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE

FREDERICK P. BUNNELL

INTERIM REPORTS SERIES

MODERN INDONESIA PROJECT

Southeast Asia Program
Department of Asian Studies
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PREFACE

Those who have followed the history of Indonesia's foreign relations will have been struck by the frequent lack of congruence between the Indonesian conception of the country's posture in international affairs and its perception abroad. The reasons for this are generally complex, and it is undoubtedly as difficult for Indonesians to understand them as it is for other people. There have been, however, during the past decade and a half, a number of episodes in the course of Indonesia's foreign relations which have been important in developing this incongruity and which, if fairly analyzed, should help to explain it. Such an episode was the September 1961 Belgrade Conference of non-aligned countries. Mr. Bunnell's account and analysis of the American reaction which it provoked is, I believe, a useful contribution to an understanding of this development, helpful, I would hope, to Indonesians as well as to Americans.

The fact that the Soviet Union resumed nuclear testing on the eve of the Belgrade Conference served to ensure that world--and particularly American--interest in the Conference would be keen. As one of the three co-sponsors of the Conference--and perhaps also because of the leading role she had played in the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung in 1955--Indonesia received particular attention. Certainly the image of Indonesia in the United States was defined more clearly by the Belgrade Conference; the fact that the Conference provoked a hostile reaction on the part of some segments of opinion in this country tended to ensure that at the same time that Indonesia's image was becoming clearer it was also being viewed more critically.

It should be emphasized that this study is confined primarily to American reactions to the Belgrade Conference and, especially, the American assessment of Indonesia's part in it. No account is given of the proceedings of the Conference as such; nor does Mr. Bunnell attempt to present or explain Indonesia's aims at Belgrade. He devotes the major part of his study to an account of the reaction of the American press and Congress to the Conference, and Indonesia's role in it, and to an assessment of the effect of this reaction on Administration policy towards Indonesia. This is an Interim Report, based only on sources available in the United States, and Mr. Bunnell wishes to make clear that his study as here presented is provisional and tentative. Mr. Bunnell is currently in Indonesia pursuing research relating to Indonesia's relations with the United States. It is my hope and expectation that his work there will lead to the publication of a fuller

and broader monograph of considerable importance to those interested in Indonesia's foreign relations in general and Indonesian-American relations in particular.

Ithaca, New York
December 20, 1963.

George McT. Kahin
Director

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INTRODUCTION

THE "MODERATE" AND "MILITANT" POSITIONS AT THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE

In late April of 1961 President Tito of Yugoslavia and President Nasser of the United Arab Republic jointly announced their intention to organize a summit conference of non-aligned nations. Three weeks later Indonesia officially indicated that she too would be a co-sponsor of the projected meeting. After securing the reluctant support of Prime Minister Nehru of India, the three sponsors convened a Preparatory Conference of twenty-one non-aligned nations in Cairo on June 5. This meeting was marked by considerable disagreement on several issues. The most important of these concerned the scope of the agenda and the length of the invitation list. In both of these matters the three sponsors again found themselves at odds with India. Still refusing to commit herself to participation in the planned summit gathering, India insisted on the exclusion from the agenda of major colonial disputes--disputes such as Angola, Algeria, the Congo, and West Irian. All of these touched on the special interests of one or more of the sponsors and their African supporters. Moreover, a militant anti-colonialism had become for many of these nations the central focus of their foreign policies. For India, on the other hand, a militant anti-colonialism seemed unwarranted. Nehru's position was that not only had Western colonialism virtually disappeared from Asia and Africa, but in the early summer of 1961 the issue of world peace demanded priority. With the Berlin Crisis deepening, the responsibility of the non-aligned nations was to concentrate on ways to decrease tension between the two world powers.

It was this dispute over the relative priority of the issues of peace and colonialism that lay also behind the Cairo Conference controversy over the invitation list. Essentially, India sought to expand the invitations to embrace both moderate Asian-African neutrals, such as Nigeria, and the traditional European neutrals, such as Sweden. With these nations present, India believed she would have a better opportunity to restrain the militant anti-colonialism of the sponsors and their supporters and provide a fuller opportunity to work towards a US-Soviet detente. The sponsors, on the other hand, clearly wished to preserve their dominance by restricting the summit meeting to the nations present at Cairo. Bargaining on this issue extended at least into early July, the ultimate result being that the sponsors prevailed--though in part because some of India's proposed invitees declined to attend. Thus it was that in Belgrade on Friday, September 1, 1961, 24 nations--later 25 with the arrival of Congo delegates--

opened "The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries."

Generally speaking, the most conspicuous theme to emerge from the Conference addresses, the reports of the secret Committee meetings, and the final declarations was the continuing tension between the priorities of easing cold war tensions and mounting an attack on colonialism. As at Cairo, India was without question the chief protagonist of what, from a Western perspective, was a relatively moderate position. Not only did Prime Minister Nehru publicly lecture the Conference on the waning significance of the colonial problem, but he warned them against making specific proposals for the settlement of the Berlin and German questions. These were, he said, the most urgent questions, but they could be settled only by the great powers. The task of the non-aligned nations was to create the proper atmosphere for negotiations between the Soviet Union and America. This could only be done by articulating their demand for peace and exerting their collective pressure for negotiations. For nations of meagre military and economic strength to attempt more than this was futile. More important, any specific suggestions made by the Belgrade participants would be likely to irritate one side or the other and thus exacerbate tensions.

Although there were significant differences between them, the three Conference sponsors--Yugoslavia, the U.A.R., and Indonesia--all dissented from the moderate course urged by Nehru. Of the three sponsors, it was, however, Indonesia that clashed most directly with India both in the public meetings and in the secret committee sessions. This clash is amply illustrated by the sharp contrast offered by the addresses of Nehru and Sukarno to the Conference. Activated by both domestic political considerations and a deep ideological commitment, Sukarno delivered a scathing denunciation of colonialism. Not only did he disagree with Nehru's estimate of the threat to peace posed by the remnants of traditional colonialism, but he also warned of the "real danger" of "colonialism in a new cloak, the so-called neo-colonialism." This new form of colonialism included, he said, the various stratagems employed by Western powers to preserve their economic interests--and sometimes also their political and military concerns--in their former colonies. In Sukarno's view this double-faceted colonialism constituted the most urgent issue confronting the non-aligned nations. While not denying the danger to world peace posed by cold war tensions, Sukarno rejected Nehru's assumption that the prime cause of world tension lay in ideological conflict between the Great Powers. To make such an assumption was to misread world history, for the real cause of international tension was the confrontation between the "old forces of domination" and the "new emergent forces for freedom and justice." Unlike the cold war tensions, this confrontation could not be resolved through coexistence. For, in Sukarno's words, "there can be no co-existence between independence and justice on one side and imperialism-colonialism on the other side." The chief threats to world peace, Sukarno argued, lay in Angola and West Irian rather than in Berlin.

Just as the more militant sponsors' position, illustrated by Sukarno's Conference address, dissented from Nehru's analysis of the causes of world tension, so also it tended to propose a radically different resolution of those tensions. The most important responsibility of a non-aligned nation truly devoted to world peace was to intensify the struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism. As for the cold war confrontation, the task of the non-aligned was greater than that suggested by Nehru. The role of the non-aligned must be measured against the tide of history not merely in terms of a calculation of military and economic strength. As the leaders of the "new emergent forces," the non-aligned nations deserved a prominent role in the settlement of all world issues, not just those directly affecting their own regions. Moreover, it was consistent with such a role that these nations not refrain from suggesting specific solutions to world problems and, in short, assume a more assertive role in international affairs than was agreeable to Nehru.

There were other important elements in the proceedings of the Belgrade Conference that would refine this simplified portrayal of the ideological contrasts between the moderate Indian position and the more militant position represented by Indonesia. Moreover, other aspects of the Conference--such as the impact of the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing--bore on the character of the factional differences within the Conference and at the same time constituted important independent themes. Nevertheless, in this brief background to a study of American reactions to the Belgrade Conference, it is especially important to illuminate the moderate-militant divergence. For not only did this divergence occupy a prominent place in most American comment on the Conference, but the nature of those American comments also raises a crucial question about the capacity of many American editors, Congressmen, and Administration officials to understand the motivations behind non-alignment.

CHAPTER I

AMERICAN PRESS REACTIONS TO THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE

On the eve of the Belgrade Conference the Soviet Union announced that it was about to resume nuclear testing. That announcement had a profound effect on the delegates gathering in Belgrade. It had an even more profound effect on the American press. (1) Suddenly the significance of the Belgrade meeting had multiplied. Moscow's action had imparted a new dramatic urgency to the attention first turned on Belgrade by the Berlin Crisis. In American eyes the neutrals had been placed on trial. Such was the theme of initial press comment typified by the New York Times editorial captioned, "Moscow Challenges Belgrade":

The Belgrade meeting of "non-aligned" --or "positive neutralist" --Governments opened yesterday in what was obviously an atmosphere of crisis. The crisis arose from the challenge which had been contemptuously thrown before the Belgrade meeting by the Soviet Government earlier this week when it unexpectedly announced its intention of resuming nuclear testing, including testing of the most powerful hydrogen bombs the world has ever known. Already it can be seen that the success or failure of the Belgrade meeting will be decided by how it reacts to that challenge. (2)

In underscoring the challenge Soviet policy had imposed on the non-aligned conference, much of the press expressed considerable confidence that Belgrade would respond to the challenge. Even papers consistently hostile to neutrals felt that Moscow's blatant brutality would jolt the most complacent neutral. Such, for example, was the reaction of the Chicago Tribune in its lead editorial of September 1 entitled "Farewell to Illusion":

-
- (1) The papers used to illustrate American press reaction were arbitrarily selected on the basis of those available in the Cornell University Library. As such they do constitute a selection of leading papers from major regions of the country. They do not, however, constitute a rigorously selected sample of the American press as a whole.
 - (2) Editorial, New York Times, Sep. 2, 1961 (henceforth cited as Times or NYT, without year unless other than 1961.)

"World opinion," for what it is worth, is outraged at the Soviet stimulus to an arms race...The profession that Russia is a champion of peace can be seen for what it is, although why there should have been any bemusement on that score is a mystery. (3)

Papers more sympathetic to neutrals adopted a similar stance. They too hailed what seemed an inevitable propaganda victory for an America accustomed to steady abuse from "world opinion." The Atlanta Constitution heartily endorsed Secretary Rusk's professed intention to let the Soviet resumption announcement "soak in hard." Like Rusk, the Constitution editor assumed he understood the psychology of the non-aligned:

The Soviet announcement is, in a grotesque way, an American victory...The side that unilaterally resumed testing was bound to take a beating in world opinion. Russia, not America, must now take that beating. (4)

In a similar vein the vast majority of the press indicated that the uncommitted would this time side with the West in condemning patent treachery by the Soviet Union. (5) The fact that the US itself had appeared to be on the verge of resuming tests was, for the most part, conveniently forgotten--though in some instances it was cited as another reason for hailing the Soviet propaganda blunder. As the Kansas City Star frankly put it, the US had been relieved of "an extremely serious problem of world opinion." (6)

For the vast majority of American editors the non-aligned leaders disappointed expectation. Most viewed the Belgrade reaction to the Soviet tests as woefully mild. In addition, they resented the persistence of what they termed the neutrals' "double standard" on other cold war issues--a "double standard" that allegedly discriminated against the West. Some editors echoed their reporters in lauding Nehru's efforts to tone down the anti-Westernism of the militant majority, but in the end the Belgrade Conference emerged as an unqualified symbol of the neutrals' hypocrisy and pro-Soviet proclivities.

(3) Editorial, Chicago Tribune, Sep. 1. Cf. New Orleans Times-Picayune, Sep. 1 and Wall Street Journal, Sep. 5.

(4) Editorial, Atlanta Constitution, Sep. 1.

(5) See sampling of press reactions to Soviet test announcement in St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sep. 3. Also see Max Frankel, NYT, Sep. 1.

(6) Cited in St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sep. 3. Concerning American plans for the resumption of testing, see NYT, Sep. 1.

The Vehement Reaction

The most emotional and simplistic cold war judgements of the Conference came from the chauvinistic, conservative press. Probably representing more than a majority of the editorial voices in the country, this segment of the press tended to reflect and determine the "mood response" of the "mass public." (7) In the midwest the Chicago Tribune reacted with predictable vehemence. And like many conservatives in Congress the Tribune pointedly linked the conduct of the Belgrade neutrals to American aid policy:

The US has about 6 billion in foreign aid invested in this bunch of myopic opportunists, whose conception of justice is anything that gives them advantage, and whose dedication to peace can be translated as a disposition to accept with equanimity the destruction of Western civilization as long as their hides come through unscathed.

There isn't a nickel's worth of principle or morality in the whole crummy crowd, and in the face of the apelike Khrushchev's studied insults and his determination to impose the law of the jungle in the whole world, all that the lot of them can do is to withdraw into their mental bomb shelters, as impervious to reality as to reason or ethics. (8)

In siding with the Tribune, the New Orleans Times-Picayune spoke for the Southern conservative bloc in Congress. Under the title "Undiscerning Conscience," it declared:

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- (7) It is generally agreed that the majority of the press editorials in the United States tend to be both more conservative and more chauvinistic than either of the last two Administrations. See V. O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York, 1961), Chap. 15.

The terms "mood response" and "mass public" are taken from a most stimulating study by Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York, 1960), especially Chapter VII.

For estimates of the impact of the mass media--including the press--on the opinions of various elements of the American public, see the cautions expressed by Almond, op. cit., p. 140, and elaborated in Key, op. cit., Chaps. 14 and 15.

The terms conservative and chauvinistic are obviously inadequate for characterizing the general foreign policy orientation of a newspaper. The former term is perhaps especially misleading because of the lack of correlation between "conservativeness" and what is now falsely termed "isolationism." See Key, op. cit., Chapter 7, on "Interrelations of Opinion."

- (8) Editorial, Chicago Tribune, Sep. 6.

To be sure, no one expected these neutral countries to be too "harsh" with Khrushchev even though it might be routine for many of them to belabor the whole world day in and day out for a multiplicity of fancied wrongs.

But certainly as a distillation of the world's conscience the conference of the neutral nations failed dismally in not indicating in some fashion its recognition of the fact that Moscow's resumption of nuclear testing does anything but help ward off danger of nuclear war "which threatens the world and humanity". (9)

Other papers predisposed against the Kennedy Administration policy of wooing the neutralists joined the chorus of emotional denunciation. The New York Daily News, the Washington Evening Star, and the Minneapolis Star expressed varying degrees of bitterness with Belgrade. (10)

The conservative press evaluation of the Belgrade Conference found its most telling representation in a cartoon. On the day the Belgrade "peace mission" conferred with President Kennedy in Washington, the Chicago Tribune adorned its front page with a graphic message. Under the caption, "The Neutral Can't Choose Between Right and Wrong," a cartoon showed Nehru undecided between the United States--pictured as "The Good Samaritan"--and the Soviet Union--represented as a "Vicious Barbarian." Clearly the Tribune was not impressed with its own stories on Nehru's efforts to moderate the tone of the Belgrade declaration. (11)

The Moderate Reaction

The most significant aspect of the American press reaction to the Belgrade Conference appears on the editorial pages of the highly influential New York Times and Washington Post. Generally relatively sympathetic to neutralist sentiments and their economic needs, these two papers constitute a good index of the pervasiveness of American irritation with Belgrade. Although the Times and Post seldom affect the sentiment of the "mass public," they do penetrate the more strategic levels of public opinion--the levels of the "attentive public" and the "foreign policy elites." (12) Their view would, in short, tend

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- (9) Editorial, New Orleans Times-Picayune, Sep. 10.
 - (10) See editions of these papers for Sep. 6, Sep. 7, and Sep. 5 respectively.
 - (11) Cartoon appears in Chicago Tribune, Sep. 13. Stories on Nehru appear on Sep. 3 and 5. For back-handed editorial praise for Nehru, see editorial, Sep. 6.
 - (12) Again Almond's terms. See Almond, op. cit., especially pp. 138-139.

to reflect and partially determine the degree of impact the Belgrade Conference would have in the highest levels of the Kennedy Administration. (13)

Consistent with their relatively great emphasis on international affairs, the Times and Post reacted editorially more quickly to Belgrade than did the Chicago Tribune or the New Orleans Times-Picayune. (14) Complementing front page dispatches by their own reporters in Belgrade, both papers ran considerable editorial comment. These comments proved more discriminating and sophisticated than those already cited. But as the Times editorial on the opening speeches demonstrates, the liberal-internationalist press tended to share some of the moral indignation of their more conservative-isolationist colleagues. Alluding to "Moscow's Challenge to Belgrade," the Times delivered this judgement of Tito, Nasser and Sukarno:

It must regretfully be said that the proceedings during yesterday's initial meeting in Belgrade were far from encouraging. Of the three opening speakers, Tito, Sukarno, and Nasser, only the latter spoke with anything remotely like the required honesty in condemning the planned Soviet crime against all humanity. The other two speakers dodged the issue which they knew was in the mind of every person in their audience. President Sukarno was particularly shocking since that gentlemen found it possible in the same speech to come out with what was virtually a demand that the West bow in all respects to the Soviet "solution" for Berlin and Germany. (15)

Despite the cryptic title "It Pays to Be Wicked?," the Post reacted somewhat less severely than the Times. It merely confessed to "rueful resignation" at the neutrals' initial "discreet disapproval" of the Soviet tests. Furthermore it pointed out that there is a "profound compliment in this double standard," just as it was willing to concede that it is "doubtless true that many of the emergent nations have had bitter first-hand experience with Western colonialism." Essentially, however, the Post shared much of the Times'

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- (13) Evidence for this statement is necessarily circumstantial. For one impressive instance of such, note Senate Majority Whip Humphrey's citation of Washington Post (henceforth cited as Post) and Times editorials in his floor speech on Belgrade and American testing; Congressional Record, Sep. 16, pp. 19896-98. See Key's discussion of the quality press; Key, op. cit., p. 405. Also see Douglas Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government (Boston, 1959).
 - (14) The date of the first editorials were as follows: NYT, Sep. 2; Post, Sep. 2; Chicago Tribune, Sep. 6; and New Orleans Times-Picayune, Sep. 10.
 - (15) Editorial, NYT, Sep. 2. For a more moderate assessment of Sukarno's position on the Berlin and German question see the report of the Times' own correspondent, M. S. Handler, in the same issue.

irritation. It admitted its aggravation "that the pious preachments of the neutrals are sometimes directed with even-handed nicety to both West and East." (16)

Later, at the conclusion of the Conference, the editors of the Times and Post underscored their disapprobation of neutral conduct under the themes of "Disappointment at Belgrade" and "Belgrade's Eloquent Silences." Mingled with their annoyance at the neutrals' failure to side with the moral principles of the Western cold war position was a broader concern. The neutrals had, in their view, forfeited the opportunity to play their professed role as "the conscience of mankind." And by abdicating that role they had undermined those in the West—including the Times and Post—who had persistently counseled delay in US resumption of tests. (17)

The stress of the Times and the Post on the neutrals' failure to grasp their opportunity for moral leadership finds its sharpest expression in a Herblock cartoon. (18) Displaying awareness of the factional line-up at Belgrade, Herblock did not follow the Chicago Tribune in selecting Nehru as the prototype of the Belgrade leader. Rather he selected a leader of the militant faction that opposed Nehru. Significantly that choice was President Sukarno. There was no question as to the identity of the prototype. Dressed in a military uniform, the figure wore Sukarno's characteristic accoutrements—dark glasses and a black pitji. With devastating mockery Herblock pictured Sukarno atop a child's sandpile labeled "Belgrade Resolutions." Clutched in his hand is the standard of non-alignment. Its banner bears the slogan "We are firmly opposed to the evils of the 19th century." With his other hand Sukarno shields his eyes in order to survey better the terrain ahead. But directly behind this ludicrous caricature of a visionary statesman towers a tremendous mountain peak symbolizing the "Neutrals' Opportunity for Moral Leadership." As a final touch Herblock had added the caption "The Sandpile Summit."

As already indicated, both the Times and the Post displayed a much greater degree of discrimination in their attacks on the Belgrade Conference than did most papers. The appropriateness of Herblock's choice of Sukarno as the militant neutralist prototype is paralleled in the Post's editorial praise for Nehru. "The Conference of non-aligned nations, thanks to Prime Minister Nehru's exertions, faced up to the unpalatable fact that tomorrow's thermonuclear wars may be more than yesterday's colonial wars. That was a gain for realism." (19)

(16) Post, Sep. 2.

(17) NYT, Sep. 6, and Post, Sep. 7.

(18) Post, Sep. 7. The same cartoon was reprinted the following Sunday in the NYT, Section IV, Sep. 10.

(19) Post, Sep. 7.

Amid its general "disappointment" the Times also saw some positive features in the Belgrade meeting:

Yet with all its shortcomings, the meeting also demonstrated that reality --as distinct from dogma --is touching the conscience of the "neutralists." Thus, despite all their discretion, they were far less enthusiastic about communism than at Bandung six years ago; and President Tito's best efforts failed to persuade them to downgrade the United Nations Secretary General. Their next meeting should show them even farther advanced along the road of genuinely objective judgement that would lend meaning and stature to their neutralist position. (20)

The Relatively Mild Reaction

A few papers seemed to deviate from the consensus of "disappointment" and "aggravation" registered in the Times and Post as well as in the conservative press. The most puzzling of these is the San Francisco Chronicle. The day after the Times and Post had expressed their initial indignation with the opening speeches at Belgrade, the Chronicle characterized those same speeches in the following fashion: "national leaders who have consistently echoed Soviet aspiration against Western imperialism and colonialism, have expressed shock and bitter regret over Soviet action." (21) Clearly, the Chronicle attached different meaning to the words "shock" and "regret" than did the Times or Post editors--not to mention the Chicago Tribune. What seems to explain this satisfaction with the neutrals' response to the Soviet tests is the Chronicle's steadfast opposition to the resumption of American testing. By keeping alive the notion that the Soviets had suffered a propaganda defeat on the testing question, the editors of the Chronicle could hang on to an important supporting argument against American tests. Significantly, they did not follow the Times and Post in approving the President's decision on September 6 to resume US tests. (22)

The Denver Post also displayed some hesitancy in condemning the Belgrade leaders. As late as September 4 the Post described the neutral leaders' reaction to the Soviet tests as "irate." Confidently it asserted that the Soviets had suffered "at least a short-term propaganda defeat." But an accompanying cartoon showed that the Post had limited respect for the neutrals' moral fiber. It depicted

(20) NYT, Sep. 6.

(21) Editorial was entitled "World Reacts to Soviet Blunder." San Francisco Chronicle, Sep. 3.

(22) Editorial was entitled "Bleak Return of Atomic Tests." San Francisco Chronicle, Sep. 7.

the Belgrade nations running for cover in the face of the Soviet tests. (23)

A more significant instance of a comparatively mild reaction to the Belgrade Conference appears in the Christian Science Monitor. On September 5 the Monitor editor Erwin Canham argued that the anticipated propaganda defeat for the Soviet Union had, in fact, taken place. The editorial's wording suggests, however, some tension between the Monitor's perception of Belgrade reactions and its predisposition to be sympathetic to the neutrals.

Thus, although some of the more communistically inclined of the delegates gathered at Belgrade have made proposals regarding Berlin which would play right into Mr. Khrushchev's hands, most of them--like Prime Minister Nehru of India--have in the end condemned the action in Berlin. There has been virtually no defense of his resumption of nuclear testing except in the satellite bloc itself. (24)

Finally among the relatively mild reactions to Belgrade, mention must be made of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Its reaction is noteworthy primarily because, like the Times and Post, it can claim considerable influence among the "foreign policy elites." In addition, the Post-Dispatch commands special interest because of its close identification with a sympathetic policy toward neutral countries. Even more emphatically than the Times and Post, the St. Louis paper vigorously supported the Stevenson-Bowles stress on America's need to identify with the aspirations of the newly independent, uncommitted nations. Implicit in this approach were assumptions about the importance of "world public opinion," the role of the United Nations and the motivations of non-aligned nations that had won acceptance in official policy during the first nine months of the Kennedy Administration. (25) The Belgrade Conference offered a dramatic test of those assumptions. Not only the neutrals themselves, but American policy was on trial at Belgrade. For this reason the impact of Belgrade on one of the most outspoken press supporters of Administration policy gives some clue to whether Belgrade would induce a policy review in the Administration.

(23) Denver Post, Sep. 4.

(24) Christian Science Monitor, Sep. 5.

(25) References to the Stevenson-Bowles group or a like-minded group within the Administration appear in the following articles, among others: NYT, Aug. 27; Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 29; Hanson Baldwin, NYT, Sep. 7; James Reston, NYT, Sep. 25; Warren Unna, Post, Aug. 20; Joseph Alsop, Post, Sep. 9; Newsweek, Sep. 4, pp. 28-29.

On September 3, in their initial editorial on the Belgrade Conference, the Post-Dispatch revealed none of the "rueful resignation" and "shock" that marked the September 2 editorials in the Post and Times. As with the San Francisco Chronicle, the Post-Dispatch opposition to the resumption of US tests may at least partly account for its view of the Belgrade reaction to the Soviet tests. Asserting that Russia was "reaping the whirlwind of world contumely," it went on to warn that the US would face a similar denunciation if she followed the view of "powerful elements" urging test resumption. Departing sharply from the Times evaluation of the initial speeches at Belgrade the Post-Dispatch pointed to Nasser's expression of "deep regret" with the Russian test decision. Of more significance, however, was the succeeding sentence: "This probably expressed the feelings of most of the delegates, for while all the countries are by no means monolithic all have a deep interest in disarmament." Like the Monitor's appraisal, this statement carefully skirts the critical question of whether the public statements at Belgrade--other than Nasser's--lived up to neutral pretensions of morality. In not raising this question and instead conveying the impression that the neutrals were condemning the Soviets, the Post-Dispatch like the Monitor--and perhaps the Chronicle--exhibited a degree of patience and sympathy with non-aligned nations lacking in the reaction of both the conservative and moderate press. (26)

Significantly, the Post-Dispatch devoted only a small portion of its initial editorial to the question primary in most other editorial declarations--how well the neutrals rated on cold war issues. Most of the September 3 editorial constituted an affirmation of support for the Administration policy toward neutralism. They explicitly praised the President for having adopted views "a long way from the attitude once expressed by Secretary of State Dulles, that neutralism is immoral." Specifically with regard to Belgrade, the Administration had taken "the proper position"--"identifying without trying to influence on specific issues." In offering justifications for the Administration's deference to neutralism, the Post-Dispatch first noted that the countries represented at Belgrade totaled about one-fourth of the UN membership. Then they concluded with what could be construed as a cautious reply to those who questioned the importance of neutralist opinion in power politics:

The importance of a neutral force in the world is growing rather than decreasing. With intensification of the arms race the neutralist middle could become the only mediator between East and West. Its value would lie in its genuine neutrality, a neutrality it should jealously maintain. (27)

(26) Editorial, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sep. 3.

(27) Ibid.

Four days later, after the close of the Conference, the Post-Dispatch rendered a less favorable evaluation of the Belgrade Conference. Although with less bitterness and fewer pejoratives than the Times and Post, it manifested considerable disappointment with the neutrals' performance. The editors complained that the final declaration represented not a consensus but a series of compromises to accommodate many individual selfish interests. In particular, Kashmir had been conveniently omitted while Israel had been included. While not actually employing the opprobrious term "double standard", the Post-Dispatch did object to the neutrals' "frowns" on Western colonialism without any mention of Soviet colonialism. Significantly, however, the editorial balanced its mild condemnation with some important praise. In conclusion it conveyed the impression that the neutrals had, indeed, fallen short of their opportunity for moral leadership, but that they had taken some constructive steps for peace. Certainly Belgrade had not fallen "dismally short" of its opportunities, as the Times had adjudged. Accordingly, after alluding to the selfish character of the resolutions, the Post-Dispatch declared:

It is difficult to see what is to be gained by resolutions such as these, since the familiar process of log-rolling is so obviously involved. The Conference was on sounder ground when it appealed to the US and the Soviet Union to start immediate negotiations to head off nuclear destruction, and was acting constructively when it supported Yugoslavia President Tito's proposal for a world conference on disarmament convened by the United Nations.

The neutral nations can accomplish an important mission by advocating and helping implement agreement between East and West. Their voice will be louder if they act in concert to bring about peace rather than to advance the selfish interests of individual nations. (28)

Mauldin's accompanying cartoon seemed to parallel the relative absence of moral condemnation in the editorial. In place of the harsh indictment conveyed in the cartoons of both the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Post Mauldin showed the neutrals hopelessly caught in the meshes of the conflicting cold war antagonists. An image of moral cowards thus gave way to one of helpless victims. (29)

A brief survey of American press reaction to the Belgrade Conference reveals widespread irritation with the neutrals' conduct. While most vehement in the conservative press, expressions of irritation also figured prominently in the editorials of the influential pro-Administration papers, such as the New York Times and the Washington Post. Despite the sometimes bitter tone of these two journals, their pique

(28) Editorial, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sep. 7.

(29) Ibid.

never moved them to advocate even a review of American policy. The mildest reactions among the major papers examined appeared in the Christian Science Monitor and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Especially the latter demonstrated two important points. Even the most vigorous supporters of the Stevenson-Bowles approach to neutrals confessed to some disappointment with the Belgrade participants. But one dramatic episode surely was not enough to jolt the assumptions of those whose ingrained attitudes dictated a sympathetic regard for both the opinions and the economic needs of the uncommitted nations.

In short, the basic attitudes of the major papers were not shifted by Belgrade--just as those of Congress do not appear to have altered. But despite this, the strength of those distrustful of the Administration approach to neutrals grew as a result of Belgrade. The chauvinistic and conservative elements that controlled a probable majority of the press had been aroused. They had what they regarded as a new symbol of neutral perfidy to add to their arsenal. Even if Belgrade did not assist them in winning converts to their cause, it would help in placing the advocates of Administration policy on the defensive.

Indonesia's Image in the Press Reaction to Belgrade

As one of the three co-sponsors of the twenty-five-nation neutralist gathering, Indonesia could not escape the disapprobation leveled by the American press at the Belgrade Conference. The relative frequency with which President Sukarno's picture appeared in the press indicates that in the American newspaper reading public he ranked only behind Nehru and Tito--and perhaps Nasser--as a prototype of the neutralist leader. (30) This fact is, as we have noted, perhaps best demonstrated by Herblock's selection of Sukarno to represent the Belgrade neutrals in his cartoon indictment of the Conference. (31)

The reputation of President Sukarno and Indonesia did not suffer merely from the general attitude of irritation with Belgrade neutrals. Specific comments about Sukarno individually, and comparison of him with the other major leaders, tended to assure that Indonesia would become a target of special annoyance when Belgrade was discussed. Most references to Sukarno or Indonesia were prompted by his speech, his role in the factional struggle at Belgrade, or by his peace mission to Washington.

Only the New York Times made specific editorial comment on Sukarno's speech. As noted above, of the three sponsors the Times found Sukarno "particularly shocking" because of his silence on the Soviet tests and his pro-Soviet stance on the Berlin and German

(30) For example, see NYT Sunday Magazine, Oct. 1, p. 29; or News-week, Sep. 4; or Time, Sep. 8.

(31) See above, p. 6.

questions. (32) Dispatches in the Times, the Post, the Herald Tribune as well as in the AP and UPI stories used by other papers also conveyed an unfavorable impression of Sukarno's speech. Virtually all of these headlined their gratitude to Nasser for denouncing the Soviet tests. (33) Readers learned that, in contrast to Nasser, "the other two sponsors, Tito and Sukarno, made no mention of the tests." (34) In their summaries of Sukarno's speech, most reporters accurately emphasized his preoccupation with "denouncing imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism." (35) The Chicago Tribune chose to embellish its AP-based story by adding the tag "pro-Communist" in its initial mention of President Sukarno. (36)

The unfavorable reaction to Sukarno's opening-day speech was reinforced by subsequent press accounts of the factional struggle at Belgrade. (37) The hero of these battles was Nehru. Consistent with his "statesmanlike" speech, the Indian Prime Minister was pictured as waging a stubborn campaign against the "militant" anti-Western majority. Cast as the chief villain in leading the militants was Tito, but Nkrumah and Sukarno were several times identified as his leading allies. On Soviet tests, on Germany and Berlin, on colonialism and lesser issues the newspaper reader was told that Indonesia fought for the pro-Soviet position. It is this fact that made Herblock's use of Sukarno as the target of contempt consistent with the predominant American press reaction. George Sokolsky was stirred by a similar perception of the factional differences at Belgrade when he remarked that "at Belgrade only Nehru has the courage to take a noble moral attitude. Both Tito and Sukarno displayed unbelievable cowardice." (38) In its summary judgement of Sukarno at Belgrade, the Chicago Tribune underlined another aspect of his press image: "Mr. Sukarno was not deterred from performing his usual service to Moscow with a comprehensive plan for Western appeasement." (39)

(32) See above p. 5.

(33) See the Sep. 2 editions of NYT, Post, New York Herald Tribune. AP-based accounts appear in Sep. 2 editions of Denver Post, Atlanta Constitution, and New Orleans Times-Picayune. Also see Christian Science Monitor, Sep. 3.

(34) See, for example, the AP story in Denver Post, Sep. 1.

(35) See the AP story in San Francisco Chronicle, Sep. 2.

(36) Chicago Tribune, Sep. 2.

(37) Reports of the factional struggle are numerous. Among the most comprehensive, see M. S. Handler, NYT, Sep. 7, and Flora Lewis, Post, Sep. 5 and 6. Also see Sharokh Sabavala, Christian Science Monitor, Sep. 6. For AP dispatch see Washington Evening Star, Sep. 5. For Reuter account see National Herald (India), Sep. 5.

(38) Post, Sep. 20.

(39) Chicago Tribune, Sep. 6.

A week after the close of the Belgrade Conference President Sukarno and President Keita of Mali came to Washington as the official emissaries of the Conference. Their assignment was to present President Kennedy with an appeal for the resumption of negotiations between the President and Premier Khrushchev. Although the mission visit received much less attention in the press than did the Conference itself, the eastern press gave both front page coverage and editorial judgements. (40) Given the above described press reaction to both the Conference generally and Indonesia's role in particular, it is not surprising that editorials stressed the demonstrated moral incompetence of the neutrals to play the role of mediators. The Times, the Post, and the Christian Science Monitor all struck this lecturing note. (41) Only the Herald Tribune, however, made specific aspersions about both the neutralism and the personality of the emissaries themselves. The Tribune opened its editorial with a gratuitous description of Sukarno as "the carefree President of Indonesia." More significantly, the title of the editorial--"Mr. Sukarno Should Be Asked to Explain"--illustrated how the mission had cast Sukarno in a most difficult role. In effect he served as the lightning rod for inflamed irritation with the Belgrade neutrals as a group, as well as for the special annoyance with Indonesia and the President himself. (42)

Perhaps even more critical to the shaping of Indonesia's image were the Tribune's disparagements of Sukarno in their stories of the mission. Under the front page single column headline "Sukarno In With 45 To See Kennedy," Tribune reporter Marguerite Higgins effectively satirized the President's practice of traveling with a great entourage. Unrelentingly Miss Higgins went on to refer to it "as one of the most astonishing entourages in recent diplomatic annals." (43) The Tribune's weekly news review picked up where Miss Higgins left off. Noting that the two peace envoys from Belgrade were quite different personalities, the Tribune gave this picture of President Sukarno:

President Sukarno of Indonesia is regarded as something of a playboy who enjoys night clubs featuring belly dancers. He startled Washington by flying here with an entourage of forty-five; the extravagant size made it look

(40) Antara reported that "leading American papers gave wide publicity to the mission, but took a reserved attitude toward its results." Among the papers not giving the mission front page coverage were, however, the Atlanta Constitution, Denver Post, and New Orleans Times-Picayune.

(41) See the editions of Sep. 13, Sep. 13, and Sep. 7 respectively.

(42) New York Herald Tribune, Sep. 13.

(43) Ibid., Sep. 12.

more like a junket than a business trip. After seeing Kennedy, he popped promptly to New York to see the sights by day and by night. (44)

These specific references to Indonesia and her President were thus further indication that any ire generated over Belgrade would very likely fix on Indonesia as a primary target.

(44) Ibid., Section II, Sep. 17.

CHAPTER II

THE ADMINISTRATION'S REACTION TO THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE

The Major Sources of Irritation

The Kennedy Administration's reaction to the Belgrade Conference closely paralleled the editorial reaction of the Times and Post. The Administration, like the press, was incensed by the neutrals' stand on the pressing cold war issues of nuclear testing and Berlin. On the former issue, the Conference's failure to denounce the Soviet violation of the test ban greatly provoked Washington. (1) In addition, the neutrals annoyed the Administration by refusing to commend the President's persistent and conciliatory endeavor to reach a test ban agreement at Geneva. (2) Consistent with a major Kennedy campaign promise this endeavor had had a high priority in the personal views of both the President and his advisers. The Conference's Declaration did endorse the Western insistence on an international system of control for disarmament agreements. But this proved small consolation for the "eloquent silence" on both Soviet perfidy and American good intentions. (3)

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- (1) See Ambassador Kennan's telegram to the Department of State of September 4, given in Appendix I, pp. 74-75.

Before a Congressional Committee on July 30, 1962; Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs made this allusion to US reaction to the Belgrade response to nuclear testing: "That Conference was a conference in which much was said that was critical of the positions we had taken on a number of significant issues, including the question of testing. I think we were extremely disappointed that nations which had been vociferous about nuclear testing when our turn came said so little about the Soviet tests which had started just on the eve of that conference, you may recall." See Mr. Talbot's reply to Rep. Ford, Hearings Before Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations of the House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Part III, July 30, 1962, p. 240 (henceforth cited as 1962 Passman Committee Hearings).

- (2) Max Frankel, NYT, Sep. 6.
- (3) For Administration views on testing issue prior to Belgrade see NYT, Aug. 27 and Aug. 31. For summaries of Administration reaction to Belgrade on testing and other issues, see James Reston, NYT, Sep. 25; Murrey Marder, Post, Sep. 22; Max Frankel, NYT, Sep. 6.

On the Berlin question the Administration's irritation was perhaps even more marked than on the testing issue. To the President, as well as to virtually the entire "attentive public" the moral principle of self-determination infused the Berlin issue with a great symbolic importance. This was not merely a clash of political interests over a remote city. To Washington the essence of the Western ideological position was at stake. As Senator Keating later said on the Senate floor, this was an issue on which there could be no neutrality. (4)

What intensified the Administration's disappointment with the Belgrade stance on the Berlin question was the Administration's expectation that the newly independent nations shared Washington's moral commitment to self-determination. It was this view that had informed much of the Kennedy Administration strategy for identifying with the new nations.

Given this background, it was natural that the Administration should have invoked the principle of self-determination in its propaganda on the Berlin question. With the Soviet erection of the Berlin Wall in mid-August, emphasis on this point intensified further. And, after first following a policy of official silence on the approaching Belgrade Conference, the Administration decided to use the self-determination principle in an appeal to the Belgrade participants for moderation, if not open support, on the Berlin issue. This decision reflected the relative ascendancy in the Administration of those advisers with the greatest sympathetic understanding of the emergent nations. (5) Implicit in their orientation was the hopeful assumption--apparently shared by the President--that these nations would indeed voice some support for self-determination in Berlin and Germany. (6) Significantly, Secretary Rusk asserted on August 19 that the neutral nations were responsive to the notion of self-determination. In a TV interview he remarked:

They do look upon the immediate problem of Berlin as a question primarily for the great powers. But when the issue becomes completely clarified, the so-called neutral nations will make it clear that this principle of self-determination, that is so important to them, is one to which they attach importance right around the world.

I am not discouraged about their attitude on this question. (7)

(4) Congressional Record, Sep. 15, p. 18420.

(5) For references to divided counsels in the Administration see p. 15, n. 3.

(6) NYT, Section IV, Aug. 27.

(7) National Herald (India), Aug. 19.

Although some doubts did develop about the potency of the self-determination appeal, it appears that on the eve of the Conference Washington still entertained some hope that it would have an impact. (8) A Times dispatch from Belgrade on the day before the Conference reflects this hope: "The United States insistence upon upholding the principle of self-determination for the people of Berlin and Germany is believed to have made an impression upon the participants in the Conference which opens Friday." (9) A more reliable indication of the Administration's hopes and expectations on the eve of the Conference is the President's message to the Conference. In what the Times termed a "tacit appeal for the Conference to take a strong stand on national self-determination and an effort to associate the United States with that position in advance," the President said:

We believe that the peoples represented at this Conference are committed to a world society in which men have the right and freedom to determine their own destiny, a world in which one people is not enslaved by the other and in which the powerful do not devour the weak.

The American people share that commitment. We have pledged the influence of this nation to the abolition of exploitation in all its forms. (10)

In view of these hopeful appeals on the basis of self-determination, the Administration's "disappointment" over Belgrade becomes more understandable. Pique over Belgrade speeches on Berlin reflected more than awareness of a propaganda defeat. Washington's ideological sensitivities had been deeply wounded. And, more importantly, some wishful thinking about the convictions of the non-aligned nations had been rudely shattered. (11)

The Belgrade "double standard" on both the Soviet tests and the Berlin problem did, then, produce genuine anger in the Administration. The crucial question, however, was whether the Administration's anger affected policy toward the Belgrade participants. Perhaps the most reliable index of Belgrade's immediate impact on policy--as distinguished from impact on Administration tempers--is United States aid policy. Although the major policy battle over foreign aid had just ended with the compromise allowing long-term commitments, but not appropriations, Congress had yet to act on the foreign aid appropriations bill. The intensity of the President's exertions

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- (8) These doubts arose largely from Nehru's unfavorable interpretation of the legality of the Western occupation rights in Berlin. See NYT, Aug. 27.
 - (9) NYT, Aug. 31.
 - (10) Both commentary by reporter Tom Wicker and the President's news conference transcript appear in NYT, Aug. 31.
 - (11) Reston suggests the characterization "naive" for Kennedy's expectations of the neutrals' conduct; NYT, Sep. 25.

on behalf of that bill would be one measure of the depth of his pique with the Belgrade Conference. (12) And a still more specific test of his feelings lay in the Administration's handling of current aid negotiations and deliveries. If the President sought to retaliate for a particular nation's offensive behavior at Belgrade, a delay or a stoppage of aid was one readily available weapon.

The Administration's Post-Belgrade Aid Policy

The President's first public comment pertaining to the Belgrade Conference appeared on Labor Day, September 4--the day before the Conference published its final declaration. Occasioned by his signing of the 1961 foreign aid authorization bill, the President's statement proved to be of crucial relevance to the United States's post-Belgrade aid policy. In what appeared to be an urgent plea to Congress to restore the aid appropriations cuts engineered by the Passman Committee, the President cited the intensification of Communist efforts in underdeveloped countries and the dangerous Berlin crisis as reasons for firm backing for the aid program. The statement concluded with a final sentence reportedly appended by the President himself. It is this sentence that provoked a spate of speculations that the Belgrade Conference had prompted a shift in American aid policy. The President's comment read as follows:

It is my belief that in the administration of these funds we should give great attention and consideration to those nations who have our view of the world crisis. (13)

Most of the statement could be dismissed as the perennial Presidential plea to Congress to resist the scuttling designs of Chairman Passman. Even the final sentence seemed aimed at reassuring the critics and wavering supporters of foreign aid whose ire had undoubtedly been aroused by the Belgrade Conference. It may have been primarily a calculated tactic to forestall any drastic attacks on the aid appropriations bill--a bill scheduled for debate in the House the very next day. Later in the Senate debate--as noted below--it was employed by Administration supporters for just such a purpose. But apart from such political tactics, it seems highly probable that the President's personal addendum to the perfunctory prepared statement reflected a degree of personal ire with at least some of the speeches at Belgrade. Although he probably had not yet received Ambassador Kennan's cable evincing bitter disappointment with Tito's speech, certainly the President had had ample opportunity to learn the tenor

(12) As the description below--especially pp. 40n, 46--shows, but does not spell out, the President did lobby intensively for the foreign aid money bill.

(13) NYT, Sep. 5.

of the initial speeches and the press reaction to them. (14)

Reporting from Washington on September 5, Times reporter Max Frankel stressed this element of personal ire in the President's cryptic comment on future aid policy. Alluding to the "perceptible feeling of annoyance and disappointment" in Washington due to the Belgrade Conference, Frankel offered the following interpretation of the President's remark:

That the White House was moving closer to the view that foreign aid ought to go first and foremost to nations in accord with the foreign policy objectives of the United States was first revealed by the President yesterday.

Informed sources said Mr. Kennedy himself added a final sentence to a statement he issued at Hyannis Port, Mass., when he signed a bill authorizing \$4,253,500,000 for foreign aid this year.

That sentence read: "It is my belief that in the administration of these funds we should give great attention and consideration to those nations who have our view of the world crisis."

The same sources said that the President "meant exactly what he said."

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- (14) The State Department received Ambassador Kennan's summary of Tito's Belgrade speech at 9:06 p.m. on Sep. 3. Kennan's telegram with his comments on the speech did not arrive until 4:27 p.m. on Sep. 4. Presumably, then, the President was aware of Tito's remarks, but not of Kennan's comments, when he appended the sentence on aid preference to ideological allies. The President did have, however, the press reports on the morning of Sep. 4 (Labor Day Monday). The New York Herald Tribune (to which the President still subscribed at this time) had an especially scathing denunciation of Tito which it telegraphed to its readers with this front page head: "Tito Backs Red Line, Hits German Arming." Reporter Donald Cook pursued this theme in his opening paragraph: "[Tito] aligned himself with the Soviet Union on just about every point yesterday in a major policy speech to the conference." Paul Hoffman's story in the NYT had a less provocative head, but like Cook he spelled out the close parallels between Tito's line and that of the Soviet Union. Both reporters also referred to the American Embassy as "bitter and disappointed" because the Yugoslavs had indicated that Tito would take a more moderate stand. See NYT, Sep. 4, and New York Herald Tribune, Sep. 4. Also see Post, Sep. 4.

The statement, they remarked, was partly intended to please Congressional leaders now weighing foreign aid appropriations.

At the same time, they said, it was also directed at those neutral leaders whose comments on Berlin and on the renewal of nuclear testing by the Soviet Union could be considered to have given aid and comfort to Moscow.

Specifically, it was learned, the President had in mind President Tito of Yugoslavia and, to a lesser degree, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India. (15)

Frankel's view that the President's September 4 comment did reflect genuine Presidential anger with the neutrals finds corroboration in the September 7 column of Post staff writer Carroll Kilpatrick. But like Frankel, Kilpatrick is uncertain whether the "President was expressing pique or policy." Rather bitterly Kilpatrick complained that "officials who should know do not seem to know" and that "the White House has declined to explain or to amplify the President's statement." Not only was official Washington "baffled," but there were "serious misgivings in many embassies." (16)

The failure of the Administration to clarify the President's statement allowed the bafflement and misgivings to continue. An initial partial clarification did occur as early as September 22. At a news conference before the UN Foreign Press Association, Secretary Rusk gave some reassurance to an Indian questioner. Reflecting the speculation in the Indian press over the alleged shift in American aid policy, the Indian newsman sought an official statement from Rusk. (17) What he got was an abbreviated remark which did not directly answer the concern about future United States policy. Rusk simply said the Administration "would not expect to withdraw economic aid from neutral countries." (18) In any case, Rusk's reply did not receive sufficient attention in the press to stifle speculation now recently sustained by reports of a shelving of Yugoslav aid requests. (19) Subsequently reports of a "review" of American aid

(15) Max Frankel, NYT, Sep. 6.

(16) Post, Sep. 8.

(17) Ashwini Kumari comments on Indian press reaction to American press speculation on a possible shift in American aid policy. See Post, Sep. 16.

(18) NYT, Sep. 23.

(19) The Washington Post did not report the Rusk comment. But the transcript of the entire news conference does appear in the NYT, Sep. 23. Reports of the shelving of Yugoslav aid requests appears in NYT, Sep. 14.

to the Ghana Volta River Project added further weight to the view that Administration policy had shifted. (20) Both the Times and Post issued editorial warnings against the indications of a new policy of attaching political conditions to our aid--a futile policy of "buying intellectual allies." (21)

Only after nearly six weeks of mounting speculation and concern did the President finally clarify the policy implications of his September 4 expression of preference for aid to "those nations who have our view of the world crisis." The pertinent question and the President's extended reply came at a news conference on October 11:

Q: Mr. President, written into the foreign aid bill is a clause which says that there should be more stress on giving aid to friendly countries, countries that share our view on major world problems.

In view of the decision to review aid to Ghana's River Project, could you elaborate on how far you think the countries should go towards agreeing with us on these major issues?

The President: I don't think that there is--we are not attempting to use our aid in order to secure agreement by these countries with all of our policies. The phrase that was used in signing the Mutual Security Bill was that we should give particular attention to the needs of those countries which share our view of the world crisis.

Our view of the world crisis is that countries are entitled to national sovereignty and independence, and that is all we ever suggested. That is the purpose of our aid, to make it more possible.

Now, if a country has ceased to choose national sovereignty or should cease to choose national independence, then, of course, our aid becomes less useful. But that is a different matter from suggesting that in order to be entitled to our assistance, particularly as a good percentage of our assistance today is in the form of loans, that they must agree with us, because quite obviously these people in the underdeveloped world are newly independent and they want to run their own affairs and they would rather not accept assistance if we have that kind of string attached to it.

Therefore, I think that we ought to make an educated guess, but it is not an easy matter. These countries are passing through very difficult times, and they are going to swing one way, and then another. In general, our

(20) Post and NYT editions of Sep. 23.

(21) NYT, Sep. 9 and Oct. 4. Post, Sep. 22.

object is that they maintain their independence. We hope it is theirs. (22)

The President's reply testifies to the general consistency of Administration post-Belgrade policy with that preceding Belgrade. In expressing the most liberal possible interpretation of his ambiguous September 4 remark the President calmed the fears of liberal-internationalists who discerned a new policy of political blackmail. But despite this the President's declaration of policy does not tell the whole story of America's post-Belgrade aid policy. When policy actions are set along side the October 11 policy statement at least a small discrepancy seems apparent. As one Washington official stated in late September, there had been "a tightening of attitude, but not a reversal of policy." In expanding on this remark for Post reporter Kilpatrick, the same official said that in practice this would mean a willingness to forgive many irritations from a country like India or Burma whom the Administration felt was attempting to follow a neutral course. But it would mean less tolerance of neutrals such as Ghana and Guinea who frequently attacked the United States and excused the Soviet Union. Essentially, however, the Administration still believed, as both the President and Secretary Rusk had often said, that a genuinely neutral and independent country is a valuable free world asset in that it is an obstacle to Soviet expansion. (23)

A brief examination of the Administration's post-Belgrade aid policy toward the major neutral countries confirms this impression that there had been "a tightening of attitude, but not a reversal of policy."

a) The Special Disappointment
with Yugoslavia

Of the five major neutrals Yugoslavia reportedly aroused the Administration's anger more than any other. Immediately after Tito's speech to the Conference on September 2 both the Times and Post reporters in Belgrade wrote of the bitterness expressed at the American Embassy. (24) Ambassador Kennan had earlier confidently predicted that Tito would play a moderating role at Belgrade. Although based on private talks with Yugoslav officials, this firm expectation was not realized. Kennan's anger at what he viewed as a broken promise permeates his cable back to Washington. The text of this cable lends considerable credence to reports that not only the American Embassy in Belgrade but also the President of the United States himself was embittered by Tito's conduct at Belgrade. (25)

(22) NYT, Oct. 12.

(23) Carroll Kilpatrick, Post, Sep. 21.

(24) Post, Sep. 5, NYT, Sep. 5, and New York Herald Tribune, Sep. 4.

(25) See the Kennan Telegram of Sep. 4 in Appendix I, pp. 74-75.
Also see news reports cited above in n. 14 on p. 19.

Ambassador Kennan's cable bolsters the plausibility of reports of subsequent policy rebuffs to Tito by the Administration. As early as September 13 Times reporter E. W. Kenworthy reported from Washington that Tito's aid requests and tentative plans for a state visit to the United States in 1962 had been shelved. In accounting for these decisions Kenworthy quoted an official who referred to the "great anger at the White House" with President Tito because of his statements at Belgrade. (26) Over a month later on October 18 an AP dispatch attributed a similar interpretation to "State Department officials" who had been asked to comment on the temporary shelving of a Yugoslav request to buy 500,000 tons of surplus wheat. The same sources said American policy was to continue all present commitments for economic assistance, but to halt consideration of new programs. (27)

On the same day, however, Secretary Rusk sought to correct this picture of the impact of the Belgrade Conference on Administration aid policy toward Yugoslavia. After defending past aid to Yugoslavia on the grounds that it had unquestionably strengthened Yugoslavia's ability to maintain her independence of the Soviet bloc, Mr. Rusk went on to reaffirm his confidence in Yugoslav independence. While conceding some Administration disapproval of Tito's stance at Belgrade, he emphatically repudiated critics of aid to Yugoslavia: (28)

I think some of the criticism which this policy is now receiving stems to a certain degree from public disappointment that our aid to Yugoslavia has not led to full Yugoslav agreement with the foreign policy of the United States.

But, as the President has stated, our aid programs are not designed to purchase agreement with us. In our view, countries are entitled to national sovereignty and independence and the basic purpose of our aid is to strengthen the efforts of recipient countries to maintain their national sovereignty and independence.

(26) NYT, Sep. 14.

(27) NYT, Oct. 19.

(28) NYT, Oct. 19. Cf. later dispatch in which "Belgrade officials" are pictured as being "immediately concerned with the question of the alleged US economic pressure against them." The dispatch goes on to say: "This charge stems from Washington's failure to act on Yugoslav's requests for aid in the wake of a drought that cut the wheat harvest below normal consumption figures.

"The Yugoslavs contend that this is part of a campaign by Washington against the position of all the non-aligned nations." See NYT, Nov. 16, 1961. Cf. Time, Jan. 12, 1962, pp. 19-20.

Some of the disappointment in this country has come from the Belgrade meeting. We do not believe that that Belgrade meeting indicated that Yugoslavia was in the process of losing its independence, even though some things were said there that we ourselves did not particularly approve.

b. India

As the Kennan cable suggests, American confidence in Nehru's moderation had been confirmed by his speech. (29) Although he fell far short of endorsing the principle of self-determination in Berlin, his sincere and partially effective efforts to forestall the militants' attempt to recommend recognition of the two Germanies in the Conference resolution must have been appreciated in the State Department. The United States press image of Nehru as the champion of a moderate non-alignment was also reflected in Ambassador Galbraith's description of President Kennedy as having been "personally pleased" with the role of Nehru at the Belgrade Conference. (30) The more recent testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia, Phillips Talbot, suggests that such an estimate is only mildly exaggerated. Although granting that Nehru fell short of Makarios's endorsement of self-determination for the German people, Talbot defended Nehru's moderation at Belgrade. (31)

c. UAR

President Nasser of the UAR also managed to escape the focus of the Administration's disappointment over Belgrade. Not only did he express some "shock" about the Soviet tests, but his own fear of a partition solution in Palestine led him to oppose a similar resolution of the German question. (32) Moreover, it is noteworthy that Ambassador Kennan cites Nasser along with Nehru as one of the few moderating influences at Belgrade. (33)

d. Ghana

The positions taken by Ghana and Indonesia at Belgrade elicited a markedly different American reaction than that produced by India and

(29) See the Kennan Telegram of Sep. 4.

(30) NYT, Sep. 16.

(31) 1962 Passman Committee Hearings, Part III, p. 214. See p. 15, n. 1.

(32) M. S. Handler, NYT, Sep. 2 and Sep. 7.

(33) Kennan Telegram of Sep. 4.

the UAR. At the Conference they apparently played the role ascribed to them by the American press--leaders of the militant group which in considerable degree prevailed in spite of Nehru's efforts to promote a more moderate anti-Western stand. (34) But though their militancy associated them with strident anti-colonialism, and a resolution urging recognition of the two Germanies, these positions and others were largely anticipated in Washington. Indonesia and Ghana behaved less out of character than did Tito. (35) Accordingly irritation with them had more the quality of the Washington Post's "rueful resignation" than the "anger" generated by Tito's denial of expectation. Even so it was the group led by Indonesia and Ghana together with Yugoslavia that employed the alleged "double standard" with the greatest fervor. Certainly they would not escape the consequences of a shift in aid policy to favoring politically correct neutrals. The fact that they did not suffer such consequences is further evidence that its general policy did not shift--although attitudes hardened.

In Ghana's case, Nkrumah's role at Belgrade seems to have had some influence on the Administration's decision of September 22 to review its commitment of \$133,000,000 million in aid to the Volta River Project. In a nicely balanced analysis, Times reporter Kenworthy noted that the expectation was that the aid agreement would be delayed, but that it would be signed. He also pointed out that although the Belgrade Conference was a major factor in the Administration's decision, other political and economic factors were also important. (36) A subsequent Times report described the Administration's decision to review the Volta River Project "as an opportunity to show that, while the United States is willing to give aid to genuine positive neutralists, it expects to see a little more accent on the positive." (37) That this review in fact constituted only mild political pressure was reflected in another dispatch which again noted that "It is unlikely that the Administration will pull out of the project at this late date. Such a step would be reminiscent of the United States' decision in 1956 to back down on aid to Egypt's Aswan Dam Project on the Nile." (38)

(34) See above p. 12.

(35) NYT editorial of Sep. 2 suggests that Sukarno's stand on Germany and Berlin perhaps came as something of a surprise. Also see West German press reaction. See PIA, Sep. 5, 6, and 7 and Antara, Sep. 8 and 15.

(36) NYT, Sep. 23.

(37) NYT, Sep. 30.

(38) Ibid. In this regard it is interesting to note that the Cairo press pictured the "reconsideration" as "due to the attitude adopted by Ghana at the conference of non-aligned nations held

These reports, however, disturbed the Times editor enough to elicit the warning that "it would be self-defeating for decisions in Washington regarding Ghana to be based upon pique over Nkrumah's foreign policy pronouncements in Belgrade or over his plans to speed up socialization of Ghana's economy." The Times went on to show even more emphatically that its own pique over the neutrals' Belgrade pronouncements had not lessened its antagonism to using foreign aid as "bribery". (39) Essentially this warning to the Administration was unnecessary, for it was just a week later at his October 11 News Conference that President Kennedy reaffirmed his allegiance to the policy defended by the Times. (40) The fact that on December 10 the Kennedy Administration announced its decision to participate in the Volta Project is another indication that Belgrade alone had not caused a basic shift in policy. (41)

e. Indonesia

The attention given above to the Administration's post-Belgrade aid policy toward the leading Belgrade Conference neutrals contributes to an understanding of policy toward Indonesia. Ghana's experience with the Kennedy Administration seems especially relevant. The press had labeled both Ghana and Indonesia "pro-Soviet" both before and during the Belgrade Conference. Since the advent of President Sukarno's concept of Guided Democracy in 1957 and the attendant rise in influence both of the Communist Party and of the

in Belgrade in September last, which was received with disapproval in Washington and contributed to the elimination of cooperation with neutralists such as Dr. Nkrumah." This particular report appeared in a magazine article the title of which appeared on the cover with an added reference to the parallel with Secretary Dulles' withdrawal of aid for the Egyptian Aswan Dam project: "As with the High Dam WASHINGTON WITHDRAWS ITS OFFER OF HELP FOR THE VOLTA DAM." See the Cairo-published The Scribe (Oct.-Nov. 1961), pp. 62-65. In that this magazine is distributed upon request by the United Arab Republic Embassy in Washington, it seems reasonable to consider its view close to the government's. (This in no way diminishes the author's gratitude to the Embassy for this and other copies of UAR publications.)

(39) NYT, Oct. 4.

(40) See above pp. 21-22.

(41) NYT, Dec. 16 and 17, 1961. The author is grateful to the Information Division of the Ghana Embassy in Washington for the loan of its clipping file on the Volta River Project.

Soviet Union, Indonesia had, in the Western view, turned "left." Her recently completed arms deal with Russia gave added force to this label. In addition, Indonesia, like Ghana, gave official Washington pause because of Sukarno's alleged "dictatorship" and because of chaotic economic conditions. Finally, Indonesia shared Ghana's concern with a possible shift in American aid policy. For like Ghana, Indonesia anticipated a major increase in economic assistance from the new Kennedy Administration.

Despite these parallels with Ghana, Indonesia did not apparently suffer even the mild intimidation implied in the Administration's review of the Volta River Project. In part this may have been due to the Administration's greater uncertainty in gauging the impact of its policy in Indonesia. In any case, it appears that the United States continued without interruption to implement its existing aid arrangements with Indonesia. On September 12 in a press release possibly timed to coincide with Sukarno's arrival in Washington on his Belgrade "peace mission," the Agriculture Department announced that a shipment of \$5.4 million in PL 480 wheat would arrive shortly in Indonesia. (42) Ten days later another USIA release told of the departure for the United States of the 3000th ICA student grantee from Indonesia. (43)

Another indication of the amicable tone prevailing in Indonesian-American aid relations in September and October is the relative absence in the Indonesian press of uneasy speculation over a possible shift in American aid policy. Unlike the Indian press or the government-controlled Egyptian press neither of Indonesia's government news agencies even reported the Washington dispatches on retaliatory delays in aid to Yugoslavia and Ghana. (44) The only PIA dispatch alluding

(42) PIA, Sep. 13.

(43) Antara, Sep. 22.

(44) This is based on a thorough perusal of both PIA and Antara for September 1961, as well as the USIS Press Summaries which include a fairly wide sampling of editorial opinion. Together these three sources constitute substantial, but admittedly inconclusive, evidence of Indonesian indifference to speculation about a shift in American aid policy toward offensive Belgrade neutrals. Cf. the Yugoslave reaction cited in NYT, Nov. 16, and the Indian reaction in Post, Sep. 16. For the Egyptian view of American policy see citation in n. 38, p. 25 above.

PIA does cite one editorial from Bintang Timur condemning West Germany for its alleged threat to "discontinue economic aid to countries which agree to the decisions of the Belgrade Conference of non-bloc countries"; PIA, Sep. 9. For report of German aid policy see sources cited in n. 35, p. 25.

to the speculated shift in American policy is, however, of some significance.

Based on a UPI Washington release this story was prompted by the arrival in Washington of Indonesian Minister for Development, Chaerul Saleh. Noting that Saleh's visit concerned the prospects for American support for Indonesia's new 8-Year Plan, the dispatch declared that Saleh's talks at the State Department would "test the meaning of President Kennedy's newly declared foreign aid policy" of giving priority to nations sharing the US view of the world crisis. While admitting that no official indication had yet been given of the policy's effect on Indonesia, the article hinted that the policy had been applied "in slowing down action on aid to other countries which have supported the Soviet stand in the Berlin crises." (45) The significance of Saleh's visit is further heightened by recalling that a team of American experts (known as the Humphrey Mission) had just returned from a four-week study mission to Indonesia. As provided in an earlier Kennedy-Sukarno understanding, the team was to evaluate the Indonesian 8-Year-Plan and to make recommendations for possible United States assistance. (46) A major purpose of Saleh's visit was to inquire about the preliminary findings of the Humphrey Mission. (47)

Both Indonesian and American officials have indicated that Saleh's visit did not provoke allusion on either side to any possible shift in American policy because of Indonesia's stance at Belgrade. (48) One Indonesian Embassy official asserted that Saleh was pleased with the talks he held with both State Department and AID officials. This testimony coincides with the report of PIA's Washington correspondent that "Indonesia's overall development plan has received favorable attention from American circles." (49) Given the generally sympathetic character of the final report of the Humphrey Mission, it does seem

(45) PIA, Sep. 27.

(46) The understanding was reached during President Sukarno's April 24 visit with President Kennedy. See forward to Indonesia Perspectives and Proposals for United States Economic Aid: Report to the President by the United States Economic Survey Team to Indonesia (Reproduced by the Agency for International Development of the US Government in the summer of 1962; henceforth cited as Humphrey Mission Report).

(47) PIA, Sep. 26. Also interviews of author with American AID officials.

(48) Interviews with author in August 1962.

(49) PIA, Sep. 27.

likely that Saleh was generally content with the summary presented to him of the mission's initial conclusions. (50)

On the other hand, it must be noted that Saleh apparently displayed some impatience with the slow progress of the Humphrey Mission in drafting its comprehensive report. But American officials have insisted that delays then and subsequently resulted primarily from difficulties in securing adequate data--and not as a result of calculated policy. The full explanation of later delays is beyond the scope of this inquiry, but it seems likely that the West Irian dispute rather than Belgrade would have provided the motivation for any delay dictated on policy grounds.

Finally, with regard to Saleh's visit, mention must be made of the considerable furor that erupted in the Indonesian press over Saleh's irritation with Eugene Black, President of the World Bank. The relevant point here is that neither Saleh nor the Indonesian press seem to have related the World Bank incident to the alleged shift in American aid policy. Saleh denounced Black for having insulted Indonesia by remarking that Indonesia could not qualify for a World Bank loan because of her failure to compensate the Dutch for the 1957 confiscations. (51) As with a more minor incident involving Senator Sparkman, Saleh did not link this insult to any hardening of American aid policy. (52)

The course of American aid relations with Indonesia following Saleh's visit bears out the impression that Belgrade had no detrimental affect. A perusal of USIA's selected translations of Indonesian editorials in the fall of 1961 reveals only one comment on alleged American policy shift. On October 2 the Surabaya Post briefly and critically noted the United States' intention to favor nations sharing her view of the world situation. (53) Despite this continued indifference of the Indonesian press to United States aid policy, a USIA release of October 28 plainly indicated that there was some puzzlement among Indonesian leaders about the import of the September 4 Kennedy statement. A high USIA official stationed in Djakarta at the time has confirmed both the presence of this uneasiness and the USIA efforts to clarify Washington's stand. (54)

(50) An Indonesian Embassy Official used the adjective "sympathetic" to describe his initial reaction to the Humphrey Mission Report. Interview with author in August 1962.

(51) PIA, Sep. 29.

(52) PIA, Sep. 27.

(53) USIS Press Summary, Surabaya, Oct. 2, 1961.

(54) Interview with author August 1962.

Although State Department officials contend that Indonesian uncertainty about our aid policy was neither marked nor significant, the October 28 release is unmistakable evidence that the State Department had--perhaps belatedly--recognized that an elaborate and emphatic clarification was necessary.

Djakarta, Oct. 28 '61:--A number of questions have arisen following signing of the new U.S. Foreign Assistance Bill. In this connection the following has been received by the U.S. Embassy from Washington.

"The United States fully recognizes that a revolutionary process of modernization is under way in many parts of the world. Many nations, including those emerging from colonialism, seek the political, economic and social means of expressing their national personality and securing their national independence.

"The United States welcomes and encourages this movement, which has a parallel in America's own revolutionary origins.

"In extending assistance to nations in the process of modernization, the United States seeks two results:

(1) that truly independent nations shall emerge on the world scene; and

(2) that each nation shall be permitted to fashion, out of its own culture and aspirations, the kind of modern society it wants. (55)

The release concluded by citing the aforementioned clarifications of US aid policy made by President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk at their news conferences on October 11 and October 18 respectively. (56)

Though the failure of the Administration to forestall the need for such a clarification of policy is in itself of some significance, it does appear that there was in fact no basis for Indonesian concern. The picture in September of an uninterrupted aid program prevailed also in October. On October 27 a USIA release announced that United States military assistance deliveries were proceeding. Of a programmed delivery of fifty T-34A primary flight trainers for AURI, twenty-five had been delivered on September 30, fourteen on October 14, and the remaining thirteen would arrive on November 18. (57)

Apart from deliveries of surplus food and military equipment stipulated in existing agreements, Washington exhibited willingness to make new agreements--a willingness which was somewhat tempered in the Yugoslav and Ghana cases. Congressional hearings on American aid to Indonesia in the fiscal year 1962 revealed that in October 1961

(55) USIS Release, Djakarta, Oct. 28, 1961.

(56) See above pp. 20-22.

(57) USIS Release, Djakarta, Oct. 27, 1961.

the decision was made to program contingency funds for Indonesia for assistance in constructing a bypass in Djakarta. (58) In addition, on October 26 the US signed an agreement to provide fifty-five thousand tons of rice under the "Food for Peace" program. (59) In that negotiations for such an agreement must have been carried on for at least a few weeks prior, the agreement must be interpreted as indication of US application of the policy enunciated by Kennedy and Rusk in their mid-October news conferences. A similar significance can be given to the amendment made on November 17 to the October 26 agreement. This provided for an additional fifty thousand tons of rice. (60)

In 1962 two prominent facts demonstrated that American aid policy eventually did change with regard to Indonesia--but the change was in the direction of a much more generous program of economic assistance supplemented by continuing PL 480 sales. On February 19 Foreign Minister Subandrio and Ambassador Jones signed a new surplus food agreement, providing for a total of \$92.7 million in rice, wheat flour, cotton, and tobacco in the initial phase of a three-year program. (61) Far more significant is the content of the Humphrey Mission Report presented to Sukarno on August 1. (62) Although AID officials have asserted that the recommended tripling of the level of economic assistance over the next five years did not perfectly coincide with the figures presented to Congress, a reading of the House hearings on appropriations shows that the Humphrey Mission recommendations have been relied on to justify large increases in aid to Indonesia. (63) Certainly the Belgrade Conference itself did not arouse sufficient Administration ire toward Indonesia to alter the pre-Belgrade course of our aid policy. (64)

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- (58) 1962 Passman Committee Hearings, Part II, p. 704.
 - (59) USIS Release, Djakarta, Nov. 17, 1961.
 - (60) USIS Release, Djakarta, Nov. 17, 1961.
 - (61) USIS Release, Djakarta, Feb. 20, 1962.
 - (62) Antara, Aug. 1, 1962.
 - (63) See particularly the discussion of new AID projects planned for Indonesia in the fiscal year 1963. 1962 Passman Committee Hearings, Part III, pp. 600-613.
 - (64) Given the American willingness in 1962 to abandon its neutrality in the West Irian dispute for a role of active mediation producing a solution favorable to Indonesia, it appears that Belgrade also had no significant bearing on US political policy toward Indonesia.

CHAPTER III

THE IMPACT OF THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE ON CONGRESS, 1961

The Belgrade Conference had a perceptible impact on the US Congress' regard for aid to neutral countries. Like the President, Congress felt immediate shock and irritation at the exhibition of the "double standard" at Belgrade. But unlike the President's irritation, Congress' ire tended to be both more lasting and more potent in its effect on American aid policy. This was the case in part because the Congress does not feel the acute inhibitions of executive responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations. Congressional irritation was more severe also because resentment over the foreign aid program generally and over aid to neutrals particularly had been mounting for several sessions. In this context the Belgrade Conference functioned as a catalyst. It reinforced and crystallized a latent attitude of frustration--a feeling that insults were the only return we could expect from our billions of aid to the "so-called" neutrals. Although the conservative opponents of aid displayed the loudest annoyance with Belgrade, it is significant that some of the more moderate-internationalist figures also expressed dismay. In any case, the net result visible by the fall of 1962 had been the strengthening of a major argument in the brief against foreign aid. (1)

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- (1) Several legislative assistants to Representatives, Senators, and Committees confirmed this general impression in interviews with the author during August 1962.

Among the press references to Congressional reaction to Belgrade the most impressive analysis appears in veteran Times reporter Felix Belair's account. Summarizing Congressional attitudes in the 1st session of the 87th Congress, Belair puts the impact of Belgrade in its proper context--a context of perennial hostility to foreign aid because of its alleged effect on the American economy: "Their [Congressmen's] conclusions have less to do with neutrals remaining neutral in the 'cold war' between the East and West than with domestic unemployment, budget deficits, inflation and foreign competition."

Belair went on to appraise the impact of Belgrade in these terms: "The resentment of the employer and worker alike had already been registered in the Congressional mail when the Belgrade Conference...got underway. Its condemnation of the

The House Aid Debate of September 5

The first occasion for Congressional reaction to appear was the September 5 House debate on the foreign aid appropriations bill--a debate that occurred as the Belgrade Conference participants were themselves debating the working of their final declaration. Although the stage was thus set for a rash of oratory denouncing the treacherous neutrals, the oratory was in considerable degree absent. Indeed, the floor debate generally disappointed the press expectation of a fierce battle by the Administration to restore some of the \$896 million that Representative Passman's Committee had cut from the amounts in the Congressional authorization bill for foreign aid.

Before reviewing the allusions that were made to Belgrade in the floor debate, it is important to assess why the debate did not fulfill expectations of a dramatic battle to restore cuts--cuts which would have been defended with aroused passion by those infuriated with Belgrade. The primary reason for a relatively placid debate was the nature of the Administration's strategy. Assessing the mood of the House, the Administration decided against risking a floor debate challenge to the influential recommendations of the Passman Committee--recommendations already endorsed by the parent House Appropriations Committee and destined to pass the House with little protest. This decision must have been at least partially based on an awareness that the current reports of the Belgrade Conference would invoke an emotional response in the House. Such a response would certainly sustain the cuts made in the development loans and grants, and possibly even deepen them. Opponents of the strategy argued that the cold war crises over Berlin and nuclear testing would have permitted sizeable restoration on the floor. In any case, the Administration strategy of not bucking Passman on the House floor meant that the resulting floor debate did not produce the expected battle. Indeed, on some amendments offered in defiance of the Administration strategy, Administration adherents including Acting Speaker McCormack voted with the Passman supporters against restoring Committee cuts. (2)

American naval base in Cuba and failure to mention the resumption of Soviet nuclear testing was all that was needed to set the catalyst to work."

Within the week the resentment of the Senate was written into the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 in the form of a clear directive to the Administration to focus its aid on those nations "who share our view of the world crisis." See, Section IV, Oct. 1, 1961.

- (2) The Administration strategy is most fully discussed in the Post, Sep. 6 and 7. Also see Felix Belair, NYT, Sep. 6; Don Irwin in New York Herald Tribune, Sep. 6; and the AP account in St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sep. 6. As some of these accounts reveal, McCormack voted against the Ford Amendment to restore \$300 million

Other less weighty reasons contribute to the argument that this debate was not an adequate index of House reaction to the Belgrade Conference. Because the debate came on the morning after the long Labor Day weekend, it seems likely that many Congressmen were at least somewhat unprepared--if not actually absent. (3) Rumours of the Administration strategy to avoid a floor fight had been circulating over the weekend to add impetus to the human impulse to let holiday take precedence over duty. Also the Belgrade Conference had only begun on Friday September 1--and although press coverage was extensive because of the resumption of Soviet tests, the holiday weekend tended both to limit the number of immediate Congressional reactions to the neutrals' "eloquent silence" or to obscure the few that were made. (4) The President's statement of September 4 on aid preference to "those who share our view of the world crisis" did eventually trigger a Senate amendment to the foreign aid bill, but on the House floor on the September 5 no one even alluded to it. (5) Finally, most of the Congress felt that the real battle over foreign aid had already been settled. Strong fears of encroachment on Congressional control had checked the President's energetic efforts to win long-term aid appropriations. (6) The resulting compromise providing for long-term authorizations subject to annual appropriations was interpreted, however, by the Administration and many in Congress as imposing a moral obligation on Congress to appropriate approximately the amount

in military aid. He did so, however, only on the voice vote. When a roll-call was demanded, McCormack switched his vote. Also see Belair, NYT, Aug. 24, 1962.

Also see references in Passman's floor presentation to his deal with "high echelons" concerning his recommendation of a \$175 million restoration of military aid funds. See Congressional Record, Sep. 5, pp. 16995-99.

- (3) 44 were recorded as "not voting" on the motion for final passage of the aid appropriation bill; Congressional Record, Sep. 5, p. 17043.
- (4) No major Congressional statements appeared in NYT or Post in the period prior to the House debate. The first notable Congressional statement touching on the neutrals' conduct at Belgrade was Senator Keating's proposal that the neutrals be invited to Berlin to see "the wall"; New York Herald Tribune, Sep. 5.
- (5) Congressional Record, Sep. 5, pp. 16995-17043.
- (6) E. W. Kenworthy, NYT, Section IV, Aug. 27.

approved in the authorization bill. (7) All these reasons but especially the first concerning the Administration's strategy help to explain why the House debate did not generate many references to the Belgrade Conference.

Despite these reasons for discounting the House debate as an adequate index of House reaction to the Belgrade Conference, the debate does record the views of several members toward aid to unfriendly neutral countries. Some of these contain allusions to the Belgrade Conference. Although only one comment specifically mentions Indonesia, it seems reasonable to assume that most Congressmen upset about the Belgrade Conference's "double standard" would also be upset specifically with Indonesia. For, as indicated above, the American press portrayed Indonesia's role at Belgrade as decidedly "militant" in its denunciation of Western colonialism, in insistence on recognition of two German states, and in maintaining silence on Soviet test resumptions. (8)

As Chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, Rep. Otto Passman (D., Louisiana) was floor manager for the Committee bill during the House debate. This bill included the \$896,000,000 in cuts engineered by Passman's Committee. Given the Administration strategy based on agreement with Passman, the Louisiana Representative had little to fear in the way of a concerted floor effort to restore any of the cut funds--with the exception of military aid funds which to Congress had far greater cold war justification than funds for development loans and grants. (9) It is these latter categories that are of primary concern in a study of the impact of the Belgrade Conference because the neutral countries by in large received very little military aid from the US. (10) The

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- (7) See the President's statement of Sep. 4; text cited in NYT, Sep. 5. In the floor debate in the House on Sep. 5 note the remarks of Congressman Rooney, the ranking pro-Administration Democrat on the Passman Committee; see Congressional Record, Sep. 5, p. 17014. Also see views of the most ardent advocate of foreign aid on the Passman Committee, Congressman Conte (R., Mass.), Congressional Record, Sep. 5, pp. 17007-08.
- (8) See above p. 12.
- (9) In 1960, for example, Congressman Taber, who has been a consistent enemy of foreign aid, sponsored a successful amendment to restore \$200 million in military aid funds. Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1960, pp. 456-457.
- (10) Funds programmed during the fiscal year 1962 for the Belgrade Conference participants totaled \$821.7 million in economic assistance (loans and grants by AID) and only \$63.9 million in military assistance. Unexpended balances in these two categories of American aid for neutrals stood, as of June 30, 1962, at \$1,360.2 million and \$83.9 million respectively. The ratio of economic to military aid is thus approximately 12 to 1. See 1962 Passman Committee Hearings, Part III, p. 583.

Passman Committee cut in development loans was \$175 million from the authorized \$1.2 billion and in development grants \$121 million from the authorized \$380 million. (11)

The first explicit reference to Belgrade was made by Rep. Cederburg (R., Michigan). Announcing his opposition to the entire bill because of the action of the "so-called neutrals" at the Conference, Cederburg, responding to anti-Western statements made by neutral leaders, summarized his feelings as follows:

We are dedicated to doing something good for people. I am tired of having my country kicked around by so-called neutrals. If we as a nation are considered to have ulterior motives in mind then I say they are not worthy of our assistance. (12)

Cederburg concluded his brief comments by reading to his colleagues the views of Washington Evening Star columnist Crosby S. Noyes. In an article devoted to denigrating the neutralists' "monstrously distorted double standard of international morality," Noyes furnished abundant ammunition for inveterate opponents of foreign aid like Cederburg. (13) Significantly, the following passage at the outset of the article identifies Indonesia with the objectional neutralist views detailed in the body of the article.

In tone, they [the speeches of the leaders] have ranged all the way from the rantings of Indonesia's Sukarno and Ghana's Nkruma through temperate statements of India's Nehru and Burma's U Nu. (14)

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- (11) E. W. Kenworthy, NYT, Sep. 2, 1961. Also see House Report No. 1107, 87th Congress, 1st Session, on Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1962, pp. 1-8.
 - (12) Congressional Record, Sep. 5, p. 17004.
 - (13) If a Congressman has voted frequently against the foreign aid authorization and appropriation bills during the three year period 1960-1962, he is generally characterized here as an "inveterate opponent of foreign aid." Except for a partial deviation in 1960, Rep. Cederburg of Michigan has consistently voted against both these bills. For the six roll call votes in question the author has referred to the Congressional Quarterly Almanac for 1960 and 1961. For 1962 votes the appropriate weekly editions of the Quarterly have been used.
 - (14) Congressional Record, Sep. 5., p. 17004.

Cederburg was not alone in his condemnation of the Belgrade participants. Rep. Durno (R., Oregon) began by objecting to the dire effects of the aid program on the American economy, the bungling and waste in the administration of the program abroad, and the support given "to state monopolies to compete against private enterprise." Supplementing these familiar arguments of the fiscal conservative was this recommendation to stop aiding unfriendly nations:

Cuba, Brazil, France and Tunisia and the Belgrade Conference should teach us something.

Military aid to those who can help us and development loans to our friends, yes, to the world, no. (15)

Near the close of the debate Rep. Hollifield, (D., California) interrupted to report that President Kennedy had just announced that the US would resume nuclear testing. Hollifield then volunteered a rebuke to the neutrals' "double standard" on testing. At the same time he tacitly questioned the importance the US had been putting on world public opinion:

I believe the sober consideration given by the President and his advisers to the resumption question--both before and after the recent Soviet decision--has done much to improve the US posture in world opinion. However I must say that the comments of most of the neutral leaders were somewhat restrained to say the least. Does anyone believe they would have been as restrained with the US, if we had unilaterally resumed testing? (16)

The comment of Rep. Ashmore (D., South Carolina) also deserves mention because it reflects on the House image of Indonesia. Hostile to the entire aid bill, Ashmore offered these dire judgements of the success of our aid policy:

It has gained us little if any prestige and probably no real staunch allies in our never-ending struggle with Communism... The so-called neutral nations receive millions of our dollars. Both India and Indonesia are accepting our money and then invariably vote with Russia in the United Nations. But American aid to Poland and Yugoslavia is simply unbelievable. (17)

(15) Ibid, p. 17010. Durno voted against the authorization, but for the final appropriation.

(16) Ibid, p. 17023. Hollifield generally supports foreign aid.

(17) Ibid, p. 17041. Ashmore is consistently opposed to foreign aid authorizations and appropriations.

In addition to these comments during the floor debate three Representatives reacted violently enough to Belgrade to have articles condemning the neutrals placed in the appendix of the Congressional Record. Rep. Flood (R., Pennsylvania) cited David Lawrence's September 6 column in the Washington Evening Star. Lawrence's slant appears in an opening sentence appraising the neutral's "soft and almost inaudible protest" of the Soviet tests as "proof that they were aligned with the Soviets." (18) Rep. Derounian (R., New York) manifested his attitude toward the non-aligned by citing an editorial in the New York Daily News which concluded with this recommendation to the President as to how to treat the Belgrade emissaries, Sukarno and Keita:

President Kennedy can hardly tell these uninvited guests not to come here. But he can make it plain to them that they are not wanted or welcome.

Why not give them the coldest reception possible? What more do we owe to bums who take our money but reserve the right to stab us in the back? (19)

Mr. Derounian's Republican colleague from New York, Katherine St. George chose a more sophisticated, but no less disparaging commentary to illustrate her reaction to Belgrade. She cited Marguerite Higgin's column entitled "Power and Popularity" which bewailed American naivete in seeking applause rather than respect from world public opinion. (20) Like Joseph Alsop, Miss Higgins had a virulent dislike for those in the State Department who underestimated the role of power in international relations.

Such were the scattered comments in the immediate wake of Belgrade in the House of Representatives. Paralleling the views of the press, most of these comments are those of arch enemies of foreign aid. (21) Belgrade did not alter their existing views. Rather it functioned to confirm and reinforce deep-seated attitudes. And as such it furnished the opponents of aid another supporting argument for their annual attack on expenditures.

(18) Ibid, Sep. 7, p. A 7043.

(19) Congressional Record, Sep. 7, p. A 7067. Derounian has a mixed record on foreign aid roll calls.

(20) Congressional Record, Sep. 5, p. A 693. St. George voted for aid in 1960 under fellow Republican Eisenhower, but against it in 1961 & 1962.

(21) References have been made in preceding notes to voting patterns of most of the cited Congressmen. Also see p. 37, n. 13.

Despite Administration strategy not to challenge Rep. Passman and the inveterate opponents of aid, an effort was made on the floor to restore cuts made by the Passman Committee. Rep. Ford (R. Michigan), a member of the Passman Committee, successfully pressed an amendment to restore \$300 million in military aid. Given the immediacy of the cold war crises, Mr. Ford had important levers on his side. (22) Even Passman himself had conceded to the traditional House preference for military aid by offering to restore \$175 million. (23)

The more noteworthy challenge to Mr. Passman came from another member of the Passman Committee, Rep. Conte (R., Massachusetts). The only member of the Committee to denounce the Committee's cuts publicly, Conte offered an amendment to restore the development loan fund to its authorized figure of \$1.2 billion. (24) In presenting his case for such an amendment, Conte revealed himself as an articulate advocate of the Administration policy toward aid to uncommitted countries. In a prepared speech--the longest of the day in support of increased economic assistance--Conte went so far as to suggest he felt no disappointment over Belgrade. Although this may have been because his speech was prepared before the Belgrade Conference speeches, (25) Conte's remarks leave no doubt as to his policy toward aid to uncommitted nations:

Over the years, our foreign policy has been aimed at keeping the uncommitted nations free and uncommitted, and to

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- (22) Among the aid proponents invoking the urgency of the cold war situation as justification for aid funds were President Kennedy and ex-President Eisenhower; see NYT, Sep. 5. Rep. Boland (D., Mass.) cited letters from Secretaries Rusk and MacNamara who also used the cold war lever on behalf of aid; see Congressional Record, Sep. 5, pp. 17002-03. Rooney and Conte also used this argument; see Congressional Record, Sep. 5, pp. 17014 and 17001 respectively.
 - (23) See Passman presentation of the Committee bill on the House floor in Congressional Record, Sep. 5, pp. 16995-99. Also see NYT, Sep. 6.
 - (24) Press release from the office of Congressman Silvio Conte, dated Sep. 1, 1961. This release opened with an unequivocal slap at the Passman Committee, on which Conte served. "I am most disappointed--in fact, shocked by the way in which the Subcommittee has acted." (Copy secured from Rep. Conte's office.) Conte's amendment is found in Congressional Record, Sep. 5, p. 17019.
 - (25) Conte's legislative assistant has agreed with the author that Conte did use poor strategy in referring to Belgrade in a speech defending the aid program.

assist these nations in developing a particular philosophy, not necessarily producing the same conclusions to specific international problems as ourselves, but nevertheless, a philosophy acceptable to their peoples and not alien to our way of life. The final curtain has descended today on the Belgrade Conference of the uncommitted nations - these nations geographically arranged in various parts of the world are key countries politically. As a result of their increasing role in world affairs and the prestige they command, they are bound to exert a powerful influence on other countries who are economically underdeveloped and politically uncommitted. Yet, by the axe we are attempting to use, these nations will no longer look to the west for help and guidance in the process of developing their democracies and their economies - their sights may be turned to the Soviet Union if we are inconsistent in our desire to continue assisting them. As I pointed out earlier, these are the nations we must not allow to lag behind because they might well conclude that the democratic process is too expensive a system for them to adopt. (26)

Following this forceful plea for more development loan funds, Rep. Gross (R., Iowa) rose to challenge Conte's assumptions as to the American national interest in aiding the uncommitted nations. The heated exchange which ensued provides a further insight into the poles of House sentiment toward the "so-called neutrals":

Gross: Since the gentleman has raised the issue of Communism, how many nations are involved in the so-called uncommitted nations meeting in Belgrade at the present time?

Conte: Just about all, 30, I believe.

Gross: Thirty or thirty-six nations that are uncommitted?

Conte: About that.

Gross: Why should there be any uncommitted nations, at the rate we have been shoveling out money all over the world?

Conte: I do not think this foreign aid should be a question of bribery. I do not think we should buy anyone.

Gross: What is the purpose of this so-called foreign aid?

Conte: The purpose of it is to help the underdeveloped and underprivileged people of the world. It is a twofold program. It is like a two edged sword. It is for the security of the free world and also a

(26) Congressional Record, Sep. 5, pp. 17007-08.

humanitarian program to help those less fortunate throughout the world.

Gross: Such as Ghana, and Nkrumah, the head of that government? Is that an independent nation?

Conte: I think it is very important to keep these nations friendly to us.

Gross: Does the gentleman know that Nkrumah is one of the worst dictators in the world today?

Conte: There are a lot of dictators throughout the world, such as in the Dominican Republic and other nations.

Gross: It is very fitting that these uncommitted nations that have been the beneficiaries of billions of dollars of our money, including Nehru of India, should now be over in a Communist country, throwing brickbats at us.

Conte: It is better to have them independent than under the Communists.

Gross: How could we get any help from the uncommitted nations?

Conte: I hope that they will be on the side of the free world if the chips are ever down. ...

Gross: The gentleman knows where they are going to be if the chips are ever down. They are going to be neutral. The gentleman knows these uncommitted nations did nothing for us over in Korea, when Americans were fighting and dying, and we were financing all the war in Korea. Where were the uncommitted nations then? All India ever produced for Korea was a hospital unit, and the gentleman knows it. (27)

Conte won floor support from a perennial defender of foreign aid in the House, Rep. Judd (R., Minnesota) and Rep. Lindsay (R., New York), who asserted that the development loan fund was the most important part of the bill. The fervent appeals of Reps. Bolton and O'Hara, members of the Foreign Affairs Africa Sub-Committee, for restoration of development grants which would go to Belgrade participants including Ghana and Guinea indicate that Conte's views were shared by some influential House figures even at a time when aid to the uncommitted would appear to be an unpopular subject. In any case, given the Administration strategy and the dominant mood of the House, the Conte Amendment for restoration of development loans and the like-motivated Yates Amendment for restoration of development grants both met defeat by votes of 132 to 110 and 144 to 131 respectively. (28)

(27) Congressional Record, Sep. 5, p. 17013. Gross votes on foreign aid as would be suspected from his remarks.

(28) Congressional Record, Sep. 5, pp. 17024 and 17027.

The impact of the Belgrade Conference on the House did not die with passage of the foreign aid appropriations bill. On the contrary, the Belgrade Conference was to emerge in the second session of the 87th Congress as an important theme in the Passman Committee hearings on aid. As such, it would also again have a role in kindling the latent feelings of the House against foreign aid expenditures. Before looking at the 1962 hearings, note must be taken of reaction to Belgrade manifest in the Senate debate on foreign aid appropriations on September 15.

Senate Debate of September 15

The Administration strategy for restoring a sizeable portion of the Passman Committee cuts assumed that both the Senate Appropriations Committee and the whole Senate would appropriate virtually the entire authorized amount for foreign aid. The fact that these assumptions proved correct shows that the irritation over the Belgrade Conference was not by itself deep enough to cause the Senate to take immediate reprisals against the offending nations. (29) The major factor restraining such impulsive action was the continuing cold war crises over Berlin and nuclear testing. (30) In addition, as with some members of the House, the Senate was sensitive to the moral obligation imposed by the passage of the authorization bill compromise instituting long term authorizations subject to annual

(29) New York Herald Tribune reporter Donald Cook laid the greatest stress on this point. In his story on the work of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, he said on September 14: "The Appropriations Committee mark up of the foreign aid money bill was the first real chance Congress had to take counter-action [against President Tito] and instead voted a massive increase of \$537.1 million, all but \$62.9 million of \$600 million slashed from the bill in the House"; See Tribune, Sep. 14. Despite some exaggeration in Cook's account, it is noteworthy that on Sep. 15 the whole Senate endorsed its Appropriation Committee by a margin of 62-17. But as the New York Herald Tribune's Rowland Evans pointed out, "the debate [in the Senate], however, brought to the surface for the first time a strong political reaction against President Tito of Yugoslavia for his blatant criticism of US policy... during the Belgrade Conference." Evans went on to discuss the Keating Amendment: "President Tito and other 'neutral' leaders who failed to stand up against Soviet decision to resume nuclear testing were in the mind of Senator Keating"; See New York Herald Tribune, Sep. 16. Cf. Felix Belair, NYT, Sep. 14 and 16 and Oct. 1; Post, Sep. 16; Carroll Kilpatrick, Post, Sep. 21; Washington Evening Star, Sep. 14, 15, and 17.

(30) See, for example, Washington Evening Star, Sep. 14.

appropriations. Also as the body constitutionally responsible for advising the President on foreign affairs the Senate usually proves more sensitive to the President's need for flexibility in dealing with his complex international responsibilities.

Irritation over Belgrade was, however, severe enough to manifest itself in the Senate debate on the foreign aid appropriation bill on September 15. (31) As in the House fiscal conservatives and chauvinists issued their expected denunciations of the neutrals' "double standard." In addition Senators of a more liberal-internationalist bent added their voices to the outcry against Belgrade. Led by Sen. Keating (R., New York) this latter group supported an amendment that would incorporate President Kennedy's statement of September 4 into the appropriations bill. This Keating amendment, cosponsored by Sens. Bush, Fong, and Scott (all Republican) stated:

It is the sense of Congress that in the administration of these funds great attention and consideration should be given to those nations which share the view of the United States on the world crisis. (32)

Outrage at the "double standard" of the Belgrade neutrals was the direct cause for the Keating amendment. The Senator himself asserts that without the stimulus of the Belgrade Conference he would not have been moved to offer the amendment. (33) This influence is amply reflected in Keating's floor speech in support of the amendment. Like the American press and the President himself, Sen. Keating seemed most perturbed at the neutrals' seeming blatant hypocrisy in supporting the principle of self-determination in Asia and Africa while ignoring its application to the people under or threatened by Communist domination--and particularly the people of West Berlin. This shocking behavior could not be overlooked, for "the basic issue, the long-term issue and the issue upon which the nations of NATO are taking their stand, is not just West Berlin, but the right of a people to self-determination." While conceding that it is "perhaps understandable for newly independent nations to try to avoid cold war struggles in which their own interests

(31) For the major press accounts of this debate see sources cited above in n. 29, p. 43.

(32) Congressional Record, Sep. 15, p. 18419. Co-sponsors Bush, Fong, and Scott are cited the previous day, Congressional Record, Sep. 14, p. 18210.

(33) Interview with the author on Aug. 13, 1962. Keating specifically cited Egypt, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, and India as the nations which had particularly irritated him at the time of Belgrade. Whether the Senator's recollection is colored by his more recent efforts against Egypt and India is moot. See Keating's floor speech on April 30, 1962, on Foreign Aid Guidelines. (Copy secured from Sen. Keating's office.)

do not appear to be immediately involved," the Senator obviously could not stomach their blindness to the moral issue in the current Berlin crisis:

the time has come for the United States to take a second look at the neutrality of some of these so-called neutral nations. When the free world is facing a crisis over Berlin, a crisis in which the freedom and independence of millions of people is at stake there can be no genuine neutrality for any nation which pays even the slightest lipservice to the ideals of freedom. (34)

Keating went on to castigate the Belgrade participants for their reaction to another issue on which "there is also no room for neutrality"---the question of nuclear testing:

their reaction to the blatant Soviet resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, make us really wonder how neutral these neutral nations are. It is beginning to look as if some of them were neutral against the West, and neutral in favor of the Communist bloc. (35)

While venting his outrage with the Belgrade performance of "some of these so-called neutrals", Keating emphasized that his appeal for "a second look" at their neutrality did not imply backing for an immediate slash of aid funds to such countries. Indeed he expressed full support for the bill restoring all \$63 million of the House cuts. Nor did the Senator wish to impose a binding directive on the President. He simply wanted to write into the record a principle---what he would later call both a warning and a guideline-- (36) embodying the language used by the President on September 4:

I think it is about time that the Congress is placed on the record as specifically preferring the extension of U.S. aid to those countries which have a genuine appreciation of freedom and a genuine concern for the welfare of mankind. We are literally throwing our money down the drain if we give it or lend it to nations, the leaders of which are unable to appreciate what is at stake in the Berlin crisis or unwilling to

(34) All the above quotations appear in Congressional Record, Sep. 15, p. 18419.

(35) Ibid.

(36) Interviews with Sen. Keating, his legislative assistant, and the legislative assistant of Sen. Aiken. Also see speech by Keating cited in n. 32, p. 44.

condemn the belligerent nuclear testing undertaken by the Soviet Union. I realize that an amendment in this form is not absolutely binding, but I think it is important nonetheless to reaffirm this principle as stated by the President so that we can in fact concentrate our assistance on those countries which share in our own concern for the survival of freedom throughout the globe and our hope for economic and social betterment. (37)

The first and probably the most influential endorsement came from Sen. Saltonstall (Massachusetts), the ranking Republican on the Senate Appropriations Committee--the committee responsible for restoring the House cuts. As perhaps the most respected member of both that committee and the Senate delegation to the crucial Conference Committee, Saltonstall's brief but unqualified sanction assured wide support for the amendment:

I have read the suggested amendment of the Senator from New York. I have talked to him about it also. It is an excellent amendment. I hope that the chairman of the committee will accept it and take it to conference. (38)

In taking this position Saltonstall did not, however, fully share the intensity of Keating's discontent. While certainly not pleased with Belgrade, the Massachusetts Senator was motivated more by legislative tactics than emotional feeling about Belgrade. As may have been known to the influential members of the Senate, the President himself had appealed to Sen. Saltonstall to take practical responsibility for directing the aid appropriation through the Senate and into the inevitable combat with Rep. Passman in the Conference Committee. There was no Democrat of sufficient energy and prestige to take on this task--although Sen. Pastore of Rhode Island would be nominally responsible together with octogenarian Sen. Hayden, the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee. Experienced from many similar battles in the past and firm in his support of the legislation, Saltonstall was, indeed, an excellent choice. Whatever criticism might be made of the Administration's Congressional liaison in other phases of the foreign aid legislation process, the President had in this case traded

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- (37) Congressional Record, Sep. 15, p. 18419. Keating's voting on foreign aid roll calls in the past three years reveals consistent support for the program, but sympathy for moderate cuts in economic development loans.
- (38) Congressional Record, Sep. 15, p. 18420. Saltonstall has been firmer than Keating in supporting the Administration on all but one amendment during the years 1960-1962.

effectively on his surprisingly amicable relationship with the Republican Senator from his own state. (39)

In keeping with his assigned task, Sen. Saltonstall's motive in supporting the Keating Amendment was to forestall an even more stringent amendment both in the Senate and possibly in the Conference Committee. It seems likely that Senator Hayden's backing had a like motive. (40) That there was danger of an amendment with more binding language than Keating's is suggested by the chorus of bipartisan support the latter elicited from conservatives and liberal-internationalists as well. Both groups voiced what the Times reporter Felix Belair termed "sharp criticism" of the Belgrade Conference. (41)

Among the more conservative group, Sen. Lausche (D., Ohio) complained that the language in the amendment was too "mild"--although he recognized that "we cannot have rigid, inflexible language on the subject." (42) Sen. Miller (R., Iowa) allowed Crosby Noyes of the Washington Evening Star to speak for him in a column entitled "Will the United States Reappraise the Neutrals?" Cautioning against the danger of a reappraisal going too far, Noyes stressed the importance of discrimination between "moderate" and "radical" neutrals. In the

(39) A source close to Sen. Saltonstall is responsible for most of the above interpretation. Another such source has pointed to the relatively amicable relations between Saltonstall and Kennedy during the 1960 campaign.

(40) It seems likely that the Administration and its supporters on the Appropriations Committee, like Hayden and Pastore, endorsed the strategy. No objection was raised by anyone really superfluous given the President's stand. But Pastore endorsed the amendment and also placed his discontent with Belgrade into the record. See Congressional Record, Sep. 15, p. 18420.

(41) See sources cited in n. 29, p. 43, above.

(42) Congressional Record, Sep. 15, p. 18420. Lausche emerged in the 1962 session as a major critic of aid policy. He sponsored the controversial amendment banning aid and PL 480 loans to "nations dominated by Communism and Marxism." See Congressional Quarterly, June 8, 1962, p. 1000. As a member of the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee explained to the author, Lausche's "Horatio Alger rise" from a poor immigrant background has made him highly sensitive to ideologies hostile to America. He also has been upset by several encounters with neutralist spokesmen who somewhat tactlessly indicated their belief that America owed them assistance. Interview in August 1962.

former camp he specifically placed Nehru and U Nu. The identity and qualities of the "radicals"--including Sukarno--emerged in this remark:

Many who sat through the recent conference came away with the feeling that the sublime arrogance of the Titos, the Nkrumahs and the Sukarnos of the world could stand a bit of healthy deflation. Those who proclaim the moral obligation of the rest of the world to support them and then use this very aid as a club to beat their benefactors can hardly hope to escape forever the consequences of their own lack of realism. There are limits, after all, to the patience of the most dedicated advocate of American aid programs. And the reaction of some diplomats to the goings-on in Belgrade suggested that this limit was perilously close to being reached. (43)

In urging reappraisal of policy toward these "radicals," Noyes offered this justification:

It is not a question as some nonaligned leaders loudly claim of attaching political strings to aid or interfering in the affairs of other nations. It is a question merely of whether the results of these policies, as reflected in the political attitudes of the countries involved, justify continued sacrifice on the part of the American taxpayer. (44)

Sen. Proxmire (D., Wisconsin) followed Sen. Miller's citation of Noyes with another citation stridently urging the same course. Again in this US News and World Report article entitled "To Neutrals: US Billions; From Them: 0," Indonesia is firmly associated with the offending militants at Belgrade. This is apparent in the US News' account of the policy implications allegedly drawn by American observers at Belgrade:

U. S. policy in recent years has been greatly influenced by concern of what neutrals might think of U. S. policy. There was no evidence at Belgrade that this policy has paid off.

(43) Congressional Record, Sep. 15, p. 18421. Miller voted for final passage of the aid money bill, but supported Sen. Ellender and others in cutting both military and economic aid. He also backed restrictive amendments such as Lausche's in 1962.

(44) Congressional Record, Sep. 15, p. 18421.

Nikita Khrushchev in the same period has acted on the theory that neutrals respect power, threats, more than cash and kind words. This policy, it seems, has paid off for the Soviet Union.

Indonesia's Sukarno, recipient of half a billion dollars of US aid and an ardent backer of Soviet policy at the Belgrade Conference, with President Keita of Mali, is taking the neutral peace appeal to President Kennedy in the United States.

Question now asked: After Belgrade, will the United States keep supplying neutrals with cash, kind words, and a voice in U. S. policymaking toward Russia? (45)

One of the co-sponsors of the Keating Amendment, Sen. Scott (R., Pennsylvania) appeared to take a position close to Keating's. Evincing his continuing support for foreign aid, he went on to complain that "it is becoming more and more difficult to support foreign aid because of the flagrant and arrogant attitude of those who take our money and then serve the other side." "I am tired of paying for people to be Communist stooges with the aid of American cash." Sen. Scott went on to cite a William Randolph Hearst Jr. editorial entitled "Neutrals' Stand Perils Peace." Like Noyes, Hearst distinguishes between relatively moderate leaders like Nehru and Nasser and the militants "who did their Commie best to steer the just-closed Belgrade Conference into anti-US positions." (46)

Another co-sponsor of the Amendment had already manifested an even more severe view of Belgrade. Sen. Fong (R., Hawaii) said during the floor debate:

We can only conclude from their own words that the nonaligned nations are not "neutral" but are decidedly biased against the West. The so-called neutral nations chose to ignore the indisputable legal rights of the West, and they rendered only lip service to moral rectitude.

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- (45) Congressional Record, Sep. 15, pp. 18421-18422. In 1961 and more conspicuously in 1962 Proxmire has emerged as a prime advocate of reductions in funds and of restrictions on aid to Yugoslavia and Poland. He did, however, back the President in voting for long-term aid appropriations in August 1961.
- (46) Congressional Record, Sep. 15, p. 18457. In 1962 Scott showed greater enthusiasm for the Administration aid program than Keating. More recently they parted company on what the NYT called the "key vote" in the Senate's Oct. 2, 1962, debate on the aid money bill. See NYT, Oct. 15, 1962.

At the same time the 25 nonaligned nations severely criticized the West, they called upon us for help--for food to feed their hungry, for funds to develop their resources and industries, for technicians to instruct them...

The American people are asking why should we continue to help nations which, by their words and deeds, reveal a strong prejudice against the West? (47)

Senators regarded as more staunch supporters of foreign aid than any of those above joined in the general denunciation of Belgrade.

(48) The Republican whip, Sen. Kuchel (R., California) declared that "The time is overdue for the nations of the world to stand up and be counted." Kuchel, however, shied away from a strict construction of the Amendment's intent. He did not explicitly advocate or even suggest cutting aid to unfriendly neutrals. Rather he used his brief statement to urge cooperation with like-minded people. (49) Sen.

(47) Congressional Record, Sep. 12, pp. 19086-87. Fong's voting on aid has been identical with Lausche's in the author's limited sample of 1960-1962 roll calls. That his views in 1962 paralleled those in the immediate wake of Belgrade appeared in his speech of July 5, 1962. Voicing a strict construction of the strengthened 1962 version of the Keating Amendment, he said; "Nations seeking our aid in developing their economies should be put on notice that we will not extend aid if they use their own economic resources to buy Communist military equipment or take actions contrary to America's foreign policy objectives. It is time to attach some sensible strings to our foreign aid to insure that it will be used in accord with, not against, America's best interests." See script for radio tape for Station KGU, Honolulu, on July 5, 1962. (Copy secured from Sen. Fong's office.)

The third co-sponsor of the 1961 Keating Amendment, Sen. Bush (Connecticut), did not participate in the debate on the aid money bill. He did reveal a relatively mild discontent with the Belgrade reaction to Soviet testing. This was in a radio broadcast on Sep. 8. See press release from office of Sen. Bush on Sep. 8, 1961. (Copy secured from Sen. Bush's office.) His voting on aid seems closer to Keating's than to Scott's.

(48) As above, general indications of the Senators' voting on aid measures will be entered in the footnotes.

(49) Congressional Record, Sep. 15, p. 18420. While voting against the Administration in 1961 on two key aid amendments, Kuchel in the aforementioned key vote in the Oct. 2, 1962, debate sided with the Administration; See NYT, Oct. 15, 1962. See n. 45, p. 49.

Aiken (R., Vermont) also eschewed the polemical tone of some of his colleagues. In his reference to Belgrade he mingled some sympathetic understanding with his general discontent. Noting that Cyprus was the only nation "who dared to stand up and express its opinion of Russia's resumption of nuclear testing," Aiken felt "certain that other so-called neutral nations...perhaps shared our views about the Russian testing but did not express them very forcefully. Had they done so, they probably would have been out-numbered by many of the 24 nations represented there." (50)

There is also some evidence that even the most ardent backers of foreign aid--Sens. Humphrey and Cooper--were not unaffected by Belgrade. Sen. Cooper did not allude specifically to Belgrade during his speech on the floor, but he did include the following in his list of six suggested improvements in the foreign aid program: "the US must not submit to pressure from any country, that it will seek aid from the Soviet Union unless we meet their requests." Whether Belgrade helped to prompt this requirement is not known, but it fits the general mood of irritation with the "pro-Soviet" neutrals which was provoked by the Conference. (51)

There is no question about Sen. Humphrey's feeling. The Senate majority whip did not contribute to the September 15 debate, but the following day he alluded to the Belgrade Conference:

speaking of those neutrals, I want it quite understood that as one who had frequently stood on this floor during the last twelve and a half or thirteen years that I have been a Member of the Senate and have defended the right of neutral countries to be neutral, I do not defend the right of any country to be neutral as regards morality. It is one thing for a nation and its leaders to be neutral in the power struggle--neutral in the sense that they do not want to be caught up in the contesting forces of the major powers. But one cannot be neutral as between right and wrong or as between decency and indecency...

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- (50) Congressional Record, Sep. 15, p. 18420. While supporting some amendments providing cuts in funds, Aiken was one of a tiny Republican minority that voted against the restrictive Lausche Amendment of 1962 banning aid to countries dominated by Communism or Marxism. As his legislative assistant pointed out to the author, Sen. Aiken definitely held to a loose construction of the Keating Amendment. "Opponents of aid say don't aid them unless they conform to the guidelines. While Aiken and others say continue aid, but establish administrative and policy guidelines." Interview with author in August 1962.
- (51) Congressional Record, Sep. 15, p. 18459. Cooper, of course, together with Case and Javits, has the most consistent record of any Republican in backing Administration aid policies.

Mr. President, what happened at Belgrade was in my opinion, one of the most disconcerting, and one of the most depressing acts of nation-states in modern times..... There may be an explanation for that, and I wish to be charitable, and to afford them an opportunity to make such an explanation if there is one. But certainly the only way in which the so-called nonaligned powers can be powerful is by holding to a moral position and by using good judgement on the basis of a sense of justice, not on the basis of a sense of expediency. (52)

Clearly Humphrey showed the moral indignation voiced earlier by Keating and others, though he refrained from alluding to the Keating Amendment or any other course of action as a justified US response to the neutrals' conduct. (53) This falls short of the tone and emphasis of the Keating position, but it demonstrates again what the Post, Times and Evening Star reporters agreed was a virulent Senate reaction to Belgrade. (54)

Although this reaction resulted in only a minor amendment with no binding effect on Administration policy, it was a reaction of some significance. It passed on an unanimous voice vote. As in the House it obviously provided conservatives with additional data for their thesis against aid. Moreover, middle-of-the-road internationalists testified to their increasing irritation with the "so-called neutrals." Even allowing for the inevitable deference paid in floor speeches to home constituents and oratorical effect, several Senatorial legislative assistants testify to the catalytic effect of Belgrade on Congress. A building resentment of the ingratitude of neutrals found a new and evocative symbol. It was one which was to be used again in the second session of the 87th Congress as a subordinate, but nonetheless important weapon in the anti-foreign aid arsenal. The President's statement of September 4 and the Keating Amendment as incorporated into the final foreign aid appropriations act would provide convenient supporting references. (55)

(52) Congressional Record, Sep. 16, pp. 19886-19888.

(53) This restraint undoubtedly reflects the Administration position--given the recognized identity of Humphrey and Administration views on policy generally. Likewise, indication of Humphrey's personal irritation seems to coincide with reports of the President's personal feelings about Belgrade.

(54) See sources cited in n. 29, p. 43, above.

(55) The Conference Committee approved the inclusion of the Senate-sponsored Keating amendment. See House Report No. 1270, 87th Congress, 1st Session and Public Law 87-329, 87th Congress, H.R. 9033, September 30, 1961, p. 3.

A hint that this strategy would, indeed, be employed in 1962 appears in the brief House debate on the Conference Committee report on the aid money bill. Two members of the powerful Passman Committee revealed their intention to use the symbol of Belgrade to win cuts in what they regarded as a vastly over-extended program. Congressman Gary (D., Virginia) rose first to hail the virtue of the Keating Amendment and offer this strict construction of its meaning:

May I say we also hope that the converse will be true and that no consideration will be given to the so-called neutrals that try to kick our teeth down our throats every time they get a chance.

I am hopeful that this is going to be a great source of savings during the coming year, and that, therefore, there will be a substantial balance at the end of the year. (56)

This commentary prompted a familiar reply from Chairman Passman. It reflected his ardent desire to attempt to enforce Gary's interpretation on the Administration:

I thank the distinguished gentleman from Virginia, but knowing how the bureaucrats operate, I would say that the chances are that they are, at least on paper, allocating money this afternoon to some of those so-called neutrals who are kicking us in the pants. (57)

(56) Congressional Record, Sep. 26, p. 20117.

(57) Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONGRESSIONAL REACTION IN 1962: THE PASSMAN COMMITTEE HEARINGS

The Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee has established itself as the prime obstacle in the way of Congressional approval of the President's annual request for foreign aid funds. Under the strong hand of Rep. Otto Passman of Louisiana, the Committee invariably culminates months of detailed hearings by insisting upon major cuts in the Administration's foreign aid program. These cuts in turn almost automatically receive the prompt endorsement of Rep. Cannon's Appropriations Committee. Then with relatively minor amendments the Passman bill passes the full House. Subsequently, the Senate Appropriations Committee usually restores a large portion of the House cuts and then wins approval of the whole Senate. There then ensues the final and most crucial skirmish over foreign aid. In the Senate-House Conference Committee a tenacious Passman normally holds out for a compromise weighted in favor of the House bill. (1)

Chairman Passman's Views and Tactics in the 1962 Hearings

The widely acknowledged power of Rep. Passman in determining the amount of foreign aid cuts each year makes his attitude of prime relevance in a study of Congressional attitudes toward aid to Indonesia. In assessing Passman's view of aid to Indonesia, it is first necessary to note that the Congress does not have the power to specify how much or how little of appropriated funds a given country or even a given region will receive. Although this is the case, administrators concerned with securing maximum funds must often defer to the preferences of Rep. Passman and his associates. (2)

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- (1) For a review of this pattern in 1961 and a discussion of its first stage in 1962, see Felix Belair, NYT, Aug. 24, 1962.
 - (2) Numerous references to Congress' inability to specify countries or projects in making fund reductions can be found in the 1962 hearings of the Passman Committee. See Hearings Before Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations of the House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Parts I-III, July 30, 1962 (henceforth cited as 1962 Hearings).

An evaluation of Passman's views of a particular country requires an additional caution. Both because of the assigned jurisdiction of his committee and because of his own predilections, Passman is preoccupied with reducing the cost of foreign aid. Foreign policy considerations as such seem to be of less importance to him. He does, however, have policy views, including judgements about the governments of particular aid recipients, such as Indonesia. Accordingly, although policy is a subordinate issue to Passman, his policy views do inevitably affect his judgement about the degree to which a given category of aid should be cut. Likewise, his attitude toward a particular country may affect his decision as to which of the almost one hundred aid recipients should receive the committee's close scrutiny. Since limited time and resources force the committee to focus its investigations on only a small portion of the vast aid program, this is often a decisive factor in the hearings. (3)

During the 1962 hearings of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, Chairman Passman again focused his attention on the impact of foreign aid on the United States economy. In building his case for another sizeable slash in foreign aid appropriations, Passman seemed moved by a genuine concern with the continuing problem of American balance of payments. The concomitant problem of America's declining gold reserves led him, for example, to document instances where aid recipients have purchased United States gold. Likewise, with each country studied, he marshalled figures showing the United States trade balance with aid recipients. He also sought to undermine the Administration contention that eighty per cent of foreign aid funds would be spent within the United States under the "Buy American" policy. (4)

Complementing these arguments was Passman's prominently publicized tactic of inflating the actual amount of foreign aid expenditures. He

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- (3) These impressions emerge from a perusal of the 1962 Passman Committee Hearings, the transcript of Mr. Passman's remarks on Meet the Press of Aug. 7, 1961, and various press comments. Brief interviews with the chief clerks of both the Passman Committee and the Hardy Committee (Government Operations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Monetary Affairs) have also helped to form the author's general impressions of both the Committee's functioning and the role of the Chairman.
- (4) These and other points reoccur in the Hearings. They are summarized in House Report No. 2410, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Sep. 18, 1962. Chairman Passman presented a more elaborate summary of this Report in his presentation to the House on Sep. 20, 1962. See Congressional Record, Sep. 20, 1962, pp. 19031-19035. Note especially Passman's "eleven statements" on p. 19032. Also see the dispatches by Felix Belair in the NYT cited in n. 5. below.

did this by lumping together in one bill "all 19 spigots" of foreign aid rather than just the three categories with which AID is primarily concerned--development loans, supporting assistance, and development grants. Apart from military aid and PL 480 aid, Passman insisted on the inclusion of American contributions to the World Bank, the IMF, the EX-IMP Bank, and other international lending agencies. By so inflating the overall total for foreign aid Chairman Passman hoped to make his recommended cuts in development loans more palatable to Congress. A similar illusion was achieved by Passman's familiar tactic of stressing the amount of unexpended balances in AID accounts. These, he contended, were sufficient to warrant Congress passing only a token appropriation for the next year. (5)

Passman's emphasis on these and other economic arguments against the current rate of foreign aid expenditures reflected what seemed to be a rigid fiscal conservatism. It was a position which had won him the consistent support of a majority of his own Committee. (6) It also appealed to the powerful conservative-coalition in the House as a whole. But unlike some fiscal conservatives--most notably former President Eisenhower--Passman's attitude toward foreign aid expenditures was reinforced by an unwillingness to accept what internationalists term the burdens of America's role as a world power. Passman in 1962 was not an isolationist, but his limited understanding of the new nations blended with his fanatic concern with the integrity of the American economy to produce an emotional fear that our expanding commitments abroad were already beyond our control. Rep. Passman and at least the most faithful of his supporters on the committee--notably Reps. Andrews, Alexander, and Taber--were thus openly hostile to the Administration's concept of a "Decade of Development."

It is not surprising then that Passman supplemented his battery of economic arguments for cutting foreign aid with a number of political arguments--arguments based on simple common sense bolstered by an ingrained suspicion of foreign countries. Two such arguments appear prominently in the 1962 hearings. Both of them bear significantly on Passman's view of Indonesia.

The first concerns Soviet aid. In justifying American aid expenditures Administration witnesses from both the State Department and AID frequently cite the challenge presented by the growing Sino-Soviet aid program. Given the rapid acceleration in Soviet economic and military aid to Indonesia since Khrushchev's visit in

(5) Evident in the sources cited in n. 4 above, this strategy is illuminated by Felix Belair in a series of dispatches from Washington. Among them are NYT, Aug. 24 and 30, Sep. 9, 16, 20 and 21.

(6) See below pp. 66-67.

February 1960, this argument has been especially conspicuous in defending the increased aid requests for Indonesia. (7) Throughout the hearings Passman--often backed by his colleagues--has countered the references to the Soviet aid challenge with the rejoinder that the Soviets "never give anything outright"--that they are "long on promises and short on deliveries." One illustration of these conflicting views on Soviet aid appears in the following exchange between Passman and Seymour Janow, AID Administrator for the Far East:

Mr. Janow: We have had in Indonesia a very small total program, perhaps one-tenth of the size that the Communist bloc has had.

Mr. Passman: We have been told Russia has never given as much as one rupee, that their assistance is in the form of hard-boiled loans, short-term loans bearing a high rate of interest, or in profitable barter arrangements.

Mr. Peterson. Sir, I do not think that is correct.

Mr. Passman. I have been trying for at least the last 8 years to find where Russia has given anything outright.

Mr. Peterson. I would like to submit the recent Soviet proposal for assistance to the Indonesian aviation industry.

Mr. Passman. We would like to have that, but I wish you would also confirm or deny at this point that the Russians are long on promises and short on deliveries. (8)

Following this exchange Mr. Passman's faithful supporter, Rep. Andrews of Alabama referred to a press story that Russia had informed India that she "would not be able to go through with about a \$365 million offer of economic assistance." In his spontaneous comment on this story Passman displayed an extraordinary degree of suspicion of both the reality of Soviet aid claims and the motives of neutral countries.

Mr. Passman: It has been said in previous years it has not been possible to prove that the Russians have ever made an outright grant of one rupee. It has been understood that this is a trick of the Russians, and a lot of the neutrals are cooperating with them. They make these fabulous commitments and it may well be it is understood that deliveries would be only a small proportion of the total. As long as you do not know, and I do not either, this may shed some light on it. I am reading from an article entitled "Russia Cannot Deliver Equipment for India," by Patrick J. Killen. It is dated at New Delhi, August 5, UPI:

(7) The President himself gave prominence to "the challenge of Soviet aid" argument in his Aug. 30 news conference. He cited Indonesia as a prime example of Soviet intensification of its aid drive. See Transcript of President's News Conference, Question 8, in NYT, Aug. 31, 1962.

(8) 1962 Hearings, Part III, pp. 605-606.

Russian officials have quietly informed the Indian Government that they will have to welsh on a promise of electrical equipment. Diplomats said the reasons are economic, not political.

It could be that Mr. Nehru thinks we will rush in and fill the vacuum?

Mr. Rhodes. You think we will not?

Mr. Janow. I would like to finish this point. I think it is relevant to the committee's consideration. (Off the record.)

Mr. Passman. And at this time we do not know if there is as much as a \$1 grant?

Mr. Janow. We do not know the details.

Mr. Passman. But what information you do have indicates there are some short-term, interest-bearing loans?

Mr. Janow: Yes. (9)

In concluding the discussion on Soviet aid to Indonesia, Mr. Passman exhibited his tactical skill in getting witnesses to contribute to his brief against foreign aid. Through persistent questioning he compelled Mr. Janow to admit again that the AID had little data on the amount of Soviet aid actually delivered to Indonesia and even less on the precise terms of Soviet loans.

Mr. Passman. I believe you said yesterday that you did not know the terms of these loans?

Mr. Janow. That is correct.

Mr. Passman. It could be, like most other Russian loans, short term, high rate of interest, and well tied down?

Mr. Janow. Our information is very sketchy in this case.

Mr. Passman. Thank you.

Mr. Janow. I think they are 20 years in some instances but we do not have full information.

Mr. Passman. I believe we agreed that they are strong on promises and short on deliveries, the Soviets?

Mr. Janow. That is true. (10)

The Relative Tactical Importance of the Belgrade Conference

In addition to countering the Administration's tactic of using increased Soviet aid as a justification for more American aid to

(9) Ibid, p. 607.

(10) Ibid, pp. 706-707.

countries such as Indonesia, Chairman Passman also developed another argument against aiding "so-called neutrals" like Indonesia. With a sensitive ear to the grumblings of his colleagues in the House, Passman cleverly utilized the symbol of the Belgrade Conference to rally opponents of aid to neutral countries.

Mindful of the widespread irritation in Washington over the performance of the neutrals at that Conference, Passman throughout the hearings charged that the Administration contradicted the expressed wishes of both the President and Congress in increasing instead of reducing aid to the unfriendly Belgrade neutral nations. As evidence for this charge Passman first cited the September 4 aid policy statement of the President and the subsequent incorporation of that statement into the 1961 foreign aid appropriation bill. In addition, Passman required AID to produce a chart demonstrating the statistical fact that current AID aid requests for the Belgrade participants represented a twenty per cent increase over the level of aid to these countries before the Belgrade Conference. In this way Passman effectively dramatized his case for a sharp reduction in aid funds to the Belgrade neutrals. This strategy was first unveiled in the early stages of the hearings during the June 12 testimony of AID Administrator Fowler Hamilton. Chairman Passman raised the subject of the Belgrade Conference in the following studied fashion:

PROGRAMING OF FUNDS FOR BELGRADE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Passman. Section 112 of last year's appropriation act stated:

It is the sense of Congress that in the administration of these funds great attention and consideration should be given to those nations which share the view of the United States on the world crises.

If I remember correctly, Section 112 is almost exactly the same as the President's remarks when he signed the authorization bill last year.

Of 24 so-called neutral nations that attended the Belgrade Conference last year, how many have had fiscal year 1962 funds programed for them out of any category of funds made available, and how many are programmed to receive funds in fiscal 1963?

Mr. Hamilton. If you give me a list, I will be glad to answer it. I do not recall them all offhand.

Mr. Passman. I cannot ask the question and answer it, too. You should have the list.

Mr. Hamilton. I do not have it. The preponderant part of our funds covered by the appropriation you gentlemen are considering goes to people with whom we have a military alliance.

Mr. Passman. There should be a way to get that information.

Mr. Hamilton. I will be glad to furnish it for the record.

Mr. Passman. Please do, sir.

(The information follows:)

Of the 24 countries sending delegates to the Belgrade Conference in September 1961, 23 are receiving U.S. economic assistance and 13 military assistance in fiscal year 1962. In fiscal year 1963 economic assistance is programed for 22 countries and military assistance for 13.

U.S. AID TO COUNTRIES ATTENDING
BELGRADE CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 1961

Delegations:	Delegations-Continued	Delegations-Continued
Afghanistan	Guinea	Somali Republic
Algeria	India	Sudan
Burma	Indonesia	Tunisia
Cambodia	Iraq	UAR
Ceylon	Lebanon	Yemen
Cuba	Mali	Yugoslavia
Cyprus	Morocco	Observers:
Ethiopia	Nepal	Bolivia
Ghana	Saudi Arabia	Ecuador

Total U.S. economic and military assistance, fiscal year 1962, \$671 million (does not include observers).

Total U.S. economic and military assistance, fiscal year 1963, \$813,500,000 (also does not include observers).

Note. - Additional funds have been programed for 1963 since the above information was received by the committee. (11)

On several subsequent occasions Passman either repeated his case against aid to the Belgrade neutrals or solicited further data from AID witnesses to bolster the case. In addition, other members of the Committee sometimes expressed their support for the Passman indictment of ungrateful neutral aid recipients. The most extended expression of discontent with the Belgrade "double standard" came, however, from Rep. Ford, a member of the minority on the Committee regarded sympathetic to the Administration aid program. Commenting on the Belgrade speeches, Rep. Ford denounced those "sanctimonious leaders

(11) 1962 Hearings, Part II, pp. 205-206.

who have been preaching to us for years about our policies, and then when the Soviet Union does something their attitude is quite different." (12)

In condemning the insulting response of Belgrade neutrals to generous American aid, Passman and Ford expressed an attitude shared by a majority of the committee. This is an attitude of combined suspicion and disapproval of unfriendly aid recipients. As in the 1962 hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, this attitude emerged most prominently in discussion of projected aid increases for India. (13) Most of the comments both in the Senate Committee and in the Passman Committee focused on episodes subsequent to Belgrade--notably India's "aggression in Goa," her planned purchase of MIGs from Russia, and hostile remarks by Menon and Nehru. (14) But these comments still seem related to the same basic attitude that produced Congressional irritation with Belgrade. It was well illustrated in the expanded version of the Keating Amendment that Congress incorporated into the 1962 foreign aid authorization bill. As with the original Keating Amendment in September 1961, the 1962 version was aimed primarily at the more "radical" neutrals at Belgrade -- especially those like Indonesia who showed their "pro-Soviet" leanings not only by word but by acceptance of Soviet military aid.

It is the sense of Congress that in the administration of these funds great attention and consideration should be given to those countries which share the view of the United States on the world crisis and which do not, as a result of United States assistance, divert their own economic resources to military or propaganda efforts, supported by the Soviet Union or Communist China, and directed against the United States or against other countries receiving aid under this Act. (15)

Within the Passman Committee--and very likely in the House as a whole--a majority applied their general distrust of unfriendly neutrals to Indonesia. It was a distrust deep enough to pose a real threat to the Administration's proposed increase in aid to Indonesia for fiscal year 1963 and thereafter. During the 1962 Passman Committee hearings remarks about Indonesia by three of the more active Committee members

(12) 1962 Hearings, Part III, p. 241.

(13) 1962 Hearings of Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

(14) For Passman Committee irritations with India see 1962 Hearings, Part III, especially pp. 229-246.

(15) Public Law 87-565, 87th Congress, S. 2996, Aug. 1, 1962, cited as Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, Section 101, par. (b).

revealed several elements in Indonesia's image that activated the Committee's latent feeling of distrust for the Belgrade neutrals.

Elements in the Committee's Perception of Indonesia

a) Passman's Views

With regard to the most powerful individual on the Committee, Chairman Passman, it is first important to establish that he did identify Indonesia with the Belgrade Conference--and that accordingly his above-cited brief against increased aid to Belgrade Conference participants did in fact apply to Indonesia. On the second day of the hearings on the Far East (which in AID organizational structure embraces Indonesia) Passman reacted in the following manner to testimony by AID officials concerning the amount of United States aid to Indonesia.

TOTAL AID TO INDONESIA

Mr. Passman. What has been the total amount of aid to Indonesia since the inception of the program?

Mr. Tennant. \$598.9 million.

Mr. Passman. There is that much aid in Indonesia?

Mr. Tennant. That includes Public Law 480, Sir.

Mr. Poats. A substantial part of that is Public Law 480.

Mr. Passman. That does not matter.

(Off the record.)

Mr. Passman. You are dealing with two spigots only, are you not?

Mr. Tennant. Two funds; yes, sir.

Mr. Passman. Let us have the total. So, it is \$598,900,000 to this Belgrade Conference so-called neutral country since the inception of the program?

Mr. Tennant. That is correct. (16)

Here then in this spontaneous expression Mr. Passman included Indonesia in two groups for which he had displayed consistent contempt--the participants in the Belgrade Conference and the "so-called neutrals." Another aside from Mr. Passman revealed that he also identified Indonesia's President Sukarno with Nehru, a leader for whom Mr. Passman evinced considerable hostility earlier in the hearing. This aside is especially noteworthy because it appeared not in the discussion on Indonesia, but in a discussion on aid to Guinea. Accordingly it shows again the association in Passman's mind of Indonesia with "left-leaning" neutral countries, especially those like Guinea who allegedly have learned from Sukarno and Nehru how

(16) 1962 Hearings, Part III, p. 669.

to blackmail the United States for aid. (17) This reference to Sukarno and Nehru as blackmailing the United States for aid finds its most extreme statement in the above-mentioned Passman charge that neutrals generally and Nehru particularly actually "cooperate with the Communists" to secure more aid from the United States. (18)

Passman looked on Sukarno not only as a clever blackmailer, but as a pro-Communist. This is indicated by three remarks made by Passman during his lengthy questioning of Mr. Janow about new projects planned for Indonesia. At the outset of the discussion Passman responded to Janow's expression of hope about the aid opportunity in Indonesia in the wake of the probable settlement of the West Irian problem. "If you keep Sukarno out of Moscow long enough you might be able to do something." (19) Later, during Janow's description of proposed American assistance to the Indonesian Council of Sciences, Passman interrupted with this observation: "Sukarno spent that amount, probably, in his last visit to Moscow." (20) Near the close of his interrogation of Mr. Janow, Passman questioned the appropriateness of Janow's drawing an analogy between projects in Taiwan and Indonesia.

Mr. Passman. You are referring to Taiwan, with a pro-American government. There is no relationship between the two. One is neutral, no doubt pro-Russian, and the other is 100 percent pro-American. I do not think you can do too much of a job testifying what you do in Indonesia by what we did in the Republic of China. (21)

The Passman image of Sukarno was not of recent origin. Events within the previous year, such as the Belgrade Conference, had served to reinforce a stereotype already well-established in Passman's perception. During the hearings on foreign aid in March 1960, for example, Passman complained to Secretary of State Herter that the United States had allowed an admitted pro-Communist like Sukarno to blackmail us into an increase in aid. (22) Despite Herter's vigorous denial of this allegation, the Louisiana Congressman did not perceptibly alter his view of Sukarno. For later in the same hearings Passman again expressed suspicion of the Indonesian President's Soviet

(17) 1962 Hearings, Part II, pp. 771-775.

(18) See above pp. 58-59.

(19) 1962 Hearings, Part III, p. 600.

(20) Ibid, p. 605.

(21) Ibid, p. 613.

(22) 1960 Passman Committee Hearings, Part I, pp. 121-122.

sympathies. (23) Although a review of the 1961 aid hearings reveal no further Passman references to Indonesian political views, his previously cited comments in the 1962 hearings demonstrate that Passman still considered Sukarno a clever pro-Communist neutralist who regularly blackmailed the US for millions in foreign aid.

b) Ford's Views

Aside from Chairman Passman, Rep. Ford (R., Michigan) evinced the most detailed interest in current and future American aid operations in Indonesia. While not supporting Passman's blanket indictment of the administration's aid program, Ford's extensive questioning of AID Administrator Janow about aid to Indonesia reflected his general concern about the efficiency and justification of particular projects. His questions about such matters as the discrepancy between the estimates for fiscal year 1962 and the actual expenditures had the clear purpose of documenting the Committee's perennial charge that AID requested far more funds than it actually needed to operate. (24)

At one juncture, however, Ford did reveal his interpretation of Indonesia's political leanings. Noting that \$5.5 million had been obligated for supporting assistance to Indonesia in 1962 and that more was anticipated in 1963, Ford pointedly asked Mr. Janow: "In light of the present government of Indonesia, why do we give any supporting assistance?" (25) The disapprobation implicit in this remark takes on added meaning when related to Ford's earlier cited castigation of the Belgrade neutrals for their "double standard." (26)

c) Rhodes' Views

Irritation with the current Indonesian government also appeared in the comments of Rep. Rhodes (R., Arizona). While more cautious than Passman in ascribing Communist leanings to Sukarno, Rhodes also disparaged Indonesia's President as a dictator. This double objection to Indonesia's government emerged sharply in Rhodes' exchange with Assistant Secretary of State Harriman on the West New Guinea question. After complaining of the seeming inconsistency in American aid policy toward dictatorships in Korea and Laos, Rhodes shifted his attention to Indonesia with this remark:

Mr. Rhodes. You talked about another dictator,
Mr. Sukarno. You mentioned, when you first came in the

(23) Ibid, Part II, p. 2492.

(24) 1962 Hearings, Part III, pp. 700-706.

(25) Ibid, Part III, p. 702.

(26) Ibid, Part III, pp. 240-241.

room, that you were somewhat elated because we are apparently being successful in getting the Dutch to step out of West New Guinea so Sukarno can take over.

Mr. Harriman. Could I change one word?

Mr. Rhodes. Yes.

Mr. Harriman. "Elated." I said I was encouraged.

Mr. Rhodes. Very well, "Elated" was my word. To me this is a mistake. In the first place, as far as I know there is no more reason for Indonesia to control West New Guinea than there is for the United States to control it--ethnically or any other way. In the second place, I wonder if, by putting a dictator who was at least somewhat oriented toward Communists in control in New Guinea, we do not create a brandnew Cuba for Australia right off the coast there. In other words, I wonder if this situation might not rise to haunt us.

Mr. Harriman. (Off the record.) (27)

The Distribution of Power on the Passman Committee

The present incomplete sampling of the attitudes of the Passman Committee needs to be supplemented by a comprehensive survey of each member's expressed views, voting record, constituency pressures, etc. But in lieu of such a survey, a cursory review of the membership's voting on 1960-1962 roll calls on foreign aid will tend to bolster the impressionistic picture that has emerged from the citation of comments in the 1962 hearings. This is a picture of the balance of power resting rather firmly in the hands of Chairman Passman and a core of inveterate critics of foreign aid. (28)

In terms of both attitude and voting Passman's most consistent allies in defending the domestic economy against the ravages of

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- (27) Ibid, Part III, pp. 563-564. It is significant to note that Rhodes' concern over Indonesia's acquiring West New Guinea was shared by at least one other member of the Committee. Surprisingly this was Rep. Conte--who as has been noted earlier has the most sympathetic view of neutralism of anyone on the Committee. (See above pp. 40-41.) Conte's concern, however, seems to have had a different basis: "to me this is the worst form of colonialism by the Indonesians trying to take over New Guinea." (1962 Hearings, Part I, p. 497).
- (28) The following discussion of the Passman Committee power balance is at best a preliminary impression. Chief sources have been: the articles of Felix Belair cited in n. 5, p. 57, above; Congressional Quarterly article of Sep. 8, 1961, pp. 1553-4; and an imperfect sampling of roll call votes on foreign aid in the years 1960, 1961, and 1962. The voting data is presented in a simple table in Appendix II, pp. 74-75.

foreign aid expenditures have been Andrews (D., Alabama) and Alexander (D., North Carolina). These two conservatives have, indeed, been as extreme in their hostility to the aid program as Passman himself. Unlike the Chairman they even vote against the final aid appropriation measure although it is a product of their own sub-committee. Taber (R., New York) has proved equally adamant in his protest against aid legislation--except that in 1960 under a Republican President he deviated from his rigid stand not only to vote for the appropriation bill, but to offer an amendment restoring \$200 million of the Passman Committee cut in military aid. Another Republican conservative, Rhodes (R., Arizona), moved in 1962 into the camp of the hard core opposition to aid. For the first time in three years he voted against both the authorization and appropriation bill. Even more significantly he moved to recommit the Passman Committee bill with the instruction that an additional \$100 million be cut from "economic assistance" categories. From the Committee he won support for his motion from only Andrews, Alexander, and Taber.

To this group of four perennial adversaries of the aid program, Passman can usually add the vote of the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Rep. Gannon (D., Missouri) who exercises his privilege to participate in the sub-committee's voting on the mark-up of the bill. Together with his own vote Passman can thus muster 6 of the 12 votes on the Committee to support most of the reductions he recommends in his capacity as Chairman.

To secure a clear majority Passman must, however, draw the backing of at least one of what appears to be a somewhat inconsistent middle group of three--Gary (D., Virginia), Natcher (D., Kentucky), and Montoya (D., New Mexico). Although the Congressional Quarterly suggests that Natcher is the most friendly to the aid program, it is significant that he did not join the pro-Administration Committee minority (Conte, Ford, and Rooney) in voting for the Ford military aid restoration amendment to the 1961 appropriation bill. But both Natcher and Gary did vote with the Administration on a more telling test of sentiment toward the aid program. This was a bill in 1960 authorizing the US to participate in the International Development Association and subscribe \$320,290,000 to it. On this test of sympathy for the concept of economic development loans the only member of the middle three to join the Passman six in opposition was Montoya. On this shred of evidence it would appear that Montoya more frequently provides Passman with the decisive 7th vote than do either Gary or Natcher. This tentative interpretation finds some confirmation in the Congressional Quarterly's characterization of Montoya as voting with the Administration "only when specifically requested to do so." On the other hand, Congressman Gary--despite his professed support for the concept of foreign aid--clearly does not favor the level of expenditure recommended by the White House.

Variations in intensity of support are also discernible in the pro-Administration minority of Conte, Ford, and Rooney. Conte

unquestionably is the Administration's most determined advocate on the Committee. As noted already, he alone denounced the Passman Committee bill in 1961 both on the floor and to the press. And in both the 1961 and 1962 floor debates on the appropriations bill he strongly urged restoration of cuts in the economic development loans, as well as in the generally more popular military aid category. His Republican colleague Ford has also backed the Administration, but his ardent support seems limited to military aid--as evidenced in his offering an amendment restoring military aid funds in the 1961 debate. As for Rooney (D., New York), his budget-slicing on State Department allowances raises a question about the fervor in his backing of Administration aid requests. He has not offered a restoration amendment--although in 1961 and 1962 he would have been considerably inhibited by the Administration strategy of conceding to Passman in the floor debate.

The Implications for Indonesia

Whatever the precise balance of power within the Passman Committee during the crucial secret mark-up of the bill in August 1962, the Committee's bill was itself incontrovertible evidence that the Passman-led fiscal conservatives prevailed. The numerous variations in voting patterns and attitudes among the twelve-man Committee should not obscure its predominantly conservative cast--a conservatism which combined with a distrust of neutrals to imperil prospects for a major increase in economic assistance to Belgrade participants. The Passman Committee Report of September 12, 1962, called for reductions in development loans of \$475 million out of the requested total of \$1,250 million and reductions in development grants of \$110 million out of the requested total of \$335 million (29), and the intent of the Committee was for the Belgrade neutrals to absorb the bulk of the cuts. This was evident from the inclusion in the Committee Report of the indictment against the Belgrade Conference which Chairman Passman had carefully developed in the hearings. Ironically, the President's remark of September 4, 1961, expressing aid preference "to those nations which share the view of the United States on the world crises" again served as a convenient crutch for the Passman case against the President's aid requests. Noting the incorporation of the President's remark into the 1962 Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act, the Report stated:

During the hearings this year the subcommittee inquired into the administration of the above-quoted section of law which appeared to be the policy of the United States in September 1961, to see what effect it had on programs proposed for fiscal 1963 for nations who participated in the Belgrade Conference. The Conference was a meeting of the so-called neutral nations, all of whom, except Cuba, received grant aid from the United States in fiscal 1962.

(29) House Report No. 2410, p. 36.

Final documents of the Conference were critical of the United States and its allies; while Russia received no criticism. To the subcommittee's surprise, the proposed 1963 program -- military and economic aid--is \$813,500,000, an increase of \$142,500,000 above the 1962 program. The Committee cannot reconcile the substantial increase of the 1963 program over the 1962 program with last year's statement of the Executive Branch. (30)

In presenting the Committee Report to the House, Passman repeated the substance of this paragraph. He also added a shorter paragraph which gave some indication of the specific countries who because of Belgrade and other events had become the prime targets of Passman's irritation with neutrals:

I am concerned also with the large sums programmed for so-called neutralist or nonaligned nations. I think of the immense sums already committed and set aside for India, Indonesia and Ghana. Should we not expect that these countries would at least support us on major issues before the United Nations? Yet, preponderantly their votes have been against our proposals. (31)

As a postscript, it is noteworthy that the Administration again felt constrained to bargain with Passman rather than fight him on the House floor. In that the House only narrowly defeated a motion to cut economic aid an additional \$100 million, this seemed to have been a shrewd strategy. Then, despite the usual Senate restoration, the Conference Committee had to concede the Passman forces about seventy per cent of their proposed reductions. The final aid appropriations bill for 1962 thus restored only \$300 million of the \$1,124,400 deleted by the Passman Committee. Although the President is given the authority to determine the allocation of this restored \$300 million, a severe cut in the economic loan and grant categories is mathematically unavoidable. It thus seemed likely that neutrals like India and Indonesia would feel the impact of the Passman Committee's ardent onslaught on the foreign aid program. (32)

(30) Ibid, p. 6.

(31) Congressional Record, Sep. 20, 1962, pp. 19034-19035.

(32) NYT, Oct. 2, 5, 6, and 8, 1962. Also see other articles cited in n. 5, p. 57, above.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, it is important to underscore several points made throughout the course of the previous discussion. The first concerns the approach employed to highlight the place of Indonesia in the various American reactions to the Belgrade Conference. Due largely to the limited data reflecting specific reactions to Indonesia's Belgrade role, it has been necessary to rely extensively on general reactions to the Conference as a whole. Where possible, such as in the cases of Sen. Keating and Rep. Passman, it has been shown that the general antipathy towards neutrals generated by Belgrade applied very pointedly to Indonesia. But even where evidence of such applicability has been lacking, it has been argued that such an identification is implicit or latent. This would not be a safe assumption in the cases of all the neutrals participating in the Belgrade Conference, but it does seem justified with regard to Indonesia. This is so in part both because of Indonesia's role as one of the three sponsors of the Conference and because of President Sukarno's role as Conference emissary to President Kennedy. More critical, however, was the frequent American identification of Indonesia as a leader of the militant and allegedly "pro-Soviet" faction at the Conference. As such Indonesia became associated with those actions of the Conference that most offended American Congressional opinion. These included in particular the unwillingness to denounce the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing, advocacy of recognition of two German states, and strong condemnation of the West for what many Congressmen regarded as the almost anachronistic issue of colonialism. In short, as illustrated by the Herblock cartoon, Indonesia often could and did serve as a lightening rod for America's sense of moral outrage at the proceedings at the Belgrade Conference.

Second, an attempt has been made throughout to stress the limited impact of the Belgrade Conference on American policy toward Indonesia and other aid recipients among the neutrals. Despite the widespread editorial denunciation of the neutrals' apparent deference to the Soviet Union, Congress did not appear to be sufficiently aroused to take any immediate retaliatory action against them. The September 5 debate in the House--although an inadequate index of House attitudes toward Belgrade--did demonstrate that Belgrade alone was not sufficient to precipitate any impulsive action in the branch of Congress most sensitive to the public's response to foreign events. In the Senate debate of September 15 on the foreign aid appropriation bill, irritation with Belgrade seemed more pronounced and pervasive--reaching into

the ranks of internationalists such as Sens. Humphrey and Kuchel. At the same time the lack of protest over the mild non-restrictive language of the Keating Amendment showed again that Congressional ire with the neutrals' "double-standard" produced no tangible results in terms of any change of policy. The Administration, like Congress and the press, exhibited initial displeasure toward the Conference. While Yugoslavia was the prime target of this annoyance, the Administration seemed to share the prevalent exasperation with the militant tone of the Conference with which Indonesia was identified. Accordingly, there appears strong circumstantial evidence that personal anger was at least partially responsible for the President's public statement that in foreign aid allocations greater attention should be given to "nations sharing our view of the world crisis." But even though the initial Presidential reaction may have been one of severe annoyance, it did not, in fact, lead to a revision of the Administration policy of extending aid not only to the "moderate" neutrals like India, but also to the allegedly "militant" and "pro-Soviet" neutrals like Ghana and Indonesia--as well, indeed, as to Communist Yugoslavia.

Thirdly, while stressing the limited impact of the Belgrade Conference on American aid policy, it has been insisted here that Belgrade did produce a "toughening of attitude" toward neutrals such as Indonesia. In the case of the Administration, James Reston contended that this meant a subtle sobering of the previously enthusiastic and perhaps naive policy of wooing neutrals--a policy linked with the "Stevenson-Bowles" group. For the press and presumably much of the newspaper-reading public, as well as for Congress, the "toughening of attitude" had a different meaning. For those previously hostile to foreign aid to neutrals, such as the Chicago Tribune and Rep. Passman, Belgrade had a reinforcing effect. Moreover, it provided them with another symbol of neutral perfidy. The discussion of Passman's tactics in the 1962 legislative struggle over aid appropriations has shown how that symbol could be extensively exploited to damage the aid prospects of Belgrade participants. Meanwhile, it appears that those inclined to support the Administration's aid policy experienced a stiffening of attitude akin to that of the President. In Congress, this shift in mood seems to be illustrated by the wide support for the Keating Amendment. It proved an ideal vehicle for those internationalists who felt keen disappointment over the alleged hypocrisy of the neutrals, but who still balked at altering the substance of Administration policy either by cutting appropriations or by attaching binding restrictions. This shift in mood of those previously sympathetic to neutrals, together with the reinforcement of previously hostile attitudes towards neutrals, testifies to what several Congressional staff assistants termed the catalytic effect of Belgrade on Congressional feeling with regard to aid for neutrals. In short, while not precipitating any immediate shift in policy, Belgrade did prepare the ground for a future shift. It would seem that if later events fail to dispel the impression made by the Belgrade Conference the public and Congress will increasingly demand both a reduction of the amount and an increase in the conditions of aid to neutrals generally and militant neutrals in particular. Certainly

the rebellion in the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1963 against American aid policy in Indonesia lends support to this speculation.

Finally, apart from these conclusions about the impact of the Belgrade Conference on American policy and attitudes on aid to neutrals, there are two other facets of the American reaction to Belgrade that are important for an understanding of Indonesian-American relations. First, from a historical point of view, the American impression of Indonesia at Belgrade marks another stage in the deterioration of Indonesia's image in the United States. Dating at least from President Sukarno's enunciation of the concept of Guided Democracy in early 1957, this deterioration had been abetted by such events as the 1958 rebellion, the growth in influence of the Indonesian Communist Party, the Indonesian dependence on the Soviet Union for military assistance, and Indonesia's militant posture in the West Irian dispute. Indonesia's role at Belgrade clearly served to reinforce the impressions made by these earlier events. In addition, Belgrade marked the emergence of a more prominent and more sharply defined image of Indonesia in the United States. Not only was Indonesia increasingly identified as a leader of the "pro-Soviet" or "militant" neutral group, but she had achieved a greater place in the American perceptions of international relations. In short, at the same time that Indonesia's image was deteriorating it was receiving more attention.

The second point about the emerging character of this Indonesian image concerns the American assumptions that lay behind it. Although the limited and often impressionistic illustrations given in the foregoing account offer little basis for firm generalization, it seems apparent that most American reactions to the Belgrade Conference generally--as well as to Indonesia's role in particular--are colored by ideological obsessions with the cold war. This is especially evident in the moral indignation registered by many editors, Congressmen, and Administration officials. Ironically, it is just such an ideological orientation to foreign affairs that may impair America's ability to strengthen its position in the cold war. For it is often the preoccupation with the Communist challenge that tends to blind Americans to the nature and origins of the emergent nations' non-alignment policies. This in turn has had and will continue to have a deep bearing on the relations of Americans with the Belgrade Conference participants generally--and in particular with the "militant neutrals" such as Indonesia.

APPENDIX I

COMMENTS OF AMBASSADOR KENNAN ON PRESIDENT TITO'S SPEECH TO THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1961

Incoming Telegram Department of State
Belgrade (Kennan)

Rcvd. 4 Sep 61
4:27 pm

"Tito's statements on Berlin and Soviet resumption of tests came as deep disappointment to Western observers here including myself. Passage on Berlin contains no word that could not have been written by Khrushchev; and that on testing, leading off with reproach to French and accepting in full Soviet explanations for resumption, is weaker and more pro-Soviet than even those of Nasser and Nkrumah. Private information indicates Tito has been endeavoring behind scenes to play down issue of tests ever since beginning of conference probably fearing it would adversely affect success of meeting.

"I have repeatedly called attention to strong Yugoslav feelings over rearmament of West Germany and their negative reaction to impression we have given of unwillingness to negotiate or at least to make any positive proposals for settlement of Berlin problem, as confirmed by Kohler to Nikezic on August 29. But neither I nor any of my Western colleagues were prepared for so one-sided an attitude on Tito's part as this; and I think we must reflect carefully on its implications for our treatment of conference and, in more long-term, our attitude towards role of Yugoslavs at this juncture.

"I am stuck with Tito's expressed understanding that we are preparing to go to war over specific issue of signing of peace treaty itself and his evident failure to understand that our military interests could be actively engaged only if substantial effect of treaty were to create intolerable limitations on allied rights in Berlin or on freedom of city's communications. I recently urged, in conversation with the Secretary, that we take steps to make plain that crucial issue in our eyes would not be signature of treaty itself but situation which would arise if attempt were made to give to treaty an interpretation and implementation which would affect these factors just mentioned. Would like now to repeat this recommendation. So

long as we let stand present ambiguity on this score we will lead with our chin for line of reproach which Tito took in this respect.

"At conclusion of Tito's speech I had occasion to talk alone with Nehru during intermission. I expressed to him my shock over image conveyed by Tito of juxtaposition in Germany of stable East German state peacefully developing under happy socialist system, as against West Germany seething with "Fascist and Revanchist conceptions and tendencies." Pointed out this was fantastic distortion of facts, and that no attempt by us to play positive role in reaction to Berlin crisis could conceivably be successful if it ignored fact that heart of difficulty was incredible political failure of Ulbricht regime, which could not even stand comparison with other Communist regimes of East Europe. This, I said, was problem not only for us but for Russians themselves, and no action of this conference based on fiction this problem did not exist could come anywhere near root of difficulty or have any particularly helpful effect. Nehru listened attentively but was non-committal. Private knowledge that same thesis was forcefully put to him this morning by personal envoy of Willi Brandt leads me to hope all this may have some effect on his thinking.

"Archbishop Makarios speech, which followed Tito's, was very constructive on Germany and nuclear testing, calling for reunification of Germany on basis of a plebiscite and characterizing Soviet test resumption as "shocking," while expressing concern over French nuclear tests in Africa.

"It is unfortunately plain that if moderation and balance is to be brought into final resolutions of Conference on Berlin question, the impulse will have to come from Nehru, Nasser, U Nu and others, not from Tito."

APPENDIX II

VOTING RECORDS OF THE PASSMAN COMMITTEE MEMBERS

			<u>1962</u>						<u>1961</u>				<u>1960</u>		
			1	2	3*	4	5	6	7	8*	9	10	11*	12	13
ADMINISTRATION POSITION			Y	Y	N	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
<u>Representative</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>State</u>													
Andrews	Dem.	Ala.	N	N	Y	N			N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Alexander	Dem.	N.C.	N	N	Y	N			N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Passman	Dem.	Louis.	N	N	N	Y			N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Taber	Rep.	N.Y.	N	N	Y	N			N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Rhodes	Rep.	Ariz.	N	N	Y	N			Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Cannon	Dem.	Mo.	Y	N	N	Y			Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N
Montoya	Dem.	N.M.	Y	Y	N	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Gary	Dem.	Va.	Y	Y	N	Y			Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Natcher	Dem.	Ky.	Y	Y	N	Y			Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Ford	Rep.	Mich.	Y	Y	N	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rooney	Dem.	N.Y.	Y	Y	N	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Conte	Rep.	Mass.	Y	Y	N	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Representatives are arranged roughly in terms of their degree of support for foreign aid. The strongest supporter being at the bottom.

* Indicates an especially controversial vote that helped to define factions.

(All roll-calls taken from Congressional Quarterly.)

ISSUE KEY

- 1962: 1 FA Authorization Bill. Passed 250-164 on July 12, 1962.
- 2 FA Authorization Bill Conference Report. Passed 221-162 on July 24, 1962.
- 3 Amendment to delete \$100 million from FA Appropriation for "economic assistance" categories. Defeated 203-190 on September 20, 1962.
- 4 FA Appropriation Bill. Passed 249-144 on September 20, 1962.
- 1961: 7 FA Authorization Bill. Passed 287-140 on August 18, 1961.
- 8 Amendment to add \$300 million for military aid to FA Appropriations Bill. Passed 243-151 on September 5, 1961.
- 9 FA Appropriations Bill. Passed 270-123 on September 5, 1961.
- 10 FA Appropriations Bill Conference Report. Passed 192-81 on September 26, 1961.
- 1960: 11 Authorize US participation in International Development Association and authorize US subscription of \$320 million. Passed 249-158 on June 29, 1960.
- 12 FA Appropriations Bill. Passed 259-124 on June 17, 1960.
- 13 Amendment to restore \$200 million in military aid funds. Passed on June 17, 1960.

